The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap, in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed by the City of Kissimmee (the City) from July 17, 1989, to the present as a tele- communicator in the Communications Center of the Police Department. Petitioner and his health care provider advised the City sometime in 1995 that Petitioner is diabetic. Diabetes has impaired Petitioner's work schedule and his willingness to train other employees but has not handicapped Petitioner. The diabetes has not substantially limited Petitioner in a major life activity and has not substantially limited Petitioner from performing a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes. Petitioner is able to care for himself. Petitioner clothes himself, bathes, shaves, brushes his teeth, and combs his hair. Petitioner checks his own blood sugar level regularly during waking hours. Petitioner is able to perform other major life activities. Those activities include walking, driving a vehicle, performing manual tasks, seeing, speaking, hearing, learning, talking, and performing the duties of his occupation. Petitioner has walked for several years approximately 1.25 miles a day. Petitioner drives his own vehicle. Petitioner performs manual tasks. Petitioner operates a computer, though he has some difficulty doing so. Several months ago, Petitioner helped a friend hang an interior door. Petitioner has also helped friends paint walls in recent years. Petitioner has difficulty with his uncorrected vision. With reading glasses, however, Petitioner reads documents most of the time. Petitioner uses a device identified in the record as a CPAP machine to assist him in breathing at night. However, Petitioner does not need to use the machine during the work day to do his job. No health care provider has advised Respondent that Petitioner is disabled. Petitioner’s diabetic specialist is Dr. Jose Mandry. Dr. Mandry did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Mandry informed Respondent that Petitioner has diabetes in a note the City received on or about February 6, 1995, when Respondent attempted to schedule Petitioner for a night shift in the Communications Center. The note from Dr. Mandry did not indicate that Petitioner was handicapped (disabled), or that any accommodations were required in order for Petitioner to continue working. The note requested the City to keep Petitioner on daytime shifts "if possible." The note did not indicate that a daytime schedule was medically necessary. Rather, the note indicated that working day shifts would be “desirable.” On March 23, 1995, Dr. Mandry provided another letter to the City regarding Petitioner's medical condition. The note stated that Petitioner needed to “be accommodated with a normal daytime work schedule.” In July 1995, the City established a regular daytime work schedule for Petitioner. The City never regarded Petitioner as disabled, and the daytime work schedule for Petitioner was not an “ADA Accommodation.” The City employee who granted the request for a daytime schedule was identified in the record as Police Department Commander Johns. Commander Johns did not have authority to provide an ADA accommodation. The authority to provide an ADA accommodation is vested in the city manager and city attorney. They make a final determination of whether the City will provide an ADA accommodation to a particular employee. The city manager and city attorney did not authorize the City to provide any ADA accommodation to Petitioner. The daytime schedule granted to Petitioner is part of Respondent’s general practice and policy of working with impaired employees and employees who have personal needs. The policy attempts to help such employees with their schedules when it is possible to do so without an adverse impact on the City’s ability to provide services. Assuming arguendo that City employees had the authority to provide ADA accommodations to Petitioner in the absence of a formal determination by the city manager and city attorney, Petitioner relies on evidence of interactions between City employees and Petitioner in an attempt to show the City provided Petitioner with ADA accommodations. The relevant evidence involves two time periods. The first is the period from June 4, 1996, until June 5, 2002. The second is the period from June 5, 2002, through March 16, 2006, when Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination with the Commission. The record evidence does not support a finding that City employees provided an ADA accommodation to Petitioner. The daytime work schedule authorized in 1995 remained in effect until June 4, 1996, when Dr. Mandry advised the City that Petitioner could work up to 12 hours a day, as long as the 12 hours were daytime hours. Between 1996 and June 5, 2002, the City allowed Petitioner to work overtime when he wanted to, based on Petitioner's self-assessment of his physical condition. Petitioner acknowledged the overtime schedule in a memo that he wrote to Lieutenant Donna Donato on June 5, 2002 (the memo). The memo described Petitioner's plans for his future work schedule. The memo stated that Petitioner was providing notice “that due to self-assessed health issues” Petitioner intended to restrict the amount of his overtime in the future. (emphasis added). In relevant part, the memo advised the City that Petitioner did not intend to “demand the imposition of the restrictions [on his work schedule] as addressed by City Management in June of 1995.” Instead, the memo advised that Petitioner would address his concerns “to the best of [his] abilities by modifying [his] agenda. " Petitioner listed a number of items that may be fairly described as terms or conditions for when and under what circumstances Petitioner would work overtime. Petitioner provided no new medical evidence to support a finding of medical necessity for the terms and conditions that Petitioner prescribed in the memo. Petitioner acknowledged that his concerns were based on “self-assessed health issues” and asserted that “no further documentation should be necessary.” Petitioner did provide a note from Dr. Mandry on June 20, 2002. The note states: The following is a letter as requested by the above-captioned patient [David Dey]. As you know, he suffers from diabetes and also requires insulin for his control. David needs to monitor glucose levels and follow fairly stable meal patterns in order to try to achieve good control of diabetes and avoid complications. It would certainly be to his advantage and much preferable if he could have a stable work shift where he could regulate his meals and his injections properly. (emphasis added) Respondent's Exhibit 18 (Hereinafter R-18, etc.). During the second period of time between June 5, 2002, and the Charge of Discrimination, the City hired a new manager for the Communications Center. In July 2002, the City hired Ms. Jean Moe to manage the Communications Center at the Police Department, and Ms. Moe remains responsible for the supervision and management of Petitioner. Ms. Moe is diabetic. Ms. Moe met with Petitioner on August 6, 2002. The two discussed the issues Petitioner raised in his memo and agreed on a number of items outlined in Ms. Moe’s memo of August 6, 2002 (the Moe memo). The Moe memo provides in relevant part: Beginning today, August 6, 2002 you will only work your twelve (12) hour shift assignment [sic]. You will not volunteer or be assigned any overtime. You are also no longer on the standby schedule. Here you had some concern on the overtime issue, however, as stated by your doctor in writing he is recommending that you do not work any extra hours. Should he feel your health improves and he authorizes your overtime, I will take his note under advisement. That does not mean I will immediately give you overtime but will review his letter and his suggestion. Along with the above issues, your supervisor has been advised under no circumstances will you miss your assigned lunchtime or breaks, these are important to keep you regulated on your medication per your doctor. You also requested you be allowed to lift your feet after working several hours, this will also be under consideration when I receive a note from your doctor stating it R-19. would be another requirement for health reasons. In 2004, the City Police Department considered changes to the normal work schedule for employees in the Communication Center. The City advised employees, including Petitioner, that the City would require employees to rotate work shifts between daytime and night shifts. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner wrote to the City Human Resources Department and requested a “final, permanent accommodation . . .” for daytime work only. Petitioner provided copies of documents from Dr. Mandry, which did not include a medical opinion that Petitioner is disabled. Assistant Human Resources Director Andrea Walton wrote to Dr. Mandry on July 15, 2004, and requested clarification of his letters in order for the City to arrange an appropriate schedule for Petitioner. Ms. Walton specifically inquired about the possibility of Petitioner's working a rotating work schedule and asked Dr. Mandry to clarify Petitioner's ability to work overtime. The City wanted Dr. Mandry to clarify previous statements that Petitioner could work overtime as a parking enforcement specialist but that Petitioner's overtime work as a tele-communicator must be limited. Dr. Mandry responded to Ms. Walton on July 26, 2004. The response explained that Petitioner was able to work in a rotating schedule and for unspecified amounts of overtime if control is optimal and under ideal circumstances. Dr. Mandry was unable at that time to give more specific information to the City. He explained: R-27. With regards to some of the other issues, again, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for me to give you a specific answer, and I would rather you talk to Mr. Dey specifically so that he can let you know what his current limitations are. On August 3, 2004, Ms. Beth Stefek, the director of Human Resources for the City, wrote to Petitioner and explained that the City was willing to work with Petitioner to arrive at an appropriate work schedule. Ms. Stefek did not indicate that the City considered Petitioner to be disabled. Sometime after August 3, 2004, Petitioner experienced further difficulties in controlling his diabetes. On August 10, 2004, Dr. Mandry wrote to the City again. Dr. Mandry told the City: I just saw David today who seems to be having some further difficulties with his health and his control of diabetes. At this time, I have reviewed his records, and I think it would clearly be in his best interest that from now on, he work only on a stable daytime work shift only [sic]. He certainly is not doing well when he tries to do overtime, and traditionally in the past has always become more complicated and his health has deteriorated whenever he tries to do either night shifts or overtime shifts. I have, therefore, at this time, recommended that David should not be allowed to work any overtime and/or nighttime shift. Of course, he needs to have accommodations for meals and monitoring or blood sugar levels as necessary, and he needs to have access to food in case he becomes hypoglycemic. R-29. The difficulties Petitioner experienced in controlling his diabetes were attributable to an increase in stress that Petitioner experienced between June and September 9, 2004. Petitioner's father died in June 2004, and three hurricanes impacted Petitioner’s home from August through September 2004. The hurricanes also increased stress at work due to increased demand on City services. On August 15, 2004, Petitioner advised Ms. Moe that he was intentionally running his blood sugars “higher than desired” at work to “offset and reduce the possibility of a hypoglycemic situation.” Toward the end of August 2004, the City moved Petitioner to the night shift in the Communications Center. Petitioner worked the night shift for a few nights. On September 5, 2004, Petitioner advised Ms. Moe that he was available to be part of a voluntary group of dispatchers to work catastrophic disasters like hurricanes if she decided to form the group. On or about September 9, 2004, while Petitioner was at home, Petitioner fell unconscious and was transported to the hospital for treatment. On September 16, 2004, Dr. Mandry wrote to the City and advised that it was necessary for Petitioner to refrain from working "any overtime shifts and/or nighttime shifts.” On or about September 21, 2004, Petitioner returned to work, and the City placed Petitioner on a daytime work schedule through the remainder of 2004. On January 6, 2005, Ms. Moe advised Petitioner the City needed Petitioner to work the night shift for a few nights. However, the City was able to satisfy its needs without placing Petitioner on the night shift at that time. Petitioner responded to Ms. Moe on January 6, 2005, by stating that he was going to begin a search within the City for another position that would meet his medical needs. On January 20, 2005, Petitioner inquired about an opening within the City for a parking enforcement specialist. On January 25, 2005, Petitioner informed Ms. Moe and others at the City that he would not consider either the parking enforcement position or a community service officer (CSO) position that had become available because both jobs contradicted his "medical requirements.” On April 4, 2005, Ms. Moe sent a memo to Petitioner advising him that the City would place Petitioner on a list identified in the record as the call-back list for emergency back-up in the Communication Center. Ms. Moe specified that the placement of Petitioner on the call-back list was subject to the work conditions previously established in July 1995 by Commander Johns. Ms. Moe advised Petitioner that he would be placed on the call-back list effective April 20, 2005, but only in those weeks when he was scheduled to work 33 hours so that his work week did not exceed 40 hours. She assured Petitioner that absent some extraordinary circumstances, the City would not call Petitioner back to work a night shift and would not schedule Petitioner on a call-back that would result in Petitioner working more than 40 hours in a work week. The memo from Ms. Moe expressly indicated that the City did not consider the Petitioner to be ADA disabled. Ms. Moe told Petitioner to advise her if he thought there was some medical or ADA reason why he could not be on the call-back list. On April 13, 2005, Attorney Edward R. Gay wrote to the City on behalf of Petitioner. Mr. Gay stated that Petitioner believed there was a medical reason that prevented Petitioner from being placed on the call-back list. On April 21, 2005, Attorney Lucille Turner, the City’s special labor counsel, responded to Mr. Gay. Ms. Turner provided Mr. Gay with a copy of the City’s April 4, 2005, memo detailing the call-back restrictions applicable to Petitioner. Ms. Turner repeated that it was not the City's intent to call Petitioner back to work a night shift or to schedule Petitioner to work more than 40 hours a week in the absence of “some extraordinary circumstance." The City, through its counsel, expressly advised Petitioner that the City had never undertaken a formal review of whether Petitioner should be classified as a person protected by the ADA. Instead, the City had informally worked to develop a work schedule for Petitioner that takes into account the information provided by Petitioner's health care providers. The City provided Petitioner with written guidance concerning the procedure for Petitioner to follow to seek a classification from the City as ADA disabled. In relevant part, the letter advises: If [Petitioner] believes that his diabetes (or any other medical condition) requires the City to not include him on the call back list, or to change his work schedule, he should provide the City with further information in support of his request. This should include information about the legal basis for his disability claim . . . [keeping in mind case law cited earlier in the letter indicating diabetes is not a per se disability]. . . . The City will then review the information to determine whether Mr. Dey has a disability as defined by the ADA, and, if so, what accommodations can be reasonably made. R-54, at 3. Petitioner did not ask to be classified as disabled. Rather, Dr. Mandry wrote to the City on June 8, 2005. Dr. Mandry stated that he was writing at the request of Petitioner. In relevant part, Dr. Mandry explained: R-1. Mr. Dey is by no means disabled, and he can clearly work and satisfy the capacities of his job as long as there is some stability involved in it. (emphasis added) In March and August 2005, the City did not select Petitioner to fill respective vacancies for a shift supervisor in the Communication Center and a parking enforcement specialist for the City. Neither action constituted an adverse employment action against Petitioner. The job duties for the vacant shift supervisor in March 2005 required the successful applicant to work night shifts. Petitioner did not apply for the shift supervisor position. When the City posted the notice of vacancy for the shift supervisor, Petitioner requested Ms. Moe to provide Petitioner with information about the job requirements for the position. Ms. Moe responded on March 14, 2005, and advised Petitioner that the position was night shift duty and required the supervisor to train other employees. On March 23, 2005, Petitioner wrote to Ms. Moe indicating he had concluded that multiple aspects of my physical disability are contradictory to the requirements of the supervisory position and that he had elected not to apply for the position. If Petitioner were to have applied for the shift supervisor position, Petitioner was not qualified to perform the essential requirements of the position. Petitioner was unable or unwilling to work the night shift and was unable or unwilling to train subordinate employees. The Communications Center receives 911 calls from the public. Employees receive calls and dispatch them to the police department and fire department 24 hours a day. The work schedule at the Communication Center is divided into two shifts. The day shift begins at 6 a.m. and ends at 6 p.m. The night shift begins at 6 p.m. and ends the following day at 6 a.m. Approximately four to six employees work each 12-hour shift in the Communications Center. However, only one supervisor works each shift. A shift supervisor oversees the duties of all employees at the Communications Center and trains, advises, and assists subordinates. Supervisors are routinely required to work overtime, perform on-call duty, fill in for other shift supervisors, and hold over for indefinite times at the end of a shift to handle ongoing calls. Petitioner claims to suffer from hypoglycemic episodes in which he becomes unresponsive and dysfunctional. Petitioner has previously asked on two separate occasions to be relieved of responsibility to train personnel because it was too stressful for him. In each instance, the City relieved Petitioner of any training responsibilities. In August 2005, Petitioner applied for a job opening as a parking enforcement specialist for the City. The City selected another candidate identified in the record as Ms. Evelyn Thurman. The selection of Ms. Thurman over Petitioner to fill the vacant position of parking enforcement specialist was not an adverse employment action against Petitioner. Ms. Thurman was more qualified by training and experience. When the City selected Ms. Thurman to fill the vacant position of parking enforcement specialist, Ms. Thurman had 24 years of law enforcement and security experience in various agencies. From 1980 until 1996, Ms. Thurman worked as a crime scene investigator for the City of Miami Police Department, where she received numerous commendations, and her performance evaluations rated her as an above average employee. Ms. Thurman also worked at the Sheriff’s Office in Tampa, Florida, and in Security at the Florida Department of the Lottery. Petitioner was unable to meet the essential functions of the job requirements for a parking enforcement specialist. A parking enforcement specialist routinely works alone and is required to work at night. The nature of the job does not permit the type of schedule Petitioner requires. The work schedule of a parking enforcement specialist is not limited to daytime hours that do not exceed 33 to 40 hours a week. A parking enforcement specialist may be required to work evening shifts, long hours, overtime, and holidays. A parking enforcement specialist also must adjust his or her work schedule when needed. A parking enforcement specialist also must be available during emergencies to alleviate calls for service from patrol officers. A parking enforcement specialist works alone. Petitioner suffers from hypoglycemic episodes in which he becomes unresponsive and dysfunctional. The episodes can occur at any time, and Petitioner prefers not be alone on the job if possible. On October 31, 2005, Ms. Moe issued a verbal reprimand to Petitioner for insubordination. The verbal reprimand is not an adverse employment action against Petitioner. The City did not reduce Petitioner's pay and did not change the terms, conditions, or privileges of Petitioner's employment as a result of the reprimand. In preparation for Hurricane Wilma earlier in October 2005, Ms. Moe sent an e-mail to employees in the Communication Center instructing them to come to work the following day with the supplies they would need if events required them to stay at the Communication Center during the hurricane (the Moe email). Petitioner and most of the other employees did not bring their hurricane supplies with them when they reported to work the morning after the Moe email. The City sent Petitioner and the other employees home to fetch their supplies and did not impose a time limit for the task. Petitioner took about 90 minutes to get his supplies and return to work, and the span included the regular lunch hour. The time he took was not an issue of concern and did not provide a basis for the verbal reprimand. Petitioner did not eat lunch during the time he retrieved his supplies. Later in the day, Petitioner requested a meal break, and his supervisor denied the request. Petitioner took a second meal break. On October 23, 2005, Ms. Moe delivered to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Discipline for insubordination. On October 31, 2005, Ms. Moe issued an Oral Warning to Petitioner. Petitioner grieved the verbal reprimand. During the grievance procedure, the City offered to rescind the warning to resolve the grievance. Petitioner rejected the offer as unsatisfactory unless the City also destroyed the record of the discipline. The City advised Petitioner that it could not destroy the document because the document was a public record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July 2007.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, the following facts are found: The Petitioner, Anna Torres, (hereinafter "Torres") worked for the Department of Transportation as a toll collector at the Golden Glades toll plaza and was a career service employee at all times pertinent to this case. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Torres had been employed by the Department for about eight years. Torres was authorized to be on approved leave from October 24, 1989, through November 8, 1989. Torres used that period of leave to drive from South Florida to California to visit her parents. Torres was accompanied on the trip by her roommate. Torres was expected to return to work on November 9, 1990. Torres' father had been sick for several years and during her visit his condition took a sudden turn for the worse, as a result of which it was necessary for her father to be hospitalized. Torres was very concerned about her father's medical condition and felt a need to remain in California until it could be determined whether her father was going to recover from his worsened condition. To facilitate a longer stay in California, Torres' mother offered to pay Torres' airfare from California to Florida in the event Torres could not obtain additional leave, and the roommate offered to drive the car back. On November 7, 1989, Torres placed a telephone call from her parents' home in California to the Golden Glades toll plaza. She spoke with Mildred Burham, who was, and is, the assistant manager at the Golden Glades toll plaza and the supervisor of one of the shifts. Mildred Burham was not the supervisor of Torres' shift. The essence of what Torres told Mildred Burham is that, because of a family emergency, Torres needed to stay in California for another two weeks and wanted a two week extension of her vacation. Torres also asked Mildred Burham to convey the message to Vera Hulse. 1/ Vera Hulse was, and is, the manager of the Golden Glades toll plaza. At that time, Torres did not have sufficient annual or sick leave to cover an additional absence of two weeks. During the November 7, 1989, telephone conversation, Mildred Burham told Torres that she (Burham) would "check into" the request for additional leave and would convey Torres' message to Vera Hulse. Ms. Burham did not tell Torres that the two week extension of her vacation was approved. 2/ During the November 7, 1989, telephone call, Torres did not give Ms. Burham the telephone number at her parents' house in California. Instead, she told Ms. Burham that if they needed to get in touch with her, they could call Torres' son at her home in Florida and he could give them the California telephone number. When Ms. Burham told Vera Hulse about the telephone call from Torres, something apparently got lost in the translation. The message communicated to Ms. Hulse was to the general effect that Torres had called and said that because of a family problem Torres would not be back to Florida for another two weeks. Ms. Hulse was not advised that Torres was requesting leave; only that Torres would be two weeks late getting back due to a family problem. Torres was scheduled to work on the following days: November 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15, 1989. Torres did not report for work on any of those days, nor did she have any other communication with her employer after the telephone communication of November 7, 1990, until November 20, 1989, when Torres called again. Between November 9 and November 20, 1989, Ms. Burham and Ms. Hulse called Torres' home telephone number in an effort to contact her son and obtain the telephone number where Torres was staying in California. Those efforts were unsuccessful. On November 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15, 1989, Torres was placed on unauthorized leave without pay. On November IS, 1989, the Department sent Torres a letter advising her that because she had failed to report for work and had been on unauthorized leave without pay since November 10, 1989, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order in this case concluding that the Petitioner, Anna Torres, did not abandon her position of employment with the Department and ordering that she be reinstated to her position as a toll collector with back pay. DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of June, 1990. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1990.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 37-year-old Caucasian male. Respondent is an insurance agency registered and licensed to do business in Florida and headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent is a direct marketer of insured products, including health insurance policies, and non-insured products, such as lifestyle benefit programs and telemedicine. Respondent uses a call center model to market insurance products. At the call center, sales agents take calls from prospective clients and are paid a "base wage" plus commission. Since sales agents are paid a base wage, they must meet minimum sales requirements to help offset the fixed costs associated with their employment. Petitioner became employed at Respondent's Miramar call center as a sales agent starting on or about September 9, 2013. His employment duties entailed calling potential sales leads and selling non-major medical insurance policies over the telephone. The position for which Petitioner was hired did not have a specified term of employment, and Petitioner and Respondent did not execute an employment contract when Petitioner was hired.1/ Petitioner's work hours were from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., five days per week. Sales agents, including Petitioner, were paid $12.50 per hour, with a guaranteed salary of $500 per week, plus a commission on sales made. In late September 2013, Petitioner became ill. His illness manifested itself as shortness of breath and coughing. By late October 2013, his illness had progressed to the point that he was experiencing acute respiratory distress episodes. Petitioner testified that he experienced shortness of breath that, at times, made it "physically impossible" to talk on the telephone. However, he also testified that "I was on the phone doing what I was supposed to be doing, making calls and talking to potential customers, and I was doing it in a way in which other agents did it, which was normal and customary."2/ During his employment tenure with Respondent, Petitioner took time off work for medical appointments related to his condition, but he could not recall how many times, or for how long. There was no evidence presented showing that Respondent was aware of the specific reason for Petitioner's medical appointments. On October 30, 2013, the day he was terminated, Petitioner experienced a respiratory distress episode and had to use the nebulizer while at work. He also had experienced a similar episode at work approximately two days before and had had to use the nebulizer. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that he was experiencing shortness of breath, respiratory distress, or any other medical condition that interfered with his ability to perform his job. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent's human resources representative had witnessed the acute respiratory distress episode that Petitioner suffered the day he was terminated. However, there is no direct evidence that anyone with Respondent in a position (such as supervisors or managers) to make decisions about Petitioner's employment was made aware of his shortness of breath, acute respiratory distress episodes, or use of the nebulizer while at work. On October 30, 2013, Respondent terminated Petitioner from his employment. The evidence shows that at the time Petitioner was terminated, he was informed that it was due to inadequate sales production.3/ Petitioner testified at the hearing, on rebuttal, that when he was terminated, the manager who fired him "made a comment to me that I couldn't do my job, referring to the fact that I was short of breath on the phone, not to the——to a reference of low sales."4/ There is no other evidence in the record that Petitioner was told that he was being fired because he was physically unable to do his job. Petitioner testified that he did not recall having been informed, before his termination, that he was not meeting performance expectations. He testified that he did not know how his sales performance compared to that of other agents whose employment duties were the same as his. He testified that he did not believe he was the lowest-performing sales agent at the call center. He also testified that he believed he was the only person terminated that day. However, he did not articulate any specific factual or perceptual bases for these beliefs. At the time he was terminated, Petitioner asked to be given two extra days, until Friday of that week, to allow new medications he recently had been prescribed to be given a chance to work so that he could talk on the telephone without experiencing severe shortness of breath. Respondent declined to provide him the two extra days before terminating him. Petitioner had been employed with Respondent for approximately seven-and-a-half work weeks5/ when he was terminated. Petitioner testified that as of October 30, 2013, he was "disabled,"6/ although he did not know it at that time. He testified, persuasively, that he continued to have difficulty breathing after being terminated. Sometime after he was terminated, Petitioner was determined eligible for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits from the Social Security Administration, and eligible for vocational rehabilitation services from the Florida Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitative Services.7/ Petitioner asserts that even though he did not notify Respondent that he was disabled before he was terminated, he believes that Respondent's supervisors and managers perceived him being as disabled due to his respiratory distress episodes, shortness of breath, and use of a nebulizer while at work, and that they terminated him on that basis. However, as noted above, the evidence does not show that anyone in a position to make decisions about Petitioner's employment was aware of his health condition before Respondent terminated him. At the time of Petitioner's employment, Stephen Fingal was Respondent's director of enrollment and oversaw the sales department, including the call centers. Petitioner was among the employees Fingal supervised. Fingal testified that each call center sales agent was required to make a minimum of 12 "primary" insurance policy sales per week8/ in order to cover his or her $500 per week salary,9/ as well as the cost of "leads," which are generated through Respondent's commercial advertising programs, and break down to a fixed cost of roughly $1,500 to $2,000 per week per agent. The competent, persuasive evidence, consisting of Fingal's testimony and sales logs,10/ shows that Petitioner consistently failed to meet the minimum sales performance standard over the entire term of his employment with Respondent. During Petitioner's first week of employment, he was being trained, so made no sales. He made four total sales his second week of employment; no sales his third week of employment; one total sale his fourth week of employment; 17 sales of mostly ancillary policies his fifth week of employment; no sales his sixth week of employment; nine total sales his seventh week of employment; and no sales the week he was terminated.11/ The evidence does not establish a pattern linking Petitioner's lack of productivity to any documented episodes of shortness of breath or respiratory distress. Over Petitioner's entire tenure with Respondent, he sold a total of only 33 policies. Of these, only 15 were primary health insurance policies. By contrast, using the 12-sales-per week minimum performance standard, an agent whose sales performance level was marginally adequate would have sold at least 60 primary policies over a five-week period——approximately four times more than Petitioner sold over a six-and-a-half week period. To prove this point, Respondent presented the sales productivity information for two other sales agents, whose performance was characterized as "average," for the same time period as Petitioner's employment. These agents sold approximately two times more primary policies and three times more ancillary policies than Petitioner sold during the same period. On cross-examination, Fingal characterized Petitioner's comparative sales performance as "in the lower quadrant." When asked whether it was possible that 20 to 25 percent of the sales agents performed at a lower level than Petitioner, Fingal answered "probably not." Fingal testified, persuasively, that Respondent declined to give Petitioner the requested two additional days because he asked for them when he was terminated. By that point, Respondent already had determined, based on Petitioner's consistent failure to meet minimum performance standards over his entire employment term, that Petitioner was not going to be a productive employee.12/ Respondent does not hire part-time sales agents, and at the time Petitioner was terminated, there were no sales positions that did not involve speaking on the telephone. Additionally, at the time Petitioner was terminated, Respondent did not have any available non-sales positions into which Petitioner could transfer. Moreover, even if such positions were available, there was no evidence showing that Petitioner was qualified for them. In any event, the evidence shows that Petitioner never requested to be transferred to an alternative employment position that did not entail speaking on the telephone. Petitioner did request what he characterized as an "accommodation" of two additional days, but, as discussed above, Respondent declined because it had already decided to terminate him due to his consistently inadequate performance over the term of his employment. Petitioner posited that he was not the lowest performing sales agent, but he did not present any evidence to support that supposition. He also posited that he was the only sales agent terminated that day, but, again, did not present any evidence supporting that supposition. He did not present any evidence showing that non- disabled call center sales agents who performed at or below the same level as he performed were not terminated. He presented no evidence showing that Respondent subsequently filled his position with a non-disabled person. In fact, approximately ten months after Petitioner was terminated, Respondent substantially reduced its call center sales agent work force, closed the Miramar call center, and consolidated its call center operations at its Boca Raton location, in an effort to reduce the substantial cost associated with having call centers in multiple locations. This is consistent with Respondent's assertion that Petitioner was terminated because he was not a profitable employee and that Respondent was losing money in continuing to employ him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2016.
The Issue Whether Baxter's is delinquent in the progress of the Project pursuant to Rule 14-23.001, Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact On January 21, 1987, the Department received bids on the Project. On March 6, 1987, the Department awarded the Project to Baxter's. The Project number is 53010-3522. The Project consisted of the realignment of the intersection of U.S. Highway 90 and Russ Street in downtown Marianna, Florida. The Project involved approximately 500 feet of road surface at a congested intersection. The work on the Project had to be performed without shutting down the intersection to traffic. In addition to widening and resurfacing existing pavement, the Project entailed relocating storm sewers and other drainage structures, construction of a concrete retaining wall, curbs, gutters and sidewalks, replacement of traffic signals, landscaping and painting new markers on the road. Access to existing businesses had to be maintained during the period of the Project. Pursuant to the specifications for the Project, the Project was to be completed within ninety (90) days (hereinafter referred to as the "90-day Period"). Almost two months after the Project was awarded to Baxter's the Department issued a notice to proceed. As required by the specifications for the Project, the Department informed Baxter's in the notice to proceed that the first day of the 90-day Period of the Project would begin on May 17, 1987. At the time the notice to proceed was issued by the Department, the Department and Baxter's knew that certain telephone utilities work had be completed by Centel before work on the Project could begin. The Department believed, however, that the telephone utilities work would be completed before May 17, 1987, when it issued the notice to proceed. By letter dated May 7, 1987, Baxter's requested vacation time for May 18, 1987, through May 31, 1987. The request was made because Baxter's was working on other jobs. The Department approved this request. After learning that the telephone utilities work would not be completed Baxter's requested that the leave time be treated as delay time. This request was denied by the Department. Approximately five to six days before May 17, 1987, the Department realized that the telephone utilities work which had to be completed before the Projects was begun would not be completed by May 17, 1987. May 17, 1987, was the first chargeable day of the 90-day Period on the Project. From May 18, 1987, through May 31, 1987, Baxter's was treated as being on vacation for purposes of the Project. Therefore, the running of the 90-day Period was tolled during this approved vacation time. June 1, 1987, was the second chargeable day on the Project. No work was performed on the Project during the first two weeks of June, 1987. Nor did Baxter's move any equipment onto the Project site during this period. Instead, Baxter's was performing other work at other locations during May, 1987, and the first two weeks of June, 1987. The telephone utilities work which was to be performed before work on the Project began was completed June 9, 1987. On June 16, 1987, Baxter's requested a ten day extension of time due to the delays caused by the failure of Centel to complete the telephone utilities work. Baxter's also requested additional time to mobilize [get its machinery and men ready to begin work on the site]. The twenty-four day extension of the 90-day Period requested by Baxter's was granted by the Department on July 30, 1987. The Department approved ten days for the telephone utilities delays on May 17, 1987, and June 1, 1987 through June 9, 1987 and fourteen days to allow Baxter's to mobilize. Fourteen days is a reasonable period of time for mobilization for the Project. Baxter's did not actually report to the Project site until July 8, 1987. Prior to this time, Baxter's had been working on other jobs. On July 15, 1987, a water line on the Project site broke. The time required to fix the water line, however, was insufficient to warrant approval of any extension to the 90-day Period. On July 16, 1987, a gas service line on the Project site was broken. This line was not located where it was expected to be located before the Project was begun. This broken line caused a delay of seven-tenths of a day. From July 22, 1987, through July 28, 1987, problems associated with utilities located on the Project site prevented work from being performed on the Project. On July 29, 1987, there was a delay of two-tenths of a day. From July 30, 1987, through August 6, 1987, the Department instructed Baxter's to halt any work associated with the concrete retaining wall for the Project. The delay, however, was caused by a question concerning the forms to be used in constructing the wall. The use of the these forms in the construction of the wall was to take place at a location other than the Project site. No delay was actually caused, therefore, on the Project site with regard to other work to be performed. In August, 1987, the Department performed an initial investigation of the Project consisting of a comparison of monthly estimates of the dollar amount of completed work on the Project and the dollar amount of the work that Baxter's had estimated would be completed in its projected work schedule for the Project. Based upon this review, Baxter's was more than ten percent behind schedule on the Project for the month of July, 1987. Baxter's did not meet at least one of the tests of Rule 14-23.001(3)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated August 5, 1987, the Department informed Baxter's that it did not meet the ten percent requirement of Rule 14-23.001(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Department informed Baxter's that it could request an extension of time or show why it was not delinquent. On August 5, 1987, Baxter's filed a new projected work schedule. This work schedule was approved by the Department. This work schedule was requested because of the twenty-four day extension approved by the Department. On August 10, 1987, Baxter's sent a letter to the Department in response to its letter of August 5, 1987. In Baxter's letter, Baxter's asked the Department if it had taken into account the twenty-four day extension of time the Department had approved on July 30, 1987, and indicated that it had sent a revised work schedule on August 5, 1987. On August 13, 1987, the Department responded to Baxter's letter of August 10, 1987. The Department indicated that the revised work schedule had not cured the ten per cent delinquency. Despite these conclusions, the Department informed Baxter's that it would wait until information concerning work on the Project for August, 1987, was available to be sure that Baxter's was delinquent. The Department informed Baxter's in the August 13, 1987, letter: Therefore, should you believe that there is justifiable reason for a time extension, you should submit that reguest as directed in my letter of preliminary notice. Baxter's still failed to meet one of the two tests of Rule 14- 23.001(3)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code, by the end of August, 1987. At the time the Department sent its letter of August 5, 1987, and its letter of August 13, 1987, the Department was aware that Baxter's had been granted a twenty-four day extension of time on the Project. On August 19, 1987, Baxter's requested a twenty- one day extension of time on the Project due to the delays on the Project during July and August of 1987. On August 26, 1987, the Department approved a seventeen-day extension for the Project. This extension of time was warranted because of the delays experienced on the Project on July 16, 1987, July 22, 1987 through July 28, 1987 and July 30, 1987 through August 6, 1987. See Findings of Fact 17-20. These delays resulted in the loss of sixteen days. Additionally, the Department awarded an additional delay day for July 29, 1987, which was a day which fell between the two major delays experienced during the period of time in question. On September 1, 1987, Baxter's submitted a revised projected work schedule based upon the additional extension of time granted by the Department. The Department, therefore, waited until it had reviewed Baxter's progress on the Project during the month of September, 1987, before issuing a final notice of delinquency. Baxter's still did not meet one of the two tests of Rule 14- 23.001(3)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code, as of the end of September, 1987. The Department granted a total of forty-one days of additional time for the Project. Therefore, the Department allowed a total of one hundred and thirty-one days for completion of the Project. Even when these extensions of time are taken into account, Baxter's did not meet one of the two tests of Rule 14-23.001(3)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code. On October 9, 1987, the Department sent a Communication Terminal Message Sending Blank to Baxter's, indicating that a final notice of delinquency would be issued on the Project. The final notice of delinquency was issued by letter dated October 9, 1987. In this letter the Department informed Baxter's that it had considered the information provided by Baxter's and had determined that work on the Project was still delinquent pursuant to Rule 14-23.001(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated November 25, 1987, Baxter's informed the Department for the first time that it did not believe that the 90-day Period was a sufficient of period of time for the completion of the Project. By letter date November 30, 1987, the Department informed Baxter's that the 90-day Period was an item included in the bid specifications for the Project and could, therefore, not be reconsidered. As of the date of the formal hearing of this case the Project was in its one hundred and eighty-fifth day. There was a 13 percent minority business goal for the Project. In order to comply with the 13 percent minority business goal, Baxter's employed Coggins and Deermont as a subcontractor, a disadvantaged business enterprise. Coggins and Deermont was certified by the Department as a disadvantaged business enterprise. Subcontractors had to be approved in writing by the Department prior to commencement of work by the subcontractor. Concrete and survey work was a logical choice for Baxter's to subcontract the minority business goal work to. As part of its contract with the Department, Baxter's agreed that subcontractors would be treated as employees of the prime contractor. Baxter's knew that it was responsible to the Department for its subcontractors' work. Coggins and Deermont was the primary reason for Baxter's failure to complete the project within the time required. Baxter's could have assisted Coggins and Deermont in completing its work, but the Department's rules do not permit a prime contractor to perform the work of a minority business. Coggins and Deermont was not the only reason for delays on the Project. Some delays were also caused by Baxter's. Baxter's could have attempted to replace Coggins and Deermont. In fact, Baxter's spoke to another minority business enterprise. Only one other subcontractor was checked with, however. Contract time extensions for the Project were authorized when: a controlling time of work is delayed by factors determined to be beyond the Contractor's control which could not be reasonably anticipated at the time bids for the project were received... Time was of the essence for the Project.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED a final order be issued finding Baxter's delinquent on the Project. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4947 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1 and 2. 2 3-4 and 8. 3 14 and 34. 4 5. 6. Although it is true that Baxter's requested vacation time, the evidence failed to prove that it was requested because of the telephone utilities work. The last sentence is irrelevant. The evidence failed to support this proposed finding of fact. Baxter's was already at another site and Baxter's did not request vacation time because of the telephone utilities work. 12. The second sentence is irrelevant. The third sentence was not proved. 14. The ten-day extension was for May 17, 1987, and the period from June 1, 1987, to June 9, 1987. Irrelevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. 15-20 and 27-28. The evidence did not prove that there were "numerous" utility conflicts or that the Department only recognized "some" of the delays. 15-20 and 28. Delays on July 16, and 22-28, 1987, warranted extensions. The evidence did not prove that delays on July 15, 17 or 29, 1987, warranted extensions. Nor did the problem with the gravity wall cause all work to stop. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 23. Except for the first two sentences, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 21 and 22. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 31. Except for the first two sentences, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 16-20 Irrelevant or not supported by the weight of the evidence. 36. Coggins and Deermont was not "approved by the Department for performance of survey and concrete work." Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 23 37. 24 38. 25 40. 26-29 Irrelevant or not supported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 30. 2 22. 3-5 21. 6 25. 7 26. 8 31. 9 29. 10 3, 14 and 28. 11 34. 12 14. 13 28 and 29. 14 28. 15 4 and 8. 16-17 14. 18 6. 19 11. 20 6. 21 15-20, 27 and 28. 22 36. 23 35. 24-25 39. 26 40 and 41. 27 41. 28-30 Hereby accepted. 31 42. 1 41. 2 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Brant Hargrove, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Post Office Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kaye N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Invitation to Bid (ITB) DOT Contract Number 7578 involves the mowing of various state roads in Citrus County, Florida. Citrus County is in District Seven of DOT. The ITB requires mowing, edging, sweeping and litter removal along state roads in Citrus County. The Petitioner, All Seasons is the current contractor performing the mowing services which are the subject of this protest. However, the ITB called for expansion of those services. The mowing contract had to be relet because All Seasons, opted not to renew its current contract because it felt that it was not making enough of a profit. The budget amount for the Contract Number 7578 protest was $180,000. The budget amount is the amount of money DOT has preapproved to spend for the contract. It is not the estimated amount DOT projects a contractor can perform the mowing contract for. The estimated amount is secret, but is generally close to the budgeted amount. Four bids were submitted for the mowing contract. The four bids were: Imperial Cabinets $ 70,201.05 Horticultural Industries $ 90,845.58 All Seasons $171,233.95 Mark Dunning Industries $181,119.61 In this instance, there was a large discrepancy among the bids on contract E-7578. The two lowest bidders were Imperial Cabinets and Horticultural Industries and were well below he budgeted amount. These two low bids were closer in proximity as to dollar amounts to each other and All Seasons and MDI's bids were closer in proximity to each other. The technical review committee (TRC) analyzed the bids and discussed whether or not the two lowest bidders were able to perform the contract. The TRC was concerned about whether the lowest bidder could perform the work required in the ITB at the price it bid. The TRC asked for information on the two lowest bidders from other districts. It did not receive any useful information. DOT did not inquire of the two low bidders. 1/ The TRC also consulted with DOT staff on the lowest bidder's prices. The staff thought the prices were low but could not state that the contract could not be performed the amounts which were bid. However, the TRC recommended rejection of all the bids to the awards committee. The TRC's recommendation was based on the speculation that the low bidders did not understand the scope of the mowing contract and that lack of understanding resulted in the bid prices of the two lowest bidders. However, there was nothing unique or confusing contained within the specifications of the ITB which would lead to the conclusion that a reasonable person could not understand. There is no way, just by looking at the bid proposal, to tell whether or not either firm could perform the contract at the prices. Additionally, there was no way to determine from the face of either firms bid if they did or did not understand the contract. In short, there was no factual basis for the TRC to find the low bids non-responsive and to recommend rejection of all the bids. The awards committee followed the recommendation and rejected all the bids. The awards committee utilized the same speculation the TRC had used its decision is as faulty. In this case, Petitioner relied on the same "evidence" as DOT regarding the inability of the two low bidders to perform the contract in order to demonstrate that the two low bidders were non-responsive. The evidence simply does not support a finding of non-responsiveness. Petitioner being the third place bidder has no substantive interest in this proceeding since it could not be awarded the mowing contract. Therefore, the bid protest should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the contractors protest bid for Contract Number E-7578 be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ms. Coda, began working for the Council as a project counselor in August, 1989, dealing with AFDC referrals. In June, 1990, she was also assigned unemployed parents cases in the Council's Dade City office. In February, 1991, she started experiencing personal problems. Her marriage of 33 years was in trouble and this affected her. She immediately sought medical help. She had a young daughter, who was getting married, but Petitioner was not in good health. She had high blood pressure and was 50 pounds overweight. Her doctor put her on a diet and an exercise regimen which she carried over to her work. In June, 1991, F. Shaheen left her position with the Council as a counselor in New Port Richey and recommended to Petitioner that she apply for the vacated position there because it would have been much closer to her home. Petitioner did apply but was told by her supervisor, Mr. Steinberg, that she would still have to handle her unemployed parent clients in Dade City if she got the assignment. This would not have helped her, so she withdrew her request. In July, 1991, Petitioner came to work one day and found Mr. Steinberg and others going through her records. She was thereafter given a reprimand and a three day suspension for poor records, which she accepted. This was stressful for her because she had never been reprimanded before. In late July, 1991, she went to see her doctor because of a gall bladder attack. The doctor recommended she have surgery to remove it during which he would also do a laporoscopic examination. When she went in for the work-up, a nodule was found on her left lung. The doctor recommended it be removed because he thought it might be cancer. In October, 1991, Ms. Coda found out that her husband, with whom she was still having trouble, was living with another woman. When she went back to the doctor at that time, he said the nodule had enlarged and recommended immediate surgery. Ms. Coda had already planned a vacation for that time, but when her sister stated that she had arranged for Ms. Coda to get a second opinion on her condition at the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York, Ms. Coda took her vacation leave and went there. Before leaving, she told Mr. Steinberg where she was going and he questioned her need for a second opinion. Nonetheless, on January 8, 1992, Ms. Coda, who had decided to have the recommended surgery, advised her supervisor that the operation was scheduled for shortly thereafter, but before it could be done, on January 17, 1992, she was advised that her insurance would not cover the cost of the operation if done in New York. She immediately contacted her office and told them what was happening. She said she was coming back to the local area and was waiting for the airline to get her a seat for her return, and advised the staff that she would be back as soon as she could. Notwithstanding, on January 13, 1992, Mr. Steinberg, by letter, advised her that he was aware she had not had the surgery, complained that she had not contacted him for 10 days or provided the requested physician's statement to support her absence, and further advised that if she did not contact him regarding her intentions as to work, he would terminate her for absence without leave. She returned to work on January 20, 1992 Ms. Coda also received a memorandum from Mr. Steinberg, dated January 24, 1992, advising her of his receipt of reports of her substandard performance, directing her to return to work immediately, pending her surgery, and, in addition, outlining the specific tasks upon which he wanted her to concentrate. When she got back to work, she was told not to deal with clients and was counselled by both Mr. Steinberg and the Council Executive Director, Mr. Burlingame, repeatedly, about her failure to communicate with the office. Mr. Burlingame recognized she was under stress but nonetheless threatened her with dismissal which would result in her losing her health insurance coverage. Mr. Burlingame told her to get her health problems resolved and the operation scheduled, but also advised her she was not to handle clients. Ms. Coda accepted this because she believed that if she fought the reprimand she would be discharged. The operation was set for February 10, 1992. When she contacted her physician and told him what was going on, the medications for stress were increased. Nevertheless, Mr. Steinberg showed her no sympathy. On February 1, 1992, Ms. Coda received a reprimand for previous misconduct which allegedly occurred in January. She thereafter submitted a letter from her doctor which indicated she would be out of work until at least the end of April. Ms. Coda left the hospital after her surgery on February 18, 1992 and went home in the care of a housekeeper and nurse. The extent of her surgery, which left her with 42 stitches on her left back, made it difficult for her to do much because she is left handed. She was also given extra pain medications due to a rib which was broken during the operation. She was not required to undergo either radiation or chemotherapy because her cancer was rated as stage one. She does not know the current status of her health because, since she has been discharged, she cannot afford to go in for the checkups. She was able to drive when she came back to work, however, and she could write by hand, but her arm got tired if she had to write more than usual. She could use the phone and could interview clients. During the third week of March, 1992, even though Ms. Coda had submitted a letter from her doctor indicating she should be off work until April, she was called by Mr. Steinberg and asked to come back to work early because the other counselor had to take off for elective surgery. Her primary doctor did not want her to go back to work and she explained her limitations to Mr. Steinberg who replied that in that case she would have to be replaced. Because she had a lot of surgery follow-up appointments to be met and needed her health insurance coverage, she got another doctor to give her a limited work release conditioned upon her being placed in an area where there would be no smoking, no dust, no chemicals, and, though not specifically stated therein, for no more than six hours per day. Ms. Coda went back to work on April 22, 1992. She was put into a retraining program but she considers it to have been more an update of procedures implemented during the period of her absence. She does not consider it to have been retraining because of poor performance. Evidence to the contrary, from Mr. Burlingame and her coworkers is more persuasive, however. After about two weeks back on the job, for reasons unknown to her, Ms. Coda's office was moved from the front of the building to the rear where, she contends, all the smoking was done. As she relates it, the smokers kept the rear door to the outside open so they could hear the phone if it rang, and she asserts there was someone outside the door smoking seven or eight times a day. Others said she was moved because of her loudness. Ms. Coda was in the office for four weeks after her surgery. During that time, she kept her door closed because of the smoke which would be blown back into the building through the open back door. Her requests to have the back door to the outside kept closed were refused and this added stress. In addition, she was required to commute between the office in New Port Richey and the office in Dade City to manage the unemployed parent program. These allegations of stress and working conditions are confirmed by the testimony of Mr. Rivera, her cousin by marriage, and Ms. Gonzalez, an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security who was aware of the situation. Ms. Coda claims that throughout the time she worked for the Council, she was never advised of any client complaints against her, but, eventually, was fired by Mr. Burlingame who used as a reason her poor performance. He told her he had received complaints of her lack of empathy toward clients. She denies this and claims to be very empathic. She believes her dismissal was a culmination of the harassment she had received from Mr. Burlingame. He had told her he wanted to be in first place in a case competition, but it was impossible to achieve this within the three weeks available. She also claims he was unfriendly toward her and would not speak to her, though he was quite friendly to others. In substance, she claims, her firing was due to her medical problems and the fact that they would add to the cost of health insurance paid by the Council. Mr. Burlingame places a somewhat different perspective on Petitioner's story. As he relates it, Petitioner was hired to work with extremely disadvantaged clients who experience many barriers to employment. She was to evaluate the clients to select the best program for them and then to work with the clients to see they successfully completed the program and went to work. The New Port Richey office case load is from one hundred twenty to one hundred sixty clients per counselor. The Dade City case load is much smaller, with each counselor managing from twenty to fifty or sixty clients. Petitioner worked, primarily, in the Dade City office with one other counselor, Ms. Phelps, and a receptionist, marketing representative and office manager. Mr. Steinberg was the operations supervisor physically located in the New Port Richey office, but he filled in as a counselor in the Dade City office in the absence of Ms. Phelps. The criteria for employment as a counselor with the Council includes a four year degree in psychology or social work and two years experience. Petitioner did not meet these criteria, but she was hired because she was what they could get for the salary they paid. The salary levels for counselors are now much higher and they are able to attract better qualified people. Mr. Burlingame made the final decision to terminate Petitioner based on Mr. Steinberg's recommendation for dismissal. When Burlingame received this recommendation, he called Petitioner in to his office in New Port Richey, on June 30, 1992, to hear her side of the story. During their conversation, he told Petitioner that some clients had expressed concern about working with her and he asked her to explain. In response she became hostile and defensive, and it became clear to him that she was out of control. At that point he terminated her employment. By this time, Petitioner had received several prior reprimands and Mr. Burlingame was concerned that she was not keeping up the required documentation which supports the Council's expenditure of federal funds. She had trouble following rules and was repeatedly counselled about doing audit ready work. It was clear she did not develop a clear plan for client direction. Much of this was evident long before she was ever diagnosed with cancer and had nothing to do with her absences on that account. Mr. Burlingame's agency follows the state's anti-harassment policy. He supports treating employees and clients with dignity and respect. The policy made clear an alternate avenue for voicing complaints by employees, but Ms. Coda never filed any complaint with him or the alternate. By the same token, he was not aware of any smoking problems at the Dade City office, and he has no knowledge of any smoking inside the building after promulgation of the Council's smoking policy. Employees smoked outside the building and he believes that even if the door was left open for phone purposed, the building dynamics would tend to take the smoke out from a building rather than into it. In any case, neither Petitioner nor anyone else ever complained to him about smoke conditions in the office. Petitioner did not discuss with Mr. Burlingame that she was going away for cancer treatment. Her leave request indicated she was making a family visit, (but this was before Petitioner's sister called with the appointment in New York). He did not know she had cancer before she left. The Council has a health plan for which it pays the premium for the employee and twenty-five percent of the premium for the family. It does not get into the approval of bills paid by the insurance carrier and Mr. Burlingame knew nothing of her condition. The second opinion she sought and the surgery she had were referred by the primary care physician. Mr. Burlingame was not a part of the decision making process in denying her surgery in New York, nor was the Council. Because of the terms of the insurance policy the Council had, Petitioner's surgery would have had no impact on the premium the Council paid in the future, and Mr. Burlingame was not concerned about the potential for increased premiums. The Council imposes a six month probationary period on new employees to give them the opportunity to become competent in doing their work consistent with federal guidelines. It was only when Mr. Burlingame felt that Petitioner had crossed the line from merely incompetent to potentially dangerous to the development of the clients that he determined to terminate her employment. Several clients were seen to be crying when they left the Petitioner, and some complained to him about the way they were treated by her. Some said they would drop out of the program rather than work with her. This is inconsistent with the thrust of the program and not good for the rating process. In addition, Petitioner allegedly did not return from leave when required. Mr. Burlingame received a memorandum from Mr. Steinberg that Petitioner had not returned and he didn't know when she would return. On January 7, 1992, Mr. Burlingame was advised by Mr. Steinberg that Petitioner would return on February 10, 1992. In reality, she came back to work on January 20, 1992 without having had her surgery. At that time, management was quite concerned about the program. January is the start of a new semester in the various tech schools and it is imperative that students be lined up for entry. All this work was supposed to have been done before Petitioner left on vacation. However, while she was gone, clients came in to check on their paperwork, and when her files were examined, they were found to be in such disarray no one could figure out what was going on. This was the second time Petitioner's files were found to be unsatisfactory while she was gone. As a result, when Ms. Coda came back to work in January, Mr. Burlingame felt it imperative she not deal with clients but, instead, work with her files to make them acceptable, especially in light of the fact she was due to have surgery and would be out for two months thereafter. She was not terminated at that time. However, after her surgery, when she was called to see if she could come back somewhat sooner than the doctor's predicted April 21 date, she said she would not be back until May, although, as was noted previously, she actually came back to work on April 22. When that was reported to him, he directed Mr. Steinberg to give her retraining in procedures upon her return. The first three items of that retraining were elementary procedures. Only the fourth segment consisted of updating. For training purposes, Mr. Burlingame equated her with a new employee who needed training in the basics of her job. Joellyn Chancey is administrative coordinator at the Council and supervises three sections, including management information. This section tracks the paperwork of the individual counselors. She found a lot of mistakes in Petitioner's paperwork which required it to be sent back for re- accomplishment - more so than with the other counselors. Ms. Chancey could cover for Petitioner on the more routine matters. It was the more complex matters which had to be returned. In her opinion, Petitioner was the worst counselor as far as paperwork was concerned. All counselors use the same coding and Petitioner would often leave off the required codes, omit required steps, and the like. When Petitioner came back to work after her surgery, she was to be retrained. There were few changes made during her absence and the training administered was mostly matters which had not changed. Most of the matters Petitioner had to do were routine and not specific to her. They consisted of matters which Petitioner should have learned over time but still got wrong on a regular basis. In addition, Petitioner had a relatively small case load compared to other counselors, managing approximately thirty cases as compared to between one hundred fifty or more for the others in the New Port Richey office. Mary Miller was a coworker of Petitioner, and while she did not work directly with her, observed her from time to time, and periodically took over Petitioner's clients when Petitioner was gone. The first time she did this, Ms. Miller found a lot of clients were not being called in in a timely manner, so she did what had to be done to bring Petitioner's cases current. On the second occasion that Miller worked with Petitioner's files, she found that all the files she had updated on her first substitution had been untouched since that time. The files were not updated as required, which could result in clients missing out on services and their income being cut off. On none of the conversations Ms. Miller had with Petitioner did Petitioner ever mention how her cancer surgery had affected her work nor did she complain about smoke in the office. In fact, Ms. Miller never saw any employees smoking in the Dade City office. She, too, has just returned from an extensive medical problem, and at no time was she ever harassed because of it or given any indication Council officials were concerned about the cost of her treatment. Agnes Phelps, a smoker, worked with Petitioner at the Dade City office, and before the nonsmoking policy came into effect, smoked in the office. After the policy was promulgated, however, neither she nor anyone else smoked inside the building and she could not detect any odor of smoke inside the building. By the same token, she cannot recall Petitioner as having ever complained about the smoke. Ms. Phelps has heard and observed Petitioner counseling clients. She found Petitioner to be somewhat loud in speech and there have been times when Petitioner wouldn't see clients without an appointment and would not try to accommodate them. Her tone of voice was "off-putting" at times and gave the impression she didn't want to be bothered. As a result, several clients determined not to deal with Petitioner and Miller took them over. As to the clients she took over from Petitioner, Ms. Miller was concerned about the non-positive termination rate, (those who did not graduate and go to work), which seemed to be a larger percentage of Petitioner's client load than with other counselors. Much of this, she believes, was due to a lack of strong relationship between the client and the Petitioner. In addition, it was impossible to track down a lot of Petitioner's clients. All this had an adverse effect on programs and clients. According to Harriet Chambers, the office manager for the Dade City office, the move of Petitioner's office was prompted by Petitioner's loudness which made it advisable to move her from the front of the building to the back. The move, decided upon by both Steinberg and Ms. Chambers, did not result in a complaint by Petitioner. Her only expressed concern was with furniture and she never requested an accommodation due to her physical condition. Ms. Chambers also had the opportunity to observe Petitioner's interaction with clients. Petitioner's voice was high pitched and clients would come out of her office either angry or in tears. Often Petitioner would decline to see clients without an appointment- a practice contrary to the Council's policy to treat clients with dignity. Petitioner would also characterize clients as dead beats, lazy, back stabbers, no good, and the like in dealings with other agencies. This, too is not appropriate. When Petitioner left for New York, she told Ms. Chambers she was going to see a doctor for a second opinion, but the office had trouble finding out when she would be coming back. Petitioner did not return on time, and failed to meet with clients with appointments who came in as scheduled. During 1992 Melissa G. Perry was a client of Petitioner to whom she went with problems relating to day care and the like. Ms. Perry expected Council employees to help her get a job, give her financial advice, and raise her self esteem. This did not happen, however. On one occasion, she had a complaint about the manager of her day care facility and called on Petitioner for assistance. Petitioner agreed to see her if she would hurry over. When Ms. Perry explained the problem, Petitioner dismissed it saying it was not her problem. As a result, when Ms. Perry had other problems, she didn't want to talk to Petitioner because Petitioner showed no compassion or understanding. In addition, according to Ms. Perry, Petitioner was loud and cold and gave the impression she didn't care about her. This hurt Ms. Perry's feelings and lowered her self esteem. The evidence, therefore, indicates Petitioner was discharged because she was rude, unprofessional and uncaring in her treatment of her clients. Her discharge had nothing to do with her physical condition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed in this matter by Anna de la Rosa-Coda, against the Private Industry Council of Pasco County, Inc. be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Anna de la Rosa-Coda 7484 Canterbury Street Spring Hill, Florida 34606 Alfred W. Torrence, Jr., Esquire Thornton, Torrence & Gonzalez, P.A. 6645 Ridge Road Port Richey, Florida 34668 Sharon Moultry Clerk Commission on Human Relations John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent had sufficient or complete workers' compensation coverage for his employees pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a business engaged in the practice of installing flooring, including carpets, tile, hardwood, etc. He is a sole proprietor with no one else on his payroll. His work is performed by subcontractors whom he hires for each individual job. Respondent has been involved in the construction industry for many years and is generally aware of the concept of workers' compensation coverage. He has always operated under the assumption that an employer is only responsible for providing workers' compensation coverage for persons who are directly employed, i.e., that contracted employees (subcontractors) were exempt or had to pay their own coverage. Respondent did not make workers' compensation contributions for the subcontractors who did work for him. He acted on a good faith belief that such coverage was not his responsibility. On April 7, 2006, an investigator for Petitioner conducted a compliance investigation at Pegasus Point apartments in Orlando, Florida, pursuant to a public request. In Apartment J of the complex, the investigator observed a man (later identified as Jeff Menendez), who stated he was installing carpet. When asked about workers' compensation coverage, he replied that he was a subcontractor and did not believe he needed coverage. He said he got this job from "Allied" (the Petitioner in this case). As a result of this encounter, Petitioner contacted Respondent and asked for certain records in order to determine whether appropriate coverage was in place for its employees. When the requested records were not forthcoming, Petitioner entered a Stop Work Order. This prompted another request for business records so that Petitioner could calculate the appropriate penalty. Once it received the necessary records from Respondent, Petitioner determined there were several employees (as that term is defined in statute) working for Respondent for whom workers' compensation coverage had not been paid for the period of May 3, 2003, through May 3, 2006. When those workers were checked against Petitioner's data base--called the Coverage & Compliance Automated System, or CCAS--no coverage was found for Respondent or the identified employees for that period of time. One or more of the named employees had exemptions in place for a portion of the time they did work for Respondent. After taking that into consideration, Petitioner calculated a penalty of $28,619.97 against Respondent. The penalty was calculated using the Scopes Manual, a tool promulgated by rule. Respondent's business was identified in the Scopes Manual as Code 5478: carpet or flooring installation. The assigned rate for this code was then compared to the designated insurance rate. Once the amount was determined, it was multiplied by 1.5 to ascertain the penalty amount. The Stop Work Order was lifted by Petitioner after Respondent signed a "Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty" on June 1, 2006. At that time, Respondent made a down payment of $2,867.19 and agreed to pay the sum of $403.08 per month for 60 months. Upon reaching agreement with Petitioner to pay the fine, Respondent also terminated all "employees" doing subcontract work for him at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services upholding the Penalty assessed against Respondent for failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for employees. Inasmuch as the parties have already agreed to a payment plan, it is RECOMMENDED that the plan remain in effect until the penalty has been paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Grey C. English, has worked for DOT, primarily in its Okeechobee, Florida office, for approximately seven years. At the time in question, he was serving as an HMT II, crew leader, with job duties that included various equipment and machinery maintenance and general road work. In some cases he served as crew leader and in other cases, he was merely a member of the crew. In April, 1986, Mr. English filed a charge of discrimination against DOT before the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging that he had been passed over for promotion and discriminated against therein because of his race (Black). Part of the allegation involved Mr. R. C. Roberts, who concurred in the selection of another applicant over the Petitioner when he knew there was an irregularity in the selection process. Petitioner presented this evidence in an effort to discredit Mr. Roberts' testimony for Respondent here on the basis of bias, but was unsuccessful. In January 1987, Petitioner and DOT entered into a settlement agreement which disposed of the Petitioner's charge of discrimination without assessing blame, but as a result of which, Petitioner was paid the sum of $2,656.40. This sum was paid by state warrant dated February 13, 1987 which, it is concluded, was received by Petitioner several days later. Attendance documents maintained by DOT reflect that on February 13, 1987, which was a Friday, Petitioner was on authorized leave without pay. On February 16, 1987, the following Monday, he worked 7.3 hours and was authorized leave the remainder of the time. Between Tuesday, February 17 and Thursday, February 19, 1987, Petitioner was present for duty performing safety duties. However, on Friday, February 20, 1987, he was placed on unauthorized leave without pay and remained in that status through March 19, 1987. Michelle L. King, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, relates that on February 19, 1987, when Petitioner came to work, she advised him where his work site would be and with whom he would be working. According to Ms. King, when so advised, Petitioner indicated he would not work with Mr. Mills, apparently one of his prospective co-workers, and walked off the job. Shortly thereafter, Ms. King received a phone call from Petitioner's mother who advised her that Petitioner's grandfather was seriously ill and in the hospital and Petitioner's presence was needed at the hospital to assist in caring for him. When Ms. King immediately went to look for Petitioner, she found him sitting in his car approximately one half block from the DOT yard where she advised him of the message she had received. At this point; Petitioner immediately left the area presumably to go to the hospital. According to Ms. King, he did not ask permission to leave then nor did he ask for any time off during the succeeding days for which he was marked in an unauthorized absence status. During that entire period, however, she did not try to reach him by phone or in person even though she had his phone number on record in the office and knew where he lived. She admits she made no effort to reach Petitioner to tell him his job was in jeopardy because she felt, he had walked off the job and was not, therefore, entitled to that consideration. She merely reported the Petitioner's status to her supervisor, Mr. Lanier, and considered the matter closed. Mr. Lanier indicates he made no effort to contact Petitioner either. Petitioner admits that he was sitting in his car with the mechanic who repaired it; away from the job site, when he was advised of his grandfather's illness. He contends he had left the job earlier that morning because he, himself, was ill, not because he did not want to work with Mr. Mills and he contends that his continued absence from work was occasioned by the need for him to remain with his grandfather in the hospital for the period of time of his absence because there were no other family members available to do so. He contends he stayed with his grandfather, who was ill with and ultimately died of cancer, the entire time. There is no evidence of record, however, to indicate that Petitioner requested or was placed on sick leave when he left work on the morning in question. Petitioner also claims that on one occasion several days after February 19, 1987, he met Ms. Kings, Ms. Chapman, and Mr. Lanier, another supervisor, in a local restaurant during the lunch hour. At that time he told them that he would have to have some time off for a few days because of his grandfather's illness but that he would stay in touch. Petitioner contends that this absence was approved by either Mr. Lanier or Ms. King and he was given no instructions to call in or take any other action regarding his absence. The meeting is confirmed by Mr. Branchaud, a co-worker, who observed Petitioner in a conversation with Mr. Lanier but he cannot say for certain what the specifics of the conversation were. Both Mr. Lanier and Ms. King deny any such meeting took place and this is confirmed by Ms. Chapman. Ms. King and Ms. Chapman, as well as Mr. Lanier, though all employees of DOT, have nothing to gain by telling an untruth or giving perjured testimony regarding the situation involving Petitioner. Consequently, it is found that Mr. English did not get permission from either Mr. Lanier or Ms. King to be absent, and that, therefore, his absence between February 19, 1987 and March 10, 1987 was unexcused. During the period of Petitioner's absence, on March 4, 1987; a DOT official, by certified letter, advised him of his continued absence without approved leave and directed him to report to his duty section by 8:00 am on March 9, 1987 under pain of termination for a failure to comply. The return receipt executed by someone reflecting Mrs. Grey English indicates that the letter was received at Petitioner's home address in Okeechobee on March 11, 1987, one day after the action was taken to terminate him. Petitioner contends that he did not receive that letter and that on the date in question, there was no Mrs. Grey English. He was living at that residence, he contends, with his mother whose name is not English. No other female at that address bore the name Mrs. Grey English. The girl friend who he sometimes identified as his wife was not living at his address at the time the letter was received and did not sign for it in his behalf. Be that as it may, the letter was receipted for by an adult at the Petitioner's address. He did not, however, thereafter comply with the terms of the letter and termination action was taken by DOT on March 10, 1987 when the District Director sent him a letter notifying him of his termination by certified mails return receipt requested. Petitioner, as was stated previously, denies any intention to abandon his position and denies having received any letter of warning. He was, however, fully aware of the department's procedures for obtaining leave authorization and obviously failed to take any of the necessary steps to secure that authorization, instead relying on a purported casual meeting with his supervisor at a restaurant where he supposedly received verbal permission to be absent. This is not persuasive. His credibility, in addition, is somewhat suspect in that he has already demonstrated his willingness to falsify official documentation if it suits his purpose. Petitioner admits that several years prior to the instance in question, he, though not married, filled out certain official documentation for DOT claiming his girlfriend to be his wife for the purpose of putting her on his record as beneficiary of his insurance with the department. He claims he was advised by some official of the department to do this but does not indicate who this individual was. Even if that were the case, he recognized at the time that the lady was not his wife and was nonetheless willing to falsify documentation if it was to his benefit to do so. Consequently, his willingness to be less than candid when it suits his purpose to be so has been established and in this case, the better weight of the evidence establishes clearly that notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, he walked off the job without authority and made no effort to take any action necessary to preserve his employment status. It is, therefore, concluded that he did abandon his position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Grey C. English, be terminated from employment with the Department of Transportation effective March 11, 1987. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of September, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1931 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By the Petitioner 1-2. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 1. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10, except for the last section thereof relating to a restatement of his testimony at the hearing, which is not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected. Petitioner was not terminated for excessive absenteeism. The respondent was considered to have resigned his position with the Department of Transportation and the rules regarding disciplinary termination are not relevant to this situation. 9-12. Irrelevant. 13-17. Rejected as not Finding of Fact. By the Respondent Accepted. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. 3-4. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. 8-9. Accepted. 10-13. Irrelevant. Rejected as not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Isidro Garcia, Esquire Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc. 572 S.W. 2nd Street Belle Glade, Florida 33430 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed with the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Facilities Management, Bureau of Maintenance (DMS), in 1979 or 1980. Her date of retirement was February 19, 1993. Petitioner graduated from Florida A&M high school and attended Florida A&M University for approximately one and one-half years. Between 1950 and 1979 or 1980, Petitioner was primarily a homemaker but also worked in various clerical positions until starting work with the Department of Management Services as a custodial worker. Petitioner began working as a custodial worker at the Twin Towers Building in Tallahassee, Florida. In that capacity, Ms. Lewis was responsible for dusting, vacuuming, trash removal, and spot cleaning furniture, walls and doors. During her tenure at the Twin Towers Building Ms. Lewis received the following discipline: Oral reprimand for excessive absenteeism, on September 20, 1982. Written reprimand for excessive absenteeism; on September 15, 1983; and Suspension for three workdays for the third offense of excessive absenteeism on September 5, 1984. Additionally, around April 30, 1985, the building superintendent at Twin Towers gave Ms. Lewis a memorandum of concern about her absenteeism. Around April 23, 1987, she was given a memorandum of concern about tardiness in reporting to work because she had been late to work twelve times in the three month period prior to the memo. Ms. Lewis seemed to improve her daily attendance at work but, the problem of tardiness to work continued. Petitioner began working as a night shift custodial worker at the Capitol in May of 1988, when she was transferred from the Twin Towers Building. The transfer was necessary because all of the full-time custodial positions at the Twin Towers Building were changed to halftime positions. DMS custodial workers at the Capitol on the night shift were responsible for cleaning of the public areas and offices of the capitol complex, including dusting, vacuuming, trash removal, and spot cleaning furniture, walls and doors. Generally, four employees work as a team to quick clean certain areas and do more thorough cleaning in other areas each night as assigned by that shift's custodial supervisors. All members of the general cleaning teams were expected to arrive at work at 5:00 p.m. and work until 1:00 a.m. The lunch break was considered work time for the employees and was therefore paid. Upon joining the custodial workers at the Capitol, Ms. Lewis was assigned the task of dusting the historic capitol building. Her performance appraised by Tommy Denis, Custodial Supervisor III, indicated that she was a good worker with attendance and tardiness problems. Eventually, Petitioner, at her request, was moved to work with a team on the plaza level at the Capitol. Her duties consisted of dusting with occasional vacuuming and emptying of small office trash cans which weighed less than 10 pounds into large trash containers on wheels. She continued to receive good appraisal ratings with the problems of attendance and tardiness noted. Another change in duty assignment placed Ms. Lewis with a team working on multiple, upper floors of the Capitol. Her principal duty continued to be dusting with occasional vacuuming and emptying of small office trash cans which weighed less than 10 pounds into large trash containers on wheels. Ms. Lewis reported to her doctor that she was assigned the duty of dusting. Petitioner testified she could empty the small office trash cans. Ms. Lewis was not assigned to lift recycle paper and not assigned to pull bags of trash out of the large trash barrels on wheels. Additionally, Ms. Lewis, along with other custodial workers were instructed not to lift anything that was too heavy and to call for help when such a situation was encountered. At some point in her employment, Ms. Lewis injured her back while lifting trash. Because of the injury she experienced recurrent pain in her right leg and lower back. In August of 1989, Ms. Lewis had surgery for her back problem. Soon after the surgery in September of 1989, Ms. Lewis fell out of bed onto her hip. The fall delayed her in recovering from the surgery mainly due to new pain in her hip. The pain for which she had the surgery was absent. However, Ms. Lewis did not communicate with DMS regarding her status and her ability to return to work. Since her medical condition was unclear to Building Superintendent Boynton, he requested the assistance of the Bureau of Personnel Management Services. Bureau Chief Dave Fulcher wrote Ms. Lewis to ascertain her status. She solicited her surgeon, Dr. Geissinger, to respond to Mr. Fulcher. Dr. Geissinger evaluated the duties of the position held by Ms. Lewis from her position description. On November 30, 1989, Dr. Geissinger wrote Mr. Fulcher that Ms. Lewis could be expected to perform the duties of her position. Dr. Geissinger also attached a copy of his office notes dated 11/30/89, which indicated Ms. Lewis still experienced some pain but that she was not in acute distress. In November 1989, Dr. Geissinger did not specify "light duty" for Petitioner but at other times, Dr. Geissinger and other doctors specified a weight limit for Petitioner's lifting. The suggested limits did not exceed the lifting requirements of Petitioner's position. Dr. E. E. Lowder sent the last "light duty" restriction for Ms. Lewis. He limited her lifting to 10 - 15 pounds and indicated that her release from doctor's care was pending. Importantly, there was no evidence which indicated that Petitioner's back problem amounted to a condition which impaired any major life function of Petitioner. Moreover, there was no evidence that DMS perceived Petitioner's back problem as a handicap. In fact, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated Petitioner's condition was not a handicap and was not perceived as such by her employer. During the six month period from 5/8/92 to 11/5/92, Ms. Lewis was tardy 46 times by eight minutes or more. During the eight month period from 6/20/90 to 2/28/91 Petitioner was tardy 46 times. Following 2/28/91, Ms. Lewis was tardy at least 5 more times. On April 11, 1991 Ms. Lewis received an oral reprimand for her tardiness. Ms. Lewis was again tardy two more times and received a written reprimand for excessive tardiness on May 7, 1991. Later, Petitioner received a three workday suspension for tardiness which was served on January 12, 13, and 14, 1993. Ms. Lewis did not deny that she had been tardy. Other employees, males and females, were disciplined for excessive absenteeism and tardiness. After the suspension was served in January, 1993, Ms. Lewis was tardy 15 times in the next 18 days, nine days of which were 8 minutes or more. The fact that some of the days Petitioner was late were for less than seven minutes does not eliminate the tardiness. DMS rules on the subject only address when an employee's wages can be docked for such lateness. Since Ms. Lewis continued to be tardy, Allen Dallis, Maintenance Supervisor, initiated the first step of a recommendation to dismiss Ms. Lewis for continuing tardiness. Ms. Lewis gave reasons for being tardy which included, being stuck in traffic, doctors' appointments, her ride to work being late, caring for her grandchildren, and sickness of her daughter. Often she was late simply because, for unknown reasons, she waited outside her place of employment before coming into work. At no time in the disciplinary process leading up to the suspension or after the suspension did Ms. Lewis assert that she was being singled out due to her sex or handicap. In fact, Ms. Lewis would not talk with her supervisors about her tardiness or her assignments. In general Ms. Lewis did not communicate well with her supervisors and had formed the habit that if they said something to her, she would walk off and not respond. Generally, Ms. Lewis did not notify her supervisors ahead of time that she would be tardy even though she knew in advance when her tardiness might occur. She occasionally called Mr. Rivers, a custodial supervisor, on the same day that she would be tardy to tell him she would be late. Mr. Rivers was not available for calls until 5:00 p.m. each day after the shift had begun. Occasionally, Ms. Lewis would advise her supervisors the evening before that she would be late the next day. After July 12, 1990, Ms. Lewis received leave without pay (LWOP) when she was more than seven minutes tardy and she had not brought in medical certification. Tardiness of custodial workers presented problems in scheduling the work because the workers were organized in teams whose members moved together doing their tasks. If one of the usual team members was absent or late at the beginning of the shift, the supervisors would organize the employees who were present into different teams in order to try to cover all areas with the available workers and have no one working alone. Frequently it was not evident whether Ms. Lewis was tardy or absent for the evening. Ms. Lewis asked that if she were tardy in reporting to work, she be allowed to make up the amount of time she had been tardy on the same night. She did not request a change in her schedule. Her choice of make up time was during the lunch break when her time was already counted as work-time, or after 1:00 a.m., when all workers and supervisors were gone from the building. The request was denied because a daily schedule which changes as the employee chooses would not fit the staffing organization of the custodial work force in the Capitol. Additionally, a worker could not stay in the Capitol past the end of the shift at 1:00 a.m. with no supervisors present. No employee was permitted to adjust their daily schedule in such an unpredictable manner. A few years ago, Dunk Chambers, at the time a custodial worker on a floor team, and Johnny Pease, at the time a Custodial Supervisor I, had flexible schedules in which they reported to work at 5:30 p.m. each day except Wednesday. On Wednesdays they reported to work early enough to make up time missed during the week. These schedules were predictable and set well in advance. Currently, Mr. Chambers, Custodial Supervisor II, and Mr. Pease, Custodial Supervisor III, currently follow the regular night shift schedule. Presently, two female custodial workers at the building where Tommy Denis is supervisor, follow a schedule in which their arrival and departure from work is different from that of other employees. Again these schedules are predictable and are set well in advance. The denial of Ms. Lewis' request to make up time when she was tardy was not due to a medical condition, handicap or sex. At least one other female employee who had no medical problem was disciplined for excessive tardiness to work. Allen Dallis asked Ms. Lewis if she wanted to work part-time as a suggestion of a possible change that would enable her to report to work on time, but she walked off with no answer. The option of retirement was offhandedly mentioned to her also. During these conversations, there was no coercion, duress, misinformation or deception by the supervisors and there was no indication that Ms. Lewis was in any way harassed by her supervisors. During her tenure with DMS, Ms. Lewis did not present any medical justification for nor request any specific accommodation for her back problems other than temporary light duty for a condition from which she would soon be released. The evidence was very clear that Petitioner was only doing light duty work which work could not be lightened further. Finally, there was no evidence that Petitioner was subjected to any discrimination based on sex or handicap. Finally, the evidence did show that Petitioner's discipline was justified, that she was not constructively discharged, and that Petitioner chose to retire in February 1993. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was discriminated against because of her sex or handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX TO DOAH CASE NO. 94-3996 The facts contained in paragraphs of 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 34, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 68 Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3,,, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61, 67, 70, 71, 72 and 73 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 43, and 44 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3, 9, 11, 18, 13, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 45, 46 and 47 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 8, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 28, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41 and 42 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Van Arsdall Department of Management Services Suite 309 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Marie Mattox 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, FL 32303 Helen Burgess AFSCME Florida Council 79 345 South Magnolia Drive Suite A-13 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ms. Sharon Moultry Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was required to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees, and if so, the penalty that should be assessed. Whether the Petitioner violated the Stop Work Order entered May 18, 2005, and, if so, the penalty that should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Tak-A-Way is a Florida corporation which engages in the business of performing small jobs such as removing trash and debris, digging up small driveways, and excavation. Tak-A-Way owns several dump trucks, and it maintains a permanent storage yard for materials and equipment. Tak-A-Way's payroll records for the period January 2003 through May 2005 establish that several persons were listed as "Help" and received regular checks from Tak-A-Way during this period. Donald Oppenheim is the owner and president of Tak-A-Way. He is exempted from workers' compensation coverage. On May 18, 2005, during a routine investigation, an investigator employed by the Department observed two men ripping up an asphalt driveway and loading the asphalt into a truck at a private residence in Pompano Beach, Florida. One man was operating a backhoe, and the other was operating a bobcat. The equipment and trucks being used at the site displayed the name “Tak-A-Way”, and the two men confirmed that they were employed by Tak-A-Way. The men were identified as Andy Oppenheim and Kevin McManus. The Department did not find any record of workers’ compensation insurance in its database for employees of Tak-A- Way, and Mr. Oppenheim confirmed during a conversation with the Department’s investigator that Tak-A-Way had no workers' compensation coverage for any of its employees. The Department's investigator issued a Stop Work Order against Tak-A-Way on May 18, 2005, because it did not have workers’ compensation coverage for its employees; the Stop Work Order was hand-delivered to Mr. Oppenheim on the date of issue. The Stop Work Order required that Tak-A-Way "cease all business operations in this state" and advised that a penalty of $1,000.00 per day would be imposed if Tak-A-Way were to conduct any business in violation of the Stop Work Order. Finally, the Stop Work Order included the following: "This Stop Work Order shall remain in effect until the Division issues an order releasing the Stop Work Order, or until the Division issues an order of conditional release from Stop Work Order pursuant to the employer entering into a payment agreement schedule for periodic payment of penalty." Penalty Assessment for Failure to Have Workers' Compensation Insurance Coverage At the same time that she delivered the Stop Work Order to Mr. Oppenheim, the Department's investigator delivered a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation, in which Mr. Oppenheim was directed to produce business records for the period extending from November 3, 2003, through May 18, 2005.2 Mr. Oppenheim produced Tak-A-Way's business records as requested, and the Department's investigator used the payroll information in the records for calculating the penalty to be assessed for Tak-A-Way's failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees. The Department uses the National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. ("NCCI") Scopes Manual, which includes risk classifications and definitions used to determine rates for workers' compensation insurance coverage. The payroll records provided by Mr. Oppenheim did not indicate the workers' compensation classification codes assigned to Tak-A-Way's employees, so, in accordance with the NCCI Basic Manual for Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance ("Basic Manual"), the Department's investigator assigned all of Tak-A-Way's operations to what she determined to be the highest- rated classifications of its business operations. As shown in the worksheets attached to both the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the Department's investigator classified all of Tak-A-Way's employees under the classification "Excavation," Code 6217, for the period extending from November 3, 2003, through December 31, 2004, which had an approved manual rate of $13.79 per $100.00 in payroll for that period; she classified all of Tak-A-Way's employees under the classification "Concrete," Code 5213, for the period extending from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005, with an approved manual rate of $24.66 per $100.00 in payroll for that period; and she classified all of Tak-A-Way's employees under the classification "Erection Permanent Yard," Code 8227, for the period extending from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005, with an approved manual rate of $9.38 per $100.00 in payroll for that period. The worksheets showed the premium calculation for each classification to be $19,248.91, $10,130.08, and $365.82, respectively, for a total premium of $29,744.81. The penalty, calculated as 1.5 times the premium for each classification, was shown on the worksheets as $28,873.37, $15,195.12, and $548.73, respectively, for a total penalty for the failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage of $44,617.22. The operations included in the NCCI Scopes Manual classification "Excavation & Drivers," Code 6217, describe most closely the business operations of Tak-A-Way during the period of time covered by the penalty assessment for the failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the nature of Tak-A-Way's operations changed on or about January 1, 2005, nor did the Department's investigator provide any explanation for the change in classification from "Excavation" to "Concrete" effective January 1, 2005.3 In the absence of any evidence to support the change in classification, the Department has failed to sustain the $44,617.22 penalty assessment for the failure of Tak-A-Way to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage from November 3, 2003, through May 18, 2005. Rather, the premium calculation for the period from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005, should be based on the classification of "Excavation," Code 6217, which carried the approved manual rate of $12.77 for that period, and not on the classification of "Concrete," Code 5213.4 Tak-A-Way maintained a permanent storage yard in which its material and equipment was stored during the times material to this proceeding. The Department's investigator correctly included a premium calculation for "Erection Permanent Yard," Code 8227, as part of the calculation of the penalty against Tak-A-Way for failure to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees. Tak-A-Way obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage from Florida Citrus, Business & Industry, effective June 1, 2005. Penalty Assessment for Violating Stop Work Order On May 24, 2005, the Department’s investigator observed a Tak-A-Way truck traveling in front of her on the street and concluded that Tak-A-Way was conducting business in violation of the Stop Work Order issued May 18, 2005. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment against Tak-A- Way issued on June 1, 2005, included a penalty of $1,000.00 for Tak-A-Way's violation of the Stop Work Order from May 24, 2005, to May 25, 2005, for a total penalty of $45.617.22. Tak-A-Way conducted business operations after the Stop Work Order was issued. Mr. Oppenheim rented dump trucks owned by Tak-A-Way to Preston Contractors. Mr. Oppenheim, who was the only Tak-A-Way employee involved in the business operations at the time, would drive a truck to one of Preston Contractors' construction sites, towing his pickup truck. He would park the truck and leave the site, and employees of Preston Contractors would fill the truck with construction debris. Mr. Oppenheim would return to the construction site and drive the truck to the landfill and dump the load of debris. At times, there were several Tak-A-Way dump trucks at the Preston Contractors' construction site. According to invoices maintained by Preston Contractors, it paid Tak-A-Way for truck rental and dump fees from February 2005 to September 2005. On November 22, 2005, the Department issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, increasing the penalty for Tak-A-Way's violation of the Stop Work Order to $73,000.00, covering the period extending from May 19, 2005, through September 21, 2005, for a total penalty of $117,617.22. Based on the evidence presented, Tak-A-Way was conducting business operations in violation of the Stop Work Order during the period for which the penalty was assessed and had not obtained either an order releasing the Stop Work Order or an Order of Conditional Release from Stop Work Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Tak-A-Way, Inc., failed to have workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees, in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; Finding that Tak-A-Way, Inc., engaged in business operations during the pendency of a Stop Work Order, in violation of Section 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes; Assessing a penalty against Tak-A-Way, Inc., equal to 1.5 times premium based on the approved manual rate for the classification "Excavation," Code 6217, for the period extending from November 3, 2003, through May 18, 2005, and on the approved manual rate for the classification "Construction & Erection - Permanent Yard," Code 8227, for the period extending from January 1, 2005, through May 18, 2005 as provided in Section 440.107(7)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a penalty of $73,000.00, against Tak-A-Way, Inc., for engaging in business operations in violation of the May 18, 2005, Stop Work Order, as provided in Section 440.107(7)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2006.
