Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Insurance, is an agency of the State of Florida. Respondent, Bill Gunter, as Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, is the agency head of the Department of Insurance. Petitioner, Insurance Services Office, is a rating organization qualified to transact, and is transacting, specified rate-making services in Florida pursuant to a certificate of authority issued by Respondent. The other petitioners are foreign corporations authorized to do business in the State of Florida. They are licensed as automobile casualty insurers by Respondent and transact automobile and casualty insurance business in the State of Florida. The Department has adopted Rule 4-43.03, Florida Administrative Code which provides: 4-43.03 Unfair discrimination in private passenger motor vehicle insur- ance rates - based on sex, marital status and scholastic achievement. No insurer authorized to engage in the business of insurance in the State of Florida shall establish classi- fications or premium rates for any policy, contract or certificate of private pas- senger motor vehicle insurance based upon the sex, marital status or scholastic achievement of the person or persons insured. This rule shall become effective on March 1, 1980. The purpose of the proposed rule is to eliminate the use of sex, marital status and scholastic achievement criteria in the formulation of private passenger automobile insurance premium rates. Tile business which Petitioners conduct in the State of Florida involves, in some direct manner, the setting of private passenger automobile insurance premium rates. In the formulation of these rates Petitioners use, in part, sex, marital status or scholastic achievement criteria, or some combination thereof. Petitioners, with the exception of Petitioner Insurance Services Office, are insurance companies competing with one another in the private passenger automobile insurance market in Florida. They represent a very significant portion of the private passenger automobile insurance business in Florida. All of their premium rates for such insurance are formulated using sex, marital status, or scholastic achievement, or some combination thereof, along with other factors. The rule would apparently invalidate all of the rate classification plans by which Petitioners set premium rates Presently in force in Florida. To comply with the rule the Petitioners will have to devise and implement new rate classification plans. Such an action is a major undertaking by an insurance company. Prior to the adoption of the rule the Department's historic interpretation of the Florida Insurance Code and specifically Section 626.9541(15)(h), Florida Statutes, has allowed rate classification plans using sex, marital status and scholastic achievement criteria in their formulation. Such criteria have historically been part of rate classification plans and, prior to adoption of the rule, have never been disapproved by the Department. It should be noted that Florida is a "use and file" state wherein an insurer files its rate classification plan with the responsibility then shifting to the Department to challenge the validity of that plan. The Respondent did not offer evidence or testimony sufficient to establish that factual changes of any nature have occurred, or that the Department has become aware of new factual information, which would support a deviation from their historic interpretation of the Florida Insurance Code. Historically the Department has not considered rate classification plans which use sex, marital status and scholastic achievement, along with other criteria in their formulation to be "unfairly discriminatory as that term is used in the Florida Insurance Code. As confirmed by the testimony of the Chief Actuary and Director of the Division of Insurance Rating for the Department, as well as expert actuaries testifying on behalf of Petitioners, the best way to equitably reflect differences in expected losses among insureds is to reflect those differences as accurately as possible. From an actuarial standpoint the most equitable classification factors are those that are the most actuarially sound. The classification factors of sex, marital status and scholastic achievement, in light of the present state of the art in the industry, enhances the actuarial soundness of a rate classification for automobile insurance. The Chief Actuary and Director of the Division of Insurance Rating for the Department did not know of any classification plan that eliminated sex, marital status and scholastic achievement as classification factors that is as actuarially accurate as Petitioner State Farm's present classification plan which uses some or all of those classification factors. Respondents have admitted that Section 626.9541 (15)(h), Florida Statutes, (which reads No insurer shall, with respect to premiums charged for automobile insurance, unfairly discriminate solely on the basis of age, sex, marital status or scholastic achievement) does not absolutely prohibit all discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, or scholastic achievement. In the insurance industry rate classifications necessarily discriminate between different classes of individuals with different levels of expected losses and exposure. Such discrimination is not necessarily unfair. The Economic Impact Statement promulgated by the Department in the adoption of the rule was prepared by Mark Trafton III, Chief Actuary and Director of the Division of Insurance Rating for the Department. The elimination of the subject criteria by the Rule will require insurance companies writing automobile insurance in Florida to devise and file new rate classification plans. Such action on the part of the insurance companies will cause them to incur expenses, possibly substantial in nature. The Economic Impact Statement contains no estimate of, nor reflects any inquiry into, the expense to the industry or individual insurance companies of devising new rate classification plans for use in Florida. In Paragraph 1 of the Economic Impact Statement it is estimated that the cost to the Department of implementing the Rule will be approximately $6,000.00. The evidence establishes that this estimate, at best, reflects only the cost to the Department of the adoption process. It is not intended to reflect any cost to the Department of the actual implementation of the Rule. It is reasonable to assume that because of the Rule there will be a significant increase in the number of rate filings with the Department which the Department will be required to review. The Economic Impact Statement reflects no assessment of any kind, of this potential cost to the Department. There is a class of individuals in Florida presently receiving the benefit of discounted premiums through "good student discounts" offered by one or more insurance companies. This class of individuals will be adversely affected by the Rule in that they may no longer receive the discount they are now receiving. No estimate of this cost to that class of individuals is reflected in the Economic Impact Statement and, in fact, no such estimate was made. Further, the testimony establishes that there was no reason why such an estimate could not have been included in the Economic Impact Statement and its omission was probably an oversight by the preparer of the statement. The evidence establishes that the Department has changed its interpretation of the word "equitably" as used in Section 627.0651(6), Florida Statutes (1979), as well as its interpretation of the phrase "unfair discrimination" as contained in the Florida Insurance Code relevant to this proceeding.
The Issue The issue is whether the registration of Robert T. Marsh as a motor vehicle service agreement company salesman should be revoked. The Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York revoked the licensure of Mr. Marsh under Section 117 of the Insurance Law of that state and Mr. Marsh failed to acknowledge this on his application for licensure in Florida, despite a specific question requiring disclosure of such information. This demonstrates a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business authorized under Chapter 634, Florida Statutes. Mr. Marsh's license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Marsh became licensed 1/ as a motor vehicle service agreement company salesman in Florida in 1984. On May 11, 1977, the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York revoked all casualty insurance licenses of Robert T. Marsh under Section 117 of the Insurance Law of the State of New York because he failed to account for premium funds collected from clients and violated agreements regarding the payment of unearned commissions due to insurers (Petitioner's Exhibit 2a, Tr. page 13, line 9). In his findings of fact, conclusion and decision the Superintendent of Insurance also found that letters directed to Mr. Marsh regarding complaints filed with the New York Insurance Department were ignored, and such action reflected adversely upon Mr. Marsh's trustworthiness (id). The Insurance Department of the State of New York notified Mr. Marsh that his license had been revoked by certified mail dated June 28, 1977. The return receipt for that letter shows that it was received by Mr. Marsh on June 28, 1977 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4); Mr. Marsh admitted during the hearing that he received the notification from the New York Department of Insurance (Transcript p. 13 lines 2 and 3). Mr. Marsh applied for registration in Florida as a motor vehicle service agreement company salesman using Department form DI4-161 on August 31, 1984 (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). That form posed the question "Has your application for license ever been declined by this or any other Insurance Department or has your license or eligibility to hold a license ever been declined, suspended, revoked, placed on probation or administrative fine levied? If answer is "YES," give full details: Mr. Marsh answered no. The Department of Insurance learned that Mr. Marsh's license in the State of New York had been revoked after he received his Florida motor vehicle service agreement salesman license. The Department then sought an explanation of his original answer to question 5 above in an amended application filed December 13, 1985 (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). In his amended application Mr. Marsh then stated "To my knowledge my license was never suspended or revoked . . . I had mail going to many different addresses and know that I didn't receive all of it." (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) Mr. Marsh's testimony at the hearing that he signed the return receipt for the revocation notice, as well as the copy of the return receipt for the revocation letter from the Insurance Department of the State of New York rendered this first explanation unworthy of belief. Mr. Marsh explained at the hearing that he thought question 5 referred only to discipline of a service agreement license, but the New York revocation was for a casualty license, and therefore did not have to be disclosed (Transcript, p. 13, lines 6-9). Not only is this a strained interpretation of the question, it is not the explanation Mr. Marsh gave to the Department in his amended application, and apparently was developed between the date of the amended application and the date of the final hearing. This belated excuse for nondisclosure of the New York license revocation is also rejected.
Recommendation It is recommended that the motor vehicle service agreement company salesman license issued to Robert T. Marsh be REVOKED for misstatements or misrepresentations made in his application for licensure which have demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in business authorized under Chapter 634, pursuant to Sections 634.181(1), (5) and 634.191(1), Florida Statutes (1983). DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of May 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May 1986.
Findings Of Fact Charles Edward James in the relevant period of time considered by these proceedings was an insurance agent licensed by the State of Florida in the categories of ordinary life, general lines, and disability. In that same time period Respondent was the president, director, and registered agent for Friendly Auto Insurance of Panama City, Inc., located at 704 West Eleventh Street, Panama City, Florida. He was also the president, director, and registered agent of All Auto Insurance of Quincy, which operates from 101 East Jefferson, Quincy, Florida. At various times in the critical period, Respondent had five other employees in Panama City in the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency. Among those employees was Alton McCollum, Jr., a licensed general lines agent in the State of Florida. His tenure with the Panama City office was from approximately February or March, 1982, until April, 1983. Anita Prevost worked in the Panama City operation commencing August, 1981, and was employed at the time of hearing as the office manager. Michelle Tolden started working in the Panama City office in February, 1982, as a clerk. At the time of the hearing she was excused from her employment on maternity leave. Tina Clark worked as a clerk in the Panama City office, but resigned prior to the hearing date. Carmen Browning was an employee in the business whose length of employment is unknown. McCollum, as a licensed general lines agent, had been hired by Respondent to operate the Panama City office and allow Respondent to do business in Quincy. At the time James employed McCollum, he gave no specific instructions as to how McCollum would supervise the Panama City office. James basically told McCollum that he wanted McCollum there so that McCollum's agent's license could be utilized to allow the Panama City office to remain open. McCollum spent a couple of hours a day operating the office. His time was primarily devoted to review of applications received by office employees. When he was not available in the office, McCollum could be contacted by phone by other office personnel. When he arrived, he assumed that the employees who were not agents understood how to conduct the business in the sense of giving quotes for automobile insurance over the phone and filling out the necessary forms. In the beginning, he was not familiar with the sale of motor club benefits, having never worked with that type of offering. The motor club memberships that were being sold at the time that McCollum was serving as the agent for Friendly Auto called for commissions to Friendly in the amount of 70 to 80 percent of the premium. Eventually, McCollum determined that the motor club sales through the Panama City operation were questionable. He discovered that customers were not being told that they were getting a motor club membership in addition to their requests for basic automobile insurance. In effect, what he found was that the other employees in Respondent's Panama City office were quoting a single price to customers requesting basic automobile insurance which included the cost of the basic insurance premium and the price of membership in the motor club. As McCollum realized motor club is not part of basic automobile insurance coverage in Florida. McCollum then attempted to have other employees within the Respondent's office specify to customers the particulars of what they were receiving, i.e., that motor club memberships were separate from automobile coverage. He also instructed the other employees in selling motor club memberships to explain to the customers that they were purchasing a motor club membership and specifically indicate what the cost was of that plan. As a result, Friendly Auto sold fewer auto club memberships while under the supervision of McCollum. McCollum also discovered that the other employees in the Panama City office were inappropriately filling out the applications in the sense that the name, address, driving history, and other background information were filled out but that portion related to premium costs and the break out of those costs was not being completed at the time the customer was in the office. That information was being placed in the application at a later date. The normal procedure was for the customer to be provided with a copy of the application which did not contain the specific itemized costs related to premium payments. Once McCollum discovered the problem with the applications, he instructed the employees in the office to fill out the application forms completely to include specifying the premium costs in the application and providing the customer with a completed copy of the application to include a break out of these premium charges. Tina Clark in particular did not readily accept the suggested changes for improving the integrity of the operation. McCollum had suggested that James fire this employee. Instead, Respondent decreased the hours available for that employee to work in the office based upon his belief that she would leave voluntarily and the employee left several months later, indicating that she could not accept reduced hours of work. Anita Prevost was hired by Respondent and trained by Carmen Browning. Before McCollum's involvement with the Panama City office, Prevost, in taking applications for automobile insurance, would quote a cost which included motor club membership as well as the automobile premium costs, even if the customer simply requested insurance necessary to receive a license and tag for an automobile. At the time of filling out the automobile insurance form it would be signed, the motor club membership application form would be signed, and a rejection form related to coverages not requested in the automobile policy line would be signed. Prevost and other employees would not refer to the motor club membership by that name. Instead, at most benefits of the motor club membership would be explained, such as towing, rental reimbursement, accidental death benefits, and emergency road service. The idea of explaining the coverage and not referring to the motor club membership as such was that of the Respondent. When an individual discovered that they had purchased a motor club membership, Prevost and other employees per Respondent's instructions would provide a full refund of the membership costs to that customer. Prevost, and other employees, in dealing with PIP coverage routinely filled out a deductible in the amount of $8,000 after asking a customer if they had hospitalization and without regard for the customers' response. When confronted with a customer who was not interested in that amount of deductible, they would offer a lesser deductible or no deductible. This technique was in keeping with instructions given by Respondent. Later, in dealing with the PIP purchase, Prevost and other employees in the agency would ask if the customer had hospitalization. If they said yes, an $8,000 deductible PIP would be suggested; otherwise, it would be recommended that the customer purchase the PIP coverage that did not carry a deduction. This new policy was established by the Respondent in early 1982 but was not always adhered to as seen in subsequent facts. When Michelle Tolden took applications for persons who wanted basic automobile insurance, she explained the limits of liability in the coverage; coverage related to PIP and its limitations and the benefits related to motor club memberships to include road service, rental, towing reimbursement and any accidental death benefits. The words "motor club" were not mentioned and Tolden has not deviated from the practice from this decision not to mention motor clubs. She feels that the customer understands better what is involved without mentioning the term "motor club." This technique is contrary to the instructions given by McCollum. Tolden, prior to her maternity leave, dealt with the question of the sale of $8,000 deductible PIP in the same fashion as described in the facts related to Prevost. Respondent, in his training in Port Myers, Florida, prior to coming to Panama City, had utilized the technique of packaging minimum automobile insurance coverage necessary with a ¬or club membership when a customer sought "tag" insurance. He and his employees pursued this technique at the time he operated as the general lines agent with Friendly Auto from June 1981 to March 1982. This packaging did not tell a customer specifically that the customer was purchasing an unnecessary and unrequested motor club membership. The resulting confusion and deception related to the aforementioned packaging is seen in the following factual account related to select customers mentioned in the complaint. According to James, in selling PIP $8,000 deductible the realized return was $3.00 with a cost of service of between $20 and $25. As a consequence, he decided to package automobile coverage and the motor club membership in view of the fact that the motor club paid 70 percent or better as commission for the agency in the sale of memberships. This enabled the agency to realize a profit in the combination of the sale of minimum automobile coverage and motor club memberships. The average return for commissions on automobile insurance policies generally is 15 percent. COUNT I LINDA C. SMITH In May, 1982, Linda C. Smith went to Respondent's Panama City office to purchase the necessary automobile insurance to obtain a tag. Smith desired to have PIP and liability coverage; however, in the face of a quoted cost of $79 for the insurance, she determined that she could only afford PIP. She paid $79 for what she assumed was PIP coverage upon a quote of that amount by an employee in Respondent's office. Only $29 related to automobile insurance coverage, the balance was for motor club membership. No mention was made to Smith on the subject of the purchase of a motor club membership and Smith would not have purchased it in view of the fact that she had a friend who was in the wrecker business. That friend was Robert Griffiths. Smith did sign a slip pertaining to a motor club membership which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8. She does not remember seeing the membership fee of $50 reflected on that form. Subsequently, Smith discovered that she had purchased a motor club membership. Had she realized that the $50 had been spent on motor club membership, she would have utilized that payment to purchase liability insurance in lieu of the motor club membership. After complaining to the Insurance Commissioner's office in Panama City, she was contacted by Friendly Insurance and received a $50 refund related to her purchase of a motor club membership. At the time of the transaction, Smith did not read the entire explanation on documents provided to her. Smith's determination to purchase the no fault deductible in the amount of $8,000 was on the basis of the signing of a form provided by the agency which is known as a rejection of liability coverages. The particular form in question may be found as Respondent's Exhibit 11, admitted into evidence. Smith does not recall checking the block which shows the $8,000 deductible PIP. Nonetheless, one of he items on that form related to the $8,000 deductible and it indicates the significance of the deductible, in that it reduces the amount of PIP benefits paid to the purchaser or resident relatives. The form also indicates that this kind of deductible is not recommended for those persons who do not have other coverages which would respond adequately to payments for injuries received in automobile accidents. In addition to this information, the employee who assisted the customer had asked about hospitalization for the benefit of Linda Smith. Smith did have health insurance or medical insurance at the time of purchasing the automobile insurance policy. In addition that form as signed by Smith, had a portion which stated "I understand the accidental death benefit through the life insurance company is a separate item, that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge to this coverage is included in with my downpayment." Smith did not equate this latter item with motor club membership. COUNT II JACKIE MERCER Jackie Mercer went to the Panama City office of Respondent in order to purchase necessary insurance to obtain a driver's license. This explanation was made to the employee who assisted the customer at Friendly Auto. The amount of quotation for the premium was $581, which was paid by Mercer. An automobile insurance application form was signed by Mercer and a copy of that may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13 admitted into evidence. The coverage was for one year, commencing April 17, 1982. No mention was made to Mercer of the purchase of a motor club membership and Mercer would not have knowingly accepted that unsolicited membership. Nonetheless, as part of the package of coverage, $25 was charged for each of two vehicles that were being insured for a total of $50 for membership in a motor club. The real automobile insurance policy amounts for the two cars for the one year period was $531. At the time that the purchase was made, Mercer did not understand that he had paid a separate amount for motor club, notwithstanding signing two forms which are constituted as Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 15 indicating application for motor club membership. Mercer has no recollection of signing the forms related to motor club. Mercer spent 10 to 15 minutes in the office in applying for the insurance coverage and did not read the various documents presented to him in applying for the insurance. As related in Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, Mercer signed that aspect of the rejection of liability coverages pertaining to the fact that accidental death benefits were a separate item from the overall automobile insurance coverage for which there was an additional charge. This related to the motor club membership benefits; however, Mercer was unaware of this. The automobile insurance application, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13, does not break down the various charges related to premium payments for insurance for the two automobiles. On the other hand, the application which was presented to the insurance company and is found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14, dated April 16, 1982, carries a quotation for the total premium payments for both cars as being $431. Eventually, Mercer was notified of the cancellation of his coverage with Protective Casualty related to the two automobiles for reason of nonpayment of additional premium. It was at that time that he learned from the Florida Department of Insurance that the overall charge of $581 made by Respondent's Panama City operation included $50 for motor club memberships which were not desired by Mercer. COUNT III RENATA DOTSON On October 26, 1981, Renata Dotson went to the Panama City office of Respondent and purchased automobile insurance by dealing directly with the Respondent. She told James that she wished full coverage and paid the $289 quoted price with the expectation of receiving six months' coverage for automobile insurance. She did not wish to purchase motor club membership which is not part of automobile insurance. The cost of auto coverage was $214. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17, entered into evidence is a copy of the application form which was used in requesting insurance from Colonial Insurance Company This item was not filled out by Dotson. She did sign the document on the second page. Ms. Dotson did not obtain a copy of the original of the application form upon leaving the agency. Dotson also signed an application for membership in the Nation Motor Club. A copy of that application may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 20, admitted into evidence. She did not fill out the other information set forth on the form. At the time of requesting automobile insurance on October 26, 1981, through James' agency, in addition to not requesting to join a motor club, she recalls no discussion of joining a motor club. She would not have desired membership in the Nation Motor Club because her parents were involved in another motor club that to her understanding would cover her car. Dotson did not understand that she had signed an application for a motor club membership. Likewise, Dotson does not recall the discussion of an $8,000 deductible PIP which eventually was written into the policy or any other discussion related to deductibles. Dotson did not carefully read all papers presented to her at the time she was in Respondent's office on October 26, 1981. Dotson later discovered that she had paid $75 for motor club membership and upon that discovery, Friendly refunded her $75. As reflected in Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, Dotson signed that aspect of the rejection of liability coverages dealing with accidental death benefits and the fact that this was a separate item promoting an additional charge for coverage. She did not equate this as being unrelated to automobile insurance requested by her and related to purchase of a motor club membership. Her understanding was that the questions related to naming a beneficiary for the accidental death benefit was part of the purchase of the automobile insurance. COUNT IV EMMETT FOWLER Emmett Fowler was interested in obtaining less expensive automobile insurance that he presently held and based upon a television advertisement, he purchased automobile insurance from Friendly Auto in Panama City. When he bought the insurance, he was of the opinion that he had paid for a full year when in fact he had paid for six months' coverage. When inquiring about this misunderstanding, it was revealed that he had purchased motor club membership. He had not understood that he had purchased that membership prior to this subsequent inquiry and would not have desired the membership in that he had been a member of another motor club for fifteen years. He was reimbursed $50 for the motor club membership when he informed Friendly that he was not interested in that benefit. The actual automobile insurance premium was $52 and he had paid $102 which had been quoted as the price of automobile insurance. The other $50 was for motor club membership. Fowler had signed the application for the automobile policy, a copy of which is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 26 and for the motor club membership, a copy of which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 28. At the time of purchasing the policy, no discussion was entered into on the question of purchase of a motor club membership. The employee who assisted Fowler in the purchase of the automobile insurance indicated that in view of the fact that Fowler had retired from the military, that the $8,000 deductible on personal injury protection would make the policy cheaper. Having heard this explanation, Fowler chose an $8,000 deductible PIP. The total time involved in the purchase of the automobile insurance was 10-15 minutes. Fowler did not read the documents presented to him in this session very carefully. At the time of purchase, accidental death benefits were discussed; however, Fowler was unaware that this matter pertained to motor club membership and not the insurance policy. Fowler also signed the rejection of liability coverages form which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence. In particular, his signature appears on that portion of the form related to the fact that accidental benefits are a separate item and that there is an additional charge for that coverage. The motor club application which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 28, does not reflect the fact of the $50 fee related to that membership. A copy of that application produced by the Respondent from his records which is admitted as Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, shows a charge of $50. The conclusion of fact to be drawn from this discrepancy is to the effect that the $50 was placed on the application form subsequent to the time that Fowler made application and without his knowledge. COUNT V MAXIE REEDER On June 4, 1982, Maxie Reeder made an application with Friendly Auto, Panama City, for automobile insurance and paid the $200 which had been quoted as the price of the insurance. Of that $200, $175 actually pertained to the automobile insurance premium and the remaining $25 paid for membership in a motor club. Reeder purchased the insurance based upon a need to have sufficient insurance to obtain a tag for her automobile. Reeder was unaware that she had purchased a motor club membership until she received notification of her membership from the motor club. Reeder also experienced problems with trying to gain benefits of her automobile insurance coverage in that she had difficulty gaining assistance from the Respondent following an automobile accident that she had in late June. The automobile policy was not received by Reeder until August 1982. Eventually, Reeder cancelled the automobile insurance policy. She requested that Friendly Auto provide her a refund for the motor club and received a refund in the amount of $25. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 30 is a copy of the application for automobile insurance which was signed by Reeder on June 4, 1982. It does not reflect the exact cost of the various elements of the automobile insurance policy premium. Those premium amounts are broken out on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 31, which is a copy of the application as completed by someone in the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency and submitted to the insurance company after Reeder left the agency. It reflects the various charges and the total charge of $175. Through this scheme of completing the form later, Reeder was not aware that the full amount of the automobile insurance was $175, not the $200 quoted, nor did she recognize that the remaining $25 of the money that she paid was for motor club membership. Reeder would not have knowingly joined an automobile motor club because she was not financially able. The transaction for the purchase of the automobile insurance on June 4, 1983, took approximately 45 minutes and the customer did not read the documents involved carefully. Reeder was eventually paid $140 related to the automobile insurance premium which represented the amount of premium not yet used at the point of her cancellation. As reflected in Respondent's Exhibit No. 9, admitted into evidence, Reeder signed that portion of the rejection of liability coverages referred to as the accidental death benefit separate item and the fact of additional charge for that coverage. Notwithstanding that signature on the rejection of liability coverage, Reeder and all other customers in this complaint did not understand the separate nature of the automobile insurance coverage and the motor club membership. Moreover, nothing that was done by the employees at Friendly Auto had as its purpose explaining the meaning of the aforementioned statement signed by the customer and the fact that the automobile club membership was not necessary in order to obtain the so-called tag insurance. In the Reeder transaction and the others, even in the face of a separate application for motor club membership and automobile insurance and the purported identification of the separateness of automobile insurance and motor club membership found in the rejection of liability coverage form signed by the customer, the overall technique used in responding to the customer's request for automobile insurance was one of obscuring the distinction between automobile coverage and motor club membership. Actions by Respondent and his employees in dealing with Reeder and the other named customers camouflaged the fact that motor club membership was not necessary to meet the requirements of law for the purchase of a tag. By these actions, Respondent and employees at Friendly Auto were making a misrepresentation to the public related to necessary coverage for obtaining automobile tags and the cost of automobile insurance and motor club membership. COUNT VII ROBERT GRIFFITHS Based upon advertising, Robert Griffiths went to the Friendly Auto to purchase full automobile insurance coverage. This visit was on February 12, 1982. At that time, he paid Friendly Auto in Panama City $168 for what he was led to believe was automobile insurance coverage requested. The copy of the application made on February 12, 1982, may be found as part of composite Exhibit No. 72 by the Petitioner. It does not reflect the exact charges related to the automobile insurance. This is a copy which was obtained by the Griffiths when they purchased the insurance. In actuality, the cost of the insurance was less than $168 paid. Griffiths signed an item requesting an application for membership in Nation Motor Club which is part of Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 40 admitted into evidence. Notwithstanding the fact that he signed this application form, he did not understand that he had purchased a motor club membership and would not have desired that in that he operated a wrecker and would not need the towing service provided by the motor club membership. At the time of purchase of automobile insurance in February, 1982, Mr. Griffiths and his wife thought that the motor club membership was part of the automobile insurance without charge, in that the copy of the application which was received did not indicate a membership fee. This is seen in a xerox copy of the membership application which is part of composite Exhibit No. 40 as contrasted with the agency's yellow copy of the membership application and part of the composite Exhibit No. 40. The latter item contains a $25 membership fee. It is concluded that the fee quote was placed on the application form submitted to the Nation Motor Club at a time subsequent to the Griffiths' departure from Friendly Auto on the date in February, 1982. Moreover, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 73 is a copy of the basic service contract for the motor club which was received by the Griffiths and the fee amount is whited out further leading the Griffiths to believe that there was no charge for that coverage. There was no discussion on February 12, 1982, between the employee of Friendly and Griffiths on the question of joining a motor club. In the February application process, when Robert Criffiths signed the motor club membership application form and the application for insurance he did not read those matters carefully. Griffiths also signed the rejection of liability coverage acknowledgement form, Respondent's Exhibit No. 10, admitted into evidence, related to separateness of the accidental death benefit and the additional charge for that coverage. Griffiths, in asking for full insurance coverage did not wish to have the $8,000 deductible PIP at the time of purchasing insurance in February. The automobile insurance protection which was requested on the application was shown to be worth $153 and the actual policy amount was finally determined by the insurer to be $150 including the policy fee. This is reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 39, admitted into evidence which is a copy of the application for insurance policy and the statement of policy declarations. The period of coverage was for six months commencing February 13, 1982. In August, Griffiths returned to Friendly Auto Insurance to renew the automobile insurance policy. On this second visit, Griffiths' wife was with him and she concluded the transaction and Griffiths returned to work. When the application for renewal was applied for in August, 1982, and Mr. Griffiths left, he left after revealing to the employee at Friendly that his duties included that of operation of a wrecker. On this second visit in August, 1982, no discussion was entered on the question of continuing the $8,000 deductible PIP which had been purchased at the time that the automobile insurance was obtained from Friendly in February, 1982. Had Mrs. Griffiths known, she would not have applied for an $8,000 deductible PIP at the time of renewal, acting in her husband's absence. She did not feel that she could afford to pay the $8,000 deductible if the insurance was needed. In addition, the automobile insurance policy renewal was not promptly forwarded to the insured even though application was made on August 17, 1982. As a consequence, when Mrs. Griffiths had an accident on August 20, 1982, she was not covered by the policy. The problem with lack of coverage of the accident on August 20, 1982, and the deficit in the coverage related to PIP were rectified by Friendly and the motor club fee was returned. COUNT VIII BRENDA D. HENDERSHOT/BRUMFIELD On January 15, 1982, Brenda Hendershot, now Brumfield, looked the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency up in the phone book and through the telephone process received a quote for insurance and decided to purchase automobile insurance to obtain an automobile tag. The purchase price quoted of $153 included motor club membership, unknown to the customer. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 44, admitted into evidence, is a copy of the application for automobile insurance. It does not reflect a break down of the cost related to the policy, although there are spaces provided for those entries. This document was signed by Brumfield at the time of applying for the policy at the Respondent's office in Panama City. That exhibit is a copy of what was given to Brumfield when she left Respondent's office. Anita Prevost was the employee who took care of Brumfield on the date the automobile insurance was purchased. During this purchase no discussion was made of the motor club. Brumfield did sign the Nation Motor Club application form that is depicted as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. In addition, she signed the rejection of liability coverage provided by Friendly, to include that portion of the form related to accidental death benefits, being a separate item carrying an additional charge. As with other cases spoken to in this Recommended Order, the accidental death benefit was part of the motor club membership and not part of the automobile insurance coverage requested by Brumfield. Brumfield recalls some discussion about $8,000 related to personal injury protection but did not understand from this conversation at the time of purchase that this $8,000 amount pertained to a deductible. She did not discover this fact until a subsequent time. On that same occasion, Brumfield discovered that she had purchased a motor club membership which she did not request. The copy of the application for insurance which the Respondent's agency in Panama City submitted to the insurance company as shown through Petitioner's Exhibit No. 45, admitted into evidence, reflects the various charges set forth in the premium and demonstrates that the real cost of the automobile insurance was $128 with the other $25 being related to motor club membership. The customer did not carefully consider documents by reviewing them at the time of her purchase. COUNT IX BENNY L. COON On December 31, 1981, Benny Coon went to Friendly Auto Insurance to purchase the necessary automobile insurance to satisfy legal requirements in the State of Florida. He chose this agency because it was the nearest to his residence. A quotation was made to him of $158 and he paid $158 for what he understood to be the necessary automobile insurance coverage. This quote, unknown to Coon, contained motor club charges. A copy of the application form, for automobile insurance which contains his signature, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 49, admitted into evidence. Coon's also signed an application for Nation Motor Club as shown in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 52, admitted into evidence which is the copy kept by Friendly insurance. As reflected on that exhibit, $25 was charged for motor club membership unrelated to the automobile insurance requested by Coon. Coon had not requested to join a motor club when be went to the agency, not being interested in that plan, and there was no discussion made about joining the motor club. Eventually, Coon received a copy of the declaration statement related to the automobile policy and it reflected the true charge of $133 as opposed to the $158 which Coon paid, believing that was related to the cost of automobile insurance not automobile insurance and motor club membership. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 50 is a copy of the application submitted to the insurance company and it also shows charges in an amount of $133. The break out of the charges for the automobile insurance was not reflected on the copy of the application provided to the customer on the date he made that application. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 49. Coon had not carefully read the documents prepared at the time of requesting insurance coverage. Again this customer completed the rejection of liability coverages form which is found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. He signed that aspect of the form related to accidental death, i.e. death benefit being a separate item and the additional charge related. COUNT XI DAVID B. PERMENTER David Permenter went to the Friendly Auto Insurance office in Panama City on March 15, 1982, to purchase basic automobile insurance coverage required by the State of Florida. He was quoted a price with a premium of $346 and he paid that price. This price included motor club membership without his knowledge. At the time the application was made, he signed a form related to membership in Nation Motor Club and was provided the customer's copy. This is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 63, admitted into evidence. It does not reflect the amount of charge for this protection. He also executed an application form related to the automobile insurance, a copy of which is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 60. This item does not display the break out of the cost related to the automobile insurance which ultimately was determined to be $321 with the balance of the amount he paid being $25 utilized for membership in Nation Motor Club. The declarations document related to the automobile insurance policy was received by the customer subsequent to the purchase of the insurance. That document reflects the cost of automobile insurance to be $321 and it was received as evidence, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 61. At the time the automobile insurance was purchased, no request was made to join a motor club and no inquiry was made of the customer if he desired to join a motor club. The purchaser thought that he was buying automobile insurance and did not recognize that motor club membership was envisioned in the sale. He would have joined the motor club if it was part of the policy payment and not a separate charge but did not wish to pay additional money to join the motor club. Permenter did not discover that he had joined a motor club until a date subsequent to the time of the purchase of insurance. No specific discussion was entered into about the features of coverage being purchased, the principal emphasis of the sale being related to the total price. The customer was in the insurance agency for approximately 15 minutes and he did not complete the application forms other than to sign them. This customer did not read the documents carefully at the time of the purchase. The amount of money paid for the motor club membership was refunded. This customer completed a rejection of liability coverages to include a signature on that aspect of the sheet which indicated that accidental death benefit was a separate item for which a charge would be placed. This document is found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact: Respondent holds a license issued by Petitioner which permits it to engage in the business of a motor vehicle dealer at 9901 N.W. 80th Avenue, Bay 3C, Hialeah Gardens, Florida. On Friday, September 9, 1988, during normal business hours, Karen Reyes, who is employed by Petitioner as a License and Registration Inspector, visited this location to attempt to conduct an annual inspection of Respondent's records. The doors to the warehouse where the business was supposed to be located were closed and locked and no one was around the dealership. Reyes left a note requesting that a representative of the dealership contact her. She then-departed. Reyes returned to the location on Tuesday, September 20, 1988. Although it was mid-morning, the warehouse doors were closed and locked and there was no one present. Before departing, Reyes left a second note asking that she be contacted by someone from the dealership. The following day Reyes attempted to telephone the dealership. No one answered the phone, however, when she called. Reyes reported her findings to her supervisor. As a result, on October 20, 1988, Respondent's President, Javier F. Rodriquez, was sent a letter in which he was advised that Petitioner proposed to revoke Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license on the ground that Respondent had closed and abandoned its licensed location. The letter further advised that Respondent had the right to request a formal hearing before any final action was taken against it. Rodriquez responded to the letter by requesting a hearing at which he would have the opportunity to present proof that the dealership had not been closed or abandoned. In view of this response, Reyes was instructed by her supervisor to pay another visit to the dealership. She made this visit on Tuesday, November 8, 1988. This time she encountered two men at the location. There were also a couple of cars there as well. One of the men, who claimed to be a representative of the dealership, telephoned Rodriquez's wife and had her speak with Reyes. During their telephone conversation, Mrs. Rodriquez informed Reyes that her husband was still active in the automobile sales business, but that he was conducting his business at their home. At the conclusion of their discussion, Reyes asked Mrs. Rodriquez to have her husband call Reyes' office. Mr. Rodriquez telephoned Reyes' office on November 16, 1988. Reyes was not in, so Rodriquez left a message. Later, that day, Reyes returned the call, but was unable to reach Rodriquez. The following day, Reyes went back to the dealership, where she found the same two men she had met there on November 8, 1988. Rodriquez, however, was not at the dealership. Reyes therefore left. She came back later in the day. This time Mr. Rodriquez was present and he spoke with Reyes. When asked by Reyes why there was no business activity nor records at the licensed business location, Rodriquez responded that the dealership was now open every day from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. He provided Reyes with no additional information. Reyes revisited the dealership on Friday, January 13, 1989, Wednesday, January 18, 1989, Thursday, January 19, 1989, and Monday, January 23, 1989, during normal business hours. On each of these occasions, she found no one at the location and the doors to the warehouse closed and locked. She made another visit on Monday, January 30, 1989. Although it was during normal business hours, there was no indication of any activity at the dealership. Furthermore, the sign which had identified the business had been removed. This prompted Reyes to speak with the leasing agent at the warehouse complex. The leasing agent told Reyes that Respondent was no longer occupying space at the complex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Javier F. Rodriquez, President Inrodar Auto Sales, Inc. 9901 N.W. 80th Avenue, Bay 3C Hialeah Gardens, Florida 33016 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts set forth in paragraphs 1-5, below. Stipulated Facts James Phillips is the president and sole shareholder of the Respondent, Sunshine Auto Sales, Inc. The Respondent's place of business is located at 2050 North West 36 Street, Miami, Florida 33142. The Respondent was issued motor vehicle dealer license number 7VI- 005928 on May 1, 1987. The Petitioner's order summarily suspending Respondent's license was dated September 17, 1987, and was served on Respondent on or about November 9, 1987. On December 22, 1987, the Circuit Court for the 11th Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, entered an emergency injunction against enforcement of Petitioner's Order of Summary Suspension, contingent upon the posting of a $2500 bond by Respondent. The bond was posted on March 31, 1988. Other Facts On November 17, 1976, Respondent's president and sole shareholder, James Phillips, executed a sworn affidavit as part of the application for a motor vehicle dealer license. In that affidavit, he stated that no partner or corporate officer of the Respondent had ever been arrested or convicted of a felony. In subsequent annual renewal applications for the years 1977-84, Phillips stated that all terms and conditions as set forth in the original application were correct. In actuality, Phillips was arrested for breaking and entering, theft and rape in 1956. In 1960, he was arrested for aggravated assault. In 1972, he was arrested for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Grand larceny was the subject of his arrest in 1976. In 1982, he was arrested for aggravated battery. Phillips' statement that he interpreted this language on the application and renewal forms to be applicable only to the corporation itself is not credited due to his demeanor while testifying and the clarity of the statement on the application requiring such disclosure. The Petitioner's policy is not to deny or revoke licenses simply on the basis of an arrest record of the applicant or licensee. Instead, when the information is correctly provided by applicants or licensees, a further investigation is made by the Petitioner to determine if there has been a conviction of a crime meriting suspension or denial of a license. When Petitioner becomes aware that an applicant or licensee has falsely answered an application regarding previous arrests, the policy of Petitioner is to deny the application for licensure or institute revocation action against a licensee on the theory that such falsification shows a lack of honesty in the applicant or licensee. On February 24, 1986, and May 20, 1986, James Phillips received warning letters from the Department reminding him that failure to apply for title or to file for transfer of title within 20 days following delivery of a vehicle to a purchaser is a violation of Florida law. In June and July of 1987, an employee of Petitioner, Helen Wandell, made numerous attempts to obtain information from Respondent regarding a particular complaint against Respondent. Information was sought by Wandell regarding the identity of the vehicle which was the subject of the complaint. She telephoned Respondent's facilities on June 10, 11, 12, and 16, 1987, during regular business hours and received no answer. On June 17, 1987, Wandell went to the Respondent premises during regular business hours and found the facility closed. She left a note and James Phillips called her the following day. He gave her information concerning the subject vehicle which proved to be incorrect. Again, Wandell attempted to contact Respondent's establishment by telephone on June 22, and 23, 1987, but did not get an answer. She telephoned again on July 24, 1987, and spoke with Phillips. In the course of the conversation, he informed Wandell that he could not provide the vehicle identity information she sought. He further warned her not to call again, cursed her and threatened to kill her. Madeline Fils-Aime does not read or understand English very well. On April 8, 1987, she entered into a parol agreement to buy a 1981 Mercury automobile from Respondent. The agreed upon price, as established by testimony of Fils-Aime, was $750. This amount was to be paid in installments as the money became available to Fils-Aime. Until the total amount of $750 was paid, the car would continue to be owned by and remain in the Respondent's establishment. On April 8, 1987, Fils-Aime paid $160 to Robert Sayre, James Phillips' stepson, at Respondent's establishment toward the cost of the automobile. She received a receipt from Sayre. The receipt carried the notation "no refunds" and "sold as is." The receipt also carried a notation that the remainder of the funds would be due on April 15, 1987. Fils-Aime returned to Respondent's establishment on April 16, 1987, paid another $100, received another receipt signed by Sayre carrying a notation that the remainder would be due on April 26, 1987. This receipt also carried the notation "no refunds." Fils-Aime returned to the Respondent establishment again on April 21, 1987, and paid another $40 on the car. This time she received a receipt signed by Thomas Phillips, son of James Phillips, which carried the notation that the balance would be due on May 7, 1987. Another payment of $100 was made by Fils-Aime on May 4, 1987. Another receipt bearing the signature of Robert Sayre was received. A new balance due date of May 14, 1987, was shown on this receipt. Fils-Aime returned at a later date to make a subsequent payment, but the Respondent's establishment was closed. Approximately six weeks after the May 4, 1987, payment, Fils-Aime returned to Respondent's establishment to learn that the car for which she had been making payments was gone. Testimony of James Phillips establishes the sale of the vehicle to another person. Phillips also readily admitted knowledge of the payments made by Fils-Aime and the practice of granting extensions to her of the due date for the total balance at the time of each payment. Since his clientele is poor, he uses the "lay away" plan on occasion to sell vehicles to individuals like Fils-Aime. In spite of her demands, he did not return Fils- Aime's previous payments to her. At the time of the May 4, 1987, payment, Phillips gave Fils-Aime an envelope to use in the event the Respondent facility was closed on her return to make a future payment. He instructed her to leave the envelope with the body shop next to Respondent's establishment. A contractual document offered in evidence at hearing by Respondent to substantiate James Phillips version of the parol agreement with Fils-Aime is not credited with any probative value. The document appears unsigned by anyone and the portion of the page where Fils-Aime would have signed is conveniently torn off and missing. Additionally, Fils-Aime denied knowledge of the document. After receipt of a complaint by Fils-Aime, the Petitioner's employee was denied access to Respondent's premises to inspect Respondent's records on July 21, 1987. The request was made during reasonable business hours and within the business hours posted on the fence at Respondent's establishment. On August 31, 1987, Respondent sold a 1979 automobile to Gloria Little. Respondent did not apply for title for Ms. Little. She went to the tag agency herself because there was no one at Respondent's facility to go with her. She was unable to obtain the title transfer and contacted Petitioner's offices. A telephone call by Petitioner's employee resulted in an individual from Respondent's establishment being made available to assist and complete the title transaction on December 16, 1987. The Respondent did not apply for title transfer to a 1975 vehicle sold to Rafael Castillo on August 8, 1987. After being contacted by a Petitioner employee, Respondent applied for the title transfer on December 16, 1987. On December 29, 1987, Respondent sold a 1981 automobile to Kimberely DeNunzio. Title application to the vehicle was made in February, 1988, and issuance of the title to DeNunzio occurred February 24, 1988. The Petitioner's Order of Summary Suspension of Respondent's motor vehicle license was in effect at the time of this sale.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's license and denying the application for renewal of same. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of July, 1988. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-5616, 88-2528 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS The Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of paragraphs erroneously numbered. Those paragraphs, 25 in number, have been properly numbered and are addressed as follows: 1-3. are included in findings 1-3, respectively. 4-7. are included in findings 12-18. 8-10. are included in finding 21. 11-13. included in finding 22. 14-16. included in finding 23. 17. included in finding 20. 18-19. included in finding 11. included in finding 6. included in finding 7. included in finding 8. 23-24. included in finding 9. 25. included in finding 10. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS The Respondent's proposed findings were likewise erroneously numbered. Numbering has been corrected and the 36 paragraphs are addressed as follows. 1-3. included. 4-15. rejected, unnecessary to result reached. 16. included in finding 12. 17-18. included in finding 6. 19-27. rejected, unnecessary. 28-29. addressed in finding 5. rejected, on basis of credibility. included in finding 17. 32-36. rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Department of Legal Affairs Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Seril L. Grossfeld, Esquire 408 South Andrews Avenue Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Charles J. Brantley Director, Division of Motor Vehicles Room B439 Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be disciplined pursuant to a nine count administrative complaint, each count containing allegations of multiple violations of the Insurance Code.
Findings Of Fact Emerald Coast Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Emerald Coast) is a nonstandard automobile insurance agency, insuring high risk drivers who normally have a difficult time procuring insurance. Emerald Coast advertises. Some customers named in the administrative complaint responded to advertisements featuring "high risk, low down payment." At all times material, Respondent was licensed as a life agent, as a life and health agent, and as a general lines agent and was the corporate president, director and registered agent of Emerald Coast. Respondent was present and actively overseeing all of the applications involved in this case, even when information was written on forms by the customer, another agent, or an unlicensed employee. Most of the complaining witnesses were able to identify Respondent as being present and/or assisting while their forms were made out. DOI did not affirmatively prove that any unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast spent more than 10 percent of his employment time interacting with customers. Prior to these proceedings, DOI has never taken action against Emerald Coast or Respondent. Respondent went to DOI on two occasions prior to the filing of this administrative complaint and discussed optional coverages in an effort to avoid situations that might lead to disciplinary action. Emerald Coast has four offices in three cities. All of the events underlying the charges herein occurred in Tallahassee. Emerald Coast has written between 15,000 and 18,000 automobile insurance policies in the three years it has been open. Approximately 70 percent of Emerald Coast's customers who purchase automobile insurance policies cancel those policies prior to the renewal date. Eighty percent of these cancelled policies are cancelled for nonpayment of premium. Among these cancellations are individuals called "tag runners." Tag runners purchase the minimum required insurance for receipt of an automobile license tag, with the intent of having the policy cancelled after they have made one or two payments and taking the chance that the Division of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles will not catch up with them to suspend their licenses because insurance cancellations may take up to six months, even for non-payment. Once the policy information is taken from the customer, it is entered in a computer and, within three to five days, checks are written from Emerald Coast to the insurance carriers for initial premiums. If the proposed insured fails to make a payment or stops payment on a check, the agency loses money on the transaction because the agency has already forwarded the money to the insurance company. Emerald Coast provides the option of financing a premium if a customer cannot pay it in a lump sum annually. When a customer cannot pay in full for an insurance policy, Emerald Coast offers the option of purchasing an ancillary product like an auto club for a set price in addition to paying for the insurance with a low down payment. The club cost is in addition to the total insurance premium, and the low down payment for the insurance premium is conditional upon the customer's paying for the club's product. If the customer does not want the auto club product, Emerald Coast still permits him to finance his insurance premium with a 50 percent down payment. Emerald Coast's purpose of requiring a 50 percent down payment or payment in full, or the purchase of the auto club when a small down payment is made, is to offset cancellation rates and the agency's losses incurred thereby. The premium finance companies which finance insurance policies require fees. There are no premium finance companies that require Respondent to sell auto clubs in order to sell their premium finance products. The insurance carriers charge a premium for the risk they assume with the contract of insurance. There are no insurance carriers that require Respondent to sell auto clubs in order to sell their insurance. Approximately 60 percent of the people to whom Emerald Coast has sold policies also purchased auto clubs, including towing and rental features. The larger the fee paid by the customer for the club, the greater the towing, rental and other benefits that the club provides and the greater amount the seller makes. Respondent received a 90 percent commission from Atlantic Travel Association of North Florida, Inc. for the auto clubs he sold and sent to them. Respondent also sold American Travelers Association death and dismemberment benefit contracts at a similar commission. Respondent and Emerald Coast used to sell Atlantic Travelers Association, Inc. auto clubs. As of January 1, 1992, they switched to selling Atlantic Travelers Association of North Florida, Inc. clubs. The two clubs are not associated in any way. By agreement with the new club's owner, Respondent and Emerald Coast continued to use the old forms bearing the wrong company name and submitted them to the new club. The forms do not provide the address of the club, and members are expected to submit claims through Emerald Coast. Atlantic Travelers Association of North Florida, Inc. is a valid auto club and pays valid claims. Atlantic Travelers Association of North Florida, Inc.'s owner testified that his company was prepared to honor each misnamed form that Respondent sent to him with a fee, but it is probable that the form issued in the wrong name would not be legally binding. If the form was never received by the new club, Emerald Coast's customer would have an even more tenuous claim. Therefore, Respondent's auto club customers were protected only at the new club's whim as to whether or not a contract they paid for would be honored, and each form issued by Respondent or Emerald Coast with the wrong auto club name on it constituted a misrepresentation, deceptive to the customer on several levels. Respondent also continued to use the Atlantic Traveler's Association, Inc. name on all the acknowledgments he asked his customers to sign, signifying that they understood that the auto club cost was optional and in addition to their automobile insurance. The use of the wrong name on these acknowledgment forms also was a misrepresentation. Due to space considerations, and for greater clarity, Atlantic Traveler's Association, Inc. will hereafter be referred to as "the old auto club," and Atlantic Traveler's Association of North Florida, Inc. will hereafter be referred to as "the new auto club." None of the customers named in the administrative complaint lost money as a result of any auto club sold by Respondent or Emerald Coast. The auto club contracts offered 38 different choices of benefit levels. Each of the benefit levels was an option which should have been discussed with and knowingly accepted by the customer. Respondent gave the individuals selling the auto clubs no instructions on which of the options they should sell to a customer or how they should judge which option(s) a customer needed. Routinely, neither Respondent nor any of his employees ever offered all 38 options to each customer. Rather, dependent upon the car insurance coverage the customer selected, or upon the unbridled discretion of the salesperson, each salesperson sold what he felt like. Respondent and Emerald Coast use an acknowledgment form to let the customer know he is purchasing an ancillary product, that the total cost of the ancillary product is in addition to insurance premiums, and that the ancillary product is optional and not required by law. They use a document called an "affidavit" to inform the customer of other coverages and when the coverages will go into effect and to hopefully insure that the information received from the customer is accurate. These so-called "affidavits" are neither notarized nor attested-to by anyone. Respondent acknowledged that the DOI and the insurance industry consider the word, "premium," as applying to insurance premiums only, not ancillary products such as auto clubs. See, Section 627.041(2) F.S. Laymen likewise regard the word "premium" as reflecting the cost of insurance. Respondent and Emerald Coast use generic receipts which say "premium," not "insurance premium." Where insurance premium collections and ancillary product sales were conducted simultaneously, Respondent used the word "premium" on these receipts to cover the total amount tendered by each customer as a down payment on both the insurance policy premium and on the ancillary product. He then listed only the insurance premium down payment (total amount tendered by the customer minus ancillary product full fee or down payment) on the insurance premium finance agreement because only insurance premiums can be financed on those forms. Where receipts specified "total premium" he lumped in the cost of the ancillary product. Respondent thus misused the word "premium" on receipts issued to customers. Accordingly, the receipts provided to Respondent's customers were misrepresentations and deceptive. One result of the misuse of the term "premium" was that customers sometimes were led to believe that their deposits against both auto clubs or death and dismemberment policies and insurance coverage were down payments on the insurance policies alone, even where the receipts specified "premiums" and "deposit." Accordingly, Respondent's deductions of all or part of the ancillary product fee up front resulted in false statements on other documents that the full down payment for premium or financing of premium had been made when it had not. Respondent testified that his standard operating procedure was for himself or another licensed insurance agent to explain the coverages on each of the policy application forms executed at Emerald Coast; that where marks occurred on the summary of coverage pages, they were made by himself or another Emerald Coast representative during these explanations; that he explained the cost coverage breakdown for each customer he saw; and that he instructed each customer he saw to read all documents before signing. However, the juxtaposition of the "total" space block and the column where premiums and other costs are added on the "summary of coverages and cost breakdown" form makes it impossible for the customer to quickly add up the premiums for each type of insurance coverage and the cost of ancillary product in a straight line. Also, due to the confusion of Respondent's use of the word "premium" for different purposes on different documents, the figure for total "premium" frequently cannot be reconciled among the receipt, the financing document, the insurance application, and/or the summary of coverages and cost breakdown form. Even a reasonably attentive customer would be confused by the several forms. Reading the summary before signing it would not necessarily have revealed what funds were being applied to which purpose. In some instances, more specifically set out by customer and count infra., the completed summary of coverages and cost breakdown forms were misleading or unexplainable as to what amounts were being charged to the customer. Count I (David K. Register) On January 31, 1992, David K. Register went to Emerald Coast to purchase insurance. The applications made out at that time were executed by Respondent as brokering agent. Mr. Register signed all documents without reading them. Nonetheless, he understood that he was purchasing personal injury protection, property damage coverage, comprehensive and collision coverage, and what the deductibles were at the time he signed the documents. He also knew he was purchasing an auto club at the cost of $150. The total cost of the insurance coverage he was seeking was approximately $750. Respondent required Mr. Register to purchase an auto club contract as a condition of obtaining premium financing for his insurance policies. Respondent completed a premium finance agreement for financing the unpaid premiums for the policies showing that Mr. Register had tendered a $197 premium down payment. Respondent advised Mr. Register that he owed an additional $135, due February 14, 1992. Respondent issued a receipt to Mr. Register showing the total premium was $937. When he applied with Emerald Coast, Mr. Register had four offenses on his driving record, three for unlawful speed and one for violation of the alcoholic beverage open container law. His complete driving record was not disclosed on the documents prepared. If it had been disclosed, an additional premium would have been charged. The testimony is in direct conflict on whether or not Mr. Register orally disclosed his prior violations to Emerald Coast: Mr. Register maintained that he did; Respondent maintained that he did not. There is no direct evidence to show which witness was accurate on this issue. Circumstantially, there was no reason Respondent should fail to write down violations told him by Mr. Register since Respondent was prepared to write insurance in the high risk category anyway and one way or another Respondent could have insured Mr. Register for the amount Mr. Register was prepared to pay that day. Subsequently, Mr. Register made a down payment and executed an insurance application with Progressive Insurance through Swann Insurance Agency on which he also failed to disclose his entire driving record. He did so with the explicit understanding at that time that the new carrier would run a license check on him and an additional premium would be required due to his bad driving record which he had disclosed orally to Swann Insurance Agency. The "safety net" when a bad driving record is not disclosed on an application is that carriers routinely run independent driving license checks and adjust the premium upward or refuse coverage if they discover an undisclosed bad driving record. What Swann Insurance Agency and its carrier did after the carrier researched David Register's driving history is not clear on the record. When Emerald Coast and its carrier discovered his history, they demanded a higher premium. The evidence falls short of showing that Respondent deliberately left information provided by Mr. Register off his application at Emerald Coast. On February 6, 1992, Armor, the carrier with whom Emerald Coast had placed Mr. Register's PIP and property damage coverage, notified Mr. Register and Respondent that the policy binder would be cancelled if required photographs of the vehicle were not received. On February 10, Mr. Register took the vehicle to Emerald Coast for photographs. On February 13, Respondent wrote Mr. Register a letter threatening to cancel his "policy" if the $135 "premium" were not paid by February 14. Respondent testified that the letter referred to cancellation of the auto club towing "policy" and therefore he was not threatening to cancel Mr. Register's automobile insurance policy for failure to pay for an ancillary product. However, on its face, the letter was misleading. Respondent's unique "wordology" had the effect on Mr. Register of a threat to cancel his automobile insurance policy for non-payment of the ancillary product fee. On February 14, David Register and his father wrote Respondent requesting cancellation of the insurance policies and return of all money paid, since they had purchased duplicate coverage at Swann Insurance Agency. Respondent did not forward the cancellation request to Nu-Main, general agent for the carrier with whom he had placed Mr. Register's comprehensive and collision policy. Respondent did not forward the car photographs to Armor. As a result of the photographs not being received, on February 18, Armor cancelled its binder to David Register. On March 9, 1992, the finance company sent David Register and Emerald Coast its cancellation notice for nonpayment of premiums. David Register never paid the additional $135 due on February 14 for the auto club and the new auto club had no record of his old auto club form being received. Due to his February 14 cancellation, Respondent eventually refunded Mr. Register $140 of the $212 he had paid on January 31, 1992. Mr. Register's father testified that the $72 difference was accounted for by the cost of coverage from January 31 to February 14 and cancellation fees charged by the carriers. Count II (Diedre Hawks Johnson) On August 15, 1992, Diedre Hawks went to Emerald Coast to buy minimum insurance for a used car she had just purchased and financed. She executed an application for property damage, comprehensive, collision, and PIP insurance coverages. These coverages are more than the minimum required by law, but may not be more than the minimum required by the financing of Baldwin-Foster Motors, where Ms. Hawks had just purchased the car. The record is unclear on this distinction. Ms. Hawks tendered $165. Respondent actively supervised Dan Allison, a licensed insurance agent, during this transaction. Contrary to Ms. Hawks' testimony, it is found that she understood on August 15 that she had purchased an auto club. Although she did not read them at the time, Ms. Hawks executed the premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the automobile insurance policy premium and the application for an auto club at $150. Ms. Hawks likewise signed both an acknowledgment showing she knew she was getting an auto club for $150 and an "affidavit." She also signed a summary of coverages and cost breakdown acknowledging that Emerald Coast employees had explained the coverages, that she fully understood them, and that she had received a completed copy of that document. Her explanation at formal hearing for why she did not read what she signed was that she was in a hurry because it was late in the day and the Emerald Coast employees were rushing to get out. However, she acknowledged that Respondent gave her an opportunity to read the documents which clearly set out that she was buying an auto club for $150. However, even if she had read them, the documents presented to Ms. Hawks were ambiguous as to what the amounts paid or owing were to cover. The enumerated coverages on the cost breakdown form add up to $745 (including a $150 auto club) plus a policy fee of $25 and a "grand total" of $770. The financial agreement shows a $620 premium total with $465 financed, a $155 down payment and $65.49 per month due in monthly payments. The receipt issued to Ms. Hawks by Emerald Coast on August 15 showed that she had tendered a $165 deposit, was paying for a $770 annual premium, and owed an additional $140 deposit. Upon the foregoing, Ms. Hawks' testimony was convincing that even though she initialled the receipt requiring the additional deposit, she did not know that she still owed a $140 down payment when she left Emerald Coast and that she believed that she only had to pay her premium in monthly increments of $65.49. The next day, August 16, 1992, Underwriters Guaranty Insurance Company issued Ms. Hawks an insurance policy with an annual premium of $620. The difference of $150 between the $770 and $620 figures was the total $150 cost of the auto club which she was required to buy in order to get financing with Emerald Coast. Ms. Hawks signed a contract with the old travel club. Emerald Coast sent the contract to the new travel club. Ten dollars of Ms. Hawks' initial $165 had been applied by Emerald Coast as a down payment on the auto club. No paper specifically shows this diversion of funds. On September 8, Emerald Coast wrote Ms. Hawks that she must come in and pay $140 more on her down payment for "premium" or her insurance would be cancelled. Ms. Hawks purposefully ignored the letter since communications with the carrier clarified that the money was actually to be applied to the auto club fee. Beginning September 13, Respondent telephoned her several times to come in and make the payment. Ms. Hawks still did not pay the $140. Therefore, Respondent refused to turn over to her a copy of her automobile insurance policy when it was issued. Ms. Hawks again dealt with the carrier directly and the carrier assigned her to a new agent. She never paid the auto club fee. Count III (Christine Maddux Vollenweider) On March 16, 1992, Christine Maddux asked to finance part of a $242 premium. Respondent told her that the additional cost of financing insurance with the $242 annual premium would be $317. Respondent also told her that Emerald Coast had a condition of financing which required her to buy an auto club. Ms. Maddux executed an application for a PIP and property damage automobile insurance policy with a total annual premium of $242. Respondent told her that she must pay a $143 down payment. Ms. Maddux had only $80 with her, so she tendered $80 to Respondent, who told her she must pay the remaining $68 the following week. On her first visit, the "total premium" was $317 on the receipt ($80 received and $68 deposit due). She paid the $68 the following week, as agreed. That amount was also receipted as "total premium." On March 16, Ms. Maddux executed a premium finance agreement to obtain premium financing on the balance of the premium amount and applied for an auto club. The premium financing agreement showed that she had tendered only $73 down payment on the insurance premium. The $7 balance of her $80 went for the auto club, but no document specifically shows that diversion of funds. Ms. Maddux did not read the summary of insurance coverages and cost breakdown prior to signing it. She was not told that she could not read the document, and she signed a statement acknowledging that the coverages had been explained to her, that she fully understood them, and that she had received a completed copy of the document. All of the documents except the financing agreement consistently reflect the $75 for the auto club. Ms. Maddux applied for the auto club at a cost of $75 even though she already received equal or better auto club benefits from AAA-Plus, and had told Respondent so. No one at Emerald Coast told Ms. Maddux that she was required by law to purchase it. She applied for the auto club only because of Respondent's specific agency business practice to require an auto club purchase of any customer who had to finance insurance premiums after a down payment of less than half of the entire annual premium. The auto club contract Ms. Maddux signed was with the old club showing a cost of $75. Emerald Coast sent the contract to the new club. Ms. Maddux was issued a policy by Security Insurance Company of Hartford. Count IV (Candy Bassett) On March 16, 1993, Candy Bassett wanted to purchase the minimum required non-owner's automobile insurance to get back her driver's license, which had been suspended. She incorrectly stated to Emerald Coast that she had only four points on her driving record, when in fact she had twelve points. The points had been accumulated for speeding tickets, for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) with serious bodily injury, and for a conviction for failure to identify upon an accident. Ms. Bassett signed Emerald Coast's summary of coverages and cost breakdown form and the policy application form, stating therein that her violations and offenses as revealed by her were accurate and acknowledging that the coverages had been explained to her and were fully understood by her. Ms. Bassett executed both a cost breakdown and summary and an acknowledgment. The cost breakdown and summary showed she was purchasing a travel club including accidental death coverage for $100. Her acknowledgment showed she was purchasing a motor club including towing and rental reimbursement for $187. Ms. Bassett executed an application for an automobile insurance policy to be issued by Underwriters. The application listed the total annual premium as $334. Ms. Bassett tendered her down payment check in the amount of $187. The receipt showed the "total premium" to be $449 and the amount received to be $187. Ms. Bassett executed a premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the policy premium. It showed that Ms. Bassett had tendered only an $87 down payment on a total premium of $349. Underwriters issued Ms. Bassett an insurance policy for an annual term. Respondent actively supervised her transaction and executed the policy application as brokering agent. As part of this transaction and as part of a specific Emerald Coast business practice, Respondent required Ms. Bassett to execute an American Travelers Association, Inc. accidental death and dismemberment benefits contract reflecting a fee of $100, not a towing contract as reflected on some of her other paperwork. The $100 for this death and dismemberment product constituted the difference between the $87 shown on the finance agreement as the amount tendered and the $187 check Ms. Bassett actually tendered. There is no evidence as to the status of American Travelers Association Inc. or whether it received Ms. Bassett's contract. Contrary to other documents she executed, Ms. Bassett signed an acknowledgment form to the effect that she knew the club, including towing and rental reimbursement, were optional at a fee of $187 separate from her automobile insurance and that she understood that it was not insurance. Ms. Bassett testified that she thought the death and dismemberment benefits were included in her insurance, that she was not informed that she would have to pay an additional $100 for those benefits, and that she did not intend to pay any monies for such benefits. The foregoing testimony is not entirely credible in light of the rest of the evidence. Ms. Bassett also specifically testified that she was told that the travel/accident feature was "included in the -- I can't remember how much the premium was, it was four hundred and something, he said it was included in that." (Emphasis supplied.) She also signed an acknowledgment indicating the towing fee would be in addition to the insurance premium and a paper showing the amount for financing the insurance premium totalled only $349, and she was asked to name, and did name, a beneficiary on the death and dismemberment form. Further, she admitted that she understood that she was receiving travel/accident benefits through American Travelers, and that it was required for premium financing. However, she is credible and clear that all the amounts she had paid and was going to have to pay were not fairly represented to her and that Respondent made out forms showing she was being charged $187 for an auto club or towing feature which, having no car she could not very well use, as well as forms showing she was purchasing a death and dismemberment feature at $100, purely as a requirement of financing automobile insurance. Count V (Cynthia Mann) On January 24, 1992, Cynthia Mann made application for full coverage automobile insurance. Respondent actively supervised her transaction. Respondent was the brokering agent for the policy. Ms. Mann tendered a check for $180 and was advised that an additional down payment of $95 was due on the policy. She tendered the additional $95 down payment to Respondent on February 3, 1992. Charter American Casualty Insurance Company issued her standard automobile policy. Ms. Mann also executed a premium finance agreement to obtain premium financing for the policy. This agreement indicated that the total down payment for the policy was $165. Respondent required Ms. Mann to execute an old auto club contract in order to get the financing. She signed an acknowledgment that she had been offered an opportunity to purchase insurance from Emerald Coast without any auto club. The new auto club had no record of receiving Ms. Mann's Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. contract. The record is silent as to whether or not the old auto club received her contract. The annual fee specified on the old auto club contract was $110. Emerald Coast took $110 from Ms. Mann's $180 deposit and applied it to the auto club contract. Ms. Mann signed an application form, an acknowledgment form similar to those signed by the other complainants, and an "affidavit." Ms. Mann contended that Respondent had told her that she had a towing benefit as part of the automobile insurance policy purchased. The reconciled and understandable portion of her paperwork shows otherwise. She was not told she could not read the documents placed before her for reading and signature, but she did not read any of the documents prior to signing. She did not want to spend additional time reading documents because she "knew [she] had to have insurance." However, reading the documents would not have eliminated some of the contradictory and therfore false statements as to what constituted insurance premium. Count VI (Jacque Flowers) Respondent was actively involved in both of Jacque Flowers' transactions. At all times material, Paul Wettrich, an unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast, spent less than ten percent of his time actually filling out forms for customers or taking information from customers. On December 31, 1992, Jacque Flowers went to Emerald Coast to purchase automobile insurance and executed an application for various coverages for two automobiles. On December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers tendered $160 as a down payment to Mr. Wettrich. Mr. Wettrich signed a receipt as "salesman," and assisted Ms. Flowers in filling out the required forms. The receipt showed a total premium of $849. The Respondent executed the application as brokering agent. Mr. Wettrich never signed any of the applications on behalf of Respondent or any other licensed agent. Also, on December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers executed an Underwriters Financial premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the policy premium. Respondent executed that agreement as agent of record. The agreement incorrectly specified that a $187 down payment already had been made. As part of the December 31, 1992 transaction, and pursuant to Emerald Coast's standard business practice, Ms. Flowers was required to contract with Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. for an auto club at a $100 fee. The $100 auto club fee was deducted from the $160 cash payment made on that date. On December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers was in a hurry to complete her transaction because she had her three-year-old child with her. Without reading them, Ms. Flowers signed an application form, a premium finance agreement, an acknowledgment form, an Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. form, and a summary and cost breakdown form, acknowledging the truth and accuracy of the statements contained in each document, that the coverages had been fully explained to her, and that she understood them. Effective January 1, 1993 and pursuant to the policy application, Underwriters issued to Ms. Flowers a policy with a total annual premium of $749. On January 27, 1993, pursuant her agreement on December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers tendered to Respondent an additional $127. ($160 plus $127 would equal $287 paid up to that date.) Also on January 27, 1993, Ms. Flowers deleted one car from the policy. On February 15, 1993, Ms. Flowers deleted the second car from the policy and added a third car. This resulted in an increased premium and an addendum to the policy which had been issued January 1. Ms. Flowers paid $92 more to Respondent's brother Scott, an unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast, who signed the receipt. The addendum stated that the additional policy premium was $167, and that $67 had been the cash down payment. Respondent executed the addendum as brokering agent. In accord with its standard business practice, Emerald Coast, through Scott Whitaker, required Ms. Flowers to execute an accidental death and dismemberment contract with American Travelers Association, Inc. Twenty-five dollars for this item was taken from her $92 paid that day. The receipts and other documents provided Ms. Flowers at this time were inconsistent, and Respondent was unable to explain the inconsistencies at formal hearing. Although Ms. Flowers testified that the two ancillary product packages (auto club and death and dismemberment benefits) were never explained to her and that she would never have purchased either package if she had understood that there were additional charges therefor, her paperwork shows otherwise. Also, she specifically testified that when she went to Emerald Coast the first time, on December 31, 1992, her insurance had just been cancelled by Florida Farm Bureau due to her husband's driving record, and that when she requested full coverage, she understood "full coverage" to include towing, based on her experience with Florida Farm Bureau. Therefore, it is concluded that she wanted the towing benefit however she could get it. She also admitted that each paper was explained to her before she signed on December 31, 1992. Therefore, she knew on December 31, 1992 that she was getting towing and was paying for it through an auto club, even though the totality of the paperwork is misleading as to what amounts were paid for each purpose, and even though the several options within each type of ancillary product were not explained to her and the Emerald Coast employees chose what benefit amount to sell her each time. The December 31, 1992 old auto club package was sent to the new auto club. The record is silent as to what became of the February 15, 1993 American Travelers Association, Inc. death and dismemberment form. Count VII (Sebrena McPhaul) On September 21, 1992, Sebrena McPhaul went to Emerald Coast to purchase automobile insurance and executed applications for bodily injury, property damage, and PIP coverages with Underwriters and for physical damage coverage with Nu-Main, for a total premium of $651, to be divided appropriately between the two carriers as they required. Ms. McPhaul executed a finance agreement stating that the down payment for her insurance policies was $163. Ms. McPhaul tendered a $163 down payment check with the understanding that she would tender an additional $100 in two subsequent $50 installments. Ms. McPhaul also signed an Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. form, even though she informed Emerald Coast employees that she did not need an auto club since she had AAA. The application she signed was for an auto club at a cost of $130, a portion of which was to be taken from the down payments to be made by Ms. McPhaul. Ms. McPhaul signed a summary of coverages and cost breakdown form which stated that an auto club was covered, including payment for bail bonds, towing and labor and owner protection at a cost of $130, but she did not read it before she signed it. Ms. McPhaul admitted that the coverages had been explained to her by Scott Whitaker, an unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast, prior to her signing the summary of coverages and cost breakdown form, but maintained that he had not adequately explained that the $130 for the auto club was in addition to her insurance premium instead of part of it. Ms. McPhaul signed an acknowledgment form concerning the purchase of the auto club and an "affidavit" concerning the truthfulness of her responses, but she read neither of them, either. She conceded that if she had taken the time to read the acknowledgment form instead of just signing it, she would have understood the difference. Scott Whitaker issued her a receipt showing her total premium was $781. Respondent was in charge of the office, was actively involved in her transaction, and signed the applications as brokering agent. Emerald Coast sent the old club form to the new club. Ms. McPhaul executed a premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the premiums for her policies which were executed by Respondent as agent of record. Ms. McPhaul was issued insurance policies for her purchased coverages, on September 21 and 22, respectively. At this point, Ms. McPhaul understood that she was paying $130 for an auto club above and beyond her premiums and financing costs. Previously, she had thought that towing was part of her standard automobile insurance contract. She blamed the misunderstanding upon misrepresentations made by Scott Whitaker, but the acknowledgment she signed is clear on this portion of the disclosure. Ms. McPhaul stopped payment on a check she had used to pay the down payment on her insurance. Emerald Coast thereby incurred a loss of $90 it had forwarded to the carriers, and also lost the cost of processing her applications. The receipts and other documents provided Ms. Flowers were inconsistent. Respondent was unable to explain the inconsistencies. Count VIII (Steve Reeves) On March 20, 1993, Steve Reeves went to Emerald Coast to purchase automobile insurance for a new truck he was leasing. He did so because he had unilaterally formed the opinion that his current truck insurance would not cover a new truck he had just leased. Mr. Reeves tendered to Emerald Coast a down payment of $175 with the understanding that he would make an additional $45 premium payment to Emerald Coast. That additional premium payment was paid by Mr. Reeves at a later date. Mr. Reeves executed a premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of his policy premium. The financing agreement showed the down payment was $120, not $175. This is the only significant discrepancy among Mr. Reeves' documents except for the wrong use of the word "premium" on the receipt and the wrong auto club being named in the acknowledgment and auto club form. Respondent executed the policy application as agent of record. The application stated that the premium was $453 plus a $25 policy fee for a total of $478. The receipt to Mr. Reeves for the down payment lists the total premium as $578, as does the cost breakdown form. The $100 difference was applied to an auto club fee. Mr. Reeves also purchased an auto club from Emerald Coast. He knew he had purchased the auto club as a condition of getting his insurance from Emerald Coast. His companion suggested going elsewhere for cheaper insurance without the auto club, but Mr. Reeves declined this suggestion because it was late in the day and he wanted to get his truck insured right then and drive it home. The auto club contract reflected a fee of $100 and bore the name of the old auto club. It was sent to the new auto club. Mr. Reeves signed an acknowledgment form which also reflected a $100 auto club fee, an "affidavit," a summary and coverage cost breakdown form, and a travel association form, but did not fully read them. Executive Insurance Company issued a policy to Mr. Reeves, which he paid on monthly for five or six months. He eventually allowed the policy to lapse for non-payment because he got in a dispute with Emerald Coast about the agency's refusal to accept payments made in its office by way of a third party check.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Insurance enter a final order suspending Respondent's licenses for thirteen months for eight violations of Section 626.9541(1)(x)4. and eight violations of Section 626.621(6) F.S. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-5436 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 6-7 Rejected as not proven. 8-10 Subordinate to the facts as found. 11-15 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer counts. Subordinate to the facts as found. Rejected as a conclusion of law 19-29 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 30-31 Subordinate to the facts as found. 32 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective count. 33-38 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 43-47 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 48 The first sentence is rejected as a conclusion of law. The second sentence is accepted,. 49-50 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 51 Accepted as covered in FOF 18. 52-53 Subordinate to the facts as found. 54-55 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 56 Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. The remainder is covered in substance. 57-59 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 60 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 61-62 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 63 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 64-71 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 72 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 73-74 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. Otherwise accepted. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 78-79 Accepted in part and rejected in part upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. See FOF 66-68. 80-83 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 86-87 Accepted in part and rejected in part upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. See FOF 20,24, 72-76. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 90-95 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected because not proven as stated. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 98-99 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 100-102 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 106-111 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 117-118 Rejected in part and accepted in part as covered in FOF 90-91. 119-124 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as misstating the primary party. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 123 and respective customer count. 128-130 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 133-138 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 139 Rejected as contrary to the record as a whole. 140-145 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 146-147 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 148-150 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 153-157 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 158 Rejected as a conclusion of law. 159-162 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Respondent's PFOF: 1-18 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 19-20 Rejected because misleading and non-dispositive as stated. See FOF 17-20. 21 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 22-25 Unnecessary. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. Immaterial 28-37 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 38 Accepted but not dispositive 39-42 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 43 Rejected as not proven. 44-103 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized, and some further explanation has been added. Some matters have been considered on the issue of credibility but not incorporated. 104 Rejected because not proven as stated. 105-108 Covered only as necessary in FOF 23-24 109-112 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. The primary party has been indicated. 113-124 Rejected as quoting isolated, unreconciled testimony, as mere legal argument, and as stating a conclusion of law. 125-128 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 129-133 Rejected as quoting isolated, unreconciled testimony, as mere legal argument, an as stating a conclusion of law. 134-137 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael K. McCormick, Esquire David D. Hershel, Esquire Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Bill O'Neil, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Sumner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance, (Department), was the state agency responsible for the licensing and registration of insurance agents in Florida and for the regulation of the insurance industry in this state. At the same time, Respondent was licensed in Florida as a general lines agent, a life and health (debit) agent, a life and health agent, and as a dental health care services contract salesman. He was president, director and registered agent of, and was the only licensed insurance agent working at, Devor of Brandon, a general lines insurance agency located in Brandon, Florida. At the times in issue, Respondent employed Jay Schetina, not a licensed insurance agent in Florida, to work as a salesman at the Brandon office. Mr. Schetina worked directly under the supervision and control of the Respondent and was in charge of the Brandon office when Respondent, who worked four days a week at the other office he owned in Cape Coral, Florida was not there. On January 11, 1989, Nellie Wynperle Henry went to the Respondent's Brandon agency to buy automobile insurance. She dealt with Mr. Schetina who sold her a policy to be issued by Underwriters Guarantee Insurance Company for an annual premium of $1,288.00, and to be effective January 17, 1989. She gave Mr. Schetina a $429.00 down payment and ultimately was issued policy no. 12207947. The policy reflected Respondent as agent for the company. Though she was not told what it was and does not recall signing it, an application for an auto service contract, to be issued by Century Auto Service, was also prepared and bears what purports to be her signature. That application was prepared and submitted without her knowledge or permission. The fee for the policy was $40.00, of which the agency got to keep 90%. Since she was already a member of AAA and had their service coverage, Ms. Wynperle did not need the service club policy sold to her at Respondent's agency and, in fact, had told Mr. Schetina so. Though she was charged for the service policy, she never received a copy of it and did not know she had it. At the time she applied for the auto insurance, Ms. Wynperle also applied to finance the unpaid balance due over and above the down payment through Underwriter's Financial of Florida, Inc., a premium finance company. The premium finance agreement includes the amount of the unwanted service policy, and is also incorrect in that it reflects that the down payment tendered by Ms. Wynperle was only $389.00. Dorothy Lunsford purchased auto insurance from the Respondent's agency on January 18, 1989. The premium for her policy, also with Underwriters Guarantee, was $707.00 and she made a down payment, by check, of $217.00. She financed the balance but the application for financing showed a down payment of only $177.00. On the same day, an application form for an auto service policy was also submitted in Ms. Lunsford's name. The cost of this policy was $40.00. On January 31, 1989 Joanne Coleman applied for automobile insurance at Respondent's agency. She was to be insured by two companies' policies, one issued by United Guarantee and one by Hamilton Insurance Company. The total combined premium was $670.00. Both policies were issued and Respondent's agency was listed as agent on both. She paid for the policies with a check for $687.00. No explanation was given for the difference. At the same time she applied for the auto insurance, though she had had no discussion with the clerk with whom she dealt at the agency about it, an application for an auto service policy was also filled out in her name, carrying a premium of $20.00. She did not receive a service policy. She neither authorized or consented to the submittal of the service club application in her name. Ms. Coleman's memory of the events, however, was not clear, but it is clear that she did not want the service policy she was charged for. On February 9, 1989, Kathy Gall applied for auto insurance with the Respondent's agency. The annual premium was$733.00 and at the time, she gave the agent a check for the down payment in the amount of $240.00. She applied to finance the balance but when prepared at the agency, the application form reflected a down payment of only $220.00. This was in error. However, at that same visit, an application for an auto service policy was also filled out in Ms. Gall's name. The policy bore a premium of $20.00. At no time did Ms. Gall authorize that service policy nor, in fact, was it ever discussed with her and she did not know she was purchasing it. Finally, on February 6, 1989, Lucinda Romano applied with the Respondent's agency for an automobile insurance policy with Allegheny Mutual Casualty Company. At that time, she gave Devor a check for $61.80. Though at the time she went into the agency she did not intend to purchase an auto service contract because she was having financial problems and wanted only the most basic lawful coverage, and did not sign the application for it, she was charged for an auto service policy at a cost of $20.00. She thought she was purchasing only PIP coverage which cost $60.00. Ms. Romano subsequently requested a refund of the amount she paid for the auto service policy and the payment was refunded by check on May 19, 1989 from Jay Schetina. Sometime after the Devor agency was taken over by Sam Capitano/Action Insurance Agency, and the latter's employees were servicing the company's files, Ms. Brown-Parker, an employee of Action found the auto service policies, including those issued in the name of Ms. Romano, Ms. Gall, Ms. Coleman, and Ms. Wynperle,and Ms. Lunsford, which had not been transmitted to the policyholders. Both copies of the policy were in the file. Respondent is also the subject of a Consent Order issued on February 26, 1990, subsequent to the date of the matters in issue herein. The Settlement Stipulation For Consent Order, on which the Order is based, refers to the matters in issue here which relate to Respondent's allowing his non-licensed employees to use his license to practice insurance, and allowed the agency to operate, at least at times, without an active, full time agent in charge. At paragraph 10(c), the Stipulation provides, in part: ... If the Department has good cause to believe that, after the issuance of the Consent Order in this cause, unlicensed individuals are transacting insurance at any agency at which Respondent operates as a general lines agent ..., or that any agency at which Respondent operates ... is not at all times after issuance of the Consent Order in this cause under the active, full-time charge of a general lines agency, the Department shall initiate proceedings to suspend or revoke the licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations of the Respondent based upon the original grounds as alleged in the Administrative Complaint referred to herein. The original charges referred to, supra, relate to Respondent's alleged authorization of unlicensed employees to transact insurance, and his alleged authorization of the agency to, at times, operate without an active, full-time agent in charge. It did not refer to the incidents alleged herein, to wit: theimproper charges for undesired auto club membership and the preparation of false premium finance applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued dismissing the allegations that Respondent, John W. Ganter, violated Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, but finding him guilty of violations of Section 626.621, 626.9521 and 626.9541(1)(k)1, Florida Statutes, as to Ms. Wynperle, Ms. Gall, Ms. Coleman, Ms. Romano, and Ms. Lunsford, and imposing a suspension of his licenses and eligibility for licensure for a period of one year. However, under the provisions of Section 626.691, it is further recommended that in lieu of the suspension, the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two years under such terms and conditions as specified by the Department. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida this 10th day of October, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. & 24. Accepted. 25. Not a Finding of Fact. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted expect for the representation that Petitioner presented no evidence as to Count II. The Stipulation of the parties clearly makes detailed reference to the allegations regarding Ms. Lunsford. Accepted as to Counts VI, VII & VIII. Rejected as to Count II. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. - 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. - 34. Accepted as to the actual dealings of the Respondent. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Orrin R. Beilly, Esquire The Citizens Building, Suite 705 105 S. Narcissus Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mary Lou Finn, is licensed by Petitioner as a general lines insurance agent. During the period of May 5, 1979 until November 1, 1980, she was the agent of record at the Ocala, Florida, office of University Insurance. During that time she held a 220 license and was the only agent responsible for that office. From April 1979 until November 1, 1980 Mr. Robert Vittitoe was the manager and owner of the Ocala office. Through an arrangement, which Respondent described as a consulting contract, she supervised the operation of the office. She also had a consulting contract but no supervising duties with University Insurance offices in Lake City and Tallahassee. In the course of her supervision and consulting advice for the University Insurance offices Ms. Finn issued a blizzard of memoranda on the operation of those offices. One of the memoranda which was received at the Ocala office on August 27, 1979 gave instructions concerning the sale of automobile motor club memberships. It states in pertinent part: The new yellow I.D. cards are for the following reason--When you write PIP only and a club, do not tell the insured he has towing and road service. Simply quote him the total rate, get all required signatures and TYPE them the yellow ID. card. When PIP policy and club policy [come] in we WILL NOT MAIL. We will keep their policies in their file. This will save on cancelled clubs when insured sees everything, plus it will save loads of postage. Remember - DO NOT MENTION motor club, towing and road svc., etc. They do not have to take the club anymore. Simply say the coverage they want (PIP) is $44.00 or whatever get signatures, type them their card and say good-bye. (Get money) This memorandum was shortly followed by one dated September 2, 1979, which said in part: In Gainesville we are not mailing policies. Instead having insured pick up. We will try it & see. Last week I sent a memo to you to explain. Had some calls that you didn't understand memo & thought I meant keep policies in file NO! No one has enough room in file cases for that. It is to save on postage. If you want to save yourselves money give it a try Re: The motor club, don't overemphasize the towing and road svc. We have too many claims. Explain all the coverages and emphasize the bail bond, legal fees, trip routing etc. Subsequently by a memorandum dated September 26, 1979, Respondent sent further instructions regarding motor clubs. The memorandum stated: When you write a motor club with other coverages and finance, be sure to list premiums separately on finance contract and get all signatures incl. club app. Make sure that the ins. knows all coverages on club. We are having a lot of towing claims and company is complaining so go into detail on other coverages as well. The last memorandum concerning this issue sent from Respondent to the Ocala office was written in the early part of 1980. It says: Please use the small statements for insureds to sign in addition to motor club app. so they are well aware of what they are purchasing. Will protect you too. Make sure they understand all coverages, BI, PD, PIP, COLL, COMP, UM, motor club if written & explain all deductibles. VERY IMPORTANT. 3 weeks after they leave office they won't know what they have, so be explicit. Get all signatures required especially motor club apps. & the statement that insured understands they have motor club & its [sic] a separate charge. The foregoing memoranda were sent by Ms. Finn with the intent that the sales personnel at the Ocala office follow her instructions contained therein. I find that the memorandum received on August 27, 1979 constituted an instruction to misrepresent the full nature of the insurance purchase transaction between the Ocala office and its customers. Ms. Finn's instructions were that "when PIP policy and club policy [come] in we will not mail. We will keep their policies in their file. This will save on cancelled clubs when the insureds see everything, plus it will save loads of postage." The implication is clear that the insureds are not to know that they have purchased automobile club coverage so they will not cancel it. This finding is supported by the following instruction: "Remember - DO NOT MENTION motor club, towing and road svc., etc. They do not have to take the club anymore. Simply say the coverage they want (PIP) is $44.00...". The three later memoranda in varying degrees countermanded the instructions of the August 27 memo. As soon as September 2, 1979 Respondent instructed the Ocala office to explain all the coverages and emphasize the bail bond, legal fees and trip routing features of the motor club memberships. If the sales people followed this directive they would necessarily inform the applicants that they were purchasing motor club memberships. The taint of the August 27 memorandum which arises from the instruction not to mail out insurance policies was eliminated by the September 2, 1979 memorandum which suggests that rather than mailing policies, the office request the insureds to pick the policies up. I find by September 26, 1979 Respondent was no longer instructing the Ocala office to "slide" motor clubs. 2/ Her memorandum of that date required listing the motor club fee separately on the premium finance agreements signed by the applicants. That instruction is incompatible with sliding. By the time her memorandum of early 1980 was written, Ms. Finn was instructing the Ocala office to add additional statements to insure that the insured knew they were purchasing motor club memberships and it was a separate charge. At the final hearing Ms. Finn gave testimony in an attempt to resolve the contradiction between the August 27, 1979 memorandum and the subsequent three memoranda received into evidence. She stated she intended by the August 27, 1979 memorandum to have the sales personnel only de-emphasize the towing and road service portion of the motor club memberships being purchased. While her explanation coincides directly with the instructions in the September 2, 1979 memorandum, it does not adequately explain the clear language of the instructions received in Ocala on August 27, 1979. Ms. Finn's testimony on that point is not accepted as credible. This finding rests in part on the evasiveness and demeanor the witness showed in answering both direct and cross- examination questions during her testimony. Individual Transactions On June 4, 1979 Ms. Lillie Mae Young purchased an automobile insurance policy at University Insurance in Ocala. 3/ As part of the transaction she also purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club. During the course of that transaction she executed three documents: an insurance application, a Nation Motor Club application, and a premium finance agreement. When Ms. Young went to the Ocala office of University Insurance she asked to purchase the minimum insurance required by law to have her automobile registered. Whoever sold her the insurance did not mention to Ms. Young that she was purchasing a motor club membership. Ms. Young did not carefully read the documents she executed when she purchased her insurance. She believed that the person who sold her the insurance was a man. If Ms. Young had known that she was paying $35 for a motor club membership, she would not have bought it. On June 2, 1979, Ms. Willie Mae McCray purchased personal injury protection and bodily injury insurance for $163 at the Ocala office of University Insurance. As part of that transaction she also purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club for $35. In the course of the transaction she executed three documents: an insurance application, a Nation Motor Club application, and a premium finance agreement. Both the motor club application and the premium finance agreement indicated the fee for the motor club was $35, but the evidence is not clear whether these documents were completed when Ms. McCray executed them. When Ms. McCray went to the Ocala office she asked to purchase PIP insurance. She was told by the salesperson that she could not buy just PIP alone, but must also purchase "liability". Ms. McCray agreed to purchase both coverages because she needed to register her automobile. She was not aware on June 2, 1979 that she had purchased a motor club membership. She was not told by the salesperson, who was not Ms. Finn, that she was making such a purchase. If Ms. McCray had known that the motor club membership was a $35 charge over and above her insurance premium she would not have paid it. At the time Ms. McCray bought her insurance she signed the documents mentioned above without reading them because she was in a hurry to get her insurance. She has difficult reading but did not mention her difficulty to the salesperson. On June 15, 1979 Mr. Alton Starker purchased personal injury protection and bodily injury insurance for $183 at University Insurance in Ocala. As part of that transaction he also purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club for $35. In the course of the transaction he executed three documents: an insurance application, a Nation Motor Club application, and a premium finance agreement. The Nation Motor Club application which he signed indicated the club membership fee was $35. There is no evidence on whether the application was filled in at the time he signed it. There are two duplicate parts of the premium finance agreement in evidence. One part, the assured's copy, has only the dollar amounts filled in and Mr. Starker's signature; the other part, the agent's copy, is completely filled in and shows a $35 charge for Nation Motor Club membership. These two copies are part of a manifold tear- apart form. The original was not in evidence; therefore, it is impossible to tell which part of the premium finance agreement was filled in at the time Mr. Starker executed the original. The copy which was given to him to retain for his records was the assured's copy which does not show an itemized charge for the motor club. Mr. Starker's memory of the transaction is not accepted as credible. His testimony at the final hearing was impeached by a prior inconsistent statement he made in a discovery deposition. He denied signing the insurance application, yet without his signature he could not have purchased insurance which he testified he bought. On May 5, 1980 Mr. James Clark purchased personal injury protection and bodily injury insurance for $274 from University Insurance in Ocala. As part of the transaction he also purchased a membership in the Associated Motor Club for $35. In the course of that transaction he executed two documents: an insurance application and a premium finance agreement. The finance agreement indicated the charge for the motor club was $35 but there is no evidence on whether the document was filled in at the time Mr. Clark signed it. When Mr. Clark, who was accompanied by his wife, went to the Ocala office he asked to purchase the insurance necessary to "cover the vehicle, that's required for the law, and that was it." The salesperson who handled Mr. Clark's purchase did not show him anything which Mr. Clark thought indicated he purchased a motor club membership. Ms. Finn was not the salesperson in his transaction. Mr. Clark did not know he had paid a motor club membership fee until the investigation of this case by Petitioner began. On December 14, 1979 Mr. Mark Alfarone purchased bodily injury, liability, property damage liability, comprehensive including collision, and uninsured motorist coverage for $579 at University Insurance in Ocala. As part of the transaction he also purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club for $35. In the course of the transaction he executed three documents: an insurance application, a premium finance agreement and a Nation Motor Club application. Both the motor club application and the premium finance agreement indicated that the membership fee was $35 but there is no evidence whether the documents were filled in at the time Mr. Alfarone executed them. When Mr. Alfarone went to purchase his insurance he asked for full coverage because the new Corvette he was insuring was financed. He did not request a motor club membership. He already belonged to AAA. Sharyn Vittitoe, the wife of the office manager Robert Vittitoe, handled his purchase. Mr. Alfarone did not read all the documents Ms. Vittitoe handed him to sign. She did not fail to answer any of his questions about his coverage which she explained to him. He did not tell her that he was a member of AAA. At the time he purchased his insurance Mr. Alfarone was not aware that he was charged for a motor club. He does not recall anything about a motor club being discussed then. He also does not recall receiving any documentation in the mail which identified him as a member of the Nation Motor Club. Mr. Alfarone does not recall signing any document for the purchase of a motor club membership although in his cross-examination he admitted probably seeing the Nation Motor Club application before he signed it. On September 26, 1979 Mr. James Curry purchased personal injury protection and bodily injury insurance on two automobiles for $299 at University Insurance in Ocala. As part of that transaction he also purchased two memberships, one per car, in the Nation Motor Club for a total of $53. In the course of the transaction he executed four documents: two Nation Motor Club applications, an insurance application and a premium finance agreement. One motor club application indicated that the membership fee was $35. The other application showed a fee of $18 for a second car. The premium finance agreement indicated a charge of $53 for "NMC". There is no evidence on whether the documents were filled in at the time Mr. Curry signed them. The evidence does not show what type of coverage Mr. Curry requested when he went to the Ocala office. At the final hearing he testified as follows: (Mr. Sumner) Q All right. Did you have any particular insurance coverages in mind? (Mr. Curry) A Well, I just wanted some where I could get my tag and, you know, cover some liability. (Mr. Sumner) Q Did you explain that to the people at the University Insurance Agency? (Mr. Curry) A I don't know what I did. I don't know, really I don't. But I just told them I wanted some coverage, you know, to protect me on the road and, you know-- He did not remember the details of what happened during the transaction. He did not remember signing either his insurance application or his premium finance agreement. He did not read the documents he was asked to sign. At the end of the transaction he did not understand that he had purchased motor club membership. On June 18, 1979 Ms. Betty Jean Nobles purchased personal injury protection and bodily injury insurance for $163 at University Insurance in Ocala. As part of that transaction she also purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club for $35. In the course of her transaction she executed three documents: a premium finance agreement, an insurance application, and a Nation Motor Club application. Both the premium finance agreement and the motor club application indicated that the motor club membership fee was $35 but there is no evidence on whether the documents were filled in when Ms. Nobles signed them. Ms. Nobles' testimony about the details of her insurance purchase has not given any weight here because at the final hearing she did not remember the transaction well. The following testimony is typical of her recollection: (Mr. Sumner) Q Did you have any particular insurance coverages in mind when you bought -- went down there to buy insurance? (Ms. Nobles) A Not really, just full coverage. I needed insurance for a tag. (Mr. Sumner) Q Did you ask for full coverage, or did you explain what you wanted to the people there? (Ms. Nobles) A Well, I think I asked -- I really don't remember. I think I asked for full coverage. I didn't ask for insurance just for a tag, no. (Mr. Sumner) Q Okay. Miss Nobles, it's also been established that at the time you bought your automobile insurance, that you were charged for an automobile club membership. Were you aware that you had paid for that particular item at the time that you bought your insurance? (Ms. Nobles) A Well, to tell the truth, I can't say yes, and I can't say no, because I don't remember asking for one, no. On July 6, 1979 Mr. Vernajor Parker purchased personal injury protection and bodily injury insurance for $293 from University Insurance in Ocala. As part of that transaction he also purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club for $35. In the course of the transaction he executed three documents: an insurance application, a premium finance agreement and a Nation Motor Club application. Both the premium finance agreement and the motor club application indicated that the motor club membership fee was $35. There is no evidence on whether or not the motor club application and the premium finance agreement were completely filled in at the time Mr. Parker signed them. 4/ Mr. Parker went to the Ocala office with the intention of purchasing the minimum insurance he needed to register his car. He does not remember whether or not the man who sold him his insurance discussed towing and road service with him. Mr. Parker remembers reading what he considered the important parts of all the documents he signed. The insurance policies of Mr. Parker, Mr. Curry and Ms. Young were not delivered to them but were retained in their file at University Insurance in Ocala. The Nation Motor Club Service contracts of Ms. Young, Mr. Alfarone and Mr. Parker were similarly retained in their files. These documents are necessary to a full understanding of the insurance coverage and motor club benefits the insureds purchased. Because certain dates in these findings are crucial to the following legal conclusions the dates are summarized here: Chronology of Transactions and Memoranda June 2, 1979 Willie Mae McCray June 4, 1979 Lillie Mae Young June 15, 1979 Alton Louis Starker June 18, 1979 Betty Jean Nobles July 6, 1979 Vernajor K. Parker August 27, 1979 Memo received instructing no disclosure of motor clubs. September 2, 1979 Memo written instructing explain all coverages but do not overemphasize towing and road service. September 26, 1979 Memo written instructing make sure insureds know all coverages on motor clubs. September 26, 1979 James Alfred Curry, Jr. December 14, 1979 Mark Alfarone Early 1980 Memo written instructing use small statements that applicants understand they have purchased a motor club for a separate charge. May 5, 1980 James Franklin Clark CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case. Sections 120.57(1) and 120.65, Florida Statutes (1981). By its Amended Administrative Complaint the Department seeks to suspend or revoke Respondent's license as a general lines insurance agent. Authorization for such action is found in both Sections 626.611 (compulsory revocation or suspension) and 626.621 (discretionary revocation or suspension), Florida Statutes. 5/ As alleged by the Administrative Complaint the pertinent portions of Section 626.611 are: The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent ... and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such persons if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist: * * * If the license or permit is willfully used, or to be used, to circumvent any of the requirements or prohibitions of this code. Willful misrepresentation of any insurance policy or annuity contract or willful deception with regard to any such policy or contract, done either in person or by any form of dissemination of information or advertising. * * * (7) For demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. * * * (9) Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit. * * * (13) Willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of, any proper order, rule, or regulation of the department or willful violation of any provision of this code. Section 626.621, Florida Statutes provides: The department may, in its discretion, deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent...and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such persons if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under s. 626.611: * * * (2) Violation of any provision of this code or of any other law applicable to the business of insurance in the course of dealing under the license or permit. * * * (6) If in the conduct of business under the license or permit he has engaged in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part VII of this chapter, or has otherwise shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest. The relevant provisions of Part VII of Chapter 626 referenced above include Sections 626.9521 and 626.9541, Florida Statutes (1981). Section 626.9521 provides in part: No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined in this part as, or determined pursuant to s.626.9561 to be, an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice involving the business of insurance. Any person who violates any provision of this part shall be subject to the penalties provided in s.627.381. Section 626.9541 explicates the alleged unfair competition charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint as follows: The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices: * * * Filing with any supervisory or other public official, Making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, Delivering to any person, Placing before the public, Causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public, any false material statement. * * * Knowingly making false or fraudulent statements or representations on, or relative to, an application for an insurance policy for the purpose of obtaining a fee, commission, money, or other benefit from any insurer, agent, broker, or individual. * * * Knowingly collecting as a premium or charge for insurance any sum in excess of or less than the premium or charge applicable to such insurance, in accordance with the applicable classifications and rates as filed with and approved by the department, and as specified in the policy; or, in cases when classifications, premiums, or rates are not required by this code to be so filed and approved, premiums and charges in excess of or less than those specified in the policy and as fixed by the insurer. This provision shall not be deemed to prohibit the charging and collection, by surplus lines agents licensed under part VI of this' chapter, of the amount of applicable state and federal taxes in addition to the premium required by the insurer. Compared with the foregoing legal labyrinth the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint are simple. Eight transactions are charged. The allegations as to each transaction are the same except for the dates and the customers. The following count is representative: COUNT VI That you, MARY LOU FINN, as the general lines agent of record for the University Insurance Agency, Ocala, Florida, or one of your agents or employees acting under your direction or supervision, on or about December 14, 1979, sold to Mark Alfarone automobile insurance coverage. That you, MARY LOU FINN, or one of your agents or employees acting under your direction or supervision, charged Mark Alfarone for membership in an automobile club in the price of his automobile insurance premium without his knowledge or consent. That Mark Alfarone neither requested nor desired to pay additional monies for membership in an automobile club and would not have knowingly purchased the same at additional cost. IT IS THEREFORE CHARGED that in the conduct of business under your license, you, MARY LOU FINN: [Legal Conclusions Follow] Standard Of Proof In license revocation cases such as this the Petitioner has the burden to prove the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Bach v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 378 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980). The standard by which the agency's proof is tested has not been clear in Florida. Fact finders such as judges, jurors and hearing officers are familiar with three standards of proof: preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing, and beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. Traditionally findings of fact once made by the fact finder have been reviewed by appellate bodies under the test of "competent substantial evidence." The fact finding tests are essentially weighing devices. Because appellate bodies do not reweigh evidence, 6/ they review a record only to determine if someplace in that record there appears evidence of sufficient reliability (competent substantial evidence) which should be allowed to support a factual determination. Town of Indialantic v. Nance, 400 So.2d 37, 40 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981); Hughes v Office of the Comptroller, So.2d 6 FLW 2490 (Fla. 2nd D.C.A. November 18, 1981); 5 Am Jur.2d, Appeal and Error 839 at 282 (1962). Once reliable evidence can be gleaned from the record which supports a finding, the appellate body cannot upset that finding. 5 Am Jur.2d, Appeal and Error 882 (1962). Unfortunately the foregoing concepts have been confused in recent opinions concerning professional license revocation cases. Gans v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, 2 FALR 239J (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. April 29, 1980) is an example. There the appellant argued in a license revocation case that a preponderance of the evidence test had been used by the Hearing Officer instead of the clear and convincing test, contrary to the holding of Walker v. State Board of Optometry, 322 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975). In his opinion for the Court Judge Hendry asserted that the preponderance of the evidence is the correct test to be used in an administrative proceeding. Judge Nesbitt, specially concurring, argued that the proper test was competent substantial evidence. Judge Hubbart dissented. He correctly reasoned that competent substantial evidence was not a test to be employed by fact finders but was really a standard of review by appellate bodies. Because his argument cannot be better restated by the undersigned, it is quoted here: Finally, I find nothing in Florida's Administrative Procedure Act which dictates a contrary result. It is true that an administrative agency in reviewing the findings of fact of a hearing examiner, as contained in the recommended order, may not reject or modify such findings unless it first determines that the findings of fact were not based on "competent, substantial evidence" in the record; Section 120.57(1)(b)9, Fla. Stat. (1979); moreover, an appellate court in reviewing final administrative agency actions may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on the disputed findings of fact and is authorized to set aside such agency action only if it finds that such action depends on a finding of fact that is not supported by a "competent, substantial evidence" in the record. Section 120.68(10), Fla. Stat. (1979). These are, however, standards by which an administrative agency and an appellate court must review findings of fact previously made by an hearing examiner or other administrative finder of fact; they do not speak to the burden of proof which a hearing examiner, as here, must employ in making his findings of fact after a full evidentiary hearing. As such, these review standards have no relevance to the central issue of this case and in no sense conflict with the rule of the Walker decision. In this regard, I find the following principle of law entirely controlling: "There is a distinction between the standard by which an administrative tribunal measures the proof presented to it. . .and the standard by which a reviewing court measures the correctness of an administrative order under review... See DeGroot v. Sheffield, (Fla. 1957), 95 So.2d 912, 916. The functions of the two tribunals are dissimilar and the standards are not interchangeable." Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Div. of Health v. Career Service Comm'n of the State of Fla., Dep't of Admin., 289 So.2d 412, 415, n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), quoted with approval in Fitzpatrick v. City of Miami Beach, 328 So.2d 578, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). It should be noted that the Hearing Officer in the Gans case actually employed a competent substantial evidence test. Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Gans, Case No. 78-101 (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, Recommended Order October 2, 1978). The District Court of Appeal, Third District, became aware of that fact after issuing its original opinion which was subsequently withdrawn. The replacement opinion, with all three judges in agreement states: The administrative order under review is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) the standard of proof employed by the hearing examiner in reaching the findings of fact in this cause was not one of preponderance of the evidence, as both parties to this appeal have mistakenly assumed, and, accordingly, we have no occasion to determine whether the utilization of such a standard would in the abstract, constitute reversible error, as urged by appellant, it being abundantly clear that such an alleged error did not occur in this case. Gans v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, 390 So.2d 107 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1980). The opinions in Gans were followed by Bowling v. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981). The Court there held that the Hearing Officer (whose recommended order was adopted by the Department) erred in finding that Bowling had violated statutes regulating the conduct of insurance agents. In deciding the case the court properly applied the appropriate review standard, competent substantial evidence, and found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support certain findings. Unfortunately the opinion contains language which can be interpreted to mean that the competent substantial evidence test should be used to determine the existence or nonexistence of facts during an administrative hearing. See for example, Smith v. School Board of Leon County, 405 So.2d 183, 186 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981); Office of Treasurer, Insurance Commissioner v. Azis, Case No. 80- 1278 (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings Recommended Order, June 3, 1981); Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate v. Miller, 3 FALR 2317A, 2319A (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings Recommended Order, August 14, 1981). It frequently happens during a trial or a hearing that there is competent substantial evidence to support the existence of an alleged fact and there is also competent substantial evidence to support the non-existence of that fact. Because of its roots in the review process, competent substantial evidence provides no assistance to the fact finder in weighing evidence which may be equally competent and substantial yet contradictory. The task of the fact finder is to resolve the contradiction. This is where the traditional standards of proof give direction. The fact finder knows if the appropriate standard is preponderance of the evidence, then one scintilla of evidence more in favor of the existence of a fact than that evidence to the contrary will require him to find the fact exists. If the appropriate test is beyond and to the exclusion of the reasonable doubt he knows the evidence in favor of a fact must be so overwhelming as to exclude any reasonable contrary conclusion. For the foregoing reasons I conclude that competent substantial evidence as discussed in Bowling is not the appropriate standard of proof to be used in this proceeding. Since license revocation cases are penal in nature, 7/ clear and convincing evidence is the applicable criterion for determining whether or not Petitioner has established the facts alleged in its Amended Administrative Complaint. Walker v. Board of Optometry, 322 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975); Reid v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 188 So.2d 846, 851 (Fla. 2nd D.C.A. 1966). Proof Of Allegations The Respondent had no direct contact with any of the alleged customers of University Insurance in Ocala. None of the insurance purchasers remembers Ms. Finn as the person who sold him his policy. Because they were not called as witnesses there is no evidence from the Ocala salespeople who actually had contact with the complaining witnesses that Ms. Finn told them to "slide" motor clubs. The only link between Ms. Finn and the transactions alleged in the Administrative Complaint to violate the Insurance Code is the instructions she gave the Ocala office in her memorandum received on August 27, 1979. It is therefore concluded that no nexus has been established here between Ms. Finn and all transactions which antedate August 27, 1979. See the chronology of transactions set out in Finding of Fact 30. For this reason, Counts I, II, III, VIII and IX should be dismissed. The fact that Ms. Finn was the agent in charge of the Ocala office is not by itself sufficient to find her guilty of the alleged violations set out in the Counts above. Mere negligence in supervision of the salespeople even if proven, is not sufficient to sustain discipline in a license revocation case of this kind. Bach v. State Board of Dentistry, supra at 36. Counts IV, VI and VII concern transactions subsequent to the August 27, 1979 memorandum. Mr. Curry purchased his insurance on September 26, 1979. That was the same day Respondent wrote her memo which purged her earlier instructions to slide motor clubs. The record is barren of evidence on when the September 26, 1979 memorandum was received or acted on in Ocala. If I assume arguendo that the Ocala office was operating under a continuing taint from the August 27, 1979 memorandum, it is still not permissible to conclude that Petitioner has proven a violation by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Curry, when testifying three years after he bought his insurance, did not remember what coverage he asked for or many other significant details of his transaction. When asked on cross-examination whether he remembered what happened at his transaction on September, 1979 he stated "No, I can't remember." Count VII of the complaint therefore must be dismissed for a lack of proof. Counts VI and IV, alleged transactions which took place subsequent to September 26, 1979, when the improper instructions of the August 27, 1979 memorandum had been effectively countermanded. The link between Respondent and any misrepresentations which occurred in the sale of insurance to Mr. Alfarone and Mr. Clark had been severed. For this reason, Counts VI and IV should be dismissed. Summary The facts established here by clear and convincing evidence do not support a conclusion that Ms. Finn has violated any provisions of the Insurance Code as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. This determination is not meant to condone in any way Respondent's instructions in her August 27, 1979 memorandum. Had she been charged with instructing her subordinates to violate the Insurance Code and therefore demonstrating a lack of fitness to be licensed as an insurance agent, this might have been a different case. Since no such facts were pled here, the Amended Administrative Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. 8/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Mary Lou Finn. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gloria Ann Ellwood, is currently licensed and eligible for licensure in the State of Florida as a general lines agent. Ellwood purchased in January 1985 from Pasqualey "Pat" Caliguiri what they both believed to be were shares in two franchises to operate a nonstandard automobile insurance business, Cash Register Auto Insurance of Escambia County and Cash Register Auto Insurance of Okaloosa County. Ellwood paid Caliguiri $10,000 as a down payment and financed $35,000 for 500 of 1,000 shares in the Escambia County agency and approximately $25,000 for 500 of 1,000 shares in the Okaloosa County agency. Ellwood paid Caliguiri approximately one-half the amount financed before the events occurred which are the basis for this case. These two franchises Caliguiri had purchased in 1983, along with another franchise, for nonstandard auto insurance sales offices from Lloyd Register for $5,000 apiece, as evidenced by 500 shares of 1,000 shares common stock in each of the three corporations. Through this purchase, Caliguiri received a reduction in the amount of commission paid on the franchise and the ability to realize a profit from his efforts in building the business. He executed a consulting agreement with Register and had to sign an employment contract with the various corporations. Register provided accounting and similar services, and Caliguiri had to repay to Register all capital expenditures made on the agencies. Register was present at the closing of the sale between Caliguiri and Ellwood. Register was silent at the closing between Ellwood and Caliguiri regarding Ellwood's rights. He was aware of the transfer of Caliguiri's stock to Ellwood for valuable consideration. After the transfer, Ellwood executed a consulting agreement with Register and signed an employment contract with the two corporations which she had purchased. Ellwood was entitled to $500 per week salary from `the corporation. In the case of both Caliguiri and Ellwood, when receipts from the business were low, Register suggested that they take some lesser sum as a salary payment than what they were entitled to under their employment contract. Register demanded payment of all moneys due to Register, although he did extend the time for payment for Caliguiri at one point when business was particularly bad. Both Caliguiri and Ellwood thought that they owned the stores which they had purchased. Ellwood served as general manager, president and director of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Escambia County at all times material to the complaint. Cash Register of Escambia was a Florida corporation engaged in the operation of a nonstandard insurance agency at all times material to the complaint. During 1985 and 1986, Ellwood paid for rent, improvements to property, telephone service, and similar business expenses from her personal account when there insufficient funds in the operating account to cover these expenditures. The total of these loans to the corporation was $14,930.37. Ellwood was charged by Register for the annual state corporate filings with the State of Florida. The Escambia agency had two checking accounts; one for payroll and the other for bills and refunds. The latter account was called the operating account into which deposits and premiums were deposited. Checks for insurance companies, insureds, beneficiaries and all business expenses, except salary, were written on this account. Ellwood wrote or caused to be written all checks for the agency from both accounts. Starting in January 1987 and continuing to June 1988, Ellwood wrote a series of 14 checks on the operating account to fictitious payees which were designated as refund checks to insureds; however, the payees had never paid a deposit to the company. Between January 1987 and July 1988, Ellwood endorsed and cashed these checks keeping $1,897.44. Ellwood described these checks as repayment of the money which she had advanced to the business. Ellwood explained that she wrote these checks to fictitious payees to prevent questions from Register's accountant and from fear Register would want commissions from non-franchise agencies which she owned. During all times material to this complaint, Register provided accounting services as part of his consulting agreement. Register or his accountant was aware that checks had not been drawn on the operating account for payment of rent, advertising, and telephone services and he knew the agency was still in business at the same locale. Register or his accountant was aware of the checks for refunds which ran from $21.89 to $398.99, no two of which were for the same amount. These checks do not appear on their face to be refunds for special high risk automobile insurance although they are annotated as such. Register suggested and was aware that Ellwood and Caliguiri took less salary than they were entitled to take under their employment contracts. Although money received from a client or company for a client or beneficiary is held in a fiduciary capacity, the operating account is not an escrow account and agents are not required to maintain deposits in an escrow account pending transfer of the premiums to an insurer. No evidence was received that Ellwood impaired these accounts by issuing these checks to fictitious clients and cashing them. Ellwood did not question her ownership of the business until late summer 1988 when Register advised Brian Fisher, a potential buyer, that Fisher would not have the rights of ownership if he purchased Ellwood's shares of stock because she held only common stock and control of the corporation was vested in those persons holding preferred stock all of which was owned by Register and his wife.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the charges be dismissed against the Respondent DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX A TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 89-4903 The following is a list of the proposed findings which were adopted and those which were rejected and why. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: Paragraph 1 Adopted. Paragraph 2 Adopted. Paragraph 3 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 4 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 5 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Paragraph 6 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Paragraph 7 Respondent admitted she used the money for another agency; however, that does not establish that taking the money was fraudulent. Paragraph 8 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Respondent's Proposed Findings: Paragraph 1 Adopted. Paragraph 2 Adopted. Paragraph 3 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 4 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 5 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 6 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 7 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 8 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Paragraph 9 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Roy Schmidt, Esq. Office of the Treasurer Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Fletcher Fleming, Esq. Shell, Fleming, Davis & Merige Seventh Floor, Seville Tower P.O. Box 1831 Pensacola, FL 32595
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's licenses as a general lines agent (2-20) and Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriters Association (FRPCJUA) agent (0-17), held pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2001)?
Findings Of Fact Facts Admitted by Answer Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, you Jennifer L. Faloon, currently are licensed in this state as a general lines (2-20) agent and a FRPCJUA (0-17) agent, and were so licensed at all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced herein. Your license identification no. is A080736. Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, the Department of Financial Services has jurisdiction over your licenses and appointments. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced herein you, Jennifer L. Faloon, were employed with Beck Insurance, in Jacksonville, Florida. Additional Facts Established by Responses to Requests for Admissions Respondent was licensed as a general lines (2-20), and a Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriters Association (0-17) agent, in Florida, from June 25, 2001, until and including the present time. From June 25, 2001, until and including February 19, 2002, Respondent was employed with Beck Insurance, in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent signed the insurance application on February 19, 2002, to bind coverage for Ms. Wilson (Danyetta Wilson). Respondent signed the insurance application on January 21, 2002, to bind coverage for Mr. Appling (Marc Appling). Respondent signed the insurance application on January 22, 2002, to bind coverage for Ms. Brown (Laura Brown). Anna Michelle Mack transacted insurance business with Laura Brown on January 22, 2002. Respondent signed the insurance application on June 25, 2001, to bind coverage for Mr. Henderson (William Henderson). Respondent's Duties at Beck Insurance Respondent began her employment with Beck Insurance, in September 1996. She began as an unlicensed person. While working with Beck Insurance she obtained her (4-42) license allowing limited customer service related to the sale of automobile insurance. She subsequently obtained her (2-20) insurance agent license related to property and casualty, which would allow the sale of automobile, homeowners, and commercial insurance. Prior to this case Respondent has had no complaints filed against her in her capacity as insurance agent. In addition to selling insurance at Beck Insurance, Respondent is familiar with ancillary products offered through that agency. In particular, she is familiar with the sale of contracts involving towing a disabled car operated by a party who has contracted for those services. Respondent is also conversant with rental car contracts sold at Beck Insurance. The rental car contract allows for the customer to rent a car when the customer's personal car is unavailable. During the years 2001 and 2002, the years in question in this case, Respondent served as a supervisor at Beck Insurance in her capacity as a licensed (2-20) agent for persons employed by Beck Insurance, both unlicensed and licensed. The licensed agents that she had supervisory responsibility for were (4-42) limited or unlimited customer service licenses for automobile insurance and (4-40) full customer service agents. Respondent also was expected to deal with issues of underwriting for the insurance policies sold. As few as five and as many as ten agents were employed with Beck Insurance in the relevant time frame. This included another supervising (2-20) agent named Lon Woodward. Both Respondent and Mr. Woodward supervised the licensed (4-42) and (4-40) agents at Beck Insurance, who could not conduct business without supervision from the licensed (2-20) agent. The office hours in the relevant time period were from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, and 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. In any given month in excess of 100 customers might be served. Not all activities in providing service were in relation to writing insurance policies. Beck Insurance, at times relevant to the inquiry, represented numerous insurance companies involved with the sale of automobile insurance. The clientele that purchased automobile insurance from Beck Insurance was principally constituted of persons with problematic driving records, including suspensions, DUIs, lapses in coverage, as well as persons who only intended to pay the minimum amount necessary for a premium to obtain insurance that would allow that person to operate a motor vehicle in Florida. As a non-standard agency, the majority of Beck Insurance customers are persons who would not be provided insurance by the standard insurance companies such as State Farm, AllState, and Nationwide. Typically, when a customer initially contacted Beck Insurance by telephone they wanted the best price. In response, the Beck Insurance employee would consider the price structure among the 35 insurance companies represented by Beck Insurance to choose the most economical policy. When telephone inquiries were made about purchasing automobile insurance through Beck Insurance no mention was made of the All World towing and rental plan. Beck Insurance trains its employees in the manner those employees will serve the customers. Respondent was included in that training, having received training and provided training in those approaches. Ordinarily when a customer inquired concerning the purchase of automobile insurance at Beck Insurance, he or she was asked about the type coverage he or she was interested in purchasing. Information was gathered concerning the automobile to be insured. A questionnaire was completed. Within that document is a reference to towing and rental car reimbursement coverage, as well as information about the automobile insurance itself. The questionnaire which was used at times relevant to this case sought information about the customer and the use of the automobile that was being considered for coverage with blanks being provided to the left of the questions for initialing by the customer and blanks to the right for an affirmative or negative response. By contrast to other items, item 11 within the questionnaire was declarative in nature. It had a space for the initials of the customer, but not one to declare acceptance or rejection of what was described. By its terms it stated: "Motor Club - I am aware that towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier)." The parenthetical reference within item 11, was by smaller type, unlike the interrogatories that were found within the questionnaire. The statement in item 11 has an internal contradiction. In its initial sentence, it talks about the optional opportunity to obtain towing and rental car reimbursement, but it is followed by a sentence which says that the customer wants to carry the coverage with no apparent opportunity within the document to decline that coverage. Moreover, at the bottom of the questionnaire, there was the opportunity for the customer to say that he or she did not want to carry and was rejecting bodily injury liability, uninsured motorist, medical payments, comprehensive and collision, and custom or special equipment coverage, by initialing the blank provided with each category of coverage, but there was no similar opportunity to reject the towing and rental car reimbursement that was described earlier in the document. The insurance coverages were referred to as optional, as was towing and rental. An example of the text within the document, aside from its execution, is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. The execution of that document will be discussed subsequently in relation to the customer Danyetta Wilson. According to Respondent, the typical customer for automobile insurance at Beck Insurance is told "In this price we are also giving you towing and rental reimbursement." The nature of the plan for towing and rental is described. For example, if it is Plan 3, the customer is told "you will receive free tow reimbursements for six months for $100.00 each. You will also receive -- -- if you are involved in an automobile accident with another vehicle and you have to have your vehicle in a shop for repair, you will receive $25.00 a day reimbursement for five days. These claims have to be filed through our agency. You bring us the receipt within 60 days, we file it." The towing and rental services being sold by Beck Insurance, which are the subject in this dispute, are offered through All World All Safe Drivers (All World), part of Beck Insurance. Once more specific discussion is entered into concerning the automobile insurance policy applied for, the Beck Insurance employee also returns to the discussion of the All World towing and rental products. Beyond the presentation of the information concerning the purchase of the insurance coverage that has been chosen, Respondent testified that during the time in question the customer would be told "this is your towing and rental reimbursement contract." The details concerning the towing and rental in the contemplated agreement between Beck Insurance and the customer are as set forth in Respondent's Exhibit numbered 28, a form application for towing and automobile rental reimbursement through All World. The form application which constitutes the basis for providing the coverage makes no mention concerning the charge for the various plans offered to the customer for the towing and rental. The terms set forth in the application bundle the reimbursement plan for automobile rental and towing services, as opposed to separate coverage for automobile rental reimbursement and towing reimbursement. Notwithstanding the lack of explanation within the form application for All World rental reimbursement and towing service reimbursement, concerning the costs for the various plans described, Respondent indicated in her testimony that those packages are $35, $60, and $75, in costs. The discussion of the amount charged for towing and rental is included in the price breakdown that also pertains to the costs for the automobile insurance purchased. Approximately 50 percent of the customers solicited purchased All World towing and rental contracts in the time in question. Customarily, the application for automobile insurance is signed by an appointed licensed (2-20) agent at Beck Insurance who has authority to review the application to make certain that it has been correctly executed. When the transaction is complete between a customer and the Beck Insurance employee, there is but one receipt provided to the customer. That receipt sets out the aggregate charges and then breaks out individual charges for the automobile insurance policy, All World, and the motor vehicle report (MVR) fee that some insurance companies charge. As the receipt suggests, the amount tendered at the time that the automobile insurance is purchased and towing and rental reimbursement is purchased is a single amount that would have cost components for the automobile insurance, towing and rental, and a MVR fee. Another form is provided to customers with Beck Insurance. An example is found as Respondent's Exhibit numbered 27. That form outlines automobile insurance coverage by providing explanations about the types of coverage and advice on making certain that the insurance company pays claims made by the customer. There is a reference within this form to a subject other than automobile insurance, namely a reference to towing and rental-car reimbursement wherein is stated: "Reimbursement for towing charge when your covered vehicle is unable to safely proceed under its own power. Reimbursement for rental car when your covered vehicle has been involved in an accident. This coverage is optional. Consult individual plans for different payment amounts and certain restrictions that may be applied to each optional plan." As anticipated by law, persons who work for Beck Insurance, other than the licensed (2-20) agent, may take information supporting the application for automobile insurance sold through Beck Insurance. Count II Danyetta Wilson Danyetta Wilson was interested in purchasing automobile insurance in February 2002. She called Beck Insurance and spoke to Respondent concerning that purchase. After receiving a telephone quote, Ms. Wilson immediately went to Beck Insurance to transact business. The date was February 19, 2002. Before arriving at Beck Insurance, Ms. Wilson had told Respondent what she wanted in the way of automobile insurance coverage, and Respondent indicated that everything necessary to conclude the transaction would be prepared in advance before Ms. Wilson arrived at Beck Insurance. Of course, the application for insurance had not been executed, but pertinent information had been written down by Respondent on scratch paper. Essentially Ms. Wilson told Respondent in the telephone call that she wanted a minimum down-payment and low monthly payments, without discussing the amount of the deductible. When Ms. Wilson arrived at Beck Insurance, she saw Respondent. Both the Respondent and Tracy Laroe assisted Ms. Wilson in the transaction. Ms. Laroe was employed by Beck Insurance. Her application to become a licensed (4-42) limited customer representative was authorized by Petitioner on December 11, 2001. Petitioner issued license no. EO10041 (4-42) to Ms. Laroe on March 8, 2002, as recognized by Beck Insurance on March 29, 2002. As of July 1, 2002, Ms. Laroe's license was inactive based upon cancellation by Beck Insurance as the appointing entity. On February 19, 2002, Respondent was responsible for Ms. Laroe as supervisor at Beck Insurance, in relation to Ms. Wilson's transaction with Beck Insurance in purchasing automobile insurance through Progressive Insurance and automobile rental and towing reimbursement through All World. Most of the activities involved with the transaction occurred between Ms. Wilson and Ms. Laroe when addressing the purchase of automobile insurance on the date in question. During the transaction at Beck Insurance, Ms. Laroe, while assisting Ms. Wilson, did not suggest possible interest in buying the motor club also referred to as a towing and rental contract. Nor was there mention of All World as the company to provide that ancillary product. What was established in discussion was the amount of down-payment and the monthly payments for the automobile insurance. The down-payment was made by cash. Ms. Wilson was told that the down-payment would be $332, which is the amount that she paid. Ms. Wilson completed and was provided copies of certain documents in the transaction. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2 is the application for the automobile insurance questionnaire that was completed by providing answers and initials in relation to the underwriting information that was requested in the application form. Ms. Wilson signed the application on February 19, 2002. She did not read the document carefully because she was, as she describes it, "in a rush." The completed application was counter-signed by Respondent as producing agent on February 19, 2002, at 1:41 p.m. On February 19, 2002, Ms. Wilson was provided a receipt indicating a total amount of $332. The receipt reflected that $269 was a down-payment for Progressive Insurance, an amount of $60 as related to All World rental and towing, and $3 for a MVR fee. Ms. Wilson did not examine the receipt at the time it was provided to her. The receipt was filled out by a cashier at Beck Insurance, a person other than Respondent and Ms. Laroe. No explanation was made concerning its several parts. In addition to the questionnaire associated with the application for insurance coverage pertaining to the Progressive Insurance policy, Ms. Wilson executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire which described automobile insurance generally and the All World towing and rental. That questionnaire is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 creates the impression that towing and rental is an integral part of the purchase of automobile insurance. It was signed by Ms. Wilson on February 19, 2002, and initialed in its numbered parts. Those parts included the reference to the motor club at number 11 where it stated, "Motor Club - I am aware that the towing and rental care reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" Again, while the towing and rental car reimbursement was stated as being optional, the quoted material was ambiguous as to its optional nature, and there was no opportunity in the latter portion of the questionnaire to specifically decline this ancillary product. In connection with the rental and towing service through All World, Ms. Wilson signed as applicant for the product. This application which formed the basis for charging Ms. Wilson $60 for rental and towing is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. It is in the manner described earlier as to its form, in which no indication is made concerning the amount charged to purchase Plan 3. Ms. Wilson did not read Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, which described the automobile rental and towing reimbursement offered through All World. She signed her name by a red "X" on the application line. The document which described the nature of the reimbursement plan offered through All World was not specifically explained to her. Ms. Wilson was not told that there was an additional charge for the towing and rental. She had no interest in towing and rental, having been provided similar services through her cell-phone plan. In this process, Respondent came over to the location where Ms. Wilson was seated and pointed out certain places in the insurance application to check-off and initial.1 Respondent did not sit at the desk with Ms. Wilson when the transaction took place. During the transaction, Ms. Laroe told Ms. Wilson that the questions she was asking would have to be directed to Respondent, in that Ms. Laroe could not help Ms. Wilson by providing the answers. Ms. Laroe mentioned that her participation was part of the customer service. Ms. Wilson also was involved with a sheet which was informational in nature describing the various types of insurance coverage. Respondent showed Ms. Wilson that form. It is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 1, which was signed by Ms. Wilson on February 19, 2002. It indicates that Ms. Wilson declined uninsured motorists and medical payments coverage. Zeros are placed next to those explanations. Within the document is a reference to towing and rental reimbursement, wherein it is stated: Towing and Rental Car Reimbursement. Reimbursement for towing coverage when your covered vehicles are unable to safely proceed under its own power. Reimbursement for rental car when your covered vehicle has been involved in an accident and is being repaired. This coverage is optional. Consult individual plans for different payment amounts and certain restrictions that may be applied to each optional plan. The towing and rental had a dash placed by that item together with the balance of the items on the information sheet that described insurance coverage. Respondent saw Ms. Wilson place the marks by the side of the forms of coverage and the information about towing and rental reimbursement, which is not part of automobile insurance coverage as such. The overall expectation within Respondent's Exhibit numbered 1 is to generally describe available products. It does not serve as an application. The status of the document is not changed by having Ms. Wilson sign the document. Respondent saw Ms. Wilson initial item 11, concerning the motor club found within Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Ms. Wilson did not ask any questions of Respondent concerning Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Respondent was present when Ms. Wilson signed the application for towing and rental, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. Respondent in relation to that document asked if there were any questions. Ms. Wilson did not indicate that she had questions. In relation to Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, Respondent recalls the nature of the explanation that she gave to Ms. Wilson as: "What this is, is this is your towing and rental contract. It gives you three tows per six months, $100.00 reimbursement on every tow, on each tow with a limit of three per six months. The rental benefit is $25.00 a day for five days if you are involved in an automobile accident and you need reimbursement. All claims have to be brought here to the office within 60 days in the form of receipts. We file the claims for you. Now, I need you to sign there." Nothing in that explanation indicates that there was an opportunity to decline to participate. The explanation did not establish the cost for the plan. Respondent indicated hat Ms. Laroe in her participation in the transaction with Ms. Wilson was there to listen and learn. Count III Marc Appling On January 21, 2002, Marc Appling purchased automobile insurance from Beck Insurance. He wanted full coverage for his car. The amount quoted for the insurance as a down-payment was $288. On January 21, 2002, $200 was paid. On January 24, 2002, the additional $88 was paid. Of the $288 paid, $222 was a down- payment for automobile insurance through Superior American Insurance Company (Superior), $60 was for All World automobile towing and rental reimbursement, $3 for a MVR fee, and $3 for some unexplained charge. The receipt provided Mr. Appling when he paid the initial $200 reflects $222 for down-payment to Superior, $60 for All World, and $3 for a MVR fee. That receipt is Exhibit numbered 9 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. On January 21, 2002, Mr. Appling primarily dealt with Lance Moye, an employee of Beck Insurance who gave him a price quotation for the purchase of insurance through Superior. Mr. Moye explained to Mr. Appling the details, to include the amount of payment per month beyond the down-payment. Michelle Mack, an employee for Beck Insurance was sitting next to him. If Mr. Moye experienced problems in carrying out the transaction, he would ask Ms. Mack her opinion. Mr. Moye has never been licensed by the Petitioner in any capacity. During 1991 and 1993, he had applied for a (2-20) general lines property and casualty license. On the date in question, Michelle Mack, known to Petitioner for licensing purposes as Anna Michelle Mack, was licensed as a (4-42) limited customer representative agent. Mr. Appling executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire and acknowledgement form that has been previously described, to include initialing item 11, related to the motor club which says: "I am aware that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" This form that was signed and initialed and answered yes or no in various places was Exhibit numbered 8 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. Mr. Moye told Mr. Appling that "you pay," addressing Mr. Appling, "X amount of dollars for rental car coverage and everything like that." However, Mr. Appling was not satisfied with the explanation. The questionnaire Exhibit numbered 8 to the Appling deposition, describing towing and rental car reimbursement as optional, did not create below that statement the specific opportunity to decline that option as would have been the case as items such as uninsured motorist and medical payments. Mr. Appling was left with the impression that the motor club was part of the insurance policy that he purchased and that the $288 down-payment included the motor club. Because Mr. Appling was interested in full coverage, he believed that the automobile insurance itself would cover rental reimbursement. Notwithstanding that the form questionnaire, Exhibit numbered 8 to the Appling deposition referred to towing and rental car reimbursement as an optional item, Mr. Appling did not understand that it was an optional purchase. Had he been persuaded that it was a separate item he would not have purchased the motor club. Exhibit numbered 7 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16, is the application for All World towing and rental reimbursement. The automobile insurance application through Superior is found as Exhibit numbered 5 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. It was executed and signed by Mr. Appling on the date in question, then was marked as bound and signed by Respondent on that date. Although Respondent signed the Appling application for automobile insurance with Superior, she had no specific recollection of the event and was not otherwise involved in the transaction. Count IV Laura Brown On January 21, 2002, Laura Brown purchased automobile insurance through Beck Insurance. She dealt with Valerie Lynn Webster and Anna Michelle Mack, employees at Beck Insurance. At various times in 2002 and 2003, Ms. Webster had applied to Petitioner to be licensed as a (2-14) life, including variable annuity agent and a limited customer representative (4-42). No licenses were issued to Ms. Webster. Before arriving at Beck Insurance, Ms. Brown had obtained a preliminary quotation by telephone from the agency related to the purchase of automobile insurance. Ms. Brown was interested in obtaining full coverage for her car. The nature of the discussion once Ms. Brown arrived at the agency was about the purchase of automobile insurance, not about a towing and rental contract, motor club membership or the All World plan. A down-payment was made with installments to follow, associated with the automobile insurance. Ms. Brown thought that the entire amount of the down-payment was for the insurance premium. No explanation was made to the effect that the motor club was separate from the automobile insurance policy. When Ms. Brown left the Beck Insurance agency, she did not realize that she had purchased anything other than automobile insurance. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 12 is the automobile insurance application through Superior, executed by Ms. Brown on the date in question. It was signed by Respondent, noting that the policy was bound. Respondent had no other direct involvement in the transaction. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 13 is a receipt dated January 22, 2002, issued to Ms. Brown by Ms. Webster and Ms. Mack, totaling $247 that Ms. Brown paid on that date. It is broken out as $184 for Superior, $60 for All World, and $3 for a MVR fee. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 14 is an executed application for All World automobile reimbursement and towing service reimbursement executed by Ms. Brown for the period January 22, 2002, through June 22, 2002, under Plan 3 in the form that has been previously described. As reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15, Ms. Brown executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire in the form that has previously been described that contains item 11, relating to the motor club stating, "I am aware that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" The questionnaire additionally sets forth that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional but without the opportunity to decline that option that is specifically described for other optional coverage in the form, such as uninsured motorists and medical payments. In an affidavit containing Ms. Brown's statement prepared on May 23, 2002, Ms. Brown stated, "I knew that I had purchased towing or rental reimbursement policy for my policy 1/22/2002/2003 because I saw the form and I asked questions about it. The lady in picture number 10 (Ms. Mack depicted on Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17) told me I would get so many tows for free, she also told me it was from Beck Insurance." But in that affidavit Ms. Brown goes on to state, "I did not know that I paid an additional $60 for the towing policy. I thought this was just something I got with the car insurance policy." Again, nothing in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 14, the application for All World towing and rental, reflects the cost of Plan 3. That was made known in the receipt, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 13. Count V William Henderson On June 25, 2001, William Henderson purchased automobile insurance from Beck Insurance. He dealt with Daphne Ferrell, a person Respondent claims was a licensed agent at the time. No proof has been presented to contradict Respondent's position, and it is found that Ms. Ferrell was a licensed agent when the transaction took place. On the date in question, Mr. Henderson was interested in purchasing full coverage for his automobile. He executed an application with Atlanta Casualty Company (Atlanta Casualty) to purchase the automobile insurance. That application is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. Respondent's involvement in the purchase was the signing of the application in the place indicated for the agent's statement vouching for the application's correctness. The automobile that was covered by the purchase was inspected by Ms. Laroe as evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7. The inspection was not a function that required a licensed person to perform. Mr. Henderson paid Atlanta Casualty $306 on June 25, 2001, for automobile insurance. That payment is reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8, a copy of the check written to Atlanta Casualty. The money that was paid was acknowledged by a receipt from Ms. Ferrell dated June 25, 2001, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9. That receipt reflects $306 down-payment for the automobile insurance to Atlanta Casualty and $75 for a rental contract involved with All World, for a total of $381. Whether Mr. Henderson paid the $75 for towing and rental, aside from the $306 check written for the insurance to Atlanta Casualty, is not clear from the record. Mr. Henderson had made application on the form related to All World for auto rental reimbursement and towing service reimbursement, which has been previously described. The specific application by Mr. Henderson is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10, relating to Plan 3. Mr. Henderson executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire form that has been previously described setting forth item 11, the motor club, which states: "I am aware that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" While Mr. Webster initialed item 11 on the form, as other customers had done in the circumstances addressed in the Administrative Complaint, the form he executed, as with other customers, did not create an opportunity to opt out of the motor club. While the form at item 11 spoke of the optional nature of the motor club, it was followed by a statement that made it appear that the opportunity to decline the coverage had already been determined, when it said: "I want to carry this coverage." The reference to the optional nature of the towing and rental car reimbursement in the latter portions of the form was not followed by an opportunity to specifically decline the motor club, as allowed in reference to other forms of optional insurance coverage pertaining to such items as uninsured motorist and medical payments, for example. The executed questionnaire is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 11. In completing the Beck Insurance questionnaire, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 11, his instructions were to initial where the solid arrow runs from items 1 through 14, at the top of the page, and by the Xs at the bottom of the page. The arrow and the Xs were placed by someone other than Mr. Webster. Only a brief explanation was given to Mr. Webster concerning the questionnaire. Mr. Webster has no recollection of someone specifically reading item 11, related to the motor club. During the transaction at issue, Mr. Webster remembers a discussion of towing and rental. He indicated that he was not interested in rental reimbursement. He did want towing. Mr. Webster, like the other customers who have been discussed, did not carefully read the documents presented to him for his consideration in purchasing the automobile insurance and in relation to the motor club. Mr. Webster has a vague recollection of someone placing an "X" on the applicant's signature line in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10 and signing that application for the All World motor club, but he thought that he was only purchasing towing not rental. The application covers both rental and towing.
Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of those provisions within Count II that have been referred to, dismissing the others within that count, dismissing Counts III through V; suspending Respondent's licenses for nine months, placing Respondent on two years' probation and requiring attendance at such continuing education courses as deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2004.
