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TRIPLE M PACKING, INC. vs. FAIR CHESTER TOMATO, 85-000410 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000410 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. (Triple M) is in the business of selling produce, particularly tomatoes from its principal business address of Post Office Box 1358, Quincy, Florida. The Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester), is primarily engaged in the business of packaging, distributing and brokering tomatoes in the New York City metropolitan area. It purchases produce from various sellers around the country in tomato-producing areas for resale at markets in the New York City area. Since it is a licensed agricultural dealer, the Respondent is required under the pertinent provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, to file a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), designed to guarantee payment of any indebtedness to persons selling agricultural products to the bonded dealer to whom the dealer fails to make accounting and payment. Fair Chester has thus obtained a 50,000 surety bond which is underwritten by its Co-Respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford). During the 1984 growing season, the Petitioner sold certain shipments of tomatoes to the Respondent for a price of $12,276. Thereafter, curing middle-to-late 1984, the Respondent Fair Chester, found itself in straitened financial circumstances such that it was unable to pay its various trade creditors, including the Petitioner. In view of this, various creditors at the behest of a lawyer retained by Fair Chester, eventually entered into a composition agreement, whereby the unsecured trade creditors agreed to settle, release and discharge in full their claims against Fair Chester on the condition that each creditor signing that agreement be paid thirty-three and one-third percent of its claim. It was determined that the composition agreement would be operative if the trade creditors representing 95 percent or more in dollar amount of all unsecured debts accepted the terms and provisions of that composition agreement on or before November 13, 1984. All the Respondent's unsecured trade creditors were contacted and ultimately those representing more than 95 percent of the outstanding creditor claims against Respondent accepted the terms and provisions of the composition agreement by the deadline. A document indicating acceptance by the Petitioner was signed by one Robert Elliott, purportedly on behalf of the Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. In this connection, by letter of November 13, 1984 (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Attorney Howard of the firm of Glass and Howard, representing the Respondent, wrote each trade creditor advising them that the required acceptance by 95 percent of the creditors had been achieved, including the acceptance of the agreement signed and stamped "received November 8, 1984" by Robert Elliott, sales manager of Triple M. In conjunction with its letter of November 13, 1984, Glass and Howard transmitted Fair Chester's check for one-third of the indebtedness due Triple M or $4,092. The Petitioner's principal officer, its president, Kent Manley, who testified at hearing, acknowledged that he received that letter and check, but he retained it without depositing it or otherwise negotiating it. In the meantime, on October 29, 1984 a complaint was executed and filed by Triple M Packing, Inc. by its president, Kent Manley, alleging that $12,276 worth of tomatoes had been sold to Respondent on June 13, 1984 and that payment had not been received. The purported acceptance of the composition agreement executed by Robert Elliott, sales manager, was not executed until November 8, 1984 and the check for $4,092 in partial payment of the Triple M claim was not posted until November 13, 1984. Mr. Manley's testimony was unrefuted and established that indeed Mr. Elliott was a commissioned salesman for Triple M, was not an officer or director of the company and had no authority to bind the company by his execution of the composition of creditors agreement. Mr. Manley acted in a manner consistent with Elliott's status as a commissioned salesman without authority to bind the Petitioner corporation since, upon his receipt of the "one- third settlement" check with its accompanying letter, he did not negotiate it, but rather pursued his complaint before the Department. In fact, in response to the Department's letter of December 20, 1984 inquiring why the complaint was being prosecuted in view of the purported settlement agreement, Mr. Manley on behalf of Triple M Packing, Inc. by letter of December 28, 1984, responded to Mr. Bissett, of the Department, that he continued to hold the check and was not accepting it as a final settlement. Thus, in view of the fact that the complaint was filed and served before notice that 95 percent of the creditors had entered into the composition agreement and never withdrawn, in view of the fact that on the face of the complaint Robert C. Elliott is represented as a salesman indeed, for an entity known as "Garguilo, Inc.," and in view of the fact that Mr. Manley as president of Triple M, retained the check without negotiating it and availing himself of its proceeds, rather indicating to the Department his wish to pursue the complaint without accepting the check as settlement, it has not been established that the Respondent, Fair Chester, was ever the recipient of any representation by Manley, or any other officer or director of the Petitioner corporation, that it would accept and enter into the above-referenced composition of creditors agreement. It was not proven that Triple M Packing, Inc. nor Mr. Manley or any other officer and director either signed or executed the composition agreement or authorized its execution by Robert C. Elliott. Respondent's position that Mr. Manley and Triple M acquiesced in the execution of the settlement agreement by Elliott and the payment of the one-third settlement amount by the subject check has not been established, especially in view of the fact that the complaint was filed after Attorney Howard notified Triple M of Respondent's settlement offer and prior to notice to Triple M that the settlement agreement had been consummated by 95 percent of the creditors and prior to the sending of the subject check to Triple M. Mr. Manley then within a reasonable time thereafter, on December 28, 1984, affirmed his earlier position that the entire indebtedness was due and that the settlement had not been accepted.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence of record and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. pay Triple M Packing Company, Inc. $12,276. In the event that principal fails to or is unable to pay that indebtedness, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company should pay that amount out of the surety bond posted with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kent Manley, Jr. Post Office Box 1358 Quincy, Florida 32351 P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 16th day of September, Arthur Slavin, Esquire BLUM, HAIMOFF, GERSEN, LIPSON, GARLEY & NIEDERGANG 270 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =========================================================== ======

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.30672.201672.724
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CLASSIE SALES, INC. vs TONY AND ROBERT TOLAR, D/B/A TOLAR FARMS, AND PREFERRED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 96-001776 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Apr. 12, 1996 Number: 96-001776 Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner, Classie Sales, Inc. (Classie), is entitled to be compensated for produce sold and delivered to Respondent, Tolar Farms (Tolar), and if so, in what amount.

Findings Of Fact On June 30, 1990, Roger Harloff, on behalf of Roger Harloff Farms, and John A. Tipton, Secretary of Classie Sales, Incorporated, a sales agent founded by Harloff, entered into a written agreement whereby Classie would serve as sales agent for all sales of produce grown by or on Roger Harloff Farms. Between October 17, 1995 and December 9, 1995, Classie, on behalf of Roger Harloff Farms, sold watermelons with a total net sales price of $170,839.27 and tomatoes with a total net value of $1,720.00 to Tolar Farms. These sales were not direct sales to Tolar but transactions wherein Tolar was to sell the produce to whomever would buy it at an agreed price and would withhold its 3/4 per pound commission from the sales price, remitting the balance to Classie. Trucks arranged for by Tolar picked the produce up at the growing field and at the time of pickup, Classie issued to Tolar a packet jacket for each load sold. As the loads were sold Tolar would issue a ticket for that load which bore the shipping date, the lot number, the farmer, the transporting trailer's tag, the truck broker, the truck driver, and the weight of the product. Sometime later, when the produce was sold, Tolar issued an invoice bearing Classie Sales' logo, reflecting Tolar as the buyer and showing the lot number which corresponded to the load ticket, the shipping date, a description of the produce, the quantity, the unit price for that load, and the extended price from which was deducted Tolar's commission and an unspecified assessment. These documents were then forwarded to Classie. The terms of the sale between Tolar and Classie, on behalf of Harloff, were loose. The invoice documents reflected a net due 21 days after invoice date. The first delivery in issue here was made on October 17, 1995, and 21 days after that is November 7, 1995. The amount reflected by the deliveries made after that date is $27,509.72. Respondent, Preferred, claims that since Classie continued to make deliveries to Tolar's drivers after it was not paid within 21 days after the first shipment, it failed to mitigate its damages and should not be paid for any deliveries made after November 7, 1995. Classie was not paid for any of the instant invoices by Tolar, but Classie did not become concerned about Tolar's failure to make timely payment until January 1996. Tolar's payment and pricing practices were no different during this time than in years past. Typically, Tolar would start out quickly notifying Classie of the sales. As the number of shipments grew, however, the time for notification grew longer. It must be noted that less than two months transpired from the date of the first shipment in issue to the last.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a Final Order in this matter directing Tony and Robert Tolar, d/b/a Tolar Farms, to pay Classie Sales, Inc., the sum of $172,559.27. In the event this sum is not paid by Tolar, the Department should apply the bond posted by Preferred National Insurance Company in the amount of $75,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-1776A To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein as the testimony of the witness. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the issues. Accepted and incorporated herein. Respondent Preferred's Proposed Findings of Fact. Preferred accepted all of Classie's Proposed Findings of Fact but suggested an amendment to Number 14. The suggested amendment was made a part of the Findings of Fact made by the Hearing Officer. Respondent Tolar's Proposed Findings of Fact: Tolar consented and agreed to all Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact except for Number 9. The substance of Tolar's objection to Classie's Number 9, relating to a provision for a commission, has been made a part of the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: Hywel Leonard, Esquire Carlton Fields Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601-3239 Scott R. Teach, Esquire Meuers and Associates, P.A. 2590 Golden Gate Parkway, Suite 109 Naples, Florida 34106 David A. Higley, Esquire Higley and Barfield, P.A. The Maitland Forum 2600 Lake Lucien Drive, Suite 237 Maitland, Florida 32751-7234 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (3) 120.57559.27604.21
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JOHN CRAWFORD, D/B/A CRAWFORD AND SON'S FARMS vs WISHNATZKI AND NATHEL, INC., AND CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 94-004308 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Plant City, Florida Aug. 04, 1994 Number: 94-004308 Latest Update: Jan. 26, 1995

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner John Crawford, operated Crawford and Son's Farms located in or near Lakeland, Florida, on which he grows produce including, inter alia, beans of the variety in controversy here. Respondent, Wishnatzki, is a produce broker located in Tampa, Florida, and has been in the business of brokering produce grown by Florida farmers throughout the United States for three generations. Petitioner and Respondent have done business together in the past on many occasions, without controversy, and have, over the years, developed an amicable business and well as personal relationship. For a substantial portion of that time, including the time in issue, the parties' transactions were consummated under a "written statement of terms and conditions" which called on the broker, Wishnatzki, to act as the grower's agent on the basis of "gross proceeds of a sale, less carrier, cooling, packing and palleting charges, if any, and a Grower's Agent's customary commission." At some time prior to April 28, 1994, Mr. Crawford, who was, at the time, carrying a bucket full of the beans later sold through Respondent, saw Mr. Wishnatzki who, he claims, indicated the beans could be worth $25.00 per bushel. The beans at hand were the earliest produced from the Petitioner's fields, however, and the main crop was not yet ready for harvesting. Mr. Crawford acknowledges this comment by Mr. Wishnatzki was no guarantee of price but merely an opinion, and Mr. Wishnatzki claims it was Crawford, not him, who stated a figure. Several days later, however, on or about May 3, 1994, while his beans were being picked, Mrs. Crawford spoke with Mr. Wishnatzki who said he needed beans and had a truck going to New York. According to Mrs. Crawford, Mr. Wishnatzki advised her they could probably get $20.00 per bushel for the beans if Crawford could get them in. Mrs. Crawford immediately went to Petitioner and told him what Respondent had said, and within two days, on May 3 and 4, 1994, Mr. Crawford delivered to Mr. Wishnatzki 164 bushels of beans. The beans were shipped up north, but in the interim, the price of beans, according to the Department of Agriculture's price report, dropped considerably from a price near $18.00 per bushel. Records maintained by Respondent reflect that between May 4 and May 7, 1994, Respondent sold the entire 164 bushels, in varying amounts, to six different customers, as follows: 5/4/94 Scarmardo Produce. 40 bu at $14.00/bu 5/5/94 C & S Wholesale Gro. 73 bu at 12.00/bu 5/5/94 C & S Wholesale Gro. 2 bu at 0.00/bu 5/5/94 Watson's Produce 5 bu at 16.00/bu 5/6/94 Scott Street Tomato Co. 5 bu at 16.00/bu 5/6/94 Sy Katz Produce 5 bu at 16.00/bu 5/7/94 Tamburo Bros. 34 bu at 4.00/bu Respondent received a total of $1,812.00 for the sale of all Petitioner's beans consigned to it for an average price of $11.04 per bushel. Notwithstanding Respondent was entitled, by the terms of the agreement between it and Petitioner, to deduct a commission on the sale, because of the long- standing harmonious relationship which had existed between them, and because Respondent felt it important to support its growers and insure their financial well-being, Respondent, nevertheless paid Petitioner the full amount it received, and an additional sum as well, for a total payment of $2,132.00. In other words, though Respondent received only an average of $11.04 per bushel from its customers for Petitioner's beans, it nevertheless paid Petitioner an average of $13.00 per bushel for the beans it received from him. Petitioner is not satisfied with the amount received, however, and claims Respondent sold the beans at a price below market. He refers to Mr. Wishnatzki's comment in passing in late April that the beans could bring $25.00 per bushel. He also notes that the market should have been good because of an infestation of bean virus due to white flies. He further contends that Respondent should not have sold the beans for such a low price; that Respondent should have checked with the northern markets, and if there was a problem with his beans, Respondent should have procured a government inspection of them. While he admits beans were in a downward fall, he does not believe the price dropped to $13.00 per bushel on a first hand picking. In support of his position, he refers to two separate market reports, the first dated May 4, 1994, and the other dated May 6, 1994. The former reflects a "fairly light" demand for beans, with handpicked beans selling between "16.00 and 18.65, mostly 16.65 few 12.00", and the latter reflects, for handpicked beans, a "fairly light" demand with sales at "14.00 - 16.65 few 12.00 occasional lower." Petitioner does not claim he should have received $18.00 per bushel which he cites, inaccurately, was the fair market price according to the Florida Market Reports cited above, but claims he could have come off that price if he had been contacted to negotiate price. However, the $18.00 price he cites was not, according to the evidence, the usual price received. The usual price was around $16.65, with some lower. In any case, the terms of the brokerage agreement does not provide for price negotiation after delivery is made to the broker. Further, Mr. Wishnatzki did not call Petitioner when he saw the beans were not selling well because they had already been picked and were in Respondent's hands. Not much could have been done at that point, and he had other growers to deal with as well. In addition, Mr. Crawford has access to the market report and knew the price was falling. He did not call Respondent to set a minimum price. According to Mr. Wishnatzki, the price paid to the growers is based upon the price his company receives for the produce. However, Respondent does not wait until it has been paid before paying its growers. When the produce is sold, the grower is paid, and Respondent receives payment from the buyer after that. There is no way to say with certainty when the grower delivers produce to Respondent what price an ultimate buyer will pay for that produce. Many factors come into play, including quality of the produce, current market price, supply and demand and the like. A market bulletin, published at the end of each market day, gives some idea of what the next day's price is likely to be, but only market conditions control the price. Review of the prices received by Respondent for the first 130 bushels of beans sold reflect a price of from $12.00 for the 73 bushels sold to C & S, to $14.00 for the 40 bushels sold to Scarmardo. The 15 bushels sold to three different brokers for $16.00 per bushel is but a small amount of the total. The remaining 34 bushels sold to Tamburo for $4.00 per bushel brought the average price received down, as did the two bushels for which no payment was received. Respondent claims they received only $4.00 per bushel from Tamburo because of a constant decline in the market during the entire week the beans were for sale, and the sale to Tamburo was, in effect, a distress sale. Wishnatzki started the week out offering the beans at $18.00 per bushel. The price was reduced each day until the final Saturday when it is usual to sell what they have left over for what they can get. On Saturday, May 7, Wishnatzki still had 34 bushels of beans left and Tamburo sold them at the lower price. It was lower that Wishnatzki had expected, but consistent with the agreement they had with Tamburo who had the beans on consignment. Mr. Wishnatzki asserts the sale at that price was a judgement call he had to make, but were he confronted with the same situation, he would do it again. At no time did Mr. Wishnatzki advise Mr. Crawford he could, or would, sell a given quantity of beans at a certain price. If he had known what price he would get for the beans at later sale, he would have paid Mr. Crawford on the spot, in advance. Further, even though at the beginning of the week in question the market reports showed beans selling for a good price, sales can not always be made at the reported market price. The price he gets is what his customers are willing to pay. His procedure is to send out a daily inventory sheet to each of his customers, nation-wide, by FAX. At the time these beans were delivered to Respondent, the demand was light, witnessed by the fact that it took a whole week to dispose of 164 bushels. That is not a large volume. While he understands Mr. Crawford's disappointment, it is a result of the fact that Crawford's expectations were higher than reality delivered. This has happened to growers before, and it will, no doubt, happen again.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Crawford & Son's Farms' claim against Respondent, Wishnatzki & Natel, Inc. and Continental Insurance Company, in the amount of $824.00, be denied. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John Crawford d/b/a Crawford & Son's Farms 2545 Sleepy Hill Road Lakeland, Florida 33809 ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1994. David L. Lapides, Esquire W. Edwin Litton, II, Esquire Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards & Roehn, P.A. Post Office Box 3433 Tampa, Florida 33601 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21604.34
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ERNEST LECLERCQ, D/B/A SUN COAST FARMS vs. ORRIN H COPE PRODUCE, INC., D/B/A SOUTH DADE PRODUCE AND SENTRY INC., 86-001029 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001029 Latest Update: Jul. 01, 1986

Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Sun Coast Farms, is agent for Strano Farms of Florida City, Florida, a producer of agricultural products. The Respondent, South Dade Produce, is a dealer in agricultural products and is located in Naranja, Florida. On April 4, 1985, Mr. George Mason, salesman for Petitioner, received a call from Respondent proposing to buy some squash. An agreement was reached for the sale of 400 crates of crookneck squash (#1 grade) at a price of $10.20 per unit "FOB Florida City, Florida." The agreed upon price for the full amount of the squash was $4,080. The squash in question was grown and packed by Strano Farms in Florida City, Florida. The 400 cases of squash were received by Respondent on April 4, 1985. During an inspection of the squash, Mr. Cope, owner of South Dade Produce, noticed that some of the squash had wind scar. Mr. Cope felt that the wind scar damage was minor and proceeded to dispose of the squash as planned. One hundred cases of the squash were sold and shipped without difficulty and are not a part of this action. On April 4, 1985, the 300 cartons of squash in question were shipped to Texas in a refrigerator truck and delivered April 6, 1986 to Harrington Produce Company of Dallas, Texas, through Reaves Brokerage Company, also of Dallas. Harrington Produce Company planned to sell the squash to consumers through its own retail outlets. Upon examination of the squash at destination, Harrington Produce Company represented to Reaves Brokerage Company that it believed a portion of the squash were spoiled and unmarketable. Reaves Brokerage Company notified the Respondent of this potential problem and requested instruction. That same day, April 6, 1985, having received notice of the problem in Dallas, the Respondent notified George Mason, a salesman for Petitioner. George Mason indicated that a "federal inspection certificate" (an inspection performed upon receipt to verify the condition of produce) was not required. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent requested a federal inspection to verify the condition of the squash. In an accounting statement provided to Respondent on December 30, 1985 Harrington Produce stated that in order to render the squash sellable, it was necessary to run (sort and repack) the squash twice to assure that each carton contained only sound vegetables. Harrington Produce Company further asserted that the cost of sorting and repacking was $1.50 per finished carton per run or $540.00 for the 180 salvageable cartons which were kept and sold. Harrington Produce stated that it did not charge labor costs for unsellable cartons, but that 120 of the 300 cartons delivered were unsellable, which, at $10.35 per carton, meant an additional deduction of $1,242.00. Because of the foregoing, Harrington Produce Company deducted $1,782.00 as an adjustment to Respondent's bill. Because Harrington Produce deducted $1,782 from Respondent's billing, Respondent deducted $1,782 from Petitioner's payment. The parties stipulated that the unpaid amount on the contract for the 400 units of squash was $1,782. No "federal dump certificate" (a certification of spoilage done at the time that unmarketable produce is discarded) was performed on the 120 cartons of squash which were supposedly dumped by Harrington Produce Company. It is standard practice in the industry that an independent, third-party assessment of produce be performed prior to "dumping". Ordinarily, "certification" of the condition of produce by the ultimate purchaser himself is unacceptable. Where a "federal dump certificate" is unavailable, some other independent assessment of the produce is required. It is standard practice in the industry that the buyer receiving the problematic goods request the necessary inspections. It was the understanding of the parties, who had undertaken similar transactions previously, that adjustments to the price of the goods when subsequently resold could be passed back to the producer. However, it is normal and customary practice in the industry to have an independent entity, be it state, federal or private, inspect agricultural products before they are "dumped" or thrown away as unmarketable. On April 5, 1985, Petitioner invoiced Respondent $4,080 for the full amount of the squash. In May 1985, Respondent remitted to Petitioner the sum of $2,298, leaving a balance due of $1,782. On June 21, 1985, Petitioner requested an accounting from Respondent for the sale of the Dallas squash. On August 1, 1985, Petitioner again requested an accounting from Respondent. On January 2, 1986, Respondent submitted a letter from Harrington Produce, dated December 30, 1985, accounting for the disposition of the 300 units of squash. On April 4, 1985, 1,800 units of squash harvested from the same field as the squash in question, were packaged by Strano Farms and sold without any complaints or returns.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued finding that Respondent is indebted to, and required to pay, the amount of $1,782.00 to the Petitioner. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of July, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-1029A The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 5 and 12. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as recitation of testimony. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or subordinate. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate. Addressed in procedural background section of R.O. Addressed in procedural background section of R.O. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent J. Fiorica 5856 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33144 Steven F. Brines 48 Northeast 15th Street Homestead, Florida 33133 Hon. Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight Bureau of Lic. & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 F. J. Manuel, Jr., Esquire Welbaum, Zook, Jones & Williams Post Office Box 3626 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57604.15604.21
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LEO R. FLEMING vs. WOODROW W. AND ELIZABETH G. MADDOX, D/B/A D & M PECAN COMPANY AND CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, 87-002213 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002213 Latest Update: Feb. 26, 1988

Findings Of Fact In the summer of 1986, petitioner, Leo R. Fleming, as the agent for a Mr. Griffin, entered into an agreement with Jimmy Davis, representing D & M Pecan Company, to sell an unspecified amount of watermelons to D & M at the "ground" price which was to be determined daily. The parties also agreed to "joint" the melons, meaning that D & M and Mr. Griffin would split whatever profit or loss was made on the sale of the watermelons. Under the terms of the agreement D & M supplied the trucks and petitioner was responsible for harvesting and loading the melons on the trucks. Fifteen loads of watermelons were loaded and sold to D & M between June 28 and July 2, 1986. On June 28, 1986, D & M paid petitioner $3,000 as an advance on the watermelons so that the field crew could be paid. On June 30, 1986, D & M paid $5,000 and on July 2, 1986, D & M paid $3,000. None of the monies paid to petitioner between June 28 and July 2 were for specific loads or lots of melons, but were advances to be credited against the total amount that was ultimately owed to petitioner. From the first day of loading, June 28, 1986, D & M experienced problems with the melons loaded by petitioner. Mr. Davis would call petitioner the night before the loading to advise him as to the type and size of melon that was to be put on each truck to be loaded the following day. However, petitioner would get the orders confused, which resulted in the trucks being loaded with a different size and type of watermelon than was ordered. D & M usually did not discover the problem until the trucks reached their destination. On a few occasions, the discrepancies were discovered when petitioner called back in after the trucks had left the field to report the amount of melons put on each truck. In any event, the failure to load the right melons on the trucks caused D & M to have to find other buyers and reroute the trucks or reduce the price of the melons delivered. On July 12, 1986, petitioner and Mr. Davis met in Cordele, Georgia, for the purpose of determining the amount owed by D & M for the watermelons. Petitioner brought typed invoices with him which reflected the type of watermelon, the number of pounds shipped, and ground price per pound for each lot or load. However, due to the problems with the wrong melons being loaded, the parties agreed to reduce the price per pound on those loads which had not been loaded as ordered. The adjusted price agreed upon was written on the original invoices and the typed price was marked through. No adjustment was made for the lots that were loaded properly. Lot 621 was not included in the negotiations because petitioner did not present an invoice for that lot and neither party at that time knew what had happened to that truck. However, the parties did agree to settle the other 14 loads for a total price of $25,783.60. (See Appendix A which lists the invoiced price and negotiated price per load.) D & M deducted $10,000 from that total for the advances that had been made and gave petitioner a check for $15,783.60. 1/ The stamp marks on the back of the check reveal that the check was deposited by petitioner on or before July 14, 1986. On July 15, 1986, petitioner wrote a check to the grower for the watermelons. The amount of the check was based on the negotiated price minus petitioner's commission and the cost of the harvesters. This amount is reflected on the original invoices. (P.Ex.1) However, Mr. Griffin did not accept the changes in the price and insisted upon payment from petitioner based on the original invoiced amount. Petitioner then paid Mr. Griffin based on the original invoiced amount "for keeping him from going to the PACA." (T-30) Thereafter, on August 6, 1986, petitioner sent D & M a statement reflecting a balance due based on the original invoiced amounts. From thee evidence presented, it is clear that on July 12, 1986, the parties reached an agreement concerning the full amount to be paid for all the loads of watermelons purchased by D & M except for the load labelled Lot No. 621. D & M admits that it owes petitioner for Lot No. 621, but it contends that it only owes $1,898.40 for that load, whereas the invoice indicates that $2,133.90 is owed. Mr. Davis explained that D & M should not have to pay $2,133.90 for that load because that was the total amount it was able to get for the load. In other words, if D & M paid the full invoiced amount, it would not make a profit. Nevertheless, the original agreement of the parties was that D & M would pay ground price for the melons. D & M paid full invoice price on the melons that were correctly loaded and paid an agreed upon adjusted price for the melons that were not loaded as ordered. D & M failed to present any evidence establishing that Lot No. 621 consisted of melons that were not of the type and size ordered. Therefore, D & M owes petitioner $2,133.90 for Lot 621.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture directing respondent to pay petitioner the sum of $2,133.90 within 15 days after the final order is entered. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1988.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57604.15604.20604.21
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R. L. LAWSON vs F. H. DICKS, III, AND F. H. DICKS, IV, D/B/A F. H. DICKS COMPANY; AND SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, 92-000901 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Live Oak, Florida Feb. 07, 1992 Number: 92-000901 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1992

Findings Of Fact The Respondents, F. H. Dicks, III; F. H. Dicks, IV; and F. H. Dicks Company, are wholesale dealers in watermelons which they purchase and sell interstate. The Respondents' agents during the 1991 melon season in the Lake City area were Harold Harmon and his son, Tommy Harmon. The Harmons had purchased watermelons in the Lake City area for several year prior to 1991, and the Petitioner had sold melons to them in previous seasons. The terms of purchase in these prior transactions had always been Freight on Board (FOB) the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. The terms of purchase of the melons sold by Petitioner to the Respondents prior to the loads in question had been FOB the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. One of the Harmons would inspect the load being purchased during the loading and at the scale when the truck was weighed out. After this inspection, the melons accepted by Harmon were Respondents'. Price would vary over the season, but price was agree upon before the melons were loaded. Settlement had always been prompt, and the Harmons enjoyed the confidence of the local farmers. In June 1991, the Harmons left the Lake City area. There were still melons being picked in the area, and Harold Harmon advised the Petitioner that Jim would be handling their business. On June 30, 1991, load F 267 of 48,600 pounds of watermelons was sold to the Respondents through their agent, Jim, for 4 per pound. Fifteen thousand pounds of this load of melons was purchased by Food Lion in Salisbury, NC, for $1,450, and the remaining 33,600 pounds were refused. That portion which was refused was transported back to Respondents' workplace, and 33,600 pounds of the melons were sold at 3 per pound, or $1,008. The Respondents received a total of $2,458 for load F 267, and had transportation cost of $1,202.50 on this load. On July 1, 1991, load F 269 of 43,710 pounds of watermelons was sold to the Respondent through his agent, Jim, for 4 per pound. This load was to be shipped to Rich Food, Richmond, VA. An annotation on the Bill of Laden indicates the load was returned to Respondent and subsequently dumped. The load was not inspected after refusal, and there is no evidence that the load did not grade to standard. Petitioner's testimony is uncontroverted, and there is no indication that the terms for these two loads were different from the earlier transactions between Petitioner and Respondent, that is, FOB the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. Under the terms of sale, FOB purchaser's truck at seller's field, the Respondent bore the costs of transportation and the risk of refusal of the produce. Respondent's recourse was against the purchaser who refused delivery. If there was a problem with the grade, the Respondents also bore the risk of loss on sales which they made and which were rejected. The Petitioner is entitled to his full purchase price on both loads: $1,748.40 on F 269 and $1,944 on F 267.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: Respondents be given 30 days to settle with the Petitioner in the amount of $3,692.40, and the Petitioner be paid $3,692.40 from Respondents' agricultural bond if the account is not settled. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry McDavid, Esquire 128 South Hernando Street Lake City, FL 32055 F. H. Dicks, III c/o F. H. Dicks Company P.O. Box 175 Barnwell, SC 29812 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 South Carolina Insurance Company Legal Department 1501 Lady Street Columbia, SC 29202 Victoria I. Freeman Seibels Bruce Insurance Companies Post Office Box One Columbia, SC 29202 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (2) 120.57672.606
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JIMMIE MOTT AND D. W. NEELY vs. ANTHONY AND JOSEPH PELLEGRINO, 78-002023 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002023 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1979

Findings Of Fact The Petitioners and the Respondents had a contractual agreement, whereby the Respondents agreed to purchase watermelons from the Petitioners during the 1978 harvest season. The Petitioners were to be compensated for their watermelons by the pound as the melons crossed the scales during loading of the melons onto trucks. The actual price fluctuated based upon the market conditions. The Respondents' employees were responsible for picking and loading the melons. Pete Potenza was in charge of the loading operation for the Respondents. Mr. Potenza advised the Respondents that the price for the watermelons would be two and one-half cents per pound for the medium watermelons and three cents per pound for large ones. At the agreed price, the Petitioners would have been entitled to compensation of $1,197.75 for one load of watermelons, and $1,083.50 for another load. The Respondents compensated them $958.20 and $866.80 for the respective loads. The price paid by the Respondents was less than had been agreed upon. The Petitioners are entitled to $217.50 additional compensation for the first load, and $239.55 additional compensation for the second load. The Petitioners are entitled to total additional compensation in the amount of $457.05. There was no dispute as to the quality of the Petitioners' melons. The Respondents picked several loads of melons from the Petitioners subsequent to those which were disputed. Mr. Potenza advised the Petitioners that they would receive additional compensation, but they have not. The Respondents are licensed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as an agricultural commodity dealer. The Respondents have filed a $20,000.00 bond with the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services finding that the Petitioners are entitled to $457.05 in additional compensation for agricultural goods which they sold to the Respondents and requiring the Respondents to pay this sum to the Petitioners. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32304 William F. York, Esq. GILMAN, MCLAUGHLIN & HANRAHAN Ten Post Office Square Boston, MA 02109 J. Victor Africano, Esq. P. O. Box 1450 Live Oak, FL 32060 Joseph Pellegrino, President A. Pellegrino & Sons, Inc. 24 New England Produce Center Chelsea, MA 02150 E. G. Musleh, Esq. P. O. Box 924 Ocala, FL 32670

Florida Laws (3) 120.57604.20604.21
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ARVIN C. MOORE AND REAL ESTATE 3, INC., 79-000549 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000549 Latest Update: Oct. 10, 1979

Findings Of Fact Arvin C. Moore was a registered real estate broker from January 3, 1977, and active firm member of Real Estate 3 Incorporated, a registered corporate broker with an address registered with the Petitioner Commission as Route 2, Box 59B, Chipley, Florida 32428. Prior to January 3, 1977, Alvin C. Moore was a registered real estate salesman, registered as of September 2, 1975. Regarding the allegations that Respondent Moore was an officer of American Universal Investment Corporation at the time he acted as broker in the Tew transaction, the evidence presented showed that Moore resigned as president of American on April 29, 1977. Negotiations with the purchaser Tew began in the summer of 1977, and the contract between American and Tew was entered into on or about July 20, 1977. Moore was made vice president of American on November 3, 1977, some time after Tew had advised that he did not wish to complete the purchase. The evidence shows that Moore advised Tew that the property in which Tew was interested was owned by members of his family. Whether the corporation was identified as a closely-held corporation is not relevant, because Moore had advised Tew of his potential personal interest in the transaction. Moore advised Tew, after Tew expressed an interest in the property, that he would see for what price his family would be willing to sell the property. Moore advised Tew that the family would sell eleven (11) acres for $9,900. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Moore told Tew that American's cost was $900 per acre, and that this was a misrepresentation concerning the facts of the sale. The evidence shows that the seller, White, received $36,000 from the sale of the property to American; however, American paid $4,000 in brokerage fees to Moore. American's cost was $40,000. The parcel contained approximately fifty-eight (58) acres, but this included approximately eight (B) acres of public roads. In addition some of the land was so low that it was not usable. Depending upon what cost and acreage figures were used, the price per acre varied from $620 to approximately $900 per acre. Moore was representing American in this transaction and, as a real estate broker, was permitted to present the property in its best light. Representing the purchase price as $900 is not a misrepresentation but mere puffing. Moore's sole duty to Tew was to deal at arm's length with him. No evidence exists that Moore did not deal at arm's length with Tew. Further, concerning the representations regarding the cost paid by American, it is noted that these representations are irrelevant to Tew's right to reject the tendered offer from American. No evidence was presented that Tew was induced into the contract by the representation that American paid $900 per acre for the property. American tendered a written contract to White on September 23, 1976, which was rejected. However, this contract became the basis for further negotiation which resulted in an oral contract for sale between American and White. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine when this contract was consummated; however, negotiations of certain details continued until after the Tew/American contract was executed. These negotiations between American and White included an arrangement for White to transfer the the eleven (11) acre parcel which Tew was purchasing directly to Tew and convey the remainder to American, avoiding a dual transfer and dual taxation. The Complaint alleges that Moore misrepresented the contract to Tew because American did not have title to or an assignable interest in the property. The facts show that a contract did exist between White and American, and that White concurred in the transfer to Tew. Although this oral contract was not legally enforceable, as agent for American Moore was aware that the oral contract was sufficient for American and that American was acting in reliance on its oral contract with White in making on offer to Tew. The contract between American and Tew was a valid enforceable written contract notwithstanding whether American had or obtained title to the White property. Tew could have sued for damages if American had not obtained the property, or for specific performance had American acquired the property and refused to transfer it to Tew. Tew's interests were not jeopardized under the contract. Although Moore's duty to American is not at issue, Moore's duty did not extend to protecting American from its own acts. Moore had no duty to advise Tew that the oral contract for purchase was not enforceable. The evidence shows that Tew accepted the contract for purchase and sale for eleven (11) acres at $9,900 and was satisfied with this transaction until his sister-in-law advised him that one of White's agents had told her American had purchased the property for approximately $500 per acre. At this point, Tew sought to withdraw from the contract. This explains the origin of Tew's complaint against Moore and Tew's interest in the outcome, because the American/Tew contract contained a default clause. Clearly, Tew defaulted on the contract by refusing to go through with it when American stood ready to convey the property to him. Moore deposited the $1,000 deposit check he received from Tew to the escrow account of the Washington County Abstract Company, a title company located and doing business in the State of Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no formal action be taken against the Respondents, Arvin C. Moore and Real Estate 3 Incorporated. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day off October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Russell A. Cole, Jr., Esquire 206 East Iowa Avenue Bonifay, Florida 32425

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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LEAH RAULERSON vs DIXIE GROWERS, INC., AND U. S. FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, 92-005753 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Plant City, Florida Sep. 25, 1992 Number: 92-005753 Latest Update: Aug. 16, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner, Leah Raulerson, for agriculture produce purchased and not paid for in the amount of $3,722.49.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. During times material, Petitioner, Leah Raulerson, was an agricultural producer within the meaning of Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes and concentrated primarily in the production of peppers. During times material, Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., was an agricultural dealer within the meaning of Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, and wholesaler and purchased peppers from Petitioner during May and June, 1992. Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, issued a surety bond to Respondent Dixie during times material. During late May and June, 1992, Petitioner sold various types of pepper including hungarian wax, finger hots, long hots, bell pepper, fancy cubanelle and jalopeno to Respondent Dixie. During times material, Petitioner inquired of one of Respondent Dixie's owners, Charles Lawton, what the wholesale market was bringing for the type of peppers that she produced and desired to sell. Respondent Dixie advised that the average wholesale price was $8.00 per box. Petitioner told Respondent Dixie, that she could sell her peppers for that price but if the market deteriorated to the point where the price was $4.00 or less per box that she should be advised whereupon she would cease picking the peppers as her labor and other related costs would be below her breakeven point of $4.00 per box. Respondent Dixie, advised Petitioner that he (Charles Lawton) would let her know if the market declined. The agreement was struck and Petitioner was advised by Respondent Dixie to "bring the peppers on." Based on their agreement, Petitioner continued picking the peppers. Petitioner delivered to Respondent Dixie, a load of the various types of peppers that she produced and expected to be compensated at the rate of an average of $8.00 per box for her produce. Petitioner was not paid for the peppers at that time nor was she told that she should not bring any more peppers to Respondent's warehouse. Approximately two weeks from the date of delivery, Petitioner was paid an average of $1.03 per box by Respondent Dixie. Petitioner provided copies of the wholesale market reports for the types of peppers that she produced and sold to Respondent, Dixie, during May and June, 1992. The reports reflect an average wholesale price of $8.00 per box. Petitioner is owed by Respondent Dixie, the sum of $3,722.49 for nonpayment of produce (peppers) that she delivered to Respondent Dixie during May and June, 1992. Respondent Dixie, has countered that Petitioner's produce was bad and that the market had declined to the point whereupon they (Dixie Growers) were only able to obtain approximately $1.03 per box for the produce that Petitioner sold to Respondent Dixie. However, Respondent Dixie, failed to present any credible evidence which would establish that either Petitioner's produce was bad or that they were only able to obtain $1.03 as contended. No evidence was presented that the market declined or situation was anything different from the prices Petitioner was quoted and as reflected by the prices shown in the wholesale market reports. It is more probable than not that Respondent Dixie received the amounts reflected in the wholesale market reports for the produce that it purchased from Petitioner during May and June, 1992.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Agriculture, Bureau of License and Bond, issue a Final Order requiring that Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,722.49 as claimed for agricultural produce purchased from Petitioner. In the event that Respondent Dixie fails to pay Petitioner, within 30 days of the date of the Department's Final Order, the sum of $3,722.49, that Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, as surety, remit to the Department that sum which should then be timely remitted to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Terry Lawton P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Legal Department P. O. Box 1138 Baltimore, Maryland 21203-0000 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol - PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Dixie Growers, Inc. P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - PL 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0350

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68604.15604.21604.34
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