Findings Of Fact On September 13, 1989, petitioner, Donald Ray Ballard, filed an application with respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department) for a Class "A" private investigative agency license and Class "C" private investigator's license. Pertinent to this case, the application, which was attested to by petitioner, averred that he had never been convicted for any violation of the law. By letter of February 8, 1990, the Department timely denied petitioner's application predicated on its contention that petitioner had been convicted of four felonies on April 28, 1980, to wit: sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine, possession of a short barreled rifle, and possession of narcotics paraphernalia. Petitioner filed a timely request for formal hearing, which contested the fact that he had ever been so convicted, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. At hearing, the Department introduced into evidence certified copies of a judgment, order and commitment entered by the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Florida, on April 28, 1980, and bearing Case No. 79-2970 CF B 02. Those documents reflect that one Donald Ballard entered a plea of guilty to the offense of sale of cocaine (Count I), possession of cocaine (Count II), possession of a short barreled rifle (Count III), and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Count IV). The documents further reflect that such person was found guilty on Counts I and II and that imposition of sentence was withheld, and that adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence was withheld as to Counts III and IV. As to each count, such person was placed on probation for a period of 5 years, to run concurrently with each other, under the supervision of the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner denies that he and the Donald Ballard so charged and convicted are the same person. Officer Stephen Lobeck, the officer who arrested the person charged and convicted, as heretofore discussed, identified petitioner within a 90 percent degree of certainty as the same person he arrested. Melanie Eggleston, who was employed as a probation parole officer with the Florida Department of Corrections from 1980 until April 1985, positively identified petitioner as the same Donald Ballard she supervised as a probationer following his conviction for drug dealing. Given such credible identification, and the fact that the term of probation for the person she supervised was due to terminate in April 1985, it is more likely than not that the respondent is the same Donald Ballard who was convicted on April 28, 1980, as heretofore discussed. In concluding that respondent was so convicted on April 28, 1980, it has been unnecessary to consider the arrest record of the Sheriff's Office, Palm Beach County, Florida, for August 3, 1979 (Respondent's exhibit 3, page 2) or Officer Lobeck's arrest report (Respondent's exhibit 2). These documents are hearsay, as discussed supra at footnote 3, but due to the provisions of Section 120.58(1)(a), Florida Statutes, are, nevertheless, admissible in administrative proceedings to supplement or explain competent evidence. Harris v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 495 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Here, the persuasive testimony of Officer Lobeck and Ms. Eggleston, provided competent proof of petitioner's identity as the Donald Ballard who was convicted on April 28, 1980. Were the arrest record considered, as supplementing that proof, it would be supportive of the ultimate conclusion reached. In this regard, the arrest record identifies the subject as Donald Ray Ballard; his local address as 149 Granada Drive, Palm Springs, Florida; his occupation as disabled veteran; his date of birth as December 2, 1931; his social security number as 240-40-4932; and his general description as that of a white male, height 5'7", weight 144 pounds, black hair, brown eyes, and medium complexion. Petitioner's general description is grossly consistent with the description contained in the arrest record, his residence address at the time was 149 Granada Drive, Palm Springs, Florida, and he is a disabled veteran. Further, while the identification petitioner produced at hearing referenced a date of birth of December 3, 1931, the proof also reflects that he had, on other occasions, been attributed with a date of birth of December 2, 1931. Specifically, the two DD214 forms he attached to his application to evidence his military service, as well as his transcript from Indiana Technical College, reflect a date of birth of December 2, 1931. Finally, petitioner's social security number has been variously reported as 240-40-4937 and 240-40-4937A. But for the last digit, petitioner's social security number is consistent with the social security number contained on the arrest record. 4/ On balance, the arrest record is supportive of the competent proof which identified petitioner as the Donald Ballard convicted on April 28, 1980.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioner's application for a Class "A" private investigative agency license and Class "C" private investigator's license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of March 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March 1991.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact On May 16, 1983, Walter Taylor (Respondent) was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner), having been issued Correctional Certificate Number 66856. On December 23, 19851, Respondent was certified by Petitioner, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 66855. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by the Riviera Beach Police Department (Riviera Beach PD) as a law enforcement officer. In April 1994, Respondent and his wife were divorced. They had been married 14 years and had minor children. Prior to the divorce, Respondent had several confrontations with his wife regarding her relationship with another man, a Mr. Chilton, whom she had met in or around 1988. During one confrontation in April 1993, Respondent slapped his then wife. At times, Mr. Chilton was present when the confrontations took place. At no time prior to the divorce did Respondent harm or threaten to harm Mr. Chilton. Subsequent to the divorce, Respondent’s ex-wife and Mr. Chilton continued their relationship. In August 1994, Respondent wanted to attend his family’s reunion in New York but had insufficient funds to take his children with him. Respondent’s ex-wife agreed to attend the reunion with them. With her financial support, everyone could attend the reunion. Respondent and his ex-wife agreed to a pre- arranged time for them to meet on August 11, 1994, and drive to the reunion together. On August 11, 1994, prior to the pre-arranged time, Respondent and his children were packed and ready to leave. Respondent attempted to contact his ex-wife, so they could depart early. He called several places but to no avail. Having failed to locate his ex-wife, Respondent concluded that she was at Mr. Chilton’s apartment. Respondent called Mr. Chilton’s apartment several times only to get an answering machine. He drove to Mr. Chilton’s apartment. By this time, it was approximately 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. When Respondent arrived at Mr. Chilton’s apartment complex, he observed both Mr. Chilton’s and his ex-wife’s vehicles in the parking area. Respondent knocked on Mr. Chilton’s apartment door but received no response. Having knocked from two to five minutes, Respondent left but stopped nearby at a telephone. He repeatedly called Mr. Chilton’s apartment and again the answering machine answered. Respondent was convinced that his ex-wife was in Mr. Chilton’s apartment and that they were refusing to answer the telephone or the door. Respondent was upset and frustrated. Respondent returned to Mr. Chilton’s apartment and began knocking again. The more he knocked, the more frustrated he became. His knocks became harder and louder until he was pounding the door. No one answered the door. Respondent’s ex-wife and Mr. Chilton were afraid to open the door. At all times, Mr. Chilton and the Respondent’s ex-wife were inside the apartment. The door was locked and the deadbolt was engaged. Becoming more and more frustrated, Respondent hit the apartment door two or three times with both hands, arms raised, palms forward and with the weight of his body behind him. The force applied by Respondent knocked down the door. Respondent entered Mr. Chilton’s apartment beyond the door frame. He told his ex-wife to come outside with him and talk. She immediately complied. While exiting Mr. Chilton’s apartment, Respondent informed Mr. Chilton to bill him for the door. The door to Mr. Chilton’s apartment was damaged beyond repair and the area surrounding the door was severely damaged. The dead bolt area on the door was bulged. The area on the door jam in which the dead bolt slid had popped and come loose and was indented. The door handle was very loose. The trim on the doorway was split. On many occasions Respondent has been involved in law enforcement raids in which he, personally, has had to break down doors with his body. The method used by Respondent to break down the doors during the raids was not the same method used by him on August 11, 1994. Even though Respondent’s action forced open the door to Mr. Chilton’s apartment, he reacted out of frustration, not with the intent to force the door open. However, Respondent acted in reckless disregard for the consequences of his actions. He should not have returned to Mr. Chilton’s apartment but waited for his ex-wife until the prearranged time. Respondent’s actions could have escalated the situation into a more serious incident. He exhibited a reckless disregard for the safety and property of others. The incident was reported to the Martin County Sheriff’s Department. The Deputies on the scene took pictures and completed a report. Mr. Chilton did not want to file criminal charges against Respondent but only wanted his door repaired. The Deputies assisted Mr. Chilton in somewhat securing the door, so that it would at least close. Approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 12, 1994, Respondent telephoned Mr. Chilton. Respondent apologized for the damage to the door and agreed to pay for the damage. Subsequently, Respondent telephoned the apartment complex’s manager and agreed to pay for the damage to the door. The cost of the door was $352.99. A payment plan was arranged in which Respondent would pay for the damage in installments. Due to financial constraints, Respondent was unable to comply with the payment plan as agreed upon. The final payment was made on or about February 2, 1995. Respondent had no reason associated with his law enforcement duties to enter Mr. Chilton’s apartment. Respondent was off-duty and out-of uniform. Respondent entered Mr. Chilton’s apartment without permission or invitation. Respondent is responsible for the damage to the door of Mr. Chilton’s apartment. Prior to the incident on August 11, 1994, in or around June 1994, Respondent received training in Anger Management. On August 3, 1994, Respondent was promoted to Sergeant, on a probationary status, by the Riviera Beach PD. As a result of the incident on August 11, 1994, the Riviera Beach PD conducted a personnel investigation. On January 24, 1995, it issued a notice of intent to take disciplinary action against Respondent -– a demotion from a Sergeant to a Patrol Officer, which included a five percent cut in salary. The disciplinary action was taken by the Riviera Beach PD. On November 2, 1994, Petitioner’s Probable Cause Panel issued Respondent a Letter of Guidance for the act of committing battery (slapping) upon his then wife in April 1993. At the time of the issuance of the Letter of Guidance, Respondent had successfully completed the Probable Cause Intervention Program. The Probable Cause Panel was not aware of the pending disciplinary action against Respondent by the Riviera Beach PD involving the incident of August 11, 1994. Neither Respondent nor the Riviera Beach PD notified the Probable Cause Panel of the pending disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order Reprimanding Respondent; and Suspending Respondent’s certification for thirty (30) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1997.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact On August 31, 1981, Petitioner issued to Respondent certificate number 02-29029, certifying Respondent as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. On March 4, 1987, Respondent, who was employed as a deputy sheriff by the Broward County Sheriff's Department, was on duty at Port Everglades in Broward County, Florida. At the time, Port Everglades was closed to the public between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 4, 1987, a car approached the front gate of the Port. Present in the guard house at the front gate at the time were Port security officers Joel Myers and William Updegraff, along with Respondent. Myers stepped out of the guard house and stopped the vehicle at the front gate. He asked the driver and passenger where they were going. The driver answered incoherently and appeared to be intoxicated. About that time Respondent and Updegraff came out of the guard house and approached the rear of the vehicle. Respondent instructed the driver to pull over as he was being stopped by a deputy of the Sheriff's office. The driver instead accelerated and drove into the Port. At no time was there any danger of the car hitting the Respondent, Myers, or Updegraff. Respondent got into his patrol car and began pursuing the vehicle. Myers and Updegraff remained at the guard house. A radio transmission was sent to other employees of the Port advising them that an unauthorized vehicle was in the Port. A few moments later, Donald Leake, a firefighter employed by the Port who had joined in the search, saw the vehicle heading toward the front gate in order to exit the Port. Leake drove his patrol unit beside the vehicle and motioned to the driver to pull over, which the driver did. The vehicle stopped approximately 100 yards from the guard house at the front gate. Leake sent a radio transmission that he had stopped the vehicle in question. He then approached the vehicle on foot and instructed the driver and passenger to place their hands on the steering wheel and the dash of their vehicle. The occupants followed Leake's instructions and offered no resistance to him. It appeared to Leake as though the driver was intoxicated. Leake walked to the rear of the vehicle and obtained the license tag number. He then approached the driver and asked for his driver's license and vehicle registration, which the driver provided to him. The driver's license identified the driver as Rodney Hensen. Myers and Updegraff had observed Leake stop the vehicle, and Updegraff left the guard house and walked to the vehicle in question in order to offer assistance to Leake if Leake needed any. After Updegraff had reachecd the vehicle, Respondent arrived at the scene, got out of his vehicle, approached Leake and Updegraff, handed them his night stick and radio, and opened the driver's door. After opening the door, Respondent began punching the driver in the chest and face, while chastising the driver for running from a Broward Sheriff's Office deputy. Respondent punched Hensen several times with closed fists for a period of approximately 30 seconds. The driver was offering no resistance or threat at the time of the incident and still had his hands on the dash when the punching began. Hensen began crying and kept asking Respondent why Respondent was doing that to him. As he was being punched, he leaned away from Respondent in a defensive position, trying to protect his face with his hands and arms. The passenger kept his hands on the dash while Respondent was punching Hensen, and he offered no resistance or threat to the Respondent. Neither the driver nor the passenger ever struck the Respondent or threatened to strike him. Both remained passive and in defensive positions, leaning away from Respondent. Both Leake and Updegraff repeatedly called out Respondent's name to get his attention and repeatedly told him to stop. Respondent then grabbed Hensen, and pulled him from the vehicle, pushed him up against the car, and handcuffed Hensen behind his back. Respondent then retrieved his night stick, placed it between Hensen's cuffed arms, twisted it, and caused Hensen to roll down the car and fall to the ground, hitting his head against the ground. Respondent then picked up Hensen and placed him in the back seat of Respondent's patrol car. Respondent then commented to Updegraff, "I thought you would have liked to get in on that." As Respondent was handcuffing Hensen, he instructed Leake to remove the passenger and place him face down on the ground. Leake did so, and the passenger was compliant. Respondent sent a radio transmission to the Broward County Sheriff's Office advising that he had made an arrest and had been involved in a fight in doing so. Almost momentarily, other law enforcement officers arrived at the scene. Respondent was not involved in a fight. He struck Hensen repeatedly without provocation, and it was not necessary for Respondent to strike Hensen to effectuate an arrest. During the ensuing investigation conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office, Respondent admitted striking Hensen.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-6708 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-34 and 36 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 35 and 37 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 8 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4-7, 9-14, 20 and 21 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony or argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 15-19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Larson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Tavalario 270 Southeast Second Avenue Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, Esquire General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact On May 27, 1975, the Public Employees Relations Commission certified the Petitioner as the exclusive presentative for the purpose of collective bargaining for a unit of employees of the City of Riviera Beach. All issues respecting the appropriate collective bargaining unit were resolved by the Commission in its order, except that no determination was made as to whether police lieutenants should be included in the unit. There are a total of approximately 67 sworn personnel in the City of Riviera Beach Police Department. The Chief of Police and the Inspector of Police are of the top management officials. There are three police captains, six police lieutenants, and thirteen police sergeants. The department is divided into four divisions: Uniform Division, Detective Division, Records Division, and the Services Division. Until approximately four years ago, the divisions were headed by police lieutenants. At that time the rank of captain was created. Captains are regularly charged with heading the Uniform Division, the Detective Division, and the Records Division. Due to the illness of the captain who formerly headed the Uniform Division, a lieutenant is in charge of the Uniform Division, and the captain who formerly headed the Uniform Division now heads the Services Division. Lieutenants are charged with the command of units within the divisions. Lieutenants are in charge of each of the three regular shifts and of the relief shift within the Uniform Division. A lieutenant is in charge of the 4:00 P.M. to midnight shift in the Detective Division. Ordinarily a lieutenant heads the Services Division. A lieutenant in the Uniform Division will have from ten to eleven sworn officers under his command. The lieutenant in the Detective Division will have approximately four sworn officers under his command. The lieutenant who heads the Services Division will have one sworn officer under his command. Between the hours of 5:00 P.M. and 8:00 A.M. on weekdays, and on weekends, lieutenants in the Uniform and Detective Divisions are the highest ranking on-duty employees of the Police Department. The qualifications, duties, and responsibilities of police lieutenants are described in Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 6. Lieutenants in the Uniform Division spend the bulk of their work day on the road in patrol cars. They serve as backup units to other patrol cars, and act in a supervisory capacity. Lieutenants make arrests for traffic violations, but they generally do not make as many arrests as lower ranking officers. Lieutenants in the Uniform Division wear the same uniform as police captains, except that they were lieutenants bars on the shoulders of their shirts rather than captains bars. Lieutenants and captains wear white shirts and brown slacks. Police sergeants and lower ranking officers wear brown slacks and shirts. Police lieutenants play limited policy making and budgetary roles. Lieutenants are expected to make recommendations to captains respecting policy making needs. Lieutenants occasionally meet as a group with captains, the Chief of Police, and the Inspector of Police. During these staff conferences proposed policies are discussed and final policies ultimately may be adopted as a result of the meetings. Lieutenants do not have the authority to promulgate policy either individually or as a group. Their role is limited to proposing and discussing policies. The lieutenant's budgetary role is similar. Lieutenants are expected to advise captains and other superior officers of the budgetary needs of their units. Lieutenants have no authority to make binding budgetary recommendations, and have no role in promulgating a final proposed budget for consideration of the City Commission of the City of Riviera Beach. Lieutenants play no part in hiring new employees. Unless serving as an acting captain, a lieutenant would not interview job applicants, and would have no input into hiring decisions. Lieutenants do not have final authority to promote, transfer, or discharge employees. Lieutenants do make recommendations respecting promotions, transfer, and discharge. with respect to promotions, the views of the police lieutenants would be solicited, and are given great weight. Employee evaluation reports are used to evaluate probationary personnel, and permanent employees. These reports are prepared by lieutenants and reviewed by the captain. Probationary employees may be rejected for permanent status based in part on these reports, and permanent employees may be denied promotions based in part upon these reports. The evaluations are also used to determine whether employees should get step increases. Captains make recommendations for promotion to the Police Chief based upon the lieutenant's evaluation. A lieutenant makes recommendations to the captain respecting transfer or discharge of an employee. These recommendations are given some weight, but are not always followed. A lieutenant to the Uniform Division assigns the officers in the division to their jobs on a daily basis. This duty may be delegated to a police sergeant; however, the responsibility lies with the lieutenant. A lieutenant is responsible for the work performance of personnel under this command. Lieutenants can discipline employees by taking such action as removing the employee from duty for the remainder of a shift. The lieutenant must then, as soon as possible, submit a full report to the captain, who will forward it to the Inspector of Police and to the Chief. Lieutenants can make recommendations to their superior officers respecting discipline of employees under their supervision, but only the City Manager has ultimate authority to suspend an employee. Lieutenants serve as the first step in the city's formal grievance procedure; however, the police captain must approve any affirmative action taken by the lieutenant. Two police lieutenants testified at the hearing that they do not wish to be part of a collective bargaining unit with lower ranking police officers. The testimony of one witness was based upon his feeling that it would be more difficult for him to carry out his job under those circumstances. The testimony of another lieutenant was based upon his personal dislike for labor unions. Two other police lieutenants signed affidavits stating their preference to be included in the "Management Group" of the city. No basis was given for these statements. ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis L. Mack, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 105, 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Irving Weisoff, Esquire Suite 804, Roberts Building 28 W. Flagler Street Miami, Florida Nicholas P. Wellman, Esquire 4655 S. Military Trail Lake Worth, Florida 33460
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on November 10, 1983 and issued certificate number 16-83- 002-04. At all times pertinent to this procceeding, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer and was employed as a Deputy Sheriff by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. Respondent was not on duty or in uniform at the time of the incident described in the Administrative Complaint. On October 1, 1989, the Respondent and his wife, Janet Phillips, were leaving the TCBY Yogurt Shop in the Royal Palm Beach area. As the Respondent was proceeding to get into the driver's side of their BMW and Janet Phillips was proceeding to get into the passenger side, another car, driven by JoAnn Baker, pulled into the space next to the Respondent's car. Mrs. Baker parked in a position where the driver's door of her car was next to the passenger door of the Respondent's car. As Mrs. Baker was getting out of her car and Mrs. Phillips was getting into her car, the car doors bumped into each other causing the BMW door to knock Mrs. Phillips in the back. After the cars doors bumped, Mrs. Phillips and Mrs. Baker began exchanging words. While Mrs. Baker contends that she was only attempting to apologize, the more credible evidence established that she was a vocal and agitated participant in the argument. Respondent joined in the verbal altercation while all parties were still in the parking lot. At this point, there was no physical contact between Mrs. Baker and Mrs. Phillips nor between Mrs. Baker and the Respondent. Mrs. Baker flipped a "bird" at Respondent and his wife and walked into the yogurt store. The Respondent and his wife got into their car. However, after a few moments, the Respondent's wife got out of the car and went back into the yogurt shop after Mrs. Baker. Respondent followed his wife into the yogurt shop a short time later. Mrs. Phillips walked directly up to Mrs. Baker and got within two (2) or three (3) feet of her. The two women exchanged verbal insults and vulgarities. Mrs. Phillips then stepped toward Mrs. Baker, raised her hand and slapped Mrs. Baker in the face. Mrs. Baker immediately put her hands up in defense to block any other blows. She also made a move towards Mrs. Phillips. Respondent, who by this point had entered the shop, stepped between the two women and pushed Mrs. Baker back against the counter. The Respondent grabbed Mrs. Baker by her arms, lifted her up off the floor and physically placed her down on the counter in a rough manner. The Respondent also placed his forearm and elbow against Mrs. Baker's throat and chest area pinning her against the counter while bending her backwards with her legs dangling off the floor. While pinning Mrs. Baker against the counter, the Respondent was very upset; he put his face within a few inches of Mrs. Baker's face and was screaming at her. Respondent called her a "whore" and a "bitch". After a brief period had passed, the Respondent let go of Mrs. Baker. The Respondent did not apologize to Mrs. Baker nor did he offer any type of assistance to her after the incident. Mrs. Baker went outside to get the Respondent's tag number and told them she was going to call the cops. She also threatened to sue Respondent, which she subsequently did. The Respondent and his wife got in their BMW and left the area. Mrs. Baker received minor bruises and injuries to her back as a result of the incident. Prior to the Respondent grabbing Mrs. Baker, Mrs. Baker had not made any physically aggressive moves towards the Respondent. At the time of the incident, the Respondent was 6'3" in height and weighed 215 pounds; JoAnn Baker was 5'4" in height and weighed between 126 and 135 pounds. The evidence was inconclusive as to the size of Mrs. Phillips, but she was roughly the same size as Mrs. Baker. The Respondent was subsequently charged with a misdemeanor battery based on a complaint filed by Mrs. Baker. He entered a nolo contedere plea to the charge on the advice of his attorney. Adjudication was withheld and Respondent was sentenced to a brief probationary period which he successfully completed . As a result of this incident, Respondent has lost his job with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's office. Respondent's wife had abdominal surgery approximately two weeks before this incident. Respondent claims that he was very concerned about her physical condition and was simply trying to protect her when he thought that Mrs. Baker was going to "attack" his wife. While Respondent's concern is understandable, it is clear that he overreacted and used undue force in restraining Mrs. Baker.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and suspending his certification as a law enforcement officer for three months followed by a probationary period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. The Respondents's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2-3. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4-6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9-10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11-12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11-12. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 12-13. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 11-12. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 11-12. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12-15 and 17. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12-15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Pompey, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mark D. Ewart, Esquire 319 Clematis Street, Suite 817 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Jeffrey Long, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact On November 9, 1972, the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer. Certificate number 6350 was duly issued to Respondent by Petitioner. On September 10, 1984, the following occurred in Delray Beach, Florida: At approximately 12:30 a.m., Respondent was found asleep in his automobile by two Delray Beach police officers, Sergeant Stephen Barborini and Detective Thomas Tustin. Respondent was alone in the automobile. Respondent's automobile was parked in a public parking lot in the 1100 block of North Federal Highway in Delray Beach with its engine running and its headlights on. Respondent was awakened by the police officers and questioned while in the parked automobile after the engine had been turned off by Officer Barborini. Respondent was very intoxicated. Upon being questioned, Respondent produced a police badge case, without a police badge, and identified himself as a Metro-Dade Police Officer. The Delray Beach police officers advised Respondent that he was in no condition to drive and offered to either give him a ride home or to arrange other transportation for him. Respondent then got out of the car. As a result of his intoxication, Respondent was unable to maintain his balance, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. At times Respondent was incoherent. Respondent began to behave in an erratic manner. He shouted and yelled obscenities at the officers, he cried, and he pleaded on his knees for the officers to leave him alone. Respondent became angry with Detective Tustin while Detective Tustin was trying to calm him down. Respondent placed his hands on the person of Detective Tustin and pushed him back a couple of steps. Respondent was arrested by Officer Barborini for disorderly intoxication and taken into custody. Upon arrival at the police station, Respondent again began to shout obscenities and pushed another officer, Officer Giovani. Respondent met with the officers about two months later and apologized for his actions. Officer Barborini asked the State Attorney's Office not to prosecute because Respondent was a police officer and because Officer Barborini had been told that Respondent was seeking help for his drinking problem. The State Attorney's Office granted Officer Barborini's request. Respondent was not charged with battery because Officer Barborini and Detective Tustin thought Respondent was too intoxicated to intentionally batter Detective Tustin. On August 28, 1985, Respondent was found guilty by the Dade County Court of the charge of battery on the person of Jose Lleo. The battery occurred on February 22, 1985, while Respondent was on duty. Although Respondent was not intoxicated at the time, he had consumed alcohol before reporting to work. Following his conviction, the Court withheld adjudication of guilt and also withheld sentence. On April 3, 1986, the following occurred in Deerfield Beach, Florida: At approximately 3:35 a.m., Respondent was found asleep in his automobile by Officer John Szpindor and Officer Dale Davis of the Deerfield Beach Police Department. Respondent was alone in the automobile. Respondent's automobile was parked on the grassy shoulder of the road in the 2700 block of Southwest 10th Street with its engine running and its headlights on. The officers were able to awaken Respondent after several minutes of shaking him and talking to him. Respondent, upon being awakened, was belligerent and uncooperative. He used profanity towards the officers, calling them names and telling the officers they had no right to bother him. Respondent got out of the automobile after being instructed to do so. Respondent was very intoxicated. As a result of his intoxication, Respondent was groggy and unable to maintain his balance. His eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. Respondent's pants were wet in the crotch area. The officers identified Respondent by examining a wallet, with Respondent's permission, which was lying on the seat of the car. The wallet contained an empty badge case. From examining the wallet, the officers obtained sufficient information to enable the dispatcher to contact Shirley Daniels, who was married to Respondent at that time. Mrs. Daniels was asked to come to the scene. While waiting for Mrs. Daniels to arrive on the scene, Respondent became more belligerent. His shouting grew louder and more confrontational. Despite the officers' attempts to calm him down, Respondent took off his jacket, threw it on the ground, and assumed a defensive stance as if he wanted to fight the officers. The shouting disturbed the residents of a nearby residential area. Respondent confronted Officer Davis, who had Respondent's wallet, told Officer Davis that he had no business with the wallet, and he struck Officer Davis in the chest and chin areas. The blow to the chin was a glancing blow as opposed to being a hard blow. Officer Davis was not injured. Officer Davis and Officer Szpindor immediately thereafter physically overpowered Respondent, placed him under arrest for disorderly intoxication and battery, and took him into custody. When Shirley Daniels arrived on the scene, she told the officers that she would be unable to manage Respondent at home in his intoxicated condition. Respondent was then taken to jail by the officers. There was no evidence as to the disposition of the charges of disorderly intoxication and battery. Respondent is an alcoholic and was an alcoholic at the times of the incidents described above. Prior to those incidents, Respondent had sought treatment and thought that he had successfully completed the program. Between the incident in Delray Beach and the incident in Deerfield Beach, Respondent attended Alcoholics Anonymous. Respondent continued to drink, to the extent that he suffered blackouts, because he did not immerse himself in the Alcoholics Anonymous program. During the periods Respondent maintained control of his drinking, he exhibited the qualities required of a enforcement officer. Whenever the alcoholism gained control, as was the case in the 1984 incident in Delray Beach and the 1986 incident in Deerfield Beach, Respondent lost control of himself and of his actions. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent had abstained from alcohol for two and one-half years. For the past two and one-half years Respondent has been seriously, and successfully, involved in Alcoholics Anonymous. Respondent is a recovering alcoholic who has good moral character as long as he has control of his alcoholism. Respondent currently operates his own business as a private investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission, enter a final order which finds that Respondent failed to maintained good moral character, which places Respondent's certification on a probationary status for a period of two years and which contains as a condition of probation that Respondent abstain from the use of alcohol. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0714 The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2-3. Addressed in paragraph 2(a). Addressed in paragraph 2(c). Addressed in paragraph 2(d). Addressed in paragraph 2(e). Addressed in paragraph 2(g). Addressed in paragraph 2(h). 9-10. Addressed in paragraph 2(i). Addressed in paragraph 3. Addressed in paragraph 12. 13-14. Addressed in paragraph 6(a). 15-16. Addressed in paragraph 6(b). Rejected as being unnecessary to the results reached. Addressed in paragraph 6(c). Addressed in paragraph 6(e). 20-22. Addressed in paragraph 6(f). Addressed in paragraph 6(g). Addressed in paragraph 6(h). The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2-5. Addressed in paragraphs 2(a), (b), and (c). Addressed in paragraphs 2(f) and (g). Addressed in paragraphs 2(h) and (i). Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings reached. Addressed in paragraph 4. 10-12. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings reached. 13. Addressed in paragraph 3. 14-16. Addressed in paragraph 6(a). Addressed in paragraph 6(b). Addressed in paragraph 6(e). Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings reached. Addressed in paragraphs 6(g) and (h). 21-24. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the findings reached. 25. Addressed in paragraph 5. 26-27. Rejected as being recitation of testimony, as being unnecessary to the result reached and, in part, as being subordinate to the findings reached in paragraphs 9 and 10. 28-31. Rejected as beings recitation of testimony as being unnecessary to the result reached, and, in part, as being subordinate to the findings reached in paragraphs 7, 9, and 10. 32-36. Rejected as being recitation of testimony as being unnecessary to the result reached, and, in part, as being subordinate to the findings reached in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10. 37-38. Rejected as being unnecessary to the results reached. 40-41. Rejected as being recitation of testimony , as being unnecessary to the result reached, and, in part, as being subordinate to the findings reached in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10. 42-45. Rejected as being recitation of testimony, as being unnecessary to the results reached, and, in part, as being subordinate to the findings reached in paragraph 8. 46-49. Rejected as being recitation of testimony, as being unnecessary to the results reached, and, in part, as being subordinate to the findings reached in paragraph 8. 50. Addressed in paragraphs 1 and paragraph 11. 51-54. Rejected as being unnecessary to the results reached Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. The purported statement of Mr. Kastrenatis is rejected as being hearsay. Addressed in paragraph 9. Rejected as being unnecessary to the results reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James C. Casey, Esquire 10680 N.W. 25th Street Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33172 Jeffrey Long, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should be dismissed from employment with Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact In 1987, Steven E. Belford, hereinafter Mr. Belford, began his employment with the Palm Beach County School Board, hereinafter School Board, as a School Police Officer. From 1991 through April 1995, Mr. Belford considered the conduct of the School Board’s employees, including supervisory and management personnel, towards him to be racially hostile. During this same time period, from 1992 through April 1995, the School Board considered the conduct of Mr. Belford towards co-workers, supervisors, superiors, and students to be inappropriate. On April 10, 1995, a meeting, which could affect Mr. Belford’s employment, was held regarding his job performance. At this meeting, Mr. Belford was represented by counsel from the Police Benevolent Association, hereinafter PBA. Also among those present at the meeting was James Kelly, Chief of the School Police for the School Board. Chief Kelly was concerned with Mr. Belford’s conduct in the performance of his duties. During this meeting, Mr. Belford described the problems that he was experiencing in the work place. After listening to Mr. Belford, Chief Kelly’s concerns extended to the safety of students, staff, and visitors at the school to which Mr. Belford was assigned. As a result of this meeting, Chief Kelly determined that Mr. Belford should and would be required to undergo a fitness for duty examination. Mr. Belford’s PBA counsel advised him to undergo the fitness for duty examination. Even though Mr. Belford’s position was that there was no basis for the examination and that it was, therefore, inappropriate, he agreed to the examination. Mr. Belford was willing to comply with whatever was required of him, even though he may not agree, to keep his job. It is undisputed that the referral of Mr. Belford for a psychological evaluation was reasonable. On April 25 and 26, 1995, Dr. Harley V. Stock performed what he referred to as the “mandatory fitness for duty examination.” In Dr. Stock’s evaluation, dated May 3, 1995,2 he stated, among other things, the following: [Mr. Belford] shows no impairment in relationship to reality. . . . there was no indication of any underlying mood disorder. . . . There is no indication of any underlying thought disorder. . . . In summary this examiner has had the opportunity to review a significant amount of collateral information regarding Mr. Belford’s employment with the Palm Beach School Police Department. It appears that he has had fluctuating reviews, particularly in areas as it relates [sic] to interpersonal interactions. When confronted with documentation, Mr. Belford always has an “excuse”. He essentially feels that most of the problems that he is currently facing are a result of racial discrimination. He takes absolutely no responsibility for his own behavior. He is overly suspicious about other people’s motives towards him. He denies any type of provocative physical action towards the students or others. He believes that he is “misunderstood”. Psychological testing reveals him to be a skeptical, suspicious, over-controlled individual who may have the propensity to lose his “temper” at times when provoked. He, however, will have no insight into this. Instead, he would rather shift the blame, and responsibility to others for any problems that he finds himself in. I find some of Mr. Belford’s explanations for his behavior, as contained in the allegations, incredible. Based on psychological testing, Dr. Stock made the following recommendations in his evaluation: Because of his current psychologic [sic] functioning, his behavior at this time cannot be predicted in terms of his interactions with students and faculty members. He obviously harbors a great deal of hostility towards others, but does not either acknowledge, or recognize it. This can lead to episodes where he may become physically assaultive at the most, or at the very least, verbally aggressive in a way that is inappropriate in a school environment. I would therefore recommend that he is temporarily Unfit For Duty and that he needs mandatory psychologic [sic] counseling. Mandatory psychologic [sic] counseling means that the School Board should be appraised [sic] of his keeping scheduled counseling appointments, and that within a reasonable time, he be re-evaluated to ascertain whether he is making any progress in psychotherapy and gaining any insight into how to both understand his behavior and to modulate his impulses. During the time of treatment, I would recommend that he not engage in any functions that would place him in the role of having any type of “police authority”. This would include coming into contact with students and administrators. However, his psychologic [sic] condition does not render him totally incapable of employment. A “light duty” position would be appropriate in which he can carry on selected roles as described by the School Board while receiving treatment. After treatment is completed, within a reasonable time, Mr. Belford should then be re-evaluated to see if indeed treatment has had any effect on him. At that juncture, a further determination can be made about his work placement. In a meeting held on May 17, 1995, the results of Dr. Stock’s evaluation were discussed with Mr. Belford who was accompanied by his PBA counsel. Mr. Belford was advised that Dr. Stock considered him to be temporarily unfit for duty. In May 1995, in accordance with Dr. Stock’s recommendations, Mr. Belford was removed from duty. He was assigned light duty in the risk management department while he underwent counseling. Mr. Belford’s psychological counseling sessions were conducted by MCC Behavioral Care. His counseling sessions began on May 18, 1995. The School Board coordinated Mr. Belford’s appointments with MCC Behavioral Care and Dr. Stock. Melinda Wong was the coordinator for the School Board. During his last counseling session with MCC Behavioral Care held on August 4, 1995, Mr. Belford and his counselor agreed that he need not return to MCC Behavioral Care for any more counseling sessions. However, the counselor did not indicate to Mr. Belford whether he should or was required to return to Dr. Stock for a final evaluation. In August 1995, a representative from Ms. Wong’s office informed Mr. Belford that his final evaluation with Dr. Stock would be conducted on August 29, 1995. Mr. Belford attended the session with Dr. Stock on August 29, 1995. Mr. Belford departed the session with the understanding that the session was for his final evaluation and that Dr. Stock would submit his final report to the School Board within the next week. However, no final determination was made by Dr. Stock regarding Mr. Belford’s fitness for duty. Dr. Stock had concerns regarding the appropriateness of the counseling provided to Mr. Belford by MCC Behavioral Care. During the month of September 1995 and subsequent months, Mr. Belford periodically inquired of Ms. Wong about the status of Dr. Stock's final determination. Each time, she informed him that no determination had been made by Dr. Stock. Mr. Belford was clearly frustrated. On October 5, 1995, Mr. Belford filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, hereinafter EEOC, against the School Board. Finally, Dr. Stock's office contacted Ms. Wong and informed her that Dr. Stock needed to have one more session with Mr. Belford in order to make a final evaluation. Ms. Wong arranged for the session to be conducted on January 3, 1996, after Mr. Belford's Christmas vacation. On Friday, December 15, 1995, at approximately 2:40 p.m., Ms. Wong went to Mr. Belford’s workplace which was in the immediate vicinity of her workplace. She advised Mr. Belford that he needed to attend a final session with Dr. Stock on January 3, 1996, in order for Dr. Stock to prepare the final evaluation. Believing that he had attended his final session with Dr. Stock on August 29, 1995, and that Ms. Wong was not aware of the final session, Mr. Belford informed Ms. Wong that he had already completed his final session and requested that she check her records. Mr. Belford was visibly tense and upset. Ms. Wong was surprised by Mr. Belford's reaction. She interpreted Mr. Belford's conduct as refusing to attend his last session with Dr. Stock for a final evaluation. Ms. Wong departed Mr. Belford’s workplace and immediately contacted Chief Kelly. Seeking advice, Chief Kelly telephoned Louis Haddad, the School Board’s Coordinator of Employee Relations. Mr. Haddad advised Chief Kelly to immediately contact Mr. Belford and to arrange a meeting with Mr. Belford that afternoon in Mr. Haddad's office, which was in the same building. Attending the meeting would be Mr. Belford, Chief Kelly, Ms. Wong, and Mr. Haddad. Chief Kelly telephoned Mr. Belford and informed Mr. Belford that he wanted to meet with him in Mr. Haddad's office. Mr. Belford informed Chief Kelly that he was getting-off work in approximately 10 minutes at 3:00 p.m.. At that time, Chief Kelly made it clear that he was giving Mr. Belford a direct order to attend the meeting. Mr. Belford advised Chief Kelly that he wanted his counsel present at the meeting. Chief Kelly did not respond to Mr. Belford's request, but asked him if he was refusing to attend the meeting, thereby disobeying a direct order. Immediately, Mr. Belford became nervous and afraid and felt queasy in the stomach. He inquired as to the location of the meeting. Chief Kelly informed him where the meeting was being held, and they both terminated the telephone conversation. Mr. Belford was on duty when Chief Kelly gave him the direct order to attend the meeting. Mr. Belford did not refuse to attend the meeting. He intended to attend the meeting. When the telephone conversation ended, Chief Kelly had a reasonable expectation that Mr. Belford would obey the direct order and attend the meeting being held that afternoon. Shortly after the telephone conversation with Chief Kelly, Mr. Belford began recalling the events leading up to the telephone conversation, and his nervousness and queasy feeling intensified. Mr. Belford became ill and was unable to attend the meeting. He departed from his workplace without notifying anyone of his sudden illness3 and without attending the meeting. While waiting for Mr. Belford, Chief Kelly, not being aware that Mr. Belford had departed his workplace, telephoned Mr. Belford's PBA counsel and informed him of the meeting and briefly of the underlying circumstances. The PBA counsel considered the meeting appropriate and advised Chief Kelly that he would be available by telephone when Mr. Belford arrived. Immediately after leaving his office, Mr. Belford contacted his new counsel. At approximately 3:25 p.m., a representative from the office of Mr. Belford's new counsel telephoned Chief Kelly. The representative of Mr. Belford's new counsel indicated to Chief Kelly that Mr. Belford would not be attending the meeting due to his sudden illness. Chief Kelly informed the representative that Mr. Belford had disobeyed a direct order and that, among other things, Mr. Belford was relieved of duty and would be recommended for termination due to insubordination. Prior to this telephone call, Chief Kelly had no knowledge that anyone other than the PBA counsel was representing Mr. Belford. Unbeknownst to the PBA counsel and Chief Kelly, Mr. Belford had decided prior to December 15, 1995, that he no longer wanted the PBA counsel's representation and that he wanted new counsel. On Monday, December 18, 1995, the next business day, Chief Kelly received written notification from Mr. Belford's new counsel regarding the reason for Mr. Belford's failure to attend the meeting. It is undisputed that there is no right to consult an attorney before obeying a direct order of a superior officer. Furthermore, it is undisputed that obeying a direct order from a superior officer is a critical and important aspect of the responsibilities of a police officer. On December 20, 1995, Chief Kelly recommended that Mr. Belford be terminated from employment with the School Board for insubordination. Mr. Belford never had a session with Dr. Stock subsequent to August 29, 1995. It was reasonable for Mr. Belford to presume that, since he was being recommended for termination, he was not expected to attend any future session with Dr. Stock. Dr. Stock never made a final determination as to whether Mr. Belford was fit to return to duty. On January 9, 1996, a pre-termination meeting was held with Mr. Belford at which he was represented by counsel. At the meeting, Mr. Belford was notified that he was being terminated for gross insubordination. By letter dated January 26, 1996, the School Board notified Mr. Belford that he was being suspended without pay and that he was being recommended for termination due to gross insubordination. On February 23, 1996, the School Board responded to Mr. Belford's charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. The School Police for the School Board has a written policy regarding separation from employment. The policy defines gross insubordination in section "IV. C. Suspension/Termination" as "a willful disregard or constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature and given by and with proper authority." Furthermore, section "IV. D." provides that "Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." The School Board and the Palm Beach County PBA have a collective bargaining agreement, hereinafter CBA. Article 7 of the CBA, entitled "Police Officers Bill of Rights," provides in pertinent part as follows: 7.1 All law enforcement officers employed by the School Board shall have the following rights and privileges: Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, such interrogation shall be conducted under the following conditions: * * * I. At the request of any law enforcement officer under investigation, he/she shall have the right to be represented by counsel or any other representative of his/her choice who shall be present at all times during such interrogation when the interrogation relates to the officer's continued fitness for law enforcement service. * * * 5. No law enforcement officer shall be discharged, disciplined, demoted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or otherwise be discriminated against in regard to his/her employment, or be threatened with any such treatment, by reason of his/her exercise of the rights granted by this part. Article 29 of the CBA, entitled "Progressive Discipline," provides in pertinent part as follows: This Section covers actions involving oral or written warnings, written reprimands, suspensions, demotions, dismissals, or reductions in grade or pay with prejudice. Disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by sufficient evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 8. The discipline, dismissal, demotion, and suspension of any employee shall be for just cause. Where just cause warrants such action(s), any employee may be demoted, suspended, or dismissed upon recommendation of the Chief of Police to the Superintendent of Schools. Except in cases that constitute a real immediate danger to the District or other flagrant violation, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal warning (written notation). Written warning. Written reprimand filed in Personnel. Suspension with or without pay. Dismissal. It is inferred and a finding is made that Mr. Belford is a member of the Palm Beach County PBA and is, therefore, subject to the collective bargaining agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Palm Beach County School Board enter a final order revoking the suspension and dismissal and reinstating Steven E. Belford under terms and conditions as are appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1997.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Commission on January 22, 1981, and was issued certificate number 02-026742. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been employed as a law enforcement officer with the City of Pompano Beach Police Department. Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance pursuant to Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, possession of cocaine is a felony. In accordance with a collective bargaining agreement, the Police Benevolent Association, as the bargaining unit for its members, agreed to random drug and alcohol testing for all police officers employed by the City of Pompano Beach Police Department. Pursuant to that agreement, Respondent was requested to, and agreed to submit a urine sample for testing on September 24, 1992. In order to coordinate the testing, the City of Pompano Beach had contracted with a private company, Worker's Compensation Medical Center (WCMC), which was to conduct the collection of urine samples for testing purposes. On the testing dates selected, WCMC employees set up collection facilities at the police station. Ms. Bobkier, a WCMC employee with four and a half years experience, was responsible for collecting the urine sample from Respondent. According to Ms. Bobkier, employees from WCMC set up tables at the police station during the hours of 6:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on September 24, 1992. On that date, Respondent presented for testing, completed the paperwork to accompany the sample, went into the bathroom designated for use, and returned a sample to the collection table. This sample was identified as DO482663-5. As she did with all samples collected that date, Ms. Bobkier then placed the sample into a holding cooler until it was transferred back to the WCMC office. Before transferring the samples back to the office, they were cataloged and inventoried. Once back at WCMC, a courier from the testing center, National Health Laboratories (NHL) picked up the samples at approximately 7:15 p.m. on the evening of September 24, 1992. The courier presumably took the samples to NHL where they were given assension numbers by a NHL employee. Neither the courier nor the "assension" employee testified at the hearing. The assension number assigned to sample DO482663-5 was 3303217-5. According to Dr. Donald R. Stalons, the director of NHL, testing on assension sample no. 3303217-5 was performed on September 24, 1992 at approximately 2:45 p.m. NHL is a clinical laboratory fully licensed by the State of Florida and the federal government and is authorized to perform forensic toxicological testing. According to the test results for assension sample no. 3303217-5, such sample was positive for cocaine metabolite. The "assension number" referred to above was the control number assigned to the sample for testing purposes. The sample retained that number throughout the testing process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3695 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 12, and 21 are accepted. Paragraphs 13 through 20 are rejected to the extent that they conclude the sample was Respondent's. The Petitioner failed to prove the sample was Respondent's as his sample was not transported to the testing center until approximately 7:15 p.m. on September 24, 1992. The sample tested by NHL purported to be Respondent's sample was tested at 2:45 p.m. that same day. This would be physically impossible. To the extent that the paragraphs correctly outline the testing procedures and results at NHL, they could be accepted but are irrelevant as the sample could not have been Respondent's. Paragraph 22 is rejected as it is not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Paragraphs 23 through 32 are rejected as irrelevant and outside the scope of the administrative complaint. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted in a form which can be addressed by either accepting or rejecting a statement of fact. Otherwise, Respondent's proposed findings of fact are rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Lober Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 W. George Allen One River Plaza, Suite 701 305 S. Andrews Avenue P.O. Box 14738 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
