Findings Of Fact During the period March-May, 1983, Petitioner shipped eggs to Respondent at invoice price of $31,062.53 for which payment in the amount of $15,448.82 was received, leaving a balance due of $15,487.81 (Exhibit 1). No evidence was submitted that the eggs sold to Respondent from Petitioner's facility at Balm, Florida, were not produced in Florida. Petitioner agreed to reduce the amount due by $177 on Invoice 1741 dated 4/21/83 because 20 cases of large Grade A eggs were not on invoice submitted to Respondent. Respondent withdrew the allegation in the amended Answer respecting the $.04 overcharge per dozen after producing no evidence to substantiate this claim. Respondent's primary claim is that in June and July of 1983 it returned eggs to Petitioner for which Respondent had paid because these eggs were bad and that Respondent should have been granted credit totaling $2,397.77 for these eggs. Petitioner acknowledged that Respondent had returned some eggs but claimed these eggs were in different cartons than in which shipped, that they had been held by Respondent for some time before they were returned, and that credit was not given for eggs returned under those circumstances.
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should disqualify Savin Corporation's bid for failure to submit a separate supply price list.
Findings Of Fact On April 26, 1984, DGS issued ITB 402-600-38-B entitled "Walk-up Convenience Copiers, Plain Bond Paper" to establish a state contract for the purchase of walk-up convenience copiers. The ITB contains general and special conditions and specifications. The specifications provide for four types and twelve classes of copiers with four acquisition plans -- one-year lease, two- year lease, three-year lease, and outright purchase. Vendors may submit a bid for each type, class, and acquisition plan. Savin submitted a bid for all acquisition plans in Type I, Classes 1-10; Type II, Classes 1-3; Type III, Classes 1-10; and Type IV, Classes 1-10. /4 The special conditions of the ITB require that a price sheet (page 14 of the ITB) be submitted for each machine bid. The price sheets are used to evaluate the bids, and contracts are awarded in each category to the bidder submitting the lowest cost per copy. The cost per copy is determined by a cost formula set for in the special conditions which consist of three factors: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. The following special conditions of the Invitation To Bid relates to supply costs: C) SUPPLY COST- The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state contract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment; the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median volume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. The price list shall also include the manufacturer's standard test pattern as the original document. Vendor must complete the supply price list (See page 13) and include it with his bid and must submit a separate supply price list reflecting volume discount prices to substantiate that correct price volumes were used unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies during the term of this contract if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all performance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. Failure to include the supply price lists and manufacturer's guaranteed yields with your bid shall automatically disqualify the bid. NOTE: In the event of a variance between supply prices listed on the bid sheet and the supply price list submitted with the bid, the supply price list prices shall prevail, and the bidder's cost per copy will be adjusted accordingly. NOTE: All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply costs volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchasing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. The above quoted portion of the ITB makes it absolutely clear that each vendor had to submit two supply price lists: the supply price list set forth on page 13 and a separate supply price list, reflecting quantity discounts which was to be used to "substantiate that correct price volumes were used." Further, it was specifically stated that the failure to include both supply price lists with the bid would result in the bid being automatically disqualified. The page 13 supply price list consists of a list of various supplies and two columns for the bidder to complete entitled "Net Delivered Price (per carton)" and "Manufacturer's Guaranteed Yield". Page 13 was included in the ITB to cure a problem the Department had in the 1983-84 contract year with the manufacturer's guaranteed yield. A note at the bottom of page 13 reminds the bidder that a separate supply price list must be submitted with the bid. It states: NOTE: Bidders must submit their quantity discount prices for supplies on a separate sheet for verification and inclusion in the contract should the State elect to award supplies. The separate supply price list reflecting quantity discounts was required to verify the prices submitted by the bidder on pages 13 and 14 and to prevent the practice of low-balling". "Low-balling" occurs when a bidder uses a large quantity supply cost to determine the cost per copy on a low volume machine. This results in an artificially low cost per copy and gives the "low- balling" bidder an advantage over other bidders who use the correct supply price based on the median volume of the machine being bid. To verify that the proper cost per copy is submitted the prices on the separate supply price list are compared to the prices on the bid sheet. If there is a conflict, the prices on the separate supply price list prevail, and the prices on the bid sheet and on page 13 are adjusted to conform to the prices on the separate supply sheet. Prior to the 1984 Invitation to Bid Savin historically offered the state volume discount pricing for supplies. However, for the 1984-85 Invitation to Bid Savin decided to offer set pricing for supplies rather than volume discount pricing. Under set pricing the price of the supply item remains the same regardless of the quantity purchased. By offering a set price for supplies, at the lowest published discount pricing level offered to the Federal government, Savin felt it would gain a competitive advantage in Florida and other states that had competitive bidding. In states where competitive bidding was not used Savin did not offer set pricing but used published quantity discount pricing. In response to the 1984 Invitation to Bid, Savin completed the Supply Price List on page 13 and the bid sheet on page 14 for each machine bid. However, Savin did not submit the separate supply price list for each bid as required by the note at the bottom of page 13 and the underlined portion of the special conditions relating to supply cost. Because the separate supply price lists were not submitted with the bids, the Department determined that Savin's bids were unresponsive. The Department also disqualified three or four other vendors, including Royal, Panasonic, and Southern Copy Products, because they did not submit the separate supply price lists. Savin did not submit the separate supply price list because it interpreted the terms and conditions of the ITB as requiring a separate supply price list only when quantity discount pricing was being offered. Because Savin was offering set pricing, it did not consider that the separate supply price list was necessary. However, the only way the Department could determine whether a vendor was offering set pricing or quantity discount pricing was by referring to the separate supply price list. Several other vendors that offered set pricing including Canon, Mita Copy Star America, Pitney Bowes, Monroe and A. B. Dick, submitted separate supply price lists with their bids which indicated that set pricing was being offered. The separate supply price list not only indicated whether quantity discount pricing or set pricing was being offered, as stated above, it was used by the Department to verify the prices submitted on the bid sheets and on page 13. In one case where the bidder offered set pricing, the supply prices for toner and developer listed on the bid sheets and on page 13 differed from the prices on the separate supply price list, and the prices on the bid sheets and page 13 were adjusted to conform with the prices on the separate supply price list. Therefore, the inclusion of the separate supply price list was not necessary only when discount pricing was offered, it was necessary when set pricing was offered. The separate supply price list established that set pricing was being offered; it established the price at which the bidder must sell the supplies; and it was used to verify the prices on the bid sheet and page 13. /5 Therefore, the omission of the separate supply price list from the response to the ITB cannot be considered a minor irregularity which may be waived. Although a separate supply price list is required by the ITB, the list does not have to follow any particular format. The separate list sufficiently indicates that set pricing is being offered if only one price is quoted for a given supply. If varying prices are offered for a given supply, based on the amount ordered, then quantity discount pricing is being offered. Many of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner have been rejected in whole or in part. The majority have been rejected by way of making contrary findings of fact as set forth above. Others have not been addressed in the findings of fact because they are conclusions of law or argument on the issue. However, other proposed findings are rejected for the reasons stated in the subparagraphs below: Paragraphs 17 and 18 are rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and not supported by competent substantial evidence. When Mr. Hittinger was asked whether he assumed that Savin was offering quantity discount pricing, he answered "I didn't assume. I didn't make any assumptions." (T-266). Mrs. Hayes stated: "I am afraid on a bid situation, we can't assume what their pricing would have been if they had submitted it." (T-245) Mr. Nee did indicate that the disqualification of Savin did not make any sense, but explained that statement by stating: "The phrase that didn't make any sense was talking about Savin's failure to submit a quantity discount price list... Because Savin had always done it in the past, and they -- they never left -- if we asked them to cross every T, they crossed every T and it didn't make any sense that something apparently looked to be omitted". Paragraph 15 is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. The evidence indicates that the primary purpose of page 13 was not to establish the price at which vendors would be obligated to sell their supplies, but was included in the ITB for the submission of manufacturer's guaranteed yields (T-144, T-146; T-158-16O, T-166-167, T-242). Further, the witnesses who testified that the vendor would be bound by the prices on page 13 all qualified their answers. In response to the question of whether the bidder would be bound by the prices on page 13, Mrs. Hayes responded, "...if he did submit a substantiating document that he is offering a set price, and that set price agrees with the price that is on page 13, yes." (T-242); Mr. Hittinger responded: "If he receives an award, yes"; "If he had a responsive bid" (T- 264); and "No, in itself it does not. It would have to have a supporting verification sheet to complete that offer." (T-268); Mr. Barker responded, "If they are correct," (T-163). Virtually all the witnesses testified that it was the separate supply price list that established the prices by which the vendors would be bound. Paragraph B is rejected as irrelevant, however, the evidence supports a finding that some state agencies utilize volume discounts on copier supplies and some state agencies do not purchase in sufficient quantities to utilize volume discounts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Savin's bids be disqualified. DONE AND ENTERED this of 7th June 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1985.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Department of Revenue (Department) has properly issued an assessment against Mitchell's Grocery and Seafood (Mitchell's) for additional sales and use tax, interest and penalty; local government infrastructure surtax, interest and penalty; and school capital outlay surtax, interest and penalty; purportedly due in connection with business operations of Mitchell's relating to underreported taxable sales.
Findings Of Fact Mitchell's Grocery and Seafood is located at 8221 North Century Boulevard, Century, Florida. Mr. Harold Mitchell is the sole proprietor of that business and it is a retail sales business meeting the definition of the term "dealer" as defined in Section 212.06(2)(c)(d), Florida Statutes (2001). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing the tax laws of the State of Florida in accordance with Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. Mitchell's is engaged in the business of operating a "general store," selling fresh seafood, fishing tackle, fish bait, animal feed and general grocery items during times relevant to the audit period. On June 7, 2001 the Department sent Mitchell's a Form DR-840, being a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records. The audit was conducted between June 2001 and July 20, 2001. The purpose of the audit was to determine whether Mitchell's was properly collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to the State of Florida through the Department. The audit period with which the audit effort was concerned relates to May 1, 1996 through April 30, 2001 (audit period). On September 4, 2001, as a result of its audit, the Department sent a "Notice of Proposed Assessment" (Assessment) to Mitchell's indicating that it believed Mitchell's owed additional sales and use taxes in the amount of $50,864.13 with a related penalty of $25,138.96, with interest through September 4, 2001 in the amount of $15,950.65, for a total amount of $91,953.74. It also assessed a local government infrastructure surtax amount allegedly due of $8,477.43, with related penalty of $4,126.79, with interest through September 4, 2001, of $2,658.39, as well as additional school capital outlay tax allegedly due $2,934.02, with related penalty of $1,505.55, with interest through September 4, 2001 of $637.96. The taxpayer, the Petitioner chose to contest this assessment and filed a protest letter, dated August 18, 2001. The Petitioner submitted financial information in an additional letter submitted to by the Department during its informal protest. Mitchell's filed a formal protest by letter dated April 23, 2002. The Petitioner availed itself of the reconsideration process by the Department and a Notice of Reconsideration dated October 16, 2002, was issued by the Department. This was done after the Department's representatives visited the Petitioner's place of business on July 9, 2002, reviewed the taxable "markup" percentages and the exempt markups and elected to reduce its total tax assessment from $62,275.58 to $58,371.47 and, concomitantly, the related penalty and interest sought as to the amount of the reduction. The Department conducted the audit of the books and records of Mitchell's from June 5, 2001 through July 10, 2001. The necessary documentation was provided by the Petitioner for the Department to make its assessment. With Mitchell's concurrence, the Department's auditor determined that Mitchell's records were voluminous and on June 21, 2001, due to the voluminous nature and substance of the records, the Department and Mitchell's agreed to a two-month sale sampling period, representing the months of July 1999 and March 2001, being used for purposes of the audit. The Department followed a regular audit program it has developed for convenience stores similar to Mitchell's which it used in conducting the audit. Upon concluding the audit, the auditor determined a proper ratio of taxable sales to gross sales should be 53 percent. He used invoices from the two months representing the Petitioner's purchases for re-sale, as a sample in determining the ratio of taxable sales to gross sales. The auditor found that during the audit period the reported taxable sales were an average of 26 percent of the invoice-supported purchases for re- sale and that after the audit period Mitchell's reported taxable sales rose to approximately 43 percent of taxable sales in ratio to the total purchases for re-sale. The auditor found that during the audit period Mitchell's purchased between $20,000.00 to $27,000.00 of taxable items to sell at retail while reporting, on a monthly basis to the Department, taxable sales of between $12,000.00 to $15,000.00. The Department's auditor found the taxpayer to be knowledgeable about the items that were taxable that he carried in inventory for sale in his store. The Department's auditor used the Petitioner's purchases supported by purchase invoices in the sample months, to determine the tax liability because of the inherent inability to determine what Mitchell's actually sold, since the cash register tapes do not show the items sold; they only show the amount and the category of the item sold. Moreover, the cash register tapes would not reflect what happened to inventory that was not sold (for instance the owner "eating out of the store"), would not show cash sales which were not "rung up" on a cash register and would not reflect items stolen. This is the procedure that the Department has determined from long practice to be the most effective in ascertaining tax liability resulting from an audit. The auditor's determination of the amount of tax actually owed by Mitchell's was not based upon what Mitchell's purchased. Rather, the auditor used the purchases to determine the proper taxable ratio of taxable items purchased for re-sale to apply in determining Mitchell's proper tax remittance to the Department. The most reliable records used by the Department to determine the tax liability were the taxpayer's own invoices of purchased inventory. Because the taxpayer's records are voluminous the Department exercised its discretion under the law and entered into a sampling agreement with Mitchell's, wherein it made a good faith effort to reach an agreement on a sampling procedure, as required by law. The records shows that Mitchell's provided documentation during the protest period which the Department also considered and analyzed, resulting in a small reduction to the assessment. The Department's assessment is based upon the average, initially 53 percent, of Mitchell's taxable purchases for re-sale. Through the Department's Notice of Reconsideration process this percentage was reduced to 51 percent. The Petitioner contends that the auditor's approach of using invoices of purchased inventory to determine the proper taxable ratio of the taxable items purchased for resale, fails to take into account that just because items come into inventory does not mean they are sold or does not mean they are sold during the period the auditor is sampling. In this regard, however, the auditor found that Mitchell's has sold essentially the same inventory mix of items, over the time period since the audit period, as was typically sold during the audit period (i.e. the mix of nontaxable to taxable items). Moreover, the auditor examined and compared Mitchell's federal tax returns and concluded that the taxpayer's inventory did not radically change during the audit period. He also determined that the inventory did not build up and remain unsold over several months, but rather tended to turn over and be completely sold on a monthly basis. He determined this by examination of the taxpayer's own yearly inventory records. Mr. Mitchell testified that his sales had not increased since the end of the audit period. The auditor for the Department testified that he determined the mark-up ratio from each invoice provided to him from the taxpayer or after talking with the taxpayer concerning his practice on determining mark-up. Based upon this determination of information by the auditor, the mark-up ratio or percentage was entered into the Department's computer program to calculate the retail price of the taxable items purchased. The mark-up is the difference between the cost of the item when purchased and the price of the item when sold by the Petitioner at retail. For each transaction reflected in the invoices provided by the Petitioner to the Department, the auditor calculated the average taxable ratio for the Petitioner. The taxable ratio is based upon an analysis of Mitchell's gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales, tax collected and the tax rate. The taxable ratio is determined by dividing the gross purchases for re-sale at retail made by Mitchell's in a particular month, divided by the taxable purchases for re-sale at retail. The taxable amount owed by the Petitioner is calculated by a computer program. The retail mark-up for each transaction is examined to derive the taxpayer's taxable ratio for each transaction. The computer program then calculates the average taxable ratio for all of the transactions. The taxable amount owed by the Petitioner is then calculated by multiplying the taxable ratio by the amount of gross sales. At the end of each day the taxpayer finalizes the total number of sales by "zeeing it off" at the cash register. This procedure allows the taxpayer to ascertain the taxable merchandise sold and the total income. The "zee tapes" break down the transactions into the various categories of the items sold by the taxpayer, including sales of non-taxable items. The taxpayer records the total taxable sales in a journal at the end of each day. This journal and the sales invoices are sent to the taxpayer's accountant who figures out the taxpayer's monthly remittance of tax to the Department. Mr. Mitchell did not submit into evidence the journals used by the accountant to ascertain Mitchell's monthly tax liability. Mr. Mitchell contends that "to meet Mr. Statum's (the Department's auditor) expectations of the assessment, I would have to have approximately nine hundred dollars a day in taxable sales 30 days a month." The taxpayer stated that $900.00 in taxable sales is achieved only a "few days." The Petitioner retained the summary tapes that break down each category of items sold by the Petitioner. The summary tapes were not made available to the auditor during the audit period, nor placed into evidence. The Petitioner contends that the sampling period did not account for changes in inventory. He noted that inventory fluctuations occurred, especially with respect to fish bait and tackle. Records of spoiled inventory (fish bait) during the audit period were provided to Mitchell's accountant. The spoilage was taken into account by Mitchell's as a tax deduction. Mitchell's accountant prepared the federal income tax returns based upon journals provided by Mitchell's. The Petitioner signed those tax returns prepared by his accountant and found them to be acceptable. Mr. Mitchell testified that his accountant prepared his personal tax returns for the years 1996 through 2001 during the audit period. He testified that the inventory figures on the "Schedule C's" for the years 1996 through 2001 during the audit period, were accurate. The taxpayer's accountant, Better Business Services, also prepares a monthly income statement which shows Mitchell's gross sales, purchases, expenses, gross profit and net profit. Mr. Mitchell testified that his accountant provided him with accurate information on the income statements for the years 1996 through 2001. The Petitioner accounted for the fact that purchases of inventory on a monthly basis are greater than the taxable sales reported to the Department by stating that he has unsold inventory in his store including a lot of nails, wine, cigarettes, fishing tackle, fishing rods and reels, high powered rifle cartridges, and shotgun shells, as reflected in the inventory figures shown on his Schedule C's of his federal tax returns for the years 1996-1998. The Petitioner also contended that the auditor's mark- up prices for soda pop, potato chips (which are delivered pre- priced) and animal feed were not correct. He also contends that the auditor's mark-up prices do not reflect inflation and thus that the auditor's wrongly assessed the cost value of his inventory at 2001 prices when he bought some of it as far back as 1996 at cheaper prices. For the two months that the auditor sampled, July 1999 and March 2001, the tax liability was computed by applying the taxable ratio of 53 percent to Mitchell's gross sales. The auditor then input over 100 transactions of items sold by Mitchell in June, 2001 into a computer program in order to compute the "effective rate" of tax, taking into account the statutorily mandated "bracket" rates for taxable transactions in accordance with Section 212.12, Florida Statutes. Concerning the auditor-sampled month of July 1999, the Petitioner agreed with the "mark-up" figures as reflected in "Exhibit A01, Sales Exhibit" with regard to cigarettes, fishing tackle, and Baldwin Snacks. The taxpayer agreed with the cost figures put forth by the auditor as reflected in that exhibit. The Department's auditor determined that for the month of July 1999 the Petitioner would have more taxable merchandise sold than he reported. Concerning the sample month of March 2001, the auditor determined that the Petitioner would have more taxable merchandise sold than he reported. The Petitioner agreed that the total figure for the inventory purchases reflected in the above referenced exhibit, was accurate. The auditor examined the taxpayer's exhibits (see exhibit volume II pages 160-327) and found that purchases for the months represented in those exhibits, May, June, August, September and October, 1999, were well in excess of taxable sales reported to the Department. The auditor found that Mitchell's reported taxable sales to the Department increased by approximately 75 percent after the audit period. The records of the two sample months from the audit period show a taxable sales amount reported that is comparable to the taxable sales reported to the Department after the audit period, specifically during the month of July 2003. The Department's Exhibit, pages 335-336, shows that during months after conclusion of the audit, beginning in September 2001 through December 2002 the Petitioner had more taxable sales reported to the Department than before the audit, showing an average increase of almost 75 percent after the audit period. Indeed, for several days examined for July of 2003 (immediately prior to the hearing) the taxable sales ratio was running in the range of approximately 50 percent of gross sales. The Petitioner contends that the difference in the taxable sales ratio as reported during the audit period, with the taxable sales ratio reported after the audit period, was because, as to the months of July 2002 and July 2003, he sells more fish bait, ice and beer in the month of July. He also stated that the more outdoor-oriented workforce in the area depends on good weather to achieve a steady income, which results in his July sales being inordinately high compared to other months. The Petitioner contends that July sales do not represent an average month. In summary, the Department's audit and the method it employed in its audit was shown to be reasonable under the circumstances and in accord with the statutory authority cited below. The result of that audit, culminating in the testimony and evidence adduced by the Department, shows that the Petitioner under-reported taxable sales to the Department during the audit period. The testimony of the Petitioner concerning such matters as inventory spoilage, climatic and seasonal weather changes and their effect on the local economy and therefore sales, and discrepancies with the Department's auditor over the mark-up prices of certain items sold in the store does not constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the preponderant showing that the Department's assessment is correct.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witness, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue sustaining the revised assessment at issue in the amount of $58,371.47 plus concomitant penalty and interest and subject to any discretionary negotiated settlement of tax, penalty and interest amounts. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Mitchell Post Office Box 13 Century, Florida 32535 Robert F. Langford Assistant General Counsel Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue What amount should be awarded Petitioners as attorney's fees and costs in the underlying case in this matter, Savona et al. v. AHCA, Case No. 97-5909RU (DOAH Amended Final Order On Remand issued November 6, 1998).
Findings Of Fact Petitioners challenged a non-rule statement and policy of Respondent which limited physicians' Medicare cost-sharing reimbursement to the rate for Medicaid. Petitioners submitted an itemized statement of the requested hours, a summary of hours by stages of the case, and a summary of total hours, rates, and expenses requested. The hours and rates are supported by the testimony of Petitioners' counsel, David K. Miller, and corroborated by testimony of Attorney Samatha Boge and Attorney Nancy Linnan. An affidavit of Attorney Barry Richard in a related case adds further corroboration to hourly rates submitted by Petitioners' counsel. Respondent did not present independent evidence concerning proper number of hours, rates or expenses. Respondent did challenge some portions of the hours claimed by Petitioners' counsel and opposed the claim for fees and costs in its entirety. As established by testimony of David K. Miller, Samantha Boge, and Nancy Linnan, all attorneys licensed and practicing in Florida, the time spent by Petitioners’ attorneys in the initial proceeding and their hourly rates were reasonable. Further corroboration of testimony regarding hourly rates was presented by an affidavit from Barry Richard, an attorney in a related case. Petitioners have revised the number of hours properly allocated to this case and reduced same by 1.9 hours from hours allocated to M. Stephen Turner, one of the Petitioners’ attorneys. Respondent also challenges 3.9 hours charged by Petitioners' attorneys for monitoring of legislation, specifically senate bill 384, amending the law governing Petitioners rights to payment on crossover claims. The claim of counsel for Petitioners that this 3.9 hours (performed by Attorney Jody Chase) is relevant to proceedings in the underlying action, is not credited and these hours are also deducted from Petitioners’ claim for fees and costs. Petitioners request as adjusted is summarized as follows: M. Stephen Turner 73.7 hours@ $300/hr.= $22,110.00 David K. Miller 240.4 hours@ $225/hr.= 54,090.00 15.0 hours@ $225/hr.= 3,375.00 Other Partners .10 hours@ $225/hr.= 22.50 Associate .3 hours@ $175/hr.= 52.50 Paralegals 2.4 hours@ $ 75/hr.= $180.00 Fees $79,830.00 Expenses 2,280.00 Total $82,110.00 As modified above, the hours and rates requested are found to be reasonable in view of the novelty and complexity of issues, level of legal skills required, and the amount potentially at stake to Petitioners. Particularly, the amount awarded is justified in view of customary amounts charged or awarded for comparable services. The requested expense reimbursement is also reasonable. The expenses are of the kind typically billed to clients in addition to the hourly rate charged.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Fraternal Order of Eagles #4033, whose address is 615 Ridgewood Ave., Holly Hill, Fl. 32117 and holds license number 74-01574, Series 11C from the Division. The Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco had adopted rules which allow licensees to submit monthly surcharge reports based on either a "sales method" or a "purchase method," both of which are defined in Rule 61A-4.063(4), F.A.C. The purchase method is described as taxing the alcoholic beverages as they come in the door, and the sales method as taxing them as they go out the door. The only significant difference between the two is that current inventory is not subject to tax under the sales method until it is actually sold. Otherwise, the sales depletion method of auditing is applied similarly under either method of reporting. On or about January, 1994, the Division conducted an audit of Respondent's records to determine alcoholic beverage surcharge payment compliance during the period July 1, 1990 through October 31, 1993. The audit method used is commonly referred to a "inventory depletion," or "sales depletion." Respondent selected the sales method of reporting surcharges due, and timely submitted a surcharge report and payment during each month of the audit period. Respondent's reports are based on cash register records which indicate the number of units of each type of beverage sold, i.e., mixed drink, beer or wine by the glass. Respondent's surcharge reports calculated gallonage of liquor based upon a factor of one ounce per drink. Respondent did not maintain records of any "complimentary" drinks served. Respondent did not file any police or casualty reports regarding alcoholic beverages which it contends are attributable to theft during the audit period. The Eagles' well ordered weekly sales records understate the amount of alcoholic beverages sold, due primarily to the existence of overpouring, wherein the actual amount of liquor sold exceeds the one ounce per drink estimate relied upon by Respondent in compiling its monthly reports. Respondent did not conduct an internal audit to determine whether its sales records were accurate, or take some other significant action over the 39 months of the audit period to attempt to determine whether its primary assumption of one ounce per drink was accurately reflecting actual sales. Respondent's cash register tapes comprise an estimate of the amount of gallonage actually sold. The Division made no representations to Respondent which it might reasonably have relied in expecting that the accuracy of its monthly estimates of gallonage used, based on a one ounce per drink assumption, would not be subject to confirmation by audit. Respondent presented only anecdotal evidence to attempt to explain the admitted discrepancy between the actual gallonage used and the estimates contained in its sales tapes. The contention that some portion of the gallonage deficiency was attributable to pilferage by Eagles members or others, and an unspecified quantity of complimentary drinks for members or others, was not supported by any competent records or other evidence. The deficiency for Respondent Holly Hill Eagles represents thirty nine and eight tenths percent (39.8 percent) of the total surcharge paid during the audit period, which was $36,861.97. Since the completion of this audit and filing of the administrative action, Respondent has adjusted its assumption to reflect an administrative sale of one and a quarter (1.25) ounces per drink served. Respondent did not, however, present any evidence as to whether that assumption is any more accurate than the previous assumption. Based on this audit methodology, a surcharge liability of $14,691.83 exists. Respondent was aware of the Division's rule providing that surcharges are calculated based upon gallonage of alcoholic beverages sold, which states: If the vendor chooses the sales method, the vendor will bear the burden of proof that the method used accurately reflects actual sales. The surcharge deficiency determined by the Division to be owed in this case includes consideration of all applicable allowances, including spillage allowance of ten percent (10 percent) for draft beer and liquor, and five percent (5 percent) for all other alcoholic beverage products, which was applied and credited at the time of audit prior to stating the amounts owed. Based on this surcharge liability, the applicable penalty is $3,672.96.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Holly Hill Eagles be ordered to pay overdue surcharges in the amount of $14,691.83 and a penalty of $3,672.96, and a civil penalty of $250.00 suspended upon payment of the surcharge and penalty within 90 days of the entry of a Final Order in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 31th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed findings of facts. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20 Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. Gilroy, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Michael Dukeshier P. O. Box 821 Holly Hill, Florida 32117 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 John J. Harris, Acting Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Notice of Change to proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) of Respondent is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, under Subsection 120.56(1)(c), Florida Statutes, because the proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious and because Respondent has failed to follow rulemaking procedure or requirements in attempting to change its proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact The undisputed material facts are as follows: Carrie Johnson is the maternal grandmother and caretaker of Jevon Kyshan Evens, aged 17, and Willard Cody Sanders, aged 15. Ms. Johnson and her grandchildren live at 806 E. James Street, Tampa, Florida 33603. Ms. Johnson has court-ordered custody of both of her grandchildren. During all times relevant to these proceedings, Jevon Kyshan Evens was a minor child. Ms. Johnson currently receives a maximum of $637 in Supplemental Security Income (hereafter "SSI") subsistence disability benefits. She gets governmental housing assistance. She also gets TCA for both grandsons to help her care for them. For her two grandsons, the most Ms. Johnson is eligible to receive in TCA is a grant of $241 each month. Respondent's records show that, at least as early as 1992, Jevon lived with Ms. Johnson. At one time, Jevon went to live with his natural mother. However, Jevon moved back in with his grandmother, Carrie Johnson. Respondent charged Jevon's natural mother with an overpayment of $2,562 in TCA benefits. Respondent reduced Petitioner's cash assistance benefits as a means to recover the outstanding cash assistance overpayment claim established against the mother. The authority cited for Respondent's action was Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.900, which implements Section 414.41, Florida Statutes. Prior to October 1, 2007, Respondent began to collect Jevon's mother's overpayment by reducing the amount of TCA it gave to Carrie Johnson for Jevon. Respondent recouped at least $369 of Jevon's mother's overpayment from Jevon's temporary assistance between 2005 and the end of 2007. Respondent continued to reduce Ms. Johnson's TCA benefits to recoup Jevon's mother's overpayment until the end of December 2007. Effective October 1, 2007, however, Respondent changed its cash assistance program's benefit recovery policy based on a different interpretation of Subsection 414.41(1), Florida Statutes. Prior to October 1, 2007, all participants in the cash assistance program at the time an overpayment occurred were identified as a "responsible person" for purposes of repayment of a cash assistance overpayment claim. However, as of October 1, 2007, the meaning of "responsible person" was changed by making "adults" the only group of people who could be responsible for repaying cash assistance overpayment claims. Therefore, it excluded recovery of cash assistance overpayments from minors. Consistent with the new policy concerning "adults" and "responsible persons," Respondent voluntarily restored cash assistance benefits to currently active cash assistance households that contained a minor child in the assistance group if the household's cash assistance benefits had been reduced to recover repayment of an outstanding overpayment cash assistance claim. The restoration period covered October 1, 2007, through December 31, 2007. Petitioner's household was a benefactor of Respondent's decisions to restore the cash assistance benefits for the months of October and November, 2007. Although Respondent paid Ms. Johnson supplemental TCA to offset the benefits it recovered in October and November 2007, Respondent did not return to Jevon or Carrie Johnson any of the money that it kept from Jevon's cash assistance prior to October 1, 2007, in order to recoup his mother's overpayment. Carrie Johnson is substantially affected by the Proposed Rule and, thus, has standing in this challenge. On December 14, 2007, Respondent published Notice of Development of Rulemaking with the stated purpose of "align[ing] . . . policies for recovery of overpayment in the public assistance programs." On March 7, 2008, Respondent published Notice of Proposed Rule stating that "the proposed rule aligns policies for recovery of overpayment in the public assistance programs. . . . The proposed rule amends language about who is responsible for repayment of overpayment of public assistance benefits." The operative date of October 1, 2007, was set forth in the second sentence of the proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) ("Cash assistance benefits will not be paid to offset recovery prior to October 1, 2007, from individuals who were children in the overpaid assistance group"). Petitioner alleged that the operative date of October 1, 2007, was arbitrary and capricious. Proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a), as published on March 7, 2008, reads, in its pertinent parts, as follows: * * * Persons Responsible for Repayment of Overpayment. Persons who received AFDC and cash assistance overpayments as an adult shall be responsible for repayment of the overpayment Cash assistance benefits will not be paid to offset recovery prior to October 1, 2007 from individuals who were children in the overpaid assistance group. * * * (e) For the purpose of this rule, an adult is defined as: Eighteen (18) years of age or older, A teen parent receiving assistance for themselves as an adult, An emancipated minor, or An individual who has become married even if the marriage ended in divorce. (Underlining in original) The summary section of the proposed rule states that it ". . . amends language about who is responsible for repayment of overpayment of public assistance benefits. . . ." The purpose and effect of the proposed rule making is the alignment of policies for recovery of overpayment in the public assistance program. Subsection 414.41(1), Florida Statutes, reads, in its pertinent parts, as follows: 414.41. Recovery of payments made due to mistake or fraud. -- (1) Whenever it becomes apparent that any person . . . has received any public assistance under this chapter to which she or he is not entitled, through either simple mistake or fraud on the part of the department or on the part of the recipient or participant, the department shall take all necessary steps to recover the overpayment. Recovery may include Federal Income Tax Refund Offset Program collections activities in conjunction with Food and Consumer Service and the Internal Revenue Service to intercept income tax refunds due to clients who owe food stamp or WAGES debt to the state. The department will follow the guidelines in accordance with federal rules and regulations and consistent with the Food Stamp Program. The department may make appropriate settlements and shall establish a policy and cost-effective rules to be used in the computation and recovery of such overpayments. (Emphasis added.) Following the filing of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Final Order on the Second Petition, Respondent moved to delete the contested sentence Petitioner objected to. Thereafter, Respondent's Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly striking the sentence which read: ". . . [c]ash assistance benefits will not be paid to offset recovery prior to October 1, 2007, from individuals who were children in the overpaid assistance group. " Following publication of the Notice of Change, the Third Petition was filed, in which Petitioner seeks a determination that the Notice of Change, the scheduled public hearing, and Respondent's intent to change the language of proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, as originally published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, by deleting a sentence constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See § 120.52(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007) At no time at any public hearing on proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) was testimony given suggesting that the sentence challenged by Petitioner in proposed rule 65A-1.900(2)(a) should be placed in a rule other than Rule 65A-1.900. Respondent did not receive any written material or objections from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) advising Respondent that the challenged sentence should be moved from Rule 65A-1.900. When Respondent submitted documents to JAPC concerning a Notice of Change to Proposed Rule 65A-1.900, no reason for the change was included in these documents. JAPC wrote to Respondent and asked the agency to explain the reason for the Notice of Change. Respondent has not responded to JAPC's request for an explanation of the reason for the Notice of Change. There is no written record of JAPC instructing Respondent to hold a public hearing to discuss the Notice of Change. Respondent published a Notice of Rule Development to amend Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-4.220. The draft text of the proposed rule was published and a public hearing was held on October 8, 2008. Following the public hearing, a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of Proposed Rule 65A-4.220 was filed October 20, 2008 (hereafter "Fourth Petition"), and assigned DOAH Case No. 08-5227RP.
Findings Of Fact During the tomato growing season involved in this case (November 1982) Max Frosteg, Respondent, was salesman for Isom, Petitioner, under the terms and conditions of the contract admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. The tomatoes were grown by Isom and sent to the packing house where Frosteg's agent, Boyd, acted as salesman for the grower. Boyd contacted various buyers and obtained prices for tomatoes of specified grade at destination and took orders for these tomatoes. The tomatoes were shipped from the packing house and, upon arrival at destination, the buyer did not always pay the invoice price. It is the difference in invoice price and price paid by the buyer that is here in dispute. The contract (Exhibit 1) authorized the salesman to make adjustments in the price that may be necessary, to assign the contract, or use price arrivals in selling the product. The duty of the salesman is to get the best price possible for the grower. The contract further provided, and it is customary in the business, that the salesman apprise the grower of all situations where the buyer fails to pay the invoice price because of alleged grade discrepancies in the product or for any other reason. This gives the grower the option of requesting an inspection of the product at destination to determine if the product, in fact, meets or does not meet specifications; and the option of refusing the offering price if the product does not meet specifications. On the invoices here in question the salesman accepted less than invoice price for the tomatoes but failed to notify the grower and give the grower the option of accepting or refusing the lower price. The money paid for the tomatoes was forwarded to Frosteg, who remitted to Isom his portion of the money received. The amount received by Isom was $9,529.43 less than Isom would have received if the invoice price had been paid for the tomatoes. By failing to notify the grower that he was accepting a less-than- invoice price, the salesman, Boyd, breached his duty to the grower, Isom. No inspection reports were submitted to show that the tomatoes shipped met specifications for the classification shown on the invoices and no inspection reports were submitted to show that the tomatoes failed to meet said invoice specifications at destination. Since neither party was represented by an attorney at this hearing, available evidence may not have been submitted.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Kalunian was registered as a real estate broker with FREC holding Certificate Number 0045958. Kalunian's registration with FREC was suspended by FREC in an emergency suspension order dated September 21, 1978. On or about July 18, 1978, Harry and Joan Soden, as buyers, entered into a contract with Warren and Barbara Grund, as sellers, for the sale and purchase of real property. In connection with that sale, the buyers entrusted the sum of $2,000.00 with Kalunian as an escrow money deposit. The closing for this transaction was scheduled for October 1, 1978, and at no time prior to the scheduled closing did the parties to the transaction authorize the disbursement of the escrow money deposit. On or about June 23, 1978, John and Wanda Carlantonio, as buyers, entered into a contract with Ralph and Margarie Steigerwald, as sellers, for the sale and purchase of real property. In connection with that contract, the buyers entrusted the sum of $7,000.00 with Kalunian as an escrow money deposit. The closing for this transaction took place on September 15, 1978. However, at the time of the closing, the $7,000.00 escrow money deposit was not accounted for. At no time prior to the closing did the parties to the transaction authorize a disbursement of the escrow money deposit. On or about July 8, 1978, Diane Maholland, as buyer, entered into a contract with Rita Auletta, as seller, for the sale and purchase of real property. In connection with that contract the buyer entrusted the sum of $9,500.00 with Kalunian as an escrow money deposit. The closing of the transaction took place on September 6, 1978. However, at the time of the closing, the $9,500.00 escrow money deposit was not accounted for. At no time prior to the closing did the oarties to the transaction authorize a disbursement of the escrow money deposit. On July 31, 1978, the balance in Kalunian's escrow account was $501.13. On August 6, 1978, a letter from Kalunian was discovered in Kalunian's office. In that letter, Kalunian admitted that he had converted funds from his trust account for his own use.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner John Crawford, operated Crawford and Son's Farms located in or near Lakeland, Florida, on which he grows produce including, inter alia, beans of the variety in controversy here. Respondent, Wishnatzki, is a produce broker located in Tampa, Florida, and has been in the business of brokering produce grown by Florida farmers throughout the United States for three generations. Petitioner and Respondent have done business together in the past on many occasions, without controversy, and have, over the years, developed an amicable business and well as personal relationship. For a substantial portion of that time, including the time in issue, the parties' transactions were consummated under a "written statement of terms and conditions" which called on the broker, Wishnatzki, to act as the grower's agent on the basis of "gross proceeds of a sale, less carrier, cooling, packing and palleting charges, if any, and a Grower's Agent's customary commission." At some time prior to April 28, 1994, Mr. Crawford, who was, at the time, carrying a bucket full of the beans later sold through Respondent, saw Mr. Wishnatzki who, he claims, indicated the beans could be worth $25.00 per bushel. The beans at hand were the earliest produced from the Petitioner's fields, however, and the main crop was not yet ready for harvesting. Mr. Crawford acknowledges this comment by Mr. Wishnatzki was no guarantee of price but merely an opinion, and Mr. Wishnatzki claims it was Crawford, not him, who stated a figure. Several days later, however, on or about May 3, 1994, while his beans were being picked, Mrs. Crawford spoke with Mr. Wishnatzki who said he needed beans and had a truck going to New York. According to Mrs. Crawford, Mr. Wishnatzki advised her they could probably get $20.00 per bushel for the beans if Crawford could get them in. Mrs. Crawford immediately went to Petitioner and told him what Respondent had said, and within two days, on May 3 and 4, 1994, Mr. Crawford delivered to Mr. Wishnatzki 164 bushels of beans. The beans were shipped up north, but in the interim, the price of beans, according to the Department of Agriculture's price report, dropped considerably from a price near $18.00 per bushel. Records maintained by Respondent reflect that between May 4 and May 7, 1994, Respondent sold the entire 164 bushels, in varying amounts, to six different customers, as follows: 5/4/94 Scarmardo Produce. 40 bu at $14.00/bu 5/5/94 C & S Wholesale Gro. 73 bu at 12.00/bu 5/5/94 C & S Wholesale Gro. 2 bu at 0.00/bu 5/5/94 Watson's Produce 5 bu at 16.00/bu 5/6/94 Scott Street Tomato Co. 5 bu at 16.00/bu 5/6/94 Sy Katz Produce 5 bu at 16.00/bu 5/7/94 Tamburo Bros. 34 bu at 4.00/bu Respondent received a total of $1,812.00 for the sale of all Petitioner's beans consigned to it for an average price of $11.04 per bushel. Notwithstanding Respondent was entitled, by the terms of the agreement between it and Petitioner, to deduct a commission on the sale, because of the long- standing harmonious relationship which had existed between them, and because Respondent felt it important to support its growers and insure their financial well-being, Respondent, nevertheless paid Petitioner the full amount it received, and an additional sum as well, for a total payment of $2,132.00. In other words, though Respondent received only an average of $11.04 per bushel from its customers for Petitioner's beans, it nevertheless paid Petitioner an average of $13.00 per bushel for the beans it received from him. Petitioner is not satisfied with the amount received, however, and claims Respondent sold the beans at a price below market. He refers to Mr. Wishnatzki's comment in passing in late April that the beans could bring $25.00 per bushel. He also notes that the market should have been good because of an infestation of bean virus due to white flies. He further contends that Respondent should not have sold the beans for such a low price; that Respondent should have checked with the northern markets, and if there was a problem with his beans, Respondent should have procured a government inspection of them. While he admits beans were in a downward fall, he does not believe the price dropped to $13.00 per bushel on a first hand picking. In support of his position, he refers to two separate market reports, the first dated May 4, 1994, and the other dated May 6, 1994. The former reflects a "fairly light" demand for beans, with handpicked beans selling between "16.00 and 18.65, mostly 16.65 few 12.00", and the latter reflects, for handpicked beans, a "fairly light" demand with sales at "14.00 - 16.65 few 12.00 occasional lower." Petitioner does not claim he should have received $18.00 per bushel which he cites, inaccurately, was the fair market price according to the Florida Market Reports cited above, but claims he could have come off that price if he had been contacted to negotiate price. However, the $18.00 price he cites was not, according to the evidence, the usual price received. The usual price was around $16.65, with some lower. In any case, the terms of the brokerage agreement does not provide for price negotiation after delivery is made to the broker. Further, Mr. Wishnatzki did not call Petitioner when he saw the beans were not selling well because they had already been picked and were in Respondent's hands. Not much could have been done at that point, and he had other growers to deal with as well. In addition, Mr. Crawford has access to the market report and knew the price was falling. He did not call Respondent to set a minimum price. According to Mr. Wishnatzki, the price paid to the growers is based upon the price his company receives for the produce. However, Respondent does not wait until it has been paid before paying its growers. When the produce is sold, the grower is paid, and Respondent receives payment from the buyer after that. There is no way to say with certainty when the grower delivers produce to Respondent what price an ultimate buyer will pay for that produce. Many factors come into play, including quality of the produce, current market price, supply and demand and the like. A market bulletin, published at the end of each market day, gives some idea of what the next day's price is likely to be, but only market conditions control the price. Review of the prices received by Respondent for the first 130 bushels of beans sold reflect a price of from $12.00 for the 73 bushels sold to C & S, to $14.00 for the 40 bushels sold to Scarmardo. The 15 bushels sold to three different brokers for $16.00 per bushel is but a small amount of the total. The remaining 34 bushels sold to Tamburo for $4.00 per bushel brought the average price received down, as did the two bushels for which no payment was received. Respondent claims they received only $4.00 per bushel from Tamburo because of a constant decline in the market during the entire week the beans were for sale, and the sale to Tamburo was, in effect, a distress sale. Wishnatzki started the week out offering the beans at $18.00 per bushel. The price was reduced each day until the final Saturday when it is usual to sell what they have left over for what they can get. On Saturday, May 7, Wishnatzki still had 34 bushels of beans left and Tamburo sold them at the lower price. It was lower that Wishnatzki had expected, but consistent with the agreement they had with Tamburo who had the beans on consignment. Mr. Wishnatzki asserts the sale at that price was a judgement call he had to make, but were he confronted with the same situation, he would do it again. At no time did Mr. Wishnatzki advise Mr. Crawford he could, or would, sell a given quantity of beans at a certain price. If he had known what price he would get for the beans at later sale, he would have paid Mr. Crawford on the spot, in advance. Further, even though at the beginning of the week in question the market reports showed beans selling for a good price, sales can not always be made at the reported market price. The price he gets is what his customers are willing to pay. His procedure is to send out a daily inventory sheet to each of his customers, nation-wide, by FAX. At the time these beans were delivered to Respondent, the demand was light, witnessed by the fact that it took a whole week to dispose of 164 bushels. That is not a large volume. While he understands Mr. Crawford's disappointment, it is a result of the fact that Crawford's expectations were higher than reality delivered. This has happened to growers before, and it will, no doubt, happen again.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Crawford & Son's Farms' claim against Respondent, Wishnatzki & Natel, Inc. and Continental Insurance Company, in the amount of $824.00, be denied. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John Crawford d/b/a Crawford & Son's Farms 2545 Sleepy Hill Road Lakeland, Florida 33809 ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1994. David L. Lapides, Esquire W. Edwin Litton, II, Esquire Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards & Roehn, P.A. Post Office Box 3433 Tampa, Florida 33601 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
