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LUSHERYL WALDEN vs SOMERSET PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.; WISE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.; AND THOMAS KELLEHER, 20-005191 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 30, 2020 Number: 20-005191 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 2024

The Issue Whether Somerset Park Condominium Association, Inc.; Wise Property Management, Inc.; and Thomas Kelleher (collectively referred to as Respondents) discriminated against Lusheryl Walden (Ms. Walden or Petitioner), on the basis of Ms. Walden’s disability; and, if so, the relief to which Ms. Walden is entitled.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Walden is a 49-year-old woman. She has a muscle disorder which causes her to need the assistance of a medical walker. She also uses a cane and electronic wheelchair. Ms. Walden lives in a rented condominium unit at Somerset Park Condominiums (Somerset Park), which is located at 2866 Somerset Park Drive, Unit 103, Tampa, Florida. She has lived in unit 103 since March 2018. Unit 103 is privately owned, but is managed, along with the other condominium units at Somerset Park, by Wise Property Management, Inc. Mr. Kelleher is employed by Wise Property Management, Inc., as the property manager for Somerset Park. Somerset Park was created by, and continues to be governed by, a Declaration of Condominium of Somerset Park, A Condominium (Declaration), which instrument was recorded in 2006, in the public records of Hillsborough County, Florida. The Declaration describes parking spaces as follows: (c) Parking Spaces. Parking for the Condominium is part of the Common Elements of the Condominium on the Condominium Property. The parking spaces shown on Exhibit 2 of the Declaration may be assigned to a Unit (which assignment need not be recorded in the public records of the County) by the Developer (for so long as the Developer offers a Unit for sale in the Condominium and thereafter by the Association), whereupon it shall become Limited Common Elements of the Unit to which it is assigned. Any consideration paid for the assignment of the parking spaces shall belong to the Developer. A Unit Owner may assign the Limited Common Element parking space appurtenant to his Unit to another Unit by written instrument delivered to (and to be held by) the Association; provided however that no Unit may be left without one Limited Common Element parking space. Upon making such assignment, the Limited Common Element so assigned shall become an appurtenance to the Unit(s) and shall pass with the title thereto regardless of whether or not specifically referenced in the deed or other instrument of conveyance of the Unit. According to the Declaration, parking spaces at Somerset Park are considered “limited common elements” after they are assigned to a unit. Generally speaking, limited common elements consist of properties, equipment, or structures whose use is reserved to a particular unit to the exclusion of other units. Units at Somerset Park are individually owned. When a unit is sold by Somerset Park, the unit comes with its own parking space, which is considered a limited common element “appurtenant thereto.” Other types of limited common elements include patios, balconies, and terraces, as well as air conditioning compressors and water heaters that are located outside of the condominium unit. When Ms. Walden moved into unit 103 in 2018, she was notified that she was assigned to parking space number 409. Parking space number 409 is the limited common element attached to unit 103. In March 2020, Ms. Walden made a verbal request to Mr. Kelleher to be reassigned a parking space closer to her unit. Mr. Kelleher told Ms. Walden that he could not reassign a parking space, but that she was welcomed to reach out to her neighbors to find someone willing to switch. The Declaration specifically sets forth the means by which an assigned parking space may be reassigned. It provides that a “unit owner may assign the limited common element parking space appurtenant to his unit to another unit by written instrument delivered to [Somerset Park.]” For a parking space assigned to a unit that is still owned by Somerset Park, Somerset Park may reassign such parking space to another unit. Ms. Walden’s assigned parking space—parking space number 409—is four parking spaces away from her unit. Ms. Walden has an informal agreement with the resident assigned to parking space number 408 (which is three spaces away from her unit), who allows her to park in that space. There are six parking spaces closer to Ms. Walden’s unit than her assigned space—three to the left and three to the right of the walkway to her unit. All six parking spaces are assigned as limited common elements to condominium units not owned by Somerset Park. All six are outside the control of Respondents who have no authority to force the owners to switch spaces with Ms. Walden. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner failed to prove that there was any reasonable accommodation Respondents could have given her that would have enabled her to park closer to her unit. Respondents offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying Petitioner’s request for a parking space closer to her unit. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents intentionally discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. 1 Fairway Villas was vacated through settlement agreement during the pendency of an appeal. 2 Somerset Park has unassigned parking spaces that are not reserved as limited common elements. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2021. Joseph G. Riopelle, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Lusheryl Walden 2866 Somerset Park Drive, #103 Tampa, Florida 33613 Boyd, Richards, Parker and Colonnelli, P.L. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 1150 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

CFR (1) 24 CFR 100.204 Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.68760.20760.23760.35760.37 DOAH Case (1) 20-5191
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MARCELLA AND LILIANA ZAMBRANO vs VERSAILLES PLAZA CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC., 13-004335 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 08, 2013 Number: 13-004335 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2014

The Issue Whether Respondent Versailles Plaza Condo Association, Inc., ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Marcella Zambrano's disability in violation of Florida's Fair Housing Act, and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Marcella Zambrano ("Marcella") is a 28-year- old-female, who is mentally retarded and suffers from cerebral palsy. Marcella weighs 260 pounds, has the mental age of a two-year-old, cannot speak, has difficulty walking, and frequently falls down when she attempts to walk. Marcella attended the final hearing in a wheelchair, and she has obvious physical and cognitive impairments. Marcella requires the use of a wheelchair due to her very limited mobility. She cannot be left alone for very long, and she is unable to wheel herself in a wheelchair. Petitioner Liliana Zambrano is Marcella's mother and primary caregiver. Liliana Zambrano weighs 135 pounds, and pushes Marcella in the wheelchair. The wheelchair weighs approximately forty pounds, and it is difficult for Liliana Zambrano to transport Marcella in the wheelchair. Petitioners reside in a third-floor unit at the Versailles Plaza Condominium in Miami, Florida. Respondent is the condominium association for the condominium complex. Petitioner Liliana Zambrano has two assigned parking spots for her unit within the complex's resident parking lot. Petitioners reside in the last unit on the far-east side of the residential building in which their unit is located. There is only one entrance from the parking lot into the condominium building in which Petitioners' unit is located. The entrance to the building is located in the middle of the building. The distance from Petitioners' assigned parking spot to the entrance of the building is approximately 50 yards. The distance from the entrance of the building to Petitioners' unit is approximately another 50 yards. Thus, the total distance from the assigned resident parking spot to Petitioners' unit is approximately 100 yards. Marcella attends a day program at the Association for Retarded Citizens ("ARC") from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., three days a week. In order to get to the program, a bus arrives at the front of the condominium complex to pick her up. A gate is located at the front of the condominium complex. The bus stops to pick Marcella up just outside the gate. In order to get Marcella to the bus in the mornings, Liliana Zambrano must push her in the wheelchair from their apartment through the entrance of the building, then from the entrance of the building through the parking lot, and then from the parking lot through the front gate. Once Petitioners reach the gate, Liliana Zambrano must activate a hand-held remote-controlled device for the gate to open. When the gate opens, Liliana Zambrano must then push Marcella's wheelchair to get her out of the complex and to the bus. No ramp is located in the vicinity of the gate. This mode of transporting Marcella is repeated in the opposite direction in the afternoons when the bus returns to the complex to drop Marcella off from the ARC program. Petitioners requested that Respondent provide them a reasonable accommodation due to Marcella's handicap by re-assigning at least one of their parking spots closer to the entrance of the building. Petitioners further requested that Respondent provide them a reasonable accommodation for Marcella's handicap by allowing the ARC bus to enter the building's drive-way to drop her off in the afternoons. Respondent offered Petitioners a new parking spot outside the fenced-in condominium parking lot in an area typically reserved for visitors of the complex. In order to transport Marcella to and from the parking space proposed by Respondent as an accommodation, Liliana Zambrano would be required to push Marcella's wheelchair through a spring-loaded gate that will not open or close automatically. Moreover, Petitioners would have to negotiate two curbs, which are each five to six inches high. Furthermore, the space is in a high traffic area directly in front of a fire hydrant. As to the request regarding access for the bus, Respondent refused to allow the bus to enter the complex through the gate. The evidence adduced at the final hearing established that Marcella is a handicapped person because she has physical and mental impairments which substantially limit one or more life activities, and she has developmental disabilities. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Respondent knew of Marcella's handicap, that reasonable accommodations were requested and are necessary to afford Petitioners an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling and facilities, and that Respondent refused to provide the reasonable accommodations for Marcella's disability by failing to assign Liliana Zambrano a designated accessible parking spot closer to the entrance of the building and by failing to allow the ARC bus to enter the complex. Respondent failed to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by FCHR requiring that Respondent: provide Petitioners with an accessible parking space closer to the entrance of the building; allow the ARC bus to enter the complex through the gate; and award Petitioners' counsel their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. If there is a dispute regarding the amount of attorneys' fees and costs, remand this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the purpose of determining the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2014.

CFR (1) 24 CFR 100.204 Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57393.063760.20760.22760.23760.34760.35760.37
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THOMAS V. INFANTINO AND FRANCES INFANTINO vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-006017BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Nov. 03, 1989 Number: 89-006017BID Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

The Issue Whether the specifications set forth in Respondent's Invitation To Bid for Lease No. 590:2029 are in accordance with law.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) determines space need annually pursuant to a letter of agency staffing, primarily generated as a result of legislatively allocated new positions. Based on the letter of agency staffing showing the need for additional office space in the Inverness, Florida service area of the Department's District Three, the Department caused an ITB to be advertised regarding Lease No. 590:2029 seeking some 19,373 square feet of office space, plus of minus 3%. The Petitioners presently lease office space to the Department in the Inverness, Florida, District Three service area. This office space is located within the preferred zone set forth in Attachment B to the ITB. In addition to the presently leased space, the Petitioner intends to offer additional space within the preferred area. The Department's Leasing Manual HRS M 70-1 (Manual) sets out the procedure to be followed when the Department is seeking to lease office space of 2,000 square feet or more in privately owned buildings. Within this manual are the forms to be utilized for this purpose and, among other forms, is an ITB packet that contains a Bid Submittal Form (BSF) and, within the BSF is a page entitled Evaluation Criteria. The Department followed the procedure set forth in the manual in advertising for competitive bids on Lease No. 590:2029 for office space in Inverness, Florida service area of District Three and, in doing so, used the ITB packet that contains the BSF with the Evaluation Criteria page. The BSF, including the Evaluation Criteria page, is a slightly modified version of the Department of General Services' (DGS) Request For Proposal Submittal Form - BPM 4136, incorporated by reference in Rule 13M-1.015(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code, as a suggested format. The Evaluation Criteria page of the Department's BSF contains nine of the eleven evaluation criteria set forth on the evaluation criteria page of the BPM 4136, but does not place any limit on the weight of award factors as does BPM 4136 on two of the same criteria used by the Department. The Evaluation Criteria set out in paragraph C. 2. and 4. of BPM 4136 which corresponds to paragraph 1(a) and 2(c) of the Department's Evaluation page, provide that award factors for these two criteria should not exceed ten, whereas the Department does not place a limit on the award factors for any of the criteria. The two Evaluation Criteria on BPM 4136 that do not appear on the Department's Evaluation Criteria page address the availability of dining facilities and proximity of offered space to other Department activities and public services. Both the BSF and BPM 4136 are used in bidding for space in existing facilities and, therefore, require a scaled floor plan showing present configuration, with measurements that equate to the net rentable square footage using the Standard Method of Space Measurement. The BSF does not attach a "floor plan for suggested configuration of offices and rooms" as does the BPM 4136 but does provide the number, types and sizes of rooms to be placed in the existing facility. Both forms leave the final configuration of the floor plan to the successful bidder and the lessee. The Department's reasoning for not including a "suggested floor plan" is that this may reduce the number of prospective bidders due to the varied configuration of existing facilities in the bid area. The majority of the clients to be served by the Department in Citrus County, Florida reside within the preferred zone shown as Attachment B. However, there may be other areas where a lesser concentration of clients may be served by "outposting". That is, servicing those clients on a regular scheduled basis at other smaller facilities within an area outside of the preferred zone. The Department no longer requires the facility to be under one roof but how co-location is accomplished is important to the efficient utilization of services and supervision of staff. Elderly and handicapped clients experience difficulty in utilizing needed services (when more than one service is needed) because of distance between buildings. Department clients frequently utilize the services of more than one program and such multi-service utilization is projected to increase in the future. Public transportation in Citrus County, Florida is partially funded by the Department to assist its clients and is uniformly available to the clients in the Inverness services area. The Department did not prepare any studies of functional space needs, staff space needs, client needs, client demographics or client transportation needs before or after the ITB was advertised. The Evaluation Criteria did not include a factor for future expansion even though the Department's caseload is projected to increase. In accordance with the procedure set forth in the Manual an Evaluation Committee (Committee) was appointed to determine, among other things, the award factor or weight to be placed on the nine Evaluation Criteria set forth on the Evaluation Criteria page of the BSF. The committee determined the significance of the nine criteria on the Evaluation page to the Department's needs in regard to Lease No. 590-2029 and awarded a weight factor in accordance with the significance of the criteria. Those criteria most significant to the Department's needs received the highest weight. These award factors were added to the Evaluation page of the BSF at the time the ITB was advertised. No additional Evaluation Criteria were used by the Committee. There was insufficient evidence to show that Committee's action in determining the weight to be given the nine criteria was arbitrary or capricious or unlawful even though different weights had been placed on some of the same criteria in the 1988 ITB. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to show that any of the specifications set forth in the ITB did not promote fair competition or otherwise reflect normal policy or, that the criteria were designed to favor a specific location or prospective bidder within the preferred zone. The procedure and the forms set forth in the Manual and used by the Department, including the procedure followed by the Evaluation Committee in putting together the ITB for Lease No. 590:2029, comports substantially with all substantive provisions of Chapter 13M-1, Florida Administrative Code, and more specifically with Rule 13M-1.015, Florida Administrative Code. The differences, such as they are, are not substantial, nor is there any extrinsic or intrinsic divergence from the substance of the rule such as to mislead any potential bidder who sought to address the ITB.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department dismissing Petitioners' Formal Notice of Written Protest. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6017BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings Of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. - 3. Covered in the Preliminary Statement 4. 6. Adopted generally in Findings of Fact 4 - 11, otherwise not material or a restatement of testimony and stated as a finding of fact. 7. - 8. Not material or relevant. 9. - 22. Adopted generally in Findings of Fact 4 - 11, 15, 17 and 18, otherwise not material or a restatement of testimony and not state as a finding of fact. 23. - 24. Not material or relevant. 23. - 24.*Covered in the Conclusions of Law, otherwise not material or a restatement of testimony and stated as a finding of fact. 25. - 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 16. 28. - 31. Not material. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16, otherwise a restatement of testimony and not stated as a finding of fact. - 37. Not material or a restatement of testimony and stated as a finding of fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. - 3. Not material. 4. 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 13, respectively. 7. - 9. Not material. 10. - 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 12 and 13. 13. - 15. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 17. Not material. 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 19. - 22. Not Material COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32609 Arthur R. Shell, Esquire 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 Sam Powers, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Case No. - 89-6017BID

Florida Laws (6) 120.53120.54120.56120.57255.249255.25
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ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 88-002453 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002453 Latest Update: Aug. 30, 1988

Findings Of Fact Antonios Markopoulos, Appellant, applied for seven variances on property located at 200 Coronado Drive, Clearwater, Florida, to allow the construction of a 7 to 9 story parking garage covering the property from lot line to lot line. The property in question is a 95 feet x 105 feet parking lot adjacent to a hotel, shops and restaurants owned by Appellant. The first waiver requested was of the minimum lot size of 150 feet on which to build. Since this property was unique in that regard and could never attain the 150 feet minimum dimension, the Board granted that variance. The other six requests for variances involved setbacks and open space requirements. Appellant proposes to build a parking garage with two elevators to lift cars to the various parking levels with the building extending to the lot lines in all four directions. The hotel, restaurants and stores located at this site and owned by Appellant are nonconforming uses. The hotel has 86 rooms and if built today would require a minimum of 86 parking spaces. The stores and restaurants would require additional parking spaces that are now not available. Appellant proposes to construct a garage with approximately 340 parking spaces which he contends are the minimum needed to provide adequate parking for patrons at the hotel, stores and restaurants. At the hearing before the Board, Appellant contended that the parking garage would also serve to relieve parking problems at other establishments in the vicinity. Appellant proposes to have parking customers drive up a ramp through a ticket machine which will dispense a ticket which can be validated at the hotel, restaurants or shops. The car will then be parked by attendants who will drive the car onto an elevator to lift the car to a floor with parking space. This clearly indicates that Appellant is proposing to construct a parking garage which will be open to the general public. Appellant presented testimony that if the setbacks required by the Code were followed on all sides, there would be insufficient square feet per floor to make the parking garage financially feasible. He also presented testimony of the City of Clearwater Traffic Engineer to the effect that construction of a parking garage at this location would not create a traffic problem. Although most, if not all, of the property surrounding Appellant's property are nonconforming with less setbacks than are required by the existing code, none of these properties have been covered lot line to lot line with a structure or structures. The primary emphasis of the evidence submitted by Appellant is that there is insufficient parking at Clearwater Beach, and erection of a parking garage will do much to alleviate this problem.

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EDDY PHILIPPEAUX vs MCZ/CENTRUM FLAMINGO II, LLC, 13-004576 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 21, 2013 Number: 13-004576 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 2024
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STANISLAW BUDZINSKI AND KAZIMIERA BUDZINSKI vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 97-001109 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 10, 1997 Number: 97-001109 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1997

Findings Of Fact Lior Hason is the owner of Britt's Cafe, a restaurant which occupies property owned by the Petitioner's Stanislaw and Kasimiera Budzinski. On or about December 19, 1995, Harry S. Cline, an attorney for Mr. Hason and the Budzinskis, filed an application for a variance from the City of Clearwater's Development Code, for the purpose of eliminating three required parking spaces from the front of the subject property for the construction of an outdoor cafe at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard. The Code requires one parking space per 200 square feet of gross floor area, and a variance was required to remove three existing parking spaces from the unit's parking space inventory. The matter was brought before the City's Development Code Adjustment Board at its January 11, 1996 meeting. Mr. Cline appeared at the meeting on behalf of the applicant and presented the project. No one else was present to speak in support of or in opposition to the request. However, four letters in opposition from neighboring business owners were submitted. Notwithstanding these objections, the Board determined that the applicant had substantially met all standards for approval listed in the City's Land Development Code; and upon vote of the Board, the application was approved, subject to certain conditions, by a three to two majority. Mr. Hason entered into discussions with City officials to determine what was necessary. Official City reaction was initially favorable. Mr. Hason was advised of the requirements for the project and had plans drawn which called for a deck with a 35 to 36 inch railing with landscaping around it, and with posts and lights. When the plans were submitted to the City officials, the only change suggested was to raise the railing height to 45 inches, which was done, after which the City approved the plans and the permit was granted. The deck was then constructed exactly according to the approved plans. At some time during 1996, Mr. Hason discussed with some City employees putting an awning over the deck. During these discussions, the City employees sent Mr. Hason a copy of Section 41.221(1)(c), Clearwater City Code, which provides for awnings to be removable. Mr. Hason considered the sending of this Code provision to be tantamount to a favorable reply to his inquiry, and, based on that, he finalized his plans for the installation of a removable awning. The proposed awning is designed in such a fashion as to be extendible and retractable on a frame, capable of easily being pulled up against the front of the building like a drapery. With a minimum of further effort, consisting of the removal a several bolts, the entire awning construction can be removed from the frame. Mr. Hason submitted his application for the variance to install the awning on February 2, 1997. In the interim, the City employees with whom Mr. Hason discussed the project changed their position from favoring the project to opposing it. He was ultimately advised in December 1996 or January 1997 that the awning could not be permitted because an awning could not be approved over a deck for which a permit should not have been issued and for which the issuance was a mistake. Though the Board had not yet voted on the application, no information was given to Mr. Hason as to what he could do to make the project approvable. His application, on February 2, 1997, was submitted because, Hason claims, he had been told, by someone not further identified, that applying for a variance for the awning would make everything right. The Variance Staff Report submitted to the Board by the appropriate City employees acknowledged that the frame over which Mr. Hason proposed to put the awning does not meet code because it was constructed within a required setback area from South Gulfview Boulevard, but since the frame was built pursuant to a City-issued permit, consistent with City policy, the City accepted its existence. In its final recommendation to the Board, the staff concluded that notwithstanding the encroachment into the setback area, the project "appears to comply with all standards for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe:" The staff then went on to recommend approval of the project subject to certain conditions, all of which, Mr. Hason accepts and agrees to. Nonetheless, the Board denied the permit by a vote of four to one. Mr. Hason contends that the Board vote was an attempt by the Board to get back at him because of what it perceived as his failure to comply with the conditions placed upon the issuance of the first permit and his alleged misrepresentation of the scope of his project at the time. Mr. Hason, however, categorically denies he has done anything contrary to the dictates of the City. He went back to City officials many times during the construction of the deck to make sure the project was built as required. The majority of the Board members believe, however, that the deck as constructed, goes far beyond the limited structure approved by the granting of the parking space variance in January 1996. This animosity toward the project can be seen from a review of the audio record of the February 13, 1997, Board meeting where, during a colloquy between a Board member and Mr. Hason, it appeared the member was somewhat put out by the entire situation. His analysis indicates a less than complete recollection of the matter, however. Whereas one of the conditions to the issuance of the initial permit was that the area of the outdoor cafe should not be greater than 25 percent of the indoor area of the restaurant, this member pointed out that the 69 outdoor seats were far in excess of 25 percent of the 115 or so indoor seats. This constituted a confusion of seating as opposed to area. No evidence was presented concerning whether Mr. Hason had violated the area constraint. In the main, however, while it appeared that a majority of the Board members were unhappy about the way the project developed, and expressed the opinion that the project did not conform to what they had intended to approve, there was no indication any member s vote was motivated by anything other than a sincere belief in the correctness of his position. There was no indication of any inappropriate or vindictive action by anyone on the Board or its staff. Stephen Sarnoff, a central permitting specialist with the City reviewed the plans for the initial construction and for the current application. As he recalls, the plans for the initial deck construction did not show any support beams, fans, overhead structure or latticework fencing, and the deck, as built, does not conform to the plans as submitted. City Code requirements call for a railing of from 30 to 42 inches high. The current railing of 45 inches does not conform to that standard, and Mr. Sarnoff is not aware of any request from the City that the railing be raised to that height, as Mr. Hason claims. By the same token, while there is no requirement in the ordinance that a deck be of a certain height, anything higher than 12 inches is considered a structure and a waiver is required. This deck was approved for 12 inches. A certificate of occupancy is usually issued for a deck, but in the instant case, such a certificate has not been issued because the deck, as built, is not in compliance with the 1996 approval. If it is brought into compliance, it will be approved. Sarnoff is aware of and familiar with other outdoor restaurant decks built at various locations in the Clearwater area, as indicated by Mr. Hason. Some are not within the CR-28 zone and do not come under the same standards as are applicable here. Others, which must conform to the instant requirements appear to have movable awnings which are acceptable. Still others are in a different zoning district with different set-back requirements, and some were initially denied, but were subsequently approved when they were brought into compliance with the requirements. John Richter, a senior planner for the City, was the individual who prepared the staff report on the instant project and initially recommended approval, contingent upon changes to the external appearance of the facility. He made suggestions and has discussed the project with Hason on his several visits to the property. He did discuss an awning with Hason at some point, but their discussions did not deal with its mobility. All in all, Mr. Richter concluded that the project appears to meet the standard for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe. David S. Shuford, the City's central permitting director and development code administrator indicated that the variance required for the awning, which was an integral part of the structure already built, was not automatically granted with the granting of the permit for the deck structure. Section 42.221, Clearwater City Code, was adopted to promote a more festival atmosphere in some of the outdoor tourist areas. The intent of subsection (l)(c) of that provision was to require the use of moveable items and to design structures that would meet wind requirements and not interfere with pedestrian traffic. The term "moveable" means what it says, and in Shuford's opinion, from the plans he saw, the proposed awning would not be easily moveable on a daily basis. The Clearwater City Code establishes the area in question as one where, once guidelines are developed, they will be adopted and be complied with. Mr. Shuford opines that the current deck, in the rafter area, goes beyond what was proposed at the time the project was submitted for the parking variance and was approved. This is what appears to be the source of the difficulty the Board members have with it. However, if designed to comply with the guidelines, this awning could be approved. He would agree with the conditions outlined in the staff recommendation so far as they relate to painting and architectural matters.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.69
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ELIZABETHAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 90-004065BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jun. 29, 1990 Number: 90-004065BID Latest Update: Aug. 03, 1990

Findings Of Fact On or about January 26, 1990, the Respondent sought competitive bids through Invitation to Bid Number 590:2123 for the lease of certain office space in Plant City, Florida. The bid opening occurred on March 1, 1990, and Intervenor was determined to have submitted the lowest responsive bid. In addition to Intervenor's bid, bids were received from Petitioner and Walden Investment Company, which is not a party in this case. On or about May 8, 1990, the Respondent notified all bidders of its intent to award this lease to Intervenor, and on May 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed its notice of protest concerning this award claiming that Intervenor's bid was not responsive to the parking requirements in the Invitation to Bid. Section 15 of the Invitation to Bid requires that a minimum of 65 parking spaces be provided, and that a minimum of 15 of these spaces must be full size and a minimum of 5 must meet ANSI standards for handicapped parking spaces. No definition or specification for full size parking spaces is provided in the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not establish that there is a commonly accepted standard for full size parking spaces in the construction or development industry, or that the Respondent uniformly requires all full size parking spaces to be of certain dimensions. The Intervenor certified in its bid that it would meet the parking space requirement of the Invitation to Bid. The Respondent does not require detailed site plans which would depict actual dimensions for each parking space to be submitted with each bid. Rather, Section 10(d) of the Invitation to Bid requires only a line drawing "drawn roughly to scale", and specifies that final site layout will be a "joint effort between the department and the lessor so as to best meet the needs of the department". The Intervenor did submit a rough line drawing with its bid which depicts 71 parking spaces. The Respondent routinely accepts a bidder's certification that it will meet the parking requirements in an Invitation to Bid, and if those requirements ultimately are not met, the Respondent may proceed against the performance bond which the successful bidder is required to post. The Petitioner presented evidence that there is not enough room on Intervenor's site to provide 15 full size parking spaces measuring 10 feet wide by 20 feet long. However, there is nothing in the Invitation to Bid, or in the City of Plant City's Code which requires full size parking spaces of this dimension. Based upon its certification and the inclusion of a rough line drawing showing space for parking in excess of the requirements in the Invitation to Bid on this site,, it is found that Intervenor was responsive to the parking requirements in this Invitation to Bid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest and awarding Lease Number 590:2123 to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Blvd. 5th Floor, Room 520 Tampa, FL 33614-9990 Alan Taylor P. O. Box 7077 Winter Haven, FL 33883-7077 Richard C. Langford, Esquire P. O. Box 3706 St. Petersburg, FL 33731-3706 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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WHARTON LITTLE RIVER INVESTMENT, INC., BY PROCACCI COMMERCIAL REALTY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 95-001839BID (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 14, 1995 Number: 95-001839BID Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1995

The Issue Whether the Department of Corrections' proposed award of Lease No. 700:0710 to Melstine Corporation was proper.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Corrections, Region Four (Department), issued a request for proposals for approximately 7,500 square feet of office space in Dade County which was designated as Lease No. 700:0710 (RFP). The office space was to be used as offices for the professional and support staff who were providing probation and parole supervision. Petitioner Wharton Little River (Wharton), Intervenor Green East #2, Ltd. (Green East), and Melstine Corporation (Melstine) submitted proposals to the Department. The Department's evaluation committee evaluated the three proposals, and their evaluation included a site visit to each of the proposed locations. Melstine Corporation received the highest number of points followed by Wharton Little River. The Department notified all bidders of its intent to award the lease to Melstine. On March 15, 1995, Wharton filed a notice of intent to protest the Department's decision to award the lease to Melstine. Wharton filed its formal written protest on March 14, 1995. The RFP set forth the requirements for submitting a responsive proposal and the criteria to be used in evaluating the proposals. The bidders were required to provide 55 offstreet parking spaces for the exclusive use of the Department's employees and clients at no additional cost to the Department. This provision is interpreted to mean that the bidder could propose 55 exclusive parking spaces plus or minus one to two percent. The RFP provided spaces in which the bidders were to indicate whether they were proposing onsite or offsite parking. The RFP also provides: Federal, state, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from respon- sibility. This provision is interpreted to include applicable zoning codes. Both Melstine and Wharton proposed to provide 55 exclusive parking spaces onsite. Green East proposed 40 exclusive spaces and 20 nonexclusive spaces. The evidence did not establish whether Green East's spaces were onsite or offsite. The evaluation criteria assigned a maximum number of points a bidder could receive for specific criteria. The maximum points totaled 100. The criteria for evaluating parking was the "[p]roximity of adequate parking area to the building. Must be well lighted." The maximum number of points that could be awarded to a bidder for parking was 10. Melstine received 10 points for parking. The space proposed by Melstine is located on the ground floor of a six-story building with approximately 87,000 square feet. The building is currently vacant. Melstine is actively seeking to lease other portions of the building. In its proposal Melstine stated that its intention was to market the remaining space on the ground floor to the banking industry as a banking location. There are 54 onsite parking spaces on the property proposed by Melstine. There is additional space onsite that could be converted to 20 parking spaces, bringing the total parking spaces available on the Melstine property to There are approximately 50 offsite parking spaces available in a lot across the street from the building proposed by Melstine. Melstine provided a map in its proposal showing that the located property was located in a C-1, limited commercial, zone. By letter dated February 21, 1995, Phillip J. Procacci, advised the Department that he felt that the Melstine proposal did not meet the requirements of the RFP because the parking spaces did not meet the zoning code requirements of the City of Miami. Department staff contacted the City of Miami zoning officials and were advised that the parking proposed by Melstine was acceptable under the City of Miami's zoning regulations. The Department relied on the representations from the City of Miami that the Melstine property would be in conformance with the zoning code. By letter dated April 17, 1995, Juan C. Gonzalez, Acting Zoning Administrator, advised Melstine's agent that the parking on the Melstine site would be acceptable as meeting the zoning requirements for the City of Miami for office use without the need of providing additional spaces for existing office square footage. By letter dated April 24, 1995, Mr. Gonzalez further clarified the City of Miami's position on parking spaces assigned to individual tenants. While the code does mandate a certain amount of spaces to be provided on site for individual uses, the code is silent on how the parking will be assigned, therefore, the city does not become involved or regulates assignment of existing parking spaces. Region Four of the Department has not experienced a problem with lessors not providing adequate parking in the past. Melstine's proposal met the parking requirements of the RFP and complied with the City of Miami's zoning ordinance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the bid protest of Wharton Little River, Investment, Inc. by Procacci Commercial Realty, Inc. be dismissed and that Lease No. 700:0710 be awarded to Melstine Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1839BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. (Proposed Recommended Order After Reopening of Hearing) Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance as it refers to the parking criteria. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: Accepted to the extent that Wharton received the second highest number of points. Paragraphs 7-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. There was no evidence that access to the parking lot from the Melstine property is owned by Melstine. Paragraphs 13-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 24-25: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 26-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Accepted. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 31: Accepted. Paragraphs 32-34: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 35-41: Accepted in substance. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact. (The paragraphs are unnumbered. Each paragraph will be addressed in the order it appears under the section entitled, "The Computation of Error.") Paragraph 1: The first three sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 2: These adopted paragraphs are addressed above under Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 3-4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 5: Rejected as a conclusion of law. Paragraph 6: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Beth Atchison Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas 465 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432 John R. Beranek, Esquire 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida Harry K. Singletary, 2601 Blairstone Road 32302 Jr., Secretary Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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