Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following relevant facts are found: HRS District VIII includes Sarasota, DeSoto, Charlotte, Glades, Lee, Hendry and Collier Counties. There are presently no existing and operating osteopathic hospitals within District VIII. However, there are two applications now pending for new for new osteopathic facilities within the District. One is in Sarasota and one is on behalf of the intervenor Doctors' Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Coast Hospital, Inc. (Gulf Coast), which seeks to build and operate a 120-bed acute care osteopathic hospital to be located in south lee County. That application has proceeded through the administrative hearing process, received a Recommended Order for approval of 120 beds, a Final Order for approval of 60 beds and is currently on appeal. The intervenor Naples Community Hospital is an existing allopathic acute care hospital located in Collier County, which is immediately south of Lee County. The intervenor Lee Memorial Hospital is an existing allopathic acute care hospital located in Lee County and has approval to construct and operate a satellite facility in south Lee County. The petitioner Family Center Hospital Osteopathic, Inc., proposes to construct and operate a 100-bed full service, osteopathic teaching hospital in southwest Lee County. A particular site has not yet been selected or acquired. If the proposed facility was established, it would be in competition with allopathic hospitals for patients and staffing. The petitioner's original application for a Certificate of Need was submitted to HRS in the summer of 1982. That application was prepared by a health planning consulting firm, no member of which testified in this proceeding. The original application was amended prior to the hearing with regard to the need for osteopathic beds in the area, the financial projections and the architectural design of the facility. Petitioner intends to retain a full-time management firm to be responsible for managing the proposed facility. No firm commitments have been made and no tentative price quotations have been received for such an arrangement. Petitioner proposes to construct a two-story 90,000 square foot building with ancillary services on the first floor and patient areas on the second floor. The patient areas include a 15-bed obstetrical until, a 10-bed pediatrics unit, an 8-bed ICU/CCU and the remaining beds would be medical- surgical beds. The architect had no knowledge of the location of the site proposed, and thus no site plan has been developed. While the average construction cost per square foot of a health care facility in Florida is approximately $115 or $120, that cost can vary depending upon site development requirements, construction materials, floor coverings, wall coverings and the like. These details have not yet been determined The fact that the proposed facility is to be teaching hospital was not taken into account in the schematic design. An accountant, who had no prior experience with projecting financial feasibility for a health care facility was retained by the petitioner to prepare a projected financial statement for the proposed facility. His opinion that the project would be financially feasible within the second year of operation was based primarily upon occupancy projections made by a health planner, the itemization and costs associated with manpower, salaries, equipment, supplies, etc., as projected in the original application and conversations with a "Mr. Becker" relating to bond financing. He compared his estimates and projections with other Certificate of Need applications in the Lee County area. The accountant was unaware of whether nor not the applications relied upon for comparison purposes had been update or revised at some subsequent time. He also received data concerning revenues of a "select group" of hospitals as published in a Hospital Cost Containment Board report for 1984, but made no determination of that Board's grouping of hospitals for comparative purposes. No independent investigation of the accuracy of the contents of the original application was performed by the accountant or anyone on his behalf. Although the accountant adjusted the manpower requirements as originally projected to conform with his perception of the occupancy projections, he was unaware of the minimum staffing requirements imposed upon hospitals by state and/or federal regulations. The witness candidly admitted that he did not consider it within his expertise to determine the manpower or equipment requirements for the proposed facility. He is unaware of whether or not the bond financing proposed for this project is available. There was no showing that petitioner had sufficient funds available to make expenditures for project development or other pre-opening expenses, estimated to be over $400,000.00. His revenue projections did not take into account the existence of other osteopathic beds in the area. By utilizing alternative methodologies which took into account both statewide and district wide statistics regarding osteopathic utilization rates, the number and distribution of osteopathic physicians, and population projections; the petitioner's health care planner concluded that there is a gross need in the year 1991 for 144 osteopathic acute care hospital beds in District VIII. Assuming that there are no other osteopathic hospitals in District VIII, the health care planner was of the opinion that there is a net need for the same number of beds in that District. She further concludes that the proposed osteopathic hospital would obtain 90% of the osteopathic patients of Lee County, 50% of the osteopathic patients in other District VIII Counties and an occupancy rate of approximately 73% for the second year of operation. She admits that if Gulf Coast is awarded a Certificate of Need for 60 beds or 120 beds and/or if the Sarasota applicant is awarded a Certificate of Need, the net bed need of 144 would be reduced accordingly and the projected market share and occupancy rates would be affected. Petitioner presented no evidence concerning its ability to adequately staff its proposed facility. Likewise, no evidence was presented as to petitioner's ability to obtain funds for capital expenditures or for the operation of the facility. The impact of the proposed project upon the cost of providing health services was not addressed by the petitioner. There is a need for research and educational facilities to train doctors of osteopathic medicine at the student, internship and residency levels. Both Manasota Osteopathic General Hospital in Sarasota and Gulf Coast Hospital in fort Myers have indicated their desires to become teaching facilities.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of May 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May 1986. APPENDIX The proposed joint findings of fact submitted by Doctors' Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Coast Hospital, Inc., and Naples Community Hospital have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary to the issues in this proceeding. Many of the proposed findings of fact contain recitations of a lack of evidence regarding certain criteria. Where these have not been included in the factual findings, they are included in the Conclusions of Law, where pertinent. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude H. Tison, Jr., Esquire MCFARLANE, FERGUSON, ALLISON & KELLY Post Office Box 1531 Tampa, Florida 33601 R. Sam Power, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. C. Newton, II, Esquire CARSON & LINN, P.A. Cambridge Centre 253 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. David Watkins, Esquire OERTEL & HOFFMAN, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Ivan Wood, Jr., Esquire WOOD, LUCKSINGER & ESPTEIN One Houston Center Suite 1600 Houston, Texas 77010 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue An amended administrative complaint, dated July 31, 1989, alleges various violations of Chapter 459, F.S., by Respondent. Counts V, VI and VII, relating to Respondent's treatment of patient, R.C., were voluntarily dismissed by Petitioner at the commencement of the hearing. The following allegations are left at issue: That Respondent violated Section 459.015(1)(u), and (y), F.S., by prescribing Percodan and Ritalin, controlled substances, to his wife, G.I., inappropriately or in excessive quantities. That in the treatment of his wife, Respondent failed to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, in violation of Section 459.015(1)(y), F.S. That Respondent violated Section 459.015(1)(p), F.S., by failing to keep medical records justifying the course of treatment of G.I.; and that of his mother, M.I., for whom he prescribed Demerol.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Donald Iafornaro, D.O., is and has been at all times material to the allegations of the amended administrative complaint, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, with license number OS 0001794. Dr. Iafornaro has a limited osteopathic practice which he conducts from his home at 1802 North Lakemont, Winter Park, Florida. He has about fifty patients, and also treats his large family, including his wife, mother, eleven children and grandchildren. G.I. has been a patient of Dr. Iafornaro for approximately 25 years -- since 1973, as his wife, and prior to that, from 1964, along with the rest of her family in Cleveland, Ohio. Mrs. Iafornaro has had a demanding job caring for the Iafornaro children, her mother-in-law, the house and pets, and has recently been her husband's only staff in his practice. Between May 1985, and April 1987, her husband treated her for a variety of medical problems, including severe allergies, sleep apnea (a mechanical difficulty in breathing during deep sleep), depression, fatigue, a chronic fracture of the foot bone (a fracture which failed to heal), spinal stenosis, an unstable hip, ulcers, angina and various gynecological complaints Between May 1, 1985, and April 11, 1987, Dr. Iafornaro prescribed the following drugs, among others, to his wife: 2,720 tablets of Percodan 900 tablets of Ritalin Percodan is the product name for oxycodone hydrochloride, and Ritalin is the product name for methylphenidate hydrochloride. Both are Schedule II controlled substances and are legend drugs as defined in Section 465.003(7), F.S. With the concurrence of the parties, official recognition was taken of the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) for the years 1984-1987. Petitioner also presented the testimony of two osteopathic physicians practicing in Dr. Iafornaro's community. The evidence from these authorities established that the prescriptions of Percodan and Ritalin for G.I. were inappropriate or in excessive quantities. Dr. Iafornaro felt that Ritalin was necessary to counteract the sedative effect of the antihistamines his wife had to take for her many allergies. He also prescribed the Ritalin for her depression. Ritalin is a mild central nervous system stimulant. It is indicated for attention deficit disorders (primarily in children) and narcolepsy. It should not be used for severe depression or for the prevention or treatment of normal fatigue. The PDR warns of drug dependence. Ritalin is also contraindicated in patients, such as G.I., who have exhibited anxiety, tension, depression and agitation. Ritalin may cause reactions such as skin rashes, a common complaint of this patient, but a problem which Dr. Iafornaro attributed to her multiple allergies. The Percodan was prescribed by Dr. Iafornaro for his wife's pain in her foot and for other pain in her low back and in her wrist. The PDR warns that Percodan may be habit forming. It contains aspirin, which can aggravate ulcers. It is indicated for relief of moderate to moderately severe pain; it is a depressant; it can cause apnea and respiratory depression in an overdose. Mrs. Iafornaro's statement that she used only about a half a tablet a day is inconsistent with the volume of the drugs prescribed for her over the relevant period. Dr. Iafornaro produced all of his medical records for G.I. for the relevant period. He claims they are incomplete because he also makes notes on odds and ends, writes on the back of a medical journal and keeps a lot of records in his head. (Iafornaro Deposition, p.15) The medical records produced by Dr. Iafornaro do not justify his course of treatment,for this patient, and particularly fail to explain the long-term volume of drugs that he was prescribing. Dr. Iafornaro claims that the probable cause panel previously reviewed his records and found them acceptable. The records were produced in response to charges that he had violated certain terms of an earlier disciplinary action. The issue was resolved with a "no probable cause" finding. That finding, in 1983, was for a different time period than the period at issue in this proceeding. Dr. Iafornaro provided records to the panel covering a limited period in 1983 when he was treating his wife for her foot fracture, a slip and fall accident and other acute conditions. The 1983 records, in contrast to those at issue here, describe the condition and his treatment. The later records provide copious listings of a variety of prescriptions, including the Percodan and Ritalin, with scant examination results, explanation of the condition being treated, or diagnoses of the complaints. Complete written medical records are an essential element of prudent osteopathic practice, particularly when, as here, the physician is treating his family and his objectivity may be questioned. Between January 5, 1987, and March 1, 1987, Dr. Iafornaro prescribed 200 50 mg Demerol tablets to his 84 year old mother, M.I. Demerol is a product name for meperidine hydrocloride, a Schedule II controlled substance, and a legend drug as defined in Section 465.003(7), F.S. The basis for the prescriptions was an episode of right upper quadrant pain felt to be of gallbladder origin. It is cheaper to purchase Demerol tablets by the 100. After M.I. took a few of the first prescription of 100, she lost the bottle and Dr. Iafornaro replaced it with another prescription. The medical records make no mention of the lost prescription, but they marginally justify the use of this drug for the limited period in issue and for the purpose intended. A previous disciplinary case involving allegations of Dr. Iafornaro's improper prescriptions and record-keeping practices was resolved with a stipulation for his one-year probation with conditions. The stipulation was approved by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners in a Final Order entered on December 28, 1982. (DPR Cases #0010979, 0014467, and 0015303)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners enter a Final Order which finds Donald Iafornaro, D.O., guilty of having violated the provision of Subsection 459.015(i)(p), (u) and (y), F.S. and imposing the following penalties: Suspension of license for 90 days and until such time as he appears before the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners and establishes that he has taken and passed the examination conducted by the National Board of Examiners for Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons or the Special Purpose Examination (SPEX) of the Federation of State Medical Boards, as designated by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners in its final order; Upon reinstatement that his license be placed on probation for two years subject to such terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Board, including, but not limited to, restriction of practice, direct or indirect supervision of practice or prescribing of controlled substances and required additional continuing education; That he be permanently restricted from prescribing controlled substances to family members, unless under direct supervision of another osteopathic physician; That a reprimand be imposed; That a fine of $2,000. be imposed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5277 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3.-5. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10. Some blood pressure monitoring is found in the records however. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted as a conclusion of law and in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 19. Respondent's Proposed Findings Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph l. Adopted in part in paragraphs 7-10, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 4.-6. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 7.&8. Adopted in paragraphs 15, 17 and 18. 9. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Dept. of Professional Regulation 730 S. Sterling Street Tampa, FL 33609 Sam Murrell, Jr., Esquire P.O. Box 1749 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Rod Presnell Executive Director Osteopathic Medical Examiners Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, Jules Jonas Dossick, D.O. violated statutes governing the practice of osteopathic medicine on the grounds alleged in the administrative complaint and if so, what disciplinary action is appropriate. Background and Procedural Matters This proceeding commenced when Petitioner filed its administrative complaint and Respondent timely requested a formal hearing. At the hearing Petitioner verbally amended its complaint by deleting all factual and legal allegations relating to sexual misconduct and violations of Section 459.015(1)(k) Florida Statutes. Petitioner presented evidence through three witnesses and four exhibits. Respondent testified on his own behalf and presented one exhibit. All exhibits were admitted without objection. Petitioner has submitted a proposed recommended order, which proposal has been considered and, in part, included in this order. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is found in the appendix attached hereto. By pleadings dated May 23, 1986, Respondent has moved for a re- hearing and has objected to the Petitioner's proposed recommended order, both on the grounds that he has now retained counsel and should have the opportunity to have the case re-heard with the benefit of an attorney. Respondent had an attorney in an earlier part of this proceeding and discharged him by letter dated February 22, 1986. (see letter attached to motion to withdraw filed March 3, 1986). Approximately two months later the final hearing was held. Respondent had ample time to retain new counsel or ask for a continuance. He proceeded to hearing, aware of his rights and without protest. The record is void of any basis to consider such extraordinary relief.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dr. Dossick, is now and at all times relevant has been licensed as an osteopathic physician in Florida under license number OS 0000874. He practices at his clinic, North Miami Medical Center, located at 4805 East 4th Avenue in Hialeah, Florida. (T-10,11). The clinic is comprised of a reception room, a kitchen that is also used as an office, a bathroom near the reception area, a supply room, two examining rooms, and two additional rooms with a bathroom and shower at the rear of the clinic. Dr. Dossick lives at the clinic and keeps the additional rooms for his bedroom, for storage and for personal use. One of the additional rooms was used several years ago as a third examining room. (T-43, 44, 114-116). In January 1985, two investigators from the Department of Professional Regulation went to Respondent's Clinic for an inspection. They took pictures and spoke to Dr. Dossick. Three other individuals were at the clinic the day of the inspection: a man and woman in one examining room, and a woman in what the inspectors thought was an examining room, but was identified by Dr. Dossick as his personal use and storage room. (T-41, 49, 57, 64, 116). The investigators found the clinic in varying stages of filth and disarray. The reception room was old and worn, unclean, but with little sign of current use. The kitchen had dirty dishes and exposed garbage. The examining rooms were fairly neat but the medications on the countertops were old, dirty and, in some cases, expired. There was no garbage in the two examining rooms, but they did not appear clean. The third room, the former examining room (now used for storage and Dr. Dossick's personal living quarters) was a mess: clothing, mail and fast food containers were strewn about, cotton swabs were exposed and piled on a counter; syringes and medications were also exposed on the countertops. In this room the narcotics supply was stored in a locked cabinet. Two dogs were present in the clinic, one of which had patches of hair missing as if diseased. (T-46, 49, Petitioner's Exhibits #3 and #4) There was no evidence that patients had access to the kitchen, supply room or Dr. Dossick's bedroom. Patients occasionally go to the former examining room and wait there prior to seeing the doctor. Dr. Dossick keeps his own dog at the clinic and, even though he does not encourage them, his patients sometimes bring their animals to the clinic with them. Dr. Dossick admitted that he had trouble for a while keeping the place clean. The woman who worked for him injured her knee in a karate tournament and had surgery. While the admission of problems was candid, the excuse regarding the former cleaning worker was confused: the handwritten statement Dr. Dossick presented from Barbara O'Rourke suggested that her accident and subsequent surgery occurred in April and July 1 85, respectively; that is, several months after the DPR inspectors' visit. (T-64, 87-89, 105-106, 112-113). Linda Joyce Godfrey is a patient of Dr. Dossick. She is thirty-nine years old, was born with cerebral palsy, and around 1981 was diagnosed with multiple-sclerosis. She is crippled and walks unaided with considerable difficulty. She has undergone several operations and lengthy periods of hospitalization. She has been under the care of various physicians, including an orthopedist, several neurosurgeons, and another osteopathic physician. (T-66, 69) Ms. Godfrey began seeing Dr. Dossick after an extended hospitalization period. She picked him at random and asked for percodan, a controlled narcotic substance, generally prescribed for pain relief. He refused to give her the percodan and prescribed a non-narcotic medication instead. She continued seeing him and later he prescribed placidyl, percocet and percodan at various times to help her sleep and for the severe pain in her muscles and bones. He did not give her these medications until he obtained her hospital reports and talked with her regular physicians. (T-66,69,81) Ms. Godfrey admits that she was an addict. She claims that Dr. Dossick was initially unaware of this but later helped her get off the habit. On one occasion she went to his office in the state of apparent overdose. He called Hialeah Fire and Rescue and got her out of there. He told her not to come around anymore because he didn't go for drugs. She later went back and asked for help. The evidence is inconclusive as to whether Ms. Godfrey's episode was an overdose or a grand mal seizure. (T-69, 73-76, 80, 90-91). According to Ms. Godfrey, Dr. Dossick injected her with Demerol on only one occasion, around six weeks prior to the hearing, after her apartment was broken into and she was raped. (T-71, 72). The practice of osteopathic medicine encompasses all aspects of medicine commonly referred to as allopathic medicine, but also includes physiotherapy, manipulative therapy, nutrition: a holistic approach. (T-13,14). This characterization of the distinction between the professions is borne out in the statutory definitions of "practice of medicine" and "practice of osteopathic medicine": "Practice of osteopathic medicine" means the diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition, which practice is based in part upon educational standards and requirements which emphasize the importance of the musculoskeletal structure and manipulative therapy in the maintenance and restoration of health. 1l. Except for the underlined verbiage the two definitions are the same. See Section 458.305(3) Florida Statutes, and Section 459.003(3) Florida Statutes. One of the rudiments of osteopathic medicine values the "laying of hands" as part of caring for a patient in a very kind and personal manner. Cleanliness of the person and the physical area surrounding the practitioner is essential to avoid transferring disease from one patient to another. (T-18,19) Animals should not be present in the clinic because of the potential for communicating disease to humans through fleas, flies or the animals. (T-18) Old, dirty drugs and syringes should be disposed of in such a manner as to avoid access and use. (T-19,20) The above standards were described in the competent, uncontroverted testimony of Petitioner's expert, Ralph Birzon, D.O. Those standards were violated by Dr. Dossick when he allowed dogs in the clinic, when he failed to properly dispose of old drugs and syringes, and when he failed to keep his clinic clean. Dr. Dossick does, however, treat his patients in a very kind and personal manner. Ms. Godfrey was called as Petitioner's witness. Her testimony was credible and touchingly candid, as also was Dr. Dossick's. Ms. Godfrey said Dr. Dossick helped her; he took pity on her; he is good to his patients and is a good man. She does not have the money to pay for his treatment or the prescriptions, so she sometimes files and answers the phone at the clinic. Dr. Dossick is the oldest physician in the area; he spends a lot of time with his patients and they depend on him. He regularly treats his patients without charge, or for a token fee. He also loans them money for prescriptions. He has treated some patients for 25-30 years. (T-81, 83, 93, 95-96, 103) Dr. Dossick has previously been suspended by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners for six months because of allegations that he prescribed medication without performing an examination. He volunteered this fact. (T-97, 107-109) The violations occurred approximately ten years ago. See Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners v Dossick DOAH #76-1814; Dossick v Florida State Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, 359 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978). The clinic has been cleaned up since the investigators' visit and the dirty and outdated drugs have been discarded. (T- 88,104)
Findings Of Fact At the final hearing, the parties agreed to the following facts: The Respondent Garcia-Lavin is not presently, nor has she been at any time in the past, a board eligible or board certified psychiatrist; the term "board" referring to the American Board of Psychiatry or the American Osteopathic Board of Neurology and Psychiatry. In September, 1981, the Department sent to all providers of medicaid psychiatric services, including the Respondent Garcia-Lavin, a letter requesting verification of board certification or eligibility. The Respondent received her letter and informed the Department that she was not a provider of psychiatric services. Subsequent to the receipt of this letter, the Respondent Garcia-Lavin stopped billing the state for psychiatric services provided by her to medicaid patients. Pursuant to a medicaid program audit, the Department determined that between January 1, 1980 and October 5, 1980, the Respondent was paid $7,212.06 for medicaid psychiatric services provided when she was ineligible to participate in the program. On July 8, 1982, the Department notified the Respondent Garcia-Lavin that the billings during this ten-month period were improper, represented overpayments and demanded repayment of such monies. The Respondent Garcia-Lavin does not dispute that she was ineligible to participate in the program. Her position however, is that once the Department notified her that she was ineligible she stopped billing the state, and, had the Department notified her earlier, she would not have seen the patients in question. Due to the Department's failure to notify her of her ineligibility, the Respondent asserts that she should not be required to reimburse the Department for patients seen prior to such notification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, requiring the Respondent Marta S. Garcia-Lavin to reimburse $7,212.06, which represents the sum of improper payments made between January 1, 1980 and October 5, 1980. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Weiss, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Suite 406 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Marta S. Garcia-Lavin, M.D. 590 East 25th Street, Ste. 401 Hialeah, Florida 33013 Alicia Jacobs, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the licensure examination taken by the Petitioner qualifies him under Section 459.007(3), Florida Statutes, for licensure as an osteopathic physician in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Lawrence Edward Suess, is an osteopathic physician licensed by the Boards of Medical Examiners in Texas, Alabama, and Kentucky. He seeks licensure in Florida, pursuant to Section 459.007(3), Florida Statutes. He is also licensed in Arizona and Texas as a registered nurse, holds BS and MS degrees in child development and nursing and a Ph.D. in nursing. The Respondent, the Board of Osteopathic Medicine (Board), is an agency of the State of Florida, charged with regulating the admission to practice and the practice and licensure standards of osteopathic physicians licensed or seeking to be licensed in the State of Florida. The Board issued an order, as corrected, on November 9, 1995, granting application of licensure to the Petitioner upon the condition that within one year, he successfully complete Part III of the NBOME examination for purposes of licensure in the State of Florida, and not for diplomate status. The Board found in that order that the Petitioner had not passed all three parts of the NBOME examination and had submitted certification of passage of only Parts I and II. The Board found that the “FLEX” examination was not a substantially-similar examination to the required NBOME examination since the FLEX examination did not contain an osteopathic medicine component. The Board also found that the completion by the Petitioner of a Board certification examination was not substantially similar to the NBOME examination because it tested only a single subject matter and not the broad principles contained in Part III of the NBOME examination. On November 13, 1995, a Petition for Formal Hearing was filed by the Petitioner disputing the decision of the Board which precluded him from obtaining licensure to practice medicine in the State of Florida because of failure to complete Part III of the NBOME examination. He contended that he was outside the time period in which he would be allowed to take Part III. He further contended that the FLEX examination was a substantially-similar examination to the NBOME examination. The Petitioner contends that taking the FLEX examination should be sufficient to justify licensure, although he also acknowledged that Part III of the NBOME examination tests osteopathic philosophy and principle; and he acknowledged that the FLEX examination does not, although he was attempting to testify and argue that the FLEX examination was substantially similar to the NBOME examination. He provided no testimony or evidence, however, to establish that the FLEX examination tests osteopathic philosophy and principle. The Respondent presented the testimony of Joseph Smoley, Ph.D. by deposition. Dr. Smoley holds a Ph.D. in educational measurement and has served for ten of the last eleven years as Executive Director of the NBOME. The NBOME is an organization that develops an examination that is independent of the osteopathic medical schools to evaluate osteopathic physicians who are either currently in undergraduate or in graduate medical programs. The NBOME’s main mission is to provide state licensing examinations with an independent assessment of the knowledge base of candidate osteopathic physicians. Dr. Smoley oversees NBOME policy and supervises educational measurement within the osteopathic profession. His oversight responsibilities include the examination section of the NBOME. He provides a constant review of the process of testing for the Board of Directors. The NBOME developed its examination by having questions drafted by faculty members and osteopathic physicians in independent practice. Faculty members may be D.O.’s or Ph.D.’s in the various basic sciences, and there is a multi-tiered process for preparing and reviewing questions. A copy of the bulletin of information concerning the NBOME examinations was attached to and made part of the deposition. Dr. Smoley testified that typically the candidates take Part I as a sophomore during medical school, Part II as a senior, and Part III as an intern in their first post-graduate year. He established that the purpose behind that examination is “the integration of osteopathic principles and practices as well as the philosophy of osteopathic medicine.” No allopathic physicians are involved in the grading process of that examination. Some allopathic physicians associated with osteopathic colleges may submit questions that, after the review process, may be used on the examination. The purpose of the NBOME examination, as shown by Dr. Smoley, is to make sure that each question integrates osteopathic principles and practices in some way and that the entire examination is reflective of the practice of osteopathic medicine. Dr. Smoley is also familiar with the FLEX examination, as well as the current licensure examination for allopathic physicians, the USMLE. The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) does not prepare any complete examination or any additional components for its regular examination concerning manipulation or osteopathic practice and principles. According to Dr. Smoley, there has never been an official comparison or analysis between the NBOME examination and the FLEX examination. Based upon his experience and educational measurement, he has determined that if one examination, the NBOME, contains osteopathic principles and practice and the other examination, the FLEX, does not incorporate those principles and practices, then the two examinations could not be considered equivalent. The NBOME examination is more extensive because it integrates osteopathic principles and practice throughout its content. This osteopathic examination is not simply one that tests manipulation. Therefore, it is not asserted to be appropriate for chiropractors or M.D.’s who have been trained in manipulation but only for persons who have received an osteopathic medical education. The Respondent also presented the testimony by deposition of James R. Winn, M.D. He is Executive Vice President of the FSMB. The FSMB assists state medical boards in conducting their evaluation of physicians regarding their fitness to practice medicine. The FSMB developed examinations which are administered by state boards. Dr. Winn serves as the supervisor for the examination services section of the FSMB. Those examinations are developed in cooperation with the National Board of Medical Examiners. The current examination available from the FSMB is the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) used since 1992. Prior to that time, the FSMB administered the FLEX examination, which was for the evaluation of all physicians requesting licensure. The FLEX examination did not have a section on osteopathic practice, as shown by Dr. Winn. The FSMB allows all physicians seeking licensure in the United States to take that examination, including graduates of osteopathic medical schools and graduates of foreign medical schools. With the FLEX examination, unlike the NBOME examination, medical students are not eligible, only graduates of medical schools are eligible to take the examination. Dr. Winn is familiar with the examination of the NBOME and its purpose. He is not aware of any side-by-side comparison between the two examinations to determine equivalency. In his expert opinion, there would have to be such an evaluation in order to determine whether the examinations are equivalent. The testimony of Drs. Smoley and Winn was elaborated upon and corroborated by Dr. Morton Morris. Dr. Morris is a licensed osteopathic physician in the State of Florida and is board certified in osteopathic surgery by the American Osteopathic Board of Orthopedic Surgery. He is also certified by the American Board of Quality Medical Assurance and is a fellow of the American College of Legal Medicine. He is Vice-Chancellor for academic affairs in the health professions division at Nova Southeastern University, a Florida osteopathic medical school. Additionally, Dr. Morris is a licensed, practicing attorney in the State of Florida. He practices in the areas of medical malpractice, general health law and administrative law. Dr. Morris is familiar with the NBOME examination, having served as a test item writer for the NBOME. He recognizes Dr. Smoley as one who helps develop the philosophy of the examinations in question. The philosophy of the NBOME is that content concerning osteopathic practice and principles permeates the entire examination. Even when certain questions on their face are not osteopathically oriented, the evaluation and the grading of the responses is carried out from an osteopathic viewpoint and philosophy. The test item writers are directed to draft test questions which include osteopathic philosophy. In the past, the NBOME has agreed to allow a candidate to take only Part III or an equivalent examination and receive the score from the NBOME. In fact, Dr. Morris represented that person in his capacity as an attorney. He worked out the arrangements whereby that candidate could take and pass Part III of the NBOME examination in order to obtain a Florida osteopathic medical license, as the Petitioner seeks herein, even though, since he would not have taken Part III within the required seven years, he could not receive diplomate status with the NBOME. The Board’s order in this case specifically requires passage of Part III of that examination, but it does not require diplomate status. Such an arrangement would thus seem to provide a means to alleviate the Petitioner’s predicament in the instant situation. The Petitioner, in questioning Dr. Morris upon cross- examination, inquired about the possibility of a person taking all three parts of the NBOME examination, even if he had already taken Parts I and II. Dr. Morris stated that that was possible. Page 7 of the Bulletin of Information, in evidence in Respondent’s Exhibit 1, although stating that the candidate cannot take the examination “to attempt to improve his score”, states nothing to indicate preclusion of a candidate taking the entire examination for any other purpose. Dr. Morris stated that the Petitioner could take Part III of the examination and that the NBOME would make arrangements to allow him to do that, with the understanding that if he passed Part III, he would not be able to receive diplomate status from the NBOME (because of passage of time before taking Part III). In making comparisons between osteopathic medical education and allopathic medical education, Dr. Morris acknowledged that in some cases, osteopathic medical colleges use the same textbooks as used by allopathic medical schools. That does not, however, make them similar professions. Although anatomy and physiology may not be different, the philosophy of treating the whole patient is different. Responding to the Petitioner’s contention that having obtained board certification in his specialty area should count as equivalency to the entry level examination, Dr. Morris pointed out that all that the board certification accomplishes is to show that an osteopathic physician is recognized by his or her peers as competent to practice a specialty. It does not mean that the person is osteopathically oriented enough to be eligible for licensure and to be able to pass a minimum competency examination. The Petitioner contends that having passed Parts I and II of the NBOME examination, FLEX should quality him for osteopathic licensure in the State of Florida, in lieu of taking Part III of the NBOME examination, because anything of an osteopathic nature would have already been tested on Parts I and II. Dr. Morris established to the contrary, however, that Part III is the clinical testing, the testing of how the individual puts to use his clinical evaluation in treatment of patients. It is the ultimate test of whether an individual has developed and is able to apply a philosophy of practice sufficient to show that he is competent to be an osteopathic physician. Parts I and II of the NBOME examination do not test clinical skills. The FLEX does test clinical skills, but it does not test for osteopathic practices as to clinical skills. The NBOME requires that a person take Part III within seven years of having taken Part I, if that person wishes to be a diplomate of the NBOME. There is no apparent preclusion, however, in a person arranging to take only Part III, simply for purposes of state licensure. The record is not clear whether a person could take Parts I, II and III within the period of one year. It does seem apparent, however, that the Petitioner could take Part III within a one-year time period, which is all that is required in the Board’s order. Further, the statute requires that a person take all parts of the NBOME examination or a substantially-equivalent examination. What the Petitioner attempts to do is to take two parts of the NBOME examination and then substitute a different examination (FLEX) for Part III. This does not constitute a substantially-equivalent examination for the above reasons. A substantially-equivalent examination would have to be equivalent to all three parts of the NBOME examination. During discussion of the difference between osteopathic and allopathic schools of medicine, Dr. Morris pointed out that many osteopathic physicians use the same modalities that allopathic physicians use. It is just that they also use osteopathic modalities. He gave the example of a cardiac patient whom an osteopathic physician would treat just as a medical doctor would treat the basic condition with appropriate drugs but then would incorporate osteopathic philosophy, such as the “lymphatic pump”, meaning that the osteopathic physician would incorporate muscle techniques of stretching and passive manipulation in order to help the patient. The osteopathic physician would possibly use manipulative techniques on the lymphatic system and not just use drugs or other allopathic techniques. In the context of the NBOME examination, a question might reference a cardiac patient. Although the question would not mention the lymphatic pump, a proper answer might entail a clinical response that would consider that modality of treatment. In orthopedics, Dr. Morris’ specialty, an osteopathic physician can make significant use of manipulative techniques, as well as general surgery, casting and other modalities normally used by allopathic physicians. Use of the FLEX examination, rather than the NBOME examination, would not lower standards for osteopathic physicians. Rather, the FLEX examination simply embodies a different standard than the one used to test for competency in osteopathic principles and medicine. The Petitioner acknowledged that he could have taken Part III of the NBOME examination but chose not to because it was then more convenient for him to take the FLEX examination to continue his training in the State of Texas which required passage of the FLEX examination for osteopathic licensure. The Petitioner contended that if he applied for a Florida osteopathic medical faculty certificate (MFC), the FLEX examination would be acceptable and he would be eligible. That fact, he contends, by analogy, establishes that he is qualified to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida. He has never applied for such a certificate nor has he been offered an osteopathic medical faculty position in the State of Florida. Thus, determination of that issue is not before this tribunal. Even if it were, there are significant differences between a full license to practice osteopathic medicine indefinitely and a medical faculty certificate. With the MFC, the Petitioner would not be allowed to be engaged in private practice of osteopathic medicine and the MFC would only allow him to practice in the academic realm for only two years. Finally, the statutory requirements for an MFC do not require the passage of any licensure examination. Accordingly, to the extent that the Petitioner’s argument and testimony implies some analogy or equivalency between eligibility for the MFC and eligibility for full licensure, such equivalency is not borne out by the greater weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of the Petitioner, Lawrence Edward Suess, D.O., for licensure as an osteopathic physician, without conditions, is denied on the basis that the FLEX examination has not been shown to be substantially similar to the NBOME examination.DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence E. Suess, D.O., Ph.D. Owensboro Psychiatric Institute 1700 Frederica Street, Suite 106 Owensboro, Kentucky 42301 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Room PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William H. Buckhalt, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0757 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309
The Issue The issues are: (1) Whether Respondent exercised influence within a physician-patient relationship for the purpose of engaging a patient in sexual activity in violation of Subsection 459.015 (1)(l), Florida Statutes; (2) Whether Respondent engaged a patient in sexual activity outside the scope of practice or the scope of generally accepted examination and treatment of the patient in violation of Section 459.0141, Florida Statutes; and (3) If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice as an osteopathic physician.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine pursuant to Chapters 455 and 459, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, having been issued License No. OS-004450. Respondent has a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in clinical psychology and experimental psychology from Temple University, was an assistant professor of psychology at a community college before studying osteopathic medicine, and taught as an assistant professor of psychiatry in family practice at Southeastern Osteopathic Medical School. Respondent completed a residency program at Southeastern Osteopathic Hospital in North Hollywood, Florida, and also completed a three-year family practice residency program. After completing his residency programs, Respondent moved to Sarasota, Florida, and began as a family practice physician. In December 1998, Patient K.C. (K.C.) was 33 years old, married, and the mother of two children, six and two years old. Before getting married, K.C. had lived with her parents. She had attended community college for two years but did not obtain a degree. K.C. had been employed as a sales clerk and clerical staff person. On or about December 29, 1998, K.C. first presented to Respondent suffering from migraine headaches and neck pain, chronic conditions she had suffered for approximately ten years. From December 29, 1998, through or about October 1, 1999, Respondent provided osteopathic medical treatment for pain to K.C. During this period of time, Respondent treated K.C.'s migraine headaches and neck pain with heat, osteopathic manipulation, and prescription medication. Respondent also diagnosed anxiety and depression for K.C. and prescribed medication, Ativan, for this condition. Throughout the time Respondent saw K.C., he also prescribed up to six tablets per day of a sedative, Fioricet. During the time that Respondent was treating K.C., he saw K.C. once or twice a month, except for April, August, and September 1999. Respondent's records reflect that he saw K.C. four times in April, three times in August, and six times in September. There are several manipulation techniques used by Respondent in treating patients. One manipulation technique used by Respondent involves traction of the neck and movement of the patient’s head while the patient is lying down on her back. Another technique, while the patient is lying on her back, involves Respondent’s using his chest to exert pressure down on the patient’s crossed arms and body through the spine to Respondent’s hands located behind her neck and thoracic spine. Another technique has the patient roll over to the side with the leg up to the side while Respondent adjusts her pelvic bone. During this procedure, Respondent’s hand and forearm arm are placed on the buttocks to effect a pushing or pulling of the pelvic bone. The last technique Respondent provides is for the upper thoracic and lower neck area. For this, the patient places her hands on top of her head. Respondent then brings his hands around the torso from behind, placing them at the back of her neck. While the hands provide traction to the neck, Respondent pushes his chest against the spine of the patient to lift the thoracic vertebrae. It is not uncommon during this procedure for Respondent to brush his hands on the patient’s breast. Respondent’s normal office procedure is to do manipulations on patients in his treatment room with the door closed and no other persons present for 10 to 15 minutes. From December 1998 until August 12, 1999, Respondent provided adjustments to K.C. and prescribed medication and did not engage in any sexual activity or relationship with K.C. Prior to August 12, 1999, during his treatments of K.C., Respondent sometimes engaged in "random conversations." For example, during one treatment Respondent asked what kind of car she drove and when she told him, Respondent asked K.C, if her husband cared about her. Respondent told K.C. that a sports utility vehicle (SUV) was a safe vehicle, especially for someone with her condition and indicated that his wife drove an SUV. Respondent then insinuated that if K.C.'s husband cared about her, he should or would buy her an SUV. During another treatment, Respondent told K.C. that she had a good body and asked if she had been a cheerleader. During another treatment, Respondent, while engaging in conversation with K.C., made an unrelated statement about how many times per week the average married couple has sex. At another time, while treating K.C. at his office, Respondent mentioned that the sex life of people with chronic pain may be affected by their condition and asked if her sex life was so affected. Still, during another treatment, Respondent asked K.C. about her relationship with her husband, specifically inquiring as to how they related to one another. In the summer of 1999, K.C. traveled by car to Canada to visit her husband's family. For K.C., the trip to Canada was stressful and while there, she was in a lot pain. Because of the pain she was experiencing, K.C. called Respondent's office while she was still out-of-town to schedule an appointment for an adjustment upon her return to Sarasota and to request that one of her prescriptions be refilled. After K.C. returned from the trip to Canada, on the morning of August 13, 1999, she went to Respondent's office for her scheduled appointment for an adjustment. When K.C. arrived at Respondent's office, she was in a lot of pain and began to cry. K.C. told the nurse or medical assistant that she was in a lot of pain and had had a "bad trip to Canada." The nurse then escorted K.C. to an examination room. When Respondent came into to examination room, K.C. was sobbing and could hardly talk. Respondent asked K.C. to explain why she was so upset. Respondent proceeded to do an adjustment and, again, asked K.C. why she was so upset. K.C. described her feelings to Respondent, who then told K.C. that he used to counsel with patients, that he had helped a girl just like her, and that he could help her if she were willing to come back to the office and talk with him. After K.C. agreed to come back and talk to Respondent, he asked K.C. how he could reach her. In response, K.C. gave Respondent her pager number. After K.C.'s morning appointment on August 13, 1999, Respondent contacted K.C. on her pager and asked if she had made arrangements for her sons to be taken care of so that she could come back to the office to talk with him. K.C. told Respondent that she had made arrangements for her sons and agreed to return to Respondent's office that afternoon. When K.C. returned to Respondent's office on the afternoon of August 13, 1999, Beverly Carrington (Beverly), a medical assistant in Respondent's office, was vacuuming the office. At Respondent's direction, Beverly took K.C. to an examination room. Several minutes later Respondent came into the examination room and told K.C. that he had to make some calls and that he would be back in a few minutes. Respondent gave K.C. a sandwich that he said he had left over from lunch. After Respondent gave K.C. the sandwich, he left the examination room, closing the door behind him. Respondent eventually returned to the examination room and sat in a chair next to the chair in which K.C. was sitting. Respondent began asking K.C. questions about herself, similar to questions that she had been asked by counselors or psychologists. While Respondent was talking to K.C., Beverly knocked on the door of the examination room and told Respondent that she had finished vacuuming the office. Respondent indicated to Beverly that she could go home and soon thereafter, Petitioner heard Beverly leave the building.1 After Beverly left the office, Respondent continued to ask K.C. questions for the next 15 or 20 minutes. Respondent then asked K.C. to get up from her chair, face the mirror in the room, and look in the mirror. K.C. felt uncomfortable looking in the mirror, so she kept her head down. Respondent then put his hands on K.C.'s face and held her face up so that she was looking in the mirror. While doing this, Respondent asked K.C., "Don't you know you're beautiful?" Respondent placed his hands on K.C.'s shoulders and brushed his lips against her neck. Respondent began rubbing or massaging K.C.'s neck and while doing so told K.C. that she was "real tight in [her] neck" and that he would like to work on her neck again and see if he could loosen it up and help her relax. Respondent then led her to the examination table and "proceeded to rub [her] neck and then he started to take off [her] clothes." While on the examination table, Respondent helped K.C. take off her shirt, shorts, bra, and shoes and the only remaining clothing that she had on was her underwear. After her clothes were removed, K.C. presumed Respondent would cover her with a towel or give her a robe, but he did not provide K.C. with any covering. Instead, Respondent sat behind K.C., massaged her neck, and talked to her "soothingly" for about ten minutes. Respondent then took his hands and rubbed her arms and then moved his hands to her breasts, and then down to her waist and towards her panties. When Respondent moved toward K.C.'s panties, she would "tense up" and then Respondent would "start rubbing up the top part of her again." Respondent's hands again went toward her underwear and he "put his hand to go under [K.C's] underwear." K.C. was nervous about what was going on and told Respondent that she was uncomfortable. After K.C. told Respondent that she was uncomfortable, he acknowledged that she seemed uncomfortable. Respondent then handed K.C. her clothes, assisted her in sitting up on the examination table, and sat on the table while K.C. dressed herself. After talking to Respondent for about five minutes, K.C. left the doctor's office with a worse headache, feeling distraught. K.C. next saw Respondent a few days later, on a Monday or Tuesday, for an adjustment for a headache and pain. Respondent performed an adjustment on K.C. that day. During this appointment, Respondent, again, told K.C. that he wanted to help and counsel her. He told K.C. about an upcoming gun show and stated that they could talk while driving to the gun show. Later that week, Respondent paged K.C. and asked her to come to his office. In response to Respondent's request, K.C. went to Respondent's office. Once there, Respondent took K.C. to an examination room and talked to her again about the gun show. Respondent again told her that he would like for her to go to the gun show with him so that they could have time to talk. K.C. was in Respondent's office that day about ten minutes and did not receive a treatment. A few days later, on Saturday, K.C. met Respondent at his office to go the gun show. When she got there, Respondent recommended that she leave her car at the office and ride in his Toyota 4-Runner so that they could talk. Respondent stated that he and K.C. were going somewhere in Palmetto, Florida, but they actually ended up at the Manatee Civic Center. While Respondent was driving to the gun show, he told K.C. that he hoped that he was not mistaken as to the dates of the gun show. In fact, when Respondent and K.C. arrived at the Manatee Civic Center, there was no one there. Nevertheless, Respondent pulled his car into a space in the parking lot on the side of the building. Respondent left the car running and took off his seat belt as he talked to K.C. At some point, Respondent kicked his shoes off and loosened his pants and/or pulled them down, reached over toward K.C., took off her seat belt, told K.C. to get more comfortable, and adjusted her power seat in his Toyota 4-Runner to lean back more. Respondent then touched K.C.'s genitals and proceeded to get on top of her and have intercourse. While on top of her, Respondent pointed out that there were police cars in the back of the parking lot. Once Respondent pointed out the police cars, K.C. observed two or four police cars in the parking lot. Even though there were no policemen in the cars, K.C. expressed concern about the police cars to Respondent. Respondent told K.C. that she should not worry because the windows in his vehicle were tinted. Respondent and K.C. were in the parking lot about 20 minutes, although the intercourse was only three to five minutes. After the intercourse, Respondent put his clothes back on or pulled his pants up and drove back to his office. This was the first time that Respondent and K.C. had intercourse. A few days later, K.C. and Respondent engaged in sexual activity in Respondent’s vehicle during lunch while they drove to Marina Jack’s. Respondent picked up lunch at the hospital and then returned to the parking lot of his office, where K.C. met him. K.C. left her car in the parking lot and got in Respondent's Toyota 4-Runner. Respondent gave K.C. her lunch and then "fingered" her while she ate her lunch as he drove to Marina Jack's. During the period between August and October 1999, K.C. went to Respondent's house on Siesta Key. The house was in a gated community, and in order to gain entry, K.C. told the guard at the gate that she was going to Respondent's house and would give the guard her name or another name that Respondent had told her to use. At other times, K.C. would follow Respondent through the gate in her car. Some of these visits were on weekdays during Respondent's lunch break. During some of those visits, K.C. and Respondent would talk and have intercourse. K.C. and Respondent had intercourse at Respondent's house about ten times. One Saturday between August and October 1999, K.C. went to Respondent's house after he invited her to come out and talk to him and go to the beach. That day Respondent met K.C. somewhere in town and drove her to his house. When they arrived at Respondent's house, K.C. took out a bathing suit and went upstairs to change. It is unclear whether K.C. and Respondent had intercourse or engaged in any sexual activity on this day. K.C. contemporaneously reported the sexual relationship with Respondent to her husband and to a minister who had known and counseled her before she met Respondent. K.C. told her minister that the sexual activities with Respondent had occurred in Respondent's office, vehicle, and home. K.C. and Respondent had intercourse a couple of times at the home of a friend of Respondent's, Carole, that was on Tangerine Street and at the home of one of Respondent's friends, Jack Kentish. One Sunday morning in late September, K.C. went to Respondent’s office.2 While there, she went into an examination room to change clothes so that she would have attire appropriate to accompany Respondent to a gun show. About that time, K.C.'s husband showed up at Respondent's office, knocked on the office door, expressed his displeasure at the fact K.C. was there, and had a verbal confrontation with Respondent. K.C.'s husband stopped at Respondent's office after he saw his wife's car parked there. The incident described in paragraph 29, led to Respondent sending a letter dated September 28, 1999, to K.C., advising her that his professional relationship with her would terminate within 30 days. The reason for the 30 days was to allow K.C. time to find another physician. In October 2000, K.C. was admitted to Sarasota Memorial Hospital suffering from major depression, Fioricet dependence, and chronic pain. At or near the time of her admission and at this proceeding, K.C. acknowledged that she had some loss of memory surrounding the events related to the three-month period in which Respondent engaged in improper sexual conduct with her.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Subsection 450.015(1)(l) and Section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, and Subsection 459.015(1)(bb), Florida Statutes (1999), now 459.015(1)(pp), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida for one year and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about July 3, 1962, respondent was issued Osteopathic Physician and Surgeon license No. 20A-2834 by the Board of Osteopathic Examiners in the State of California. On July 14, 1962, respondent elected to use the designation "M.D." rather than "D.O.", and thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance in the State of California. On August 10, 1978, the Board of Medical Quality Assurance in the State of California revoked respondent's California license No. 20A-2834 effective September 11, 1978. By Order dated August 18, 1982, the effective date of that decision providing for revocation was changed to September 17, 1982. A Complaint Analyst with the Department of Professional Regulation, State of Florida, received documentation from the Board of Medical Quality Assurance, State of California, indicating that respondent's license No. 20A- 2834 had been revoked in California. She thereupon forwarded such documents to the legal section of the Department of Professional Regulation. On December 29, 1982, the Department of Professional Regulation filed an Administrative Complaint seeking to "revoke, suspend or take other disciplinary action against the Respondent as licensee and against his license as an osteopathic physician under the laws of the State of Florida." It is alleged that respondent is guilty of having a license to practice osteopathic medicine revoked, suspended or otherwise acted against by the licensing authority of another state, in violation of Section 459.015(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). No evidence was presented in this proceeding as to whether the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) submitted an investigative report to the probable cause panel of a regulatory board. No evidence was presented as to whether a probable cause panel of a regulatory board or the DPR found probable cause to exist. The Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners is not named as a petitioner in the Administrative Complaint. No evidence was presented in this proceeding as to whether the respondent is licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida. Petitioner made no attempt to introduce evidence of any character to demonstrate whether respondent is licensed by the State of Florida to practice osteopathic medicine or any other profession falling within the purview of the Department of Professional Regulation.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against the respondent dated December 29, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of August, 1983. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bertram Morris Rettner 998 Via Palo Alto Aptos, California 95003 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
