Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated in accordance with those statutes. Respondent is now and was at all times associated with this administrative complaint a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0251002 under the authority of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent's last license was issued as a real estate broker with the firm of Eastern Marketing, Inc. which is located at 17841 U.S. Highway 441, 3 Mount Dora, Florida 32757. RESPONDENT'S ROLE At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been involved in the real estate profession for approximately 18 years. This real estate practice has been exclusively in the state of Florida. In addition to being a real estate broker, Respondent is licensed as a general contractor in Florida and as a mortgage broker in the state. His general contractor's license is a certified license. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was a real estate broker with Collins and Associates, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. He also had affiliation with Collins Builders, Inc., a licensed general contracting firm. He was a one half owner in Tallahassee Properties, a Florida general partnership in which the other ownership was held by W. Ronnie Collins, Respondent's brother. All of these firms did business in Florida and particular as these firms are involved with the issues in dispute, they did business in Tallahassee, Florida. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was involved in a sales promotion program which has been referred to as a trade-in program. In essence, this program was designed to allow persons who had purchased residences from a firm or through affiliated Collins companies to turn over the initial residence to Tallahassee Properties in exchange for a new home bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with the builder using the real estate services of Collins and Associates, Inc. to sell the new home. The house that was being traded was deeded to Respondent or one of the companies with which he was affiliated. In this case, the company with which Respondent was affiliated with which had property deeded to it was Ralco, Inc. Those persons who were trading one home for another had been solicited by Collins and Associates, Inc. as a realtor in an advertising program. No realtor was involved in making commissions associated with the closing that took place between the sellers who were trading in a home and Tallahassee Properties, Respondent and Ralco, Inc. with whom he was affiliated. This arrangement was designed to stimulate sales of the new home being purchased. The traded homes typically had mortgages. Tallahassee Properties not only took possession of the traded or exchanged homes but was responsible for the activities associated with the closing of the transaction, to include assumption and payment of mortgages associated with the exchanged property. As grantee on the deeds in the traded homes Respondent and Ralco, Inc. were also responsible for assumption and payments. As Respondent identified in his testimony, he and his brother W. Ronnie Collins; Collins and Associates, Inc.; Collins Builders, Inc. and Tallahassee Properties were anticipated as being the individuals to apply for the assumption of loans with the lending agencies who held the mortgages on the traded property. W. Ronnie Collins was also one of the names in the overall scheme in which the traded-in property could be placed as grantee. Approximately 80 homes were traded over a period of 6 or 7 years. The properties in dispute in this case were among them. Respondent had authorized Tallahassee Properties and in particular his brother W. Ronnie Collins as managing partner of that partnership, to place the properties in Respondent's name, W. Ronnie Collins' name or any of several companies affiliated with Respondent in furtherance of identifying a grantee that the mortgage holder would allow to assume the mortgage. Respondent's expectation was that Tallahassee Properties and the title company involved in the closing of the transaction associated with the traded property would facilitate the assumption arrangement with the mortgage holder. The title company used in the cases that are at issue here was Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. In the closings for the traded homes, which are at issue in this case, the evidence presented at hearing which may be relied upon for fact finding did not reveal what attempts were made to have the mortgage holders for the traded homes ultimately accept the substitution of Respondent, his brother or one of the companies with which he was affiliated as parties responsible for the existing mortgages on the traded properties. The reason which Respondent gave for allowing his brother, W. Ronnie Collins to act in his behalf in Tallahassee Properties was that he felt that it was impossible for him to involve himself in that business and its day to day process and at the same time be active in Collins and Associates, Inc. and Collins Builders, Inc. Therefore, he allowed W. Ronnie Collins to act for him in the business of Tallahassee Properties. This explanation has not been disputed and being tenable is credited as true. In accepting deeds related to the traded property, as will be described in the individual instances that follow, Respondent recognized that he had obligated himself to take the responsibility for assumption of and payment of the mortgage. Respondent has no direct knowledge of whether any of the trade-in transactions were followed up by gaining permission from the mortgage holder to allow someone other than the original mortgagor to become responsible for the mortgage payments. The contracts for obtaining the traded-in homes were executed by Tallahassee Properties. Nonetheless, as described, Respondent was given a deed to some of the properties purchased, to include properties in dispute here. Respondent never orally or in writing advised the sellers of the traded property that the routine mortgage payments associated with the traded property and the overall mortgage obligation would no longer be the responsibility of those sellers. In one of the cases which is at issue here involving the trade-in property of John M. and Jeanne B. Miller, Respondent stated that he received their traded property as grantee on the deed. In fact Ralco, Inc. was grantee. When asked about whether he had assumed the obligation for the mortgage that existed on that home, Respondent replied that he had assumed the loan. When asked if he explained the fact to that assumption to the Millers, he pointed out that he had never talked to the individuals. When asked if he had directed anyone in any of his companies or his real estate company in particular to explain the details of the transaction, Respondent pointed out that Collins and Associates, Inc. as realtor, and as a licensed broker had trained each associate to explain all of the rules and procedures associated with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, VA and HUD loans and that Respondent as the broker of those associates would expect that the associates would explain everything to the Millers. Whether the Millers were informed about such matters by Collins and Associates, Inc. employees was not proven. The traded in properties were rented, repaired and sold or kept in inventory by Tallahassee Properties. After purchase of the traded-in properties, Respondent's expectations as a partner in Tallahassee Properties was that the partnership would take possession of the properties and manage them and make payments on existing mortgages associated with any of those properties. Respondent believes that until the latter part of 1985 when he and some of his operations were involved in a Chapter 11 Federal Bankruptcy declaration, payments on the existing mortgages for traded properties were being made, in that had it not been so that he would have been notified. The record offers no proof that can be relied upon to satisfactorily corroborate or rebut this assumption on his part. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was not caused by problems associated with the traded properties. Ralco, Inc. was not involved in the bankruptcy. Some of the traded properties in question were owned by Ralco as grantee. Although Ralco was not involved in the bankruptcy, it was unable to make payments because of the bankruptcy in that the houses in question had a negative cash flow and Respondent was unable to take funds from the bankruptcy court and place them with Ralco, Inc. to make the payments on mortgages that existed on the traded properties. Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. were not involved in the closings of the traded property. Their involvement was with the new house being purchased following the trade. The closing associated with the new house under purchase was a separate closing and Collins and Associates, Inc. received a real estate commission for its participation. None of the exact details of the solicitation process by Collins and Associates, Inc. in which homeowners were encouraged to trade existing residences on other homes built by Collins Builders, Inc. were made known, so that it might be understood whether Collins and Associates, Inc. promised to make the attempt to have the lender accept a substitute for the original mortgagor on the mortgage indebtedness, to include the possibility of the outright release of the original mortgages from the debt obligation. Therefore, that solicitation process has no part to play in examining the issue of Respondent's conduct associated with the closings of the traded homes. In the latter part of 1985, following the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Laws, Respondent and Duval First Corporation with which he was affiliated were granted an order of relief on December 23, 1985 in Case Nos. 85-07179B and 85-07178C, respectively in the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. As part of the disposition in front of the bankruptcy court, the bankrupt estates and Real Estate Financing, Inc. agreed that the bankruptcy estates would surrender certain properties and the automatic stay in all expressed injunctions associated with those properties were lifted. The bankruptcy court held that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506, Real Estate Financing, Inc. would not be entitled to an unsecured claim against the bankrupt estates for debts secured by the lien on those properties. Those properties had been encumbered by a first mortgage in favor for Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Court found that the value of those properties was equal to or exceeded the debts secured by the mortgage lien of Real Estate Financing, Inc. as of the date of the Order for Relief. In that Order for Relief, Real Estate Financing, Inc. was allowed a secured claim for the full extent of the debt due as of the date of the Order for Relief plus interest accrued up to the extent of the value of each property and up to the date of November 18, 1986. The bankruptcy court did not hold that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was entitled to any unsecured claim for any pre-petition debt that was secured by the lien on its mortgages. Among the properties affected by this action were those properties of David Walsh, Troy Brewer, Sam Hinson, Harold C. Miller, Peter Hartman, and John Miller, all of whom are listed as individuals whose transactions with Respondent are found in the Administrative Complaint and about which Respondent is said to have violated the aforementioned disciplinary provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. By this arrangement in bankruptcy court, Respondent hoped to avoid the circumstance by which the mortgage was foreclosed leaving a deficiency against the original mortgagor/homeowner of the traded-in property which would in turn lead to some claim against the bankruptcy estates for the amount of the deficiency. Nonetheless, Real Estate Financing, Inc. proceeded to foreclose on its mortgages as subsequently discussed in commenting on the individual counts to the Administrative Complaint pertaining to individual homeowners. While the bankrupt estates would have preferred to deed back the property in lieu of foreclosure, it accepted the foreclosures given the protections to the bankrupt estates that have been identified in this discussion. It should also be mentioned that two of the accounts in the Administrative Complaint pertaining to Eric Larsen and Robert Aubin, to be discussed, were not part of this arrangement in the bankruptcy court associated with Real Estate Financing, Inc. At the closings on the traded homes in question some explanations about the mortgage assumptions were made by persons who may have been representing Tallahassee Properties or other Collins affiliates, but these persons are not clearly identified in the record as to their actual position with those organizations and how Respondent was accountable for their remarks. Those remarks will be discussed in the assessment of the individual counts that follow. Respondent, following the petition for bankruptcy in his own name and that of companies with which he was associated, wrote to advise homeowners who had traded in their homes about his perception of the homeowners' status following that bankruptcy. These letters were written on February 18, 1986 on stationary of the Respondent and were signed by him. In this correspondence, which is the same format in all instances, he would make reference to the date upon which the transaction closed at which time the homeowner deeded over the traded property to Respondent or a company with which he was affiliated. He described the existence of the prior mortgage to Real Estate Financing, Inc. with a loan number and the existence of the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause and, according to the letter, that the loan was not paid off at the time of the closing and the assertion that the lender would not allow the assumption of that loan by Respondent or one of his companies. Again this record is silent on the subject of what attitude the lender held about this, or even the matter of whether an attempt was made to have the lender accept a new obligor. He described how the lender was not considering Respondent or his company as purchaser but that the original mortgagor was being considered. This was taken to mean that Respondent was trying to express that the lender was looking to the original mortgagor as a responsible entity on the mortgage. The letter described how Respondent or one of his companies had been renting and making payments since the time of closing until December 23, 1985 when declaration of the Petition in bankruptcy went forward. It described how the Respondent and his companies were unable to continue funding payments related to the mortgages on the traded property which was in the name of the homeowners who had traded the property. The letter went on to describe how the payments would be brought current until February 28, 1986. The letter is interpreted to suggest that beyond that point, the property would either be deeded back to the original owner or the lender would foreclose. The letter expressed a preference by Respondent that because, interpreting the letter again, there was no cash flow that he preferred to see the property deeded back to the original owner. The name Bobbie May was given as a contact person and a telephone number provided for the homeowners to call regarding the return of the property back to the original homeowner. The letter goes on to describe an apology from Respondent to the homeowners. Movaline Hill who was a property manager for Tallahassee Properties traded in homes, to include the homes in discussion in the Administrative Complaint, offered her testimony at hearing. The principal business of Tallahassee Properties as established in her testimony was to rent homes. Ms. Hill advertised the property for rent, collected the rent, made payments on existing mortgages on the homes, and took care of maintenance matters. Tallahassee Properties took the rent and put the payments in escrow. One of the homes that Ms. Hill was involved with had belonged to David Walsh. It was a traded home and she had discussed with Walsh getting payment cards or coupons for the mortgage that existed on the traded home. The mortgage company had sent these cards or coupons to Walsh and Hill desired to have them so that the payments on the mortgage could be made. In this connection, Hill wrote Walsh a letter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20. It indicates enclosure of a recorded deed on the traded property of Mr. Walsh showing Respondent as having the title in his name. It further states that Mr. Walsh should sign and mail a pre-prepared letter to Real Estate Financing, Inc. telling that lender to change the mailing address and requesting new payment cards. The letter describes that Real Estate Financing, Inc. did not know that the title was no longer in Mr. Walsh's name and that the lender would not transfer the mortgage to anyone and asks Walsh not to send the copy of the deed to the Respondent to the lender. Emphasis is placed in this correspondence on not sending that information to the lender. Ms. Hill was not instructed by anyone to write the letter. The reason why Ms. Hill said that she put an indication in the letter that the transfer of the mortgage could not be done was based upon her assertion that she had been told this by the lender. What connection Respondent had with the letter, if any, was not established. The cards that she received from Mr. Walsh on coupons for payments would have his name struck over and Respondent's name placed on it and Hill would send the check to the mortgage company for payment of the mortgage. With Real Estate Financing, Inc., Ms. Hill was sending one or two checks per month that dealt with 15 or 20 mortgages. There would be a lump sum payment with account numbers and backup materials sent with the check. The backup materials would include the payment cards or coupons. During Ms. Hill's tenure with the Tallahassee Properties, she says that she kept the mortgage payments current. No evidence was presented to the contrary which is competent. From this it is found that mortgage payments were kept current for a period of time which is not specifically shown. She received no contact from the mortgage companies on the topic of any assumption packages for these loans being assumed. She did receive some coupon books with the Respondent's name affixed. Those latter circumstances were not shown to be associated with any of the traded properties that are at issue in this case. Charles O. Middleton testified at the hearing. He had worked in 1981, 1982 and up to September, 1983, with Capitol Abstract and Title, Inc. which served as a closing agent on traded properties that were picked up by Tallahassee Properties. His recollection of the events is that, as closing agent for the title company, he worked from a contract which identified the terms of the transaction. His recollection is that the transactions associated with a trade property and the new home being purchased after trade was handled together. This is in contrast to the understanding of those homeowners whose traded properties are the subject of this Administrative Complaint and Respondent. The explanation by those homeowners and Respondent that two separate closings were held, one for the traded property and one for the newly purchased property is accepted as factually correct. Middleton recalls that explanations were given by him as closing agent concerning the nature of the transaction to include the matters of the paragraph 17 "due on sale" clause. He describes this arrangement as involving an affidavit or hold harmless agreement that had to be signed. This included the initialing of the paragraphs within that agreement by the buyer and the seller. Again, none of the homeowners who sold traded property that is described in the Administrative Complaint recalls such explanations and documents and their recollection is deemed more creditable and is accepted in lieu of the comments by Mr. Middleton. Likewise, the document for purposes of explanation which was offered as Respondent's Exhibit 8 containing disclaimers about the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause, while admitted, offers no insight into the nature of what the homeowners were told in the cases that are at issue here because it isn't the same form that Middleton recalls using in the transactions he participated in as closing agent and hasn't been shown to be a form used in any of the cases here. Middleton explained that in the transactions he was involved in, the homeowners were provided a copy of every document to be utilized in the closing and that the original documents had their pages turned while the copies for the homeowners were being examined at the same time. A brief explanation would be given about each document and the homeowners were asked if they wished to take some time to read the documents and to ask any questions. Middleton as closing agent would offer to answer questions or put them in touch with the lender and let the lender answer questions. In Middleton's estimation, it was the closing agent's responsibility to make sure that necessary documents were presented to the lenders in the assumption of the mortgage for the traded in property. Respondent had not instructed Middleton in any of the closings on the topic of what to do with closing documents that were used at the time of transaction. Middleton said that he was unable to produce any of the documents of explanation concerning the closings which he participated in for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. because he has no access to those files. Middleton identified the fact that in a circumstance in which a home had a mortgage and an assumption was called for, an assumption packet would be customarily ordered at the time of the request for assistance in the closing, which he refers to as an order. Middleton identifies the fact that he is only vaguely familiar with the transactions that are at issue in this Administrative Complaint. He thinks he may have closed some of them but he has no specific recollection about that. As a consequence, he has no worthwhile knowledge of how many of those transactions had assumption packages completed. COUNT I Samuel Hinson, Jr. owned property in Arbor Hills which he had bought from Collins Builders, Inc. on June 30, 1982. This house was taken in trade for a house on Starmount. This Starmount home was also purchased from Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. served as the real estate firm for the purchase of the new home as agent for the seller. Andrew Jackson Federal Savings financed the new purchase. The traded in home was sold to Tallahassee Properties with Capital Abstract and Title, Inc., serving as closing agent according to documents presented at hearing. Mr. Middleton did not appear for Capital Abstract at that closing. In the purchaser's closing statement, W. Ronnie Collins is shown as the representative for Tallahassee Properties. Two warranty deeds were made from Hinson in selling his Arbor Hill property. In deeding his Arbor Hill property on May 20, 1983, one of those went to the Respondent and the other to Tallahassee Properties. In both warranty deeds, the grantee promised to assume and pay an existing mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. The existing mortgage on the Arbor Hills property had the paragraph 17 clause which absent certain exceptions allowed Real Estate Financing, Inc. at its option to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be immediately due and payable, if the property was sold or transferred without prior written consent from the lender. None of the exceptions pertained to this transaction between Hinson and either Respondent or Tallahassee Properties. The paragraph 17 clause also stated that the mortgage holder was considered to have waived its option to accelerate if prior to the sale or transfer, the mortgage holder reached agreement with the purchaser in writing that the credit of the purchaser was satisfactory to the mortgage holder, thus allowing the purchaser to become responsible for the mortgage. In that instance, interest payable on the sum secured by the mortgage would be at the rate requested by the mortgage holder. The mortgagor, Hinson, would be released from all obligations under the mortgage note if the purchaser was substituted on prior written approval. Hinson went into the transactions involving the sale of his Arbor Hill house and the purchase of the Starmount house with the impression that he had to sell the Arbor Hill house in order to purchase the Starmount house. This was his surmise. Money realized in the sale of the Arbor Hill house was used as a down payment for the Starmount home. Petitioner believed that he had an arrangement to purchase the Starmount home with Ralph Collins. In reality, he was purchasing the home from Collins Builders, Inc. with Collins and Associates, Inc. being the seller's broker. In Mr. Hinson's mind, Respondent and Collins Brothers, Inc. and the then Collins real estate firm through Century 21 were all the same. Going into the transaction, Hinson was not familiar with Tallahassee Properties and its business purpose. Respondent was at both closings, the closing to sell the Arbor Hill house and the closing to purchase the Starmount home. No one discussed the matter of the assumption of the mortgage associated with the Arbor Hills house during the course of the closing of that home. Hinson got the impression from events that Respondent had bought his Arbor Hills house and that everything was being paid off. This impression was not based upon anything Respondent said to him. Hinson, after the closings, requested his insurance company to write to First Alabama concerning the cancellation of his homeowners policy on Arbor Hills. His understanding was that the insurance company sent a letter to do this and that First Alabama sent back a letter saying that they needed certain information. That latter correspondence was then taken to the Respondent. Respondent, under those circumstances, stated to Hinson that it was a mistake and that he would handle it, but that it would take some time to get some of the paper work done. Respondent did not comment to Mr. Hinson on that occasion that he had not assumed the mortgage for the Arbor Hill property nor did he indicate that none of the companies with which he was affiliated had assumed the mortgage. Respondent made no comment whatsoever about assumption of the mortgage in this conversation shown by facts presented at hearing. Hinson then got a new payment book from First Alabama, which he received a couple of days after the insurance letter. This was taken to Respondent and Respondent said that he would take care of it, that it was just a mistake. Again, what was meant by this remark was not developed at hearing. Hinson got one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent that has been referred to previously. Having received this correspondence, Hinson complained to the Tallahassee Board of Realtors. Out of the process of his complaint, Hinson met with Keith Kinderman, Respondent's counsel and the Respondent together with Eric Hoffman, counsel to Hinson. Respondent told Hinson he would help get information and that his counsel, Mr. Kinderman would help in getting some form of restitution and help clear Hinson's name and seek relief from the Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. who had closed the Arbor Hill home. In attempting to obtain a Visa credit card and a Sears credit card, Hinson has been denied that credit. The reason given for the denial is the circumstance associated with the Arbor Hills home and non-payment of the mortgage. The exact circumstance of the Arbor Hills property, concerning who holds it now was not proven at hearing by evidence that can be relied upon for fact finding. COUNT II David P. Walsh and Leila DeJarnette Walsh, his wife bought a home in Huntington Woods from Collins Builders, Inc. on December 23, 1981. This home was financed through Real Estate Financing, Inc. and carried a mortgage from that lender. The mortgage included a paragraph 17 whose language was the same as the Hinson home financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Walshes traded in the Huntington Woods property for a home on Faversham Drive which was financed by Citizens and Southern Mortgage Company. Separate closings were conducted. One was for the sale of the Huntington Woods property with Respondent receiving a warranty deed for that property which property was to be taken over by Tallahassee Properties. The second closing was associated with the sale of the Faversham Drive property from Collins Builders, Inc. to the Walshes. In executing the warranty deed in favor of Respondent as grantee pertaining to the Huntington Woods property, a condition of the warranty deed was an agreement by the grantee to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. and pay Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. through some person other than Middleton was the closing agent at the transaction involving the sale of the Huntington Woods property, according to documents at the hearing. Both that sale and the purchase of the Faversham Drive property took place on March 30, 1983. The Walshes signed a document reference the escrow account held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. on its Huntington Woods property. There is no indication whether this was or was not signed by Tallahassee Properties or the Respondent and sent to the Real Estate Financing, Inc. pertaining to funds in the escrow account and insurance coverage being transferred from the Walshes to Tallahassee Properties or Respondent as contemplated by the form. The separate closing associated with the Faversham Drive property was done through Tallahassee Title Company. Respondent was at the closing associated with the homes. Mr. Walsh is not in a position to pay for mortgages on two homes. Mr. Walsh's understanding of the trade in of his Huntington Woods home for the Faversham Drive home was to the effect that he could buy a new home from the transaction and that he would no longer be liable for the traded home, that all paperwork would be taken care of. Some salesman involved in these transactions made these remarks to Mr. Walsh; however, he doesn't know who that person was. Consequently, it is not possible to attribute responsibility for those remarks to Respondent. Subsequent to the closings, the Walshes received correspondence purportedly from First Alabama having to do with Real Estate Financing, Inc.'s mortgage held on the Huntington Woods' property. This correspondence of April 4, 1983, by its terms, reminds the Walshes that the mortgage holder has received notification of cancellation of the homeowner's policy and that the Walshes were to provide insurance coverage at all times. What the real circumstances of the homeowners policy was is not proven by competent evidence. In connection with the transactions, Mr. Walsh describes that he felt that he was dealing with a reputable real estate broker and that they had his best interest in mind. He was not represented by counsel at the closings. Mr. Walsh received one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. Mr. Walsh hired a lawyer to try to address the situation of the Huntington Woods property without success in the endeavor. To his knowledge the Huntington Woods property has been foreclosed on. No proof which is competent has been presented in the hearing to describe the exact nature of the developments with the property. Nonetheless, Mr. Walsh has had problems receiving credit twice since that time. Before the situation with the property he had never had credit problems. Mr. Walsh was proceeding in these transactions on the basis on the belief that Tallahassee Properties and the Respondent were the same entities. COUNT III Troy A. Brewer and Tina J. Brewer, his wife purchased a home from Collins Builders, Inc. in Huntington Woods on December 30, 1981. This home was financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. A mortgage was given by the Brewers in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. and it included a paragraph 17 assumption clause as described in the Hinson mortgage financed by that lender. On March 25, 1983, the Brewers traded their Huntington Woods property for a home on Faringdon Drive. The seller of the Faringdon Drive property was Collins Builders, Inc. In these transactions, the Huntington Woods property was deeded to Respondent with the provisor in the warranty deed that Respondent would assume and agree to pay for the mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. Mr. Brewer is not in a position to meet mortgage payments associated with two mortgages; one on the Huntington Woods property and one on the Faringdon Drive property. Therefore, he would not knowingly obligate himself to assume mortgages associated with both of those properties. In the transactions associated with the traded property and new home purchased, Mr. Brewer proceeded on the basis that the first home was being taken over by the Respondent and that the mortgage would be paid off after a month or so as a means for him to purchase the second home. What led him to believe this is not clear. Mr. Brewer's recollection is that he was told that everything would be taken care of and he would not have to worry about anything and there wouldn't be any problems about the house being traded and that he could stay in the home that he was selling until the new home had been built and that once built, all transactions would be taken care of. Both the traded property and the property being purchased were financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. He was not represented by an attorney in these matters. Some undisclosed realtor had told Mr. Brewer he could have an attorney but that he really didn't need one. As shown in the testimony of Mr. Brewer given at hearing, he had spoken to Respondent at closing. He also had conversations with Jackie Collins whom he believed to be a representative of Respondent. Jackie Collins was understood by Mr. Brewer to be a realtor. Again, the exact nature of the affiliation of Jackie Collins to the Respondent or his companies was not established in this hearing. Mr. Brewer did state that at the closing he was told by Respondent that there would be no problems. The nature of that remark was not further developed under interrogation of the witness. Nor was the matter of Mr. Brewer's comment to the effect that he had questioned the fact that his first mortgage on the Huntington Woods home was not assumable and had made that question known at the closing, other than to state that in response "they" had assured him everything would be taken care of and he wouldn't have to worry about it. This was associated with some remarks to the effect that Mr. Brewer should not worry that "we" would take it all in and that "they" would transfer everything over and take it out of the Brewers' name, again not pursued as to who "they" and "we" were and whether Respondent was a "they" or "we" or was in attendance when a "they" or "we" made the comments if he was not a "they" or "we." On this subject, Mr. Brewer was of the understanding that the transfer of the mortgage from Mr. Brewer to Respondent had in fact been tentatively approved by Real Estate Financing, Inc. but this was not proven by competent proof either. Mr. Brewer received one of the February 8, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. He in turn composed a letter of complaint concerning the transactions associated with the traded property. The complaint is dated March 31, 1986 and is addressed "To whom it may concern". As a result of the non-payment of the Huntington Woods property, Mr. Brewer received a letter purportedly from First Alabama for Real Estate Financing, Inc. dated February 13, 1986 that indicated that payment for the mortgage in the Brewer property had not been paid in January and February, 1986 and under paragraph 18 of the mortgage, Mr. Brewer was being notified of the failure to make payments and the possibility of the pursuit of these delinquent payments through legal means. Whether the assertions in this unauthenticated hearsay document are true was not proven by competent evidence. Beyond that date, in an action in which Respondent and the Brewers were named as defendants, Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. obtained a Summary Final Judgment of foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property on June 1, 1988. This points out that the Brewers were not released from the mortgage obligation as envisioned by paragraph 17. It does not address what attempts were made by Respondent or his companies to gain their release. As a result of the foreclosure, Mr. Brewer has had problems with his credit. Notwithstanding the foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property, there has been no deficiency judgment entered against Mr. Brewer, to his knowledge. COUNT V On November 30, 1983, Collins Company of Pensacola, Inc. conveyed property at Eldorado Drive in Pensacola, Florida to Harold C. Miller, Jr., a Collins employee. That property was subject to a mortgage from Real Estate Financing, Inc. which included a paragraph 17 as included in the facts pertaining to the Hinson transaction involving that lender. This house was purchased because of a transfer of Mr. Miller to Pensacola as a condition of his employment with the Collins Company. The Collins Company of Pensacola was responsible for paying the mortgages during that time frame. In conversation with Respondent, it was determined that Miller would buy the house and the Respondent would buy it back and in the interim, Mr. Miller would live rent free. On May 23, 1985, a quit claim deed was executed by Mr. Miller in favor of the Respondent returning possession of the Pensacola home. Because Respondent had told Mr. Miller that Respondent would make payments on this home, Mr. Miller did not make any payments. Mr. Miller speaks of a contract that was in writing and was involved in the closing on the Pensacola home when it was purchased and that there was a promise to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Finance, Inc. This comment is made in a deposition of Mr. Miller which was entered as Exhibit 71 by the Petitioner. Whether this refers to an assumption by the Respondent or someone else is not clear. As pointed out by the deposition testimony, more importantly, this contract was not produced then and is not available now for consideration in the deliberation of this case. Mr. Miller bought another house from Collins Construction in Leon County which is at Foxcroft. At the time of the deposition it was occupied by Susan, Mr. Miller's wife. Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued the Respondent and Harold C. Miller, Jr. and Susan F. Miller, his wife, in a foreclosure associated with the Pensacola property and received a Final Judgement for foreclosure on May 11, 1988. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. By the circumstances, Mr. Miller was persuaded that the Respondent would take care of the mortgage on the Pensacola home until it was paid off. What the payment history was on the mortgage prior to foreclosure has not been established in this record. In terms of any promises from Respondent about further obligations on the mortgage on the Pensacola home, Mr. Miller describes that Respondent never told him that he was relieved of that obligation or that he wasn't. Mr. Miller did not question the Respondent about this because he trusted him. COUNT VI On September 25, 1981, Collins Builders, Inc. sold a home to Peter A. Hartmann at Grantham Lane in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Hartmann borrowed money from Real Estate Financing, Inc. to purchase that home secured by a mortgage that included paragraph 17 the language of which is the same as in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. That property was subsequently deeded to Respondent on March 25, 1983. In the deed Respondent as grantee promises to assume and pay the Real Estate Financing, Inc. mortgage on the property. The Hartmann property upon which Real Estate Financing, Inc. held a mortgage was foreclosed upon in a suit by Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. against Respondent and in Peter A. Hartmann. Action was taken by order of court on May 3, 1988 and the property sold on May 27, 1988 as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Second Judicial Court in and for Leon County, Florida. This points out that Mr. Hartmann was not released form the mortgage obligation. There is a potential for a deficiency judgement against Mr. Hartmann following that sale. The details of the Hartmann transaction were not presented at hearing through his testimony or anyone else. COUNT VII On April 22, 1982, Collins Builders, Inc., sold John A. Miller and Jeanne B. Miller, his wife, a home in Lakewood Estates. That home was secured by a mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. It contained a paragraph 17 which had the language set out in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. which has been described. The home at Lakewood Estates was traded for a home in Huntington Woods II. Those transactions took place on March 2, 1984, and on that date the Millers executed a deed to Ralco, Inc., one of Respondent's companies. The warranty deed contained language to the effect that Ralco, Inc. promised to pay on the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. Bobbie G. May signed the contract for sales and purchase as representative of Ralco, Inc. The Huntington Woods II property that was bought by the Millers was bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with Bobbie G. May serving as representative for Collins Builders, Inc. in the contract for sale and purchase. The payments were not made as promised by Ralco, Inc. and Respondent sent the Millers one of the February 18, 1986 letters as previously described. Ultimately, Florida National Mortgage Association through Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued Ralco, Inc. and the Millers in foreclosure and obtained a summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure against those defendants. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. This as with other foreclosures does not speak to attempts by Ralco, Inc. to be allowed to assume the mortgages in a novation. The property at Lakewood Estates which had been traded in was then sold June 28, 1988, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida. That judgment against the Millers is shown on the credit report of John Henry Miller. Mrs. Miller understood that the mortgage payments on the traded home would be made until the property was sold by Ralco, Inc. Visits to the neighborhood where that traded home was found did not indicate any activities toward the sale by way of for sale signs. No one was living in the traded home at that time. The Millers were not represented by counsel during the course of the closings associated with the two homes. They were represented in the foreclosures suit. In reference to the credit circumstance of the Millers, in trying to buy a vehicle they had been denied credit once. They were eventually able to buy the vehicle. The Millers had been told when purchasing the initial home at Lakewood Estates that the reason for buying it would be the possibility of being able to trade for a larger home at some later date if needed. Again, it is not clear who made those statements to the Millers. On the day before the closing of the traded home, Mrs. Miller spoke with Sissie Collins whom she understood to be affiliated with Respondent or one of his companies. The record does not show what that affiliation would have been, if anything. In this conversation with Sissie Collins, Mrs. Miller pointed out to Ms. Collins that the loan with Real Estate Financing, Inc. was not assumable without qualifying. Moreover, Mrs. Miller believed that Respondent did not qualify for the loan and that it was not assumable unless he did. Sissie Collins stated that this was not a problem and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. or First Alabama allowed Respondent to assume a mortgage and make the payments until the property was sold and the mortgage was paid off and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was fully aware of the circumstance. Whether this was true or not was not proven by competent evidence. What Respondent knew about these matters wasn't shown either. At the time of hearing, the Millers had not been called upon to pay any deficiencies associated with the foreclosure of their Lakewood Estates property. COUNT VIII Eric R. Larsen and Young Oak Larsen, his wife, purchased a home from a Collins Company in Huntington Woods Unit II. That house was eventually traded for a home in Cross Creek. The traded home was deeded to Respondent with the promise that Respondent would assume an existing mortgage on the Huntington Woods Unit II property which is owed to Andrew Jackson State Savings and Loan Association and make payments. The closing associated with the traded property took place on December 2, 1982. The new home was being purchased through the same lending institution as the traded home. The Larsens were not represented in the closings associated with the traded home and the purchased home. The closing of the traded home took place in offices of the Respondent's business. The second closing for the purchased home took place at the Andrew Jackson Federal Savings. When Mr. Larsen asked why the deed for his Huntington Woods II property was being made to the Respondent, he was told that it was to facilitate the assumption of the mortgage. By his remarks, Mr. Larsen is not clear on whether the Respondent attended the closing associated with the traded property. He does recall someone whose name is Chip who he thought was the real estate broker who worked with Respondent was at the closing. No further indication of who this man named Chip might be as to association with Respondent or his companies was shown in this record. The Larsens received a February 18, 1986 letter from Respondent as previously described, when the problems occurred about payments for the traded property, and at that time the mortgage was shown as being held by Colonial Mortgage Company. Mr. Larsen also received a letter on April 8, 1987, purportedly from Colonial Mortgage Company, which states that Mr. Larsen is not released from liability on the traded property and some comment about assumption packages having been sent on various dates and reminds Mr. Larsen that the loan could not be assumed without the prospective purchaser's credit having been approved. The letter describes other perceptions about the ability of the Respondent to take over responsibility for the mortgage on the traded property. All of the matters set out in this unauthenticated correspondence are hearsay and they cannot form the basis of fact-finding in terms of whether Respondent or his companies were ever allowed to assume the mortgage on the traded property. People who had a direct knowledge of the mortgage circumstance with Colonial Mortgage Company pertaining to this traded property as with other traded property on which a lender held mortgages and sent letters have not been presented to explain that circumstance by competent evidence. Likewise, the outcome of what has happened with the traded property in the Larsen transaction has not been proven by competent evidence. The explanation of the outcome with that property is hearsay which may not be used as a basis for fact finding. COUNT IX Robert R. and Patricia A. Aubin, husband and wife, traded property under the program which Respondent was affiliated with for taking in one residence and selling another. Mr. Aubin thought that this kind of transaction was common and that led to his telling his financing institution that the same builder was taking back the original home in order to build Mr. Aubin another house, thinking that this might simplify the transaction. In speaking to someone about the obligation to deal with the existing mortgage on the traded property, he identifies the person he was talking to as Ed Hines. Again, it is not clear what Mr. Hines' association was with the Respondent and his companies. The traded home was going to be given to Tallahassee Properties. Mr. Aubin was not certain of the arrangement Respondent had with his individual companies. Ultimately, there was a problem with the payments on the house that had been traded in. Respondent wrote the Aubins one of the February 18, 1986 letters reference the property at Huntington Woods Unit I. An arrangement was being made whereby Real Estate Financing, Inc. received $3,704.48 from Ralco, Inc. by a check of June 26, 1986. That check was issued after Ralco, Inc. conveyed the traded property back to the Aubins on June 17, 1986 and this resolved the problem for the Aubins.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-3850 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact-finding offered by the parties. PETITIONER'S FACTS Paragraph 1 is utilized. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 4-5. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are set out in the findings of fact. 6-10. Paragraphs 6-10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 has not been proven. Paragraph 12 is correct in terms of Hinson's decision to convey the property; however, what Hinson was allowed to believe concerning the matter of assumption as it might show culpability on the part of the Respondent has not been proven. This matter set forth in paragraph 13 has not been proven. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 15 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 16 has not been proven as to any financial losses due to dishonest acts or false promises of the Respondent. Hinson was found to have been denied credit cards. The latter sentence in paragraph 16 is speculation and not fact. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 18 in the suggestion that the Respondent through his real estate office and salesmen made representations and promises to the Walshes was not proven in the sense that persons involved with the Walshes and the transaction to trade in the home were not sufficiently identified to understand how those persons were affiliated with the Respondent. Paragraph 19 is accepted as to the documents and promises by the Respondent. Again, what the association was of the other person identified as the salesman may have been is not clear in this transaction. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is not proven in the first sentence. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 was not proven. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found except in its suggestion that the Walshes had been deceived in the sense of the idea of the mortgage not having been assumed or attempts made to have it assumed. Paragraph 26 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found except as it identifies the nature of the salesperson and what the affiliation was with Collins and Associates insufficient proof was made to show the true nature of the position of the salesperson in Collins and Associates, Inc., if any, and what Respondent had in mind and any instructions to this person who was reportedly the salesperson. Paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found as to promises in the document system responsibilities of Respondent. Otherwise it is not accepted. Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found except as to its suggestion that deceit has been proven relating to the Respondent's attempts to have the mortgage assumed. Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found except as to the suggestion that this problem of the foreclosure dissolved the marriage. Paragraph 35 in its first sentence is contrary to the Impression of the facts. There was a discussion and a decision reached to buy the house, whether Respondent was acting as a real estate broker individually or as a builder developer is unclear. Whether he made his employee buy the house or directed him to is not accepted as a fact. Paragraph 36 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 was not proven on the issue of whether Respondent applied for an assumption. The Final Judgment of closure was proven. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found in a suggestion of an agreement to take over the Huntington Woods property. Reference to the allegations and the foreclosure petition are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and do not constitute an explanation of how Respondent may have carried out his promise to take over responsibilities for the mortgage and the traded property which is the true issue. Likewise, paragraph 42 where it is acknowledged in that suit the agreement to assume the mortgage does not answer the issue of whether attempts were made to bring about that assumption. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 44 and its suggestion as to any intended action on the part of a mortgage insurer has not been proven by competent evidence. Paragraph 45 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 47 in the suggestion of activities by a salesperson of Collins and Associates has not been shown in terms of the affiliation with the Respondent's companies or with the Respondent in terms of the details of that affiliation sufficient to show that Respondent is culpable for any acts of his employees. Respondent through Ralco, Inc. had agreed to assume and pay for the existing mortgage on the traded property. Paragraph 48 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 49 is subordinate to facts found. Suggestion by counsel that Respondent's admission of 86 coincide with the fact finding in paragraph 50 is erroneous as is reference to page 11 in the transcript which speaks of the admissions. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found with the exception that the Respondent was not shown to have been deceitful in saying that the mortgage had not been allowed for assumption in that no competent proof was offered as to the attitude of the lender concerning the assumption. Paragraph 53 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 54 is correct in terms of the credit report on foreclosure, otherwise it is rejected as heresay. Paragraph 55 is inaccurate when it suggests that proof was made that Respondent did not take care of the assumption in the Larsen trade-in property. Paragraph 56 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 57 constitutes legal argument. RESPONDENT'S FACTS 1-7. Paragraphs 1-7 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence of Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. The remaining sentences within paragraph 8 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 is subordinate to facts found. In paragraph 10, Charles Middleton was not shown to have been the closing agent for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. in the transactions which are at issue here. In paragraph 11, Respondent was responsible for applying for the mortgage assumptions but the proof was not made that he did not do so or that he did. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 15 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 16 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 19 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 20 is not accepted. Paragraph 21 is not accepted. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23 is not relevant. Paragraph 24 is the reputation of the Respondent is only relevant if culpability has been shown. It has not been. 25. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 26 is not accepted in terms of what position Chip Miller held and what capacity he was acting in when involved in the Hinson transaction as employee of Collins and Associates, or Tallahassee Properties or exactly what capacity. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 29 is heresay and not accepted. Paragraph 30 is contrary to the impression of the credit circumstance of Mr. Hinson. Whatever the current credit report may say, Mr. Hinson's credit had been hurt. Paragraph 31 is true. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to the facts found except for deprivation of credit. Paragraph 33 is not necessary to the resolution of dispute. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 35 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 36 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 37 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 38 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found, except in its suggestion of what capacity Sissie Collins really served which is not established. Paragraph 44 is subordinate to facts found, except not proven that mortgage assumption tentatively approved. He did make representations as the mortgage grantee. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 47 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 48 is contrary to facts found. There is no paragraph 49. Paragraph 50 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found. 53.-55. Paragraphs 53-55 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 56 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 57 is subordinate. Paragraph 58 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 59 is subordinate to the facts found. 60.-62 Paragraphs 60-62 are subordinate to the facts found. 63.-64. Paragraphs 63-64 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 65 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 66 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 67 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 68 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 69 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 70 is subordinate to the facts found. 71.-72. Paragraphs 71-72 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73 in the first sentence is subordinate to the facts found. The second sentence has to do with whether Andrew Jackson gave preliminary approval for the assumption of the mortgage on the traded property and is heresay not accepted. Paragraph 74 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 75 is subordinate to the facts found. 76.-77. Paragraphs 76 and 77 are accepted as true but are not needed. 78.-79. Paragraphs 78-79 are subordinate to the facts found. 80. In this instance and all that have discussed before, Respondent did make representations through the February 18, 1986 letters. 81-82. Paragraphs 81-82 are subordinate to facts found. 83. Paragraph 83 is subordinate to facts found. 84.-85. Paragraphs 84-85 are subordinate to facts found. Suggestion that the paragraph 86 relates back to initial paragraphs is acknowledged and accepted in the manner that has been described in the discussion at the paragraphs set forth in the proposed fact finding. Paragraph 87 is legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32817 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Eaton, Davis, Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Keith Kinderman, Esquire 906 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
Recommendation Based upon Petitioner's failure to appear, it is RECOMMENDED: That a default be entered against Petitioner and a final order be issued denying Petitioner's application for a "Business Broker's" license. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. William C. Hamblett, Jr. Central Florida Brokerage Company, Inc. Dade Savings Building 151 Wymore Road, Suite 640 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 Ralph Armstead, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street Suite 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 William M. Furlow, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George N. Sullivan, held real-estate license number 0128470 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission. His current address is 22 East Spruce Street, Orlando, Florida. At one time, respondent also held a registered general contractor's license and operated a construction firm under the name of George N. Sullivan, Inc. in Vero Beach, Florida. On or about December 7, 1979, George N. Sullivan, Inc. and Vero Fore, Incorporated entered into a construction agreement wherein Sullivan agreed to construct a residence at Lot 27, Unit III, the Moorings of Vero Beach, in Indian River County for a price of $155,628. The difference between this price and the price of $171,688 alleged in the administrative complaint is due to "extras" agreed upon by the parties to be added to the project. Sullivan began construction on the residence but abandoned the project before it was completed. When he left the job he had been paid all sums due under the agreement except one final $18,000 draw. Vero Fore later discovered that approximately $66,000 in unpaid bills were left by Sullivan. It also learned that Sullivan had obtained releases from three material suppliers by issuing worthless checks in the amounts of $5,849, $2,883.48, $1,913.14, $4,988.92 and $3,847.23. To date, Vero Fore has not been repaid by Sullivan. Sullivan was later adjudged guilty of passing worthless checks by the circuit court of Indian River County on July 8, 1981 and was sentenced to eighteen months probation and required to make restitution to the subcontractors. The official records of Indian River County reflect that Sullivan was found to be in violation of probation on March 23, 1983 for failure to make restitution. It is unknown what, if any, penalties were imposed upon him for this violation, or if restitution has ever been made. On or about September 5, 1980, Sullivan entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. James L. Cain to remodel their residence located at 2075 DeLeon Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida. The agreed upon price was $46,900. The Cains paid Sullivan $46890, or 10 percent, as a downpayment for the work on September 8, 1980. Sullivan sent three men to the Cains' house a few days later to build a platform. No other work was ever done. Sullivan did not pay the three workmen and the Cains were forced to pay them $788 to obtain a release of liens. To date, they have never been reimbursed by respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent George N. Sullivan be found guilty as charged in Counts I, III, and IV and that Count II be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that respondent's real estate sales license be suspended for a period of ten years with the condition that said license be reinstated after a period of three years if respondent can demonstrate that restitution to the three material suppliers, Vero Fore, Inc. and the Cains has been made. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Lee Printy, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. George N. Sullivan 22 East Spruce Street Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Commission is charged under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, with the licensure of real estate salesmen. The Petitioner's application for licensure was denied by the Florida Real Estate Commission. The Petitioner requested a formal hearing to review the Commission's action in denying his application. Notice of the formal hearing in this master was provided to Alan Michael Lopez at 3325 Bayshore Boulevard, Apartment D-11, Tampa, Florida 33609, and to the Department of Legal Affairs at 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 212, Orlando, Florida 32801. The Petitioner did not appear and did not present any evidence in support of his application for licensure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the action of the Florida Real Estate Commission in denying the application for licensure of Alan Michael Lopez be affirmed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Alan Michael Lopez 3325 Bayshore Boulevard, D-11 Tampa, Florida 33609 Ralph D. Armstead, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondents, or either of them, for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Eglin Realty, Inc., holds a real estate broker's license, No. M14 0024352, last renewed before the hearing on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. A Florida corporation, Eglin was originally licensed in 1971, (T. 47) or, at least, has been "in business since 1971." (T. 22) Seventy-two years old at the time of hearing, Eglin's president, Leon F. Bishop, has never held a real estate license but he has developed several subdivisions (T. 50) and "was buying and selling land all of [his] life." (T. 51) In 1982, Mr. Bishop, his wife and daughter owned stock in Eglin. Of 50 shares authorized and outstanding, he owned one share; his wife owned ten; and his daughter owned the remaining 39. In July of 1982 and for some time before, respondent Jerry L. Armstrong, himself in the real estate business for 25 years, believed he was registered as the "active broker" (T. 231), for Eglin Realty, Inc., and as a qualifying real estate broker for Armstrong and Associates, Inc.; and, he was "fairly certain . . . [that he] had an individual license at that time also." (T. 234) Arguably, nobody was registered as Eglin's "active broker" in July of 1982, because Eglin's real estate broker's license expired, at least by its own terms, on March 31, 1982. Apparently through oversight, Eglin had not renewed the license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. For four or five (T. 24) years before, however, Mr. Armstrong had indeed been registered as Eglin's qualifying broker. On December 10, 1982, Mr. Armstrong, who is now a "broker-salesman with Coldwell-Banker Deep South Realty Corporation," (T. 230) resigned as "vice president director and active real estate broker for Eglin Realty, Inc., effective December 19, 1982," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which resignation Mr. Bishop and his wife Dorothy, then Eglin's other two officers and directors, duly accepted. Id. Only the following August, after Eglin chose Joan A. Ritteman to succeed Mr. Armstrong, did Eglin learn that its license was to have expired in March of the preceding year. On October 13, 1983, Eglin made application for "late renewal," tendering a $15 late fee in addition to the $40 renewal fee. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. With the grant of this application, Eglin has been registered with DPR as a real estate broker, Ms. Ritteman being the firm's sole qualifying broker since then. King's Lake Property When Mr. Bishop met Dr. and Mrs. William D. Permenter at a land auction in Walton County in early 1982, he gave them a business card like the one that came in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10. (T. 93) "Eglin Realty, Inc." appears in the center of the card above the phrase "Land and Farm Broker." The upper right corner bears the Realtor logo under the words "Reg. Real Estate Broker." The lower left corner reads "Leon Bishop President." The upper left corner has telephone numbers, and the remaining corner gives a mailing address. The Permenters mistook Mr. Bishop for a registered real estate broker, when he introduced himself. Some days after the auction, Mr. Bishop arranged to show one or both of the Permenters a large tract he owned, but failed to interest them in it. It occurred to him that they might be willing to invest instead in the 1,527-acre parcel that Hubert Alberton Bell and C. J. King, Jr. of Defuniak Springs owned jointly in Walton County, property which the owners had listed for sale with Angus Guinness Douglass, Jr. of Douglass Realty, Inc. Mr. Bishop may have learned of this parcel's availability from Mr. Douglass at the very auction at which he met the Permenters. Under the terms of the listing agreement, Douglass Realty was entitled to a ten percent commission if a sale of the whole parcel could be arranged, at $1,000 per acre, within 100 days of May 3, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Before showing the Permenters the land Messrs. Bell and King hoped to sell (the King's Lake property), Mr. Bishop approached Mr. Douglass, and proposed that Douglass Realty, Inc. share with Eglin any commission arising from a sale of the King's Lake property to buyers Mr. Bishop or Eglin might procure. In a letter dated July 4, 1982, and signed by respondent Armstrong, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 3 and 11, Eglin's share of the anticipated commission was specified. The letter concluded: The undersigned [Jerry L. Armstrong] agrees by this letter to authorize Leon Bishop, as president of Eglin Realty, Inc., to personally deliver this agreement and to accept on my behalf, as the active licensed Florida real estate broker. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Mr. Douglass felt free to deal with Mr. Bishop with regard to the commission both because of Mr. Armstrong's letter and because he knew of no "real estate law that said [he] had to ask, or say, let me see his license before I talk to him." (T. 209) At no time did Mr. Douglass speak to Mr. Armstrong about the transaction. (T. 211) Agreement as to the commission split having been reached, Mr. Bishop showed the Permenters the King's Lake property, and, in early July, Dr. Permenter offered to buy it. After "Mr. Bishop told [Dr. Permenter that his offer] had been accepted," (T. 97) the transaction closed on July 28, 1982, in a lawyer's office in Defuniak Springs. Present were the lawyer, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Douglass, Mrs. Douglass, Mrs. Permenter and the principals. In exchange for a deed in favor of Dr. William Permenter and assigns, the vendors received a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $1,275,000, together with the balance of the $1,425,000 sales price, less various transaction costs, notably a $25,000 initial payment toward a brokerage commission totalling $118,587. Eglin's Exhibit No. 3. At no time before the final hearing in the present case did Dr. Permenter ever see Mr. Armstrong. (T. 97) In accordance with a revised commission agreement dated July 6, 1982, and executed by Messrs. King, Bell, Douglass and (on behalf of Eglin) Bishop, Eglin's Exhibit No. 2, and consistently with the earlier agreement between Eglin and Douglass, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, Mr. Douglass drew a $10,000 commission check in favor of Eglin, keeping $15,000 as Douglas Realty, Inc.'s share of the initial commission payment. (T. 212) Also in keeping with Eglin's Exhibit No. 2, Messrs. King and Bell each executed a promissory note in favor of Eglin in the amount of $21,682, bearing interest at ten percent, payable in three annual installments. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 8 and 9. These notes represented the remainder of the commission owed Eglin. (The vendors also made and delivered notes payable to Douglass for unpaid commission owed Douglas Realty, Inc.) Sharing The Commission Mr. Bishop was Eglin's only salaried employee, (T. 50) and also sometimes borrowed money from the corporation. Although a monthly salary of $1,000 was authorized "[i]n the minutes," (T. 57) "[t]here was never no set amount of salary that [Mr. Bishop] would get," Id. from Eglin in 1982. Sometimes he drew no "money for a few months, and then . . . would get a large sum." (T. 57) "Whenever [he] wanted to get money from the corporation, [he] asked for it, and . . . got it." (T. 58) He "didn't make a request to Mr. Armstrong." (T. 61) His wife had authority to write checks against the Eglin account into which the $10,000 commission check delivered at the King's Lake property closing was deposited. (T. 62) After the deposit, Mr. Bishop asked his wife or daughter for some of the money, and Mrs. Bishop drew a check in her husband's favor for $5,000 or thereabouts on the Eglin account. The totality of the evidence makes it clear that this payment, whether characterized as salary or not, was compensation for his procuring Dr. Permenter as a buyer and otherwise facilitating the sale of the King's Lake property. For one thing, "[t]he only transaction [Eglin] had during that period of time was the King's Lake [property]." (T. 254) Mr. Bishop and Mr. Armstrong "had an agreement from the start that anything [Bishop] bought and sold would go through [E]glin Realty, due to the fact that there would be a commission there, and [Armstrong] would be entitled to some of the commission." (T. 250) Mr. Armstrong professed to believe that Mr. Bishop "was operating as an owner" (T. 236) when Messrs. King and Bell sold the King's Lake property. Mr. Armstrong also testified, falsely but under oath, that he, not Mr. Bishop, negotiated the commission sharing arrangement with Mr. Douglass, the implication being that he thereby earned a portion of the commission Eglin received. In any event, Mr. Armstrong believed himself entitled to a share of the King's Lake property commission. He directed that his share be applied against outstanding loans totaling $3,500 to $4,000 which Eglin had made to him. (T. 248) Ten Percent Dr. Permenter, who has abandoned the practice of medicine in order to devote more time to real estate development, acquired the King's Lake property planning to subdivide it and sell lots. First, he caused the property to be divided into several large tracts, some of which he conveyed into trust. One tract, dubbed King Lake Estates, was conveyed to a partnership Dr. and Mrs. Permenter entered into with each other. Much, if not all of this tract, was subdivided into lots. At some point, Mr. Bishop agreed to sell the lots, and to assist development in other ways. To that end, he and his daughter spent time in a trailer on the property. The Permenters agreed to pay Mr. Bishop ten percent of the sales price of any lot he sold. In keeping with this agreement, Mrs. Permenter wrote him several checks on behalf of the partnership. On August 29, 1983, Mr. Bishop and the Permenters executed a written agreement memorializing their arrangement, reciting that some 83 lots had already been sold under it, and conveying to Mr. Bishop "a $2500.00 life interest" in the Kings Lake Estates tract. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. A purpose of this agreement was to create a legally enforceable right in Mr. Bishop to the ten percent share of sales proceeds the Permenters were then regularly paying him as lots were sold. Mr. Bishop never had any ownership interest of any kind in any portion of the King's Lake property other than the King Lake Estates tract. When Dr. Permenter sold a Kings Lake Estates lot himself, Mr. Bishop did not receive ten percent of the proceeds. (T. 100) Notes Discounted After he began selling lots for the King Lake Estates partnership, Mr. Bishop told the Permenters he needed money, and asked if they would take the notes Messrs. King and Bell had given Eglin for the remainder of the commission, in exchange for undertaking monthly payments to Eglin. Some time remained before the next annual payments called for in the notes which King and Bell had executed in favor of Eglin when they sold the King's Lake property. The Permenters were agreeable, what with the substantial sums Dr. Permenter still owed the notes' makers. In order to transform annual payments into monthly payments, Mr. Bishop, on behalf of Eglin, endorsed the notes Messrs. King and Bell had given Eglin, in favor of Dr. and Mrs. Permenter. In return, Dr. and Mrs. Permenter executed a promissory note with specified amounts payable monthly to Eglin. It was after this had been accomplished that an investigator from the Division of Land Sales of the Florida Department of Business Regulation advised the Permenters that they were required to register their subdivision with the Department. He also informed them that Mr. Bishop was not licensed as a real estate broker, which came as a surprise to them. Apparently on the theory that the promissory notes they had received in exchange for theirs represented legally unenforceable obligations to pay real estate commissions to an unlicensed entity, Dr. and Mrs. Permenter stopped making payments on their promissory note to Eglin. When Eglin sued on the note, the Permenters filed a counter-complaint alleging that "on July 27, 1983, . . . [Eglin] was not a registered real estate broker and was not entitled to be paid fees." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The litigation eventuated in an amended final judgment awarding Eglin the unpaid balance of the note. Eglin Realty, Inc. vs. William D. Permenter and Elizabeth A. Permenter, No. 85-718-CA (Fla. 1st Cir.; Mar. 30, 1987). An appeal was pending at the time of final hearing in these proceedings.
The Issue Whether the Respondents' real estate licenses in Florida should be disciplined based upon the charge that the Respondents are guilty of failing to maintain the required entrance sign on or about the entrance to the principal office in violation of Subsection 475.22, Florida Statutes and Rule 21V-10.024, Florida Administrative Code and are therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondents' real estate licenses in Florida should be disciplined based upon the charge that Respondents are guilty of failing to register a branch office in violation of Subsection 475.24, Florida Statutes, and Rule 21V-10.023, Florida Administrative Code, and therefore are in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondents' real estate licenses in Florida should be disciplined based upon the charge that the Respondent Max S. Long, Jr., is guilty of failing to be a signatory on all escrow accounts in violation of Rule 21V-14.010, Florida Administrative Code and therefore is in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondents' real estate licenses in Florida should be disciplined based upon the charge that the Respondents' are guilty of failing to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondents' real estate licenses in Florida should be disciplined based upon the charge that Respondents' are guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Max S. Long, Jr. was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license numbers 0253744, 0253742, and 0258199 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker for Stonegate Realty, Inc., 2325 Ulmerton Road, Clearwater, Florida 34620 and Queens Harbour Realty, Inc., 711 San Pablo Road North, Jacksonville, Florida 32225. Respondent Long has been a licensed salesperson since 1974 and a licensed broker since 1978. The Respondent Stonegate Property Management Corporation was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0240617 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the address of 2325 Ulmerton Road, Clearwater, Florida 34620. The Respondent Stonegate Realty, Inc. was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0182660 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last licensed issued was at the address of 2325 Ulmerton Road, Clearwater, Florida 24620. The Respondent Queens Harbour Realty, Inc., is now and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0257554 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the address of 711 San Pablo Road North, Jacksonville, Florida 32225. On or about October 17, 1989, DPR investigator Marjorie G. Maye (hereinafter Maye) conducted an inspection and audit of Respondents' offices and escrow accounts in Clearwater. Maye discovered that the Respondents did not display an office entrance sign for the corporations. Since the inspection Respondents have erected the proper sign which has been displayed continuously since that date. Respondents were operating an unregistered branch office located at 13280 Broadhurst Loop S.W., Ft. Myers, Florida. Respondents did not register the office because the salesperson was an employee of the developer and sold only property at that project. Since the inspection Respondents have properly registered the branch office. At the time of the inspection and audit Respondent Long was not a signatory on Respondents' escrow accounts. Since the inspection, Respondent Long has been added as a signatory to the escrow accounts. At the time of the audit Respondents' escrow account titled Queens Harbour Realty - Escrow account number 0089798317 maintained at C & S Bank of Pinellas County on September 30, 1989, had a current liability of $54,010.66, a reconciled bank balance of $8,537.99 thus indicating a shortage of approximately $45,472.67. Ultimately, the Respondents reduced the shortage to zero and the accounts balanced. At the time of the inspection and audit, Ed Perry, CPA, was employed by Respondent Queens Harbour in the accounting department and was in charge of the Queens Harbour Realty - Escrow account which was maintained out of Clearwater, Florida. George Patterson and Ed Perry, CPAs, and other individuals were signatories on this escrow account. The escrow accounts were used for deposits on real estate sales and leases. The funds were disbursed at sale or upon termination of the lease. Some of the funds received by Respondents were not required to be held in escrow. Eventually the deposits from several projects were placed in the escrow accounts. Disbursements were made from the escrow accounts even though the funds were not required to be deposited in the escrow account. This resulted in confusion as to the exact amounts of funds required to be maintained in the escrow accounts and which funds were available for distribution. Shortages in the escrow accounts were a result of intercompany loans and disbursements, as well as, from the co-mingling of funds. These were made at the direction of George Patterson. On or about October 13, 1989, Ed Perry, CPA and George Patterson, supervisor of the accounting department, signed a $6,000.00 check from Respondents' escrow account which was used for the purchase of a vehicle for Queens Harbour Yacht and Country Club. When this error was discovered the $6,000.00 was re-deposited to the escrow account. Respondent Long, became the broker for Stonegate Realty at the request of his cousin, Fred Bullard, the President of the Bullard Group, and a majority shareholder in Queens Harbour Realty, Inc. He was not aware of and did not sign any of the checks representing the inter-company loans or for the purchase of the vehicle. He derived no benefit from these loans. Respondent Max S. Long, Jr. understood at all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint that an escrow account is one used to hold funds belonging to third parties and that he, as the real estate broker, acted in a fiduciary capacity to those third parties. Respondent Long relied completely on the corporation's in-house accountants to properly prepare the accounting for the escrow funds. Since the DPR investigation, there have been no shortages in the escrow account, monthly reconciliation reports are prepared and signed by Respondent Long, and the escrow accounts are routinely reviewed by Respondent Long. Respondent Long has had no prior disciplinary proceedings before the Commission.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the evidence of the record, including the contents of the several exhibits received into evidence, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondents be found guilty of having violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (e) and (k), Florida Statutes, (1989), as charged in the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondents shall jointly pay a penalty of $500 and that Respondent Long's real estate licenses be suspended for a period of one year, followed by a one year period of probation upon such conditions as the Florida Real Estate Commission shall reasonably impose. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, Respondents' proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42. Rejected as irrelevant: 9, 13, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelli Hanley Crabb, Esquire Post Office Box 4110 St. Petersburg, Florida 33743 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack L. McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Norman Wayne Lund, an active broker in Lund Realty, Inc., a licensed corporate broker, failed to account or deliver to Daisy and Kenneth Parnell money in the form of a deposit which had come into his hands and which was not his property or which he was not in law or equity entitled to retain, under the circumstances, and at the time which was agreed upon or which was required by law or, in the absence of an agreed upon time, upon demand of the Parnells, who were entitled to such an accounting or delivery.
Recommendation The position and actions of the various individuals should also be considered in this case in arriving at a penalty because none of the parties have completely "clean hands." The Parnells precipitated the breach by insistence on a note and mortgage; the Hammers have made no attempt to clarify the situation by paying the commission and cost; and the attorneys kept Lund Realty completely in the dark about what was transpiring. The Lunds are the only ones involved in the transaction who have tried to carry out their obligation. Further, they also are the only one who stand to lose financially with out seeking judicial relief. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and other factors bearing on the case, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission place Norman Wayne Lund on probation for one year, and suspend the registration of Lund Realty, Inc. until the escrow funds concerned have been interplead in a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve the conflicting claims to said funds. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of January, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commissions 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Carleen Chalk Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741 Norman Wayne Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741
