Findings Of Fact Petitioner has leased land upon which to erect the proposed signs along the I-75 (Exhibit 3). The county tax appraiser's office lists the land in question as Land Use Code 99, which is used for appraisal purposes to designate land not in agricultural use. The county zoning department, which is the agency responsible for zoning, carries the sites in question as zoned agricultural. In any event, neither parcel is zoned commercial and/or industrial.
Findings Of Fact Lamar acquired permits AA-634 and 7504 from Peterson Outdoor Advertising Company for a double-faced sign located on U.S. 98, South, approximately one-half mile north of Crystal Lake Drive on a site leased from Mary D. and Billy Allred. The lease (Exhibit 1.), executed in 1978, was for a three-year term with automatic renewal for an additional five year period and thereafter from year to year on the same terms and conditions unless terminated by lessee by giving 30-days notice prior to the end of the lease year. By warranty deed dated June 14, 1983, (Exhibit 2.) Sun State acquired the property on which this sign was located from Allred. Rent on this lease for 1984 was sent to Allred by Lamar, endorsed over to Sun State and cashed by Sun State. A check for rent for 1985 sent by Lamar to Sun State was never negotiated. By letter dated April 3, 1985, (Exhibit 4.) Sun State Homes told Lamar to immediately remove the sign from its property on U.S. 98, South. On May 16, 1985, Sun State applied for a permit for a sign on U.S. 98, 550-feet north of North Crystal Lake Drive. This application was disapproved by DOT on June 7, 1985, in Exhibit 3 because it was in conflict with the sign for which Lamar held tags for the proposed site. On or about the same time, Sun State applied to Polk County for a building permit to erect a sign at this site. Polk County disapproved the application because DOT had denied the permit. By letter dated May 29, 1985, Sun State appealed the denial of their application. On or about May 27, 1985, Lamar removed their sign from Sun State's property. On May 28, 1985, Lamar submitted an application for a permit to erect a sign on U.S. 98, 1,200 feet north of N. Crystal Lake Drive (Exhibit 5.) and simultaneously surrendered tags no. AA-634 and 7504. Lamar had obtained permission from the owner of that property to erect a sign at this site. This application was denied by DOT because of the appeal by Sun State from its denial. DOT will not approve an application for a sign permit when the right of occupancy of the site is contested. Lamar appealed this denial and the two cases were consolidated for hearing. The two applications are mutually exclusive as only one can be granted without violating spacing requirements.
Findings Of Fact Violation notices for two signs owned by Petitioner were issued and were the subject of this hearing. Subsequent to the taking of the testimony but prior to the close of the record, the Respondent, Florida Department of Transportation, withdrew its complaint against Petitioner, Peterson Outdoor Advertising, on one of the signs, to wit: Board No. 92 located 4.4 miles north of State Road 404, Highway A1A, n/b with copy "Bank Services" for which a violation notice was issued the 14th day of March, 1977. The violation notice issued against Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corporation on Board No. 3297 located at 1.07 miles south of State Road 520 on Highway 1-95, M.P. 37.10 with copy "Seaworld" is the subject of this hearing. The violation notice cited Petitioner for violation of Section 479.07(1), no permit. Petitioner had a sign located in the approximate location of the sign now cited in violation. The sign was badly damaged by what was apparently an act of God, a windstorm. Most of the sign was destroyed as shown by Petitioner's Exhibit 1, a photograph taken in January of 1977. The sign had been constructed with six inch by eight inch beans and a plywood face. The height of the sign was approximately six feet. There were Peterson identifiers on part of the structure that was left standing. A new structure was erected at the approximate same location. Round poles for the supporting structure were erected. The new sign of new materials was built and the elevation of the new sign is approximately twenty feet in height. The State's Exhibits 2 and 3, photos taken on February 4, 1977, show the new structure, Exhibit 2 showing new round poles and the State's Exhibit 3 showing a sign approximately twenty feet in height advertising "Florida's Best Entertainment Value SEAWORLD. On 4 Between Orlando & Walt Disney World" as copy. The State's Exhibit 1 shows the remains of the old sign in the approximate location. The new sign, which is the sign of this hearing, carries the same permit nunber that the prior destroyed sign carried on one of the posts of the structure. The Respondent, Department of Transportation, contends: that no permit was applied for or obtained for the subject sign; that the old sign in the approximate same location was destroyed by an act of God and a new sign was rebuilt in the approximate location without a permit; that the old sign was erected with square poles and to a height of about six feet whereas the new sign was erected with round poles and with a height of approximately 20 feet; that the permit displayed on the new sign is the permit that had been issued to the old destroyed sign and when the sign was blown down the permit expired and should not have been placed on the new sign by the Petitioner, Peterson Outdoor Advertising. Petitioner, Peterson Outdoor Advertising, contends: that no one saw the old sign fall and it is a mere conclusion that it blew down; that it has a permit on it. The Proposed Recommended Order of Petitioner has been considered in the preparation of this Order.
Recommendation Remove the sign, Board No. 32-97. DONE and ORDERED this day of July, 19'77, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Room 503 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire 115 East Morse Boulevard Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32790
The Issue Whether Respondent was in violation of Subsection 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, providing for the permitting of outdoor advertising structures.
Findings Of Fact Respondent maintains an outdoor advertising sign adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Gadsden County, Florida. The sign is located approximately 1/2 mile South of the city limits of Havana. This sign has not been permitted in the years 1973 or 1974. No current permit tag was affixed to the sign as of May 12, 1975. Respondent has made no application to the Department of Transportation for a current permit.
Findings Of Fact This proceeding was initiated when the Department notified the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, that its permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 were being revoked because the Respondent no longer had permission of the property owner to maintain a sign there, as required by Section 479.07(7), Florida Statutes. Permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 authorized an outdoor advertising sign on U.S. 98, 100 feet west of Hickory Avenue in Bay county, Florida. The record owner of the property where the above permits authorized the Respondent to locate a sign is E. Clay Lewis III, Trustee, who took title by deed in 1977. By letter dated August 9, 1985, the property owner notified the Respondent that the subject property was being sold, and that the Respondent had 30 days to remove the sign from the property and cancel the outdoor advertising permits for this sign. By letter dated October 17, 1985, the property owner advised the Department that the Respondent no longer had a valid lease for the site where the subject permits authorized a sign, and that the signs had been removed. Documents marked Exhibits 1-3 reflect the foregoing, as does the testimony of the Department's outdoor advertising inspector. This evidence was received without objection from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AD089-10 and Ad090-10 held by the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of July, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 William G. Warner, Esquire P. O. Box 335 Panama City, Florida 32402 Bobbie Palmer, Esquire P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. 8palla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based on the record transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Petitioner, the following are found as the relevant facts: The Respondent, Hinson Oil Company, owns four outdoor advertising signs in Gadsden County, Florida, located on the south side of I-10, in the proximity of County Road 270-A. On October 3, 1984, the Department of Transportation notified the Respondent in writing that these signs violated Section 479.11, Florida Statutes, in that they were alleged to be located in an area which is not a zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial area. The return receipt was signed by E. W. Hinson, Jr., on October 9, 1984. Paragraph 2 of the notices of violation served on October 3 and received on October 9, 1984, sets forth the following procedural requirements: You must comply with the applicable provisions of said Statute(s) and Cede(s) within thirty (30) days from the date of this notice, . . . or in the alternative, an administrative hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, must be requested by you within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice . . . E. W. Hinson, Jr., on behalf of the Respondent, requested an administrative hearing by letter dated November 16, 1984. This request was received by the Department of Transportation clerk on November 19, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order dismissing with prejudice the Respondent's request for an administrative hearing in each of these cases. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 24th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire and Maxine Fay Ferguson, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 E. W. Hinson, Jr. Hinson Oil Company P.O. Box 1168 Quincy, Florida 32351 John Curry, Esquire P.O. Drawer 391 Quincy, Florida 32351
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Respondent violated Subsection 112.3148(8), by failing to report a $2,606.25 gift of Disney World and Universal Studios tickets on a Quarterly Gift Disclosure Form, CE Form 9; and (2) if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the proceedings, Respondent, Alan Keen, served as chairman of the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Chapter, Part III, Florida Statutes, Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions as chairman of the Expressway Authority. See §§ 112.311(6) and 112.313, Fla. Stat. In April 2006, Respondent was contacted by a family friend, James Stanley, who resides in Costa Rica. Mr. Stanley indicated that his father-in-law was paying for the family, consisting of four children and eight adults, to travel to the Orlando area in the Fall of 2006 and requested that Respondent see if he could obtain theme park tickets for their use. Mr. Stanley called Respondent and asked him to obtain theme park tickets so that the tickets could be in-hand prior to Mr. Stanley and his family arriving in Orlando. This request was made purely for the purposes of convenience.2 Respondent has known Mr. Stanley for more than 20 years and considers to him to be a friend. Mr. Stanley described Respondent as his mentor and a close friend. Respondent and Mr. Stanley and their respective families socialize and have visited with each other in the United States and in Costa Rica. Mr. Stanley never asked for or expected Respondent to obtain free theme park tickets. In fact, it was Mr. Stanley's understanding and belief that his father-in-law, Rodrigo Esquivel, was going to pay all the costs associated with the trip. Respondent contacted Bryan Douglas, the then director of marketing for the Expressway Authority and asked Mr. Douglas if he had access to complimentary tickets to Universal Studios and Disney World theme parks.3 In response to this request, Mr. Douglas told Respondent that he did not know if he had access to complimentary tickets, but indicated that he would check. As chairman of the Expressway Authority, Respondent had no supervisory authority over Mr. Douglas and never signed any of his paychecks. Approximately two or three weeks after his initial telephone call to Mr. Douglas, Respondent requested that his personal assistant, Sherry Cooper, follow-up on whether Mr. Douglas had any success in obtaining any complimentary tickets. Respondent understood that Ms. Cooper, at the request of Mr. Douglas, had inquired of Mr. Stanley how many adult and how many children tickets were needed. In 2006, Ronald Pecora was the owner of Pecora and Blexrud, a marketing communications and public relations firm that had a contract to do work the Expressway Authority. In or about May 2006, Mr. Pecora became aware of the request for theme park tickets from Christy Payne. Ms. Payne was the representative of Pecora and Blexrud who was assigned to work with the Expressway Authority. According to Mr. Pecora, Ms. Payne reported to him that she was contacted by Mr. Douglas, the marketing director for the Expressway Authority in regard to theme park tickets. Based on the above-referenced conversation between Mr. Pecora and Ms. Payne, it was his (Mr. Pecora's) understanding that the subject theme park tickets were for Respondent. However, Mr. Pecora had no idea who would be using the theme park tickets and never spoke to Respondent about those tickets. During Mr. Pecora's conversation with Ms. Payne regarding the theme park tickets, he authorized her to purchase the theme park tickets with her corporate credit card. As a result of Mr. Pecora's authorization, a total of 12 theme park tickets having a value of $2,606.25 were purchased using the Pecora and Blexrud credit card. At the time Mr. Pecora authorized Ms. Payne to purchase the 12 theme park tickets, he anticipated being repaid for the tickets. Mr. Pecora's actions after he received the theme park tickets and the invoice for the purchase of those tickets are consistent with that belief and expectation. In mid-May 2006, the 12 theme park tickets and receipt for payment invoice ("invoice") were delivered to Mr. Pecora's business address in Winter Park, Florida. The invoice indicated that the $2,606.25 payment for the theme park tickets had been charged to Mr. Pecora's credit card.4 A few days after receiving the tickets and invoice, Mr. Pecora had one of his employees deliver the theme park tickets and the original invoice for those tickets to Keewin Properties. The reason Mr. Pecora sent the invoice to Keewin Properties, whose principal was Respondent, was so that the recipient would know how much to pay him for the tickets. At the time that Mr. Pecora had the theme park tickets and invoices sent to Keewin Properties, he knew that Respondent was the owner of that business. At or near the time Mr. Pecora directed his employee to deliver the theme park tickets and invoice for those tickets to Keewin Properties, he memorialized that transaction. In a hand-written note dated May 18, 2006, Mr. Pecora indicated that the original invoice had been sent to Keewin Properties. Mr. Pecora understood that theme park tickets were not for official business purposes of the Expressway Authority. Accordingly, he did not send the invoice for the theme park tickets to the Expressway Authority, but to Respondent's privately-owned business. On or about mid-May 2006, Respondent received the theme tickets and the invoice that were delivered to him in a small brown envelope. When he received the tickets, Respondent was surprised that Mr. Pecora was involved in obtaining the tickets because he had merely asked Mr. Douglas whether he had access to complimentary theme park tickets. However, Respondent was not surprised to have received an invoice. Upon receipt of the tickets, Respondent telephoned Mr. Stanley and advised him that he had obtained the theme park tickets and the invoice for the purchase of those tickets. Because Respondent would be in Costa Rica in a few weeks, he told Mr. Stanley that he would deliver the tickets and the invoice when he arrived in Costa Rica. As he had promised, a few weeks after speaking to Mr. Stanley, Respondent traveled to Costa Rica and, while there, personally delivered the theme park tickets and the invoice to Mr. Stanley. When Mr. Stanley received the theme park tickets and the invoice, he reviewed them. Soon thereafter, Mr. Stanley gave both the tickets and the invoice to Mr. Esquivel. Prior to giving the tickets and the invoice to Mr. Esquivel, Mr. Stanley highlighted the name of the individual printed on the invoice who was to be paid for the tickets. On or about September 23, 2006, Mr. Stanley and his family, including Mr. Esquivel, began their visit to the Orlando area. During this trip, the theme park tickets were used by Mr. Stanley's family. Respondent did not use any of the theme park tickets. Mr. Esquivel did not pay for the theme park tickets prior to the time that Mr. Stanley's family used the theme park tickets. About ten days after Mr. Stanley's family, including Mr. Esquivel, returned to Costa Rica from Orlando, Mr. Esquivel suffered a stroke. As a result of the stroke, Mr. Esquivel was hospitalized for about a week, but later returned to most of his usual activities. Respondent first learned that the theme park tickets had not been paid for in December 2006, after reading an article in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Until that time, Respondent had assumed that Mr. Stanley or his father-in-law had paid for the theme park tickets. Soon after reading the above-referenced newspaper article, Respondent called Mr. Stanley to ask if they had paid for the theme park tickets. Mr. Stanley told Respondent he believed that his father-in-law had paid for the tickets, but indicated that he would check on the matter. Upon checking, Mr. Stanley determined that his father-in-law had not paid for the tickets. Based on his personal knowledge of his father-in-law, Mr. Stanley concluded that his father-in-law simply forgot to pay for the tickets.5 Soon after discovering that Mr. Esquivel had not paid for the theme park tickets, Mr. Stanley also learned that criminal proceedings related to the theme park tickets were pending against Mr. Pecora. Therefore, Mr. Stanley, in consultation with his attorneys, decided that payment for the theme park tickets should be made after the criminal proceedings were over. About a month prior to this proceeding, Mr. Stanley received wiring instructions from Mr. Pecora's attorney. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Stanley wired the full payment for the theme park tickets to Mr. Pecora's attorney, on behalf of Mr. Pecora. Mr. Stanley's father-in-law gave him the funds which were wired to Mr. Pecora's attorney. Respondent did not file a Quarterly Gift Disclosure, CE Form 9, regarding receipt of the theme park tickets. The reason Respondent did not file a Quarterly Gift Disclosure Statement was that the theme park tickets were not for him and were not used by him. Therefore, Respondent did not believe that the tickets were a gift. Mr. Pecora, the procurer of the theme park tickets, did not consider the theme park tickets as a gift. Moreover, he never intended to make those tickets a gift.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a final order and public report finding that Respondent, Allen Keen, did not violate Subsection 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Complaint filed against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th of November, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Marilyn Bethel owns Tract B of Unit 3 in Indian River Estates in St. Lucie County, Florida [hereinafter referred to as the Property]. On or about May 14, 1988, Bethel entered into a lease agreement with Respondent. The agreement, which was signed by Bethel and Respondent's Secretary Treasurer, Richard Pozniak, provided as follows: The undersigned lessor, his [sic] heirs or assigns, in consideration of the annual sum of TWELVE HUNDRED (1,200) Dollars paid by AD-CON OUTDOOR ADV., INC., its heirs or assigns, hereafter known as Lessee, hereby grants to it or assigns the exclusive right to use and occupy the premises known as, [the Property] space for a south facing sign[,] for the purpose of constructing and maintaining advertising displays and devices, including necessary equipment for a period of Year to Year years from 6/1/88 19 . First option to lease both North and South facing locations will be granted to the Lessee by the Lessor for the above mentioned location at the termination date of the Lease drawn between the Lessor and National Outdoor Adv due to expire in [sic] April 1, 1989, for an additional 1,200. Total due will be $2,400. It is further agreed: In the event said property is to be improved by the erection of a permanent building, the agreement may be cancelled by giving sixty (60) days written notice to the Lessee prior to the commencement of construction. If the title passes from the present owner, this agreement may be cancelled by giving sixty (60) days written notice to the Lessee. In either case, the Lessee shall be refunded all unearned prepaid rental. The right is given to the Lessee to cancel this agreement by giving sixty (60) days written notice if the advertising value of the premises is diminished by any law or regulation, obstruction of view, or change of traffic. The Lessor agrees not to obstruct, nor to permit any other person to obstruct, the view of the advertising displays or devices constructed on said premises in any manner whatsoever. In the event this agreement is terminated before the end of its term (or the renewal thereof) the Lessor agrees to refund to the Lessee all unearned prepaid rental. It is understood that all display or necessary equipment placed on above property by Lessee is at all times its property and subject to its removal at any time. After the term (or renewal thereof) of this agreement, it will continue in force from year to year unless terminated by either Lessee or Lessor or[sic] written notice to the other, served not less than sixty (60) days before the beginning of such additional year. Lessor grants to lessee, or agents, the right to ingress or egress during the term of this contract to maintain sign structure(s). This agreement is subject to Lessee securing a building permit for said display. Payment is to be made upon securing building permit. The foregoing agreement was drafted by Respondent. Respondent prepared the agreement by adding the underscored language to a printed, form "Outdoor Advertising Structures and Display Lease" that it routinely utilizes in such transactions. On or about June 20, 1988, Respondent submitted an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the south facing sign referenced in the above-described lease agreement. Permit AY 242-35 was subsequently granted to Respondent by Petitioner. By letter dated January 9, 1989, from Respondent's attorney, Respondent informed Bethel that it sought to exercise its option "to lease both North and South facing locations," as provided in their agreement. By letter dated January 24, 1989, Bethel, through her attorney, gave "notification to [Respondent] pursuant to the Lease that it will be terminated on May 31, 1989." The letter was received by Respondent on January 25, 1989. On or about May 1, 1989, Bethel sent Petitioner a letter advising that Respondent would "not have a lease for the billboard [which is the subject of permit AY 242-35] after May 31, 1989." Based on the information provided by Bethel, Petitioner initiated action to revoke permit AY 242-35 on the ground that Respondent no longer had "the property owner's permission to maintain signs at the subject location."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, its hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent's permit AY 242-35. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of November, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3807T The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioner: Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected. The Hearing Officer is of the view that the agreement is not vague and ambiguous regarding Bethel's right to terminate her agreement with Respondent in the manner prescribed by the agreement's termination clause. In any event, to the extent that there may an ambiguity in the agreement concerning this matter, any such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of Bethel's right to terminate the agreement inasmuch as the agreement was drafted by Respondent. See Finlayson v. Broward County, 471 So.2d 67, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). COPIES FURNISHED: Rivers H. Buford, Jr., Esquire Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Garrison M. Dundas, Esquire Swann and Haddock, P.A. Southeast Bank Building 300 South Sixth Street Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Richard J. Pozniak Ad-Con Advertising Company Post Office Box 541 Fort Pierce, Florida 34954
The Issue Whether Respondent's sign located adjacent to the south right-of-way line of Plymouth Avenue, 315 feet east of the centerline of State Road 15A in Deland, Volusia County, Florida, is in violation as alleged in Petitioner's Notice To Show Cause No. 5-79-014-89 dated June 13, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Artdev Graphics Corporation, was the owner of a sign located near the intersection of Plymouth Avenue and SR 15A adjacent to the south right-of-way line of Plymouth Avenue, 315 feet east of the centerline of SR 15A, in Deland, Volusia County, Florida which is the subject matter of this proceeding. Respondent also owns a legally permitted sign adjacent to SR 15A which is 270 feet south of the sign referred to in paragraph 1 above when measured along the east right of way line of SR 15A. SR 15A is designated as a federal-aid primary highway. Plymouth Avenue is neither a federal-aid primary highway nor an interstate highway. The sign referred to in paragraph 1 above is visible from the "main- traveled way" of SR 15A as that term is defined in Section 479.01(8), Florida Statutes, respectively. There was insufficient evidence to show that the Department advised the Respondent, at any time, that a state outdoor advertising permit was not needed for the sign in question. The sign in question does not have a state outdoor advertising permit attached thereto nor has a state outdoor advertising permit been issued to Respondent for the sign in question.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation (Department) enter a final order requiring the Petitioner, Artdev Graphics Corporation, to remove the sign in question under the terms and conditions the Department deems appropriate and in accordance with law. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner 1.-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1, as modified. 3.-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4, 1, 2, 5, and 7, respectively. 9. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent The Respondent elected not to submit any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN WATTS, P. E., SECRETARY HAYDON BURNS BUILDING 605 SUWANNEE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0450 ATTN: ELEANOR F. TURNER, M.S. 58 CHARLES G. GARDNER, ESQUIRE HAYDON BURNS BUILDING 605 SUWANNEE STREET, M.S. 58 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0458 ROBERT S. LEE, PRESIDENT ARTDEV GRAPHICS CORPORATION 409 NORTH SPRING GARDEN AVENUE DELAND, FLORIDA 32720
