The Issue Whether or not Halifax' Second Amended Petition has alleged sufficient standing to initiate a Section 120.57(1) F.S. formal hearing, pursuant to Subsection 381.709(5)(b) F.S., in challenge of HRS' modification of ATC's CON.
Findings Of Fact ATC is an existing 50-bed specialty psychiatric hospital with 25 short- term psychiatric beds for children or adolescents, five beds for short-term substance abuse by children or adolescents, and 20 long-term psychiatric beds for children or adolescents. ATC has operated under CON 2331 since 1984. By correspondence dated March 7, 1990, HRS issued to ATC Amended CON 2331 authorizing ATC to convert 15 of its 20 long-term psychiatric beds for children and adolescents into long-term psychiatric beds for adults in a secure unit. Petitioner Halifax is an existing 545 bed acute care hospital with adult patients in its 50-bed secure psychiatric unit. Its existing hospital license 2700 is for a short-term psychiatric program which does not specify use of the beds for either adults or for children and adolescents. Halifax does not have a CON for a long-term psychiatric program. Halifax' Second Amended Petition alleges its standing in the following terms: . . . Halifax is a 545 bed acute care hospital, licensed pursuant to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, and located within HRS District IV. Halifax provides psychiatric services to adult patients in its 50 bed psychiatric unit. Due to the nature of the patients served, Halifax operates it (sic) psychiatric services in a secured unit. Halifax's psychiatric unit has been in operation since December 7, 1951 and is an "established program" under Section 381.709(5)(b) Fla. Stat. * * * 5. Halifax is a substantially affected party, and its substantial interest is subject to a determination in this proceeding in that: Halifax is an existing provider of acute care hospital services, located in Volusia County, Florida, and within HRS District IV. Halifax has an established program which provides psychiatric services to adult patients within HRS District IV. If the issuance of Amended CON 2331 were upheld, ATC would offer the same adult psychiatric services presently offered at Halifax' established psychiatric program. Therefore, Halifax is entitled to initiate this proceeding pursuant to Section 381.709(5)(b) F.S. (1989). The issuance of Amended CON 2331 will result in an unnecessary duplication of the same adult psychiatric services provided by Halifax in HRS District IV. Such duplication of services will result in decreased utilization of Halifax' psychiatric program, increased costs to consumers of such psychiatric health care services, and the decreased financial viability of Halifax' established psychiatric program. Additionally, the Second Amended Petition asserts that ATC's requested amendment of CON 2331 would represent a substantial change in the inpatient institutional health services offered by ATC and, thus, is subject to CON review pursuant to Section 381.706(1)(h) F.S. (1989). Further, Halifax alleges that, if approved, the amendment to CON 2331 will authorize ATC to serve an entirely new patient population that it is not authorized to serve pursuant to the original CON.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing Halifax' Second Amended Petition and affirming the agency action modifying ATC's CON 2331. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1990. Copies furnished to: Harold C. Hubka, Esquire Black, Crotty, Sims, Hubka, Burnett, Bartlett and Samuels 501 North Grandview Avenue Post Office Box 5488 Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs The Perkins House 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner has standing to initiate the instant challenge to the preliminary determination to issue CON 6254 to Respondent Palms West Hospital, Inc.? If so, whether CON 6254 should be granted?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Palms West Hospital and Wellington Regional Medical Center are general acute care hospitals located five miles apart in western Palm Beach County, Florida (HRS District 9). Due to their proximity to one another, the two hospitals draw from essentially the same patient pool and, as a result, are close competitors. Early on, Wellington was well ahead of Palms West in terms of the number of patient days generated by the facility. Palms West, however, has since surpassed Wellington and now enjoys a slight edge over its competitor in this performance category. Wellington is licensed to operate a total of 120 beds. One-hundred and four of these licensed beds are acute care beds. The remainder are substance abuse beds. Of Wellington's 104 licensed acute care beds, approximately 45 or 46 are staffed. Wellington currently operates at 53% of its licensed total bed capacity and 49% of its licensed acute care bed capacity. During this past calendar year, Wellington has consistently operated at between 50 to 55% of its licensed total bed capacity. Palms West is now, and has been at all times material hereto, licensed to operate 117 acute care beds at its facility in District 9. At no time has Palms West been subject to a license revocation proceeding, nor has it filed any documents with HRS requesting a reduction in its licensed bed capacity. 1/ Palms West's initial license (License No. 1869) was issued on February 17, 1986. The license was effective February 14, 1986, and expired February 13, 1988. Prior to the issuance of License No. 1869, Palms West received a certificate of need (CON 1845) for 117 acute care beds in District 9. Palms West is currently operating under License No. 2701. License No. 2701 was issued on September 1, 1989, with an effective date of September 17, 1989, and an expiration date of September 16, 1991. The license provides, in pertinent part, that Palms West "is authorized to operate a Class I General hospital with 117 Acute beds." License No. 2701 was issued pursuant to a licensure renewal application submitted by Palms West. The application, which had been prepared in May, 1989, made reference to a "renovation" "[b]uilding program . . . in progress" at Palms West with an "[a]nticipated completion date [of] 8/89," but did not provide any additional information regarding the project. The "renovation" project referenced in the application involved the third and fourth floors of the hospital. Space on these floors was being converted to house an eight-bed Labor Delivery Recovery Program. By letter dated February 1, 1989, Palms West, through its Administrator, Paul Pugh, had requested a certificate of need exemption from HRS to initiate this obstetric program at an estimated cost of $1.2 million. Sharon Gordon-Girvin, the then administrator of HRS's Office of Community Health Services and Facilities, sent Pugh a letter, dated February 9, 1989, granting the requested exemption. Girvin explained in the letter that the exemption was being granted pursuant to Section 381.706(3)(f), Florida Statutes, which, she noted, "eliminates Certificate of Need review for initiation or expansion of obstetric services, provided that the licensed bed capacity 2/ does not increase." She also stated in the letter, among other things, that Palms West's "architectural plans [had to] be approved by the Office of Licensure and Certification, Plans and Construction, before construction is undertaken [to] assure conformance with licensure standards." In her letter, Girvin did not purport to authorize a decrease in Palms West's licensed bed capacity. Palms West's architectural plans were approved by Plans and Construction and work on the renovation project commenced. The project's progress was monitored by Plans and Construction. In or around August, 1989, the project was completed. The completed eight-bed obstetric unit occupied space that previously had been used to house 30 general acute care beds. As a result of the project, Palms West no longer had the space necessary to accommodate its licensed complement of 117 acute care beds. It had the physical capacity (hereinafter referred to as "constructed bed capacity") to house only 95 of its 117 licensed beds. Palms West, in undertaking this project, never intended to reduce the number of licensed beds at the facility. While it did not specifically so state in its exemption request, it had every intention of seeking authorization, "sometime soon after the [obstetric] unit was up and going," to expand its facility to accommodate the 22 licensed beds taken out of service as a result of the project. On August 18, 1989, Plans and Construction conducted an inspection of the completed project. The inspection revealed that the project had "permanently reduced" the constructed bed capacity of the facility from 117 to 95 beds. Nonetheless, Plans and Construction found the facility "to be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the licensure regulations." Accordingly, the project was approved for patient care. The first obstetric patient was admitted to the hospital on August 21, 1989. On November 14, 1989, Ira Wagner, an Architect Supervisor in Plans and Construction, sent the following letter to Palms West: 3/ On August 18, 1989 the Plans and Construction Section of the Office of Regulation and Health Facilities ran a final construction survey in your new obstetrical services project. Based on the survey results, we are able to release the area for occupancy. One requirement for the close-out documenta- tion for this type survey is a bed count iden- tifying the previous and new bed capacity. In order for this office to further clarify the information available during the referenced survey, this office would appreciate an in-depth bed count prepared by the facility and forwarded to us. The bed count format should include both the constructed bed count and the licensed capacity (not always the same) both prior and subsequent to this project. Further, the format should be on a floor and bed by bed designation basis. In response to this request, Pugh, on behalf of Palms West, sent Wagner a letter dated December 18, 1989. In his letter, Pugh provided a floor by floor "bed count" showing a total of "117 beds" "[p]rior to 8/18/89" and a total of "95 beds" "[s]ubsequent to 8/18/89" and "as of December, 1989." At Wagner's behest, Pugh sent Wagner a second letter to clarify and confirm the "bed count" figures given in the December 18, 1989, letter. This second letter, which was dated January 1, 1990, contained "bed count" information identical to that which had been reported in Pugh's first letter to Wagner. In neither letter did Pugh indicate whether the pre-8/18/89 and post-8/18/89 "bed counts" reflected licensed bed capacity or constructed bed capacity, or both. It was Pugh's unstated intention, however, to convey in these letters information regarding only the facility's constructed bed capacity. Wagner and Pugh communicated not only in writing, but by telephone as well. During one such telephone conversation, Wagner suggested that Pugh contact Girvin to seek guidance regarding what, if anything, the hospital should do now that its constructed bed capacity had been reduced to 95. Thereafter, Pugh followed Wagner's suggestion and telephoned Girvin. During their telephone conversation, Pugh and Girvin discussed the various alternative courses of action that were available to Palms West given the discrepancy between its licensed bed capacity (117) and its constructed bed capacity (95). Following their conversation, Girvin sent Pugh the following letter, dated January 18, 1990: I enjoyed talking with you by phone on Tuesday, January 9. Our conversation involved various options you have for complying with the licensure requirement that you have the capability for bringing all licensed beds into service within a 24 hour period. At the present time, the obstetrical program utilized existing space within the hospital for expan- sion. The effect was that 22 medical or surgical beds cannot be put into service within the time prescribed by law. Any change in licensed bed capacity is sub- ject to a certificate of need. (Reference Section 381.706(1)(e), F.S.) Therefore, Palms West has no authority to change its licensed bed capacity. Should a licensure inspection occur, the hospital may be found in violation if the 22 beds cannot be put into service. You have four options from which to choose: File a certificate of need application in the next hospital batch (letter of intent due no later than 5:00 p.m. local time on February 26, 1990) to reduce your licensed capacity by 22 beds; File a certificate of need application for a capital expenditure (expedited review) to seek authorization to construct capacity to house the 22 beds (due on or before May 15, 1990); File a letter seeking determination of reviewability if the proposed capital expend- iture to construct the capacity to house the 22 beds is below $1 million; or Do nothing to increase capability which would make the department file an administra- tive complaint to revoke the 22 beds. Based upon our discussion at the time, you found either option 2 or 3 to be the most appropriate one for you. It is similar to the situation at Doctor's Hospital in Coral Gables. I'm enclosing a copy of the corre- spondence between Doctor's Hospital and me. Option 3 would only be applicable if the esti- mated cost of constructing the 22 beds could be accomplished below the $1 million threshold. In my experience, 22 beds including the atten- dant and ancillary space and the equipment exceeds $1 million (especially if any land acquisition is involved.) The situation requires expeditious attention to the matter because the hospital may be found to be in violation. Therefore, I would like to work with you to avoid an adversarial relationship. To that end, the same agreement I reached with Doctor's Hospital is appropriate for Palms West. Please respond in writing by January 31 as to which of the options you will pursue. With any or all of them, I will be glad to discuss them with you or your representative. You may reach me at (904) 488-8673. In declining to take immediate action to institute disciplinary proceedings and instead providing Palms West the opportunity to bring its licensed bed capacity 4/ and constructed bed capacity into balance, HRS was following established non-rule policy and practice. 5/ Because the imbalance was the product of a renovation project that had been undertaken and completed with HRS approval and under its supervision, HRS believed that such a "wait and see" approach was particularly appropriate in the instant case. By letter dated February 2, 1990, Pugh informed Girvin that Palms West intended to pursue the second of the four options presented by Girvin in her January 18, 1990, letter. Pugh's letter read as follows: Thank you for your letter of January 18, 1989 [sic], regarding licensure requirements for Palms West Hospital. I appreciated the infor- mation relative to regulations compliance and the options my facility has at this time to maintain our current licensed capacity at 117 acute care beds. As you know, our recent obstetrical construc- tion project utilized existing space within the hospital for expansion. The effect was that 22 acute care . . . beds cannot presently be placed into service within the time [24 hours] prescribed by law. Accordingly, Palms West Hospital agrees to file a Certifi- cate of Need application for a capital expend- iture (expedited review) to seek authorization to construct capacity to house 22 beds. We agree to file the CON application on or before May 15, 1990. Please call or write my office for clarifica- tion, if necessary. I look forward to confir- mation of our request. Again, my apologies for the delay in our response. Thank you for your input and advice. A very short time after making its decision to exercise this option, Palms West hired a health planning consultant to assist it in preparing the certificate of need application. As promised, on May 11, 1990, Palms West filed the certificate of need application. The application was accompanied by a transmittal letter addressed to Girvin. The letter, which was signed by Palms West's health planning consultant, read as follows: Enclosed is the original copy of an applica- tion for Certificate of Need for the construc- tion of a 23-bed wing of acute care beds to replace a like number of licensed beds which are out of service at Palms West Hospital, Loxahatchee. This application is filed pursuant to an agreement between your office and Mr. Mike Pugh, administrator of the hospital. The filing fee of $10,000 is being submitted under separate cover on May 15, 1990 for attachment to this document, under agreement between Mr. Pugh and your staff. We look forward to working with you on the review of this document. Please contact me at this office for additional information you may need. Contrary to the statement made in the letter, only 22, not 23, of Palms West's licensed acute care beds were "out of service." One of the 23 licensed beds to be housed in the proposed new wing was to be relocated from an area of the existing facility that Palms West intended to convert into a telemetry unit. That bed was at the time of the filing of the application, and still is, operational. In Section I of the application, the project Palms West sought permission to undertake was described as follows: Replacement of existing licensed beds by construction of new bed wing on existing third floor of hospital. Section II of the application contained the following, more detailed description of the proposed project and its purpose: In 1989, in response to rapid service area growth and to local requests for high quality obstetrical service, the hospital opened an eight (8) bed LDRP obstetrical unit on its third floor. This unit and its support areas required conversion or remodeling of twenty-six (26) acute care bed spaces on the third floor. It also required use of another four (4) acute care bed spaces on the second floor for mechan- ical support systems for the C-section room in the third floor obstetrical unit. This reduced available bed space by twenty-two (22) beds. In early 1990, the hospital committed to con- vert one (1) bed space on the second floor to house telemetry equipment for the adjacent nursing unit. When this equipment is placed in service, it will reduce available bed space by an additional bed. As a result, Palms West Hospital will have temporarily lost the use of twenty-three (23) net bed spaces, or some 20% of its licensed bed capacity, in the development of expanded and improved services for patients of its service area. This application proposes to restore the hospital's available bed capacity to its current licensed bed level of one hundred seventeen (117) acute care beds. No addi- tional licensed beds or new services are proposed. The restoration of capacity will be accomplished through construction of a twenty-three (23) bed wing on the second floor of the hospital, containing seven private and eight semiprivate patient rooms. Construction should commence by May of 1991 and be completed by the end of September 1991. The estimated cost of the project is $1,560,888. All required funds will be provided by a cash grant from the applicant's parent company, so that the project itself will not adversely impact the hospital's rates and charges. The project is required if the hospital is to maintain the licensed capacity for which it received CON approval in 1984. Currently only ninety-four bed spaces can be made available for patient occupancy within 24 hours notice. In a high growth service area such as West Palm Beach County, it is not desirable for existing bed resources to be diminished. It is also not appropriate for the hospital to be penalized by reduction in licensure for the development of exempt and appropriate services which improve the quality of care and access to care in its service area. For these and other reasons, the administra- tion of Palms West Hospital and Sharon M. Gordon-Girvin of the Office of Community Health Services and Facilities agreed in early 1990 that the hospital should file this expedited CON proposal to restore its functional bed capacity to the original licensed level. Palms West's application was assigned CON Application No. 6254. In accordance with long-standing HRS non-rule policy and practice, the project proposed in the application was deemed to be a capital expenditure project reviewable only pursuant to subsection (1)(c) of Section 381.706, Florida Statutes, and, as such, it was subjected, not to a full batched comparative review, but to an expedited review that was applicant specific in nature. 6/ Full batched comparative review was considered inappropriate because Palms West was proposing to merely add space to its existing facility in order to accommodate licensed beds for which it had already successfully competed. Inasmuch as they were approved and licensed, these beds, under the bed need methodology established by HRS rule, were already included in the existing acute care bed inventory utilized to determine the number of additional beds, if any, needed in District 9 to meet projected demand (fixed need pool). 7/ Had Palms West's application been subjected to full batched comparative review, it would have been evaluated against this fixed need pool. In declining to subject the application to full batched comparative review, HRS also took into consideration that the bed space Palms West sought to restore had been lost as a result of the hospital's initiation of obstetric services. In the view of the agency, to subject such restoration projects to full batched comparative review would tend to discourage the development and expansion of obstetric programs in the state and therefore run counter to, what it perceived to be, the Legislature's intent in exempting obstetric services projects from certificate-of-need review. On August 17, 1990, following this expedited review of Palms West's application, HRS published a State Agency Action Report in which it announced its preliminary determination to issue the certificate of need requested in CON Application No. 6254.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order (1) dismissing, for lack of standing, the petition filed by Petitioner in the instant case, and (2) issuing CON 6254 to Palms West. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of July, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation which proposes to construct and operate a 60 bed intensive residential treatment program (IRTP) in Bradenton, Florida, which is located in the Department's District VI. The Department is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications. Manatee Palms is an existing residential treatment center in Manatee County, Florida which opened in January, 1987 and is currently operating without a CON. It provides services similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC. Manatee Palms was developed by, and is a subsidiary of, Psychiatric Institutes of America. Its primary service area extends beyond District VI from Orlando to Naples. Manatee Palms is a sixty bed facility providing psychiatric, substance abuse and educational services for juveniles up to 18 years of age, and is licensed by the Department as a child caring facility, as a provider of services to the Department, and for subspecialties involving drug and alcohol programs. It is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals as a residential treatment center. The average length of stay for patients is six months. Occupancy rates have been consistently above projections and have been as high as 97 percent in May, 1987. Manatee Memorial is a full-service acute care hospital and an existing provider of short-term psychiatric services in Bradenton, Florida, with 25 licensed short-term psychiatric beds, nine of which comprise a children's and adolescent unit. It is the Manatee County contract provider of in-patient psychiatric services to the medically indigent, and provides approximately 91 percent of the indigent care in Manatee County. Manatee Memorial does not have, and has never sought, a CON as an IRTP, but does have earlier-batched applications pending for additional short and long term psychiatric beds. Its average length of stay is 35-40 days, and its utilization rate is approaching 100 percent. Manatee Memorial provides services similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC, and its program also utilizes a "levels system" similar to that used by FRTC. The Application and Project On September 15, 1986 FRTC filed a Letter of Intent notifying the Department of its intent to file a CON application for an IRTP for children and adolescents in Bradenton, Florida. On October 14, 1986 FRTC filed CON application number 4825 to obtain specialty hospital licensure as an IRTP. This application was initially approved by the Department on March 10, 1987, after the filing of a completeness response on or about December 23, 1986 at the request of the Department. Manatee Palms and Manatee Memorial timely filed petitions for formal administrative hearings challenging the Department's intent to issue the CON. The project at issue in this case is a 60 bed IRTP situated on a 9.35 acre site. The proposed building will have total gross square footage of approximately 32,000 and has been adapted from a prototype short-term psychiatric hospital design which has been used in approximately 50 locations. The floor plan submitted by FRTC provides for 28 semi-private rooms, three of which are designed to accommodate the handicapped, and one 4- bed assessment unit. Additionally, reasonable and sufficient space is provided for five classrooms, occupational therapy, a gymnasium, three group rooms, three day rooms, a seclusion area, three consult rooms, laundry and storage rooms, a nurses' station, dining room, and an administrative wing. A parking area, multi-purpose court, pool, activities field and drainage retention area are also provided. The parties have stipulated that the building will be energy efficient. Total project cost is reasonably estimated at $4,303,020. As a result of design modifications, the square footage of the project has increased by approximately 1,000 gross square feet and project costs have increased by approximately $69,000 from FRTC's completed application. The Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, testified that for a project of this size these changes are not considered to be "amendments" to the application. The changes in facility design identified at hearing represent refinements and permissible modifications, rather than application amendments. There is no architectural significance to the changes. Rather, they make the design more appropriate for an IRTP. Specifically, a multi-purpose area was converted to a half-court gymnasium, the occupational therapy and interior mechanical spaces were slightly increased for more storage area, a seclusion room was deleted, the nurses' station was reduced, a 4-bed assessment unit was added, and other minor changes were made. FRTC proposes to offer 24-hour psychiatric services to children and adolescents under the age of 18, who are severely emotionally disturbed, and who are admitted voluntarily, after screening, with a history of prior treatment. Its program elements will include occupational therapy, recreational therapy, group and individual therapy, nursing care, an educational component, psychological testing, counseling and family therapy. The FRTC program will be initiated as a locked intensive program whose goal is to return the patient to his family and to life in a natural setting. Patients who are severely retarded, autistic, or with an active diagnosis of substance abuse will not be admitted. The average length of stay for patients is reasonably projected to be one year, with a range of from 6 months to two years. There are no licensed intensive residential treatment programs (IRTP) for children and adolescents in Manatee County, Florida or in the Department's District VI, which includes Manatee County as well as Hardee, Highland, Hillsborough and Polk Counties. There are also no licensed IRTPs in adjoining Districts V and VIII. Stipulations The parties have stipulated that FRTC has the ability to recruit physicians for this project, and also has funds available for FRTC's capital and operating expenditures. In addition, the parties have stipulated that review criteria concerning the need for research and educational facilities, the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professional, and the special needs and circumstances of health maintenance organizations are not applicable to this CON application. Non-Rule Policy For IRTP The Department currently has no rule governing the approval of IRTP applications for a CON. However, since February 1987 the Department has followed a non-rule policy which presumes there is a need for at least one licensed IRTP of reasonable size in each Departmental service district, and which does not consider the existence of unlicensed residential treatment beds in a district in determining if the presumed need has been met. No changes or revisions in this non-rule policy of the Department are under review. The Department applied this non-rule policy in initially approving the CON application. Based upon the testimony of John Griffin, the Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary who administers the CON program and is responsible for health planning, an IRTP applicant does not have to establish "need" in a particular service district where it wants to locate a facility because the non- rule policy presumes there is a need for one IRTP of reasonable size per district. The applicant must, however, establish that there is not presently a licensed IRTP in the district and that it proposed to establish an IRTP of reasonable size. Griffin was not able to explicate this non-rule policy based upon health planning concerns, considerations or factors. Sharon Gordon-Girvin, Administrator of the Department's Office of Community Medical Services and Facilities, was also unable to articulate or explicate a health planning basis for this policy. Rather, the only basis enunciated at hearing by the Department for this non-rule policy was its statutory interpretation of Sections 395.002(8) and 395.003(2)(f), Florida Statutes, as renumbered by Section 34, Chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. Need And Consistency With State And Local Health Plans There are no licensed IRTPs in District VI. Manatee Palms is a residential treatment center for children and adolescents located in Manatee County, but it is not licensed by the Department as an IRTP. Relevant issues identified in the District VI Local Health Plan are stated as follows: As a general policy, the least restrictive, most cost effective setting and programs should be used. The State of Florida, as a major purchaser of mental health and substance abuse services, can continue to lead the way by encouraging the development of non-hospital alternatives and by purchasing services from them preferentially. Another important issue in psychiatric care is the trend toward hospitalization of children who have behavior and conduct disorders, and who should more appropriately be served through non-hospital alternatives. . . At the present time, the severe emotionally disturbed or emotionally handicapped (SED/EH) child or adolescent is served in a broad range of programs. There are crisis stabilization units (CSUs) for stabilizing the adult client in acute crisis. Currently CSU services for children and adolescents are not adequate throughout the District. Intensive residential, day/night program, group and foster homes are for the client requiring close supervision. Relevant policies set forth in the District Local Health Plan are as follows: The multi-modality approach as expressed in the community mental health (and substance abuse) system should be considered a model of programming, staffing, facility requirements, costs, etc., against which applications for inpatient services should be reviewed. Review of applications for inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse services should include comment from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Offices of DHRS. No additional psychiatric and/or substance abuse beds should be granted approval unless the capacity of current hospital providers is being fully utilized (75 percent occupancy rate annual). Additional psychiatric and/or substance abuse beds should be through conversion of existing beds. The State Health Plan sets forth the following relevant policies and statements: The goal of (mental health) services is (to) . . . provide educational; mental health treatment; and when needed, residential services for severely emotionally disturbed students. It is the intent of the Legislature that the least restrictive means of intervention be employed based on the individual needs of each patient within the scope of available services . . . The program goals for each component of the network are . . . to provide programs and services as close as possible to the child's home in the least restrictive manner consistent with the child's needs. Sufficient funding for the development of residential treatment and community support services is necessary if the state is to fulfill its commitment to providing services for long term mentally ill persons. These services provide, in the long run, a more humane and cost effective means of meeting the mental health needs of Florida residents. Continued development of long and short term inpatient hospital programs for the treatment of adolescents and children is contrary to current treatment practices for these groups and is, therefore, inappropriate without local data to support the need for these services. Such development can contribute to inappropriate placement, unnecessary costs of treatment, and divert scarce resources away from alternative uses. In addition, the following relevant goals are contained in the State Health Plan: Promote the development of a continuum of high quality, cost effective private sector mental health and substance abuse treatment and preventive services. Bring about changes in third party reimbursement policy for psychiatric and substance abuse care which would promote the development of the most appropriate, cost-effective treatment settings . . . Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1989 . . . Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving treatment in out of state facilities by 1990. The FRTC application is consistent with the above cited relevant portions of the state and local health plans. It is consistent with the State Health Plan which reflects and emphasizes the trend toward deinstitutionalization and the current emphasis on education, treatment and residential services for severely emotionally disturbed students rather than what has been the traditional approach to treatment in an institutional setting, a generally more costly approach from a capital cost and staffing perspective. The FRTC application promotes treatment within the State and will assist in reducing out of state placements. Through the report and testimony of Ronald T. Luke, Ph.D., J.D., and despite the testimony of Jay Cushman, both of whom were accepted as experts in health planning, FRTC established the need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District VI, with 50 percent occupancy in the first year and 60 percent in the second year, using two bed need assessment methodologies. First, using the ratio of licensed IRTP beds in other service districts to population ages 0-17 years old, a range of .07 to 1.33 beds per 1,000 population is identified. Using 1991 population projections for District VI, the 60 bed FRTC facility would result in a bed to population ratio of .17 per 1,000 population aged 0-17 years. Since there are no licensed beds in the current inventory, no adjustment of this ratio must be made to account for existing beds. Thus, the FRTC application is within the range of ratios of currently licensed IRTPs in other districts, and is therefore reasonable. Second, a utilization methodology identifies an intensive residential treatment bed need of 90 in 1987 to 95 in 1991, with target occupancy rates of 90 percent. This methodology is based upon 1987 and 1991 population projections. Using a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58 which is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, an average daily census of 74 in 1987 and 78 in 1991 is derived. Thus, FRTC has established a need for its facility in District VI, given its projected occupancy levels, and given that there are no licensed beds currently in the District. It is important to recognize that the bed ratio analysis is based upon licensed intensive residential treatment beds in Florida, and is therefore clearly relevant and credible to the issues in this case. The utilization methodology supports and confirms the need found thorough the bed ratio analysis, although it is noted that this methodology, by using national data, is not based upon licensed beds in Florida, and would therefore not be sufficient, in itself, to establish need. It is, however, persuasive and credible in confirming the bed ratio analysis. Accessibility To All Residents FRTC projects only 1.5 percent indigent care and 8 percent bad debt. Its projection for private pay patients is 25 percent and for insurance covered care is 65.5 percent. This is a marginal and insignificant indigent load. There is no provision for services to state-funded patients. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable. The clear purpose of this application is to enable FRTC to become licensed as a hospital under Section 395.002, Florida Statutes, and thereby enable it to be called a "hospital". It was established through the testimony of Dwight Hood, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance and health care third party payments, that if a facility is licensed as a hospital it has a significant advantage for reimbursement from third parties who more readily reimburse for care in a licensed facility than in an unlicensed residential treatment center. Therefore, accessibility will be increased for those children and adolescents in need of this care whose families have insurance coverage, since it is more likely that payments under such third party coverage will be made at an IRTP licensed as a "hospital" than otherwise. Quality of Care The applicant has clearly demonstrated its ability to provide quality care to its patients, based upon the testimony of C. Hal Brunt, M.D., Robert Friedel, M.D. and G. L. Tischler, M.D., who were accepted as experts in psychiatry, and notwithstanding the testimony of Howard Goldman, M.D., and Glen Lewis, M.D., who were also accepted as experts in psychiatry. FRTC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation which has experience in the operation and management of a residential treatment center, Charter Colonial Institute in Virginia, and also has extensive experience in providing quality health care at five hospitals in Florida, including Charter Hospital of Tampa Bay. The treatment program at FRTC will be adapted to local community needs. In providing quality care, FRTC will assign patients to the correct level of care within the facility by insuring that they are seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee, completing appropriate patient assessments and developing integrated treatment programs which are regularly updated, making appropriate treatment outcome assessments, and providing for continuity of care for patients leaving the IRTP through the development of a community-wide continuum of care. Charter has six out-patient counselling centers located within two hours of the FRTC proposed facility. It is both reasonable and appropriate to structure psychiatric treatment and care in a hospital setting within a "levels system" that rewards and reinforces desired behavior, and FRTC will utilize a "levels system" in its highly goal oriented patient treatment programs. Quality of care is not dependent upon a hospital's environment and physical facilities, according to Dr. Goldman. The floor plan proposed by FRTC is functional and is a proto- typical design used by Charter in approximately fifty locations, although not as an IRTP. The criticisms of the floor plan and facility design to which Maxine Wolfe, Ph.D., and Glen Lewis, M.D., testified do not establish that the applicant will be unable to provide quality care in this facility. While the Petitioners might design a facility differently, and specifically provide for a different orientation of the nurses' station relative to the patient wings, a different location for the dining room, more rooms where a patient can have privacy, and more opportunity for individualized treatment, these preferences do not establish that FRTC's floor plan and design will impair the quality of care rendered at this proposed facility. It is also noted that Dr. Wolfe testified critically about residential treatment in general, and expressed the opinion that residential treatment in a hospital is not beneficial and that children should never be treated in a large facility of any kind under any circumstance. Her testimony clearly establishes her bias and impairs her own credibility and the weight to be given to her testimony in this case. Availability and Adequacy of Alternatives Although there are no licensed IRTPs in District VI residential treatment and/or psychiatric services are currently available to children and adolescents through Manatee Memorial (9 beds), Manatee Palms (60 beds), Glenbeigh (14-16 beds), Sarasota Palms (60-70 beds), Sarasota Memorial Care Center (30 beds), Children's Home in Tampa (68 beds) and Northside Center in Tampa (12 beds). The average of length of stay at the significant majority of these facilities is up to 90 days, and they also attract patients from outside District VI. FRTC proposes to serve patients who require an average length of stay of a year. Some of these facilities serve patients with a dual diagnosis that includes substance abuse whereas FRTC will not. Therefore, these facilities do not offer adequate alternatives for the patients which FRTC is seeking to serve. Further, it was not established that outpatient or ambulatory services represent an adequate and appropriate alternative to an IRTP. Availability of Resources The total project cost of $4,303,020 will be funded through an equity contribution from Charter Medical Corporation and through a conventional loan. Assuming a 50 percent occupancy rate (30 beds) in its first year of operation, the proposed facility will have a staff of 43 positions, 27 of which will represent personnel who will be direct nursing or staff support for the patients, including social workers, psychologists, staff registered nurses, mental health workers, patient care coordinator, nursing supervisors, occupational and recreational therapists and special education teachers. A part-time medical director will also be available. This results in a ratio of 1.4 positions per patient. In comparison, Manatee Palms has a 1.8 staffing ratio based on a census of 55 patients. FRTC has proposed a reasonable and adequate staffing pattern and ratio to treat 30 patients. FRTC will recruit personnel through direct advertising, community contacts, posted notices, job fairs, and school visits. It will compete with unlicensed residential treatment centers, as well as short and long term psychiatric hospitals, in attracting staff for its facility. Although only six mental health workers are identified in FRTC's list of manpower requirements, and it would be beneficial to the level of treatment and care to increase this number, nevertheless, the staffing patterns proposed by FRTC will allow it to render quality care to patients at its facility, based upon 50 percent occupancy in its first year of operation. Staff salaries proposed by FRTC are reasonable and realistic, although its proposed salaries for nurses and mental health workers are higher than that available at Manatee Memorial. Existing facilities may have to increase their salaries to the levels proposed by FRTC to continue to retain and attract qualified staff, particularly nurses and mental health workers. Recruitment difficulties have been experienced in the District VI area for nurses, social workers, mental health workers and occupational therapists. However, it appears that FRTC will be able to attract qualified applicants for all positions due to the level of salaries offered and quality of care provided. Financial Feasibility Net revenues from the first year of operation are projected to be $100,000, which represents 2.3 percent of the capital expenditure as a return on investment. In the second year of operation, net revenues are projected to be $302,000, a 7 percent return on investment. Both years show a fair return on investment, and the pro forma establishes the financial feasibility of this project. In preparing the pro forma for this project, William S. Love, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance, used the reasonable assumption of 50 percent occupancy in the first year of operation and 60 percent in the second year. Despite the testimony of Jay Cushman, who was accepted as an expert health planner, it was not established that FRTC's location will preclude these occupancy rates. Love also assumed patient revenues of $300 per day and an average length of stay of one year. Utilization by class of payor was estimated to be 65 1/2 percent insurance, 25 percent private pay, 8 percent bad debt and 1 1/2 percent indigent care. It was assumed there would be no Medicare or Medicaid. Assumptions regarding patient revenues and utilization by class of payor are reasonable based on the testimony of Love, Luke and Dwight Hood, as well as a survey of insurance benefits available through employers, and despite the testimony of Christopher Knepper, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Knepper's testimony is applicable to unlicensed residential treatment centers rather than an IRTP. Therefore, his criticism of the pro forma as underestimating bad debt and overestimating the private pay portion is not persuasive since it disregards the fact that a licensed IRTP, due to its status as a specialty hospital, will have an increased ability to attract patients with insurance and with an ability to pay deductibles and other unreimbursed costs for care. It was established that a residential treatment center licensed as a specialty hospital has a significant advantage in terms of an improved payor mix over unlicensed facilities because of its recognized status with insurance companies. In addition, Knepper's testimony at hearing concerning the financial feasibility of this project conflicted with estimates made during discovery, and his explanation of such discrepancy was not credible. This conflict in Knepper's position at hearing and during discovery reduces the weight to be given to his testimony. FRTC assumed it would not be subject to the indigent care tax, but even if it were subject to the tax this would only add $29,000 in expenses, and therefore not affect the financial feasibility of the project. A management fee will be charged by Charter Medical Corporation, although this is not separately shown on the pro forma. It is the position of FRTC that this fee is associated with home office costs which will exist without regard to this facility. However, this fee, as well as additional construction costs of approximately $70,000, will not affect the financial feasibility of this project since salary costs associated with administration, as well as data processing costs have been separately shown and included on the pro forma as expenses, even though they are sometimes included in a management fee. FRTC's estimate of gross patient revenue of $300 per day for the first year of operation is substantially higher than other facilities offering like services. Net revenues per day during the first year of operation are estimated to be $265.30. Total direct expenses are estimated to be $198.70 for the first year, with total expenses per patient day estimated at $250.50 in the first year. A 7 percent inflation factor was used for the second year of operation, and this is a reasonable inflation factor. Impact On Costs and Competition As previously noted, salary estimates for nurses and mental health workers for this project are above those provided at Manatee Memorial, and therefore could reasonably be expected to increase salaries in these categories for some facilities in the area. The all inclusive charge of $300 per day proposed by FRTC is greater than Manatee Palm's average gross charge of between $270 - $280 per day. It is likely that paying patients, including patients with insurance coverage, who would otherwise be treated at Petitioners' facilities, will be treated at FRTC if this application is approved. However, the extent of such a loss in paying patients due to FRTC is unclear since Manatee Palms is recently receiving greater acceptance by insurers for reimbursement purposes, and Manatee Memorial's estimates of patient losses were based upon impact from both Manatee Palms and FRTC. Reasonableness of Costs The equipment cost estimate of $360,015 is reasonable. This finding is based on the testimony of Susan Hickman, who was accepted as an expert in health care facility equipment. The equipment and beds are appropriate for an IRTP of this size. The total cost of $707,897 for telephones, signage, graphics, interior design and equipment is also reasonable. The construction cost estimate of $2,010,823 is reasonable. This finding is based on the testimony of Patrick A. Regan, who was accepted as an expert in health care facility construction budgeting. Due to the conservative nature of the cost figures, a 2 1/2 percent contingency is adequate, rather than the normal 5-6 percent contingency. The contingency could be used for unbudgeted items such as stucco siding and hard ceilings. FRTC owns the facility site, which was purchased for $664,000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order approving FRTC's application for CON 4825. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2036, 87-2049 Rulings on the Joint Proposed Findings of Fact filed by FRTC and the Department: 1 Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 27. 2-4 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 5 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 6-9 Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 29, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 10-11 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 15-16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 46, Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 21-22 Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10, 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 27-30 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 27, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 31 Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 32-34 Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 33, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 33, 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 50-57 Adopted in Findings of Fact 26, 39, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 58 Rejected as unnecessary. 59-61 Adopted in Finding of Fact 15, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary or as a conclusion of law. 62 Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 61 Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 15, 16. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected in Finding of Fact 17, but adopted in part in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 69-72 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant since the Department's non-rule policy was not explicated and therefore cannot be relied upon. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant since the "reasonableness" of the facility's size is not at issue, the Department having failed to explicate its non-rule policy. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 31, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 24, 33, 35, 39. The proposed average length of stay of one year is found to be reasonable in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 21, 22. 79-81 Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 23, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 18, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 26 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 87-88 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 44, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and therefore unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as unnecessary and simply a summation of testimony. 95-96 Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and in part simply a summation of testimony. 97-98 Rejected as a summation of testimony and otherwise as speculative and irrelevant. 99 Rejected as simply a summation of testimony. 100-103 Rejected as irrelevant. 104 Rejected as a summation of, and argument on, the evidence rather than a Finding of Fact. Rulings on the Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Manatee Palms: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary, and as simply a statement of position. 9-11 Rejected as unnecessary and as otherwise covered in preliminary procedural matters. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 31, but otherwise rejected as simply a summation of testimony and position of the parties. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 25, 39, 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14, but rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17, but rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22, 23. Rejected as simply argument and a statement of position rather than a Finding of Fact. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 25, 39. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22, 23. 24-26 Rejected in Findings of Fact 19, 20, 23. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 44, but rejected in Finding of Fact 23. Rejected in Findings of Fact 23, 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16, 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 34-42 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. This is a de novo proceeding through which final agency action will be taken, and therefore preliminary agency findings are irrelevant to a determination of the issues in this case which must be decided based upon evidence presented at hearing. Rejected as simply a statement of position without any citation to the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 45-46 Rejected in Finding of Fact 24. 47-48 Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 24. 49-60 Rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected as without citation to the record and as simply a statement of position rather than a Finding of Fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 66-70 Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative, since it is established that services are similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 44. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact. 26, 39 and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Rejected as simply a statement of position, without citation to the record. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. 80-81 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 82 Rejected as unnecessary. 83-84 Rejected in Findings of Fact 33 and 35, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 36. 89-90 Rejected in Findings of Fact 35, 37. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 98-100 Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 101-102 Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 39. 103-109 Rejected in Finding of Fact 39, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 29. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected in Finding of Fact 35, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 115-117 Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 40, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 8, 40, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 45. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and without citation to the record. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 128-129 Rejected as simply a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as simply a statement of position and argument. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Manatee Memorial: 1-2 Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3-4 Rejected as irrelevant. 5 Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 29. 6-7 Rejected as irrelevant to a determination of the issues in this case. 8-10 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 34, 36, 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 13-22 Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 24 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 36. Rejected as speculative and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 5, 10, but rejected in in Finding of Fact 44. 30-32 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 33 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 34-39 Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 43-45 Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Since Mr. Griffin is the highest level departmental representative who testified at hearing, his statement of the non-rule policy is presumed to be correct. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16 and otherwise as unnecessary and irrelevant. 49-51 Rejected as irrelevant since this is a de novo hearing by which final agency action will be taken. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21-23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 58-60 Rejected in Findings of Fact 21-23 and otherwise as irrelevant. 61-63 Rejected in Findings of Fact 19, 20, 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30, but rejected in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39 and otherwise as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 and rejected in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 39, 42. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 44. Rejected in Findings of Fact 24 and 39. Rejected as speculative, and not based on competent substantial evidence. 71-79 Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 38, 39 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 80-83 Rejected in Findings of Fact 33, 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 33, 35, 38, 39, 42. Rejected in Findings of Fact 39, 40. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 27, 33, 35. Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected as unnecessary. 94-95 Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. 96 Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. 97-100 Rejected in Findings of Fact 28, 29. 101-102 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 103-105 Rejected in Finding of Fact 29. 106 Rejected in Finding of Fact 8. 107-109 Rejected in Findings of Fact 27, 28, 29 and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. 110 Rejected as irrelevant. 111-112 Rejected in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected in Findings of Fact 9, 27, 28, 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 115-116 Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8 and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 3, 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25, 39, 45. 125-127 Rejected as speculative and not based on competent substantial evidence. 128-130 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: John Rodriguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jean Laramore, Esquire Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Bruce A. Leinback, Esquire Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William Hoffman, Esquire Deborah Winegard, Esquire 2500 Trust Co. Tower 25 Park Place Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Fred W. Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire 900 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, DC 20006 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Fl 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Background On July 31, 1987, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) published in the Florida Administrative Weekly an announcement of the fixed need pools for the subject batching cycle, which pertained to the planning horizon of July, 1992. According to the notice, the fixed need pool, which was calculated pursuant to Rules 10-5.008(6) and 10-5.011(m), (n), (o), and (q), Florida Administrative Code, was adjusted according to the occupancy rate thresholds as prescribed by said rules. The net adjusted need for short-term psychiatric beds in District 7 was zero. By letter to HRS dated August 12, 1987, the North Brevard County Hospital District, doing business as Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital (Jess Parrish), provided notice of its intent to apply for a certificate of need to convert 16 beds from medical/surgical to psychiatric. By Application for Certificate of Need dated September 14, 1987, Jess Parrish requested that HRS grant a certificate of need for the conversion of 16 medical/surgical beds to 16 adult short-term psychiatric beds at a cost of $46,100. Jess Parrish is a tax-exempt organization whose board of directors have been authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes in a special tax district in north Brevard County for the support of the hospital. The main hospital is located at 951 North Washington Avenue in Titusville, which is in north Brevard County. Brevard County is located in HRS District 7. By letter to Jess Parrish dated October 5, 1987, HRS requested additional information. By response dated November 9, 1987, Jess Parrish supplied the requested responses to omissions. By letter dated November 18, 1987, Jess Parrish provided additional information desired by HRS. By letter dated December 22, 1987, Wuesthoff Hospital (Wuesthoff) informed HRS that it objected to the above-described application because of absence of need. The letter states that Wuesthoff maintained an occupancy rate of 74% during the past year in its 25 short-term psychiatric beds. Wuesthoff is located in Rockledge, which is in central Brevard County. By letter and State Agency Action Report dated January 25, 1988, HRS informed Jess Parrish of its intent to issue the requested certificate of need for the conversion of the 16 beds. By Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed February 23, 1988, Wuesthoff challenged the intent to award the certificate of need to Jess Parrish and requested a formal hearing. The Application and Approval Process The application for the certificate of need states that Jess Parrish has a total of 210 beds, consisting of 172 medical/surgical beds, 10 obstetric beds, 20 pediatric beds, and 8 intensive care unit beds. The application contains all elements required by law, including a resolution authorizing the application and financial statements. The application and omissions response state that Jess Parrish admitted about 100 psychiatric patients in fiscal year ending 1987. The omissions response adds that Jess Parrish would offer the following programs for its short-term psychiatric patients: continual evaluation, screening, and admissions; individual, family, and group therapy; occupational, recreational, and vocational therapy; psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation; day hospital and day clinic; family and friends education and support groups; and specialized treatment programs for geriatric psychiatric patients. The omissions response reports that the only facility with adult short-term psychiatric beds within 45 minutes of Jess Parrish is Wuesthoff. The omissions response states that Wuesthoff had experienced the following occupancy rates in its adult short-term psychiatric program: 1984--59%; 1985--66%; 1986-- 7l%; and first three quarters of 1987--71%. The omissions response acknowledges that Jess Parrish and Circles of Care, Inc. (Circles of Care) had jointly prepared the application and that Jess Parrish "plans to employ by contract, Circles of Care, Inc. to operate and manage our unit" if the application is approved. The omissions response includes a letter to HRS dated November 10, 1987, from James B. Whitaker, as president of Circles of Care. The letter describes the 12-year relationship between the two parties, which began when Circles of Care leased its first 12 beds from Jess Parrish between 1974 and 1980. Mr. Whitaker states that the two parties thus "work[ed] out a management agreement; for the new sixteen bed unit that Jess Parrish has requested." In the State Agency Action Report, HRS notes that the project does not conform with Policy 4 of the applicable District 7 Local Health Plan. This policy provides that additional short-term inpatient psychiatric beds may be approved when the average annual occupancy rate for all existing facilities in the planning area equals or exceeds the following rates: adult--75% and adolescents/children--70%. HRS reports a similar discrepancy as to the occupancy standard in the State Health Plan, which incorporates at Objective 1.2 the same 70%/75% standards. HRS states in the State Agency Action Report that the 1986 occupancy rates for short-term psychiatric beds, which averaged 69.98% in Brevard County, were 87% at Circles of Care, 70.6% at Wuesthoff, and 14% at a new facility, C. P. C.--Palm Bay. In addition, for the first six months of 1987, the report states that the occupancy rates, which averaged 63.5% in Brevard County, were 76% at Circles of Care, 71.5% at Wuesthoff, and 43% at C. P. C.--Palm Bay. In calculating numeric need under the rule, HRS concludes that there was a net need for a total of 547 beds in the district, consisting of 312 in specialty hospitals and 235 in general hospitals. Addressing the provision of the District 7 Local Health Plan focusing upon need at the county level, HRS finds that there was a net need for a total of 38 beds. Recognizing the "sub- standard utilization" of existing short-term psychiatric beds, HRS states that the application was justified "mainly because of the enhanced access to services that the project would provide." All of the other criteria were fully satisfied with one irrelevant exception, and the State Agency Action Report concludes: Although the district and county utilization of short-term psychiatric beds falls below the 70% [sic) adult standard, this project merits a Certificate of Need because there exists numeric need in the service area and because the project affords greater access and availability to psychiatric services for underserved groups. Need District and State Health Plans Part 3 of the 1985 District 7 Local Health Plan, published by The Local Health Council of East Central Florida, Inc., sets forth policies and priorities for inpatient psychiatric services. Policy 1 establishes each of the four counties of District 7 as a subdistrict for purposes of planning inpatient psychiatric services. Policy 3 of the 1985 District 7 Local Health Plan provides a specific methodology to allocate beds when the numeric need rule methodology indicates a need for inpatient psychiatric beds. A minimum of .15 beds per 1000 projected population should be allocated to hospitals holding a general license. A total of .20 beds per 1000 projected population may be located in specialty hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. The population projections are for five years into the future. Policy 4 of the 1985 District 7 Local Health Plan provides that additional short-term inpatient psychiatric beds may be approved when the average annual occupancy rates for all existing facilities in the planning area equal or exceed 75% for adult facilities and 70% for adolescents/children facilities. The policy concludes: Additional beds should not be added to the health system' until the existing facilities are operating at acceptable levels of occupancy. Good utilization of existing facilities prior to adding beds aids in cost containment by preventing unnecessary duplication. The 1988 District 7 Local Health Plan, although inapplicable to the subject proceeding, refers to the pending application of Jess Parrish. The plan states: [T]he residents of District 7 appear to be well-served by the existing providers with only a few exceptions. First, residents of north Brevard County (Titusville area) currently have no access to any certified, short-term, inpatient psych services in less than 22 miles. In many driving situations this distance takes longer than 30-45 minutes to traverse. . . . If [the CON that has been tentatively approved] is sustained through litigation and the unit is finally opened availability of these 16 beds should ameliorate, to a large degree, the potential geographic access problems for north Brevard adult/geriatric patients at least. Objective 1.1 of the 1985-1987 State Health Plan states that the ratio of short-term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds to population should not exceed .35 beds to 1000 population. Objective 1.2 states that, through 1987, additional short-term psychiatric beds should not normally be approved unless the service districts has an average annual occupancy of 75% for existing and approved adult beds and 70% for existing and approved adolescents/children beds. Numeric Need Pursuant to HRS Rules Net Need Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4., Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the HRS numeric need methodology. The rule provides that the projected number of beds shall be determined by applying the ratio of .35 beds to 1000 population to the projected population in five years, as estimated by the Executive Office of the Governor. The relevant projected population for District 7 is 1,564,098 persons. Applying the ratio, the gross number of beds needed in District 7 is 547. The total number of existing and approved short-term psychiatric beds in District 7 in 1987 was 410. There is therefore a net need for 137 short-term psychiatric beds in District 7. The relevant projected population for Brevard County is 441,593 persons. Applying the ratio, the gross number of beds needed in Brevard County is 155. The total number of existing and approved short-term psychiatric beds in Brevard County in 1987 was 117. There is therefore a net need for 38 short- term psychiatric beds in Brevard County. A minimum of .15 beds per 1000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license, and .20 beds per 1000 population may be located in specialty hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. The calculations disclose that, for District 7, there is a net need of 73 beds in the former category and 65 beds in the latter category. As to Brevard County, the respective numbers are 41 and 4. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.d., Florida Administrative Code, provides that new facilities for adults must be able to project a 70% occupancy rate for the first year and 80% occupancy rate for the third year. Jess Parrish projects that its short-term psychiatric program will experience a utilization rate of 66% at the end of the first complete year of operation and 82% at the end of the third complete year of operation. These projections are reasonable and substantially conform with the requirements of the rule. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4.e., Florida Administrative Code, provides that no additional short-term inpatient beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for the preceding 12 months in a "service district" is at least 75% for all existing adult short-term inpatient psychiatric beds and at least 70% for all adolescents/children short-term inpatient psychiatric beds. HRS considered the 70%/75% occupancy standards in making the July, 1987, announcement of a zero fixed need pool for short-term psychiatric beds in Brevard County. The determination of zero fixed need was a reflection that, although numeric need existed, the occupancy standards had not been satisfied. The incorporation of the occupancy standard into the July, 1987, fixed need calculation represented a deviation from nonrule policy deferring computation of the occupancy levels until the application-review process. The prior announcement of a fixed need pool on February 27, 1987, stated that a number of beds were needed even though the occupancy situation in District 7 was about the same. Subsequent announcements likewise deferred consideration of the occupancy standard. HRS has explicated its nonrule policy of excluding occupancy standards from the calculation of numeric need when publishing fixed need pools. Unlike the relatively simple task of determining the relevant population projection and multiplying it by the proper ratio, application of the occupancy standards, especially at the time in question, required numerous determinations and calculations. By attempting to incorporate the occupancy standards into the calculations upon which the fixed need pool were based, HRS increased the potential for error, which occurred in this case, rather than increased the reliability of the information. Although adequate reason exists for revising the July, 1987, published fixed need pool, Rule 10-5.008(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, prohibits revisions to a fixed need pool based upon a change in need methodologies, population estimates, bed inventories, or other factors leading to a different projection of need, if retroactively applied. However, the revision of the July, 1987, fixed need pool does not represent a change in need methodologies, population estimates, bed inventories, or other factors leading to a different projection of need, if retroactively applied. The revision to the fixed need pool, which did not represent a change in need methodology or underlying facts, was a result of three legitimate considerations. First, HRS revised the fixed need pool to implement its policy decision to limit the fixed need pool to the numeric need calculation and reserve the calculations of occupancy standards to the application-review process. This consideration does not involve a change in the methodology of determining numeric need or applying occupancy standards. Second, HRS revised the fixed need pool to correct earlier, erroneous calculations. This consideration does not involve a change in the underlying facts, but merely in the computations based upon the same facts. Third, HRS revised the fixed need pool to reflect developing policy in the application of the occupancy standards. HRS decided to apply the more liberal 70% occupancy standard to facilities serving both adults and adolescents/children, exclude from the determination of occupancy levels any facilities serving only age cohorts not served by the applicant, and restrict the 75% occupancy standard to facilities serving adults only. HRS made these changes, which it felt would not harm existing providers, in recognition of the failure of data provided by health-care suppliers to distinguish between adult and adolescents/children admissions and patient days. These considerations approximate a change in methodology, but the revision resulting from such considerations does not violate the rule because HRS already has shown that consideration of the occupancy standards should not take place until after publication of the fixed need pool. In the present case, two facilities in District 7 serve only adolescents/children. These facilities are C. P. C.-- Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks, which is in Orange County. Eliminating their occupancy rates, the district occupancy rate in the year ending June 30, 1987, was 71.9%. Removing the occupancy rate of C. P. C.--Palm Bay from Brevard County, the county occupancy rate during the same period was over 75%. Under the revised policies, Brevard County had a net need of 38 short- term psychiatric beds, applicable occupancy standards in the county and district were satisfied, and the July, 1987, publication of a fixed need pool of zero did not preclude the finding of need under other than "not normal" circumstances. Accessibility Financial Accessibility The primary service area of Jess Parrish is north Brevard County. A higher percentage of the population of this area lives below the poverty level than does the population of any other sub-region of Brevard County. According to the 1980 Census data, the applicable percentages of area residents living below the poverty level were 12.7% in north Brevard County, 10% in central Brevard County, 8.4% in south Brevard County, and 9.6% in Brevard County overall. Partly as a reflection of the different sub-regions and partly as a reflection of the commitment of Jess Parrish to provide access to underserved populations, Jess Parrish provides considerably more services to Medicaid patients than does either of the other major general hospitals in central and south Brevard County. In 1987, 11.5% of the admissions and 8.9% of the patient days at Jess Parrish were Medicaid. The respective numbers are 7% and 6% for Wuesthoff and 5.8% and 3.9% for Holmes Regional Medical Center, which is in Melbourne. A key component of financial accessibility is the effect of the proposed program on Circles of Care. About 55% of the patients of Circles of Care are indigent. Another 17% of its patients earn between the minimum wage and $15,000 annually. Circles of Care has participated in all phases of the application process on behalf of Jess Parrish. The approval of the new program would not have an adverse effect on Circles of Care. To the contrary, the new program at Jess Parrish would provide Circles of Care with more treatment options, especially with respect to indigent patients, whose need for short-term psychiatric services has proven at times difficult to meet. These options are especially valuable at a time when there is no net need in Brevard County for any more short-term psychiatric beds in specialty hospitals, such as Circles of Care. The 52 psychiatric beds licensed to Circles of Care are in two different units contained within a single hospital facility located in Melbourne, which is in south Brevard County. Sheridan Oaks is a 24-bed, private unit, which cannot accept many Baker Act patients without adversely affecting the other patients and the psychiatrists who refer private-pay patients to this unit. The other unit is a public Baker Act receiving facility with 28 beds, for which Circles of Care receives state funds. Unlike Sheridan Oaks, the public receiving facility employs the psychiatrists who work there. About 85-90% of all Baker Act patients in Brevard County come through this public receiving facility, whose occupancy rate was 98% in the year ending June 30, 1987. In addition to these units, Circles of Care operates a mental health outpatient clinic in Titusville, an outpatient/inpatient treatment center in the Rockledge/Cocoa area, numerous social clubs throughout Brevard County for the chronic mentally ill, and numerous public education and awareness programs concerning the treatability of mental illness. Another limitation of being a specialty hospital is that Circles of Care does not qualify for Medicaid reimbursement. Jess Parrish, as a general hospital, qualifies for such reimbursement and projects in its application that 39% of its patient days will be Medicaid and 9% of its patient days will be indigent. Geographic Access Jess Parrish is located at the north end of Brevard County, which runs about 80 miles north-south. Wuesthoff is about 25 miles south of Jess Parrish, and Titusville is about 40 miles north of Melbourne. Intercity north-south traffic uses Interstate 95, which is west of the above-described cities, and U.S. Route 1, which runs through the center of each of these cities. Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g., Florida Administrative Code, provides that short-term inpatient psychiatric services should be located within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90% of the population of the service area. This criterion is presently met without the addition of short-term psychiatric beds at Jess Parrish. This factor is outweighed, however, by another factor in this case. Jess Parrish projects about half of its patients will be indigent or Medicaid, and north Brevard County has a disproportionate share of the county's impoverished residents. Average travel conditions for these persons require public transportation, which, in north Brevard County, is limited to Greyhound/Trailways and local taxi companies. Exclusive of time waiting for the bus and traveling to and from the bus stations, the time for the 25-mile trip between Titusville and Rockledge, of which there are three or four trips daily (excluding off-hour trips), ranges from 25-35 minutes. There is evidence in the record that mentally ill bus passengers do not always make it to their intended destinations by way of intercity buses. The use of available public transportation is therefore problematic, but in any event adds considerable time to the travel time to Wuesthoff for those individuals who do not own a motor vehicle. Effect on Wuesthoff The effect of the conversion of medical/surgical beds to short-term psychiatric beds will have no material effect on Wuesthoff, even though it did reduce the number of short-term psychiatric beds from 30 to 25 in 1986. The occupancy rate for Wuesthoff's short-term psychiatric unit in 1987 was 70.6%. The prime service areas of Wuesthoff and Jess Parrish as to psychiatric admissions do not substantially overlap. Although Jess Parrish may be expected to draw more patients from Wuesthoff's prime service area following commencement of the new operation, many of Jess Parrish's patients will be from the indigent and Medicaid payor classes for which the competition is not intense. The addition of a 16-bed short-term psychiatric unit at Jess Parrish will not materially influence the availability of qualified personnel for Wuesthoff. It appears that Jess Parrish will be able to staff the relatively small 16-bed unit without employing significant numbers of professional employees of Wuesthoff. Some of the relatively few patients whom Wuesthoff can be expected to lose to Jess Parrish involve referrals from Titusville-area physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists, who will place their patients in the closer facility once it is opened. The negative impact upon Wuesthoff is outweighed in these cases by gains for the patients in continuity of care and community support. Financial Feasibility The short-term financial feasibility is good. Jess Parrish has available to it sufficient funds to undertake the relatively modest capital outlay in constructing the facility, which will consist of about 8000 square feet on an existing floor of the hospital. The long-term financial feasibility is generally good. The financial projections are based on reasonable assumptions, which are largely derived from the actual experience of Circles of Care. The projections accurately estimate revenue sources and expenses. Jess Parrish reasonably projects an adequate supply of patients from a combination of sources, including Circles of Care, existing patients whose diagnoses include psychiatric components, and numerous health-care professionals in north Brevard County. The financial projections contemplate a material contribution by Circles of Care, but project no compensating expenditures. However, this deficiency is largely offset by the likelihood that the financial participation of Circles of Care will be restricted to a share of any excess of revenues over expenses of the new project, possibly excluding reimbursement of fairly minor expenses. If that is the case, the effect of any management agreement would be only to reduce the excess of revenues over expenses enjoyed by Jess Parrish from the operation of the short-term psychiatric unit. The management agreement would not expose Jess Parrish to losses that would not have otherwise existed but for the agreement to make payments to Circles of Care. Under these circumstances, the omission of the information, although material, does not seriously cast into doubt the long-term financial feasibility of the project. Quality of Care The quality of hospital care offered by Jess Parrish is excellent. The quality of the various psychiatric services offered by Circles of Care is also excellent. Both facilities are accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. The issue in this case involves the quality of care to be expected in the 16-bed short-term psychiatric unit for which Jess Parrish seeks a certificate of need. Circles of Care and Jess Parrish have agreed that Circles of Care will be responsible for recruiting most of the personnel for the new program and will employ the program's medical director, who will be responsible for treatment decisions. In addition, Circles of Care will advise Jess Parrish as to the adoption of policy, which will remain ultimately the responsibility of Jess Parrish. Jess Parrish will employ the head nurse and all other full-time professional staff working in the unit. The tentativeness of the arrangement between Circles of Care and Jess Parrish is partly explained by the desire of both parties to avoid the time and expense of negotiating an agreement in every detail prior to obtaining final approval of the certificate of need. In addition, both organizations were devoting substantial time to the subject litigation, for which Circles of Care was paying a portion of the expenses. In the final analysis, the failure to work out the agreement, although not a positive feature of the application, is not a serious problem for two reasons. First, Circles of Care and Jess Parrish have a long history of mutual cooperation. The relationship began when Jess Parrish leased Circles of Care 16 hospital beds for psychiatric use. Although the arrangement ended several years ago when Circles of Care constructed its Melbourne facility, the two organizations have since cooperated in several less intensive ways. Second, although Circles of Care has superior expertise in the area of mental health, Jess Parrish qualifies by itself to operate the proposed facility. Circles of Care has already provided much of the necessary technical information required for the preparation of budgets and pro formas. Recruiting would probably take somewhat longer without Circles of Care, but the modest construction budget obviously does not involve significant debt service, so that the delay would not be costly. Perhaps the most significant loss from a quality-of-care perspective would be the medical director, whose expertise will be critical. Again, this would be largely a problem of delay only, as Jess Parrish would have to find a replacement, although it appears likely that the director may be Dr. David Greenblum, who is already a member of the active medical staff at Jess Parrish. Given the quality of care provided by Jess Parrish in the past, there is no basis for any concern that, in the unlikely event that the parties fail to negotiate an agreement, Jess Parrish would jeopardize its reputation as a quality 200-bed general hospital in order to commence prematurely a 16-bed short- term psychiatric unit. Other Factors The record does not demonstrate that there are less costly, more efficient, or more appropriate alternatives to the inpatient services proposed in the subject application. There are no crisis stabilization units or short-term residential treatment programs available in Brevard County. The proposed project will have a measurable impact only upon Circles of Care, whose existing inpatient facilities will be enhanced, and Wuesthoff, whose existing inpatient facilities will not be materially affected. In general, these existing services are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. On the other hand, the beds that Jess Parrish seeks to convert are underutilized in their present designation. The medical/surgical beds at Jess Parrish have been utilized at a rate of less than 60% over the past three years. There are no feasible alternatives to renovation of the existing facilities. The costs and methods of proposed construction are reasonable and appropriate. The approval of the application will foster healthy competition in the area of short-term psychiatric services and promote quality assurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order granting the application of Jess Parrish for a certificate of need to convert 16 medical/surgical beds to 16 short-term adult psychiatric beds. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1220 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Jess Parrish 1-6 Adopted or adopted in substance. 7-8 Rejected as irrelevant. 9-10 Adopted or adopted in substance. 11 Rejected as recitation of testimony and subordinate. 12-13 Adopted or adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted to the extent of the finding in the Recommended Order that there likely will be an agreement between Circles of Care and Jess Parrish. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence that such an agreement exists already. Also rejected as unnecessary insofar as the application can stand on its own without the participation of Circles of Care. 15a Adopted or adopted in substance. 15b-15c Rejected as irrelevant. 15d-15g Adopted in substance, although certain proposed facts rejected as subordinate. However, the first sentence of Paragraph 15f is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 15h Rejected as recitation of testimony. 16-18 Adopted or adopted in substance except that all but the last sentence of Paragraph 18g. is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 19 First sentence adopted. 19 (remainder) -22. Rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. Generally adopted, although most of the facts are rejected as subordinate in the overall finding and cumulative. Adopted except that sixth sentence is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence and the seventh sentence is rejected as subordinate. Adopted in substance. First sentence adopted. Remainder rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted. 28a Rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 28b-28d Adopted or adopted in substance. and 31 Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as unnecessary. 32-50 Adopted or adopted in substance. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of HRS 1-11 Adopted or adopted in substance. & 14 Rejected as irrelevant. & 15-16 Adopted. 17 Rejected as unnecessary. 18-74 See rulings on Paragraphs 16-50 in preceding section. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Wuesthoff 1-3 Adopted or adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 6-10 & 12 Adopted or adopted in substance. 11 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as recitation of testimony and cumulative. Rejected as cumulative except that second sentence is adopted. Rejected as recitation of testimony. Rejected as cumulative, subordinate, and legal argument. Rejected as cumulative except that second sentence is adopted. First clause rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Remainder rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as cumulative and subordinate. 20-23 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. 27-28 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 29 Rejected as legal argument. 30-32 Rejected as irrelevant. 33-41 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence and subordinate. 42 and 51 Rejected as recitation of evidence. 43-45 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 46 Rejected as legal argument. 47-50 and 52-54 Rejected as subordinate. 55 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 56-59 Rejected as irrelevant. 60-66 Rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 67-69 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 70-73 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence and subordinate. 74-78 Adopted. 79 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 80-82 Adopted. 83-85 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 86 Rejected as subordinate and against the greater weight of the evidence. 87-91 Adopted or adopted in substance. 92 Rejected as against the greater weight of he evidence. 93-94 Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 97-98 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as subordinate. 101-102 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as partly cumulative and partly legal argument. Rejected as against the greater weight of the 105 evidence Rejected and irrelevant. as against the greater weight of the 106-108 evidence. Rejected as subordinate. 109 110-113 Rejected evidence. Rejected as against the greater weight of as subordinate. the 114-117 118-120 Rejected evidence. Rejected as against the greater weight of as irrelevant and subordinate. the 121-122 Rejected as subordinate. 123 124-125 First sentence adopted in substance. Remainder rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. 126-129 Rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of evidence. the COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Cleveland W. David Watkins Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 John Rodriguez 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 William B. Wiley Darrell White McFarlain, Sternstein, Wiley & Cassedy, P.A. Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 Stephen M. Presnell MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation (Charter) which proposes to construct and operate a freestanding, 60 bed, 24- hour-a-day, Intensive Residential Treatment Program for children between the ages of 6 and 18 in Palm Beach County within HRS District IX, pursuant to Rule 10-28.152(8), F.A.C. and Chapter 395, F.S. Although FRTC represents it will construct its proposed facility with or without CON licensure, which it is entitled to do, given the peculiarities of this type of health care entity, it is clear that a prime motivator in FRTC's CON application is that with CON licensure, FRTC potentially will have greater access to insurance reimbursement because it may then call itself a "hospital." FRTC will seek JCAH accreditation. HRS is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications, pursuant to Chapter 10-5.011, F.A.C. and Sections 381.701-381.715, F.S. (1987). HRS preliminarily approved FRTC's application, and supported it through formal hearing and post-hearing proposals. RTCPB is an existing 40 bed residential treatment center for adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18, located in Palm Beach County, on the campus of Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches. It provides services similar or identical to those services proposed to be offered by FRTC. It is JCAH accredited through an extension of Lake Hospital's accreditation and is close to JCAH accreditation in its own right. RTCPB is a subsidiary of Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc. (PIA) . PIA operates two residential treatment centers in Florida. RTCPB is not CON licensed as an IRTP, under Chapters 381 and 395, F.S., but is licensed as a child care facility under Chapter 395, F.S., as a provider of services to HRS under Chapters 10M-9 and 10E-10, F.A.C. RTCPB accepts substance abusers in residency. RTCPB has also applied for CON licensure as an IRTP in a batching cycle subsequent to the present one. That application has been preliminarily denied by HRS and RTCPB is awaiting a Section 120.57(1), F.S., formal administrative hearing thereon. RTCPB now estimates its current patients' average length of stay (ALOS) as 106 days but projects a 315 day (10 1/2 months) ALOS in its subsequent CON application. RTCPB is charging $185 per day or HRS patients and $255 with $23-26 ancillaries [sic] per day for private pay patients. Like FRTC, it uses a "levels" system of behavior modification and patient control. Humana is a 250 bed JCAH accredited hospital located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Of Humana's 250 beds, 162 are traditional acute care beds and 88 are psychiatric beds. The 88 psychiatric beds are administratively divided into different units, one of which is a 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit; this unit opened January 20, 1987, and has an average length of stay of nine months. Humana's existing CONs are for short-term adult psychiatric beds and do not authorize an adolescent unit with an average length of stay of over 30 days. Ninety days is the demarcation, by rule, between short- and long-term psychiatric beds. Humana recently applied for a CON for more psychiatric beds and also applied for an IRTP CON in a subsequent batch to the present one. Humana's present 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit provides grossly similar services to those proposed to be offered by FRTC, but its emphasis is more medical-psychiatric than emotional-behavioral. Like FRTC, Humana does not accept in residency adolescents with a primary diagnosis of substance abuse. Like FRTC and RTCPB, Humana uses a "levels" system. Eighty percent of Humana's patient mix are commercial pay, and the unit is running at a 15 to 20 percent profit margin. Humana usually charges $325 per day on their adolescent unit plus ancillaries [sic] amounting to 10 percent of the patient's bill, but HRS contract patients pay only $225 per day. Humana has lost a number of adolescent unit referrals to RTCPB since RTCPB opened June 1, 1987, but the unit continues to be almost fully occupied. Humana's main referral asset, as well as the source of the confusion of referring entities, appears to be the reputation of its director, Dr. Kelly. Dr. Kelly previously directed a program at Lake Hospital which was identical to the program that he now directs at Humana. Lake Hospital currently has RTCPB operating under its auspices, but not Dr. Kelly. Nature of the FRTC Program FRTC's proposed program is designed to serve those persons in the designated age group who have psychiatric diagnoses of a severity requiring a long-term approach in a multidisciplinary structured living setting to facilitate recovery. It will not, however, treat adolescents with an active diagnosis of chemical dependency or substance abuse. It also only commits to 1.5 percent indigent care. The proposed FRTC program differs from an acute care setting in significant quantitative and qualitative ways, the most visible of which is that acute care psychiatric settings (either long- or short-term) are geared toward dealing with patients actively dangerous to property, themselves, or others, but patients whom it is reasonably assumed will respond primarily to physiologically-oriented physicians and registered nurses administering daily medication, treatment, and monitoring, as opposed to a long-term living arrangement emphasizing behaviorally-oriented group interaction as an alternative to parental care at home. FRTC will, however, accept patients with psychiatric diagnoses of effective disorders, depression, schizophrenia and impulse disorders and those who may be potentially harmful to themselves, others, or property for whom no other less intensive or less restrictive form of treatment would be predictably helpful. FRTC would fall on the continuum of care below an acute psychiatric facility such as Humana. Assessment of such a target group on a patient by patient basis is obviously subject to a wide variation of interpretation by qualified health care professionals, but FRTC anticipates both verifying referral diagnoses and assuring quality of care by insuring that each new patient is seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee. FRTC also plans to complete appropriate patient assessments and develop and update individual, integrated treatment programs. FRTC will provide, where appropriate, for continuity of care from previous acute care institutions through the FRTC program and out into more normal individual or family living arrangements. Parents will have to consent to their child's placement at FRTC. FRTC's program proposes an average length of stay of 365 days (one year) with a range of six months to two years. Based upon all the credible record evidence as a whole, including, but not limited to, the protestants' respective ALOS, this is a reasonable forecast despite contrary evidence as to Charter's experience at its "template" Virginia institution, Charter Colonial. FRTC's program components will include individual therapy, recreational therapy, occupational therapy, and general education. The general education component in FRTC's proposed program is more general and more open than that offered in acute care settings, such as Humana. FRTC's overall program will utilize a "levels" system of behavioral management based upon patients earning privileges, which levels system has a good patient rehabilitation and functional administrative track record in many different kinds of psychiatric health care facilities, including Humana and RTCPB. FRTC intends that each patient's program will be individualized according to age and program component directed to his/her diagnosis and each patient will receive individual, resident group, and family therapies. As to assessment, types of therapy, continuity of care, and general education provisions, FRTC's proposal is grossly consistent with that of its "template." To the extent there is evidence of inconsistencies between the two programs in the record, the FRTC proposal represents either improvements over, or refinements of, its template program which have been developed as Charter/FRTC has learned more about what actually "works" for the IRTP form of health care, or it represents changes to accommodate Florida's perception of what less restrictive but still intensive residential treatment should be, or it anticipates local community needs. Quality of Care The applicant's parent corporation is an experienced provider of many types of accredited psychiatric facilities. The type of quality assurance program proposed and the staff mix provide reasonable quality care assurances. Design, Construction, and Personnel Refinements to FRTC's original schematic take into consideration the influence that physical structure has on an Intensive Residential Treatment Program. Those refinements include modification of a multipurpose room into a half-court gymnasium, addition of a classroom, addition of a mechanical room, modification of the nursing station to decrease the amount of space, and the deletion of one seclusion room and addition of a four to six bed assessment unit. The modifications resulted in the addition of approximately 1,000 square feet to the original design. A minimum of four to six acres would be necessary to accommodate the modified design which totals approximately 32,000 square feet. Public areas, such as administration and support services, dining room, and housekeeping areas, are to the front; private areas, such as the nursing units, are to the back. The facility's middle area houses gym, classrooms, and occupational therapy areas. The location encourages residential community involvement. Each of three, 20-bed units is made up of a group of two consultation rooms, a galley, a laundry, a day room and core living space located directly across from the nursing station for maximum observation and efficiency. Each unit comprises a separate wing. Six handicapped accessible patient beds are contemplated; the building will be handicapped-accessible. The staffing projections have increased and the pattern has been minimally altered in the updates. The updated pro forma also modified the initial financial projections so as to increase salary expense and employee benefits based on this change in staffing. An increase in the total project cost impacted on depreciation, and interest expense changed with time. All these changes are reasonable and insubstantial. FRTC's design is adequate for providing a suitable environment for intensive residential treatment for children and adolescents even though it is not identical to Charter's "template" for residential treatment and even though Charter's extensive experience with acute care facilities has focused these changes in its residential treatment concepts. The parties stipulated to the adequacy of FRTC's proposed equipment list and costs. Total construction cost was demonstrated to be reasonably estimated at $2,078,000. The square footage costs of $64.86 per square foot represet an increase from the square footage costs contained in the original CON application. The original budget was updated based upon a three percent inflation factor and the addition of the approximately 1,000 square feet. The additional space is not a significant construction change. The total project costs of $4,728,000 are reasonable. The testimony of HRS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, who testified by deposition, (RTCPB's Exhibit 8, pp. 21-22) revealed no firm policy on what the agency, within its expertise, views as substantial and impermissible amendments to a CON application; HRS did not move at hearing to remand for further review; and the undersigned concludes that the changes in facility design, costs, and staffing do not represent significant changes which would be excludable as evidence and that they do represent permissible minor modifications and refinements of the original FRTC application. Site Availability No party contended that FRTC's application was a "site specific" application, that a residential treatment program is otherwise required to be "site specific," or that an IRTP CON is governed by a "site specific" rule or by "site specific" statutory criteria. Therefore, it was only necessary for FRTC in this noncomparative proceeding to establish that several suitable sites were available within the required geographic parameters at the financial amount allotted in FRTC's projections. FRTC did establish financially and geographically available and suitable sites through the testimony of Robert H. Ellzey, a qualified expert in commercial real estate values. The Non-Rule Need Policy There are no hospital licensed Intensive Residential Treatment Programs in Palm Beach County or in District IX. IRTPs are in a separate licensure category by law from psychiatric beds, acute care beds, and rehabilitation beds. There is a separate need methodology for long-term psychiatric beds and there are no CON licensed long-term psychiatric programs for children and adolescents in District IX, unless one considers Humana which is treating adolescents well beyond 30 or 90 days residency. HRS has no promulgated rule predicting need for IRTPs seeking specialty hospital licensure under Chapter 395, F.S. Subsequent to advice of its counsel that a CON must be obtained as a condition of IRTP licensure pursuant to Chapter 395, F.S., HRS elected to evaluate all IRTP CON applications in the context of the statutory criteria of Chapter 381, F.S., and in the context of HRS' non-rule policy establishing a rebuttable presumption of need for one "reasonably sized" IRTP in each HRS planning district. The May 5, 1988 Final Order in Florida Psychiatric Centers v. HRS, et al., DOAH Case No. 88- 0008R, held this non-rule policy invalid as a rule due to HRS' failure to promulgate it pursuant to Section 120.54, F.S., but that order also held the policy not to be invalid as contrary to Chapter 381, F.S. That Final Order intervened between the close of final hearing in the instant case and entry of the instant Recommended Order, however, it does not alter the need for the agency to explicate and demonstrate the reasonableness of its non-rule policy on a case by case basis. HRS was unable to do so in the formal hearing in the instant case. Notwithstanding the oral testimony of Robert May and Elizabeth Dudek, and the deposition testimony of John Griffin, it appears that the non- rule policy is not based upon generally recognized health planning considerations, but solely on the agency's statutory interpretation of recent amendments to Chapter 395 and some vague perception, after internal agency discussions, that the policy is consistent with certain promulgated need rules and with certain other non-rule policies for other types of health care entities, which other non-rule policies were never fully enunciated or proved up in this formal hearing. The HRS non-rule policy was also not affirmatively demonstrated to be rational because it does not take into account the reasonableness of a proposed facility's average length of stay, referral sources, geographic access, or other factors common to duly promulgated CON rules. Numerical Need and Conformity to Applicable Health Plans FRTC sought to support HRS' non-rule policy on numerical need for, and definition of, a "reasonably sized" IRTP through the testimony of Dr. Ronald Luke, who was qualified as an expert in health planning, development of need methodologies, health economies, survey research, and development of mental health programs. In the absence of a finding of a rational non-rule policy on numerical need, Dr. Luke's evidence forms the cornerstone of FRTC's demonstration of numerical need. Through the report and testimony of Dr. Luke, and despite contrary expert health planning testimony, FRTC established the numerical need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District IX with projected 60 percent occupancy in the first year and 50 percent in the second year of operation using two bed need methodologies. Dr. Luke ultimately relied on a utilization methodology based upon 1991 population projections. Dr. Luke used a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58. This is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, regardless of the fact that the types of residential treatment considered by the NIMH data base employed by Dr. Luke greatly vary in concept and despite HRS having not yet clearly defined the nature of the programs and services it expects to be offered by a Florida specialty hospital licensed IRTP. Therefrom, Dr. Luke derived an average daily census of 52 in 1991. That figure yields a bed sizing of between 58 and 61 beds, depending on whether an 85 percent or 90 percent occupancy factor is plugged in. Either 58 or 61 beds is within the range of ratios calculated by Dr. Luke's other methodology for currently licensed Florida IRTPs in other districts. Assuming a target occupancy rate of 85 percent and an ALOS of one year, Dr. Luke considered the gross District IX IRTP bed need to be 60. In the absence of any like program to assess occupancy for and in the presence of similar programs such as Humana operating at nearly full occupancy now and RTCPB forecasting its occupancy at 88 percent in 1990 if it were IRTP-licensed, it is found that 60 beds are justified. Since there are no IRTP beds licensed as specialty hospitals in the current district bed inventory, no adjustment of this figure must be made to account for existing licensed IRTP beds. Simply stated, this is a CON application for an IRTP, nothing more and nothing less, and the subtrahend to be subtracted from gross district bed need is zero when there is a zero specialty hospital licensed IRTP bed inventory. Luke's calculated gross need of 60 bed is also his net need and is accepted. Fifty beds is generally the minimum size HRS will approve to be feasible for any free standing facility to be eonomically efficient and to be able to benefit from economies of scale. This 50 bed concept is within the wide range of bed ratios that HRS implicitly has found reasonable in, previously- licensed IRTP CON approvals. Conformity With Applicable Health Plans Section 38l.705(1)(a), F.S., requires HRS to consider CON applications against criteria contained in the applicable State and District Health Plans. In this regard, neither the applicable State Health Plan nor the applicable District IX Local Health Plan make any reference to a need for intensive residential treatment facilities. The District IX Health Plan addresses the need for psychiatric and substance abuse services to be available to all individuals in District IX. FRTC's project addresses this goal only in part. The District Health Plan states that priority should be given to CON applicants who make a commitment to providing indigent care. FRTC proposes only 1.5 percent indigent care which works out to only 1/2 of the ALOS of one patient at the proposed facility and is hardly optimum, but in a noncomparative hearing, it stands alone as advancing the given accessibility goal within the plan. Objective 1.3 of the State Health Plan provides: Through 1987, additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy for all existing and approved long-term hospital psychiatric beds in the HRS District is at least 80 percent. FRTC's project is neutral as to this goal. The District Plan also contains a goal for a complete range of health care services for the population of the district. FRTC advances this goal. The State Health Plan further provides: Goal 10: DEVELOP A COMPLETE RANGE OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN EACH HRS DISTRICT OBJECTIVE 10.1: Develop a range of essential mental health services in each HRS district by 1989. OBJECTIVE 10.3: Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1990. RECOMMENDED ACTION: 1.03A: Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving ing treatment in out-of-state facilities by 1990. The FRTC project advances these goals in part. To the extent SED patients placed outside the state for residential treatment services are HRS patients whom FRTC as yet has not contracted to treat, the FRTC project does not advance this goal. However, increased insurance reimbursement will advance accessibility for those SED children and adolescents in need of this type of care whose families have insurance coverage. The State Plan also emphasizes a goal for a continuum of care. The FRTC plan advances this goal. Financial Feasibility William S. Love, Senior Director of Hospital Operations for Charter, was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Mr. Love prepared the pro forma financial statement contained in the original CON application and the update of the pro forma in response to HRS' completeness questions. Mr. Love also had input into the updated financial information which increased salary and benefit expense. (See FOF No. 11). The revised pro forma utilized an assumption of gross patient revenues of $300 per day and a 365 day ALOS, both of which are reasonable and both of which support the rest of FRTC's assumptions (See FOF No. 9). Routine revenues are based on the types of routine services patients normally receive on a daily basis. Ancillary revenues are support revenues such as pharmacy charges, X-rays, lab charges, and other charges not generally utilized on a routine basis. The only charges to patients at the proposed FRTC facility are the routine and ancillary charges. The assumptions with regard to contractual adjustments are that there will be no Medicare utilization since the facility is projected for children and adolescents and no Medicaid since freestanding facilities in Florida are not eligible for Medicaid. Two percent of gross patient revenues are estimated to be contractual adjustments which relate to HMOs and PPOs. FRTC addresses indigent care by 1.5 percent of gross revenues which will be dedicated to Charter Care which is free care. The assumptions with regard to bad debt are that 8 percent of gross revenue will be the allowance for bad debt. An assumption of 20 percent of salaries was used for employee benefits which include the FICA tax, health insurance, dental insurance, retirement plans, and other benefits. Supplies and expenses were calculated as a function of patient day with a $90 per day estimate. Included in supplies and expenses are supplies utilized in the delivery of health care services as well as medical professional fees such as the half-time medical director and purchased services such as laundry, linen, speech and hearing services, utilities, telephone, malpractice insurance, repairs and maintenance. The depreciation assumptions are that the building would be depreciated over 40 years, fixed equipment over 20 years and major movable equipment over 10 years. Pre-opening expenses for the first 45 days of operation have been capitalized over 60 months with low amortization costs over 15 years. There is no income tax assumed in the first year but the assumption in subsequent years is that the tax rate will be 38 percent. The failure to assume a hospital tax is inconsequential. The assumptions for the second fiscal year are basically the same. Although staffing remained the same, the FTEs per occupied bed increased, and a 7 percent inflation factor was added. The project will be financially feasible even though the facility is pessimistically projecting a loss of $102,000 for the first year because a facility can suffer a loss in its first year of operation and remain financially feasible. The facility projects a $286,000 profit in its second year of operation. With regard to utilization by class of pay, FRTC has assumed that the insurance category represents 65.5 percent of total revenues projected and includes such things as commercial insurance, Blue Cross and any third party carrier other than Medicare and Medicaid. Assumptions with regard to the private pay are that 25 percent of the total revenues will be generated by private pay patients and would include the self pay portions of an insurance payor's bill, such as deductible and co-insurance. Bad debt was assumed to be 8 percent, and Charter Care or free care, 1.5 percent. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable and is supported by the protestants' current experience with commercial insurance utilization and reimbursement and the predicted recoveries if RTCPB were IRTP-licensed. In the second year of operation, the assumptions with regard to utilization by class of pay demonstrated an increase in the insurance category from 65.5 to 66.5 percent with everything else remaining the same except for a decrease in bad debt to 7 percent. The assumption with regard to a decrease in bad debt is based upon the establishment of referral patterns from acute psychiatric facilities, outpatient programs, mental health therapists, and miscellaneous programs. The assumption is that 65 percent of the patients would be covered by insurance, not that 65 percent of each bill would be paid by insurance. Charter's experience has been that a good portion of the deductible and co-insurance payments are collectible. FRTC did not assume payment from any governmental contracts or HRS reimbursement. FRTC's projected self pay percentages assumption reasonably contemplates the percentage of households in the district which can afford its projections for self pay. For purposes of evaluating the financial feasibility of this proposal, a management fee was not included because in looking at the financial feasibility of a facility the expenses of a corporate home office are incurred whether or not the facility is built. It was not appropriate to allocate a management fee to the hospital because it showed a loss in its first year of operation and a profit in its second. When the facility becomes profitable, FRTC anticipates passing the profit through to the corporation to help reduce the corporate overhead. If a management fee had been allocated to this facility, allocations would have had to have been made to the other Charter facilities to show where their management expense had decreased and their profitability increased. It would have been inappropriate to take these fixed expenses and allocate a portion of them to the proposed FRTC facility. In addition to the fact that the failure to include a management fee in the pro forma should not affect the feasibility of the project, Charter has good cause not to apply a $44 per patient day management fee in its IRTP. FRTC's categories of payor class are generally reasonable based in part on the results of a survey performed in Florida. FRTC's assumptions and calculations are reasonable, based upon the testimony of William S. Love and Dr. Ronald Luke, notwithstanding the testimony of Dan Sullivan, Donald Wilson, and Christopher Knepper, also qualified as experts. Specifically, it is found that Dr. Luke's assessment that the designation of a facility as a licensed specialty hospital has a beneficial effect on its ability to obtain insurance reimbursement for services, that reimbursement impacts to increase ALOS, and that the breakdown of sources of payment that FRTC has used is reasonable, is a credible assessment, supported elsewhere in the record. It is also found that Mr. Knepper's assessment for bad debt is inadequately supported and inconsistent with other evidence, and therefore not credible. Mr. Sullivan's testimony is not persuasive. Staffing and Recruitment Dr. Brett, a Charter regional director for hospital operations, was accepted as an expert in staffing psychiatric facilities including residential treatment centers. His distinctions between the acute care and residential types of facilities are corroborated and explained by other witnesses and evidence. Mr. Joyner was accepted as Charter's expert recruiter. Although the depth of Mr. Joyner's hands-on involvement in active recruitment is not extensive, the Charter network of manpower referrals and "head hunting" will obviously support this project. Upon the combined testimony of Dr. Brett, Mr. Joyner, and Paul Bodner, Charter's senior director of physician relations, there is sufficient evidence that FRTC can recruit a suitable staffing pattern to ensure quality of care (see FOF Nos. 9 and 10) in its proposed program, even if it has to hire from out of state and pay somewhat higher salaries due to some qualified manpower shortages in certain categories in Palm Beach County. In making this finding, the undersigned has considered the testimony of Donald Wilson concerning certain institution-specific recruiting problems of his principal, RTCPB, and the "step down" status of residential treatment as testified by Mary Certo, of Humana. Impact on Costs and Competition The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to attract patients with insurance coverage who would otherwise go to existing facilities for care, however, in light of the relatively consistent occupancy rates at Humana and RTCPB despite both their geographical proximity and the unique confusion of referrals arising over the relocation of Dr. Kelly, this impact is not altogether clear. Dr. Kelly's reputation will not be impacted by granting of a CON to FRTC. It is also not possible upon the basis of the record created in this hearing to factor out reimbursement differences inherent in Humana's current CON classification and RTCPB's circumstance as an unlicensed intensive residential treatment center. In any case, the negative impact upon Humana must be measured against the health planning goals expressed by several witnesses that it is desirable to substitute more suitable, less restrictive facilities for institutionalization of the severely emotionally disturbed child and adolescent whenever possible and that it is also desirable to encourage residential treatment upon a continuum of care basis after acute psychiatric care. The FRTC project will obviously increase the accessibility to this type of treatment for young people who have the appropriate insurance coverage. These goals are in conformity with the applicable health plans. The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to initially increase some costs of health services throughout the district because it will inflate some salary costs due to competition, but the negative impact will probably be short term.
Recommendation Upon a balanced consideration of all relevant criteria it is RECOMMENDED that HRS enter a Final Order approving FRTC's CON application for an IRTP, as updated, for licensure as a specialty hospital. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2037 & 87-2050 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., with regard to the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF) of FRTC: Covered in "issue" and FOF 1. Covered in FOF 1 and 2. 3-7. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 8. Accepted in FOF 12. 9-12. Except as subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative, accepted in FOF 7-9. 13. Accepted in FOF 10. 14-17. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 7-11, 30. Although portions of the underlying data referred to in proposal 16 and by Mr. Joyner in his testimony was excluded from evidence, he was qualified as a recruitment expert and for the reasons set forth in FOF 30, his opinion is accepted. 18-19. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 23. Accepted in FOF 24. Accepted in FOF 25 and 29. Accepted in FOF 26 and 29. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, covered in FOF 27. Except as mere argument or statement of position, accepted in FOF 26-27, and 29. 27-29. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 26-29. 30-31. Accepted in FOF 28. 32-40. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 9, 11, 21, 26-29. 41-44. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 29-32. 45-47. Rejected, as recital or summation of testimony and as part of preliminary agency review not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 48. Covered in FOF 7, 18-20, 22, and 26. 49-52. dejected as set out in "organic law and legislative background," "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15. See also COL. 53. Accepted in FOF 16. 54-58. Rejected in part and accepted in part as set out in FOF 14-15. Rejected where not supported in full by the record as a whole, where subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative to the facts as found and where mere recital of testimony. 59. Accepted in principle and modified to conform to the record in FOF 18-20, 31. 60-61. Accepted in part and rejected in part as stated in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and in FOF 14-16 and the COL. Accepted in FOF 15 and COL. Accepted in FOF 18-20, 31. 64-68. Rejected as unnecessary to the facts as found in FOF 1, 7, 13-15 and 29, also in part as not supported by the record as a whole, and as primarily legal argument and recitation of testimony. Accepted in FOF 3-4 and 30. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 3-4, 7, 26, and 29. 71-74. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9 and 30-32. HRS' Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): 1-3. Accepted in "organic law and legislative background." 4. (Two paragraphs) Accepted FOF 3-4. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. Accepted, FOF 29-32. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted, FOF 1. 10-18 & 20. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5, 6, 15, 26, 31. 19. Rejected as irrelevant. 21-28. Accepted in part as modified to conform to the record as a whole in FOF 6-9, 30-31. The irrelevant, unnecessary or subordinate material has also been rejected. 29-31. Accepted in FOF 4, 9, 21, 26, 29-31. 32-35. Accepted in FOF 7-9. 36-41. Accepted in FOF 7-9 as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application, in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 42-45. Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 9-11, 21, 23, 30 and 32. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 22, 26. 49-52. Accepted in FOF 3, 4, 21-29. Assuming, based on the transcript reference, that this proposal refers to FRTC's pro forma, this proposal is accepted but unnecessary for the reasons set forth in rulings on HRS' PFOF 36-45. See FOF 11 and 21-29. Accepted in FOF 13-15. 55-58. Rejected as unnecessary. 59. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 13-15. 60-62. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-14, as mere recital of testimony and statements of position. 63. Accepted in FOF 29. 64-65. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Accepted in FOF 7-9. Accepted that HRS made this assumption but it fails to explicate the non-rule policy. See FOF 13-14. Accepted in FOF 16. Rejected as a statement of position or COL. Peripherally, see COL. Accepted in FOF 13-14 but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. Rejected in FOF 13-14. 72-74. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 75-76. Accepted in FOF 17-20. This is a subordinate definition and not a FOF. See FOF 30-31 and COL. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 17-20, 31. Accepted in FOF 10. Accepted in FOF 13-15. Accepted as stated in the "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15 and in the COL. 82-85. Covered in FOF 3-6, 13-15. 86. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 87-88. Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary. 89. Accepted in FOF 29. 90-96. Accepted as modified to conform to the record evidence as a whole and FOF 15-16 and to reject subordinate and unnecessary material. Accepted without any connotations of the word "therefore" in FOF 4, 7-9, 21 and 29. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Accepted in "organic and legislative background" and FOF 13-15. Rejected as not established upon the record as a whole; unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of position only. Joint Proposed Findings of Fact of RTCPB and Humana 1-2 Accepted in FOF 1. 3-4. Accepted in FOF 2. 5-6. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. 7. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 5-6. 8-13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as set out under "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 3-6, 13-15, and the COL. 14-18. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 1, 7-9, 11, 21-29. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant preliminary action to this de novo proceeding. 28-36. Rejected in part and accepted in part upon the compelling competent, substantial evidence in the record as a whole as set forth in FOF 13-14. Also as to 33 see FOF 15. 37-52. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-16 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence of record as a whole. Irrelevant, unnecessary and subordinate material has been rejected, as has mere argument of counsel. Accepted in FOF 17. Rejected in FOF 20, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 20, 31. Excepting the mere rhetoric, accepted in FOF 18, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 7, 18-20, 26, 31. 58-59. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 17-20, 26, Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as recital of testimony and argument 62-63. Rejected as unnecessary. 64-67. Accepted in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The first sentence is rejected as cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. Rejected in FOF 4, 21. Accepted in FOF 4 and 21, 29. Rejected as unnecessary Accepted in FOF 26. Rejected in FOF 15-20, 31. Rejected as unnecessary in a noncomparitive hearing. 75-87. Except as irrelevant, unnecessary, or subordinate, accepted in FOF 5-9, 30, 31. Rejected in part as unnecessary and in part as not comporting with the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 7-10 and 30. Accepted in FOF 1, 5-9. 90-92. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Rejected in FOF 5-6. Rejected as subordinate. 95-98. Accepted in FOF 5-9. 99-102. Rejected as unnecessary. 103. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9. 104-118. Except as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, these proposals are covered in FOF 5-9, 30-31. Except as Subordinate, covered in FOF 6 and 31. Accepted in part in FOF 5-9, 21-29, otherwise rejected as misleading. Except as subordinate, accepted in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 21-29. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 21-29. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary in part and not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in 21-29. 127-128. These proposals primarily recite testimony by Mr. Grono, an administrator of a psychiatric hospital for very severely disturbed persons (Grant Center). This evidence by itself is not persuasive in light of Dr. Luke's study and other admissions of the parties referenced in FOF 21-29. Upon the greater weight of contrary evidence, it is rejected. 129. Rejected as subordinate except partly accepted in FOF 29. 130-133. Rejected upon the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 9, 11 and 21-29. 134, 139. Rejected as legal argument without citation. 135-138. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 140-144. Rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence and as partly mere legal argument. See FOF 9, 21-29. 145. The first sentence is rejected upon the reference to PFOF 140-144 for the same reasons given above and the remainder is rejected as subordinate. 146. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 147. Rejected as mere legal argument without citation. 148-149. Rejected in FOF 21-29, particularly 27 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. The mere legal argument is also rejected. 150-157. Rejected as set out in FOF 28 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. Uncited argument and statements of position have likewise bean rejected. 158, 160. Rejected as mere argument without citation. 159. Rejected as subordinate and not dispositive of any material issue at bar in FOF 23. 161. Rejected as mere argument. 162-167. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in FOF 30-32. Also 167 is rejected as mere argument without citation. 168. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 30-32. 169. Accepted but subordinate. 170. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 31. 171-180. Covered in FOF 30-32. 181-185. Rejected as contrary to the evidence in part and in part unnecessary and cumulative to the ruling in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 7, 10-11, 21, 23, 30-32. 186-188. Rejected in FOF 7, 10 and 30 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. 189. Rejected as unnecessary 190. Rejected in FOF 30. 191-392. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 30-32. 193. Rejected in FOF 30-32. 194-195. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, rejected in the several references to future establishment of referral networks. See FOF 21, 27. 196-197 & 199. Rejected as unnecessary 198. Rejected as irrelevant in part and immaterial in part upon the rulings in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 200. Rejected as unnecessary 201-202. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 26-27 and 31, but cumulative. 203. Covered in the COL. Rejected in FOF 21-22. 204. Rejected as mere argument without citation. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Glazer, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire BONNER & O'CONNEL 900 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 James C. Hauser, Esquire Joy Heath Thomas, Esquire MESSER, VICKERS, CAPARELLO, FRENCH & MADSEN 215 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred W Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire ROBERTS, BAGGETT, LaFACE & RICHARD 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims for the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing, the following relevant Findings of Fact are made: AHCA is the state agency charged with the regulation of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida, and has the authority to perform Medicaid audits and recover overpayments, pursuant to Section 409.913(2), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner is a Florida, not-for-profit corporation that was enrolled as a Medicaid provider during the audit period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was authorized to provide medical services to Medicaid recipients. The selection of records for and the conduct of the audit was not a matter of controversy between the parties. The records in this case were requested within the five-year window for record retention and agency investigation provided by Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes (2001). Medicaid pays a per diem rate for inpatient hospital care and treatment. This per diem payment covers all services and items furnished during a 24-hour period. The audit in this case dealt exclusively with inpatient services at Florida Hospital Orlando. Deborah Lynn, a medical health care program analyst for AHCA, reviews the agency's inpatient hospital audits. The agency selects a hospital for audit on a random basis, then selects for review, a random sample of that hospital's patients admitted during the audit period. AHCA sends a demand letter to the hospital, which then sends the relevant patient records to AHCA. Florida Hospital Orlando had to be granted a 30-day extension, but eventually provided, to AHCA, all of the requested patient records. The hospital's records were first provided to a nurse consultant, who reviewed the records and made a suggestion as to the number of days for which Medicaid reimbursement should be denied for each patient. The nurse consultant's suggestions were then calculated into an initial overpayment amount and included in the PAAR that was sent to Petitioner on January 20, 2005. Ms. Lynn acknowledged that the PAAR constituted the first notice to Petitioner that AHCA disputed the length of stay for some patients based on medical necessity. After receipt of the PAAR, Petitioner was given the opportunity to examine the days that AHCA preliminarily questioned and to provide additional information in defense of its Medicaid billings. Petitioner did, in fact, submit additional documentation. The records, the additional documentation, and the nurse consultant's recommendations were then forwarded to a peer reviewer; a physician who uses his or her medical expertise to determine the medical necessity of the services provided. In this case, AHCA employed the services of two peer reviewers. Dr. Laura Machado was the peer reviewer for the inpatient medical cases, and Dr. Rahul Mehra was the peer reviewer for the inpatient psychiatric cases. The peer reviewers prepared reports that offered their opinion as to which days of the patients' stays were medically necessary. Ms. Lynn then calculated the amount of the alleged overpayment and communicated that number to Petitioner in the FAAR on August 20, 2005. General issues regarding patient discharge Ms. Lynn emphasized that the peer reviewer's job is simply to determine medical necessity, not to base coverage decisions on the convenience of the patient or provider. She rejected the suggestion that it was any part of the peer reviewer's task to consider what medical facilities and services are actually available in Orlando, at the time that Florida Hospital Orlando is contemplating the discharge of a Medicaid patient. Ms. Lynn reiterated that hospital services under Medicaid are governed by the Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, the January 2001 edition, of which sets forth the following "Service Requirements": Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a covered service. Dr. Ross Edmundson, Florida Hospital Orlando's medical director for health care management, agreed that a clinically stable patient can be sent home or to a skilled nursing facility "in the best of all worlds." However, Dr. Edmundson pointed out that a safe discharge plan is the primary consideration for the treating physician, and that a safe discharge plan may render things "medically appropriate" that might not be found "medically necessary" in purely clinical terms. For example, if the Medicaid patient has no home, and the physician knows full well that the patient will be living under a bridge if he is discharged to the street, then it would be grossly negligent to discharge that patient without a plan to get better care. If the patient requires $500.00 worth of medications for the next month, and has no way of obtaining them, it may be grossly negligent for the physician to send that patient out the hospital door. The InterQual Products Group's "ISD" (Intensity of Service, Severity of Illness Discharge Screens) is a nationally recognized set of utilization guidelines that are used by hospitals, Medicare and Medicaid. Dr. Edmundson believed that these discharge guidelines take into account factors beyond the purely clinical: You have to have a discharge treatment plan. If you have a place to follow up, if you have [an] accepting physician, if you have a plan, if you know that they can make it there in the next three days and they require follow up in three days, that is clinically appropriate. If you know that they're going to live in a box and you have no assurance that this patient is going to make it back for any follow up, then that is not a safe discharge plan, it is not medically appropriate. The criteria really has that built in. There are barriers that may prevent the hospital from discharging the patient to an alternative location. Even if the hospital has met the patient's immediate medical needs and the patient's condition is stable, the patient's financial situation may present an obstacle to placement in a skilled nursing facility or to obtaining home health care. Petitioner has access to "a very limited number" of providers who will give follow up care to Medicaid and self-pay patients. Most nursing homes in central Florida have a set number of Medicaid beds for which they will accept patients. Medicaid will not pay a sub- acute facility or a nursing home any additional money for expensive medications, such as intravenous (IV) antibiotics, which further discourages those facilities from accepting patients upon their discharge from the hospital. Florida Hospital Orlando has severe capacity problems. The hospital has about 1,800 beds on its seven campuses, and these beds are almost always full. It is not unusual for the hospital's daytime census to be above 100 percent, with patients backed up in the emergency room waiting for beds to become available. Given the hospital's capacity problems and the low reimbursement rates of Medicaid, there is no motive for Petitioner to keep Medicaid patients in the hospital any longer than is absolutely necessary. Tammy Rikansrud is Florida Hospital Orlando's director of case management, utilization management, and denial management. According to Ms. Rikansrud, the hospital begins discharge planning within 24 hours of a patient's admission, and immediately begins seeking referrals as soon as its knows the patient will be discharged to a sub-acute facility. A major problem is that many facilities limit the number of beds for Medicaid patients, if they accept Medicaid patients at all. Robert Fleener is Petitioner's director of case management. Based on Mr. Fleener's testimony, the impediments to placing a patient in a nursing home from the hospital include rejection of the patient for "payer constraints," meaning that the Medicaid system does not reimburse the nursing home enough to cover its costs. Petitioner seeks placement for its Medicaid patients throughout the state of Florida and beyond, if necessary. Aside from nursing homes, Petitioner uses Shands Teaching Hospital in Gainesville, and long-term acute care hospitals such as those operated by Kindred Healthcare. Petitioner always assesses the practicality of home care for its patients. Petitioner also seeks to place its patients at outpatient clinics when appropriate, but there are few clinics in Orlando, and they are not required to accept Petitioner's discharged patients. The usual practice with ambulatory patients is to discharge them from the hospital, then have them come back on an outpatient basis for follow up treatment. Petitioner always assesses its patients to achieve discharge to the least restrictive setting. If the patient is ambulatory, the hospital will seek to place the patient in an assisted living facility. If the patient is not ambulatory, the hospital will look to a skilled nursing facility that is able to provide the necessary level of service. As also noted by Dr. Edmundson, a patient's need for expensive medicines can make it difficult to place the patient in a nursing home because of reimbursement problems. According to Mr. Fleener, nursing homes look very closely at accepting homeless patients, because they assume that if they accept a homeless person, they will have that patient for the rest of his life. Petitioner has "unavoidable" inpatient days for its Medicaid patients, where the care could have been provided in a nursing home but the hospital was unable to place the patient, due to lack of beds, patient behavior problems, age, or the cost of clinical care. Stephen William Bailey is the clinic coordinator for Petitioner's department of psychiatry. Petitioner has a 76-bed psychiatric inpatient unit and a medical psychiatric unit for patients with a psychiatric diagnosis and co-morbid medical problems. The hospital must obtain state approval to place a psychiatric patient in a nursing home, assuming it is possible to find a nursing home that is equipped to handle psychiatric issues and is willing to take the patient. It is not uncommon for Petitioner to admit a patient with behavior disturbances from a nursing home, stabilize the patient's medications and treatment, then have the nursing home refuse to take the patient back. Petitioner has no incentive to prolong inpatient stays. Patients are waiting to be admitted on a regular basis, and there are, at times, as many as 20 psychiatric patients in the emergency room waiting for admission. Cara Lee Staples is a social worker at Florida Hospital Orlando. She attends treatment team meetings, assesses patients for discharge needs, researches placement availabilities, and meets with families to plan care after discharge. Based on Ms. Staples' testimony, many of Petitioner's Medicaid patients have chronic mental illnesses and often have no involvement with their families. As soon as a patient is admitted, Ms. Staples seeks to obtain a psychosocial history of the patient, which includes where the patient came from and whether the patient can return upon discharge. If the patient cannot return to, for example, the assisted living facility from which he was admitted to the hospital, then Ms. Staples must attempt to find an appropriate placement for the patient so that he may be safely discharged once he is stabilized. According to Ms. Staples, there is a range of alternative placements she may explore, depending on the patient's circumstances. Those persons who do not need structured care may be placed in a boarding home. Those requiring minimal care may be placed in an assisted living facility or a retirement home. The next level of care would be provided by an extended care facility, which Ms. Staples described as an intermediate facility between an assisted living facility and a skilled nursing facility. Other placement options include substance abuse rehabilitation facilities, halfway houses, 28-day programs, and shelters. The hospital faces some placement problems. Assisted living facilities tend not to accept patients with recent histories of drug abuse. Some assisted living facilities will not accept patients who are incontinent and unable to change themselves. Assisted living facilities without locked units will not accept Alzheimer's patients who tend to wander. Nursing homes will often reject young psychiatric patients in need of skilled nursing services because of their age. Nursing homes are generally reluctant to accept Medicaid patients, particularly those who are homeless, because of the difficulty they will face in placing the patient after the need for skilled nursing services has passed. Nursing homes will decline to accept a patient once they learn he is on a psychiatric unit because they "cannot meet their needs," which Ms. Staples described as a global catch-all phrase for their general desire not to accept psychiatric patients. Acute Care Inpatient Hospital Stays By the time of the hearing, the acute care inpatient hospital stays of 16 patients remained at issue. The findings below are set forth in the order that the patients were listed in AHCA Exhibit 6, the recipient spreadsheet indicating the dates of the patients' stays, the dates denied by the peer reviewers, and the amount of claimed overpayment. Patient #1 R.B. R.B. was admitted on March 30, 2001, and was discharged on April 8, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that two days, April 6 through 8, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care.3 Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that R.B. was a 46-year-old female with scleroderma. She was admitted with chest tightness and found to be in near end-stage renal failure. Standard enzyme testing ruled out a heart attack. Her renal function continued to deteriorate and it became clear she would soon need dialysis. R.B. underwent placement of a Tessio catheter on April 3, and arrangements were begun for her to receive dialysis at an outpatient center in her hometown of Pensacola. Dialysis could not be arranged at the outpatient center until after she underwent dialysis at the hospital on April 4 and 5. Dr. Machado agreed that it would not have been safe to discharge her until adequate arrangements had been made for her outpatient dialysis, but that she was medically stable and ready for discharge by April 5 with an outpatient treatment plan in place. The care R.B. received in the hospital after April 5, including two blood transfusions on April 7, could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Yithak Daniel Haim, testified that R.B. was not discharged as scheduled on April 6, because of changes in her mental status. She had nausea and episodes of confusion. On April 7, her medications were reviewed in light of their propensity to cause confusion in persons with poor kidney function. It was thought that her confusion could be due to OxyContin. Dr. Haim also noted that R.B.'s hemoglobin dropped on April 7, and she required a transfusion. Treating physician Dr. Daniel Tambunan confirmed that R.B. was kept in the hospital after April 6 due to her mental status, which developed into hallucinations on April 7. Dr. Tambunan also noted that R.B. had developed tachycardia on April 5 probably due to low hemaocrit, which was measured at 22.3 on April 7. Dr. Haim stated that a normal hematocrit is between 39 and 45. Dr. Haim agreed with Dr. Machado that dialysis can usually be done on an outpatient basis, but that he decided to keep her in the hospital due to the combination of the tachycardia, low hematocrit necessitating a transfusion, and the need to ascertain whether the hallucinations were caused by medications or by the dialysis. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 6 through April 8 should not have been denied. Dr. Machado's opinion was supportable regarding the ability of the patient to receive transfusions and dialysis on an outpatient basis. However, Dr. Machado's testimony ignored R.B.'s hallucinations and the reasonableness of keeping her in the hospital until the treating physician could ascertain their cause. Therefore, AHCA offered no evidence to conflict with the testimony of Dr. Haim that it was medically necessary to keep R.B. in the hospital until her discharge on April 8. Patient #2 F.C. F.C. was admitted on March 5, 2001, and was discharged on March 12, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that the admission should be denied and a 23-hour observation should be approved.4 Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that F.C. was a 43-year-old female smoker with high blood pressure. She was admitted with chest pain for 3 days and by some notes was chronic over the last year. An electrocardiogram (EKG) did not show ischemia, and serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack. A spiral computer tomography (CT) scan was negative for a pulmonary embolism, i.e., a blood clot in the lung. Dr. Machado wrote that F.C.'s vital signs were stable, and that an outpatient work-up of her chest pain would have been appropriate. Instead, she had a stress test on March 7. The results were still "pending," according to a note on March 11. She also underwent work-up of abnormal findings on her abdominal CT/ultrasound, all of which could have been accomplished safely in the outpatient setting. Petitioner's physician expert, Dr. Haim, concurred with Dr. Machado's denial of this admission. The treating physician, Dr. Ashok Khanna, offered plausible reasons for keeping the patient in the hospital, including the fact that F.C. was a drug addict who could not be relied upon to comply with testing required to rule out coronary artery disease on an outpatient basis. However, the greater weight of the evidence supports Dr. Machado's denial of the admission. Patient #3 J.C. J.C. was admitted on July 6, 2000, and was discharged on July 12, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that five days, July 8 through July 12, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued care on the medical ward. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that J.C. was a 55-year-old male initially admitted to the psychiatric unit due to depression and suicidal gesture. Psychiatric notes indicate that J.C. complained of three weeks of exertional chest pain and fatigue. On July 6, he was transferred to the medical ward for further evaluation. Serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack, and he was hemodynamically stable. He underwent a stress test on July 6, with no chest pain and no EKG changes. Dr. Machado concluded that a transfer back to the psychiatric unit or to home would have been appropriate, with follow-up. She believed it was not medically necessary to keep J.C. on the medical ward while awaiting the nuclear images of the stress test, as he was chest pain free and hemodynamically stable after July 7. Treating physician Dr. Luis Allen testified that he was called in on a psychiatric consultation on J.C. while he was in the medical unit. Dr. Allen found that J.C.'s depression was significant and that he would be in need of inpatient psychiatric treatment. Dr. Allen therefore followed J.C. until he was transferred to the inpatient psychiatric unit. The transfer was delayed while the cardiac workup was completed, so that the physicians could be confident that J.C. was medically stable before his transfer back to the inpatient psychiatric unit. Dr. Allen noted that J.C. had a history of depressive disorder and experiencing feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, that his level of depression was significant, and that he had been admitted for a suicidal gesture. Dr. Allen testified that J.C.'s psychiatric symptoms were too marked to be treated on an outpatient basis. Dr. Allen believed that his stay through July 12, was necessary when the combination of the patient's medical and psychiatric conditions are considered. Petitioner's medical expert, Dr. Haim, disagreed with Dr. Machado that J.C. could have been transferred from the medical ward on July 7, because the results of his cardiac stress test did not come back until July 9. Dr. Haim agreed that J.C. could have then been transferred off the medical ward on July 9. However, there was no bed available on the psychiatric floor on July 9. J.C.'s condition indicated a need for acute psychiatric hospitalization, meaning that he could not be discharged home. Thus, he remained on the medical ward until a psychiatric bed became available. Dr. Haim agreed that this was not strictly a medical reason, but contended that the lack of beds constituted a "reality reason" that justified the full admission. Petitioner's expert psychiatrist, Dr. Alan Berns, agreed with Dr. Allen and Dr. Haim that the full stay was justified. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last five days of J.C.'s admission. The record established that J.C. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on July 7. The reason for keeping J.C. on the medical unit after July 7 was administrative convenience, not medical necessity.5 Patient #4 P.C. P.C. was admitted on July 9, 2000, and was discharged on July 17, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that six days, July 11 through July 17, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that P.C. was a 64-year-old female with a history of leg cellulitis treated with IV antibiotics. She was admitted through the emergency room with increased swelling of her lower left leg, which raised concerns about deep vein thrombosis (DVT), compartment syndrome, or progression of her cellulitis. P.C. also had chronic anemia, which had worsened. DVT was ruled out and she was continued on IV antibiotics. She had a blood transfusion due to her anemia. P.C. declined inpatient gastrointestinal (GI) work for her anemia, so the hospital planned to schedule the GI work after her discharge. Dr. Machado concluded that the remainder of her hospital stay could have been outpatient. She did have one further transfusion of packed red blood cells (PRBCs) on July 12, but she did not need to remain in the hospital for this, as she continued to refuse further workup and was asymptomatic. Dr. Machado testified that the physician's note on July 10 stated that the patient "looks and feels better, no complaints," and that P.C. was sufficiently improved to be discharged on that date. She could have been continued on IV antibiotics at home through home health care, or could have received the treatment at a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Machado acknowledged that the patient received a blood transfusion on July 12, but stated that this could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Blood could have been drawn after the transfusion for lab testing, and there would have been no need to call P.C. back in unless there was a problem with the labs. Dr. Haim testified that P.C. was diabetic, had kidney problems, peripheral vascular disease, and congestive heart failure. As of July 11, the status of her infection had improved, but she was still on IV antibiotics and her hematocrit had dropped. Because P.C. had several chronic medical problems, it was important to raise her hematocrit. She was given the transfusion on July 12, but her hematocrit continued to drop. Dr. Haim testified that this raised intense concerns as to "where is this blood going to." A CAT scan of her abdomen revealed no internal bleeding. Her release was planned for July 15, but blood testing on that date showed that her kidney function had deteriorated. It was feared that one of her IV antibiotics, Vancomycin, was affecting her kidney function. Dr. Haim concluded that her drop in hemoglobin and kidney function necessitated keeping her in the hospital until July 17. J.C.'s treating physician, Dr. Sidiab Elalaoui, testified that he could not have given the patient transfusions in his office. He disagreed with Dr. Machado that J.C. could have been seen in an outpatient setting as of July 11. Dr. Elalaoui noted that J.C. had been getting IV antibiotics at home, but that her condition nonetheless worsened to the point where she had to be brought to the emergency room on July 9. Dr. Elalaoui stated that J.C. did not have a simple infection. She had a bacteremia, a bacteria that went from the skin into the blood of a patient with diabetes and high blood pressure. Dr. Elalaoui could not be sure if her condition was life- threatening, but confidently stated that it was "severe." The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that July 11 through July 17 should not have been denied. Dr. Machado's opinion was supportable regarding the ability of the patient to receive a transfusion and IV antibiotics on an outpatient basis. However, Dr. Elalaoui's testimony as the treating physician, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that, whatever the patient's theoretical ability to receive transfusions and IV antibiotics on an outpatient basis, under the actual circumstances, it was medically necessary to keep J.C. in the hospital through July 17. Patient #5 A.F. A.F. was admitted on November 30, 2000, and was discharged on December 7, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that four days, December 3 through December 7, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that A.F. was a 32-year-old female admitted with a severe headache and apparent new onset seizures. She underwent a CT scan, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and an electroencephalogram (EEG), all of which reported negative. She had undergone a lumbar puncture previously for the severe headaches, which was also negative. Dr. Machado concluded that A.F. could have been discharged with oral medications and outpatient follow-up for treatment of her apparent migraine headaches. Instead, A.F. underwent further testing for low back pain, depression, and substance abuse. Dr. Machado believed that the treating physicians allowed the patient's subjective complaints to outweigh the objective clinical findings, noting that A.F. had been seen sitting up and talking on the phone during the time when she was complaining of a severe headache. Petitioner's expert, Dr. Haim, agreed with Dr. Machado that the days denied were redundant. Thus, it is found that the greater weight of evidence supports AHCA's denial of four days of A.F.'s inpatient stay. Patient #6 C.G. C.G. was admitted on May 3, 2001, and was discharged on May 14, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that eight days, May 5 through May 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.G. was a 47-year-old female admitted with increasing chest pain and numbness in her left arm. She was found to have a mass in the middle of her chest and possible early superior vena cava (SVC) syndrome. Serial enzymes and a CT scan respectively ruled out heart attack and pulmonary embolism as the cause of her chest pain. She was started on steroids and pain medication, with satisfactory pain relief. Dr. Machado concluded that the remainder of her stay focused on a workup on the mediastinal mass, which could have been done on an outpatient basis. The steroid and pain medications she was receiving through IV, could have been given orally. None of the progress notes documented sufficient evidence for inpatient workup. In her deposition, Dr. Machado explained that the SVC is the large blood vessel that returns blood from the heart to the upper portion of the body. When there is a mass in that area of the chest, it can compress the SVC and cause swelling from the backing up of the blood. Dr. Machado believed that once immediate life-threatening diagnoses such as heart attack and pulmonary embolism were ruled out, and C.G.'s pain was managed with medication, the matter of determining the nature of the mediastinal mass could have been handled on an outpatient basis. Treating physician Dr. Vajihuddin Khan, an internal medicine specialist at Florida Hospital Orlando, testified that he kept C.G. in the hospital until May 14 to complete the workup and perform all the necessary investigations of the mediastinal mass. Dr. Khan noted that C.G. could not have been released and observed daily on an outpatient basis because of transportation or financial problems. The patient lacked outside support. If she had gone out of the hospital with no place to stay and no friends to support her, the workup might never have been completed. C.G. was ultimately diagnosed with Hodgkins lymphoma. Dr. Haim testified that on May 7 the patient was ordered NPO (nothing by mouth) for a biopsy to be performed the next day. She had a swollen face, neck, and arm, with a large, undiagnosed mass in her chest. The chest pain and shortness of breath had not gone away. Dr. Haim believed it would be irresponsible to discharge C.G. in that condition without a diagnosis. The biopsy was performed on May 8 and showed cancer. The pathology report on May 9 was inconclusive, but her physicians knew it was "something bad," either lymphoma or a small cell carcinoma of long standing. Dr. Haim testified that it was important to differentiate the type of cancer because the treatments would be different for each. Therefore, it was necessary to perform surgery to obtain a larger sample of the mass. Dr. Haim noted that the surgery was not performed prior to C.G.'s discharge on May 14, due to the surgeon's unavailability. Dr. Haim agreed that reimbursement for the dates of May 10 through May 14 were "somewhat questionable" because C.G. was, in essence, sitting in the hospital waiting for a surgeon. The record did not disclose why she was forced to wait for a surgeon. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last eight days of C.G.'s admission. The record established that C.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on May 5. Patient # 7 C.G. C.G. was readmitted on May 25, 2001, and was discharged on June 3, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that the last day should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.G. was a 47-year-old female admitted for elective mediastinoscopy to diagnose a mediastinal mass. The procedure was attempted but was unsuccessful due to a large goiter. A thoroactomy was performed that diagnosed lymphoma. C.G. did fine postoperatively but her discharge was delayed after an episode of chest pain, determined to be non-cardiac. When the oncologist saw her on May 30, he felt that she had SVC syndrome and called for an urgent radiation oncology consult. She was started on IV Decadron and improved dramatically by June 2, when she received her first radiation treatment. Dr. Machado saw no reason to keep the patient in the hospital for an extra day, until June 3. Dr. Haim testified that it was reasonable to wait for hours after the radiation treatment to note any improvement or adverse reaction. The greater weight of the evidence supports Dr. Haim's opinion that it was medically necessary to keep C.G. in the hospital through June 3. Patient #8 THE. THE. was admitted on April 3, 2001, and was discharged on April 9, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that three days, April 6 through April 9, should be denied due to lack of clear documentation showing medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that THE. was a 21-year-old pregnant patient admitted with dehydration from hyper emesis gravid arum (the nausea and vomiting commonly called "morning sickness"). She had lost 14 pounds in the week prior to admission. This was the only abnormal vital sign, as she was not hypertensive or tachycardia and her electrolytes were not abnormal. No blood urea nitrogen (BUN) or cretonne was documented, indicating normal kidney function. She had two previous admissions for hyper emesis. She received sufficient IV hydration by April 4 for a 10 pound weight gain and was documented by nursing notes as feeling better and tolerating oral medications. She did have an increase in vomiting on April 5, but by April 6 this was much less and her weight was stable. Most of her anti-emetics were switched from IV to oral, and her IV was locked off for the remainder of her hospital stay. Her vital signs remained stable throughout her hospital stay, and there were no new labs to document continuing dehydration. Dr. Machado testified that the record showed no treatment after April 6 that necessitated a hospital stay. She believed THE. could have been discharged on April 6, with outpatient oral anti-nausea medications in a trial to see how she would do. Treating physician Dr. Andre Jakubowski testified that he saw THE. in his office on April 2, for an obstetrical visit. She was about 12 weeks pregnant and complaining of nausea, vomiting and the inability to keep down fluids. At her March 26, visit, she had weighed 134 pounds. On April 2, she weighed 120 pounds, a loss of 14 pounds. Dr. Jakubowksi immediately admitted T.H. to the hospital. For the first few days of T.H.'s hospitalization, Dr. Jakubowski gave her IV hydration in order to correct her electrolytes. On April 6, the IVs were discontinued and T.H. was placed on oral medications and food. Between April 6 and 7, she lost two and one half pounds. Dr. Jakubowski testified that he could not send T.H. home because she was still vomiting and was generally "not in good shape." He started her on IV hydration again and adjusted her medications. She began to eat and was able to go home on April 9. Dr. Jakubowski testified that it is not within the standards of practice to discharge a patient who has been taken off IV hydration without observing for 24 hours to be sure the patient is taking food and/or liquids orally and keeping them down. On April 8, the IV hydration was stopped for the second time. This time, T.H. was able to keep down some oral foods and liquids. Dr. Jakubowski watched her for 24 hours, then sent her home on April 9. Dr. Haim testified that laboratory testing is not necessary to document continued dehydration when the patient continues to vomit. With a weight loss of 14 pounds in a woman who was 12 weeks pregnant, this was clearly more than ordinary morning sickness. T.H. could not be discharged when she could not keep food on her stomach. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 6 through April 9 should not have been denied. Dr. Jakubowski's testimony as the treating physician, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that, although T.H. showed some improvement and was taken off IV fluids on April 6, it was reasonable to wait 24 hours to make sure that she could keep down oral nutrition. When she was unable to do so, the IV hydration was resumed and it was reasonable to keep her in the hospital until she was able to keep some food on her stomach. Under all the circumstances, it was medically necessary to keep T.H. in the hospital through April 9. Patient #9 J.H. J.H. was admitted on July 7, 2001, and was discharged on August 7, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that 21 days, July 17 through August 7, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that J.H. was a 63-year-old female lung transplant candidate with end-stage pulmonary fibrosis. She was admitted with a cough, low-grade fever, and increased shortness of breath. She also appeared to have a postoperative wound infection from recent vascular surgery in the right groin. A CT scan was negative for pneumonia or pulmonary embolism and her respiratory symptoms stabilized and, fairly quickly, returned to their concededly poor baseline. The infected right groin area was the cause for J.H.'s extended stay. The wound was debrided on July 14, following treatment with IV antibiotics and wound care. The infectious disease consultant agreed on July 16 that home IV antibiotics would be appropriate. However, the patient declined a PICC line (peripherally inserted central catheter, a long–term catheter that is inserted into the arm and threaded into central circulation) due to a past poor experience. She therefore, continued to get IV antibiotics in the hospital until July 26, when she was changed to oral Keflex. Dr. Machado found that the reasons for her continued hospital stay were unclear, except for wound care. On August 3, J.H. left the hospital for a few hours on a day pass. During her stay, she underwent other tests that are required for lung transplant evaluation, but weren't necessary during this hospitalization. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that J.H.'s lung condition stabilized, but the groin became the problem. The treating physician initially thought the problem was fluid collection, but the increased white blood cell count indicated an infection. J.H. was given proper wound care, but Dr. Machado could not see anything done in the hospital during the last 21 days of J.H.'s stay that required an inpatient stay. Dr. Machado concluded that IV antibiotics and wound care could have been given in a sub-acute skilled nursing facility or with home health. Treating physician Richard Young Feibelman is board certified in internal medicine and pulmonary medicine. He is a pulmonary physician, and was J.H.'s primary physician during this admission. In his deposition, Dr. Feibelman testified that he had followed this patient for some time prior to this admission. J.H.'s primary underlying problem was severe and progressing idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, a scarring debilitation of the lungs causing progressive shortness of breath and requiring increasing oxygen. It typically results in death within two to three years of the diagnosis. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. had recently been evaluated at the University of Miami for a lung transplant, which she desperately wanted despite the high risk of death associated with this surgery. J.H. had been undergoing workup in Miami, about two weeks before this admission, including a carotid artery angiogram and cerebral angiogram. After the angiogram, she developed a pseudo aneurism or partial false leak of the puncture site from the catheter insertion. She then developed a hematoma in that area, with wound infection and fever that made necessary her admission to the hospital. Dr. Feibelman testified that at the time of admission, it was difficult to tell whether the infection came from her groin, or whether it was a superimposed respiratory infection on top of her underlying pulmonary fibrosis. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was extremely sick, near the end stage of chronic fibrotic lung disease. He stated that this was an important hospitalization, because J.H.'s infection had to be under control to ensure she could make it to Miami, and survive the lung transplant. Before her admission, she was on immunosuppressive therapy, which increases the risk of infection. Dr. Feibelman treated her with IV antibiotics, and he described the wound care as "aggressive," an effort to heal the wound before the lung disease killed her. The wound was debrided, and J.H. was seen by an infectious disease consultant and vascular surgery consultant. There was difficulty with her blood pressure, and an episode of arm and leg numbness that required a neurological consultation to rule out a transient ischemic attack or pulmonary embolus. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was still getting IV antibiotics to almost the end of her hospitalization. She was on high flow oxygen. The pain in her wound was such that she required intravenous morphine to change her dressings. Dr. Feibelman concluded that any additional setback for J.H. would have been fatal. Her disease has a fairly rapid stair- step pattern, in which there is a drop-off, then stabilization, then a further drop-off, then stabilization. Dr. Feibelman stated that J.H. could not afford a further drop-off before her lung transplant. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was allowed to leave the hospital for two hours on a day pass. He stated that this was in all likelihood her last chance to go home, and he thought it was worth letting her go. Dr. Haim disagreed that the last 21 days of J.H.'s stay should be denied, but agreed that the last week or two were debatable, depending on the support system she had at home and the possibility of giving her IV antibiotics at home. Dr. Haim stated that she could have had IV antibiotics at home with a PICC line. However, J.H. had prior poor experiences with PICC lines and told her physicians they were not going to "torture" her again. She would also have needed assistance with her oxygen tanks if she went home. Dr. Haim stated that J.H. needed help with all of her activities of daily living (ADLs), as would any patient requiring six liters of oxygen every day. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last 21 days of J.H.'s admission. Dr. Machado correctly observed that the patient could have received IV antibiotics, oxygen, and wound care in a skilled nursing facility. She conceded that it would have been correct to keep the patient in the hospital if no skilled nursing facility was available. Petitioner offered no evidence that it attempted to place J.H. in a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Feibelman's concerns about J.H.'s precarious condition are fully credited, but the record as presented established that C.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on July 16. Patient #10 C.J. C.J. was admitted on March 31, 2001, and was discharged on April 9, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that six days, April 3 through April 9, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.J. was a 67-year-old female admitted with abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting, two days after a colonoscopy. She also had poorly controlled diabetes. The nausea and vomiting resolved quickly after admission, and she was hemodynamically stable throughout her stay. A CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis was performed, which showed a large pelvic mass (likely the recurrence of a previous cancer) with accompanying hydronephrosis (swelling of the kidney caused by obstruction of urine flow). The gastroenterologist cleared C.J. for discharge on April 2. The remainder of her stay involved consultations with urology and oncology specialists regarding the pelvic mass, which could have been accomplished in the outpatient setting. She did not have a ureteral stent (a surgical device implanted to hold the ureter open so that urine can flow freely from the kidneys to the bladder) placed until April 6. Dr. Machado wrote that it was unclear from the notes what was keeping her in the hospital after April 6. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that C.J. should have been discharged on April 3 with arrangements for an outpatient workup of the pelvic mass, which was likely a recurrence of the cancer that C.J. had ten years previously. Dr. Machado testified that the placement of the stent was necessary, either during the hospitalization or as an outpatient, and noted that if it had been an emergency, the stent would have been placed sooner in C.J.'s stay. The stent was actually placed one week after C.J.'s admission. Treating physician Dr. Alan Varraux, a specialist in pulmonary medicine, testified that C.J. was weak and somewhat frail, but underwent a colonoscopy because of gastrointestinal symptoms. The procedure caused her much nausea and vomiting. Her complaints and Dr. Varraux' concerns about dehydration led to her hospitalization on March 31. On admission, she was kept NPO and IV fluids were started. She was allowed to start eating on April 1. A GI specialist saw her on April 2 and performed an upper GI endoscopy and a colonoscopy. A consulting oncologist saw the patient on April 3. Dr. Varraux stated that an X-ray showed hydronephrosis, a blockage of the ureter system causing urine to back up into and dilate the kidney. The stent could not be placed on an outpatient basis because C.J. was a debilitated, immuno-compromised cancer patient who could be killed by a urinary tract infection. She was a high risk patient and needed to be cleared by a urological specialist before discharge. The urologist planned to place the stent on April 6, after which C.J. could be discharged if all went well. Dr. Haim testified that the stent was actually placed on April 7 and that C.J. needed to stay in the hospital for an additional 24-to-48 hours to ensure that she had adequate urine output, and that her fever was going down, and that her subjective feelings were improved. After reviewing the depositions of Dr. Varraux and Dr. Haim, Dr. Machado testified that she saw no reason to change her opinion. Dr. Machado stated that the medical record showed C.J.'s cancer was 10 years prior to this admission. This led Dr. Machado to disagree with Dr. Varraux's assumption that C.J. was immuno-compromised and unable to fight infections normally. Dr. Machado also did not see anything in the medical record to support the concerns about a urinary tract infection. C.J.'s urinalysis was normal on admission. There was glucose in her urine, which was consistent with her diabetes. On April 3, her white blood count was normal, indicating that if there was an infection, it had been treated adequately. No culture or urinalysis was performed on that date. Dr. Machado opined that the patient's low grade fever throughout her stay was not a reason to keep her in the hospital, as evidenced by the fact that she was still running a low grade fever on the day she was discharged. She was treated with antibiotics that can be given orally, but that they chose to give via IV. Dr. Machado could find no notes from the primary treating physician from April 6, until his discharge note on April 9. Dr. Machado found nothing in the medical record to support the view that the stent had to be placed in the hospital. The stent certainly needed to be placed, to allow urine to drain properly from the kidney. However, this is not always an inpatient procedure. Dr. Machado noted that the urologist's post-operative orders were written as outpatient orders. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of C.J.'s admission. The record as presented established that C.J. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on April 3. Patient #11 G.M. AHCA Exhibit 6 indicates that G.M. was admitted on July 6, 2000, and was discharged on July 20, 2000. However, Dr. Machado noted that the records provided by the hospital indicate that this patient was admitted directly to a rehabilitation facility, and was never an acute medical admission. Therefore, Dr. Machado determined that the entire 14-day stay should be denied. Dr. Haim testified that his own abbreviated notes show that the patient came into the hospital, was in respiratory failure, had shortness of breath, coded with cardiac arrest, and was intubated. However, the lack of medical records provided by the hospital to AHCA require that Dr. Machado's denial determination be sustained. Patient #12 N.P. N.P. was admitted on January 8, 2000, and was discharged on January 14, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that two days, January 13 through January 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that N.P. was a 46-year-old male with cardiomyopathy and poorly controlled diabetes. He was admitted with increasing shortness of breath, fever, cough, and chest pain. He was started on antibiotics, diuretics, and respiratory treatments, and his symptoms improved rapidly. Serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack and his chest pain was not thought to be cardiac in nature. On January 11, his IV medications were changed to oral, and it was felt he was near ready for discharge. Though he felt better, his oxygen saturations were slow to improve and he was still saturating in the high 80's on room air, which was not his baseline. Dr. Machado found it reasonable to monitor him for one more day in the hospital to see if this would improve before sending him home with oxygen. The saturations stayed the same the following day, and he continued to feel better. Dr. Machado concluded that discharge would have been safe on January 12, with home oxygen and close outpatient follow-up. Dr. Haim testified that N.P. could have probably been discharged on January 13 on oxygen, with outpatient follow-up. He noted that N.P. was started on a new medication on January 12, and that it is reasonable to keep the patient for an additional 24 hours to gauge his response. However, Dr. Haim also noted that the medication was a diuretic, not an antibiotic. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last two days of N.P.'s admission. The record, as presented, established that N.P. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on January 13. Patient #13 T.S. T.S. was admitted on September 18, 2001, and was discharged on October 16, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that 12 days, October 4 through October 16, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that T.S. was a 55-year-old man with cirrhosis and a history of drug abuse and hypertension. He was admitted for treatment of a non-healing venous ulcer that had failed outpatient therapy. T.S. was also experiencing uncontrolled pain despite oral pain medications. He was started on broad-spectrum antibiotics and underwent debridement of the wound on September 21. Plans were made to discharge him to a skilled nursing facility for several weeks of wound care and IV antibiotics. On September 22, his pain continued to be poorly controlled. On September 25, he had a fever of 101 degrees and diarrhea, which prompted further work- up. Cultures of the wound continued to show a polymicrobial infection that also had a fungal component. Oral Sporanox was added to his medications to address the fungal component. On September 27, a pain management consultation was requested due to his continued uncontrolled pain, mostly during dressing changes. T.S. was placed on a Dilaudid PCA (patient controlled analgesic) pump, which did control his pain. During this time, T.S. had waxing and waning mental status due to the pain medications. Because of T.S.' increasing lethargy, the PCA was discontinued on October 3, and T.S. was thenceforth maintained on oral medications. The patient also had chronic anemia on admission that slowly worsened during his stay. He was found not to be acutely bleeding and was transfused PRBCs with improvement in his hematocrit level. Dr. Machado agreed that it would have been difficult to discharge T.S. to a skilled nursing facility for dressing changes and IV antibiotics if he was unable to tolerate dressing changes without a PCA pump for pain. Therefore, she would allow the hospitalization through October 3, when T.S. was switched to oral pain medications and could have gone to a skilled nursing facility. Treating physician Dr. Pradeep Vangala testified that he saw T.S. in his office, prior to his hospital admission. T.S. came in with what appeared to be cellulitis in his legs, and was treated with oral antibiotics. When the condition failed to respond to treatment, Dr. Vangala admitted T.S. to the hospital. Dr. Vangala stated that T.S. was kept in the hospital after October 4 because his cellulitis had not resolved and the patient was not stable enough to be changed to oral antibiotics. Dr. Vangala testified that it was not a simple decision to send T.S. home with IV antibiotics because of complicating issues. Secondary to his cirrhosis, T.S. had significant edema in most of his body in general, and his legs in particular. Dr. Vangala stated that T.S. required close observation of his skin integrity and his cellulitis, and that his cirrhosis was the cause of the edema. Though T.S. had a lot of excess fluid, most of it was in the subcutaneous tissues rather than the blood vessels. This means that his fluid status had to be closely monitored, because of the danger that he might become intravascularly volume depleted, which could affect renal function. Dr. Vangala stated that the cirrhosis had altered T.S.'s mental status for a significant portion of his stay, and that an acutely confused patient is not a candidate for discharge because he is not able to follow discharge instructions. T.S. also had significant anemia, which meant that his hemoglobin had to be watched. Dr. Haim testified that during all 12 days denied by Dr. Machado, T.S. was still running a fever and had a depressed mental status. He was still receiving IV medications, and had a significant swelling of the abdomen that required drainage. His mental status was abnormal, and physicians were having a very difficult time titrating his pain medications. A neurologist was called in on October 4 because of T.S.'s impaired mental status. The gathering fluids in his body were causing swelling and making it difficult for him to breathe. Dr. Haim testified that the IV antibiotics that T.S. was receiving after October 4 had to be closely supervised, though he conceded that a skilled nursing facility could handle their administration. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last twelve days of T.S.'s admission. Dr. Machado's opinion that the medications administered via IV after October 4 could have been given outside of the inpatient hospital setting was uncontradicted. Dr. Vangala's concerns were genuine, but mostly consisted of monitoring actions he wished to perform as a precaution, rather than acute care needs. The record as presented established that T.S. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on October 4. Patient #14 & 15 (two denials) F.T. F.T. was admitted on March 27, 2000, and was discharged on May 13, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that: March 27 through April 4, should be approved for treatment of coagulopahty, subdural hematoma, and evaluation of the patient's near-syncopal episode; April 14 through May 7, should be approved for chemotherapy and treatment of neutropenic fever; and that April 5 through April 13 (nine days) and May 8 through May 13, (five days) should be denied because the treatment during those periods could have been administered on an outpatient basis. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that F.T. was a 49-year-old female with metastatic breast cancer admitted with a coagulopathy and near-syncope (almost fainting). She was found to have new subdural hematomas and a new pathologic fracture of the left femur. Her coagulopathy was reversed and she was evaluated by neurosurgery and radiation oncology. No surgery was recommended. She began palliative radiation therapy to the brain and left femur on March 29. She remained hemodynamically and neurologically stable, and neurosurgery signed off on the case on April 4. Her pain responded well to radiation. Between April 4 and April 14, F.T.'s hospital care involved continued radiation therapy and the biopsy of a left auxiliary lymph node (on April 11) to determine the receptor status of the breast cancer, which would enable the oncologist to decide if chemotherapy would be of benefit. Dr. Machado concluded that this evaluation and the radiation therapy could have been done on an outpatient basis. On April 14, F.T. began chemotherapy over two days and very soon began experiencing fever and neutropenia (an abnormally low level of neutrophils, the white blood cells produced in the bone marrow) and then respiratory distress. She was started on IV antibiotics and IV diuretics. She was also started on a feeding tube due to poor oral food intake. The fevers and neutropenia were resolved by April 25, but she continued to decline, with increased shortness of breath requiring more diuresis to clear fluid from the lungs. It became evident she was deteriorating and her feeding tube was discontinued by May 4. By May 8, comfort measures only were initiated, and evaluation for inpatient hospice care was requested. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that between April 4 and April 14, F.T. was receiving radiation as her main treatment, as well as further evaluation to determine whether anything more could be done for her cancer. Everything she received during this period, including the lymph node biopsy, could have been done on an outpatient basis. On April 14, she started chemotherapy, which was reasonable to perform in the hospital. By May 8, the medical chart notes indicate the initiation of "comfort only" measures. At that point, she could have been sent home with hospice care or to a hospice house. Dr. Machado conceded that some patients do receive inpatient hospice care, but she testified that this should have been done in a hospice bed, not an acute care medical bed. Dr. Haim testified that during the period of April 5 through April 13 F.T. was receiving radiation to the fractured femur and awaiting a lymph node biopsy. The initial pathology report did not have sufficient material for receptor studies, so a surgical biopsy would need to be performed. On April 5, the hospital social worker was awaiting orders to transfer F.T. back to the nursing home from which she had been admitted. However, F.T. had an episode of nausea and vomiting. Dr. Haim stated that nausea and vomiting in a patient who has metastasis is extremely serious because it could indicate more brain swelling or bleeding in the brain. She was started on IV Decadron, a steroid given to combat nausea and vomiting in chemotherapy patients. Dr. Raul Castillo, F.T.'s oncologist, met with a pathologist on April 7 to discuss the need for an open biopsy of F.T. On April 8, F.T. was receiving radiation and was started on a new chemotherapy drug, IV Aredia. She was monitored closely for side effects. Pain management was a persistent problem. On April 10, she was given the open biopsy under a local anesthetic. On April 13, an orthopedist saw her and ordered a specially fitted brace, because she had difficulty sitting due to her spinal problems. Dr. Haim concluded that, because of all the treatments F.T. was undergoing, including IV chemotherapy, it was mandatory for her to stay inpatient from April 5 through April 13. She could not get the chemotherapy in a non-acute care facility. The hospital was the only place she could get IV Aredia, the brace hadn't arrived until April 13, and she had multiple problems that required monitoring, including advanced cancer and bleeding in the brain. Dr. Haim did not believe that a skilled nursing facility had the capacity to handle F.T. As to F.T.'s second stay, Dr. Haim testified that from May 8 to May 13 F.T. was very weak. Her abdomen was markedly distended, which could have meant that her bowels weren't working well. The abdomen was X-rayed. Her platelet count was dangerously low. An oncology note dated May 9 stated that she was a full code (meaning that all resuscitative efforts must be attempted), by her own choice. Her full code status forced the doctors to plan the performance of tests on her abdomen. On May 10, F.T. voluntarily changed her instructions to DNR (do not resuscitate). Comfort measures were instituted and hospice was consulted. However, when the hospice nurse arrived, F.T. was out having an ultrasound preparatory to having the abdominal fluid drained. The hospice decided not to see her, because she was getting a procedure. The hospice nurse never saw the patient on that day. F.T. was admitted to hospice on May 13. The oncologist, Dr. Castillo, testified that his medical group first saw F.T. in March 2000. F.T. had been diagnosed with breast cancer in 1988, and treated in Puerto Rico, with a left mastectomy and chemotherapy. After she completed the chemotherapy, she had radiation. She indicated that in December 1999, she was told she had metastatic cancer in her bones. In 2000, she developed pain over her hips and legs. She had a fracture over her left femur and a prosthesis over her left leg. She had been taking Coumadin, and Dr. Castillo became involved when F.T. presented with bleeding secondary to Coumadin toxicity. Dr. Castillo described this as a very complex and emotional case in which a few strands of information had to be pieced together to determine the best case management. F.T.'s case history was incomplete because she spoke only Spanish, creating a big language barrier with most of the hospital staff. Dr. Castillo speaks Spanish, and was able to get a "full but scattered history" from F.T. F.T. had metastatic disease. Dr. Castillo testified that it is extremely important to determine if the patient has an estrogen receptor or hormonally positive tumor. Patients who are hormonally sensitive have a much higher probability of responding positively to therapy. To make things more difficult, F.T. developed a subdural hematoma, for which the medical team had to correct her coagulation. Dr. Castillo testified that they felt uncomfortable discharging F.T. while treatment planning was underway. Because of her previous exposure to chemotherapy and radiation, F.T. was at high risk for complications such as the sepsis that eventuated. Dr. Castillo emphasized that this was a complex case, and that the treatment team lacked all the information necessary to make rapid and clear decisions. One event followed another, and the team concentrated on trying to catch up and get the patient somewhat stable. Dr. Castillo stated that a problem with treating a patient this sick on an outpatient basis is the lack of supervision by a specialist. Such a patient will not have access to a site where she is going to get one-to-one care from the oncological standpoint. Dr. Castillo agreed that radiation is commonly done on an outpatient basis, but he noted that this was a patient who had bleeding on the brain and was getting radiation to the brain. If she was in a skilled nursing facility and had a subdural hematoma, she would probably have died on her way to the hospital. Dr. Castillo stated this his group's philosophy is to discharge a patient when they consider the patient stable, and not to leave a patient in the hospital for a mere workup. However, this was a patient who could become a neurosurgical emergency case at any moment. Dr. Castillo concluded that he would not have done anything different in the management of this patient. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 5 through April 13 and May 8, through 13 should not have been denied. Dr. Castillo's testimony as the treating oncologist, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that F.T.'s condition was so precarious that her entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Patient #16 J.Y. J.Y. was admitted on March 3, 2001, and was discharged on March 21, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that five days, March 16 through March 21, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that T.S. was a 39-year-old female admitted due to swallowing a dental appliance that had become lodged in her esophagus. She underwent an endoscopy on March 3, and the foreign body was removed with some difficulty. Her esophagus was perforated due to the foreign body. She began having fever and pain. A CT scan on March 6 showed extensive edema and air tracking compatible with esophageal perforation. She was kept NPO, hyperalimentation (feeding tube) was started, and IV antibiotics were continued. Clinically, she improved and conservative treatment was continued, as the patient wished to avoid surgery. Dr. Machado believed that it was still prudent to monitor and treat the patient in the hospital, due to the possibility of serious complications from this type of injury. A barium swallow was performed on March 12, which showed that a leak persisted in the esophagus. Because she was clinically so much better, it was decided to repeat the CT scan of the neck on March 14 to check for improvement. The scan showed that soft tissue gas and swelling had decreased considerably. By March 16, her IV antibiotics were discontinued and it was decided to give her a trial of fluids by mouth. She was hemodynamically stable and afebrile. Dr. Machado concluded that she should have been discharged with home health and hyperalimentation, with an outpatient swallowing study and close follow-up, rather than waiting in the hospital until March 19. Dr. Haim testified that the March 12 barium swallow results led to J.Y.'s being kept on no food by mouth and total parenteral nutrition (TPN, another term for a feeding tube). On March 16, J.Y. was noted to be clinically stable, but her liver function tests were noted to be high. Dr. Haim noted that the TPN itself could be causing the liver problems, so there was a GI consult. The gastroenterologist recommended a change of antibiotics as a possible solution to the increase in her liver enzymes. Contrary to Dr. Machado's statement, no trial of fluids by mouth was done on March 16. As of March 17, J.Y.'s orders were still nothing by mouth and TPN, and her liver enzymes continued to rise. On March 18, there were no major interventions and J.Y. was scheduled for a swallow study. Her liver enzymes were noted to be decreasing for the first time. Her swallow study results were pending on March 19. Also on March 19, a pulmonary note indicated phlebitis in J.Y.'s arm, in the area of the IV feeding. An order to replace the PICC line was written. On March 20, J.Y. was started on an oral diet and her PICC line was replaced. The gastroenterologist recommended a liquid diet for several weeks. On March 21, the patient was discharged home on IV TPN and a liquid diet. Dr. Haim concluded that the acute care setting was required for the denied days. Treating surgeon Dr. Stephen Huber testified J.Y. came in having swallowed her partial plate, which had become lodged in her esophagus. The emergency room physicians could not get it out, and so J.Y. was taken to surgery. Dr. Huber kept her NPO because he was afraid she might have torn her esophagus. He placed her on IV antibiotics and ordered a swallow study, which revealed a small leak. Dr. Huber called in an infectious disease specialist to manage J.Y.'s antibiotics because he was worried about contamination from the leak spreading into her neck. She was started on IV feedings and the medical team watched for an abscess to develop in her neck. A few days later, another swallow study was performed, which indicated the leak was smaller but still persistent. J.Y. was kept NPO and kept on IV antibiotics. A third swallow study showed the leak had resolved, and she was started on regular food the next day. Once she was cleared by all her specialists, she was discharged from the hospital. Dr. Huber testified that he kept J.Y. in the hospital after March 16 mainly to watch her. Even after the last swallow study, there was still a small leak in the esophagus. J.Y. had not eaten for a couple of weeks, but she was getting better clinically, and Dr. Huber decided to feed her. He started with clear liquids, then advanced her diet slowly over the next few days. Dr. Huber testified that J.Y. had to be watched for fevers and neck swelling caused by her eating, and that he could not evaluate her progress if she was at home. J.Y. did not speak English, and there would have been difficulty monitoring her condition if she were not under direct observation. Seeing her on an outpatient basis might prove harmful if she developed an abscess in her neck, or sepsis. J.Y. remained on IV antibiotics until she was discharged. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last five days of J.Y.'s admission. Dr. Huber's concerns were genuine, but mostly consisted of monitoring actions he wished to perform as a precaution, rather than acute care needs. The record as presented established that J.Y. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on March 16. Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital Stays By the time of the hearing, the psychiatric inpatient hospital stays of 13 patients remained at issue. The findings below are set forth in the order that the patients were listed in AHCA Exhibit 6. Patient #1 H.A. H.A. was admitted on February 20, 2001, and was discharged on February 26, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Rahul Mehra determined that three days, February 23 through February 26, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that H.A. was a 57-year-old female with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. She was admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act on February 20, for reasons unclear in the medical record. As of February 23, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient's psychotic symptoms may have persisted, but these symptoms appeared to be baseline. As of February 23, she did not need 24-hour nursing care. She was discharged on the same dose of anti-psychotic medication she was taking upon admission. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of February 23, outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Generally the Medicaid standards for whether a patient requires an inpatient psychiatric bed are as follows: whether the patient is actively suicidal or homicidal; whether the patient is so acutely psychotic that her ability to care for herself is impaired; whether the patient is physically aggressive or manic; and whether the patient is having a "complicated withdrawal" from alcohol or drugs that might cause a seizure or other acute health problem. Dr. Mehra testified that it was appropriate to admit H.A. because of her family's concerns that she might have a handgun and was threatening self-harm. At admission, she was having some psychotic symptoms, displaying disorganized thoughts. However, as of February 23, she was no longer actively suicidal or homicidal, which was the reason she was admitted. She did have psychiatric symptoms, such as visual and auditory hallucinations, but these seemed to be her baseline level of functioning. No changes were made to her medications. Dr. Mehra's recommendation would have been to transfer H.A. to an outpatient setting or a nursing home. Petitioner's psychiatric expert, Dr. Alan S. Berns, testified that H.A. was admitted through the emergency room for increasing auditory hallucinations and religious preoccupation. She had a history of non-compliance with her outpatient treatment, mood swings, and unpredictable impulse control. She denied hallucinations, but was noted to talk to herself as a religious preoccupation. The diagnostic impression was of acute exacerbation of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and rule out schizoaffective disorder. The psychosocial note on admission stated that the patient is talking to God and dead relatives. The emergency room nursing notes stated that the patient wanted to hurt an unidentified person with a handgun. She was labile, crying and laughing. H.A. had been admitted to Lifestream, a mental health center in Lake County, three times since November 2000. She had a history of "cheeking" her medications. She required assistance with her ADLs and ate poorly. The social worker reported that she did not attend group therapy sessions, and that she heard God talking to her all the time. By February 24, H.A. showed an improved mood and affect, with no overt agitation. She was observed talking to herself and appeared to be responding to internal stimuli. She also demonstrated some looseness of association. On February 25, she denied auditory or visual hallucinations and any suicidal or homicidal ideations. However, she remained seclusive, with pressured speech and a depressed, blunted affect. She refused to participate in groups. She was discharged on February 26 with improved mood and affect, no evidence of delusions, and denied hallucinations and suicidal or homicidal ideations. She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and discharged with prescribed Seroquel and Paxil, the same medications she was taking on admission. Dr. Berns concluded that H.A. warranted another day or two past the February 23 discharge authorized by Dr. Mehra. The nursing notes from February 23 show the patient alert and oriented times three (time, place and person), and indicate that she was cooperative, pleasant, and denied suicidal ideation. However, H.A. also stated that God talks to her and she sees the Holy Spirit. On February 24, she was still exhibiting some looseness of association, indicating that her thinking was not organized, which could in turn affect her ability to perform her ADLs. At this point, she did not appear a danger to herself in terms of intentionally inflicting harm. Dr. Mehra agreed that the symptoms cited by Dr. Berns, such as looseness of association, loose thoughts and disorganization, can be indicative of the need for a longer inpatient stay. However, loosening of associations is a common finding in a patient with schizophrenia, which is a lifelong disorder. Looseness of association in a schizophrenic patient does not, in and of itself, invoke the Medicaid guidelines that the patient is acutely and gravely psychotic. Dr. Mehra reasoned that if her acute condition had been such a great concern, then her antipsychotic medication could have been increased to effect a change in the observed loosening of associations. Her subtherapeutic dosage was never changed during her inpatient stay. Dr. Mehra concluded that just having loosening of associations is not sufficient, under the Medicaid guidelines, to continue an inpatient level of care. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last three days of H.A.'s admission. The record as presented established that H.A. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on February 23. Patient #2 T.E. T.E. was admitted on March 19, 2001, and was discharged on March 27, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, March 25 through March 27, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. However, in his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that he now agreed with the hospital that the entire stay should be approved.6 Patient #3 S.G. S.G. was admitted on October 25, 2001, and was discharged on November 1, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, October 28, through November 1, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that S.G. was a 42-year-old male with diagnosis of schizophrenia admitted, involuntarily under the Baker Act from Orange County Jail, for psychotic symptoms and homelessness. The patient had a previous admission to Florida Hospital Orlando's psychiatric unit, having been discharged on October 8, 2001. Dr. Mehra found that as of October 28, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient's psychotic symptoms were still present but improved. The patient was cooperative, directable, and interacting with some peers. His delusions appeared to be chronic. He did not require seclusion or restraints and was not a management problem on the unit. His vital signs, appetite, mood and sleep were stable. Placement became an issue during his inpatient stay. Dr. Mehra concluded that the appropriate level of care as of October 28, was outpatient, with closely supervised living arrangements. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that S.G. was admitted with auditory hallucinations and delusions, reaching the level of psychotic behavior. During his stay, S.G.'s speech and thought became more organized. His psychotic symptoms became less intrusive. By October 28, he was not a danger to himself or others and was ready to move into a sub-acute setting. Dr. Mehra conceded that S.G. was probably still delusional on October 28, but noted that his delusions were probably chronic and at this time were not interfering with his ability to perform his ADLs. Treating physician Dr. Rex A. Birkmire testified that S.G. was initially very psychotic, delusional, and disorganized. He had not been taking his prescribed medications. S.G. thought that one of the his nurses was the Queen of England. He heard voices and had a religious preoccupation about Satan, aliens and dragons. Staff at the jail believed S.G. needed a higher level of care, and therefore had him admitted to the hospital under the Baker Act. Dr. Birkmire testified that as late as October 31, S.G. was still so psychotic, he thought the medication Artane was a "gasoline pill." His conversation continued to be irrelevant and rambling. He said that "people see the smell but they don't see me." On October 31, S.G. was so disorganized that he could not identify the medications he would need to stay stable, and hospital staff felt he could not maintain his basic ADLs. Dr. Birkmire noted that by October 28, S.G. was "passively compliant" with his medications, meaning that he would take them when the nurses gave them to him. Dr. Birkmire stated that S.G. could have been managed in a skilled nursing facility with a 24-hour nursing staff. Dr. Berns testified that S.G.'s prior admission on October 8 raised questions as to the adequacy of his prior treatment, his compliance upon discharge, and his stress level during the interval between admissions. The notes for the current admission stated that S.G. was readmitted due to medication noncompliance. The admission note stated that the patient was psychotic and disorganized, with jumbled thoughts, and had ideas of reference as to the television, i.e., that it was sending him special messages. S.G. was reported to be hyper-religious, and carried a Bible. He had a history of hearing voices and was diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia. A note from Dr. Luis Allen stated that on October 28 the patient was still "very loose," meaning his thoughts were disorganized and psychotic. Hospital staff reported that S.G. remained delusional, and there was concern from the social worker that he might be responding to internal stimuli. On October 29, a note reported that S.G. was psychotic and manic, though starting to make more sense. On October 30, the notes stated that S.G. was still rambling and tangential, and that his ADLs were not good. Staff was concerned that S.G. was not committed to taking medication as an outpatient. Dr. Birkmire recommended the decanoate form of antipsychotic medicine, a long-acting intramuscularly administered form. Dr. Berns stated that some of these medications can be injected such that a dose can last from two- to-four weeks, which can improve patient compliance. A November 2 note from an advanced registered nurse practitioner stated that the patient seemed confused when given discharge instructions to follow up at Lakeside Alternatives. Dr. Berns testified that such confusion can be a red flag that the patient is not ready for discharge. Dr. Berns stated that S.G.'s chronic schizophrenic condition could deteriorate if he were discharged without being well stabilized and not committed to following through with his medications. Dr. Berns concluded that the length of stay was appropriate, and that he might have kept S.G. in the hospital even longer if he appeared confused on the day of discharge. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that the psychotic symptoms, including delusions that his nurse was the Queen of England, did not mean that S.G. must remain in the hospital. Dr. Mehra stated that the note in the chart that the patient believed Artane was a "gasoline pill" was not necessarily a delusion, but could have been an uneducated patient's way of saying that the pill peps him up. Dr. Mehra argued that if the medical concern was persistent psychotic symptoms so severe that he needed hospitalization, then the medical team needed to make dosage adjustments. However, no such adjustments were made after October 26. Dr. Mehra's opinion remained that S.G. did not meet Medicaid guidelines as of October 28. The patient was cooperative on the unit, not a management problem. He could live outside the hospital and still have delusions that someone was the Queen of England. Dr. Birkmire testified that S.G. was rambling, disorganized, and thought the nurse was Queen even after October 28, but that does not necessarily mean he should be in the hospital. Dr. Mehra pointed out that plenty of people walking the street have schizophrenia, are psychotic, and ramble. Dr. Mehra stated that one possible reason S.G. was kept in the hospital was concern as to where he would go upon discharge, because he came from jail and was homeless. Dr. Mehra testified that Medicaid does not cover the period of time when someone is needing placement. Dr. Mehra agreed that S.G. showed psychotic symptoms, but stated that the psychotic symptoms should affect the patient's ability to function in order to justify inpatient treatment. This patient was taking his medications, eating, participating in activities on the unit, and was directable. He did not require any means of seclusion or physical restraints and did not demonstrate aggressive behavior. Dr. Mehra agreed with Dr. Berns that it is a concern any time a patient is readmitted, because it speaks to the chronic nature of schizophrenia and psychoses, and how the symptoms persist over a period of time. "Loose" symptoms probably continued until the day he left. Dr. Mehra also agreed with Dr. Berns that schizophrenics can stabilize and have their thoughts become more organized, depending on the patient and his response to medications. One patient can be loosely organized and live on the street, and another may regain full control of his thoughts. However, Dr. Mehra saw no reason to amend his original opinion. A patient with loose thinking, who is psychotic and disorganized, may need hospitalization, if he is not taking his medicine, not eating, not sleeping appropriately, or is being aggressive. Otherwise, those symptoms may be as good as things are going to get for this patient, given that he has been in jail, has had frequent inpatient hospitalizations, and is homeless. Again, Dr. Mehra noted that S.G. remained in the hospital for several days with no changes to his medications. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of S.G.'s admission. The record as presented established that S.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on October 28. Patient #4 C.M. C.M. was admitted on March 2, 2001, and was discharged on March 10, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, March 6 through March 10, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that C.M. was a 16-year-old male admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act from the Orange County jail, where he was banging his head on the wall. Hospital records indicated concerns by hospital staff that C.M. was malingering in an effort to avoid his pending legal woes. Dr. Mehra found that, as of March 6, C.M. was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Dr. Mehra concluded that the patient should have been discharged to the juvenile detention center, with psychiatric consultation. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the hospital had a range of diagnoses for this patient, from "malingering," meaning that he was intentionally inventing his symptoms, to a concern about schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra's review of the hospital records led him to conclude that C.M. was malingering, based primarily on C.M.'s statement to his grandmother that he would get himself placed in the psychiatric unit anytime he went to jail. The record stated that C.M. said the devil was telling him to kill himself, but the physician and staff all thought C.M. was malingering. C.M.'s statement about killing himself led to no increase in precautions, and his medications were not increased until the next day. By the end of C.M.'s hospitalization, the physician was talking about tapering the boy completely off of Respiradol, an anti- psychotic, and was convinced that C.M. was feigning his symptoms. Attending physician Scott D. Farmer7 contended that C.M. remained very dangerous on March 6, because he was still complaining of command hallucinations. "Command hallucinations" cause the patient to believe there are voices telling him to act in a dangerous way, and are recognized as a "unique risk factor" justifying inpatient care. On March 6, C.M. was hearing the voice of his grandfather reassuring him, but he was also hearing the voice of the devil telling him to kill himself. Dr. Farmer testified that patients have been known to kill themselves when they have persisting command hallucinations, and this was a patient who bangs his head against a brick wall. This was an indication that his medications had not been properly adjusted, and that they could not be so adjusted on an outpatient basis. Dr. Farmer's opinion was that it was "ludicrous" to think this patient could be placed in a more complex environment and get better. To discharge C.M. on March 6, would have constituted "abandonment." Dr. Farmer contended that it is a "glib assumption" to say that C.M. was faking his illness, and it is not within the spirit of psychiatry to prejudge that a patient is falsifying his expressed distress. The tradition in medicine is to compassionately adjust medication to remedy the symptom complex, which in this case pointed toward schizophrenia. Dr. Farmer stated that the faking allegation is "a reflection of the lowest form of psychiatric practice. It is a departure from the Hippocratic oath to do no harm. It is an assumption that you can climb inside of somebody else's head and then make conclusions that are a distinct departure from what the patient is saying." Dr. Farmer pointed out that C.M. had been treated at least once for a prior suicide attempt. He also pointed out that a "first break" psychotic episode is the best opportunity for treatment to have a favorable impact in the case of a patient with command hallucinations. Subsequent episodes require more aggressive treatment and higher doses of medications. C.M. was being treated with antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. On March 6, he was taking Wellbutrin, an antidepressant that has the lowest likelihood of triggering manic-type symptoms, and Risperdal. His medications were increased on March 6 and March 7. On March 8, C.M. was still responding to internal stimuli, carrying on a conversation with an internal voice. Dr. Farmer agreed that C.M. was stabilized by March 9 and should have been discharged on that date rather than on March 10. Dr. Berns noted the suspicions of malingering, but also considered that jail staff could not handle C.M., that he appeared to be in imminent danger of harming himself, and he had been treated for at least one suicide attempt in the past. These factors raised concerns as to how much of C.M.'s behavior was malingering and how much indicated genuine illness. Dr. Berns was influenced by the fact that C.M. requested an increase in his dosage of Risperdal, which is not a medication that can be abused or used for intoxication. Dr. Berns acknowledged that C.M. lost some credibility with his statement that he would continue getting Baker Acted if incarcerated. He also acknowledged that C.M.'s age and impulsiveness made it harder to determine the extent of his malingering, but that there was undoubtedly some malingering present in this case. Dr. Berns concluded, as did Dr. Farmer, that C.M. could have been discharged a day or two earlier than March 10. Dr. Mehra replied that it was the treating physician, Dr. Birkmire, who concluded that C.M. was malingering. The auditory hallucinations on March 6 were not sufficient to keep him in the hospital where the treating physician and the medical team believed he was making up the symptoms. Nothing in the testimony of Dr. Farmer or Dr. Berns caused Dr. Mehra to change his opinion. Both doctors referred to this patient's having a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra called this a "serious and unusual diagnosis" for a 16-year-old, similar to a diagnosis of cancer in that the patient will have to live with it for the rest of his life. Dr. Mehra would expect that such a diagnosis would have led the treatment team to meet with C.M.'s family to offer the appropriate treatment planning and education regarding schizophrenia, but the record indicated that no such meeting occurred. Dr. Mehra believed that there was cause to admit C.M. for evaluation, because he was only 16 years old. Even if it turned out he was malingering, it was prudent to admit him for four days to evaluate him. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of C.M.'s admission. The record as presented established that C.M. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 6. Patient #5 L.M. L.M. was admitted on May 16, 2001, and was discharged on May 22, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, May 20 through May 22, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Florida Hospital Orlando did not contest Dr. Mehra's denial of three days for this admission. Patient #6 H.P. H.P. was admitted on March 7, 2001, and was discharged on March 14, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, March 10 through March 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that H.P. was a 34-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for "suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations." As of March 10, H.P. was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her sleep, vital signs, and appetite were stable. Dr. Mehra concluded that the patient no longer needed 24-hour psychiatric nursing care and could have gone back to the skilled nursing facility on March 10. Outpatient was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that H.P.'s improvement was such that she could have been discharged on March 10. There was no deterioration in her condition after March 10. She denied suicidal or homicidal ideations, hallucinations, and delusions throughout the day. Dr. Mehra noted that H.P. was HIV-positive and obese, and would therefore chronically be at risk for suicidal ideation. She had been hospitalized many times for suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations. H.P. claimed to have jumped from a five-story building when she was 18 years old. Dr. Mehra did not think H.P. was schizophrenic, though her attending physician was concerned about major depression with psychotic features. Attending physician Dr. Luis Allen testified that H.P. was admitted from a skilled nursing facility. She had had multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and on this admission was presenting with psychotic symptoms, hearing voices and having suicidal thoughts. Dr. Allen conceded that there was one day during her stay when H.P. reported not having suicidal thoughts, but he added that these thoughts resumed the next day. Given that H.P.'s history made her a higher risk for suicide, Dr. Allen felt that he had to ensure she was stable psychiatrically before she could return to the skilled nursing facility. Dr. Berns testified that the March 7 admission note indicated that H.P. had a history of depressive disorder and multiple psychiatric admissions to Florida Hospital Orlando. H.P. reported insomnia and auditory hallucinations, which were mostly command and derogatory hallucinations, voices calling the patient "stupid" and a "dummy" and saying that she should kill herself. H.P. had a history of several suicide attempts and had been taking Risperdal, Prozac, and Remeron. She reported suicidal thoughts, but no plan, and was alert times three. The admitting diagnosis was major depressive disorder, recurrent with psychotic features, and rule out mood disorder secondary to medical condition with depressive-like features. Dr. Berns agreed that the March 10 notes showed that H.P. was depressed with blunted affect, and that she denied suicidal ideation. On March 11, the notes indicated that H.P.'s mood was improved, that she slept better during the night, that her suicidal thoughts were significantly decreased, and that she was compliant with her medications and reported no auditory hallucinations or delusions. However, the attending physician continued to note that she was depressed and hopeless, and the social worker reported that H.P. discussed having no desire to live any more and be a burden to her children. On March 13, her behavior was improved, she had a very good appetite, and she had no hallucinations, delusions, or suicidal thoughts. On March 14, she denied suicidal ideation and hallucinations and was discharged back to the skilled nursing facility. Dr. Berns testified that H.P.'s stay was necessary, and disagreed that she could have been discharged to a skilled nursing facility on March 10. She had a previous suicide attempt, and she had suicidal thoughts and heard voices telling her to harm herself. Dr. Berns agreed that many people express thoughts such as those H.P. expressed to the social worker on March 11, but Dr. Berns pointed out that many people do not also have previous attempts or voices telling them to kill themselves. H.P. was showing improvement by March 11, but her symptoms were still present. Dr. Berns did not agree with Dr. Mehra that suicidal ideation, without the means to carry out a plan, is never sufficient to keep a patient in the hospital. Dr. Berns stated that if the patient is having thoughts of suicide and staff is documenting that the patient is helpless and hopeless, the suicide risk may be sufficient to hospitalize the patient, particularly where there have been previous hospitalizations and suicide attempts. After reviewing the testimony of Dr. Allen and Dr. Berns, Dr. Mehra maintained his opinion that H.P. should have been discharged on March 10. Dr. Mehra pointed out that no physician saw the patient on March 10, probably because it was a Saturday.8 Regardless of the day of the week, if the patient's condition is so acute that it is necessary to hospitalize her with a risk factor of attempted suicide, then she should be seen by a doctor. The unit notes for March 10 indicate she was showing no evidence of psychoses or suicidal ideation. Dr. Mehra noted that even H.P.'s mental status exam at the time of admission showed no active suicidal plan. If the patient is sick enough to be in the hospital, then she should have been seen by a physician. Dr. Mehra concluded that there appeared no need for H.P. to be seen by a doctor on March 10. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of H.P.'s admission. The record as presented established that H.P. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 10. Patient #7 J.R. J.R. was admitted on March 2, 2001, and was discharged on March 15, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that ten days, March 5 through March 15, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that J.R. was a 46-year-old female admitted from a skilled nursing facility under the Baker Act for being "suicidal." As of March 5, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. She needed intensive outpatient treatment to address her depressive symptoms, eating issues, and possible addiction to narcotics. J.R. refused to see a chronic pain specialist while in the hospital. Dr. Mehra's report also raised a "serious quality of care concern" in the fact that the patient was immediately referred for electroconvulsive therapy ("ECT") treatment based on "unclear, poorly documented reasons." The physician's decision to use ECT was based purely on the patient's report, without documentation, of failed past treatments. The patient reported that she had not had psychotherapy in years. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the admitting concern was that the patient was suicidal in her skilled nursing facility, and Dr. Allen had her Baker Acted into the hospital. Dr. Farmer performed the psychiatric evaluation on admission and stated that the patient was not actively suicidal, not psychotic, and was angry with Dr. Allen for Baker Acting her. Dr. Farmer diagnosed J.R. with major depression and anorexia nervosa. Dr. Mehra concluded that J.R. should have been discharged on March 3, because the initial admission evaluation did not establish medical necessity for an inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. Dr. Mehra testified that it was difficult to determine why the patient was at this level of care because Dr. Farmer found that J.R. was not suicidal, actively suicidal with a plan, or psychotic, had no form of auditory or visual hallucinations, and was not manic or involved in a complicated withdrawal. Dr. Mehra stated that, while he did not come out and say that J.R. should not have been Baker Acted, Dr. Farmer did repeatedly note the patient's anger at being Baker Acted, which is highly unusual in a psychiatric evaluation report. Dr. Mehra also observed that the Baker Act documents were not dated, and, thus, there was no way of saying they were completed on the day of J.R.'s admission. A Baker Act is an involuntary commitment of a patient, and it involves a patient's rights. Dr. Mehra stated that because the papers must be completed within a specified period of time of having face-to- face contact with the patient, they must note the date and time. The failure to fill out the papers completely causes a concern about the appropriateness of the patient's admission. Dr. Mehra believed that the indication for ECT was not clear. There are specific criteria to initiate a patient on ECT, and the medical record here did not support it. One of the ECT criteria is that the patient must have failed a minimum of three antidepressants at adequate doses for an adequate length of time. The only documentation in the record was the patient's own report that medications had not worked. There was no objective data in the record regarding her medication history. Dr. Mehra found it very significant that J.R. had no prior psychiatric hospitalizations, especially in the context of her being given ECT. There was not adequate medical confirmation that she had failed previous antidepressant therapy. Dr. Mehra noted that J.R. had a history of a cervical spinal fusion and issues of lumbar back pain, which should have raised concerns about inducing a grand mal seizure by way of ECT. Dr. Mehra saw no MRI or CAT scan of the brain, which is usually done prior to the administration of ECT in order to rule out a mass in the brain. Dr. Allen testified that J.R. had a history of recurrent depression with psychotic features and an eating disorder. During her initial visit to the skilled nursing facility, she was found to be anxious, depressed, and experiencing some suicidal thoughts, and was referred for inpatient treatment. She had experienced significant weight loss and had issues of untreated depression. ECT was initiated and performed three times a week. Dr. Allen conceded that ECT may sometimes be done on an outpatient basis, but stated that J.R.'s history of psychiatric symptoms and the low level of support she had in the community necessitated inpatient placement. She was at a nursing home and would have had to be transported at 5:30 every morning for the treatment. There was no transportation available for her to come in as an outpatient. Dr. Allen also felt that she needed to remain inpatient because of the confusion and disorientation that she was developing with each treatment. Dr. Allen stated that the primary reason for keeping J.R. as an inpatient was to give the ECT treatment. He decided to complete the course of ECT treatment and discharge her back to the nursing home. Dr. Farmer was the second opinion doctor who actually performed the ECT treatment. Dr. Allen stated that ECT is usually reserved for patients who are considered treatment intolerant or "refractory" to treatment, with a history of failing different trials of medications or having developed side effects, or patients who had a very high risk of suicide. With J.R., it was not clear how much the eating disorder was playing into her depression, but Dr. Allen believed that her inner functions were clearly deteriorating, as evidenced by the fact that she was in a nursing home at age 45. The ECT was to address her primary mood symptoms and appetite. At the nursing home, she was only eating percent of her meals. She was eating 50 percent of her meals when she left the hospital, and she continued to show improvement at the nursing home. Dr. Berns testified that J.R. showed a history of cervical spinal cord injury. J.R. was a nurse, and an aggressive patient had caused her injuries when she worked in the emergency room. She had a history of anorexia, depression, and alcohol abuse. She was agitated in the emergency room during admission. J.R. claimed she had had trials on all available antidepressants, which were only partially helpful or failed. She had insomnia and took Klonopin for restless legs. On admission, she was also taking OxyContin, Wellbutrin, Flomax, Trazedone, and Zofran. Her mental status examination indicated lethargy and monotone speech. She was depressed, helpless, and hopeless, but denied suicidal ideation. J.R. stated that she had an overdose of medications at age 16. On March 5, she was withdrawn, depressed, and complained of anergia (lack of energy) and anhedonia (inability to experience pleasure). She also complained of dizziness. She showed the same symptoms on March 6, hopeless and helpless but denying suicidal thoughts. She again complained of feeling weak and dizzy, and she had low blood pressure, 73 over 53. Because of concerns that her medications may have been the cause of her medical complaints, the treatment team decided to withhold all psychiatric medicines and initiate ECT. J.R.'s first ECT treatment was on March 7. On that date, she was depressed, withdrawn, had anergia, but no suicidal thoughts. Her dose of Klonopin was lowered. On March 8, her mood was depressed and she showed anergia, anhedonia, and a variable appetite. A trial of a new anti-depressant, Remeron, was commenced, and J.R. was given an Ambien sleeping pill at bedtime. Her blood pressure was still low, 70 over 50, and the treatment team decided to withhold the OxyContin. J.R. refused to see the psychiatrist and stayed secluded in her room. By the second ECT treatment on March 9, J.R.'s mood was improving and her blood pressure was up to 90 over 57. ECT was scheduled for three days during the next week. On March 10, J.R. complained of depression and suicidal thoughts, and stayed alone in her room most of the day. On March 11, she again stayed secluded in her room, depressed and with flat affect. On March 12, she slept fairly well and ate 75 percent of her meals. Her mood was improving and suicidal thoughts decreased. She had ECT in the morning then rested in bed most of the day. She was depressed and anxious, with poor insight and judgment. On March 13, her mood was improving and she denied suicidal ideation. J.R. was more goal oriented and showed less psycho- motor retardation. She was scheduled for discharge on March 14, after her ECT treatment. She had the treatment, but her discharge was placed on hold because the skilled nursing facility did not want to accept her. Dr. Berns was not sure why the facility did not want to take J.R. back, unless they considered her a problem patient or didn't want to handle a depressed patient. Such problems can hold up discharge. Dr. Berns testified that it would not be acceptable to discharge this patient to the street, and that the length of stay was medically necessary. Dr. Mehra countered that feeling depressed, helpless and hopeless is not enough to justify an inpatient admission. On J.R.'s mental status exam upon admission, Dr. Farmer documented no suicidal ideation, no psychotic symptoms, and patient anger at being Baker Acted. She was given ECT for reasons that Dr. Mehra thought were not very well documented in the medical record. Dr. Mehra stated that it is a complex question as to whether giving her the ECT treatment is reason enough for an inpatient admission. J.R. was taking a heavy narcotic medication, OxyContin, which can make one depressed, withdrawn, and isolative. Dr. Mehra could find in the medical record no real theory as to why J.R. was still taking these medications. For reasons unclear to Dr. Mehra, there seemed to be an immediate desire to give her ECT. Dr. Mehra believed that March 2, should be authorized just to see what was going on with her, given that she had been Baker Acted by a physician. However, as far as the record indicated, J.R. had no history of inpatient psychiatric treatments. Dr. Mehra found it very unusual that ECT treatments would be given on a patient's first inpatient stay. ECT is routinely performed on an outpatient basis. Dr. Mehra acknowledged that where patient compliance is a problem, it may be proper to keep the patient in the hospital. However, this did not seem to be the case with J.R. One of the cornerstones of the decision process leading to ECT is a documented failure of past antidepressant therapy, and Dr. Mehra found no such documentation in the medical record. Lack of support in the community or transportation problems are not reason enough, standing alone, to keep someone in the hospital. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last ten days of J.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that J.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 3. Patient #8 J.R. J.R. was admitted on March 16, 2001, and was discharged on March 27, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that six days, March 21 through March 27, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that J.R. was a 24-year-old male with a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, who was admitted for symptoms of agitated, psychotic behavior. As of March 21, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. J.R. may have still been psychotic, but the symptoms had improved. The patient's vital signs, sleep, and appetite had stabilized. He no longer needed 24-hour psychiatric nursing care. Dr. Mehra concluded that sub-acute treatment was the appropriate level of care as of March 21. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that J.R. met discharge criteria on March 21, and could have gone into a sub- acute setting such as a skilled nursing facility or group home. Dr. Mehra could not recall whether there was a problem with bed availability in the skilled nursing facility, but added that after a patient meets discharge criteria, it is not Medicaid's responsibility to pay for a longer hospital stay while the patient awaits placement. Once the schizophrenic's acute crisis is resolved, he no longer meets the criteria for medical necessity. Dr. Birkmire was the treating physician, and his notes indicated compliance and improvement on March 20, and 21. J.R. was having some religious preoccupation, which was probably a baseline issue for him. Religious preoccupations in people with schizophrenia are sometimes chronic and never go away. Dr. Mehra testified that being psychotic and having auditory hallucinations do not alone establish grounds for remaining inpatient. Such symptoms are consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which is chronic. Dr. Mehra stated that J.R. would probably display these symptoms no matter how long he was kept in the hospital. Dr. Mehra testified that there is a vast difference between J.R.'s having an auditory hallucination and his having a command auditory hallucination to harm himself or someone else. Treating physician Dr. Birkmire testified that J.R. was very disorganized on admission, with a grandiose religious preoccupation that indicated he was in a manic stage. J.R. was also sexually inappropriate with some of the other patients and staff. On March 21, he was inappropriate, grandiose, and sexually preoccupied. On March 22, he was still very psychotic, hearing the voice of Britney Spears, with whom he had delusions of being married. He had sexually explicit conversations with other patients and staff. On March 23, he was severely agitated, requiring staff intervention. He was illogical and bizarre, talking to himself in the hallway, reporting that he heard voices and remaining delusional. He was hearing the voice of the devil and having paranoid thoughts about people around him. On March 24, he was unchanged, still delusional and still hearing voices, though they were becoming less intense and he was becoming less manic. Dr. Berns testified that schizoaffective disorder is an illness with symptoms of psychosis in the absence of symptoms of a mood disorder such as mania or depression. It is a chronic mental illness. Dr. Berns agreed with Dr. Mehra that the presence of a chronic illness is not grounds for hospitalization. It is only when the condition becomes acute, where the patient presents a danger to himself or others, that an inpatient psychiatric hospital may be the option. J.R.'s admission note stated that he was previously hospitalized in January 2001, for agitation, bizarre delusions, and concerns about violent behavior. He stated dead people were talking to him. On March 17, the psychiatrist noted marked auditory hallucinations, grandiosity, paranoid delusions, and tangential thought processes. The plan was to keep him on Risperdal, an antipsychotic, and Lithium, which is a mood stabilizing, anti-manic medication. Dr. Berns testified that the usual practice with these medications is to start with a low dose and build it up slowly and gradually. If the patient is in the hospital, the physician can be more aggressive because he can closely monitor blood work and vital signs. Lithium takes seven to ten days to build up to a therapeutic level. The medical notes from March 22 showed that J.R. remained psychotic, had auditory hallucinations, had delusional thoughts regarding Britney Spears and Judy Garland, was responding to internal stimuli, and was sexually preoccupied. On March 23, he was agitated and illogical with bizarre ideation. On March 24, he continued to report auditory hallucinations and was labile and agitated about his upcoming discharge. On March 25, he was still having auditory hallucinations, but less of the manic behavior. On March 26, there was some improvement in his mood and his auditory hallucinations were resolving, but he was still having problems in a group situation. Dr. Berns noted that on March 17, J.R. tried to kiss a nurse, then called her a "bitch with an attitude." There were concerns about his impulse control and potential for committing a sexual offense if released before he was fully stabilized. Dr. Berns agreed with the length of hospitalization, because J.R. had shown poor impulse control and sexually inappropriate behavior on admission, had been admitted two months earlier, and there were concerns about psychosis and violent behavior. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of J.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that J.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 3. Patient #9 N.R. N.R. was admitted on March 4, 2001, and was discharged on March 16, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, March 13 through March 16, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that N.R. was a 21-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for psychotic agitation and delusions. The authorization was based on the patient's presenting symptoms, diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy, and a positive test for syphilis. As of March 13, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her vital signs, sleep, and appetite were stable. She was taking prescribed medications and following unit rules. Her psychosis had decreased and she was not an immediate danger to herself or others. She appeared to have support from her mother. Dr. Mehra concluded that outpatient was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the physician's note of March 13 stated that N.R. had no recent episodes of bizarre behavior, and no episodes of agitation or aggressive behavior. The physician progress notes for March 14 say the same thing. N.R.'s initial evaluation was for a psychotic disorder, and she was diagnosed with schizophrenia, a chronic condition. Dr. Mehra noted that the hospital did not obtain N.R.'s previous psychiatric history and that her mother could have been contacted about N.R.'s medical records. The treating physician, Dr. Allen, testified that N.R. was psychotic and grandiose on admission, and was noted at the jail to be head-banging, smearing feces, and playing in the toilet. She was pregnant with an unknown gestational age, and had a positive Rapid Plasma Reagin ("RPR") test for syphilis. She needed a lumbar puncture to determine if she had some form of neurosyphilis or another disorder that could influence her psychiatric behavior. Dr. Allen testified that she lacked the social network for the lumbar puncture to be done on an outpatient basis. He conceded that on March 13 she was compliant with her medication, but stated that she was still disorganized. The initial RPR was performed on March 4, but it took an additional ten days for the lumbar puncture to be successfully performed. One puncture was performed on March 10, but the specimen was not good, so another puncture was performed on March 14. Dr. Allen testified that the lumbar puncture requires the patient to remain very quiet in a hunched position as the needle is going through her back. An agitated, restless patient could cause problems. N.R. needed to be stabilized before the puncture could be performed. N.R. was found positive for syphilis and was discharged to her mother's home rather than to the jail. A visiting nurse went to the home to give the treatments. Dr. Allen explained that N.R. was not released to her mother between lumbar punctures because the mother had a history of depression, according to the history provided by N.R., which Dr. Allen conceded may not have been accurate. Dr. Allen also noted that N.R.'s mother was very difficult to contact. Dr. Berns testified that N.R. was psychotic on admission. At the jail, she was stripping off her clothing and hearing voices telling her that her husband was messing around with other women. She was hitting her head against the wall to get rid of the voices. Dr. Berns concluded that the length of stay was medically necessary and reasonable. N.R. was a pregnant female from the jail, psychotic, with self-destructive behavior. Her physician wanted to be extra careful in view of N.R.'s being pregnant. She was placed on antipsychotic medication. N.R. was eventually going back to the jail, and they wanted to stabilize her condition as much as possible, because the jail is a very stressful place to be. Dr. Berns agreed that, as of March 13, N.R.'s psychosis had decreased and she was not an immediate danger to herself or others. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last three days of N.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that N.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 13. Patient #10 R.S. R.S. was admitted on May 19, 2001, and was discharged on May 30, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that nine days, May 22 through May 30, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that R.S. was a 38-year-old female diagnosed with schizophrenia who was admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for worsening of her psychotic symptoms. As of May 22, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient was still psychotic but the symptoms were not worsening and appeared to be at baseline, given that they remained unchanged even at discharge. After May 22, the record disclosed no evidence that R.S. required seclusion or emergency treatment orders to force her to take medications. She voluntarily took medications and followed unit rules, and no longer needed 24-hour nursing care. Dr. Mehra concluded that sub-acute treatment was the appropriate level of care as of May 22. Dr. Mehra testified that his main concern with the length of R.S.'s stay was that she persisted with active psychotic symptoms even up to the day of discharge. There was not much difference in her symptoms between May 22 and May 30. After May 22, she received no medication on an "as needed" ("PRN") basis and required no seclusion or restraints. Despite her other noted symptoms, if she was not having command hallucinations telling her to hurt herself, she could have been treated as an outpatient. Dr. Mehra agreed that if she expressed a desire to hurt herself after May 22, then any such days should be authorized. Dr. Mehra did not have the benefit of R.S.'s past medical records and stated this made it difficult to determine if R.S. was a patient whose baseline level of functioning is so low that she could never care for herself. He agreed that the attending physician had the advantage of having seen the patient in person. Attending physician Dr. Birkmire testified that R.S. had just been discharged from a medical psychiatric unit but had to be readmitted on a Baker Act because she was not taking her medications and was psychotic again, hearing and responding to voices and unable to communicate in a meaningful manner to staff. On May 22, she was noted as unchanged from admission, still psychotic, disorganized, hearing voices, depressed, and oriented only to person and place, not date and time. She was secluded in her room, not going to any treatment groups. Dr. Birkmire testified that his greatest concern was that R.S. was so psychotic and disorganized that she would probably not take her medications and would not be not able to care for herself. On May 23, she remained regressed, bizarre and psychotic. She was "dirty and careless" in her ADLs, and was complaining of suicidal command ideations, voices telling her to hurt herself by taking an overdose. On May 24, she was showing mild signs of improvement and was a little less reclusive and bizarre. She was still hearing voices and claimed they were telling her to be a friend to everybody, but she also admitted to suicidal ideations. On May 25, R.S. was still psychotic with suicidal ideations, disorganized, and paranoid. By this time, the voices were telling her to do more good things than bad, but she needed more time to stabilize on her medications. She was still dirty and careless in her appearance, and depressed with a flat affect. On May 26, she showed further mild improvement, was less paranoid, and reported that the voices were less intense. She remained in her room most of the time, and her ADLs were still careless. On May 27, R.S. was now oriented to person, place and time. The treatment team still thought she would stop taking medications on release, and made, further, two more medication changes. On May 28, the hallucinations had resolved. She was more logical and organized and less paranoid, though her ADLs were still poor. By May 29, she was safe to go home, but her appearance was still disheveled, she had poor concentration and hygiene, still heard voices, and was depressed and anxious. She went to group therapy, but was distracted by auditory hallucinations. Dr. Birkmire believed that May 29 or May 30, would be an appropriate discharge date. Dr. Berns testified that R.S.'s diagnosis was schizophrenia. He acknowledged that R.S.'s suicidal ideations on May 22 did not indicate a plan. However, in the hospital setting, a patient may not always reveal her plans for fear of prolonging the hospitalization. On May 23, she was having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself with a plan to overdose. Dr. Berns found this very serious, because patients have been known to hoard medications in the hospital in order to take an overdose. After reciting the same day-by-day review conducted by Dr. Birkmire, Dr. Berns concluded that he concurred with the length of stay. Noting that she was still psychotic, mumbling and hallucinatory at the time of discharge, Dr. Berns testified that he did not necessarily agree that R.S. should have been released even on May 30. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that he agreed with many of the concerns expressed by Dr. Birkmire, but did not see them evidenced in the medical record. Dr. Birkmire testified that as of May 22, R.S. was so psychotic and disorganized that she would probably not take her medications after discharge. Dr. Mehra agreed this is grounds for keeping someone in the hospital, but did not see this concern noted in the medical record. Dr. Mehra also found nothing in the medical record to indicate she was having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself with a plan to overdose. Dr. Mehra stated that the record did show that on May 23 she was regressed, bizarre and psychotic, but he noted that those symptoms were also present at the time of R.S.'s discharge. However, the psychiatry unit patient notes do indicate that R.S. told a student nurse on May 23, that "she was having suicidal ideations and a plan to overdose." The other notations cited by Dr. Birkmire, with the exception of the May 22 notation regarding staff's suspicions regarding R.S. medication compliance, were all found in the psychiatry unit patient notes. It must be concluded that Dr. Mehra simply overlooked this section of the record, and that if he had seen that the record supported Dr. Birkmire's concerns, Dr. Mehra would have authorized the full stay for R.S. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that May 22 through May 30, should not have been denied. Dr. Mehra's reason for denying these days was not that he disagreed with Dr. Birkmire's concerns regarding the patient, but that he could not find those concerns reflected in the record. In fact, the record supported Dr. Birkmire's concerns and rendered R.S.'s entire inpatient stay medically necessary. Patient #11 D.T. D.T. was admitted on May 9, 2001, and was discharged on May 21, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that nine days, May 12, through May 21, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care.9 Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that R.S. was a 14-year-old female with an extensive psychiatric history who was voluntarily admitted from a community mental health center for mood swings, violent tendencies, and a report of auditory hallucinations. As of May 12, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient was taking her medications, following unit rules, and participating in activities. The patient's sleep, vital signs, and appetite were stable. Dr. Mehra concluded that she did not require 24-hour nursing care as of May 12 and that outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Mehra testified that D.T. was admitted for mood swings, a history of violence, and some personality issues. She was diagnosed as bipolar, though Dr. Mehra was not clear as to what features led to that diagnosis. She was also diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder. Further, she was diagnosed under Axis II of the DSM-IV, which includes personality disorders. Dr. Mehra found this significant because personality disorder symptoms are treated differently than bipolar disorder. Dr. Mehra found no indication in the record that D.T.'s history records were ordered or reviewed for purposes of continuity of care and current treatment. She was admitted and served on the inpatient unit, and her medications were continued: such as Wellbutrin, Topamax, and Risperdal. She was started on Geodan, an antipsychotic, which was then changed to Seroquel, and then back to Risperdal. Dr. Mehra concluded that D.T. met discharge criteria as of May 12. Nothing remarkable happened between May 12, and the date of her discharge. She continued to have some difficulties on the unit, but nothing that warranted inpatient care. She could have been sent to outpatient and returned to foster care. Given her documented history, return to a stable group home or foster home would be appropriate to help her engage with her symptoms. For someone with a personality condition to be on an inpatient psychiatric unit can worsen the symptoms. Dr. Mehra believed that D.T. needed an environment with a lot less stimulation and less potential for her to become agitated and act out. Dr. Mehra acknowledged that the records do show serious medication side effects on May 15, such as akathisia, but he stated that people have these symptoms frequently as outpatients. Dr. Mehra was curious as to why D.T. was on three different antipsychotic drugs. Three different psychotropic medications is a concern because there is insufficient clinical and medical data to use them in children when the diagnosis is not clear. They have potential long-lasting side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, where the patient develops permanent tic- like movements of the lips, mouth and jaw. Cogentin is a medication for side effects from antipsychotics, and its use caused Dr. Mehra to question whether research was done as to whether this child had been on such medications before. Dr. Mehra stated that such research is essential, especially when the patient starts showing side effects. Treating physician Dr. Scott Farmer testified that all of the denied dates represented necessary periods of care to stabilize D.T. and make her discharge safe. On May 15, she was still experiencing severe mood swings and dissociative symptoms, which Dr. Farmer described as "a watershed between normal and neurotic." In a spectrum moving toward psychosis, dissociative thinking has features of both psychotic and neurotic thinking. Dr. Farmer explained that if a physician has a patient in his office who is disassociating, the physician must watch the patient until the patient has demonstrated several hours of improved functioning. If a patient drifts into a dissociative state during psychotherapy and becomes agitated, the patient requires hospitalization. Dr. Farmer stated that D.T. could not have been released on May 15. She was still requiring Haldol due to episodes of anger, and due to her inability to recognize people who are caring for her and distinguish them from threats. Her agitation was so extreme that Dr. Farmer had to change the dose of Haldol. This was complicated by the fact she was having side effects of the antipsychotic medication. Akathisia is an acute dystonia, a side effect of these powerful medications. It is a restlessness, an inability to sit still. The patient wants to stretch her legs and flex her muscles to relieve tension that feels like an unrelenting, very slowly developing cramp. Dr. Farmer testified that akathisia is not as dramatic as other side effects because it looks like the disease itself: the patient is restless, can't sit still, and wants to walk around. There is a ramping up in the intensity of treatment for akathisia, culminating in Propranolol, which itself causes 40 percent of users to have a new onset of major depression within a year. Dr. Farmer stated that D.T. was so resistant to taking medications that at times intramuscular medications were required. Geodon was the medicine initially chosen to treat D.T.'s psychotic features because it has the least likelihood of causing weight gain. By May 15, Dr. Farmer had deemed it a failure and was in the process of replacing it with Seroquel. On May 16, D.T. remained actively psychotic with visual and auditory hallucinations, side effects of the medication. Dr. Farmer testified that the dosages of medicine that could possibly make the hallucinations go away, had the side effect of incapacitating her. D.T. could not sit in group and match her mood and comments to the group process. She was too lethargic to function. Dr. Farmer believed that as of May 16, D.T. could not be anywhere but an acute care setting, with nurses and physicians monitoring her response to medications. On May 17, D.T. reported seeing what she described as flashing lights. She moved out of her lethargy into accelerated speech. She was irritable and paranoid, different from the day before when she appeared overdrugged and lethargic. On May 18, she had a severe reaction to the Seroquel, active symptoms of delusional, confused and agitated behavior. Seroquel was discontinued and a new antipsychotic, Restoril, was introduced. On that day, D.T. was noted to be crying and hallucinating. She saw a man in her room and held so fast to the idea of being in danger that she required additional medication, Ativan PRN, to make her relax. On May 19, her Risperdal had to be further adjusted because she was overly sedated. She was disheveled, easily agitated, and still required PRN medications in addition to her standard medicines. On May 20, she remained labile, easily upset and crying. Dr. Farmer concluded, by stating, that this case involved a very complex juggling of medications to get control of auditory hallucinations with other medications striving to compensate for side effects. Dr. Berns testified that D.T. had an extensive psychiatric history and was admitted for mood swings, violent tendencies, and report of auditory hallucinations. The admissions note stated that D.T. was depressed and angry, "ready to kill everybody." She was having problems with flashbacks regarding her history of fights with her father, and was fearful that her mood changes and lability would cause her to lose her foster placement. She had been in foster care since January 2001. D.T. had a history of arrests for fighting, breaking and entering, grand theft auto, and battery. She had a decrease in appetite with a four-pound-weight-loss in the past week. She said that she felt paranoid a lot, and she overreacted to intrusions into her physical space. She heard voices with command features telling her to cut her arms instead of battering her father, and admitted to some prior plans of killing her father. The May 15 notes showed severe mood swings and unspecified dissociative symptoms. She received Haldol for anger episodes. Dr. Farmer discontinued Geodon and began Seroquel, another antipsychotic also used in the treatment of bipolar disorder. She was also given Cogentin intramuscularly, because she had tremors and akathasia. On May 16, D.T. was anxious with sleep disturbance, undescribed auditory and visual hallucinations, and said she was lethargic. On May 17, she was reporting flashbacks about "angel trumpet," which may have been a psychedelic drug. She was observed to have accelerated speech, irritable, perseverant and loquacious. Dr. Farmer raised the level of the Seroquel. D.T. was incoherent from midnight to 6:30 a.m., with auditory and visual hallucinations. She was seeing people, carrying on conversations, making and unmaking her bed, trying to open a window, and mumbling. At times she was manic, hyper-verbal, crying and laughing. She said she was high on her medications. The Cogentin was discontinued. They raised the Seroquel and put her on intramuscular injection of Ativan. On May 18, she had a severe reaction to Seroquel. She was delusional, confused and agitated, but showed no aggression. Dr. Farmer stopped the Seroquel and started Risperdal. She hallucinated seeing a man in her room. On May 19, she was anxious and irritable, having non-command hallucinations. Her Risperdal dosage was increased. On May 20, she was upset and emotional. She requested Haldol and Ativan to calm herself down. On May 21, she was organized, with no flight of ideas or loose associations, and was discharged. Dr. Berns noted that Dr. Mehra found that by May 12, D.T.'s sleep, vital signs and appetite were stable, that she was following unit rules of participating in activities, and that she was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic or in withdrawal. Dr. Berns disagreed with this assessment. On May 16, D.T. still had active psychotic symptoms. On May 17, she was paranoid and irritable, carrying on conversations with unseen people. On May 18, she had visual hallucinations. On May 19, she was disheveled and easily agitated. On May 20, she was labile, and very easily upset. Dr. Berns agreed with Dr. Farmer that the entire stay was medically necessary. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that he was aware of Dr. Farmer's statement that on May 15 D.T. was still experiencing severe mood swings and disassociative symptoms, "which are a watershed between normal and neurotic." Dr. Mehra did not know what that means in terms of the issues in this case, because disassociation is not sufficient to warrant keeping her in the hospital. Visual and auditory hallucinations, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to keep her in the hospital unless they are command hallucinations. Dr. Mehra pointed out that the treating physician's own discharge summary stated that D.T. has personality issues of concern. "Personality issue" means that a lot of the symptoms do not necessarily indicate a major, Axis I diagnosis such as schizophrenia or major depression, but are more about the patient's character and how she relates to people. Dr. Farmer noted on May 16 that, due to side effects of medication, D.T. was lethargic and could not function. Dr. Mehra stated that this might be sufficient to keep her in the hospital, though, again, the treating physician must keep the treatment options in mind and distinguish between someone with a personality disorder who is experiencing hallucinatory symptoms and someone who is schizophrenic. Dr. Mehra was concerned that the physicians were injecting this 14-year-old child with potent anti-psychotic medications and that she was having an adverse reaction. He was further concerned that she was not having much of a response to the medications, which Dr. Mehra found would not be unusual if the diagnosis were inaccurate. Based on the documentation in the record, Dr. Mehra could not be sure that D.T. had a true psychotic disorder that would respond to anti-psychotic medications. Because D.T. was in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services, Dr. Mehra believed there was "a great likelihood" that she had been physically and/or sexually abused. Many of her symptoms would be easier to understand in the context of past abuse rather than as a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra found the record confusing as to the rationale for this hospitalization. In the admission mental status exam, the physician documented no well formulated plan for the patient to harm herself. No psychotic symptoms were noted in the admission mental status exam. However, because the patient was presenting with symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, Dr. Mehra authorized and approved a three-day evaluation period. Dr. Mehra stated that he would authorize less time for an adult, but with a child it is important to take sufficient time to obtain a good history. What confused Dr. Mehra was that the medical record showed no clear documentation of collateral information regarding D.T.'s past to understand why she may be disassociating or having mood swings. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of D.T.'s admission. The record as presented established that D.T. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on May 12. However, as stated in note 10, AHCA's recovery is limited to May 14 through May 21. Patient #12 S.T. S.T. was admitted on March 7, 2001, and was discharged on March 17, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that eight days, March 9 through March 17, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that S.T. was a 34-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for violent, agitated, self-harming behavior in a community services van. The patient had a history of moderate mental retardation, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and abnormal EEGs. The patient was prescribed Haldol PRN, but required none on March 9, 10, or 11. As of March 10, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, or manic. Later in her hospitalization, the patient did require Haldol/Ativan PRN on several days, though no adjustments were made to her routine antipsychotic doses. Dr. Mehra noted that the only adjustment made to S.T.'s psychotropic dosing was on March 8, when her Depakote was increased. Dr. Mehra also noted that the patient was allowed to sign a voluntary consent for treatment, when her legal guardian should have been involved in the consent process. Dr. Mehra found in the record no informed consent for psychotropic medications. Dr. Mehra found that the diagnostic studies performed on S.T. could have been done on an outpatient basis. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of March 10, outpatient treatment with a return to the group home setting was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Mehra testified that S.T. was admitted through the emergency room under the Baker Act when she became violent and agitated in a van operated by Spectrum Community Services, the group home where S.T. lived. Her admitting diagnosis was mental retardation in the moderate range, as well as organic mood disorder. Dr. Mehra found no physician's notes in the record for March 8 or 9, which indicated that S.T. must not have many problems. The nurse's notes for March 9 indicated that S.T. was sleeping through the night. The unit notes from three different shifts on March 9 indicated that her behavior was under control and that she denied hallucinations. All of the above findings in the record, coupled with a lack of physician notes, led Dr. Mehra to conclude that S.T. should be discharged. Dr. Mehra stated that everything relative to making a medical decision must be documented in the record. If something is not in the record, then a peer reviewer must assume it did not happen. In this connection, Dr. Mehra noted there was no indication in the record that the hospital contacted S.T.'s group home for a treatment history and status before initiating invasive diagnostic procedures. On March 8, S.T. had a fall on the unit, hitting and cutting her head on the cinderblock wall. Dr. Mehra stated that a patient with cerebral palsy and mental retardation, who is having acute psychological problems and has fallen, is a grave concern, yet he could find no record that she was seen by a physician on March 9. He did find a March 9, note calling for a consultation with Dr. Henry Comiter regarding S.T.'s fall, but no actual physician's visit on that date. The record indicated that S.T. was placed in restraints on March 13 and engaged in threatening behavior on March 14. However, Dr. Mehra noted there had been no such incidents on March 11 through 12. He testified that, if a patient with these underlying medical and psychiatric conditions is kept long enough, she will probably act out. The incident on March 13, alone, was not enough to keep her without getting a legal guardian involved to continue her voluntary legal status in the hospital. This was a great concern to Dr. Mehra because the hospital appeared to be relying on a voluntary consent form signed by S.T. on March 10. S.T. was mentally retarded and possibly incompetent to admit herself to the hospital. Treating physician Dr. Farmer described S.T. as a 34- year-old mild-to-moderately retarded woman living in a group home. The incident that led to her admission was her deteriorated impulse control, agitation, and aggression directed toward the van and toward the staff and other peers during a van ride on an outing. She struck at her peers and the van driver, bit herself on the hands and arms, and stated that she wanted to hurt herself. S.T. was already scheduled to have an outpatient neurology consultation in late March with Dr. Comiter, out of concern for a seizure disorder that was not adequately managed. Because of her agitation, S.T. was sent to the psychiatric unit, which began the process of adjusting her medications. The adjustments were ongoing on March 8. She was seen by Dr. Comiter on March 8, as indicated by a consultation note in the record.10 Dr. Comiter ordered an EEG and CT scan of the head. The CT brain scan was scheduled for March 9, but S.T. was too agitated to undergo the procedure. On March 10, S.T. remained agitated. She refused a shower and was generally careless with regard to her ADLs. On March 11, Dr. Farmer reduced S.T.'s dosage of Ativan in order to calm her and make her more manageable for the CT scan. On March 12, she was less agitated, but not calm enough for the CT and EEG to be completed. She was too agitated to go for the CT study, but too fatigued from the medications to be functional on the psychiatric unit. The reduction in her Ativan dosage did enable her to respond more promptly to questions. On March 13, staff attempted to transport S.T. in the van for her EEG, but she began swinging her arms and had to be placed in seclusion and restraints. On March 14, Dr. Farmer characterized S.T. as naïve regarding her manic grandiosity, unable to recognize that her reactions are disproportionate to the circumstances. Her vocal volume was threatening and her intrusiveness was with ominous import, but she believed she was justified in her reactions. She was paranoid and misreading the likelihood of danger and pain, and so was attempting to intimidate people away from her. By this time, Dr. Farmer believed that she was reacting well to the adjusted medications. However, when the medications got her to the point at which she was not threatening others, she began having balance problems and falling again. On March 15, the medications had slowed S.T.'s psychomotor skills, and she was not assaultive. She was taking her medicines by mouth. S.T. was beginning to return to baseline and Dr. Farmer began considering discharging her back to the group home. She was denying any suicidal or homicidal ideation and denying hallucinations. She was able to be redirected from biting her hand, which was a continuing problem for S.T. She was able to participate in group therapy without disruption, though her ADLs remained careless. On March 16, she remained restless, distractable, impulsive, and aggressive, though the hospital did manage to complete the EEG on that date. The EEG showed no evidence of a seizure disorder. On March 17, S.T. was discharged back to the group home. Dr. Farmer concluded that it was in the best interest of S.T.'s care to keep her through March 17. It was best to accomplish all the needed adjustments to her anticonvulsant medications on an inpatient basis, especially since there were no EEG results until March 16. Those results could have required further adjustments, and Dr. Farmer believed that relying on the group home to make the changes in her medications might not work and could result in her readmission. Dr. Berns agreed with the length of stay because the attending physicians were not only trying to make sure that S.T. was no longer suicidal, they were trying to decrease her agitation and aggression while completing important diagnostic tests. Dr. Berns thought that authorizing her stay only through March 10 would be premature. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that March 10 through March 17, should not have been denied. Dr. Mehra's opinion in this instance was at least partly based on a misreading of the record, i.e., that S.T. was not seen by a physician on March 8 or 9. Dr. Mehra's concerns regarding S.T.'s consent to treatment are serious, but cannot be resolved on this record and do not appear relevant to the question of the medical necessity of S.T.'s hospital stay. Dr. Farmer's testimony as the treating psychiatrist credibly established that S.T.'s entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Patient #13 W.W. W.W. was admitted on June 17, 2001, and was discharged on June 28, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that five days, June 23 through June 28, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that W.W. was a 43-year-old female admitted to the psychiatric unit after an intentional overdose of psychotropic medications. Dr. Mehra wrote that his authorization was based on continued documentation of the patient's having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself. As of June 23, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her sleep, appetite, and vital signs were stable. She was not a management problem on the unit. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of June 23, the patient no longer required 24-hour nursing care and that outpatient treatment was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that W.W. was on the medical floor, then transferred to the psychiatric floor after two days. On discharge, her Axis I diagnosis was alcohol abuse, history of cocaine abuse, and rule-out schizoaffective disorder. The hospital's discharge summary stated that the reason for admission was severe depression, no psychotic features, and having suicidal thoughts. She was integrated into the milieu of the inpatient psychiatric unit and prescribed antidepressant medication. Dr. Mehra believed W.W. should have been discharged on June 23. He stated that, even on the psychiatric unit's admission mental status exam, dated June 17, Dr. Allen noted that W.W. was slightly more cooperative than on the previous day's consult, meaning that Dr. Allen probably saw her on the medical floor after her overdose. Dr. Allen noted there was no active suicidal ideation with a plan. Dr. Mehra testified that this admission psychiatric exam, standing alone, would indicate that W.W. did not need to be admitted at all. However, the totality of her presentation and history showed numerous overdoses on psychotropic medications. Based on her history and the mental status exam showing her mood was still depressed, her admission through June 22 was approved. Attending physician Dr. Birkmire testified that, in the weeks before the overdose, W.W. described becoming increasingly depressed with feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. Her history showed at least eight or nine other psychiatric hospitalizations. She indicated a history of being sexually abused by her father at age 12. Her admitting diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder, depressed, subtype provisional, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, alcohol abuse and history of cocaine abuse. W.W.'s global assessment of functioning ("GAF") upon admission was 35. Dr. Birkmire testified that a GAF below 50 indicates that a patient should be in a residential program, at least, and that a GAF below 40-to-45 indicates the patient should be on an inpatient unit. On June 23, the medical notes show she was still somewhat confused. Her mood had improved but she still had suicidal ideations. The hospital was holding her in part to see if the blood test for syphilis was negative. She felt better but complained about mood swings. On June 24, a Sunday, there were no notes. Dr. Birkmire explained that the physicians who take rounds on the weekends are required to see each patient on either Saturday or Sunday, but not both days. On June 25, W.W. was less psychotic. Her auditory hallucinations were present but decreased, and she was taking her medications. On June 26, she continued to have auditory hallucinations. She was disorganized, paranoid, and isolating herself. She reported fear in being released because she might make another suicide attempt. She was given Ativan PRN to treat reported anxiety. On June 27, her mood was euthymic (normal, neither depressed nor highly elevated in mood). She showed no psychotic symptoms, denied suicidal ideations, and felt safe for discharge. However, hospital staff said that W.W. still seemed to be responding to voices. Dr. Birkmire stated that he had reservations about releasing W.W. on June 27 because she seemed to be telling the staff she was doing better than she really was. The voices had played a role in her suicide attempt, and, thus, the knowledge that she was still hearing them would be a strong factor in deciding to keep W.W. hospitalized. In Dr. Birkmire's opinion, W.W.'s problems could not be addressed in a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Birkmire testified that, with the exception of psychiatrists who perform peer reviews and medical authorizations, there is not one psychiatrist in the country who would say that a patient should not be in an acute care setting unless she has a definite plan for suicide or the means to complete the plan. Dr. Birkmire stated that no doctor is going to risk his license in that fashion. Whole books are written on how to perform a suicide assessment, and the assessment is based on much more than what the patient tells the physician. It is based on the patient's history, her degree of hopelessness, degree of disorganization, degrees of psychosis, and her access to the means of doing the suicide. Dr. Birkmire stated that one of the best predictors of suicidality is past attempts. Dr. Berns testified that W.W.'s history of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations indicated a probability of chronic illness. He stated that the number of prior hospitalizations automatically raises the question of past suicide attempts, and noted that her history indicated three attempts prior to this one. She was diagnosed with "depressive disorder" but not otherwise specified, as well as alcohol and cocaine abuse. She took an overdose of Haldol, Cogentin, and Sinequan. Dr. Berns explained that Sinequan is an older antidepressant, a tricyclic, with which a higher number of suicides occur. Thus, an overdose of this medication is more serious than overdoses of other medicines. There were concerns about neurosyphilis because she had a positive RPR. Her physicians were concerned that inadequate treatment for this condition would complicate her psychiatric course as well as cause physical complications leading to dementia and death. Dr. Berns concluded that W.W.'s stay was medically necessary. Her physicians were trying to stabilize her condition and treat a gradual illness that can become fatal. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that the evaluation for neurosyphilis on June 23 and 24, was not, standing alone, a ground for keeping the patient in the hospital. Dr. Mehra also stated that the suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, and psychotic disorganized paranoia are not grounds to keep the patient in the hospital, unless she was actively suicidal with a plan and unless her psychoses were causing imminent danger to herself or others, or she was aggressive or noncompliant. W.W. was taking her medications, eating, and sleeping and was not requiring seclusion or restraints on the unit, which meant that she was, at some level, functioning. Dr. Mehra was adamant that Medicaid and InterQual guidelines require more than a suicidal ideation; they require a plan. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that June 23 through June 28, should not have been denied. Dr. Birkmire's testimony as the treating psychiatrist, as well as Dr. Berns' expert testimony, credibly established that W.W.'s entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Summary of Findings At the time of the hearing, AHCA sought from Petitioner overpayments in the amount of $198,582.54 for 29 patients who stayed at Florida Hospital Orlando between January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001. The findings of fact above upheld AHCA's denial of days for the following: Acute Care Inpatient Hospital patients 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16; and Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital patients 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. The findings of fact above found that the greater weight of the evidence supported Petitioner's position that AHCA should not have denied the days for the following: Acute Care Inpatient Hospital patients 1 (2 days x reimbursement rate of $1,168.38 = $2,336.76), 4 (6 days x $1,206.42 = $7,238.52), 7 (1 day at $1,168.38), 8 (3 days x $1,168.38 = $3,505.14), 14 (9 days x $919.27 = $8,273.43), and 15 (5 days x $919.27 = $4,596.35); and Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital patients 10 (9 days x $1,168.38 = $10,515.42), 12 (8 days x $1,168.38 = $9,347.04), and 13 (5 days x $1,168.38 = $5,841.90). The total dollar figure for days that should not have been denied is $52,822.94, reducing the total overpayment due AHCA from Petitioner to $145,759.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order revising its Final Agency Audit Report as directed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Background On September 28, 1988, First Hospital Corporation of Florida d/b/a First Hospital of Palm Beach County (First Hospital) filed a timely application for the July 1993 planning horizon with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) for a certificate of need (CON) to construct a 48- bed short-term psychiatric specialty hospital, dedicated to the care of children and adolescents, in District IX. 1/ District IX is comprised of Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties. On February 3, 1989, the Department published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to grant First Hospital's application. Petitioners, Lake Hospital & Clinic, Inc. d/b/a Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches (Lake Hospital), and Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches, Inc. d/b/a Humana Hospital Palm Beaches (Humana), existing providers of psychiatric services to adolescents in Palm Beach County, filed timely petitions for a formal administrative hearing to oppose the grant of the subject application. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a hearing officer to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership (Savannas), an existing provider of psychiatric services to adolescents in St. Lucie County, was granted leave to intervene. 2/ The proposed facility At issue in this proceeding is the application of First Hospital for a CON to construct a 48-bed short-term psychiatric specialty hospital dedicated to the care of children and adolescents. This project is, however, only a portion of an 80-bed facility that First Hospital proposes to construct on a 30-acre parcel of land adjacent to Wellington Regional Memorial Hospital in western Palm Beach County. As sited, the proposed facility would be located west of the Florida Turnpike; on the west side of State Road 7 and approximately .2 miles north of Forest Hills Boulevard. The 80-bed facility that First Hospital proposes to construct would consist of a central core area and three attached wings or units. Two of the wings, each containing 24 beds, will be dedicated as short-term psychiatric beds, with one wing for young adolescents (10-14 years of age) and one wing for older adolescents (14-18 years of age). The third wing, consisting of 32 beds, will be dedicated as a residential treatment center (RTC) for adolescents. The central core area would include administrative, therapy, kitchen and dining, gymnasium classroom areas and other support functions, and is essential to the operation of the psychiatric units, but will be shared with the residential treatment unit. A therapeutic preschool program, for children 3-5 years of age, as well as a partial hospitalization program for adolescents, are also proposed to be offered, and will be located in the central core area. 3/ The psychiatric program proposed by First Hospital for its 48-bed short-term psychiatric facility will address emotional and behavioral disorders that may affect adolescents, and which require admission to a short-term acute care facility for treatment. In its application, First Hospital estimates an average length of stay of 45 to 60 days. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing health card services in the service district As a touchstone for assessing need within a service district, the Department has established a short-term psychiatric bed need methodology that must normally be satisfied before a favorable need determination will be found. That methodology, codified in Rule 10-5.011(1)(0)(4), Florida Administrative Code, contains two identifiable parts. The first part deals with the mathematical derivation of a net bed need for the planning horizon by assuming a gross bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population, and reducing that figure by the number of existing and approved beds. Based on the population projections of the Executive Office of the Governor, July 1988 release, application of this methodology derives a net need for 48 short-term psychiatric beds for the July 1993 planning horizon (gross bed need of 480- existing and approved beds of 432 = 48 net bed need. 4/ The second part of the Department's need methodology addresses occupancy standards for existing facilities that must be satisfied before a favorable need determination will normally be found. For short-term child and adolescent beds, the rule mandates an average annual occupancy rate of not less than 70 percent for all such existing facilities for the preceding 12- month period. Here, the proof demonstrates an average annual occupancy rate in excess of 70 percent for the 12-month period preceding the Department's need calculation, and satisfaction of the second part of the Department's need methodology. On August 12, 1988, the Department, pursuant to Rule 10-5.008(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, published notice of the hospital fixed need pool for the July 1993 planning horizon in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Pertinent to this case, such notice erroneously established a net need for 33 short-term psychiatric beds in District IX. Following publication of the fixed need pool, the Department received information that its calculation of the net need for short-term psychiatric beds in District IX was erroneous. Upon review, the Department established that its initial calculation was in error, and on August 26, 1988, the Department published a notice of correction in the Florida Administrative Weekly, which correctly established a net need for 48 short-term psychiatric beds in District IX for the July 1993 planning horizon. This adjustment to the fixed need pool did not result from any intervening changes in population estimates, bed inventories, or other factors which would lead to different projections of need, but from an error in the Department's mathematical calculation. Under the circumstances, the Department's correction of the fixed need pool was appropriate and timely, and a need for 48 short-term child and adolescent psychiatric beds for the July 1993 planning horizon has been demonstrated. Of the 432 short-term psychiatric beds approved and existing within the district on August 17, 1988, 119 beds were reported to the local health council as dedicated to short-term child and adolescent psychiatric services, and the balance of 313 beds as dedicated to adult psychiatric services. Allocation of the 119 short-term child and adolescent beds was reported as follows: Lake Hospital 26 beds, Fair Oaks 27 beds, Humana 27 beds, Savannas 15 beds, and Lawnwood (Harbour Shores) 24 beds. Lake Hospital is a 98-bed freestanding psychiatric specialty hospital located in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, Florida, that treats adolescents and adults for psychiatric disorders and substance abuse. As of August 17, 1988, Lake Hospital was licensed to operate 56 short-term psychiatric beds, 26 long- term psychiatric beds, and 16 short-term substance abuse beds. Of the 56 short- term psychiatric beds, 26 beds were approved for adolescent care and 30 beds were approved for adult care. During calendar year 1987, Lake Hospital enjoyed an occupancy rate of 91.8 percent for its 26 short-term psychiatric beds, which were dedicated to the care of adolescents, ages 12- 17. In January 1988, Lake Hospital opened a replacement facility on its campus consisting of a two-story structure with four 18- bed units, and reported to the local health council that two of those units (36 beds) were dedicated to short-term adolescent care in January and February 1988, and that thereafter only 18 beds were dedicated to short-term adolescent care. Based on such utilization, Lake Hospital enjoyed an occupancy rate of 95 percent for the first four months of 1988 and a 93.9 percent occupancy rate for calendar year 1988 for its adolescent beds. 5/ Fair Oaks is a 102-bed free standing psychiatric specialty hospital located in Delray Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, that treats children, adolescents, and adults for psychiatric disorders and substance abuse. As of August 17, 1988, Fair Oaks was licensed to operate 70 short-term psychiatric beds, 15 long-term psychiatric beds, and 17 short-term substance abuse beds. Of the 70 short-term psychiatric beds, 27 beds were approved for child and adolescent care and 43 beds for adult care. During the calendar year 1987, Fair Oaks' second year of operation, it achieved an occupancy rate of 73.1 percent for its 27 short-term child and adolescent psychiatric beds. For the first four months of calendar year 1988, Fair Oaks enjoyed an occupancy rate of 99.7 percent, and for all of calendar year 1988 an occupancy rate of 91 percent. 6/ Humana is a 250-bed general hospital located in West Palm Beach, Florida. Of its existing beds, 162 are dedicated as medical/surgical beds, and 88 as short-term psychiatric beds. For calendar year 1987, Humana reported to the local health council that 27 of its 88-bed complement of psychiatric beds were dedicated to short- term adolescent services, but declined or neglected to report its utilization so that an average length of stay could be calculated. In fact, Humana did not operate a short-term adolescent program for 1987, but operated a long-term program without Department approval. Pertinent to this conclusion, the proof demonstrated that Humana applied for the development of an 88-bed psychiatric pavilion in 1983. Certificate of Need No. 2647 was issued to Humana on November 17, 1983, for 80 short-term psychiatric beds consisting of 48 adult psychiatric beds, 24 geriatric beds, and 8 adult special beds; and, on January 8, 1985, Humana received CON No. 3237 for the additional 8 short-term adult psychiatric beds. Humana opened its psychiatric pavilion in November 1986, and by January 1987 was serving adolescents, ages 13 through 18, in a 27-bed unit notwithstanding the absence of Department approval. As to the services provided in that unit, the proof is compelling that it was dedicated to long-term adolescent psychiatric services with an average length of stay of approximately 280 days. At some point thereafter, but not earlier than July 1989, Humana also began providing short-term adolescent psychiatric services at its facility. 7/ Following the Department's investigation into Humana's operation of a long-term adolescent psychiatric program, Humana applied for a modification of its CON Nos. 2647 and 3237 to allow it to operate a district adolescent unit. On July 14, 1989, Humana received Department approval, and such CON's were modified to allow 15 short-term adolescent psychiatric beds. This modification is, however, currently the subject of an appeal to the District Court. In the interim, on December 14, 1988, Humana received CON No. 5294 for the addition of 15 short-term beds for adolescents and adults, and on February 25, 1989, Humana received CON No. 5722 for the redesignation of 15 short-term psychiatric beds to 15 long-term beds. Currently, Humana has available 30 short-term psychiatric beds for adolescent use, and 15 long-term beds, but its short-term program is in a start-up mode. Savannas is a 70-bed freestanding psychiatric hospital located in Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida, approximately 40 miles north of Palm Beach County, that treats adolescents and adults for psychiatric disorders and substance abuse. As of August 17, 1988, Savannas was licensed to operate 50 short-term psychiatric beds and 20 short-term substance abuse beds. Of the 50 short-term psychiatric beds, 15 beds were approved for adolescent care and dedicated to patients ages 14- 17, and 35 beds were approved for adult care. Savannas opened its facility in October 1987, and for that calendar year reported 1,215 patient days for its short- term adolescent unit, For calendar year 1988, its first full year of operation, Savanna's adolescent unit achieved 3,589 patient days, or an occupancy rate of 65.5 percent. Lawnwood (Harbour Shores) is a general hospital located in Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida, that, as of August 17, 1988, was licensed to operate 60 short-term psychiatric beds. Of the 60 short-term psychiatric beds, 24 beds were approved for child and adolescent care, and 36 for adult care. The date Lawnwood commenced operations does not appear of record; however, during calendar year 1987, it achieved a 62 percent occupancy rate for its 24-bed adolescent unit. For calendar year 1988, Lawnwood maintained a similar occupancy rate even though Savannas was drawing patients from the same service area to its new facility. Considering the availability, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of short-term child and adolescent beds in the service district at all times pertinent to this case, there exists a need for the 48 beds requested by First Hospital, and such beds should be located in Palm Beach County consistent with the local health plan, discussed infra. The need for the proposed facility in relation to the district plan and state health plan Applicable to this case is the 1985-87 state health plan, which contains the following goals and objectives pertinent to short-term inpatient psychiatric beds: GOAL 1: ENSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES TO ALL FLORIDA RESIDENTS IN A LEAST RESTRICTIVE SETTING. OBJECTIVE 1.1: The ratio of short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds to Florida's population should not exceed .35 beds per 1000 population thru 1987. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: a: Restrain increases in the supply of short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds to no more than .35 beds per 1000 population. OBJECTIVE 1.2: Through 1987, additional short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds should not normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing and approved adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in the service district is at least 75% and average annual occupancy for existing and approved adolescent and children beds is at least 70%. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: a. Restrict approval of additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds to these service districts which have an average annual occupancy of 75% for existing and approved adult beds and 70% for existing and approved adolescent and children beds. GOAL 2.: PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTINUUM OF HIGH QUALITY, COST EFFECTIVE PRIVATE SECTOR MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND PREVENTIVE SERVICES. OBJECTIVE 2.1: Define, develop and implement policy regarding the appropriate treatment settings and the role of each setting in the delivery of mental health and substance abuse services by 1987. GOAL 3: DEVELOP A COMPLETE RANGE OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN EACH HRS DISTRICT. First Hospital's application is consistent with the goals and objectives of the state health plan. Here, First Hospital proposes to provide a 24-hour-a-day therapeutic milieu, with an average length of stay of 60 days or less, for children and adolescents suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. As such, First Hospital will offer care for those individuals for whom short-term inpatient psychiatric care is the least restrictive setting appropriate, and which care, consistent with the Department's need methodologies, will complement the range of mental health services needed in the district. Also applicable to this case, is the 1988 District IX local health plan. Pertinent to this case, the local health plan divides District IX into two subdistricts when planning for short-term psychiatric beds. Subdistrict one consists of Indian River, Martin, St. Lucie and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict two consists of Palm Beach County. In allocating short-term psychiatric beds between subdistricts, the local plan provides: When bed need is shown in District IX for either short-term psychiatric services or substance abuse services in accordance with Chapter 10-5.11 of the Florida Administrative Code, the method for allocating beds among subdistricts shall be based upon projected subdistrict occupancy figures as determined by use-rates during the most recent calendar year in combination with projected subdistrict population figures. New beds shall be allocated to the subdistrict showing the highest projected percent occupancy, to the extent that the projected percent occupancy equal that of the other subdistrict. When projected occupancy figures show parity, any remaining beds shall be allocated based upon each subdistrict's percentage of projected patient days for District IX. All projections shall be five years into the future to correspond with the planning horizon governing the addition of psychiatric and substance abuse beds as set forth in state rule. Applying the local plan's methodology to the facts of this case demonstrates that the beds identified by the Department's need methodology should be allocated to subdistrict two, Palm Beach County, which is the county within which First Hospital proposes to locate. The local plan also requires an examination of an applicant's commitment or record of service to medicaid/indigent and underserved population groups. The First Hospital facility will be a specialty hospital and therefore not eligible to provide medicaid services; however, First Hospital has committed to dedicate 8 percent of its patient days to indigent care. Under such circumstances, First Hospital's application is, on balance, consistent with the local plan. The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care First Hospital is a wholly owned subsidiary of First Hospital Corporation, an established provider of psychiatric services to children and adolescents since 1983. As of this date, First Hospital Corporation owns and operates 15 hospitals nationally, and has demonstrated the commitment and ability to provide quality care to its patients. Here, First Hospital's staffing is reasonable, and while the program proposed by First Hospital is generic in nature, and similar to that offered by other short-term providers of such services, it will assure, in light of demonstrated need, that patients needing acute short-term psychiatric services in the district will continue to receive quality care. To the extent that the needs of the district may subsequently evidence the need for more specialized programs, First Hospital has demonstrated its ability to address such needs, and to provide quality programs and services. The availability and adequacy of other health care facilities and services in the service area which may serve as alternatives for the health care facilities and services proposed by the applicant The Department's short-term psychiatric bed rule addresses the need for psychiatric facilities that will treat emotional and behavioral disorders which require admission to a short-term acute care facility for treatment. Where such short- term psychiatric care is indicated, any other type of placement would not be appropriate under existing rules (not long-term, residential treatment, group home, or out-patient care), and there are no alternatives for the services proposed by First Hospital. The availability of resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation First Hospital has demonstrated that it either has or can obtain all resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation. As heretofore noted, First Hospital Corporation, the parent of the applicant, has provided psychiatric services to children and adolescents since 1983, and currently owns and operates 15 hospitals nationally. It has never experienced any serious difficulty in financing its operations, either start-up or operational, and has in place an existing program for the recruitment and training of medical, administrative, clerical and other personnel that might be needed for the proposed facility. First Hospital Corporation has no other new projects pending at this time, and has committed itself to the project proposed by its subsidiary. Additionally, Dr. Ronald Dozoretz, who is president, chairman of the board, and the principal stockholder of First Hospital Corporation, has the available resources to finance the subject project, and has also committed to do so if necessary. 8/ The extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the service district, and the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent As a freestanding psychiatric facility, First Hospital is not eligible to receive Medicaid funds for the treatment of psychiatric disorders; however, it has committed to provide 8 percent of its patient days to the care of patients who qualify as indigent, and has agreed that its CON be so conditioned. In view of this commitment, as well as the demonstrated need within the district for the proposed services, approval of First Hospital's application will increase accessibility to all residents of the district. The probable impact of the proposed project on the costs of providing health services proposed by the applicant. The proof demonstrates that existent facilities in Palm Beach County are operating near capacity, and that to meet expected demand at the planning horizon an additional 48 short- term psychiatric beds are needed. Under such circumstances, approval of First Hospital's application will stimulate competition and promote quality assurance and cost-effectiveness. While the proof establishes the need for 48 additional beds at the horizon year, the protestants to First Hospital's application contend that, due to the finite number of qualified professionals within the area to staff the facility and the finite number of patients requiring such care, they will be adversely impacted if the application is approved. Succinctly, they contend that they may lose staff or be compelled to pay higher salaries, and that they may lose patients and therefore revenue, if the facility is approved. The protestants' proof regarding potential impact to their existing staff or competition for staff was unpersuasive. In light of the number of existing facilities that already offer mental health type services within the district, and therefore currently compete for the same professionals, First Hospital's entry into the market should not significantly impact existing competition. As importantly, the protestants failed to quantify any such impact or otherwise persuasively demonstrate that, assuming they were compelled to pay more to retain or attract competent staff, such increased expense would adversely affect their operation. With regard to the protestants' concerns regarding lost patient days and revenue, the demonstrated need for the additional 48 beds at the horizon year mitigates the potential for any adverse impact to existent providers in the long term. However, this does suggest that First Hospital's application, as proposed, does not demonstrate a potential to significantly adversely affect existent providers in the short term. To the contrary, should First Hospital achieve the level of utilization it projects in its application, its facility would have a significant adverse impact on existing programs. In this regard, First Hospital's application projects that it will achieve 8,956 patient days in 1991, its first year of operation, and 13,193 patient days in 1992, its second year of operation. Through 1991, there will only be a growth of approximately 3,498 patient days over those that were served by existing facilities in 1988, and through 1992, there will only be a growth of approximately 4,664 patient days over those that were served by existing facilities in 1988. Therefore, to achieve it's projected occupancy levels, First Hospital would have to capture 5,458 patient days in 1991 and 8,529 patient days in 1992 from the patient base that had previously been served at existing facilities. Such impact to those facilities, should First Hospital be able to achieve its projected levels of occupancy, would be significant and adverse. 9/ The costs and methods of the proposed construction As heretofore discussed, First Hospital proposes to construct an 80- bed facility on approximately 30 acres of land in Palm Beach County, Florida, which will include the 48 short-term psychiatric beds which are the subject of this proceeding, as well as the 32 residential treatment beds which the Department concluded were not subject to CON review. The 80-bed facility proposed, at 49,142 gross square feet, will consist of a central core area of approximately 25,000 square feet, which includes three wings; an education and activity wing, a food service wing, and an administrative wing. These wings will house the therapy, kitchen and dining, gymnasium, classrooms, administrative offices, and other services necessary to support the psychiatric facility. Attached to the core area, are two psychiatric wings, at 7,592 square feet each, which will each contain 24 beds dedicated to short-term psychiatric care, and one wing, at 8,944 square feet, which will contain 32 beds dedicated as residential treatment beds. On the adjacent grounds, First Hospital also proposed a swimming pool, tennis courts, baseball field, and sports filed. In its application, First Hospital estimated its total project cost for the proposed psychiatric facility at $4,213,522. This project cost was composed of development cost of $61,500, financing/refinancing costs of $259,800, professional services of $162,000, construction costs of $2,503,162, equipment costs of $480,000, and other related costs of $150,000. But for the construction cost category ($2,503,162), First Hospital derived its estimate of total project costs by allocating 60 percent of the cost of each component of the total cost to the psychiatric facility and 40 percent to the residential treatment facility (the 60/40 methodology). In the case of construction costs, First Hospital based its estimate on the square footage of the psychiatric wings and 60 percent of the core area, which derived a gross square footage for this cost item based on 30,184 square feet, to which it added 60 percent of its estimated costs for site preparation and contingency of construction. Based on this premise, First Hospital's proposal is driven by a $76.33 per square foot cost of construction. 10/ Assuming the propriety of First Hospital's 60/40 allocation of costs, its estimate of project costs is still significantly understated. Here, the proof demonstrates that, as opposed to the $76.33 per square foot cost for construction and site preparation costs estimated by First Hospital, the cost for such work will be $105 per square foot, inclusive of construction and site preparation costs. Based on the 30,184 square feet First Hospital allocated to the project, such cost will amount to $3,169,320, which, when added to the 5 percent contingency factor, the $96,000 allocated for the proposed pool, and the addition of 460 square feet to patient rooms needed to meet Department standards, derives a construction cost figure of $3,472,086, as opposed to the $2,503,162 estimated by First Hospital. In addition to straight construction costs, First Hospital also underestimated its equipment costs. In this regard, First Hospital's equipment list omits many necessary items, including: nurse call equipment, a security system, an emergency generator, therapy and recreational equipment, gym equipment, ice machines, defibrillators, crashcarts, educational materials, media equipment, graphic artwork, interior design items, shelving/lockers for staff and patients, housekeeping items, medication carts, and other necessary equipment. Had First Hospital properly calculated its equipment costs, it would have derived a cost of at least $1 million for movable equipment and at least $150,000 for fixed equipment for the 80--bed facility as opposed to the $700,000 for movable equipment and $100,00 for fixed equipment it estimated. Under such circumstances, applying First Hospital's 60/40 methodology would establish an equipment cost for the subject project at $690,000, as opposed to the $480,000 estimated by First Hospital. 11/ Since financing costs and professional services fees would also require an upward adjustment because of the increase in construction and equipment costs, the total cost for the subject project, utilizing First Hospital's 60/40 methodology, would reach at least $5,488,843, as opposed to the $4,213,522 estimated by First Hospital. 12/ The foregoing analysis of construction costs assumed the reasonableness of First Hospital's 60/40) allocation methodology. For reasons discussed infra, First Hospital's allocation methodology is not reasonable, and its construction costs are therefore dramatically understated. In this regard, the proof demonstrated that the core area, consisting of 25,000 square feet, would be necessary to support the 48-bed psychiatric units whether the 32-bed residential treatment unit were built or not, and that it would be more appropriate to combine the core area and the psychiatric area to assess the subject application. When this is done, the construction cost alone for the project calculates to $4,638,501. 13/ In addition to straight construction costs, all of the other estimated project costs appearing on Table 25 of First Hospital's exhibit 1 are also suspect because of its 60/40 methodology; however, for purposes of this analysis item a, project development costs, and item f, other related costs are assumed accurate, as are construction supervision costs and loan fees. Notably, capitalized interest would increase to at least $355,621, architectural/engineering fees would increase to approximately $242,969, and equipment costs would increase to approximately $726,000. With these adjustments alone, the cost of the 48-bed psychiatric project, which includes the core area, comes to approximately $6,821,000, or over $2,607,000 more than First Hospital estimated. 14/ The unreasonableness of First Hospital's 60/40 methodology To assess the financial feasibility of the proposed project, First Hospital's pro formas address only the expected financial performance of the 48 psychiatric beds and ignore the financial feasibility of the 32-bed residential treatment unit, even through First Hospital postulates that such unit will support 40 percent of the cost of the hospital's core area. At hearing, the explanation offered by First Hospital and the Department for not addressing the financial feasibility of the residential treatment unit, as well as the out-patient services, was their contention that such services are not CON reviewable because First Hospital, as regards the residential treatment unit, is not yet a "health care facility" and, as regards the outpatient services, that such services are exempt from review. In this regard, they point to the provisions of Section 381.706(1), Florida Statutes, which provides; . . . all health-care-related projects, as described in paragraphs (a)-(n), shall be subject to review and shall file an application for a certificate of need with the department . . . (c) A capital expenditure of $1 million or more by or on behalf of a health care facility . . . for a purpose directly related to the furnishing of health services at such facility; provided that a Certificate of Need shall not be required for an expenditure to provide an outpatient health service . . . (Emphasis added) They also point to the provision of Section 381.702, Florida Statutes, which contains the following definitions: (7) "Health care facility" means a hospital. . . . (12) "Hospital" means a health care facility licensed under chapter 395. Based on these statutory provisions, First Hospital and the Department conclude that the residential treatment unit and the outpatient services are not CON reviewable because First Hospital is not yet licensed or the outpatient services are exempt. While the logic of First Hospital's and the Department's conclusion seems questionable where, as here, the projects are proposed to be integrated and constructed simultaneously, the Department's reading of the statute comports with its literal reading and is accepted. However, although the residential treatment unit and outpatient services may not be subject to CON review does not suggest that their financial feasibility is not relevant to this proceeding. To the contrary, their financial feasibility is critical if First Hospital's 60/40 methodology is to be considered rational. Here, the 48-bed psychiatric facility proposed by First Hospital is comprised of two 24-bed units and a core unit that provides all necessary support functions, including administrative, therapy, kitchen and dining, gymnasium and classroom areas, for those units. That core area, of 25,000 square feet, is an essential part of the proposed psychiatric hospital; without it there would be no psychiatric hospital, and at a lesser square footage the project would be lacking sufficient space to provide necessary services. When licensed by the Department, the two 24-bed units and the core area will be licensed as a psychiatric hospital. Notwithstanding, the fact that the 25,000 square foot support area is an integral and essential part of the proposed hospital, the Department chose to ignore 40 percent of its costs and expenses in assessing the financial feasibility of the project. The basis for the Department's action was its conclusion that the non-CON reviewable residential treatment unit comprised 40 percent of the overall population of the entire facility (80-beds overall), and that since it would share the core area, 40 percent of the costs of constructing that area, as well as subsequent operating expenses, were not pertinent to an evaluation of the proposed hospital. Here, the Department's reasoning and its conclusion, be they incipient policy, do not have evidentiary support. The psychiatric hospital proposed by First Hospital is, as heretofore noted, the two 24-bed units and the core area. This is the only portion of the project over which the Department has control, and necessarily the only portion that it can assure will be built as proposed; it has no control over whether the residential treatment unit will ever be built or be built as proposed. Therefore, since the core unit is an essential part of the psychiatric hospital, and the residential treatment unit is exempt from CON review, an assessment of the subject application must consider the cost of the entire core area as part of the project under review. While economies of scale permit utilization of the core unit by the residential treatment unit without additional space, this does not detract from the conclusion that the cost of the core is a cost of the hospital. Rather, such excess capacity is fortuitous for First Hospital, and may permit it to spread the expenses of its operation over a larger population base if the residential treatment unit is built. However, to reasonably assess whether those expenses of operation can be spread to or supported by the residential treatment unit to any extent, much less 40 percent, requires an analysis of the financial feasibility of those services. Here, First Hospital offered no proof of the financial feasibility of the residential treatment unit, and there is no rational basis on which any allocation of operating expenses for the core area can be demonstrated to be supportable by it. Accordingly, to assess the financial feasibility of the proposed psychiatric hospital it is necessary to attribute the cost of the core area to the proposed project, as well as the costs of carrying and operating that part of the proposed hospital. 15/ The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal To assess the financial feasibility of the proposed project, First Hospital's pro forma assumes that it will achieve 8,956 patient days in its first year of operation and 13,193 patient days in its second year of operation, with a per diem patient charge of $500 in year one and $525 in year two, and that it will thereby achieve a gross revenue of $4,478,000 in its first year of operation and a gross revenue of $6,926,325 in its second year of operation. While the proposed patient charges are reasonable, First Hospital's occupancy projections are not supported by persuasive proof and, therefore, it has failed to demonstrate what revenues it could reasonably expect to generate. A facility's projected patient days are typically a product of an informed analysis of projected admissions and projected average length of stay. Here, First Hospital undertook no such analysis, but simply assumed a number of patient days, without any rational predicate in an effort to demonstrate financial feasibility. Notably, there is a clear trend toward shorter lengths of stay in psychiatric hospitals, which was even recognized by First Hospital's Dr. Dozoretz who reasonably expected an average length of stay at the proposed facility of 30 to 40 days. However, First Hospital assumed in its pro forma an average length of stay ranging from 45 to 60 days. Such assumption could not have been the basis for any considered analysis of utilization since it is excessive, as well as too imprecise. Moreover, in testing the reasonableness of a utilization projection, it is also important to consider physician support, the extent of waiting lists, community support, the extent of competition, and the depth of local needs assessment. Here, there is no persuasive proof that First Hospital enjoys any support from local physicians, that there are any waiting lists, that the market is not competitive, that there is any community support for the project, or that it undertook any reasonable assessment of local need. In addition to its failure to demonstrate what utilization level it could reasonably achieve in its first two years of operation, and therefore establish a reasonable estimate of its gross revenue, First Hospital's pro forma also, significantly underestimated building depreciation, equipment depreciation, and interest expense because of its failure to adequately address construction and equipment costs, discussed supra. Had First Hospital properly assessed such costs, by subsuming the psychiatric hospital to include 100 percent of the psychiatric wings and core area, it would have calculated building depreciation at $176,230 per annum, equipment depreciation at $72,600 per annum, and interest at $750,360 per annum. At these rates, assuming the validity of First Hospital's projection of gross revenue, the facility's projected loss in year one would increase from $115,629 to $529,848, and its projected profit in year two of $442,184 would be reduced to $27,965. 16/ As well as underestimating the foregoing expenses, First Hospital's pro forma also significantly underestimates a number of other expenses, including deductions from gross revenue, supplies and other expenses, and the indigent care tax assessment. In this regard, the proof demonstrates that First Hospital underestimated its deductions from revenue by $367,000 in year one and $214,000 in year two; underestimated its supplies and other expenses in year one by at least $645,000, and in year two by at least $561,000; and omitted the indigent care tax assessment of $56,000 in year one and $75,000 in year two. Considering these additional adjustments, First Hospital's project, even assuming its gross revenue projections are reasonable, is not financially feasible in either the short-term or long-term. 17/ The criteria on balance In evaluating the application at issue in this proceeding, none of the criteria established by Section 381.705, Florida Statutes, or Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code, has been overlooked. First Hospital's failure to demonstrate the financial feasibility of its proposal is, however, dispositive of its application, and such failure is not outweighed by any other, or combination of any other, criteria.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: As to Case NO. 89-1415, that a final order be entered denying First Hospital's application for Certificate of Need. As to Case NO. 89-1438, that a final order be entered dismissing Humana's petition for formal hearing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of May 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May 1990.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns and operates a skilled nursing facility in Dade County, Florida. The facility is divided into four or five sections, each of which is locked. Petitioner's facility is one of only two locked or "secure" nursing homes in Dade County. Particularly in the Center Court section of petitioner's facility, the patients tend to be disoriented and may suffer from organic brain syndrome. Eleanor Lieberman, a social worker, has arranged for patients to be placed in Center Court whom no other nursing hole would accept. Three of the bedrooms in the Manor II section of petitioner's facility each have five beds, Nos. 24, 31 and 33. Room No. 15 in the Annex and Rooms Nos. 2, 7 and 13 in Center Court also have five beds each. Room No. 5 in Center Court has seven beds. Room No. 7 and Room No. 13 in Manor I each have only three beds. The patients in Center Court are generally less oriented than the patients in other sections of the facility. Patients in Oliver House are bedridden or confined to chairs while awake. Patients in Manor I and II are ambulatory and in need of the least care of any of the patients in the facility. As a particular patient's condition improves or worsens, he may be transferred from one section to another. Within a given section, however, patients are assigned beds without regard to whether the beds are in rooms with more than four beds, rather than in rooms having only four beds. In general, the more patients housed in a given room, the more often petitioner's employees are likely to enter the room. This has the advantage of increasing the "supervision" everybody in the ward receives. Since patients in the Annex, Center Court and Manor II sections of petitioner's facility mostly spend time in their beds trying to sleep at night, however, extra patients in a room and extra visits to the room have the disadvantage of increasing each patient's chances of being awakened. Particularly in Center Court, where there are no curtains separating beds, extra patients in a bedroom mean less privacy for each occupant. These considerations notwithstanding, the evidence as a whole tended to show that the care patients bedrooms with more than four beds receive does not differ appreciably from the care other patients at petitioner's facility receive.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent permit petitioner no variation pursuant to 39 Fed. Reg. 405.1134(e) (1974), without prejudice to petitioner's making requests for variations in the future. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire 401 N. W. 2nd Avenue Suite 1040 Miami, Florida 33128 Richard W. Bonehill, Jr., Esquire 7211 S. W. 62nd Avenue South Miami, Florida 33143
Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Introduction Orlando General Hospital applied in April, 1987, for a certificate of need to allow it to convert 24 existing medical-surgical beds to short term psychiatric beds. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 1. It did not explicitly apply for beds limited to serve adults. It did, however, state that adolescent care would not be provided "at this time," leaving open the use of the 24 beds in the future for possible adolescent use. Id. at p. 5. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., applied for a certificate of need for a 50 bed short term psychiatric specialty hospital. It explicitly applied for a specialty hospital having 50 beds of "short term adult psychiatric care." C.M. Ex. 1, application, section I. In the executive summary, it characterized its proposal as a specialty hospital "for adults." Id. at p. 1. Charter does not intend to treat child or adolescent short term psychiatric patients. T. 23. The applications were filed in early 1987 to meet need in the January, 1992, planning horizon. The rule that applies in this case is the one contained in the prehearing stipulation. T. 392. It is rule 10-5.011(1)(o), Fla. Admin. Code. A copy of the rule is contained in O.G. Ex. 7, p. 33. The provisions of the local health plan at issue in this case are accurately reproduced in the State Agency Action Report (SAAR) which is C.M. Ex. 5. Net Short Term Psychiatric Bed Need (Numeric Need) Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4a-c, Fla. Admin. Code, provides that the projected number of beds shall be based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected five years into the future and based, in this case, on the January, 1987, projections for January, 1992. That 1992 population for District VII is projected to be 1,505,564, and thus the gross short term psychiatric bed need is 527 beds. For this batching cycle, the inventory of licensed and approved short term psychiatric beds was 410. These were: General Hospitals Florida Hospital-Altamonte 20 Florida Hospital-Orlando 85 Orlando Regional Med. Center 32 Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital 25 Subtotal 162 Specialty Hospitals Brevard Mental Health Center 52 CPC Palm Bay (began 10/86) 40 Laurel Oaks (began 10/86) 60 Lynnhaven (approved only) 39 Park Place (approved only) 17 West Lake 40 Subtotal 248 TOTAL (Licensed and approved) 410 TOTAL (Licensed only) 354 Thus, there is a net need for 117 short term psychiatric beds In District VII by 1992. The rule further specifies that a minimum of .15 per 1,000 population should be allocated to hospitals holding a general license, and that .20 per 1,000 of the beds may be located in either speciality hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. HRS interprets the word "should" in the rule with respect to .15 per 1,000 allocated to hospitals with a general license as being mandatory. C.M. Ex. 5, pp. 13-14. This is a reasonable construction of the rule. By 1992 there must be 226 short term psychiatric beds located in hospitals holding a general license. Since currently there are 162 beds in such hospitals, there is a net need by January, 1992, for 64 short term psychiatric beds to be opened in hospitals holding a general license. The remainder of the net bed need, 53 beds, may be located in either a specialty hospital or a hospital holding a general license. T. 500-02. The Occupancy Rate for "All Existing Adult Short Term Inpatient Psychiatric Beds" Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4e, Fla. Admin. Code, provides in part that "no additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period." (E.S.). Calendar year 1986 is the period of time accepted by all parties as the "preceding 12 month period" as specified by the rule, that is, the period of time to calculate the occupancy rate for this batching cycle. See, e.g., T. 285; C.M. Ex. 5. The State Agency Action Report Occupancy Rate The State Agency Action Report computed the occupancy rate for all licensed short term psychiatric beds in District VII in calendar year 1986 at 70.13 percent. C.M. Ex. 5, p. 10. This figure was based upon data as to patient days as reported by District hospitals to the District VII local health council and was based upon 354 licensed beds in the District during the full calendar year, but excluded 56 beds the re approved but not opened. O.G. Ex. 7, p. 6. Exclusion of CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks have been designated by certificate of need issued by HRS to serve only children and adolescents. T. 507. Since those facilities by law cannot serve adults, their beds are not "adult beds," their patient days are not adult patient days, and their occupancy rate is not an adult occupancy rate. T. 1128. If CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks were excluded from the calculation of the occupancy rate in the SAAR, the occupancy rate would be 73.7 percent. This rate is a weighted average based upon a 86,779 patient days that were possible at 100 percent occupancy of all licensed short term psychiatric beds in District VII in 1986, excluding Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11, fn. 9. How Many Adult Patient Days and Beds? HRS often issues certificates of need without age restrictions, allowing the facility to provide short term psychiatric treatment to everyone, regardless of age. Such hospitals can and do serve all ages, and their licensed short term psychiatric beds are not designated as, or restricted to, adults. T. 1128-29. With the exception of Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks, none of the other licensed short term psychiatric hospitals in the District are restricted by HRS by patient age. HRS does not have data to enable it to determine which short term psychiatric beds were used by adult patients in the District in 1986. T. 1169. Use of beds for age cohorts can dramatically and continuously change during a calendar year, and 41 has no reliable means to know about such changes. T. 1229-30. Hospitals issued certificates of need without limitation as to the age of the patient are not required by HRS to report the number of patient days served by the hospital by age or age group of the patient. See T. 1218-19; HRS Ex. 2. HRS Ex. 2. Consequently, the reported short term psychiatric patient days for District VII for calendar year 1986 mix adult patient days with patient days for children and adolescents. Thus, with the exception of Laurel Oaks and Palm Bay, it is impossible in this case for the applicants and other parties in this batching cycle to untangle pure adult psychiatric patient days from the available data. T. 392, 353, 287, 291, 371, 1169-71. It is impossible on this record to make a finding of fact as to what would happen to the mixed occupancy rate all patient days attributable to adolescents and children could be excluded from the adult patient days. The only bit of evidence is found in C.M. Ex. 17, the data from Florida Hospital, which shows for that hospital that the 16 adolescent unit in 1986 had an occupancy rate of 60.92 percent, and the open adult unit had an occupancy rate of 82.42 percent. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 3. But that percentage is more a reflection of Florida Hospital's choice in how it set up the beds in the two programs than it is a reflection of need. For example, had Florida Hospital chosen to allocate only 12 beds to its adolescent program, instead of 16, the 1986 occupancy rate for that unit, based on 3,558 patients a day, would have been 81.23 percent. One wonders why Florida Hospital did not simply allocate a lower number of beds to the adolescent unit, since it had only 13 admissions to that unit in 1986. In any event, since a hospital like Florida Hospital has discretion as to how it sets up its beds with respect to the ages of patients. In those beds, the fact that it had an occupancy rate of 60.92 percent in the subunit it called the adolescent unit in 1986 is relatively meaningless when trying to predict which way a pure adult occupancy rate might change if adolescent and child patient days could be excluded. In summary, there is no accurate count of beds licensed only as adult beds, there is no accurate count of beds used only as adult beds, and there is no accurate count of adult patient days. The Problem of West Lake Hospital The record has an additional data problem with respect to calculation of the occupancy rate of adult short term psychiatric beds. West Lake Hospital is licensed for 40 short term beds (not restricted by age), and 30 long term psychiatric beds. Data for calendar year 1986, the only year relevant in this case, is a mixture of short term and long term patient days. C.M. Ex. 17. As will be discussed ahead, additional evidence as to the patient days at West Lake Hospital was excluded from evidence for failure to comply with the prehearing order. The Problem of Short Term Psychiatric Patient Days Occurring in General Hospitals Without Licensed Short Term Psychiatric Beds A general hospital with no licensed short term psychiatric care can lawfully provide temporary and sporadic short term psychiatric care in its medical-surgical beds. T. 1191. In calendar year 1986, Orlando General Hospital reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board that it provided 4,969 psychiatric (MDC 19) patient days of care. O.G. Ex. 7, p. 11. By 1988, it had over 30 psychiatric patients in the hospital at any given time. T. 753. Orlando General Hospital does not have any beds licensed for short term psychiatric care, or for long term psychiatric care, for that matter. Orlando General Hospital's psychiatric patients are currently receiving inpatient psychiatric care that is substantially the same as would be provided in a licensed short term psychiatric bed, with the exception that the care is osteopathic in nature. See T. 797, 1355-58, 1360-62, 788-90, 792-93. HRS Policy as to the Data Problems HRS stated that it "... would not attempt to fix a specific occupancy for a specific age cohort" in this case, T. 1220. A good faith attempt was made, however. Following a new policy, HRS argued that the adult bed occupancy rate should exclude the beds and patient days of hospitals having certificates of need explicitly limited to service of the needs of children and adolescents (Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks), but should include all of the licensed short term psychiatric beds at any other facility that is not restricted by patient age. T. 1127-29. It was acknowledged that the information is faulty, but the Department urges that it is the best that it can do under the circumstances. T. 1174. With respect to patient days, HRS also urges that only the patient days reported to the local health council by hospitals having licensed adult short term psychiatric beds should be counted in the mixed rate. In particular, HRS argues that it should not use patient day data reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board because such data is not limited to hospitals having "designated" psychiatric units. T. 1126-27. This argument is not reasonable. Hospitals that are legally authorized to provide short term psychiatric care to adults (i.e., having a certificate of need and a license) can provide such care in any licensed bed in the hospital, even though the bed is not licensed as a psychiatric bed. Moreover, a general hospital with no licensed short term psychiatric care, according to HRS witnesses, can lawfully provide temporary and sporadic short term psychiatric care in its medical-surgical beds. It may even provide such care on a continuous, ongoing basis, as in the case of Orlando General Hospital, although the legality of doing so is questioned by HRS. The critical question is not whether these licensed hospitals have legal authority to provide short term psychiatric care, but whether the care in fact given results in a short term psychiatric patient day in the District. If the care given is essentially the same as if the patient had been in a licensed short term psychiatric bed, it would be unreasonable not to treat the resulting statistic as a short term psychiatric patient day. What is at stake is a true measurement of District capacity. If tomorrow all of the District short term psychiatric patients and the patient days generated by such patients transferred to the District licensed short term psychiatric beds, these short term psychiatric patient days would certainly be counted in the occupancy rate. When trying to assess the real extent of availability of District capacity, a false picture of excess and unused capacity would be shown if real short term psychiatric patient days are occurring somewhere in the District, but are not counted in determining the occupancy rate. On the other hand, if the facility is not even a licensed hospital, it is presumptively providing an alternative kind of inpatient psychiatric care that is different from a licensed psychiatric hospital. Thus, its patient days are irrelevant absent some specific proof that the care given in such a bed is essentially the same as a short term psychiatric patient day in a licensed general or specialty hospital. What is an "Existing" Adult Short Term Bed? Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4e, Fla. Admin. Code, calls for the occupancy rate for "all existing" adult short term psychiatric beds in the service district, and does not define the word "existing." Petitioners assert that "existing" adult beds of the facility for purposes of determining occupancy rate is the number of beds characterized by the facility as having been in fact used for psychiatric care during the year, but only if that number is less than the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds. T. 391, 354-55. The Respondent and the Intervenor argue that "existing" adult beds is fixed by the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds granted to the facility by the state if available to serve adult patients. Normally, to be licensed a bed must be available within 24 hours. T. 1121. Orlando Regional Medical Center In calendar year 1986, Orlando Regional Medical Center had 32 licensed short term psychiatric beds. T. 348. These 32 beds were not restricted by patient age. In calendar year 1986, Orlando Regional Medical Center characterized as "in service" 32 beds for the first 7 months of 1986, 22 beds for the month of August, 18 beds for the month of September, and 12 beds for the remaining 3 months of the year. The figure of 25 beds used by the Petitioners is the weighted average. T. 348. These licensed short term psychiatric beds at Orlando Regional Medical Center were temporarily not in service because of the construction of new facilities at the hospital. Orlando Regional Medical Facility intended to reopen those beds in the future because the hospital reminded the party seeking discovery that it had 32 licensed beds, and characterized the missing beds as having been "warehoused," that is, saved for future use. T. 509-10; O.G. Ex. 7, appendix 3. Thus, all 32 of Orlando Regional Medical Center's licensed beds would be available and would be used for adult short term psychiatric care if demand existed. Florida Hospital Florida Hospital has two facilities relevant to this case, one in Orlando, in Orange County, and one in Altamonte Springs, in Seminole County. In calendar year 1986, Florida Hospital had 105 beds licensed as short term psychiatric beds. Florida Hospital would serve patients of any age in these 105 beds. C.M. Ex. 18 is a document which was obtained from Florida Hospital through discovery. T. 286. The document is entitled "Florida Hospital Center for Psychiatry Monthly Operating Statistics," and thus was assumed by Charter's expert to be Florida Hospital's characterization of its data as psychiatric data. T. 289. C.M. Ex. 18 could not have been obtained by Charter at the time it made application. It was obtainable only through the discovery process after commencement of section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., proceedings. T. 314-16, 386-87. Florida Hospital reported in discovery that in calendar year 1986, it had 113 beds operating in its "Center for Psychiatry." Of these, 16 were substance abuse beds, 13 were beds in an eating disorders unit, and 16 were adolescent beds. That left 24 beds in the intensive care unit, 24 beds in an open unit, and 20 beds at a unit at Altamonte Springs. C.M. Ex. 18. The 16 substance abuse beds clearly were not psychiatric beds. If the 13 eating disorders beds were short term psychiatric beds, Florida Hospital had 97 of its 105 licensed short term psychiatric beds in actual operation in 1986. If they were not, Florida Hospital had 84 of its 105 licensed short term psychiatric beds in actual operation in 1986. There is no evidence in this record that Florida Hospital could not and would not have readily opened 8 more short term psychiatric beds during 1986 if demand for those beds had existed, thus having "open" all 105 of its licensed beds. There is no evidence in this record that in 1986, Florida Hospital could not have closed its 16 bed adolescent unit and devoted all of those beds to adult short term psychiatric care, had there been a need. Indeed, it appears that generally speaking, that is how Florida Hospital operates: by shifting beds to other uses within its licensed authority according to demand. See T. 1322-26. Thus, all 105 of Florida Hospital's licensed beds would have been available and would have been used for adult short term psychiatric patients if the demand existed. Counting Patient Days - Are Eating Disorder Patient Days Psychiatric Patient Days? Florida Hospital reported in discovery that it had 2,982 patient days in its eating disorder unit, and that the unit operated with 13 beds. C.M. Ex. 18, P. 3, lines 8 and 26. The eating disorder unit reports to the administrative director of the Florida Hospital Center for Psychiatry. T. 977. The administrative director could not explain why the unit reported to the Center for Psychiatry. T. 977. The unit has co-directors, one a psychiatrist, and the other a specialist in internal medicine. Id. The administrative director of the Center for Psychiatry characterizes the 13 eating disorders beds as medical-surgical beds, and classifies patients in those beds as primarily having a medical problem, T. 976, but the psychiatrist co-director of the program hedged, and would not say whether the primary diagnosis is medical or psychiatric. T. 1315. The patients typically are, however, very ill from a medical point of view. T. 1314. Florida Hospital's characterization of the nature of the care given in its eating disorders unit, as summarized in the preceding paragraph, in view of the manner in which the witnesses were unclear as to how to characterize the eating disorder unit, is not evidence that the care given in that unit is not psychiatric care in view of Florida Hospital's interest in these cases in opposition to the applications. Charter's expert concluded from C.M. Ex. 18 that Florida Hospital was serving short term psychiatric patients in its eating disorders unit at Altamonte Springs. T. 287. He characterized this as a short term psychiatric service in medical-surgical beds. T. 289. But he also characterized the 13 beds as psychiatric beds. T. 287-88. HRS has issued a certificate of need to a short term psychiatric hospital limiting that certificate of need to treatment of eating disorders, thereby recognizing treatment of eating disorders in that case as a form of psychiatric treatment. T. 1191. From testimony at the hearing, it would appear that HRS's expert would view the eating disorder unit at Altamonte Springs as a short term psychiatric program. T. 1191-1192, 1194. It is concluded that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the care rendered to patients in the eating disorders unit was psychiatric care. The unit is administratively a part of the hospital's Center for Psychiatry. While the patients are very ill, medically speaking, they also have substantial mental health problems. Finally, and most persuasive, HRS has previously characterized such care as short term psychiatric care. If these 2,982 eating disorder patient days are counted as psychiatric patient days in 1986 for District VII, and if the number of beds at Florida Hospital remains as it was in the SAAR calculation (105 licensed beds), then the total patient days for the District changes from 63,976 to 66,958. The result is that the occupancy rate for District VII for 1986 for adult and mixed short term psychiatric beds changes from 73.72 percent to 77.16 percent. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 13. This calculation is the result of a weighted average discussed above. Psychiatric Patient Days Reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital report patient days by Medicare major diagnostic categories (MDC). MDC 19 is the category for psychiatric care. T. 512; O.G. Ex. 7. The data collected in this record was for calendar year 1986. T. 603-604. Relying upon MDC 19 statistics for calendar year 1986, Florida Hospital (Orlando and Altamonte Springs combined) had 28,372 MDC 19 patient days, and Orlando Regional Medical Center had 7,328 MDC 19 patient days. The Florida Hospital MDC 19 patient days shown in table 6, O.G. Ex. 7, are very close to the number of patient days shown on C.M. Ex. 18, the operating statistics from the "Center for Psychiatry" obtained from Florida Hospital in discovery. The MDC 19 patient days, 28,372, exceed the "Center for Psychiatry" reported data by only 452. The Orlando Regional Medical Center's MDO 19 patient days, 7,328, is 618 patient days greater than the patient days reported by Orlando Regional Medical Center to the local health council. If these MDC 19 patient days are assumed to be short term adult psychiatric patient days, following the same mathematical calculation used by HRS both in the SAAR and in testimony during the hearing (with the same weighted averages), the occupancy rate for adult and mixed short term psychiatric care in District VII, using licensed beds, was 78.39 percent in calendar year 1986. O.G. Ex. 7, table 6. This calculation uses the same weighted average (86,779 patient days at 100 percent occupancy) as used by all the other parties. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11, fn. 9. There is no evidence in the record that the foregoing MDC 19 patient days are limited to short term psychiatric days, or the extent to which the data considers long term patient days as well. Of course, there is also no evidence available to separate the MDC 19 patient days into adult patient days and patient days attributable to children and adolescents. Westlake Hospital Data as to Short Term Psychiatric Patient Days in 1986 The Intervenor, Florida Hospital, has renewed its effort to have F.H. Ex. 3, and testimony based upon that exhibit admitted, into evidence. The exhibit and testimony involves data as to short term psychiatric patient days for 1986 at Westlake Hospital, located in Seminole County. Florida Hospital argues that the ruling excluding F.H. Ex. 3 from evidence, as well as testimony related to that exhibit, is inconsistent with the ruling that allowed Charter Medical to introduce C.M. Ex. 19. It is argued that the only difference is that in the case of Charter Medical, the witness first testified as to the contents of the exhibit, whereas in Florida Hospital's case, the exhibit was admitted, the witness testified, and then the exhibit was excluded. Florida Hospital argues that as a result of this sequence of events, its witness was not afforded an opportunity to present the same evidence from memory without the exhibit. From a review of the sequence of events, it is apparent that there is a substantial difference between the two exhibits, as well as a substantial difference in the procedures used by counsel, and that difference necessitates the two rulings. C.M. Ex. 19 is nearly identical to C.M. Ex. 17, with three exceptions. In C.M. Ex. 19 the patient days at the Florida Hospital eating disorder unit were moved from the Orlando facility to the Altamonte Springs facility. C.M. Ex. 19 also excluded adolescent patient days from the Florida Hospital count changed the number of "existing" beds at Orlando Regional Medical Center to 25 instead of 32. T. 295. C.M. Ex. 19 made no other changes to C.M. Ex. 17 with respect to patient days or number of beds. Two objections were made by Florida Hospital to the admission of C.M. Ex. 19, that C.M. Ex. 19 had not been provided to opposing counsel at the exchange of exhibits, in violation of the prehearing order, and that C.M. Ex. 19 was an impermissible amendment to Charter Medical's application for certificate of need. T. 295-296. Only the first objection is the subject of Florida Hospital's renewed argument. The Hearing Officer at the time overruled the first objection because it was determined that C.M. Ex. 19 merely summarized the testimony of Dr. Luke as to changes he would make to C.M. Ex. 17. That ruling was correct, and should not be changed at this time. All of the underlying data for the expert analysis in C.M. Ex. 19 came into evidence without objection that it had not been exchanged among the parties. C.M. Ex. 18 contained the data as to adolescent patient days and eating disorder patient days at Florida Hospital in 196. That data came into evidence without objection that it had not been exchanged. T. 316. Dr. Luke's testimony that Orlando Regional Medical Center had only 25 beds operational in 1986 came into evidence without objection. T. 292. Dr. Luke's testimony concerning the location of the eating disorders unit at Altamonte Springs came into evidence without objection. T. 287, 291. Both of these latter evidentiary matters were of a type that easily could have been known to Dr. Luke without reference to a document to refresh his memory. Additionally, the parties were well aware of the argument that Orlando Regional Medical Center had only 25 operational beds in 1986, and that Florida Hospital had only 48 adult beds in operation in 1986, since that evidence and argument was a fundamental part of Orlando General Hospital's basic bed need exhibit, O.G. Ex. 7, and the testimony of Ms. Horowitz. Moreover, the type of analysis of the data contained in C.M. Ex. 19 is the same as that of Ms. Horowitz in O.G. Ex. 7. Thus, Florida Hospital was not caught by surprise by C.M. Ex. 19. The exhibit did not contain new data or new modes of analysis. Florida Hospital's attempt to introduce data as to the actual number of short term psychiatric patient days at Westlake Hospital in 1986 was quite different. The data as to patient days at Westlake had not been produced during the deposition of Florida Hospital's witness, although similar data for 1987 and 1988 was produced. T. 867. Had it been made available in discovery, the failure to exchange the data as an exhibit as required by the prehearing order would have been less serious. But the exhibit had not been given by Florida Hospital to opposing parties, in violation of the prehearing order. T. 869. F.H. Ex. 3 did not reorganize data that otherwise was exchanged between the parties. It attempted to introduce new raw statistical data that had not been furnished opposing counsel as required by the prehearing order. The Hearing Officer initially ruled that F.H. Ex. 3 should be admitted into evidence and allowed the witness to testify concerning the data contained in the document. T. 870-871. That initial ruling was in error. The data contained in F.H. Ex. 3 is not at all simple. The document consists of four pages of numbers representing monthly statistics in 1986 at Westlake Hospital for each of its units. It is highly unlikely that a witness could have remembered all of that data presented the data in testimony without reliance upon the exhibit. Indeed, the witness testified that all of his testimony was based upon F.H. Ex. 3. T. 907. The witness had apparently given a different impression as to Westlake's occupancy rate in 1986 during his deposition, and did so without the benefit of F.H. Ex. 3. T. 910. Florida Hospital could have asked the witness if he could have presented his testimony without reference to F.H. Ex. 3, but it did not ask the witness that critical question. In sum, the witness could not have presented his analysis from memory. He had to have F.H. Ex. 3 in front of him as he testified. On December 2, 1987, an order was entered setting this case for formal administrative hearing beginning on July 11, 1988. That order established prehearing procedures. Paragraph 3 of that order requires counsel to meet no later than 10 days before the hearing to, among other things, "examine and number all exhibits and documents proposed to be introduced into evidence at the hearing." Later in the same paragraph is the requirement that the parties file a prehearing stipulation containing a list of all exhibits to be offered at the hearing. Paragraph 3D of the prehearing order states in part that failure to comply with the requirements of the order "may result in the exclusion of testimony or exhibits." The first time that opposing counsel were given the opportunity to see the data in F.H. Ex. 3 was in the middle of the formal administrative hearing. The exhibit contained detailed raw statistical data. C.M. Ex. 19 did not try to present new raw statistical data. For these reasons, F.H. Ex. 3 and all testimony related to that exhibit by Mr. Menard was excluded from evidence. Later in the hearing, Florida Hospital sought to introduce the same data through the testimony of Wendy Thomas, the planning director and data manager for the local health council. T. 1050. Counsel for Florida Hospital first attempted to show the witness the document that had been excluded from evidence, and counsel for the other parties objected. T. 1047-1049. The Hearing Officer suggested to counsel that counsel should first ask the witness whether she had made a computation and then ask what was the basis of the computation, rather than show the witness the document. T. 1049. Counsel then attempted to do that. But when counsel asked the witness for her computation, it was still unclear whether the witness based her calculation upon data in the excluded document. T. 1053. After a number of other questions, it still was unclear whether the data in the excluded document was the basis for the calculation. T. 1053-1055. The Hearing Officer then asked the witness if she could identify F.H. Ex. 3. The witness said that F.H. Ex. 3 contained the exact type of information that she had in her own files, and that her document looked like F.H. Ex. 3, except it was photocopied smaller. T. 1056. During all of this exchange, the witness was never asked by counsel for Florida Hospital if she ever had an independent memory of the details of the underlying data, or whether, if that memory now had faded, looking at F.H. Ex. 3 would refresh her memory. Since it was apparent that the basis for the witness's calculation was the same raw statistical data as contained in F.H. Ex. 3, the Hearing Officer granted the motion to exclude the testimony. Later, in cross examination of the proffered testimony, the witness testified that the basis for her calculation was the use of a document containing the same data as F.H. Ex. 3. T. 1087-1088, 1091. Thus, counsel for Florida Hospital did not lay a proper predicate for attempting to use F.H. Ex. 3 to refresh the memory of either witness. As discussed above, had it done so, it is unlikely that either witness could have testified from memory as to the statistics because the data contained in F.H. Ex. 3 was too detailed to have ever been in the memory of either witness. Florida Hospital argued that Ms. Thomas's calculation should be admitted because the raw data had been in her possession for over a year. That argument is unpersuasive. The raw data was in the possession of Westlake Hospital as well. The issue is not whether opposing parties might have discovered the data on their own, but compliance with the prehearing order requiring exchange of important exhibits. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer's rulings as to exclusion of the foregoing evidence will remain unchanged. The Local Health Plan Applicability No part of the District VII local health plan was adopted by HRS as a rule when these applications were and reviewed. T. 1214. Several years ago, with respect to applications for certificates of need for short term psychiatric beds, HRS considered need and occupancy rates only on a district-wide basis. T. 1184. See e.g. C.M. Ex. 20, where HRS did not refer to the local health plan as to these issues in District VII. HRS has now changed that policy, however, and considers need and occupancy at the district level and by portions of the District if those issues are effectively required by the local health plan. T. 1184. For purposes of planning for short term psychiatric services, the local health plan divides District VII into county "planning areas." Orange County is thus a local health plan planning area. The local health plan does not use planning areas for substance abuse planning, and it does not explain why there is a difference in planning. Orlando General and Charter both propose to locate their proposed short term adult psychiatric beds in Orange County if granted certificates of need. Counties are convenient units for health planning purposes because population data exists by county. T. 1180. Census tracts and zip code areas are also convenient geographical units for health planning. T. 1180-81. If a proposed facility is to be located very close to the county line, it would make no difference which side of the line it was on with respect to the ability of the facility to serve patients originating in either county. T. 1181. Allocation of Net Need to Orange County The local health plan, policy 3, provides that if the application of rule 10-5.011(1)(o) indicates a need (at the District level), the need is to be allocated among the counties in the district using the state numeric need method by county. T. 1027-29; C.M. Ex. 5. Applying all of the age calculations for the projected populations and bed inventory of Orange County only, the local health plan allocates 55 new short term psychiatric beds to Orange County by 1992. However, applying the allocation ratios of the rule, there is an excess of 18 short term psychiatric beds in general hospitals, and thus none of the 55 beds would be mainly allocable to a general hospital. There is, nonetheless, a potential allocation of need of 73 beds in either a specialty or a general hospital, and the net need of 55 beds could be allocated to either a specialty hospital or a general hospital. The Orange County Mixed Occupancy Rate The local health plan, policy 4, applies the 75 percent occupancy standard to the county level. The policy explicitly calls for an average annual occupancy rate for all existing facilities in the planning area with respect to adult short term psychiatric beds. C.M. Ex. 5. Relying upon the calculation in the SAAR, but deleting Laurel Oaks, the mixed occupancy rate for Grange County in 1986 was less than 58.4 percent. This calculation only includes the beds at Florida Hospital (Orlando) and Orlando Regional Medical Center. The calculation is based upon 18,696 patient days at Florida Hospital (Orlando) in 85 beds, and 6,242 patient days in Orlando Regional Medical Center in 32 beds. There were 4,969 MDC 19 patient days occurring at Orlando General Hospital in 1986. There were 7,328 MDC 19 patient days occurring at Orlando Regional Medical Center in 1986. The eating disorder patient days occurred in Seminole County (Altamonte springs) and should not be counted in an Orlando occupancy rate. The only data as to patient days at Florida Hospital, Orlando only, is that found in C.M. Ex. 18, which is the same as the SAAR, which reports 18,696 patient days. (The MDC 19 data mixes the two units.) The number of licensed short term psychiatric beds in Orange County in 1986 was 117. All of these beds were licensed the entire year, and thus there was no need to do a weighted average of potential patient days for these beds. See C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11; O.G. Ex. 7, table 6. Using all of the foregoing patient days, the number of patient days was 30,993, the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds was 117, and the mixed occupancy rate for Orange County for 1986 was 72.6 percent. If it is not appropriate to count the 4,969 patient days at Orlando General Hospital in the Orange County occupancy rate, the 1986 Orange County occupancy rate was only 60.09 percent. Conversion of Existing Beds and Service to Indigent Patients Policy 5 of the local health plan states that excess bed capacity in, among other types of beds, medical/surgical beds, should be eliminated by reallocation of beds among the services, including psychiatric services. Policy 6 of the local health plan states that primary consideration should be given for project approval to applicants who satisfy to the greatest extent the following priorities: The first priority is to applicants who commit to serving "underserved client groups," including Medicaid, Baker Act, and medically indigent patients. The second priority is to applicants who convert underutilized existing beds. As will be discussed in the conclusions of law, Orlando General's application satisfies these priorities, and Charter Medical's application does not. Other Evidence as to Future Need Historically, health care providers have been reimbursed on a fee- for-service basis. The more services provided, the greater the payment. These insurance arrangements had little incentive to decrease the level of services. T. 720. In the last three or four years, the health insurance industry has changed its methods of providing insurance. A very large percentage of insured patient care is now managed by use of flat rates based upon a per person count (capitation). The rates do not increase related to utilization. Managed health care reimbursement uses a system whereby the health care provider is paid a flat rate annually for each insured person, and agrees to provide for the health care needs of all such persons generally without considering the degree of utilization during the year. T. 722-723. Under the capitation system, the provider has the incentive to provide only such care that, in intensity or duration, is the minimum that is clinically acceptable. T. 724. Psychiatric services have been included in the movement of the industry toward managed health care reimbursement rather than fee-for-service reimbursement. T. 722. The health care industry now offers competitive managed health care plans in central Florida, and the trend is for an increase in the availability of such methods of reimbursement in central Florida. T. 726-727. It is now 40 percent of the insurance market, and in the early 1990's, the percentage of managed health care may be twice that percentage. T. 727. The effect of the new reimbursement system is to substantially lower the length of stay, and to lower the rate of admission as well, at short term psychiatric hospitals. T. 724-725, 881-882, 1319-1320. Orlando General Hospital projected that its average length of stay would be 30 days in 1992. It has discovered from current experience that its average length of stay is about 15 days. T. 433, 464. District VII has recently experienced an increase in the availability of community based mental health facilities. These facilities provide a variety of mental health services, including brief inpatient care. The facilities do not require a certificate of need. T. 1046-1047, 1319. The Nature of the Proposed Programs Orlando General Hospital General Orlando General is a 197 bed acute care general osteopathic hospital located in Orlando, Florida, in Orange County. Orlando General proposes to convert a 35 bed medical-surgical unit to 24 short term psychiatric beds at a capital cost of $689,272. It would relocate 11 of its medical-surgical beds, and convert the remainder to short term psychiatric beds. Orlando General Hospital is located in the southeast portion of Orange County. T. 1107. It is the most eastward facility in Orange County with the exception of a long term psychiatric hospital now under construction. T. 1107. The primary service area of Orlando General by location of physicians offices is the southern half of Seminole County and the northern portion of Orange County. In particular, the hospital serves northeastern Orange County through the location of its physicians' offices. T. 412; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 27. The program of treatment described in Orlando General's application is no longer an accurate description of Orlando General's current program or of the intended program. T. 453. The treatment programs planned for the new short term psychiatric unit are comparable to the programs planned by Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., and are adequate and appropriate programs for short term psychiatric care. Psychiatric Care for the Elderly Orlando General Hospital would provide adequate and appropriate specialized short term psychiatric care for elderly patients, but would not provide such care in a unit physically separated from other patients. There currently is a split of professional opinion as to whether or not geriatric patients should be treated in a psychiatric unit separated (physically as well as programmatically) from other patients. There are benefits from both approaches. T. 1315-1317, 68, 74-76, 43-45, 770. Various Charter Medical hospitals do it both ways. T. 70. Osteopathic Medicine at Orlando General Hospital Osteopathic medicine differs from allopathic medicine in its emphasis upon viewing the interaction of all parts of the body, rather than a single part, and the use of muscular and skeletal manipulation. T. 1349, 753-754. Orlando General Hospital is an osteopathic hospital and has been osteopathic in nature since the 1960's. It was founded by osteopathic physicians, and the hospital abides by osteopathic philosophies. The Board of Trustees at the hospital are all osteopathic physicians. Although it has medical doctors on staff, the majority are osteopathic physicians Orlando General Hospital is accredited by the American Osteopathic Association to train osteopathic physicians, and has such training programs, primarily in family medicine. T. 412-414, 755. There are about 80 osteopathic physicians in Orange County, and the vast majority are on the staff at Orlando General Hospital. T. 760. Patients who prefer osteopathy, and osteopathic physicians, prefer an osteopathic hospital. Osteopathic physicians believe that they deliver better care to their patients in an osteopathic facility rather than an allopathic facility. About 30 percent of the psychiatric patients treated by Dr. Greene at Orlando General Hospital receive manipulation as a therapy. T. 1351. There is a shortage of osteopathic psychiatrists. T. 756. Other than Randall Greene, D.O., there are no osteopathic psychiatrists in the Orange County area. Id. There is a shortage of places for psychiatric resident training. There is no osteopathic psychiatric residency in Florida, and only a few in the country. T. 764, 1349. Consequently, osteopaths seeking to become psychiatrists often have to go to allopathic hospitals for residencies. T. 1349 Residency in an allopathic hospital is often not approved by the American College of osteopathic psychiatrists. Thus the osteopath who has had his or her residency in an allopathic hospital and lacks such approval will not be readily accepted as an osteopathic psychiatrist on the staff of an osteopathic hospital. T. 1350. Orlando General Intends to have a residency program in osteopathic psychiatric for at least two positions if it is granted a certificate of need. T. 762, 415. The Evolution of Osteo-Psychiatric Care at Orlando General Hospital Dr. Randall Greene came to Orlando in 1982. He is an osteopathic physician and psychiatrist. He initially was on the staff at four hospitals but soon discovered that other osteopathic physicians were referring patients needing psychiatric care to Orlando General Hospital because it was an osteopathic hospital. These physicians frequently asked Dr. Greene to provide psychiatric care at Orlando General. T. 754. Osteopathic physicians who referred their patients to Dr. Greene and to Orlando General Hospital continued to treat the physical ailments of those patients at Orlando General Hospital. T. 760. Dr. Greene now limits his psychiatric practice to Orlando General Hospital because of the large number of psychiatric patients being treated at the hospital. T. 756. Thirty to forty percent of the psychiatric patients come to Orlando General via the emergency room. T. 421, 445. Additionally, patients admitted to the new substance abuse program often need psychiatric care. T. 407. Orlando General has difficulty transferring its psychiatric patients to other hospitals. A number of the patients have no insurance or have only Medicaid coverage. T. 420. Orlando General Hospital is located in a lower economic area, and thus attracts patients of this type. Id. Patients who prefer osteopathic treatment also prefer not to be transferred to an allopathic hospital. T. 759. The increase in numbers of psychiatric patients served at Orlando General Hospital in medical-surgical beds helped to offset the hospital's loss of medical-surgical patient days during the same period. T. 452 Due to the large number of psychiatric patients, and the decline in need for medical-surgical beds, Orlando General hospital decided to apply for the instant certificate of need. Due to the osteopathic nature of the hospital, physicians, patients and the hospital prefer to keep these patients at Orlando General Hospital rather than refer them to an allopathic hospital. It is HRS's position that if a hospital does not advertise itself as having a distinct psychiatric unit and does not organize within itself a distinct psychiatric unit, the admission and treatment of psychiatric patients to medical-surgical beds on an "random" and unplanned basis is proper even the hospital does not have licensed psychiatric beds. T. 1191. Orlando General hospital does not hold itself out to the public through advertising as having a separate psychiatric unit. T. 468. Patient Mix & Commitment to Charity Care Orlando General Hospital currently provides a large portion of charity care for Orange County. T. 1100. In its 26 bed chemical dependency unit, Orlando General reserves 2 beds for indigents. T. 785. The unit also sets aside, as needed, one bed for any Florida nurse whose license is in jeopardy due to chemical dependence and who has no financial means to pay for treatment. Id. Orlando General Hospital typically has a larger amount of bad debt and charity care (for people who do not pay) than other hospitals in the area. T. 423. In 1987, Orlando General Hospital reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board that it had $141,404 in charity care, and that it had $3,244,530 in bad debt. T. 657, 660. Bad debt constituted 9.7 percent of gross revenue. T. 660. Since it is very difficult to determine at admission whether the patient realistically can pay for services, a lot of this bad debt is, in a functional sense, charity care. T. 659-660. It is concluded from the foregoing that Orlando General Hospital has a genuine commitment to providing health care to persons who cannot pay. T. 422, 662. Orlando General Hospital projects that it will in its proposed 24 bed short term psychiatric unit 5 percent indigent patients, 8 percent Medicaid patients, 20 percent Medicare patients, 50 percent insured patients, and 17 percent private pay patients. These projections are reasonable and are consistent with Orlando General Hospital's current experience. T. 662-664; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 16. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. General Charter Medical proposes to construct a 50 bed free standing short term psychiatric hospital in Orange County, Florida. The capital cost of the proposed project would $5,85,000. C.M. Ex. 1. Charter Medical would offer adult and geriatric short term psychiatric services in the proposed short term beds. As a free standing specialty hospital devoted entirely to short term psychiatric care, Charter Medical's proposal should be able to provide more space and additional therapies than would typically be found at a general hospital with a short term psychiatric unit. T. 47-50, 890-91. Charter Medical would provide adequate geriatric short term psychiatric care in a separate unit with separate programs consisting of the latest techniques for caring for the mentally ill elderly patient. Charter Medical's proposed facility would not be able to treat short term psychiatric patients who also have serious medical problems, which undoubtedly will include elderly patients. Charter Medical would have adequate transfer arrangements with a general hospital to serve the medical needs of its patients, and would have adequate staffing and equipment within the free standing specialty hospital to meet the routine and emergency medical needs of its patients. Staffing Orlando General and Charter Medical would be able to recruit, train, and retain adequate staff to operate its proposed short term psychiatric unit. T. 635-648, 849-852, T. 137-143. Lone Term Financial Feasibility Orlando General Hospital Charges When these applications were filed, HRS did not have standards for the contents of a pro forma of income and expenses. Orlando General Hospital initially projected a charge rate of $350 in 1987 and $375 in 1988. This charge rate was based upon the charge rate for Orlando General's substance abuse unit at that time, compared with a survey of five other hospitals having short term psychiatric beds. T. 425; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 24, 49. As of the summer of 1988, the Medicaid program reimbursed Orlando General Hospital for its MDC 19 (psychiatric) patients at the rate of $418 per day. T. 585. Charter Medical proposes to charge $475 per day during 1988. Florida Hospital currently charges between $425 and $445 per short term psychiatric patient day, and these charges do not include ancillary charges. T. 992. Westlake Hospital currently charges about $550 per short term psychiatric patient day. T. 888. Winter Park Pavilion is a freestanding psychiatric hospital with 39 adult psychiatric beds. The record does not indicate whether it is licensed for short or long term care. The facility charges about $500 per patient day, which does not include ancillary costs. T. 913, 918. Crossroads University Behavioral Center is a freestanding 100 bed long term psychiatric hospital that is under construction. T. 808. Crossroads has considered charges in the range of $500 to $600 per day, but has not definitely settled on the rate. T. 832-833. The charges proposed by Orlando General Hospital in its application are very reasonable, if not very conservative. Projected Utilization Orlando General Hospital's MDC 19 patient days (psychiatric patient days) have increased steadily from 1986. In 1986, the hospital had 4,969 MDC 19 patient days; in 1987, it had 7,779 MDC 19 patient days; and extrapolating (multiplying by 4) from the data for the first three months of 196, Orlando General could reasonably expect 11,804 MDC 19 patient days in 1988. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 11; T. 516. Since a 24 bed unit at 100 percent occupancy would only generate 8,760 patient days, it is unreasonable to use 11,804 as the estimate of patient days in 1988. However, it is concluded that Orlando General Hospital would have no difficulty at all in very quickly filling its proposed 24 bed unit to capacity. Expenses Orlando General Hospital's application estimated that direct expenses of the proposed 24 bed short term psychiatric unit would be $801,505 in 1987, $839,080. In 1988, and $887,030 in 1989. O.G. Ex. 2. These are reasonable projections of direct expenses. The pro forma filed by Orlando General Hospital in its application did not include an estimate of allocated expenses. The allocated expenses would typically have been 60 percent of total expenses, and the direct expenses only 40 percent of total expenses. T. 698. The projected direct expenses for 1988 in Orlando General Hospital's application were $839,080. Since that is only 40 percent of the total expense, the total projected expense (including 60 percent for indirect allocated expense) would be $2,097,700. Long Term Financial Feasibility If Orlando General Hospital charged $375 per patient day in 1988, and had 8,760 patient days, as is reasonable to expect, given its actual experience, Orlando General would have $3,285,000 in gross revenue for 1988. Assuming that net revenue, after additions and after accounting for contractuals and bad debt, will be the same percentage of gross revenue as shown in Orlando General's application, which was 76.74 percent, this would generate a net revenue of $2,520,909. This net revenue would entirely cover not only the direct expenses but also the allocated expenses, and would leave profit of $423,209. All of the remaining issues raised by the parties as to the accuracy of Orlando General's estimates of nursing expense or bad debt are irrelevant given the large amount of leeway Orlando General would have, if necessary, to raise its charges from $375 to something closer to the charges of other area hospitals. In summary, Orlando General Hospital's proposal is financially feasible in the long term. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Charter Medical's proposed charges include charges for physicians who admit patients, perform histories and physicals, and make daily medical rounds. The proposed charges are reasonable. If there were need, Charter Medical's proposal would be financially feasible in the long term. The need for Charter Medical's proposed facility has not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, however. See the Conclusions of Law herein. While the numerical need rule as applied to Orange County shows a need for 55 beds, in actual practice that need is a need for osteopathic psychiatric care. The thirty or so patients currently treated on a daily basis at Orlando General Hospital ended up at that hospital, rather than Orlando Regional Medical Center or Florida Hospital, primarily because the patients preferred osteopathic care and were admitted to Orlando General Hospital by osteopathic physicians. Absent action by HRS to stop Orlando General Hospital from treating these patients, the patients would not be available to Charter Medical in its proposed facility. This would leave Charter Medical in a situation of opening a new 50 bed facility when the county occupancy rate in 1986 was 60 percent in the only two licensed facilities in the area. It would also leave Charter Medical in a situation of opening a new facility in the face of the trend to managed health care and the certainty that the average length of stay for short term psychiatric care by 1992 will decrease from current levels. For these reasons, Charter Medical has not proven financially feasibility in the long term by a preponderance of the evidence. Quality of Care Orlando General Hospital Orlando General Hospital would provide care of good quality comparable to care that would be provided by Charter Medical. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Charter Medical Corporation is a large corporation that has experience in the operation of a large number of psychiatric hospitals. That expertise would be available to insure that the care provided in Orange County would be of good quality. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., would provide care of good quality comparable to care that would be provided by Orlando General. Comparative Review as to Important Differences The Orlando General Hospital Application Orlando General Hospital intends to convert 24 underutilized medical and surgical beds to 24 short term psychiatric beds. T. 517. Since the project calls for conversion of existing facilities, the capital cost is $700,000, and does not include the construction of new buildings. T. 517. Since the capital cost is relatively low, the project will not drain away a large amount of reimbursement from reimbursement funding sources, thus making those funds available to other health care facilities. T. 1223. As a licensed general hospital, Orlando General Hospital's patients including the patients that would be served by the proposed short term psychiatric unit, would be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement T. 1224. Orlando General Hospital has a good record in Orange County of serving indigent patients, and currently is providing care to a large portion of the indigents cared for by Orange County. T. 1099-1100. As discussed in the section concerning osteopathic care, Orlando General Hospital's proposal for a short term psychiatric unit would have a number of benefits to the practice of osteopathic medicine in the region, and the availability of osteopathic care to patients desiring that form of care. Patients in the short term psychiatric unit at Orlando General Hospital could be transferred to a medical bed when a medical need arises without having to be transported by an ambulance. The Charter Medical Application Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation. Charter Medical Corporation has been in existence for 20 years and has 81 hospitals. Of these, 68 are psychiatric or substance abuse facilities. Charter Medical thus has extensive resources and experience to provide very good psychiatric care at the proposed facility. As a free standing hospital dedicated solely to short term psychiatric care, it is reasonable to expect that Charter Medical's facility will tend to provide more space, more varied programs, and more intensive patient care than a general hospital. This would occur because in a general hospital, the psychiatric unit must compete with medical units for allocation of resources, and in some hospitals, the psychiatric unit is given a lower priority due to the tendency of such hospitals to emphasize the medical aspect of their services. T. 47-49. Charter Medical's facility would not treat Medicaid patients, and it proposes to serve a very small percentage of indigent patients. Charter proposes in future years after the second year to provide 1.5 percent of gross revenue as charity care, and 5 percent as bad debt. T. 377-79, 197. Charter Medical's facility would serve primarily private pay and insured patients, thus draining away these paying patients from other hospitals, to the detriment of other hospitals. T. 971. The Substantial Interest of Florida Hospital If a certificate of need were granted to Charter Medical, Florida Hospital would suffer an adverse impact by loss of patients and additional competition for staff. T. 971-972, 1318-1321, 1327.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended in case number 87-4748 that a final order be entered denying the application of Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., to construct and operate a new 50 bed short term psychiatric hospital, and in case number 87-4753 that a final order be entered granting the application of Orlando General Hospital to convert 24 medical-surgical beds to short term psychiatric beds. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX 1 TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-4748 and 87-4753 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by the parties. Statements of fact in this appendix or proposed findings of fact adopted by reference in this appendix are additional findings of fact. Findings of fact proposed by Charter Medical: 3-5. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The need is for beds in either a specialty or a general hospital. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The operational use of the beds is not relevant to the occupancy rate. Had the beds been restricted as a matter of licensure to children, like Palm Bay or Laurel Oaks, the beds would not have been potentially available for adults. Only in that case would exclusion of these beds have been proper. The operational use of the beds is not relevant to the occupancy rate. The testimony regarding the use of the word "existing" in the health planning field has been rejected as not persuasive. The context of such use was not explained, and thus a finding cannot be made that the use of the word is properly applicable to the way HRS intends the word to be used in its occupancy rule. The equation of "existing" with "operational" confuses capacity and need as discussed elsewhere in this recommended order. The HRS interpretation is the most reasonable construction of the word, and leads to a meaning far more consistent with the purposes of the certificate of need regulatory law than does the equation of "existing" with merely being operational. The certificate of need law is aimed at determining need five years into the future. How a hospital may temporarily operate its licensed beds during that period to respond to fluctuations in demand and operational idiosyncrasies at the particular hospital is irrelevant to the question of whether HRS should grant certificates of need and additional licensed capacity within the District. Dr. Luke's calculation was conservative and correct, but a better calculation is the one by Orlando General's expert (78 percent) that uses MDC 19 patient days. The only relevant count is 105 licensed beds at the two facilities. The last sentence is rejected for lack of credible evidence from which to draw that inference, as explained elsewhere in this recommended order. 20-21. The only relevant count is licensed beds. 22. Orlando General's average daily census was 13.6 based upon 4,969 MDC 19 patient days in 1986. 23-24. The only relevant count is licensed beds. 28. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 30. It is true that the health care needs of the metropolitan Orlando impact counties adjacent to Orange County due to the sprawl of that urban area across several county lines. But there is sufficient expert evidence in this record to conclude that generally speaking, the local health council has not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its choices of counties as health planning areas for purposes of allocation of bed need and for purposes of applying occupancy rates. Nonetheless, the that the urban extent of the metropolitan Orlando area is important has been accepted in this recommended order with respect to the conclusion that the factor that the Orange County occupancy rate is only slightly below 75 percent is entitled to less weight in this case. 32, 33, 35, 37-63. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 64 (first sentence). It is realistically expected that Charter Medical will devote 1.5 percent of its gross patient revenue to barity care. T. 377- 379. 65-70. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 71-72. Financial feasibility has not been shown due to lack of need. Lack of need will result in insufficient occupancy and revenue. 73-74. The extrapolation from the actual trend of increase in patient days in District VII for the years 1983-1987 to create a projection of patient days in 1988 through 1992 would have been a valid and important way to show need, and would have been accepted had the projection accounted for the trend in the industry toward shorter lengths of stay due to changes in methods of payments for mental health care. The extrapolation simply assumes that the past will continue. In this case, there is substantial reason to believe that the past will not continue, that the base data, 1983-1987, is not valid for predicting patient days in 1992 because the patient days in 1992 will largely be paid for under a new system, a system that discourages inpatient stays beyond that which is absolutely necessary from a clinical point of view. Charter Medical projects that it will rely upon insurance for payment 67 percent of the time, so the changes in insurance payments will substantially affect patient days in 1992 at its proposed facility. 75-85. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 89. While osteopathic psychiatric care is essentially the same as allopathic psychiatric care, there are two critical differences. Osteopathic medicine in general emphasizes consideration of the functioning of the body as a whole; allopathic medicine does not. Secondly, osteopathic medicine utilizes muscular and skeletal manipulation in treatment, including psychiatric treatment, and allopathic medicine does not. These two differences are sufficiently marked for patients to have a preference for one or the other approach. 91-92. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 93-94. These proposed findings are true and are adopted by reference, but the findings do not prove that the quality of care at Orlando General Hospital would not be adequate in 1992. It was apparent that Dr. Greene's heavy caseload was not an optimum circumstance. However, at the time of the , Orlando General had four staff psychiatrists. T. 1355. Dr. Greene testified that the care was "basically" the same, but his testimony clearly reflected his opinion that the "deeper" differences were significant. T. 756, 1350-1354. The record cited does not support a finding that the majority of the patients transferred were indigent. That question was not asked. This proposed finding places the cart before the horse. Osteopathic physicians gravitate to Orlando General Hospital to practice osteopathy. In the practice of osteopathy, they achieve many job satisfactions, including care of patients and making money. 98-99. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant because based upon the past, not upon a future having more staff psychiatrists. Moreover, it is clinically acceptable for other professionals to provide therapy and counseling. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. The program description in the application was superseded by evidence during the formal administrative hearing. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. Orlando General Hospital is an existing hospital that already has these functions. It may need some augmentation of staff in these areas, but if it does, it would be an unreasonable conclusion to make that it would fail to add such 103-106. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The only exception is the last sentence in proposed finding 106. The number 18 is not supported by the record cited. This method has not been shown to be unreasonable. It is true that it was the method used. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. There was an accounting for bad debt. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 48. The point is essentially irrelevant. A 10 percent increase based upon 1987 salaries would be only about 20,000. Moreover, Charter Medical stipulated in the prehearing stipulation that the salaries of all personnel are reasonable. The proposed finding of fact is true but irrelevant. A pro forma does not have to comport with generally accepted accounting principles. Even with the addition of these charges, the resultant charge is comparable to charges of other area hospitals, including. Charter Medical's proposed charge of $475, which with inflation would increase rapidly to $500. 113-122, 124. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 125-127. Proof that an existing health care program is in sound financial condition is essentially irrelevant to the question of whether that program has a substantial interest sufficient to permit intervention into a section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., formal proceeding. Proof of competition for the same patients in the same service area is sufficient to show that the existing program will be "substantially affected" to entitle it to intervene. Section 381.709(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). Florida Hospital has proven its substantial interest by showing that the addition of new short term psychiatric beds, particularily a new facility like proposed by Charter Medical, will increase competition in Orange County for patients and staff. T. 881, 883, 649, 855-856. 128-129. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference 130. Mr. Holton's testimony was not only based upon consideration of the data mentioned in this proposed finding of fact, but also his experience in general with managed health care plans and the effect such plans have had upon the market place. The proposed finding that his testimony was not credible is rejected. 131 (first two sentences), 132-133. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. Findings of Fact proposed by Orlando General Hospital: 7-12, 17, 19, 29. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The statement is true only from the perspective of the osteopathic psychiatrist and with respect to osteopathic care. Allopathic physicians disagree. The second sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 34. The second sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 38-49, 51-60. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The proposition that separate geriatric units offer no benefits to geriatric patients is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The proposition that there is no problem in mixing the elderly with younger patients, or that an elderly patient does much better in a mixed population, is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The second and third sentences are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 67-71, 73-80. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 86-87. While these proposed findings of fact are true, they are only marginally relevant since the ratio is measured as of 1992, not 1988. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. It is unclear when Dr. Greene meant when he testified that his census was 35 to 40 patients. For the first 90 days of 1988, the hospital had 2,951 MDC 19 patient days, or 32.8 patients per day. The analysis with respect to "existing" beds and the county analysis have been rejected as explained in this recommended order. The last sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 97-102. The legal argument that beds temporarily not in operation are not "existing" has been rejected as explained in this recommended order. Thus, these findings are not relevant. 105, 107 (last sentence). These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 109. The second sentence is rejected as a finding of fact because the health planning context was not adequately explained. 110-111. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 114-115. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 117. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 118-120. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. 122. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 123, 124, 126, 127, 129-131, 133. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The proposed finding of fact is true, but has not been shown to impact the financial feasibility of the Charter Medical proposal. The indirect costs within a single hospital are more relevant to long term financial feasibility of the proposed project than the indirect costs to a single hospital from a parent corporation that has over 60 such hospitals. 136, 147, 151, 152. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The patient body count for the first three months of 1988 was 32.8. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 11. The "consciousness" of a corporation is difficult . Orlando General Hospital was well aware that its medical-surgical census was decreasing and its psychiatric population was increasing. It is true that the increase of its psychiatric population was largely due to causes outside the control of the hospital, however, and not due to marketing efforts by the hospital. 161 (last sentence), 162. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. This proposed finding of fact is only marginally relevant because the result could be an average caused a minority of states who do things differently. Moreover, there Is no evidence that Florida is like this. The third sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 167. The statement is true only if HRS allows Orlando General Hospital to continue to serve this large number of psychiatric patients without having a certificate of need. If the practice were discontinued, some of the patients would be served by other hospitals in the District, including Florida Hospital. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 174, 176. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 177. The current state of access to short term psychiatric services in eastern Orange County was not credibly proven. 179. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. Findings of fact proposed by HRS: 1, 2, 3, 4. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 5, 6. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 13. The number should be 64, not 63. 22. The occupancy rate is a mathematical attempt to measure the degree to which the District VII capacity to serve adult short term psychiatric patients has been used up. The theory implicit in the rule is that, with respect to adult capacity, the decision to add new capacity should be delayed until the old capacity is at least 75 percent or more used up. The rate has a numerator (patient days) and a denominator (the real capacity). Any argument that tries to ignore real patient days occurring in the District, or real capacity to serve those patients, is unreasonable. Findings of fact proposed by Florida Hospital: The second sentence is true, but the issue is not she license of the beds is, but what type of patient day is generated by that service. The preponderance of the evidence is that those were short term psychiatric patient days. The first sentence is rejected for the reasons stated above. 19-21. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 20-27. F.H. Ex. 3 was excluded from evidence, and the testimony related to that exhibit was also excluded from evidence for the reasons stated elsewhere in this recommended order. 28. This proposed finding fails to consider the MDC 19 evidence of patient days at Florida Hospital and Orlando Regional Medical Center. 29-30. These proposed findings of fact are true, and the reasoning therein is part of the reason why the denominator of the fraction that is the occupancy rate must be licensed beds. 31. A correction to the number of patient days at Westlake Hospital is legally appropriate, but the evidence for such a correction has been excluded from the record for reasons having nothing to do with the legal propriety of such a correction. 33. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 34-39. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The fact that existing facilities may have beds available to treat future patients is not inconsistent with a decision to grant a certificate of need for additional licensed beds. The occupancy rate threshold in the rule is 75 percent occupancy, not 100 percent occupancy. It is to be expected that the District will have 25 percent or less of its beds unoccupied when new beds are approved. 41, 43-44, 46-47. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. See section 381.705(1)(g) and (h), Fla. Stat. (1987). This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. To the contrary, where need exists, these are grounds for determining which of the competing applicants should be approved. 60. A conclusion that the occupancy rates are "stable" cannot be made from data based only upon calendar year 1986, which was two years ago, and six years from 1992, the time when need is projected. 61-69. These findings of fact are true. Even where there is need, the opening of the new facility normally lures some patients away from existing facilities. But if need exists sufficient to grant a certificate of need, this short term harm to existing providers is irrelevant. Finally, health care costs would not increase if there is need. While it is true that the Charter Medical utilization projections were initially prepared without a close analysis of District VII, the projections are nonetheless reasonable as discussed elsewhere in this recommenced order. Inflation of expenses without projection of inflation in revenues is an incomplete and unreasonable mode of projection. T. 229-230. Given the size of the Charter Medical Corporation and the number of hospitals it owns and operates, the condition of one more hospital will not Increase home office expenses. Those expenses will exist whether this project exists or not. The financial feasibility of the project in Orlando, therefor, need not consider home office expenses. T. 242-244. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The quantitative relevancy of this proposed finding of fact has not been shown. The proposed finding of fact is otherwise true. Orlando General Hospital's current patient census is a sufficient basis for a finding that its projected occupancy rate is reasonable. Charges proposed in an application for a certificate of need are not promises binding upon the applicant. In future years, the applicant is reasonably expected to make substantial changes in its charge structure based upon market conditions. Proposed charges, as well as proposed changes to charges to meet altered contingencies beyond the control of the applicant, is entirely appropriate for analysis in a certificate of need case. The only relevant question is whether the altered charge compares favorably with competing applicants. 81-83. Florida Hospital proved that the market for staff is competitive and that hiring staff is difficult at the moment. But it did not prove that the applicants would fail to hire adequate staff to operate their proposed facilities. T. 1327. 92-102. These proposed findings of fact summarize proposed findings of fact which have previously been addressed. APPENDIX 2 TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-4748 and 87-4753 Rule 10-5.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code, provides that "[s]ubsequent to an application being deemed complete by the Office of Health Planning and Development, no further information or amendment will be accepted by the Department." (E.S.) The rule states that the Department will accept no information after the application is deemed complete. The words used are not ambiguous or unclear. Thus, if normal rules of construction were to be followed, the conclusion would be drawn $ha the Department is bound by its own clear rule, and cannot, by interpretation, add exceptions. But an equally valid rule of construction is that absurd results must be avoided. Certificate of need cases, particular ones like the case at bar, are highly competitive and complicated. It would be unreasonable to require the applicants to prove applications that have become erroneous due to the passage of time. While the question is a close one, the Hearing Officer has concluded that it would be better to ignore the clear words of the rule, and attempt to apply the evolving interpretative policy of the Department to avoid an absurd result. The following appear to be the existing final orders of the Department interpreting rule 10-5.008(3), and its predecessor, published in the Florida Administrative Law Reports. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Palm Beach, 8 F.A.L.R. 4650 (September 24, 1986); Arbor Health Care Company, Inc., d/b/a Martin Health Center, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 709 (October 13, 1986); Mease Hospital and Clinic v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 159 (October 13, 1986); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Collier County v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 8 F.A.L.R. 5883 (December 8, 1986); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Nursing Center of Highlands County, v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1081 (December, 1986); Manatee Mental Health Center, Inc. d/b/a Manatee Crisis Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 1430 (February 2, 1987); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Hillsborouh, v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1630 (February 5, 1987); Manor Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1628 (March 2, 1987); Psychiatric Institutes of America, Inc., d/b/a Psychiatric Institute of Orlando v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 1626a (March 5, 1987) ; Manor Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2139 (March 24, 1987); Wuesthoff Health Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2110 (April 17, 1987); Hialeah Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2363 (May 1, 1987); Palms Residential Treatment Center, Inc., d/b/a Manatee Palms Residential Treatment Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 10 F.A.L.R. 1425 (February 15, 1988). These final orders contain the following statements concerning the Department's interpretation of rule 10-5.008(3) and its evolving policy with respect to changes to applications for certificates of need during section proceedings and admissibility of new information not contained in the original applications: Health Care and Retirement, supra, 8 F.A.L.R. 1081: During 120.57 proceedings, an application may be updated to address facts extrinsic to the application such as interest rates, inflation of construction costs, current occupancies, compliance with new state or local health plans, and changes in bed or service inventories. An applicant is not allowed to update by adding additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS. Manatee Mental Health Center, supra, 9 F.A.L.R. at 1431: ... HRS has authority by statute to issue a CON for an identifiable portion of . Section 381.4C4(8), Florida Statutes. MMHC's "amended" proposal reduced the number of beds sought, and was properly considered during the 120.57 proceedings. Manor Care. Inc., supra, 9 F.A.L.R. at 1628: The amended applications [amended to address needs of Alzheimer's disease patients] changed the scope and character of the proposed facilities and services and thus, must be reviewed initially at HRS... [ limited the denovo concept by requiring that evidence of changed circumstances be considered only if relevant to the application. Hialeah Hospital, Inc., 9 F.A.L.R. at 2366: It is recognized that more than a year may pass between the free form decision by HRS and the final 120.57 hearing and this passage of time may require updating an application by evidence of changed circumstances such as the' effect of inflation on interest and construction costs. For the sake of clarity HRS would avoid the use of the word "amendment" to describe such updating. Such evidence of changed circumstances beyond the control of the applicant is relevant to the original application and is admissible at the 120.57 hearing. Taking the easiest first, those items explicitly listed by the Department in the first Health Care and Retirement case, "interest rates, inflation of construction costs, current occupancies, compliance with new state or local health plans, and changes in bed or service inventories," which change after the application is initially filed, are permitted. Not permitted are "additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS." The remainder of the Department's incipient policy, as presently articulated, is obscure. The word "extrinsic" without the list of examples is of little guidance. The application is only an idea on paper. Anything new, other than the bare words on the paper as originally filed, is literally "extrinsic" thereto. The concept of whether the new information changes the "scope and character of the facilities and services" originally reviewed in free form action by the Department is similarly of little guidance because the phrase "scope and character" can mean practically anything. Of fundamental difficulty is whether this phrase is intended to select substantial changes to the original application, or all changes. For example, if the original application proposes separate shower stalls and tubs for double rooms, but the amended application proposes a combination shower and tub, has the "scope and character" of the "facilities and services" changed? The phrase "additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS" is similarly vague. What is a service or construction or a concept not originally reviewed? Would this include the change in bathing equipment discussed above? The concept of "control" of the applicant over the information that goes into the original application is the only phrase that gives applicants any guidance. The word "control" probably is intended as a "knew or reasonably should have "known" standard. If the applicant reasonably should have known about the information and should have provided the Department with the information as a part of its original application, then the new information cannot be considered during the formal administrative hearing. The Hearing Officer will be guided, thus, by the explicit list of items provided by the Department in the Health Care and Retirement case, and by the concept of "control" provided by the Hialeah case. COPIES FURNISHED: For Agency HRS Theodore D. Mack. Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (904) 488-8673 Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Fred W. Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 222-6891 William D. Hoffman, Jr., Esquire Deborah J. Winegard, Esquire King & Spalding 2500 Trust Company Tower Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 572-4600 Orlando Regional Medical Center, Inc. Steven R. Bechtel, Esquire Mateer, Harbert & Bates, P. A. 100 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 2854 Orlando, Florida 32802 (305) 425-9044 Orlando General Hospital, Inc. Eric J. Haugdahl, Esquire 1363 East Lafayette Street Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 878-0215 Florida Hospital Stephen K. Boone, Esquire Robert P. Mudge, Esquire Boone, Boone, Klingbeil & Boone, P. A. 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 (813) 488-6716 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
