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TOXICOLOGY TESTING SERVICE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 92-001779BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 19, 1992 Number: 92-001779BID Latest Update: Jun. 04, 1992

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the decision of the respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), to award the subject bid to intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors), comported with the essential requirements of law.

Findings Of Fact Background On October 16, 1991, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued invitation to bid number 91-CO-5369 (hereinafter "the ITB"), which sought to secure appropriate services to perform drug tests on certain applicants for employment and existing employees of the Department. The deadline for submitting bids was established as 11:00 a.m., November 7, 1991. At the time of the deadline, the Department had received four bids, including those of petitioner, Toxicology Testing Service, Inc., and intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors). Petitioner's bid was $372,000, and Doctors' bid was $315,491.60. Based on its evaluation, the Department ranked Doctors first and petitioner second, with composite scores of 91.67 and 90.38, respectively, and proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely formal written protest to contest the Department's decision, and charged that the Department materially departed from the evaluation criteria contained in the ITB. The Invitation to Bid Pertinent to this case, section 4.7 of the ITB established the evaluation criteria to be used in determining the acceptability of the bids as follows: 4.7 Evaluation Criteria Criteria Point Value 1. References 5 2. Firm Profile 5 3. Firms Qualifications 15 Understanding of Scope of Services 25 Bid Price 50 100 And, section 4.7.5 of the ITB established the following methodology to be utilized in awarding points for the bid price criteria: The award for bid price shall be determined as follows: The Bidder who submits the lowest bid price will be awarded 50 points. All others bidders will be awarded points based on the following formula: Bid Price Points = 50 X [1-A/B] where: A = the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid(s). B = the low bid. The lowest bid price will be computed by multiplying the unit prices for Items 1, 2 and 3 for all three years by the estimated quantity. The estimated quantity is for bidding purposes only and is not a guarantee. The total annual cost for Items 1 and 2 for all three years will be added to determine the Total Cost for all three years. The vendor with the lowest Total Cost will be awarded the 50 points. Negative points will not be awarded. Pursuant to the provisions of section 5.13 of the ITB, the contract was to be awarded to the bidder that received the highest overall point total under the criteria established by section 4.7 of the ITB. The Department's evaluation and the protest Based on its evaluation of the bids, the Department's evaluation committee awarded petitioner 49.34 points for its technical proposal (items 1-4 of the evaluation criteria) and Doctor's 41.67 points for its technical proposal. Bid price points were then established through a preexisting computer program, which derived 41.04 points for petitioner and 50 points for Doctors. When totalled, petitioner received 90.38 points and Doctors received 91.67 points. Accordingly, the Department proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely protest to contest such award. The gravamen of that protest is petitioner's contention that the Department applied a methodology other than that established by the ITB to derive the bid price points and that had it utilized the methodology established by the ITB petitioner would have received the most points and been the prevailing bidder. 1/ Consistent with petitioner's contention, the proof demonstrates that the computer program used to derive the bid price points and the methodology established by the ITB to derive such points differed with regard to the definition of A in the formula, discussed supra. In the computer program, factor A was defined as the difference between the price of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. In the ITB, factor A was defined as the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. The Department was not, however, aware of this dichotomy until the subject protest, believing that its ITB conformed with the methodology it had previously programed for its computer, and, at hearing, offered proof, which is credited, that use of the word "percentage" in the definition of A was a typographical error which should have read "price." Notably, the Department heavily weighed price (50%) in its ITB, and it is apparent the Department intended to use a formula that would create a difference in price scoring that was relative to any difference in the bid prices. Use of the formula, as correctly defined in its computer program, would accomplish such goal. Use of the formula, as incorrectly defined by the ITB and interpreted by petitioner in these proceedings, would not accord any meaningful weight to price. 2/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the Department departed from the essential requirements of law when it declined to apply the methodology as interpreted by petitioner to award the contract. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Department's decision to stand by its award based on the correctly defined methodology departed from the essential requirements of law. Here, the proof demonstrates that petitioner, upon receipt and review of the ITB, was well aware that the formula for awarding points based on price was nonsensical, and most likely, in error. 3/ Notwithstanding, petitioner took no action under the provisions of general condition 6 and special condition 4.4 of the ITB to raise any question or seek any clarification or interpretation of the formula from the Department. 4/ Rather, petitioner submitted its best price offer, more likely than not, without reliance on the erroneous formula set forth in the ITB. 5/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Department's award of the contract, based on an application of the correct definition of factor A, accorded any bidder an unfair advantage or otherwise departed from the essential requirements of law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the subject bid protest. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May 1992.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68287.057
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SAVIN CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, 84-003346 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003346 Latest Update: Jun. 07, 1985

The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should disqualify Savin Corporation's bid for failure to submit a separate supply price list.

Findings Of Fact On April 26, 1984, DGS issued ITB 402-600-38-B entitled "Walk-up Convenience Copiers, Plain Bond Paper" to establish a state contract for the purchase of walk-up convenience copiers. The ITB contains general and special conditions and specifications. The specifications provide for four types and twelve classes of copiers with four acquisition plans -- one-year lease, two- year lease, three-year lease, and outright purchase. Vendors may submit a bid for each type, class, and acquisition plan. Savin submitted a bid for all acquisition plans in Type I, Classes 1-10; Type II, Classes 1-3; Type III, Classes 1-10; and Type IV, Classes 1-10. /4 The special conditions of the ITB require that a price sheet (page 14 of the ITB) be submitted for each machine bid. The price sheets are used to evaluate the bids, and contracts are awarded in each category to the bidder submitting the lowest cost per copy. The cost per copy is determined by a cost formula set for in the special conditions which consist of three factors: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. The following special conditions of the Invitation To Bid relates to supply costs: C) SUPPLY COST- The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state contract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment; the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median volume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. The price list shall also include the manufacturer's standard test pattern as the original document. Vendor must complete the supply price list (See page 13) and include it with his bid and must submit a separate supply price list reflecting volume discount prices to substantiate that correct price volumes were used unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies during the term of this contract if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all performance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. Failure to include the supply price lists and manufacturer's guaranteed yields with your bid shall automatically disqualify the bid. NOTE: In the event of a variance between supply prices listed on the bid sheet and the supply price list submitted with the bid, the supply price list prices shall prevail, and the bidder's cost per copy will be adjusted accordingly. NOTE: All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply costs volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchasing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. The above quoted portion of the ITB makes it absolutely clear that each vendor had to submit two supply price lists: the supply price list set forth on page 13 and a separate supply price list, reflecting quantity discounts which was to be used to "substantiate that correct price volumes were used." Further, it was specifically stated that the failure to include both supply price lists with the bid would result in the bid being automatically disqualified. The page 13 supply price list consists of a list of various supplies and two columns for the bidder to complete entitled "Net Delivered Price (per carton)" and "Manufacturer's Guaranteed Yield". Page 13 was included in the ITB to cure a problem the Department had in the 1983-84 contract year with the manufacturer's guaranteed yield. A note at the bottom of page 13 reminds the bidder that a separate supply price list must be submitted with the bid. It states: NOTE: Bidders must submit their quantity discount prices for supplies on a separate sheet for verification and inclusion in the contract should the State elect to award supplies. The separate supply price list reflecting quantity discounts was required to verify the prices submitted by the bidder on pages 13 and 14 and to prevent the practice of low-balling". "Low-balling" occurs when a bidder uses a large quantity supply cost to determine the cost per copy on a low volume machine. This results in an artificially low cost per copy and gives the "low- balling" bidder an advantage over other bidders who use the correct supply price based on the median volume of the machine being bid. To verify that the proper cost per copy is submitted the prices on the separate supply price list are compared to the prices on the bid sheet. If there is a conflict, the prices on the separate supply price list prevail, and the prices on the bid sheet and on page 13 are adjusted to conform to the prices on the separate supply sheet. Prior to the 1984 Invitation to Bid Savin historically offered the state volume discount pricing for supplies. However, for the 1984-85 Invitation to Bid Savin decided to offer set pricing for supplies rather than volume discount pricing. Under set pricing the price of the supply item remains the same regardless of the quantity purchased. By offering a set price for supplies, at the lowest published discount pricing level offered to the Federal government, Savin felt it would gain a competitive advantage in Florida and other states that had competitive bidding. In states where competitive bidding was not used Savin did not offer set pricing but used published quantity discount pricing. In response to the 1984 Invitation to Bid, Savin completed the Supply Price List on page 13 and the bid sheet on page 14 for each machine bid. However, Savin did not submit the separate supply price list for each bid as required by the note at the bottom of page 13 and the underlined portion of the special conditions relating to supply cost. Because the separate supply price lists were not submitted with the bids, the Department determined that Savin's bids were unresponsive. The Department also disqualified three or four other vendors, including Royal, Panasonic, and Southern Copy Products, because they did not submit the separate supply price lists. Savin did not submit the separate supply price list because it interpreted the terms and conditions of the ITB as requiring a separate supply price list only when quantity discount pricing was being offered. Because Savin was offering set pricing, it did not consider that the separate supply price list was necessary. However, the only way the Department could determine whether a vendor was offering set pricing or quantity discount pricing was by referring to the separate supply price list. Several other vendors that offered set pricing including Canon, Mita Copy Star America, Pitney Bowes, Monroe and A. B. Dick, submitted separate supply price lists with their bids which indicated that set pricing was being offered. The separate supply price list not only indicated whether quantity discount pricing or set pricing was being offered, as stated above, it was used by the Department to verify the prices submitted on the bid sheets and on page 13. In one case where the bidder offered set pricing, the supply prices for toner and developer listed on the bid sheets and on page 13 differed from the prices on the separate supply price list, and the prices on the bid sheets and page 13 were adjusted to conform with the prices on the separate supply price list. Therefore, the inclusion of the separate supply price list was not necessary only when discount pricing was offered, it was necessary when set pricing was offered. The separate supply price list established that set pricing was being offered; it established the price at which the bidder must sell the supplies; and it was used to verify the prices on the bid sheet and page 13. /5 Therefore, the omission of the separate supply price list from the response to the ITB cannot be considered a minor irregularity which may be waived. Although a separate supply price list is required by the ITB, the list does not have to follow any particular format. The separate list sufficiently indicates that set pricing is being offered if only one price is quoted for a given supply. If varying prices are offered for a given supply, based on the amount ordered, then quantity discount pricing is being offered. Many of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner have been rejected in whole or in part. The majority have been rejected by way of making contrary findings of fact as set forth above. Others have not been addressed in the findings of fact because they are conclusions of law or argument on the issue. However, other proposed findings are rejected for the reasons stated in the subparagraphs below: Paragraphs 17 and 18 are rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and not supported by competent substantial evidence. When Mr. Hittinger was asked whether he assumed that Savin was offering quantity discount pricing, he answered "I didn't assume. I didn't make any assumptions." (T-266). Mrs. Hayes stated: "I am afraid on a bid situation, we can't assume what their pricing would have been if they had submitted it." (T-245) Mr. Nee did indicate that the disqualification of Savin did not make any sense, but explained that statement by stating: "The phrase that didn't make any sense was talking about Savin's failure to submit a quantity discount price list... Because Savin had always done it in the past, and they -- they never left -- if we asked them to cross every T, they crossed every T and it didn't make any sense that something apparently looked to be omitted". Paragraph 15 is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. The evidence indicates that the primary purpose of page 13 was not to establish the price at which vendors would be obligated to sell their supplies, but was included in the ITB for the submission of manufacturer's guaranteed yields (T-144, T-146; T-158-16O, T-166-167, T-242). Further, the witnesses who testified that the vendor would be bound by the prices on page 13 all qualified their answers. In response to the question of whether the bidder would be bound by the prices on page 13, Mrs. Hayes responded, "...if he did submit a substantiating document that he is offering a set price, and that set price agrees with the price that is on page 13, yes." (T-242); Mr. Hittinger responded: "If he receives an award, yes"; "If he had a responsive bid" (T- 264); and "No, in itself it does not. It would have to have a supporting verification sheet to complete that offer." (T-268); Mr. Barker responded, "If they are correct," (T-163). Virtually all the witnesses testified that it was the separate supply price list that established the prices by which the vendors would be bound. Paragraph B is rejected as irrelevant, however, the evidence supports a finding that some state agencies utilize volume discounts on copier supplies and some state agencies do not purchase in sufficient quantities to utilize volume discounts.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Savin's bids be disqualified. DONE AND ENTERED this of 7th June 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57287.042
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CAPITAL ASPHALT, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-003499 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003499 Latest Update: May 17, 1984

Findings Of Fact After its initial review of the bids, Respondent determined that Petitioner was the apparent low bidder, with a total bid of $344,971.53. Subsequently, however, it found an inconsistency in one of Petitioner's item prices and recomputed the subtotal which had the effect of increasing Petitioner's bid to $346,851.53. As a result of this recomputation, Intervenor became the apparent low bidder with its bid of $346,371.06. Respondent discovered that Intervenor had also made a similar error in one of its item prices which, had the subtotal been recalculated, would have increased Intervenor's bid by over $12,000. However, Respondent waived the error and allowed Intervenor's bid to stand. Respondent's bid forms specify various quantities of material required. Each quantity listed is followed by three columns which the bidder must complete. The first column is the unit bid in words (e.g. five dollars and no cents). The second column is the unit bid in numbers (e.g. $5.00). The final column, referred to as the "extension" is the total bid on the item in numbers (e.g. 30 units required times $5.00 per unit equals $150.00) Respondent's item number 10275 specified 1,890 construction signs. Petitioner entered one dollar and fifty cents in the unit bid (words) column, followed by $1.50 in the unit bid (numbers) column. Petitioner's extension column entry was $945.00. Respondent determined that 1,890 signs times one dollar and fifty cents each totalled $2,835.00, rather than $945.00, and raised Petitioner's bid accordingly. Respondent's item number 285710367 specified 7,070 square yards of material. Intervenor entered twelve dollars and no cents in the unit bid (words) column followed by $12.00 and $10.25 in the unit bid (numbers) column. A black line was drawn through the number $12.00, but was not initialed. Intervenor's extension column entry was $72,467.50. Here, Respondent determined that the $10.25 unit price should be permitted since 7,070 square yards times $10.25 did, if fact, equal the stated extension price. Using red ink, Respondent drew a second line through the number $12.00, and initialed this change. Respondent also drew lines through the words twelve (dollars) and no (cents), and wrote the words ten (dollars) and twenty-five (cents) and initialed this correction. Respondent's published policy on bid procedures is contained in its Standard Specifications Manual. Section 3-1 provides in part: In the event of any discrepancy in the three entries for the price for any item. the unit price as shown in words shall govern unless the extension and the unit price shown in figures are in agreement with each other, in which case they shall govern over the unit price shown in words. Respondent applied the above procedure to reject Petitioner's extension price on the signs since it did not agree with the unit price in figures or in words. Respondent applied the above procedure to accept Intervenor's extension price on the material since the $10.25 unit price in figures agreed with the extension. Acceptance of the $10.25 unit price figure (rather than the other entry of $12.00) was essential since no attempt had been made to change the twelve dollar unit price in words. Respondent's policy on bid procedures as set forth in its Standards Specification manual requires initialling of all changes made by the bidder. Section 2-5.1 provides in part: In case a change is made in a word or figure after it has been written in ink or typewritten, the bidder shall write his initials by the change. Intervenor failed to initial the change in its unit price figure. However, Respondent did not consider this to be a significant error and accepted the uninitialed change. Respondent's Standards Specifications Manual, Section 3-1, provides in part: Until the actual award of the contract, however, the right will be reserved to reject any or all proposals and to waive technical errors as may be deemed best for the interest of the State. This policy permits Respondent to reject either or both of these bids because of the errors discussed herein. Conversely, Respondent could consider either or both errors to be merely technical errors and waive them. Respondent's testimony and documentary evidence demonstrated that it does not enforce the policy requiring initialling of corrections. Additionally, Respondent's evidence established that it rigorously applies the procedure in Section 3-1 requiring the unit price in words to prevail where there are discrepancies except when the unit price in numbers and the extension agree. Respondent argues that the unit price figure is critical since the State may wish to order more of a given item and would not want to be bound by an erroneously high unit price. However, a stated unit price would not be binding where there is an error. Rather, the presumably correct extension price could be divided by the bid quantity to determine the correct unit price. The primary purpose of the policy which requires agreement of numbers and initialling of corrections is the prevention of conspiracy between bidders and State employees to alter bids. A further policy consideration, which is the stated basis for waiver of technical errors, is the furtherance of State interest. See Section 3-1, quoted above. In this regard, it should be noted that since Petitioner's original bid is the lowest, acceptance thereof would be in the interest of the State.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order rejecting existing bids and reissuing its bid proposal. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl R. Pennington, Jr., Esquire 325 John Knox Road, Suite L-101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire 863 West Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57337.11
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ALFAIR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-000006BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000006BID Latest Update: Mar. 28, 1989

The Issue The issues presented here concern the propriety of the Respondent's action in its decision to reject all bids submitted for Project 72906-9109, Duval County, thereby excluding the bid of the Petitioner which was the apparent low bid in this process.

Findings Of Fact Alfair Development Company, Inc. (Alfair), is a company owned by Maggie Alford. This company is certified as a "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise" under the terms of Chapter 337, Florida Statutes. This recognition is for benefit of contractual work done for the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. Alfair, together with two other companies who are "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises," responded to a bid opportunity from the Department of Transportation identified as Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County. The other two bidders were ILA Construction Company, Inc., of Daytona Beach, Florida, and Highway Valets, Inc., of Norwalk, Ohio. This project was for the construction of concrete sidewalks and curb cut ramps, installation and repair. The contract was for competition solely among contractors who had been certified as "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" by the Office of Minority Programs within the Department of Transportation. As such, it is referred to as a "set-aside" job. In a "set-aside" project, bids are accepted from these "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" in furtherance of the requirements of Section 339.0805, Florida Statutes, which mandates that not less than 10% of the amounts expended from the State Transportation Trust Fund shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. When the bids were opened related to Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County, Alfair was the apparent winner having offered the lowest bid among the three competitors. However, there was a problem with the bid submission by Alfair and the others, in that Alfair's bid was 70% above the pre-bid estimate of the Department of Transportation concerning the expected price that the agency would have to pay for this project. The other two bidders were even higher, but within the range of the 70% above the pre-bid estimate. The pre-bid estimate had been derived by resort to a manual at the Department of Transportation referred to as the Contract Maintenance Administration and Inspection Manual. Within that manual the pre-bid estimate is found, as it was here, by examining historical workload and/or work needs survey information and development of that information and retention of that information through a computation book. That book includes appropriate forms, square yards, per linear feet, etc., for each item of activity to be paid for in the contract. The form to be used in this process shows the project number, the county, the section number of the roadway to be worked, the method of calculating estimated quantities and specific project location, if known. In this arrangement prior contracts of a similar sort to that contemplated in this instance are reviewed in trying to anticipate the contract costs on this occasion. That approach was followed in making the pre-bid estimate in this project. When the comparison was made of those figures it was a comparison to the immediately preceding years' contract for similar work against the work called for in the subject project at hand. In addition, the Department of Transportation contacted concrete companies to make sure that the concrete cost had remained the same. It also verified that minimum wage requirements had not changed from the prior year to the year in question. At hearing, the only rebuttal which the Petitioner offered to this approach of pre-bid estimate was the attempt to present certain documents which were denied admission as evidence in that the representative of the Petitioner, James D. Alford, III, husband to Maggie Alford, was not shown to be sufficiently apprised of contracting matters to explain those exhibits and show how they would tend to rebut the method of pre-bid estimate by the Department of Transportation. The exhibits standing alone did not lend themselves to the interpretation that they were competent rebuttal. When the degree of difference between the pre-bid estimate and the quotes by the bidders was examined by employees within the Department of Transportation, the belief was expressed that the bids were so out of keeping with the pre-bid estimate as to put to question the advisability of contracting with the apparent low bidder, Alfair. The Department felt that it needed to make certain that its pre-bid estimate was not flawed in some fashion and a determination was made to undergo reevaluation of the initial perception held about the bids offered before making a decision. Nonetheless, the impression was created in the mind of Barry D. Bunn, District Contract Administrator for District II, Department of Transportation, that he was expected in his employment to notice that the bids had been rejected. As a consequence on October 25, 1988, the bidders were advised that all bids were rejected for the project. On that same date, an advertisement was placed in the local newspaper that the project was being resolicited for bid purposes and through the advertisement the "set-aside" was deleted. This meant that for purposes of the re-advertisement of October 25, 1988, a general class of bidders could respond, to include "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises." Having been made mindful of this error, Bunn contacted the newspaper where the advertisement had been placed and told them to take that advertisement out of circulation. This occurred on October 26,1988. On that same date further correspondence was directed to the bidders, to include Alfair, in which it was stated that the bids had not been rejected, identifying that the bids were undergoing a reevaluation process. That reevaluation process did not change the initial impression by the Department of Transportation concerning the quotations received as being too far in excess of the Department's pre-bid estimate. Consequently, on November 1, 1988, a further notice of bid rejection was dispatched. That notice did not describe the reason for the rejection, but upon inquiry Mr. Alford was informed that the basis of the rejection was that the bid quotations were too costly when compared to the pre-bid estimate. Under inquiry the Department of Transportation did not identify the details of that explanation in the sense of saying what items they resorted to for drawing that conclusion and the Alfair company did not seek to gain a further explanation of their reasoning through prehearing discovery. The Department of Transportation had refused to give any further information to the Petitioner about this in the course of the telephone conversation between Mr. Alford and an employee in the Lake City, Florida Office of the Department of Transportation based upon the Department's belief that Section 337.168, Florida Statutes exempts it from having to state the pre-bid cost estimate until a contract has been entered into concerning the project. Nonetheless, it was revealed in the course of the hearing what the difference between the bid quotation of Alfair and the pre-bid estimate had been, as well as identifying the methods for deriving that difference. When Alfair received the notice of rejection of its bid it filed a timely notice of protest followed by a timely petition in protest. In addition, the Petitioner posted the appropriate amount of bond under Section 337.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes, to allow it to pursue this case. The pleadings by the Petitioner are not particularly informative but the sum and substance off the allegations as demonstrated in those pleadings and as set forth by remarks of the representative at hearing, identify the belief held by the Petitioner that the Department of Transportation in rejecting the Alfair bid has been unjust, illegal, dishonest and arbitrary. Moreover, Alfair through its representative found fault with the refusal to reveal to him over the phone the methods of arriving at the pre-bid estimate and the general belief that the Department allows the participation in the bidding process and in the award of contract related to "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" of persons who are not registered or licensed as contractors through the offices of the Department of professional Regulation within the State of Florida. None of these claims were shown to be meritorious through the proofs submitted at hearing. The Department of Transportation seeks the award of costs under the provisions of Section 337.11(3)(b), Florida statutes. The evidence in this hearing reveals that the salaries of the two witnesses who testified for the Department of Transportation, namely Russell O. Davis and Barry D. Bunn, were $125.80 and $130.00, respectively, per day. These employees were involved in the hearing process for one day. In addition to salary costs the State had to pay these employees $62.50 each for per diem allowance in that the witnesses were from out of town. The cost of attendance at hearing by the court reporter is $67.50.

Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order be entered which rejects all bids and allows the re-advertisement of Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted a Memorandum in which an indication is given concerning the Project 72906-9109, Duval County, as to the scope of that project-and an explanation in the mind of the representative of Petitioner as to the reason for "set-aside" projects. An accusation is made that the Department of Transportation has tried to avoid bringing black businesses into the mainstream of Florida economy. This is not borne out by the proof. An accusation is made which was not proven at hearing and is not relevant to the resolution of this dispute concerning the contributions to the Florida tax base made by the black community and businesses. This contention together with the allegation that the Department of Transportation is using tactics to deny a small percent.age of tax dollars to recirculate into the black community for economic development and by such arrangement promotes institutional slavery was not proven. Reference to rejection of all bids on October 18, 1988 is at odds with the facts of this case. Further, there is no indication in the facts of this case that for the first time in history a black-owned company was going to cross economic a threshold within the district in terms of gaining business and that the agency rejected the bids to avoid this. Further reference to the procedural history of this case and the fact that corrections had to be made to the process of notification of rejection of all bids is not sufficient reason to overturn the decision to reject all bids. Reference within the Memorandum/Argument to the need to post a bond as being done because it would cause an economic hardship on a black-owned company is rejected as a grounds of argument in that the requirement of bond is a matter of law imposed upon all companies black or otherwise. The fact that office holders within the State Legislature were called upon by the Petitioner to ascertain the status of this project and that the Department of Transportation went through the process of correcting "the initial rejection of bids in favor of a reevaluation phase, has been explained in the fact finding elated to the sequence of events and the procedures involved in rejecting all bids. Reference to the failure to describe the reasons for rejection beyond the fact that the bids were too high has been described in the- fact finding. No evidence was shown that the refusal to indicate the reason in detail or to refer to the source of the data was in the interest of somehow favoring white prime contractors over black contractors. There is some other indication within this Memorandum concerning the meeting of goals for "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" and the concern that the Department of Transportation is using minority individuals instead of minority businesses to meet those goals. There was no indication that the Department of Transportation acted inappropriately in its attempts to gain a contract in this case, or that it generally has participated in a process which the Petitioner refers to dualism in preferring minority persons who are not licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation to engage in the construction business over those who are. Moreover, Section 489.103(1), Florida Statutes, states that the license provisions of Florida law, do not pertain to contractors who are working on bridges, roads, streets and highways and services incidental to that work. Comments about training and apprenticeship found within the Memorandum were not proven in the course of the hearing and are not sufficiently relevant to the inquiry at hand; that they need be considered in resolving this dispute. The suggestion that the Department of Transportation intends to put the contract back out for award in some arrangement other than a "set-aside" is correct in the sense of the intentions expressed in the ad of October 25, 1988; however, that advertisement was not carried forward and the oral indication was made by an official of the Department of Transportation at hearing, that the contract would remain "set- aside" if the Department were allowed to readvertise at some point beyond the outcome of this hearing. Finally, the suggestion that if the second bidder in this case had been a non-black company or individual, the Department would have awarded the project to that entity was not borne out in the proof. Respondent's facts are subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Alford, III 1348 Davis Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Marilyn McFadden, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S.-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (6) 120.53120.57337.11337.168339.0805489.103
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SOLID WASTE AND RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 89-005854BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 31, 1989 Number: 89-005854BID Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Department of Corrections (Corrections) initially published an Invitation to Bid (ITB) 90-Region-001 for the provision of a recyclable baling machine which had an opening date and time of 1:00 p.m., August 22, 1989. Upon opening and evaluation of the bids filed in response to ITB 90- Region-001, Corrections' purchasing and technical staff determined that the specifications for this initial ITB had been drafted too narrowly for them to validly and reasonably compare the bids submitted. This was Corrections' first attempt to meet certain recycling mandates and the agency personnel were initially unfamiliar with all of the machinery available in the marketplace. Lack of technical literature from some bidders was also a problem. In comparing the five bid responses received, it became apparent to Barbara Stephens, Corrections' Purchasing Director, that the specifications she had initially drafted worked against agency interests in that they were so narrow that different models could not be compared. In Ms. Stephens' words, one could not even compare "apples and apples," let alone "apples and oranges." The line item on Page 6 defied comparison and other line items presented significant comparison problems. After a review by Corrections' General Services Specialist Bob Sandall, it was determined that it was to the agency's advantage, as well as advantageous to the competitive bidding process, to rebid on more general specifications instead of specifications solely geared to one single model of one type of baler already owned by the agency, a McDonald single phase baler. For the foregoing reasons, Corrections elected to reject all bids received in response to ITB 90-Region-001 and rebid the item so as to broaden the eligibility base through new specifications, thereby ensuring that more than a single manufacturer could compete while making line item comparisons by the agency possible. Line item comparisons were considered advantageous to all potential bidders and to the agency and essential to a fair competitive bidding process. Considering purely bottom-line cost, Petitioner Solid Waste was the low bidder on initial ITB No. 90-Region-001 if its mathematical error were ignored and its bid were recorded as $23,960.00 instead of as $35,970.00. There were apparently some other problems with Solid Waste's bid response. These were not clearly addressed by any witness' testimony, but it is apparent that the requested manufacturer's specification sheet was included with Solid Waste's response to ITB 90-Region-001. Corrections did not reach any of the potential bid defects of Solid Waste because the agency elected to discard all the bids almost immediately. Rule 13A-1.002(9) F.A.C. provides that an agency shall reserve the right to reject any and all bids and shall so indicate in its invitation to bid. Corrections followed this requirement in General Condition 10 of ITB No. 90- Region-001, which provides in pertinent part, as follows: As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all bids . . Bob Sandall and Barbara Stephens redrafted the bid specifications for the recyclable baling machine more broadly, primarily to encourage greater competition of bidders. Corrections properly published these new specifications in ITB No. 90-Region-001 on or about September 18, 1989. Bids were to be opened on October 3, 1989. On October 3, 1989, the bids submitted in response to ITB No. 90- Region-001 were opened and checked for completeness. Upon opening the bid packet submitted by Petitioner Solid Waste, Corrections personnel discovered that the manufacturer's specification sheet which had been required in both initial ITB No. 90-Region-001 and in rebid ITB No. 90- Region-001R was missing. Based on the missing specification sheet, Petitioner's bid on ITB No. 90-Region- 001R was rejected as unresponsive. General Condition 7 in ITB 90-Region-001R provided in pertinent part: Bidder shall submit with his bid, cuts, sketches, and descriptive literature and/or complete specifications. Reference to literature submitted with a pervious bid will not satisfy this provision. The State of Florida reserves the right to determine acceptance of item(s) as an approved equivalent. Bids which do not comply with these requirements are subiect to reiection. (Emphasis supplied) Special Condition VI of ITB 90-Region-001R, "Submission of Mandatory Forms/Literature," further provided that: 5. Complete Technical Data on items other than as specified shall be provided with bid by the vendor, for evaluation purposes, otherwise bid will not be considered. Nowhere in ITB 90-Region-001R is there any suggestion that responses thereto are supplemental to those filed for ITB 90-Region-001 or that "carryovers" or "reactivations" of earlier ITB 90-Region-001 responses would be considered. Corrections rejected other bidders' responses for other acts of non- responsiveness, and it was not necessary to waive any condition in order to award the bid to any of the bidders who were in full compliance with ITB 90- Region-001R. Petitioner timely filed a formal written protest to Corrections' bid tabulation of ITB 90-Region-001R on October 23, 1989. In this protest, Petitioner also included its only and untimely challenge to the agency's rejection of all bids for ITB 90-Region-001.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest and ratifying its rejection of all bids for ITB 90-Region- O01R and its tabulation of bids for ITB 90-Region-001R. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-5854BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1. is accepted except for the ultimate conclusion of law. See Conclusions of Law. 2-3, 5-7 are rejected as mere legal argument or proposed conclusions of law. See Conclusions of Law. 4 is rejected as characterization of testimony. Respondent' s PFOF: 1-7 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: W. K. Lally, P.A. 6160 Arlington Expressway Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Courtesy copy to: Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Thomas W. Riggs, President Department of Corrections Municipal Sales and Leasing 1311 Winewood Boulevard Inc. Post Office Box 90306 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Lakeland, Florida, 33804 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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BAXTER`S ASPHALT AND CONCRETE, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-003151 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003151 Latest Update: Mar. 02, 1987

The Issue The issues to be considered in the course of this Recommended Order concern the question of whether Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. or White Construction Company, Inc. should be accepted as a successful bidder on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida, as advertised by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Transportation, (DOT), advertised for bids on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida. This was a project in which DOT had determined that 10 percent of the funding within the State Department of Transportation Trust Fund, as allotted for the project, would be devoted to economically disadvantaged individuals, also referred to as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE). This decision was in keeping with Section 339.081, Florida Statutes. Consequently, interested bidders were called upon to submit bids reflecting a DBE participation of a minimum of 10 percent of the bid submitted. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. (Baxter) and White Construction Company, Inc. (White) responded to the bid opportunity. The bids were opened on July 25, 1984, and Baxter's bid was the apparent low bid. The bid amount was $882,641.25. White was the second low bidder offering a bid of $928,353. Both bids were within the DOT estimate of construction costs. When the bids were reviewed, Baxter's bid was rejected by DOT based upon the belief that the bid failed to meet the DBE 10 percent requirement or to offer explanation of good faith attempts by Baxter to comply with the DBE contract requirement amount. See Section 14-78.03(2)(b)4., Florida Administrative Code. No other claim of error was made by DOT on the subject of the acceptability of the Baxter bid. The White bid is conforming. In preparing the bid, bidders are required to use DBE Utilization Form No. 1 to reflect the amount of DBE participation as a percentage of the overall bid estimate. In submitting its form as part of its bid blank, Baxter indicated that the total project cost was $884,000, and indicated that Ozark Striping, a DBE subcontractor, would be given $20,000 of that work or 3 percent, and that Glenn Powell, DBE subcontractor, would be afforded 7 percent of the total contract in the amount of $55,000. The total percentage according to Baxter is 10 percent, thus meeting the required DBE participation. This form is found as part of the joint Exhibit No. 1 offered by the parties. In fact, the Ozark Striping participation was 2.26 percent, and the Glenn Powell participation was 6.22 percent, for a total of 8.48 percent of the estimate reflected in the Form No. 1. Contrasted against the actual estimate of $882,641.25, these projections constitute 8.49 percent of that estimate. Thus, they are less than the 10 percent required. Given the fact that this DBE projection is less than the 10 percent, and in the absence of any attempt to offer a good faith explanation why Baxter failed to comply with the requirement, the bid was rejected for this irregularity. The Contract Awards Committee of DOT, when confronted with the irregularity of the Baxter bid, then determined to recommend the rejection of all bids. This was in keeping with the fact that the difference between the unsuccessful apparent low bid, with irregularities, and the second low bid exceeded 1 percent of the contract amount. At the time of this decision to reject all bids, DOT felt that the difference would justify re-advertising the bids. That policy position had been abandoned at the point of final hearing in this cause, wherein DOT expressed the opinion that it would be better served to accept the bid of White, and not re-advertise, again for cost reasons. In the face of the initial action to reject all bids and in accordance with Section 120.53, Florida Statutes, Baxter and White appealed that decision and by that appeal requested recognition as a successful bidder. This led to the present Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing. Baxter has never attempted to offer a good faith explanation of its non-compliance. It chooses to proceed on the theory that the mistake in computation can be rectified by allowing Baxter to submit a supplemental Form No. 1, bringing its total above the DBE requirement. In its contention, Baxter indicates that Glenn Powell could have provided $126,000 of the DBE goal, which is in excess of the 10 percent requirement. Baxter also alludes to the fact that it had contacted other DBE enterprises, such as Oglesby and Hogg, Michael Grassing, and J.E. Hill. All told, Baxter indicates that if given the opportunity, it would allow $146,000 of DBE participation to include $126,000 by Glenn Powell, and $20,000 by Ozark. This comment is suspect, given the lack of compliance in the initial bid response, and the realization that within that bid response on the item related to Glenn Powell, the original amount of work attributed to Glenn Powell was $100,000, and was struck through in favor of the $55,000, leaving a fair inference that Baxter was attempting to meet the DBE goal with a projection as close to the 10 percent as could be achieved. They fell short because in adding the $20,000 for Ozark, and the $55,000 for Glenn Powell, the addition in the Form No. 1 showed $85,000, which is more than 10 percent of the $884,000 shown on the form, when in fact the two amounts were $75,000, and less than the 10 percent required. Baxter characterizes its mistake in computation as a technical error, which can be remedied without harm to the bid process. The Baxter position must be examined in the context of action by DOT relating to compliance with DBE requirements. Prior to June 1984, a time before the subject July 25, 1984 bid opening, bidders had been allowed to amend the Form No. 1 to show compliance with the DBE requirements or demonstrate good faith efforts of compliance. That amendment as to compliance through listing of the DBE subcontractors or submission of good faith effort documentation had to be offered within 10 days per former Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code. Beginning with the June 1984 bid-lettings, all documentation had to be submitted with the bid, reflecting compliance or describing good faith efforts at compliance per Section 14-78.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 1984. This change was brought about to prevent the apparent low bidder, as indicated at the point of bid-letting, from shopping the quotations by the DBE's found in its original quote against other quotes from DBE's not listed in the bid documents initially submitted, and by amendment to the DBE statement prejudicing the former DBE group. The change was also made to avoid the possibility that the apparent low bidder could evade his bid by rendering it non-conforming, in the sense of refusing to submit the required documentation of compliance with DBE requirements or to the offer of a good faith explanation of non-compliance after the bid-letting. The change of May 1984, removed the possibility of bid shopping and bid avoidance. Both versions of Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code, pre and post May 1984, indicate that failure to satisfy the DBE requirements or offer a showing of a good faith attempt at compliance, would result in the contractor's bid being deemed non-responsive, and cause its rejection. Baxter has been able to comply with the DBE goals of DOT in its bidding prior to the present controversy.

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57337.11339.081641.25
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RANGER CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 92-001538BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 05, 1992 Number: 92-001538BID Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Department of Transportation's (hereinafter "Department") declaration that the bid of Ranger Construction, Inc. (hereinafter ("Ranger") was materially irregular and therefore unresponsive to an invitation to bid on contracts in highway construction projects 93110-3539, 3543, 3525, on State Road 80, (Avenue E), in West Palm Beach, Florida.

Findings Of Fact On December 4, 1991, both Petitioner, Ranger, and Intervenor, Community, submitted bids for job numbers 93110-3539, 93110-3542, and 93110-3525, for a construction project on State Road 80, (Avenue E), in Palm Beach County. Petitioner's bid was in the total amount of $2,554,390.37, and Intervenor's was in the total amount of $2,557,071.42. On the basis of those figures, Petitioner was the apparent low bidder. Bid specifications incorporated in all this agency's bids indicate that a bid may be rejected for irregularities. The term, "material" is not used in that specification. When bids are opened, agency procurement officials look at each bid to insure that any award is based on balanced bids containing all appropriate signatures and other requirements, and in the event of an irregularity, a decision is made on the question of whether any irregularity is material in that specific contract. This decision, made by the Awards Committee, is whether the irregularity is material enough to declare the questioned bid unresponsive and award the contract to the next lower bidder. When bids are first opened at the Department auditorium, they are checked to see if the bid bond or a cash or cash equivalent alternative is present. Then the figures are read off and recorded. The bids are then taken back to the contracts office and safeguarded until the minority business enterprise office looks at them. When this is done, the bids are then passed out to the checkers for examination. This more detailed review of the bids submitted revealed that Ranger's bid bond form, though attested to by the corporate secretary, and executed by George H. Friedlander, Agent for the bonding company, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, did not bear the signature of either Ranger's president or vice president. This is considered by Department representatives as being a requirement of a responsive bid. Community's bid bond was properly signed and attested to, and bore the signature of the agent for Reliant Insurance Company, the surety. Community failed to put the company name on the certificate of non- collusion, but in light of the fact that the certificate was signed by the president and was attached to other Community documents, it was identifiable as a part of that bid. In addition, further review of Ranger's bid revealed that on item 630-1- 12 of the computerized price breakdown, certain conduit was listed with a unit price of $621.00 per linear foot. The computer disc furnished to the bidders by the Department, which was used to compute the pricing breakout, reflected 38 linear feet of this conduit would be required. The price of $621.00 per foot on the bid form was in error, however. It should have been $6.21 per linear foot. The error occurred when Ranger's representative punched in the typographically incorrect figure, a clearly clerical error, at the time the bid forms were being completed. This was done, according to Mr. Slade, Ranger's vice president and the person responsible for the bid preparation, in the press of last minute preparation in a motel room in Tallahassee, under less than optimum circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that this was a clerical error which was not caught by any Ranger official on review of its bid prior to submittal, Department officials considered the use of that large figure made Ranger's bid "unbalanced." This defect, plus the failure of the bid bond to be signed by Ranger's president or vice-president, were both considered to be material deviations by the members of the Department's technical review committee which, based on those deviations, recommended to the Department's Contract Award Committee that Ranger's bid be declared unresponsive. This was notwithstanding the fact that even with the incorrect pricing for the amount of the conduit stated on the Department's discs, Ranger's bid was still low. It must be noted, however, that the 38 linear foot quantity of conduit listed in the Department's discs was an incorrect amount. The project plans, furnished to all bidders prior to the bid process, reflected, in the breakdown of specifications, that the correct amount was 97 linear feet of conduit required. When Ranger's incorrect price of $621.00 per foot was applied to the actual footage required, the result was a bid figure for Ranger which was substantially higher than that submitted by Community and, therefore, caused a reversal in the order of the bidders. The Department applies a deviation standard of 7% to flag bids for more careful scrutiny. Here, the $621.00 item price was clearly in excess of that standard. As will be seen below, Ranger was not the only party to make a mistake in this procurement. The Department's discs erroneously reflected the quantity of conduit required at 38 feet when the actual amount called for was 97 feet. There is a difference, however, between the Department changing its specifications, as would be the case here, and the bidder correcting a unit price after opening. The Department can but the bidder can't. The bid documents, furnished to each prospective bidder, reserve the Department's right to make changes. Though the evidence indicates that it was not unknown in the past for Department officials to call a bidder for clarification of an unclear point in its bid, prior to bid award in this case, even though the pricing of the conduit was, at a figure almost 100 times the average/estimate of $7.30 per foot, no call was made to Ranger by any Department official to insure that the stated figure was the intended figure for inclusion. Mr. Griner, upon inquiry by the Hearing Officer, indicated that though while not usual, such an intentional inflation was not unknown to happen in bidding on Department contracts. No specific cases were cited, however. The evidence also indicates that this particular item was not the only item the Department considered to be unbalanced. There were three others in Ranger's bid, but this one was the only one which was felt to be inappropriate. By the same token, Community's bid also contained several items considered to be unbalanced, but they were not considered to be in the disqualifying category that the conduit price in Ranger's bid was in. Unbalanced bids are considered bad by the Department because, if successful, they allow the contractor to recoup or receive a larger portion of the contract price at the beginning of the contract term thereby making it less disadvantageous for him to walk away from the contract and making agency control over the contractor more difficult. Here, Mr. Slade unequivocally denies it was Ranger's intention to unbalance its contract for any purpose and claims it was no more than a clerical error in inserting the decimal point in the unit price when entered into the computer which resulted in the error. He claims that if he had been contacted by the Department when the obvious error was discovered, as he asserts, has been done in the past, he would have corrected it. It is clear that while query calls may have been made by the Department to bidders in the past, they were of a nature which did not affect the price of the contract. Ranger never received any notice from the Department about any problem with its bid. The first information Mr. Slade had of any problem with Ranger's bid came when his estimator made a routine call to the Department and was told of the problem with the unbalance. Thereafter Mr. Slade spoke with Mr. Newell to determine what route the subsequent proceedings would take. The Department contends, through the testimony of Mr. Newell and Mr. Griner, that it is Department policy to consider the failure to have a required signature on a relevant document to be grounds for declaring a bid non- responsive. Their testimony further reflects, however, that while the recommendations of the Technical Review Committee, (TRC), and the Contract Award Committee, (CAC), are uniformly to that effect, the Department Secretary has, on occasion, rejected such a recommendation and awarded a contract to a bidder whose bid did not contain a "required" signature. Consequently, it cannot be said to be Department policy to reject all bids containing an unsigned document since the Secretary, who as the agency head, sets agency policy, has acted inconsistent with such a "policy." Further, Mr. Morefield indicated that the Awards Committee could waive a failure of signature if it felt to do so was appropriate. To the best of his knowledge, however, that has not been done on this type of contract documents.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Ranger Construction Industries, Inc., in regard to project Nos. 93110- 3539, 3543, and 3525 in West Palm Beach, Florida. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 20th day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1538 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: I 1. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. II 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 31. Accepted. 32. - 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. - 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. 45. - 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. 49. & 50. Accepted. - 53. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. - 61. Accepted. & 63. Accepted. Accepted. & 66. Accepted. 67. & 68. Accepted. 69. Accepted to the extend that the correction is of mathematical calculations of the bid price - not corrections of pricing elements. 70. Accepted. 71. & 72. Accepted. 73. Accepted as a probability 74. Accepted. 75. & 76. Accepted. 77. Accepted. 78. Accepted. 79. Accepted and incorporated herein. 80. Accepted as to the Bond defect; rejected as to the pricing error. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10. & 11. Accepted. 12. - 14. Accepted. 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted. 23. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. - 30. Accepted. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. & 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a summary of testimony. & 38. Accepted. Irrelevant and not related to basis for denial. - 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. First and Second sentences accepted. Balance accepted and incorporated herein. & 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Douglas S. Roberts, Esquire 123 S. Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Mary M. Piccard, Esquire 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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DOUGLAS PRINTING COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, DIVISION OF FORESTRY, 83-001984 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001984 Latest Update: Jul. 03, 1990

Findings Of Fact On May 19, 1983, Respondent mailed official Invitations to Bid (IFB) forms to 18 different firms, including Petitioner, soliciting bids for Class VI printing in accordance with the specifications and conditions attached to the letter, signed by R. E. Read, Jr. This letter contained the comment, "As the best interests of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all bids and to waive any irregularities in bids received." This letter also advised prospective bidders who had questions regarding the IFB to call Larry Amison, the individual who had drafted the accompanying specifications. The notice of IFB, published in the Tallahassee Democrat on Thursday, May 19, 1983, also contained a notice of reservation of the right to reject all bids. Only five IFB forms were returned. Three of the five were returned without bids for various reasons, such as "Not Competitive," "Unable to meet specified delivery date" and "Cannot schedule job of this proportion at this time." This type of explanation, in government procurement circles, need not be taken at face value, but is often used to signal the recipient's thanks for the invitation to bid and a desire to be invited to bid again at some time in the future. The other two forms received were bids: one from Zenith Communications Group, and one from Petitioner. This procurement was somewhat unusual in that the IFB stipulated the amount of money the agency had to spend and requested a hid as to the most product it could get for that money. There were two publications involved: "A" and "B." An alternative was given on delivery date options: one within 30 working days of receipt of approved proofs, and one within 45. Zenith offered to provide 7,180 copies of Book "A" and 7,155 copies of Book "B" (14,335 total books) for a total price of $53,400 1/ within 30 working days. Petitioner offered to provide 9,473 copies of Book "A" and 4,950 copies of Book "B" (15,423 total books) for a total price of $53,344.64 within 45 days. The bids were opened on June 1, 1983, and published from June 1 through June 10, 1983. They were brought to the Director for consideration upon opening. It is his responsibility to evaluate the bids and make a recommendation to the Commissioner of Agriculture on the successful low bidder. Since there was only one bid on each delivery date, the Director felt there were not two comparative bids. As a result, he forwarded the bid package to Ms. Grace Harrison, a purchasing agent with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and an individual very familiar with the procurement of printing services. After a review of the entire bid package, Ms. Harrison's studied opinion was that there were two valid bids and Douglas was the low bidder, and it is so found. Ms. Harrison also felt it was unusual not to receive any more responses than were received on a procurement of this magnitude. This same opinion is held by Mr. Amison, who drafted the specifications. Others have differing opinions, however. Whether it was unusual or not, however, is immaterial. There were two valid bids, and only two are required for an award. However, even in the case of two bids, the agency reserved the right to reject any and all bids. As a result, on or about June 6, 1983, the Director decided, based on his understanding of state policy on the matter and in light of the size of the procurement, to seek more bids through rebidding. In this case, the Director felt more bids were available because of the responses of the nonbidders which referred to the response times being so short. Therefore, he directed a rebid, and this information was communicated to all bidders, including Petitioner. On June 7, 1983, Petitioner wrote to the Director, disagreeing with his decision and notifying him of its protest. On the following day, the Director notified Petitioner the rebidding was being delayed, giving Petitioner 10 days to file a formal notice of protest. This was done in a timely manner. The phrase regarding the agency's right to reject bids is contained in every State IFB. Its purpose is to permit state agencies to reject bids where it becomes apparent there is a valid and legitimate benefit to be gained by the agency in doing so. One such situation is when, in the bona fide opinion of the agency, there are insufficient bids. While there is a difference of opinion as to whether only two bids are unusual in a procurement of this nature, there is no dispute that it would have been beneficial to the agency to have received more than two, since more bids would increase competition. To rebid the contract at this juncture would undoubtedly increase competition to the potential benefit of the Respondent. However, Petitioner claims it would also work to its detriment because other potential bidders would have access to the details of the two present bids and would thereby gain an advantage. This may be the result of rebidding.

Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner, Douglas Printing Company, Inc., be awarded Contract DOF- ADM-79. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1983.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ANDERSON COLUMBIA COMPANY, INC., AND PANHANDLE LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 99-000740BID (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 17, 1999 Number: 99-000740BID Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Florida Department of Transportation's (FDOT's or Department's) proposed action to award a contract to Couch Construction, L.P., is contrary to the agency's governing statutes, the agency's rules or policies, or the bid or proposal specifications.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (Department) issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) for road resurfacing on State Road 10/US 90 in Columbia County, Florida; Financial Project No. 208406-1-52-01 (The Project). Four companies submitted responses to the ITB. Couch was low bidder at $2,271,354.81, and Petitioner was second low at $2,278,263.07. The ITB incorporated the plans and specifications for the proposed highway resurfacing. The price proposal specifications stated in pertinent part: Item Number 2102-10. . .Approximate Quantity. . . 4,320.00 hours Item Number 2102-74-1 . Approximate Quantity . . .75,780.00 each day Item Number 2102-99 . . Approximate Quantity . . . 720.00 each day None of the bidders filed a timely objection to the price proposal specifications. Article 2-6, of the Florida Department of Transportation Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction states: A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alternations of form, additions not called for, conditional or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. After the bids were opened, each bid was reviewed by the Department to determine whether the bid was mathematically and/or materially unbalanced. The Department's Preliminary Estimates Engineer conducts an unbalanced review of the bids to determine if the bids are mathematically unbalanced. A bid is considered to be mathematically unbalanced if the prices quoted are significantly different from the approximate cost of the item to the contractor. It is very common for bids on construction projects to contain some item prices that are mathematically unbalanced. Bid prices that are mathematically unbalanced are considered by the Department to be non-material irregularities if they do not affect the order of the bidders. In determining whether a mathematically unbalanced price is material, the Department follows a policy set out by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The Department has been following the same policy since at least 1992. The FHWA does not allow for materially unbalanced bids to be accepted by the Department on projects that are federally funded. A materially unbalanced bid is one in which there is a reasonable doubt as to whether award to the bidder submitting the mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the ultimately lowest cost to the Department. The Department has developed an Unbalanced Program Logic for its computer analysis of the bids. The program flags the items that are mathematically unbalanced. It flags the item with an "A" for those items that are above the tolerance window, "U" for under the tolerance window, and "F" as front-loaded items. The flagged items which are short-listed by the computer program are sent to the designer of record to verify the quantities and to verify whether the correct pay item was used. The designer of record verified that the quantities were correct for this Project. As part of the bid review, the Department does a statistical average or mean average for each of the bid items. A standard and a-half deviation either side of the mean is established. The bid items outside that standard and a-half deviation, positive or minus, are discarded. The remaining bid items are re-averaged and this second average is referred to as the "serious average." A front-end loaded item is an item for which work is performed early in the contract. Mobilization is considered a front-end loaded item. Couch's Mobilization item 2101-1B was flagged by the computer analysis. The Department did an analysis of the Mobilization item. The Department started with the difference between Couch's bid and the Petitioner's bid on this item, $18,0000.00. That amount was multiplied by the current interest rate, 10 per cent, and then multiplied by a factor of .5, which spread it over half the contract, times 180-day contract period divided by 365, one calendar year. The result was $434.84, which represents the potential advantage that could result from paying the $18,000.00 amount early in the contract. That amount, $434.84, did not materially unbalance Couch's bid. The three items identified by Petitioner as unbalanced (paragraph 3, above) were low and did not present any detriment to the Department. If those three items overran at the rate established, it would be an advantage to the Department. In evaluating unbalanced bids, the Department follows the guidance in a May 1988 memorandum from the FHWA, which addresses bid analysis and unbalanced bids. The memorandum provides that where unit prices for items bid are either unusually high or low in relation to the engineer's estimate of the price, the accuracy of the estimated quantities of the items are to be checked. If the quantities are reasonably accurate, the bid is to be further evaluated to determine whether the mathematical imbalance is materially unbalanced such that there is "reasonable doubt that award to the bidder submitting the mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." The analysis of a mathematically unbalanced bid to determine if it is materially unbalanced considers the effect of the unbalanced bid on the total contract amount; the increase, if any, in the contract cost when quantities are corrected; whether the low bidder will remain as the low bidder; and whether the unbalanced bid would have a potential detrimental effect upon the competitive process or cause contract administration problems later. In this case, the Department compared the unit prices (line item prices) by each bidder on the bid proposal sheet to the average unit price for that item. The average unit price is based upon an average of the bidders' unit prices bid for a given pay item and the Department's estimated unit price for that item. If an individual bidder's unit price is significantly greater or less than the average price, the Department's computer flags the item as mathematically unbalanced. Such a bid then receives further evaluation by the Department to ensure the accuracy of the original estimates of the quantities of those items for which an unbalanced unit price has been submitted. The Department also reviews the project plans for accuracy. The more in-depth review is performed to determine if there is a potential for a cost overrun or if there is an error in the Department's estimated quantities which would result in an increased cost to the Department for the project. In this case, Couch and Anderson submitted bid proposals for each of the individual line item prices contained on FDOT's form. Couch's unit price for the off-duty law enforcement item was $0.25/hour. The Department's average price for the off-duty law enforcement item was $25.22/hour. The Petitioner's quotation for off-duty law enforcement was $26.00/hour. The Department's computer analysis of Couch's bid flagged the off-duty law enforcement item as mathematically unbalanced. The quote by Petitioner for the off-duty law enforcement item was not unbalanced, and therefore was not flagged for further review by the Department. The same analysis was applied to the barricades and variable message sign items, with similar results. The Department also did an in-depth review of item 2101-B, Mobilization, for front-end loading. The result of that analysis was that, as a result of front-end loading, there was the probability of increased cost to the Department of $443.84. This small increase in the cost to the Department was not large enough to change the order of the bidders. Therefore, it was not a materially unbalanced item. The Department then made a more in-depth review of the three mathematically unbalanced items in Couch's bid and determined that none of those items were materially unbalanced, because none of them had the potential to increase the cost to the Department and none of them had the potential to change the order of the bids. In sum, the Couch bid was not materially unbalanced. The evidence in this case is insufficient to support a basis for rejecting the Couch bid.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation issue a final order in this case dismissing the Petitioner's Formal Protest and Request for Hearing; denying all relief requested by the Petitioner; and awarding the subject contract to the Intervenor, Couch Construction, L.P. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1999.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57337.11
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FAIRCHILD CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 90-003122BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 23, 1990 Number: 90-003122BID Latest Update: Jul. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact State Project No. 46090-3511 (the project) is for construction of the West Bay Bridge on State Road 79 in Bay County, Florida. Competitive bids on the project were solicited in February, 1990. The bid letting on the project was held in March, 1990. The Petitioner, Fairchild, the Hardaway Company and ten other contractors bid on the project. The Hardaway Company submitted the lowest bid on the project in the amount of $9,487,258.17. Fairchild submitted the next lowest bid in the amount of $9,835,279.34. Divergent Unit Prices and Imbalances. The part of the Hardaway Company's bid relating to construction of the foundation for the approaches to the bridge (the "structural bid") is obviously below reasonable cost in several respects. The contract specifications require the use of sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid (biaxial type 2), and Class III (seal) concrete. The Hardaway Company's unit prices for these items were, respectively, one dollar per cubic yard for the sand fill, fifty cents per cubic yard for the shell fill, twenty-five cents per square yard for the reinforcement grid, and ten cents per cubic yard for the Class III seal concrete. As a result, the Hardaway Company's bid for these items is obviously significantly below reasonable cost and approximately $95,500 below what Fairchild bid for the same portion of the contract. In contrast to the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III concrete, the Hardaway Company's bid on some of the other parts of the structural bid were relatively high. The reinforcing steel for the substructure (Item 415-1-5) was bid at approximately twice reasonable cost (80 a pound versus, e.g., 42 in Fairchild's bid), resulting in $609,936.80 attributable to that part of the bid versus, e.g., $320,216.82 for Fairchild. The statistical average (the DOT's so-called "average 2") for the other serious bidders under this item also was 42 a pound. The Hardaway Company also bid obviously in excess of reasonable cost for the lump sum item of mobilization for pile installation--$600,000 versus $125,000 in Fairchild's bid and less in the bids of several of the others bidders. (The statistical average for the other serious bidders under this item was $225,000.) But the Hardaway Company bid only $60,000 for the lump sum item for removal of existing structures (versus $160,000 in Fairchild's bid) and only $30,000 for the lump sum item for removal and disposal of fender system (versus $110,000 in Fairchild's bid). The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to mobilization for the roadway work is significantly less than the Fairchild bid under this item ($200,000 versus $375,000) and partially counterbalances the excess in the part of the Hardaway bid for mobilization for the pile installation. The portion of the Hardaway Company's bid attributable to clearing and grubbing also was high, at $20,000 an acre versus a statistical average of $4,200 an acre for the other serious bidders, resulting in $216,000 for the Hardaway Company bid versus, e.g., $32,400 for the Fairchild bid and the $45,360 statistical average. DOT Review Procedures. Section 2-6 of the DOT's Standard Specifications applicable to the project provides: 2-6 Rejection of Irregular Proposals. A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alterations of form, additions not called for, conditioinal or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. The DOT is in the process of formulating a policy on the use of the Technical Review Committee in the bidding process. A proposed procedure has been developed, which has not yet been made final and has not yet been signed by the Secretary of the DOT, under which the Technical Review Committee would review the low bid on each contract, among other things not applicable to this case, for "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" and for "unbalanced bidding." The DOT has not yet defined "any significant irregularities in unit bid prices" or "unbalanced bidding" for purposes of defining the event that triggers review by the Technical Review Committee. The DOT Director of the Office of Construction, Robert Buser, is of the opinion that the unit prices the Hardaway Company bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III seal concrete are "significant irregularities in unit bid prices." On the other hand, the DOT's Preliminary Estimates Engineer, Robert Griner, who, unlike Buser, is a member of both the Technical Review Committee and its Preliminary Technical Subcommittee, and is of the opinion that the Hardaway bid for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the Class III (seal) concrete are "mathematical imbalances," not "significant irregularities in unit bid prices," which he would define as bids that omit a unit price, whose numerical values do not match words used to express the values, or that are not signed. Under Griner's approach, which was followed in this case, the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee looks at "mathematical imbalances" to see if they are "material imbalances." If the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee decides that it is not a "material imbalance," it simply reports this finding at the outset of the meeting of the Technical Review Committee, which accepts the finding and does not itself consider the matter any further. Only if the Preliminary Technical Subcommittee reports a "material imbalance" does the Technical Review Committee further consider the question. Front-end Bidding. Under the DOT contract for the project, like other items in the specifications, mobilization and land clearing and grubbing are paid in installments as the work proceeds. But, unlike the other items, all of the portion of the contract attributable to mobilization and land clearing and grubbing is paid by the time the entire project is half completed. Similarly, a contractor is paid for reinforcement steel (substructure) when it is delivered to the site. As a result, by shifting dollars in a bid to these "front-end," lump sum items, a contractor can manipulate the bid process and contract to reasonably insure himself of early payment of these inflated items regardless what may happen to the project later. In analyzing these front-end, lump sum items, Griner treated them (along with the unreasonably low bids on the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grids and C III seal concrete) as "mathematical imbalances." Following the guidance of a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) memorandum, dated May 16, 1988, on the subject of "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids," Griner analyzed the Hardaway bid to be sure it would not be susceptible to cost overruns (it was not) and to be sure the quantities were correctly estimated (they were). He also analyzed the additional cost to the DOT of paying the Hardaway Company early (by the half way point of the project) for the inflated front-end items to determine whether the "mathematical" imbalance was "material," i.e., whether "the mathematically imbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." Based on a twelve percent interest rate, Griner calculated that the inflated front-end items would cost the DOT approximately an additional $98,000, 1/ still much less than the difference between the low Hardaway bid and any other bid. Based on this calculation, Griner concluded that the "mathematical imbalance" in the Hardaway bid was not a "material imbalance" and did not require the award of the bid to Fairchild or one of the other bidders. Griner overlooked and did not apply another portion of the method of analysis in the FHWA memorandum on "Bid Analysis and Unbalanced Bids" that states: There are numerous reasons why a bidder may want to unbalance his/her bid on a contract. One reason is to get more money at the beginning of the project. The bidder does this by overpricing the work done early in the project. This is called "front loading" the contract. The leading case in the "front loading" area is Matter of: Riverport Industries, 64 Comp. Gen. 441 (1985). Here the Comptroller General held that if the bid is front loaded, regardless if it is the lowest bid, it "should be viewed as materially unbalanced since acceptance of the bid would result in the same evils as an advance payment. An advance payment is prohibited by law." The "front loading" may also be materially unbalanced due to the cost of money that must be paid out early versus over the normal construction fo the project. Under the Hardaway Company bid, the pile mobilization, the land clearing and grubbing, and the reinforcement steel (substructure) parts of the bid are "front-ended." 2/ Under the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, the Hardaway Company would be paid approximately $428,000 in "advance payments" under these two items if it is awarded the contract. Approximately $375,000 in pile mobilization, $183,600 in land clearing and grubbing, and $289,700 in the reinforcement steel were shifted to these front- end items from the unbalanced sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items. These dollars The shifted dollars are estimated by taking the difference between the statistical average for these items and the Hardaway bid on them. Since roiughly half of the shifted dollars would be paid earlier than they would be paid if they were bid under the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid and Class III (seal) concrete items, the amount of "advance payment," under the FHWA analysis would be approximately $428,000. Griner did not explain why he only followed part, but not all, of the method of analysis suggested by the FHWA memorandum, other than to say he overlooked it. But he also testified that it is common practice for contractors to submit mathematically unbalanced bids, and the DOT always analyzes them the way he did in this case. Indeed, in the March, 1990, bid letting, Griner found "mathematical imbalances" in 21 of the 29 low bids but no "material imbalances." The Fairchild bid also contains "mathematical imbalances." It also "front-ends" several items. The total dollar value of the "front-ending" in the Fairchild bid (including roadway mobilization) closely approximates that found in the Hardaway bid and, under the FHWA analysis, would result in approximately the same amount of advance payment. Under Section 101-2.2 of the DOT's Standard Specifications for this project, contractors are limited to a maximum of ten percent of the total contract for mobilization. The Hardaway Company's total mobilization bid is within the maximum under the specifications. Notwithstanding the imbalances in the Hardaway bid, and the so-called "advance payments" that would result from the "front-ending" in the Hardaway bid, the Hardaway bid remains the lowest and best bid on the project, and it is the best interest of the DOT and the public to award the contract to the Hardaway Company. Even if the Hardaway Company had bid the sand fill, shell fill, reinforcement grid, and Class III (seal) concrete items exactly as Fairchild did, Hardaway still would be low bidder. "Value Engineering" and Alleged Alternative or Contingent Bidding. Inferences reasonably could be drawn from the evidence that the Hardaway Company may intend to propose to the DOT that the approach to the bridge be re-engineered so as to eliminate the need for the sand fill, the shell fill, the reinforcement grid and the C III (seal) concrete. If the DOT accepts such a proposal, the contract between the DOT and the Hardaway Company would have to be modified. If the re-engineered project were to allow the Hardaway Company to do the job for less than its bid price, half (or, if the proposal is innovative or unique, up to 80%) of the savings would be paid to the Hardaway Company under what the DOT calls "value engineering." Under DOT procedures, "value engineering" proposals are not made or evaluated until after the original contract is signed with the successful bidder. It is not an alternative bid or a contingent bid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, enter a final order dismissing the bid protest filed by W. R. Fairchild Construction Company, Ltd., and awarding State Project No. 46090-3511 to the Hardaway Company. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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