The Issue Whether the disciplinary action taken against Arthur Ray Campbell was for good cause.
Findings Of Fact Arthur Ray Campbell is a Career Service Employee of the State of Florida employed by the Division of Law Enforcement, Department of Natural Resources. He was suspended for a period of eleven (11) working days for using the blue light on a Marine Patrol vehicle to run a red traffic signal in Cross City. Campbell filed a timely appeal of his suspension with the Career Service Commission. On February 10, 1976, the Florida Marine Patrol was ordered by the Office of the Governor of the State of Florida to provide personnel for a special assignment in Pensacola, Florida. These personnel were to assist local law enforcement authorities in controlling a civil disturbance in that city which had resulted from racial tensions in one of the high schools. Pursuant to those orders, Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Brown of the Florida Marine Patrol directed Major Louis Shelfer, the staff officer in charge of the Marine Patrol Emergency Squad, to notify the District Offices of the Florida Marine Patrol to dispatch Marine Patrol Emergency Squad personnel to Pensacola. Major Shelfer was ordered by Colonel Brown to make certain that all supportive personnel understood that in their movement to Pensacola blue lights and sirens would not be used. Colonel Brown further instructed Major Shelfer to advise the various district offices that personnel were to move as quickly as possible to Pensacola and that he wanted the Emergency Squad in Pensacola the morning of February 11, 1976. Just prior to 5:00 p.m. on February 10, 1976 Major Louis Shelfer called each of the district offices from which Emergency Squad personnel were being dispatched to Pensacola and advised the officer in charge or the dispatcher that the personnel on the Emergency Squad, who were already on standby for movement, were to be dispatched to Pensacola. Major Shelfer further directed that these personnel were to move to Pensacola as soon as possible but were not to run blue lights or sirens. He further advised that there was no emergency existing in Pensacola at the time. Major Shelfer did not give a time by which personnel would report in Pensacola. It was, however, the understanding of Colonel Brown and Major Shelfer that all personnel would be in Pensacola by 6:00 a.m. on February 11, 1976. In District 7, Major Shelfer spoke with Mrs. Patricia Morgan, secretary/dispatcher. Mrs. Patricia Morgan, who is also the wife of Captain H. C. Morgan, Jr., the District Supervisor of District Seven, received Major Shelfer's first alert call for the movement of the Emergency Squad personnel of District 7 to Pensacola at 4:45 p.m. on February 10, 1976. Shortly thereafter, she received the second call from Major Shelfer directing that the Emergency Squad personnel would proceed to Pensacola. Upon receiving the second call Mrs. Morgan contacted Officers Malcolm and Johnson on the communications radio and advised them that they were to proceed to Pensacola as quickly as possible but not "1018" by which she meant it was not an emergency. Mrs. Morgan further instructed these Marine Patrol Officers not to run red lights while proceeding to Pensacola. She specifically instructed Officer Malcolm that he would pick up Officer Campbell who would ride with him to Pensacola. While Officer Malcolm remembered Mrs. Morgan's reference to red lights, neither Officer Malcolm nor Officer Schumaker, who monitored their conversations, remembered any information passed on by Mrs. Morgan that the trip was not a "1018" run or not an emergency run. Mrs. Morgan was initially unable to contact Officer Campbell by radio and therefore called Officer Campbell's home and spoke with his wife giving her the information that she had given Officers Malcolm and Johnson. However, while speaking with Officer Campbell's wife, Officer Campbell called District 7 on his radio and asked Mrs. Morgan if she had any information for him. She advised Officer Campbell at that time that he would be going to Pensacola and would ride with Officer Malcolm. Mrs. Morgan did not remember giving Officer Campbell any information on the use of lights during the trip, but said that she did remember telling him it was not a "1018" run. Officer Campbell states that the information he received ordered him to return to his home and get ready to be picked up by Officer Campbell and that the information he needed had been passed on to his wife and Officer Malcolm. At approximately 7:30 p.m. on February 10, 1976, having secured from Water Patrol, gone to his home and packed, picked up Officer Campbell at his home, Officer Malcolm left Daytona for Pensacola. Officer Malcolm drove to Ocala using blue lights, where the men purchased hamburgers for their meal. Officer Malcolm ate while Officer Campbell continued to drive and the two officers changed over when they stopped to get gasoline. Officer Campbell then drove from the vicinity of Ocala to Cross City. As they approached Cross City, Officer Malcolm advised Officer Campbell to turn on the blue light because they were slightly over the local speed limit entering Cross City. As they approached the second traffic light in town which was red, Officer Campbell stopped or came almost to a complete stop at the light. As he started to proceed forward, having made certain the intersection was clear, the traffic light turned green. Malcolm and Campbell continued on through Cross City using the blue light until they reached the open highway on the north side of the city. Officer Malcolm's car does not have a siren but is equipped with blue light only. On the evening of February 10, 1976 Trooper J. R. Touchton was proceeding south on U.S. 19 in Cross City at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. He observed a northbound automobile, which shortly after he initially saw it, turn on its emergency blue lights. Trooper Touchton, not immediately identifying the type of vehicle he had passed, called his dispatcher to determine if another Florida Highway Patrol vehicle was operating in the area because the car which he had passed was a marked state law enforcement car similar to those of the Florida Highway Patrol. Touchton thought that the car which he had passed was in the process of stopping a truck immediately ahead of him. Touchton executed a "U" turn and proceeded north but shortly after Touchton turned, the truck which Touchton had thought the other patrol car was stopping turned left off the highway and the patrol car in front of him proceeded north out of Cross City still using its blue lights. Touchton saw the patrol vehicle ahead of him slow down or stop at the second traffic light but did not observe whether the second traffic light was red or green when the vehicle proceeded through it. In response to Officer Touchton's call the Highway Patrol Dispatcher advised Touchton that the vehicle which he had observed was probably a Marine Patrol vehicle being dispatched to Pensacola. Sergeant J. D. Peacock was following Officer Touchton south on U.S. 19 in Cross City and first observed that later he identified as a Marine Patrol vehicle approaching the second traffic light in Cross City. At that time the Marine Patrol had its blue lights and emergency flashers on; however, it did not have its siren on. Sergeant Peacock observed the Marine Patrol vehicle slow or stop at the traffic light and then proceed through the traffic light headed north on U.S. 19. Both Highway Patrol Officers indicated that the Marine Patrol vehicle was driving within the posted speed limit. On March 5, 1976 personnel in the Cross City, Florida Marine Patrol Office brought to Colonel J. J. Brown's attention the fact that a Marine Patrol car had passed through Cross City on February 10, 1976 using blue lights. This had been brought to the attention of the Cross City Marine Patrol by the Florida Highway Patrol Supervisor in that area, Sergeant J. D. Peacock. Colonel Brown directed Major Shelfer to conduct an investigation into the matter. Major Shelfer contacted all of the district supervisors who had sent personnel to Pensacola and requested that they provide him with the times and routes of travel of personnel which had been sent to Pensacola. From an analysis of this data, Major Shelfer determined that only personnel sent from District 7 in Daytona to Pensacola would have passed through Cross City enroute to Pensacola at the hour in question. Having determined this Major Shelfer directed Captain Morgan, Supervisor of District 7, to have the personnel from District 7 who were sent to Pensacola prepare written reports on their trips to Pensacola. Officers Campbell and Malcolm prepared and submitted written reports to Captain Morgan which were received into evidence at the formal hearing as Exhibits 5 and 6 respectively. Based upon the investigation conducted by Major Shelfer, Officer Campbell was suspended. Employee evaluations were introduced that indicate that Officer Campbell's efficiency for the period of time involved here was downgraded as a result of the conduct for which he was suspended.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer finds that substantial and competent evidence does not exist to show that the agency had good cause to suspend Officer Arthur Ray Campbell for insubordination. The Hearing Officer recommends that the suspension be set aside and further, that the Career Service Commission consider whether remedial action is necessary to clear his employee evaluation for the period in question. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Kent A. Zaiser, Esquire Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Department of Natural Resources Appeals Coordinator 202 Blount Street Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Melvin R. Horne, Esquire 800 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint. him. If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since December 7, 1990, certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer. He holds law enforcement certificate number 86138. At the time of the incidents alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), a position he held from 1990 until his dismissal on January 31, 1997. In September of 1994, Respondent's law enforcement career was temporarily interrupted when he was shot in the face and seriously injured while responding to another law enforcement officer's call for assistance. Respondent was off-duty at the time of the incident. After a lengthy hospital stay and recovery period, Respondent returned to duty, rather than seek disability compensation. For the duration of his employment as a trooper with the FHP, Respondent was assigned to Troop L and headquartered in Pahokee, Florida. From November of 1993 until his termination in 1997, Respondent was a member of Sergeant Steven Veltry's squad and under Sergeant Veltry's immediate supervision. Respondent and Sergeant Veltry's relationship was a contentious one. Respondent frequently complained to Sergeant Veltry's superiors that Sergeant Veltry was treating him unfairly. Respondent's complaints, however, were not resolved to his satisfaction. In fact, it seemed to him that his complaints made his situation even worse. As a trooper, Respondent was authorized, pursuant to the written policies and procedures of the FHP, to issue citations, as well as written warnings and faulty equipment notices. He also gave verbal warnings to motorists. (The FHP's written policies and procedures do not specifically address the issuance of verbal warnings.) The issuance of a citation has the potential of adversely impacting the cited motorist. A motorist suffers no adverse consequences, however, as a result of receiving a verbal or written warning or a faulty equipment notice. Unlike traffic citations, written warnings and faulty equipment notices are not required to be signed by the motorists to whom they are issued. Like traffic citations, written warnings and faulty equipment notices are issued in triplicate. One copy (the white copy) is given to the motorist, another (the yellow copy) is retained by the trooper, and the remaining copy (the pink copy) is turned in to the trooper's supervisor along with the trooper's Weekly Report. The Weekly Report prepared and submitted by the trooper is a report of the trooper's enforcement activities for the week. Included in the report is the number of written warnings and faulty equipment notices issued by the trooper. After they are received by the trooper's supervisor, the trooper's Weekly Report and attachments (including the pink copies of the written warnings and faulty equipment notices the trooper issued during the week) are transmitted to the district office, where the report is reviewed for accuracy by, among other things, comparing the number of written warnings and faulty equipment notices reported by the trooper in the report against the number of pink written warnings and faulty equipment notices accompanying the report. Following the completion of such a review, the trooper's Weekly Report (without the pink written warnings and faulty equipment notices, which are kept by the district office for approximately six months and then destroyed) is sent to headquarters in Tallahassee, where it is used for statistical purposes. The FHP makes decisions regarding the utilization of its resources based, at least in part, upon the information contained in the Weekly Reports submitted by its troopers. There is no minimum number of written warnings and faulty equipment notices a trooper must issue each month. Furthermore, the compensation a trooper receives is not based upon the number of such warnings and notices he or she issues. That is not to say, however, that a trooper, particularly one who is constantly at odds with his immediate supervisor concerning his work performance, would have no reason or motive under any circumstances to overstate, in the trooper's Weekly Report, the number of these warnings and notices that were issued during the reporting period and to thereby lead those in the chain of command to believe that he was more productive, in terms of his enforcement activities, than he actually was during the reporting period. With the intent to deceive his supervisors regarding the extent of his enforcement activities and to obtain the benefit of having his supervisors believe that he had engaged in such activities to a greater extent than he actually had, Respondent submitted to Sergeant Veltry four written warnings and faulty equipment notices that he prepared, but which he never gave to the motorists named in these warnings and notices: Robert Cummings, Paul Decker, Sharon Ciriago, and Armando Valverde. All four of these motorists were stopped by Respondent and issued traffic citations, but, contrary to what the paperwork Respondent submitted to Sergeant Veltry reflected, they never received any written warning or faulty equipment notice from Respondent in addition to the citations that they were given. Robert Cummings was stopped by Respondent on April 24, 1996, and issued a traffic citation for speeding. In addition to a copy of the citation, Respondent, along with his Weekly Report, submitted to Sergeant Veltry a copy of a written warning (for "violation of right of way") and faulty equipment notice (for "no stop lights") he purportedly gave Cummings during this April 24, 1996, stop. In fact, Respondent never gave Cummings such a written warning and faulty equipment notice and, at no time during the stop, even discussed with Cummings the subjects referenced in the warning and notice. Paul Decker was stopped by Respondent on June 8, 1996, at 6:23 p.m. Decker had been exceeding the posted speed limit. Respondent verbally warned Decker to slow down, but did not issue him a citation for speeding. He did issue Decker a citation for a safety belt violation. In addition to a copy of this citation, Respondent, along with his Weekly Report, submitted to Sergeant Veltry a copy of a written warning (for "exceed[ing] speed") and faulty equipment notice (for "headlights") he purportedly gave Decker during this June 8, 1996, stop. In fact, Respondent never gave Decker such a written warning; nor did he, at any time during the stop, give Decker a faulty equipment notice or even mention that there was anything wrong with the headlights on the vehicle Decker was driving. Sharon Ciriago was stopped by Respondent on June 16, 1996, and issued a traffic citation for speeding. In addition to a copy of the citation, Respondent, along with his Weekly Report, submitted to Sergeant Veltry a copy of a written warning (for "following too closely") and faulty equipment notice (concerning Ciriago's driver's license) he purportedly gave Ciriago during this June 16, 1996, stop. In fact, Respondent never gave Ciriago such a written warning and faulty equipment notice and, at no time during the stop, even discussed with Ciriago the subjects referenced in the warning and notice. Armando Valverde was stopped by Respondent on July 5, 1996, and issued a traffic citation for speeding. In addition to a copy of the citation, Respondent, along with his Weekly Report, submitted to Sergeant Veltry a copy of a written warning (for "violation of right of way") and faulty equipment notice (concerning Valverde's driver's license) he purportedly gave Valverde during this July 5, 1996, stop. In fact, Respondent never gave Valverde such a written warning and faulty equipment notice and, at no time during the stop, even discussed with Valverde the subjects referenced in the warning and notice. Following an internal investigation that had been initiated at the request of Lieutenant Roy Rogers, one of Sergeant's Veltry's superiors, the FHP's Bureau of Investigations concluded that Respondent, "between April 1996 and July 1996, falsified Warning notices and Faulty Equipment notices." Respondent was dismissed from his position as a trooper based upon the findings of the internal investigation. Since March of 1997, Respondent has been employed as a patrolman by the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office. According to person who hired him, Deputy Sheriff Arthur Owens, the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office's Assistant Director of Law Enforcement, Respondent has been "an exemplary employee."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to prove that Respondent is guilty, as charged, of having failed to maintain "good moral character," in violation of Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, and (2) revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer as punishment therefor. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1998.
The Issue The issue for determination at the formal hearing was whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by falsifying official records of the Florida Highway Patrol with intent to mislead her supervisors in violation of Section 943.1395(5), (6), Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Between March 13, 1987, and July 9, 1987, Respondent was a law enforcement officer certified by Petitioner. All events incident to the findings of fact in this Recommended Order occurred while Respondent was working in the ordinary course of her employment as a Florida Highway Patrol trooper in Miami, Florida. On April 7, 1987, Respondent stopped motorist Donald McCarron for driving a vehicle with an expired tag. Respondent issued Mr. McCarron a correction card for driving a vehicle with an expired tag but did not issue motorist McCarron a written warning. Respondent claimed both a correction card and a written warning as work activity in her weekly report to her supervisor. On June 23, 1987, Respondent stopped motorist James Merklein for speeding. Respondent issued Mr. Merklein a citation for speeding. Mr. Merklein did not have his vehicle registration in the car. Respondent verbally warned Mr. Merklein to carry his vehicle registration in the car, but did not issue motorist Merklein a written warning. Respondent claimed both a citation and a written warning as work activity in her weekly report to her supervisor. The existence of incidents in addition to those involving motorists Merklein and McCarron was not established by competent and substantial evidence. One or two incidents in which Respondent failed to give correction cards and written warnings to motorists is not clear and convincing evidence of lack of good moral character. 2/ Respondent admitted to Lieutenant John C. Baker that she "on occasion" writes warnings and cards, leaves them in her patrol car seat, and forgets to give them to the violator. Such occasions occur only when Respondent has given a motorist a lengthy explanation. The record does not reflect that Respondent admitted to additional incidents alleged to have been documented by Sergeants Alvarez and Pelton. Instead, in the words of Lieutenant Baker, "she did not deny the allegations in the complaint." Florida Highway Patrol trooper work activity, in the form of claimed written warnings and correction cards issued to motorists, form a significant portion of a trooper's report of weekly work performed. In order for a trooper to legitimately claim credit for written warnings or correction cards, the trooper must have given a copy of the document to the motorist in question. A Florida Highway Patrol supervisor, in formulating a subordinate performance evaluation for a given period, compiles statistics of the trooper's work activity and utilizes these statistics to rate the trooper's work performance. Evaluations form the basis of Florida Highway Patrol decisions concerning trooper retention, promotion, and salary increases. During the Respondent's June, 1986, to June, 1987, Florida Highway Patrol work evaluation cycle, her work activity, as reported by her, was considered by the Florida Highway Patrol to be in the "low satisfactory" range. Discounting the two incidents established by clear and convincing evidence in which Respondent claimed written warning and correction card work activity on her weekly report but failed to give the written warnings and correction cards to the motorist would not have caused her work activity to fall below satisfactory.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of the charges in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of March, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1990.
The Issue The issues are whether the agency statement identified as Section 5.02.08 of the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary Policy Manual falls within the definition of a rule, and if so, whether rulemaking is feasible and practicable.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of facts, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Berwyn R. Spear, also known as Pete Spear, operates a business under the name of "Pete's Chevron" located at 2151 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida. Among other things, the business provides wrecker services for towing automobiles. Besides operating his service station, for the last twelve years petitioner has been a member of the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary (Auxiliary), a statutorily created volunteer service organization whose members ride with and assist members of the Division of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) in the performance of their regular duties. He has expended almost $1,000 for equipment and uniforms. The Auxiliary functions under the direct supervision of the FHP, which in turn is a governmental unit under the jurisdiction of respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Auxiliary members are not required to be sworn police officers but are certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. Members are required to have monthly activity amounting to a minimum of twenty-four hours per calendar quarter, but they receive no pay or benefits other than those prescribed by Part IV of Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, which governs volunteer organizations. Finally, Auxiliary members serve at the pleasure of the FHP director and are subject to removal at will. They have no statutory right of review or appeal for disciplinary action but there is an internal disciplinary review process administered by an FHP review board in Tallahassee. Pursuant to state law, and subject to further requirements in Chapter 15B-9, Florida Administrative Code, the FHP maintains a wrecker rotation list, by which the FHP facilitates wrecker services to persons needing assistance on the roadways. For the last twelve years and until February 1992, petitioner's business was on the rotation list and he derived several hundred dollars per month in such towing income. The rotation list works in the following manner. Whenever a trooper encounters circumstances requiring the towing of a motorist's vehicle, the trooper notifies the dispatcher of the need for a wrecker from the rotation list, unless the motorist expresses a desire for a specific wrecker service. The dispatcher then telephones the next appropriate wrecker service from the rotation list and makes a request for services. It is noted that FHP troopers are prohibited by internal policy 5.19.00 found in the FHP Policy Manual from being employed by any wrecker company (as opposed to just those on the rotation list) since the FHP deems this to be an unacceptable conflict of interest. The FHP has developed an Auxiliary Policy Manual (Manual) containing various written standards and guidelines governing the conduct of Auxiliary members. Like other policy manuals developed by the FHP, the Manual has not been formally adopted as a rule. As is relevant to this controversy, Section 5.02.08 of the Manual relates to the subject of conflict of interest, and prior to January 1992, simply stated in part that "any conflict between private employment and the FHP or any abuse of a member's FHPA position that benefits his employment will result in immediate dismissal from the FHPA." However, the FHP did not construe this provision as barring petitioner from being a member of the Auxiliary and at the same time having his wrecker business on the FHP rotation list. On January 29, 1992, the director of the FHP issued a memorandum to all troop commanders regarding a change in Section 5.02.08 of the Auxiliary Policy Manual. The newly added language read as follows: Due to the sensitive relationship between the Florida Highway Patrol and wrecker companies, employment involving wrecker companies that do business with the Florida Highway Patrol is considered to be a conflict of interest. The director's memorandum provided the following instructions to all troop commanders regarding the new language in Section 5.02.08: The attached policy revisions will bring the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary Manual in line with the Florida Highway Patrol Manual regarding employment by wrecker companies. If (sic) is requested that you survey all Auxiliary members in your troop to determine if any are in violation of this policy. Please take the necessary action to bring members found in violation of this policy into compliance. In the event the member cannot comply with this policy, it will be necessary that the member resign from the Auxiliary. Pursuant to this new policy, an FHP troop commander contacted petitioner in February 1991 and advised him that he must either remove his wrecker business from the FHP wrecker rotation list or resign from the Auxiliary. Although strongly disagreeing with the policy, petitioner advised the FHP by letter dated February 18, 1992, that he wished to remove his wrecker business from the rotation list. He did so in order to remain a member of the Auxiliary. After his informal appeal challenging the policy was denied, on August 7, 1992, petitioner filed his petition seeking to have the new language in Section 5.02.08 declared invalid as an unpromulgated rule. According to the FHP's chief of special operations, there is no discretion on the part of the troop commander or other enforcing officer except to require strict adherence to the policy. In other words, the policy in question is not subject in application to the discretion of the enforcing officer. Therefore, the policy has uniform application to all Auxiliary members and requires those members who own wrecker businesses on the FHP rotation list to choose between remaining a member of the Auxiliary or removing their business from the FHP rotation list. Since he is directly impacted by the policy, petitioner has standing to bring this action. In August 1992, respondent adopted substantial amendments to Chapter 15B-9, Florida Administrative Code, which relate to "Wrecker Qualifications and Allocation System." However, the rules do not address petitioner's concerns nor codify the so-called conflict of interest policy applicable to Auxiliary members. At hearing respondent also expressed the view, without further explanation, that if it had to adopt the Auxiliary policies as formal rules, it would be a difficult and "cumbersome" task, it might well "have the effect of eliminating the auxiliary service", it would "serve to inhibit the agency from doing its statutory job", and it "would seriously affect the ability of the agency to effectively operate an auxiliary volunteer service." These assertions were not contradicted. Even so, rulemaking is found to be feasible and practicable since there is no evidence to support a finding that at least one of the exceptions in Subsections 120.535(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, is applicable.
