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PAT LA FRATTA vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 78-001799 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-001799 Latest Update: May 09, 1979

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, applied for a Bail Bond Runner's License, which application was sworn to and subscribed on the 11th day of June, 1978. Petitioner had previously, on July 9, 1976, submitted an application for professional Bail Bondsman. The Respondent, by letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Licensing, Mrs. Onez O'Neal, dated August 31, 1978, informed Mr. LaFratta that his application for Bail Bond Runner's License was denied and stated that "the investigation conducted by this Department reflects that you do not meet the qualifications as set forth in Sections 648.27(2)(4), and 648.34(2)(f), Florida Statutes." The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. A deposition of Howard Paul Sabin, who was at the time imprisoned for bribery, was entered into the evidence without objection. The deposition was taken at the Hendry Correctional Institute in Immokalee, Florida, on December 20, 1978, by counsel for the Respondent after Respondent had denied Petitioner's application for licensure. Counsel for the Petitioner, Herb Fried, Esquire, 1461 NW 17th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125, and the Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, were present. Sabin's testimony was that the Petitioner, whom he identified at the taking of the deposition, shared commissions in performing bail bond activities and that Petitioner acquiesced and participated in bribing a police officer. Mr. Sabin testified that Mr. LaFratta used LaFratta's apartment as an office. Telephone calls were made from the apartment to call the jail and speak to people to see if Sabin could help them make bond while only Sabin, not Mr. LaFratta, was licensed. Sabin testified that the name of the agency was AABBEE Bail Bonds and that LaFratta paid Sabin a percentage of bonds solicited by Mr. Sabin and referred to Mr. LaFratta. The time frame Sabin testified about was approximately from September of 1975, to December of 1975. The Petitioner's attorney questioned Sabin about any promises made to him for his testimony and about other bondsmen, but there were no questions or contradictions by Petitioner or his attorney as to testimony concerning the subject of this hearing. A yellow page from a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Directory, dated 1976, was submitted into evidence in which there was an advertisement "Bail Bonds, 24-Hour Service Any Court - State, Federal, Criminal, Narcotic - Pat LaFratta, Manager - AABBEE Bail Bonds" and a telephone number. Also submitted into evidence was a copy of a business card "AABBEE Bail Bonds - Pat LaFratta - 24-Hour Service" with the same telephone number as advertised in the yellow pages of the 1976 telephone directory. It is obvious upon examination that the telephone advertisement and card were advising the public using the directory that Petitioner LaFratta was in the bail bond business. Petitioner was not then licensed. On the application for Bail Bond Runner's License of June 11, 1978, Question 14: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" was answered "Yes." The remainder of the question stated: "If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet." This was answered: "1970 - Broward Cty. Ct. - Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. - Poss. Stolen Prop. - 23 counts, 1 yr. cty. jail 2-5 yrs. probation conc." Petitioner listed no other charges or convictions on the application or on a separate sheet. Respondent submitted in defense of its denial a number of exhibits which were entered into evidence as follows: Exhibit 3(a) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 20, 1969. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(b) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 23, 1967. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. Petitioner was released from custody. Exhibit 3(c) concerns the offense of auto theft and is dated April 4, 1969. The solicitor announced "No Information," and the Respondent was released from custody. Exhibit 3(d) concerns the offense of uttering a forged instrument and is dated June 30, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(e) concerns the offense of two counts of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. The Judge released the Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(f) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated January 22, 1969. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(g) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(h) concerns the offense of receiving or aiding in the concealment of parts of a 1968 Chevrolet Impala and is dated October 31, 1969. The State was allowed 30 days to amend because of the vagueness of the charge. Exhibit 3(i) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(j) concerns the offense of aggravated assault and is dated October 27, 1967. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was not the defendant in said case. Exhibit 3(k) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated December 13, 1968. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(l) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property arid is dated October 1, 1969. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court and released from custody. Exhibit 3(m) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated June 25, 1968. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court arid released from custody. Exhibit 3(n) concerns the offense of assault and battery, a misdemeanor, and is dated October 30, 1967. Exhibit 3(o) is a judgment and sentence for the crime of receiving stolen property and is dated October 5, 1971. Petitioner was placed on probation for five years. Exhibit (p) is a judgment and sentence dated April 5, 1971. Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison and an assessment. Exhibit 3(q) concerns the violation of parole. Respondent's Exhibit 3(e), (g), (i), (o), and (p), supra, are part of a 23-count information which was submitted as Petitioner's Exhibit #6 in Case No. 70-25492, an information for Receiving Stolen property. Respondent's Exhibit 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h), (k), (l), and (m), supra, refer to felony charges of receiving stolen property, uttering a forged instrument and auto theft, which were not listed on the Petitioner's application and were not part of the 23-count information, which information concerned receiving stolen property. Exhibit 3(a), (b), (f), (k), (l), and (m), supra, concern stolen property preceding the dates of the offenses mentioned in the 23-count information. The failure to list the foregoing felony charges shows the Petitioner made material misstatements on his application. Petitioner LaFratta testified that he sent a package regarding the 23 counts mentioned in Findings of Fact No. 3, supra, with both application for Professional Bail Bondsman and for subject license to the Respondent. His testimony was not backed by evidence that he in fact sent the materials to the Respondent, which were required to have been sent at the time the application was made and listed on his application. His testimony that he had requested the clerk to "make out a whole booklet on everything that pertains to me," if true, was not adequate to truthfully answer Question 14, Findings of Fact No. 3, supra. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner did not furnished a full and detailed report and information as required by Question 14. It is the finding of the Hearing Officer that Petitioner did not intend to furnish the required information. Petitioner testified that he did not think that he had ever been arrested for assault, but the Respondent presented evidence showing that Petitioner had in fact been arrested for assault and battery. On subject application the Petitioner also failed to fully answer the question as to his employment history for the past five years. He failed to disclose that he had worked for Abel Bail Bonds. On the question as to his residence for the past five years, Mr. LaFratta failed to show that he had been incarcerated at Florida State Prison during that period of time. The herein mentioned 23-count information and the Restoration of Civil Rights were certified in June of 1976, and application for Professional Bail Bondsman was submitted in July of 1976. It is the finding of this Hearing Officer that these instruments were the only information submitted by the Petitioner to the Respondent as to his charges and convictions, despite his testimony. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights to Pat LaFratta, dated June 8, 1976, was previous to the application for Bail Bond Runner's License sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on June 11, 1978, and to the application for Bail Bondsman sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on July 9, 1976. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights is dated June 8, 1976, and within a few weeks thereafter Petitioner failed to truthfully answer questions under oath on his application on July 9, 1976, and failed to fully and truthfully answer the question on his application for Bail Bond Runner's License of July 11, 1978.

Recommendation Reject the application of Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, for a license as a Ball Bond Runner. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire Florida Department of Insurance Legal Division 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Max P. Engel, Esquire 1461 North West 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125

Florida Laws (3) 648.27648.34648.45
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JAMES G. YOUNG vs MELONS & POTATOES, INC., 01-004902 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 24, 2001 Number: 01-004902 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs ANNE EVANS ETHERIDGE, 95-003964 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Aug. 09, 1995 Number: 95-003964 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1997

The Issue Did Respondent knowingly permit a person who had been convicted of or who had pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under law of any state, territory or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, to engage in the bail bond business as an employee of Respondent's bail bond agency? If yes, should Respondent have her limited surety agent license disciplined?

Findings Of Fact At all relevant times Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety agent, license no. 224404483. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over that license. For that reason Petitioner may impose discipline should Respondent violate laws pertaining to Respondent's activities associated with the license. Respondent is President and Director of Crews Bonding Agency, Inc., 24 North Liberty Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32222, through which business she performs insurance-related activities concerning bail bonds. Crews Bonding Agency, Inc. was incorporated in Florida on March 31, 1988. The corporation is organized for the purpose of transacting any or all lawful business. The corporation provides bail bonds at the Liberty Street premises. The corporation also runs a parking lot concession at that location. Both businesses were operated at times relevant to the inquiry. On August 28, 1995, Star Legal Research, Inc. was incorporated to operate at 350 East Forsyth Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. That street address is the street adjacent to the Liberty Street address. The Star Legal Research business works out of the same building that Crews Bonding Agency uses. The difference being that the entrance to Crews Bonding Agency is on Liberty Street and the Star Legal Research entrance is on Forsyth Street. A 1995-96 occupational license was issued to Star Legal Research c/o Jack I. Etheridge, Jr., Respondent's son, for the period October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. owns Star Legal Research. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. stated that the purpose for incorporating Star Legal Research was to provide work for Jack I. Etheridge, his father and Respondent's husband, in a setting in which Mr. Jack Etheridge, Jr. contends would be unassociated with Crews Bonding Agency. The attempt to disassociate Mr. Jack Etheridge from Crews Bonding Agency will be subsequently explained. When the hearing was convened Jack I. Etheridge had been working in an office in the building where Crews Bonding Agency has its business. That employment was under the guise of Star Legal Research. The office where Jack I. Etheridge works in the building is separated from the office associated with Crews Bonding Agency by a door. Jack I. Etheridge uses a separate entrance into the office where he works. That entrance is from Forsyth Street rather than the Bonding agency entrance from Liberty Street. The business done by Star Legal Research, according to Jack Etheridge, Jr., is one where "you can research any type of legal matters . . . that's pretty much it". Again, Jack Etheridge, Jr. states that his father, Jack Etheridge, ". . . researches legal, you know, business". Under this arrangement, Jack Etheridge is supposedly no longer affiliated with the Crews Bonding Agency in operating its parking lot or otherwise. From the record, it is unclear exactly what is meant by Jack Etheridge's performance of legal research. At present, the bail bond business is done in the front office to the building that houses Crews Bonding Agency and Star Legal Research. That office faces Liberty Street. In addition to the office where bail bond activities are conducted and the back office which faces Forsyth Street, where Star Legal Research is housed, there is a kitchen in the building. That constitutes the rooms in that building. Contrary to the claim by his son that Jack Etheridge is no longer affiliated with Crews Bonding Agency, Respondent identified that the present circumstances are such that Jack Etheridge helps with the Crews Bonding Agency parking lot business "if he sees a car and I don't, he will go there . . .". Respondent identified that she principally handles the parking lot when she is there at the business premises, but that on one occasion, she was in the hospital and was not available to do that work. Further, she stated that her physician did not really want her "running back and forth to the parking lot". Respondent intends to transfer the parking lot business from Crews Bonding Agency to Star Legal Research by January 1997. At one time, Jack Etheridge had been licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent entitled to participate in bail bond activities. Prior to the passage of Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), he had been convicted of a felony in Florida. Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), stated: No person who has been convicted of or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to any felony, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of any bail bond agency or office thereof or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business. Having a concern that Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), might disqualify him from continuing to act as an insurance agent in the bail bond business, Jack Etheridge brought suit in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In and For Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Petitioner was named defendant in that suit. As a result, an order was entered stating: The provisions of Florida Statutes 648.44(3), Fla. Stat. (1983), or its successor(s) do not and cannot be determined to effect the status of plaintiff, Jack I. Etheridge, in his individual capacity as an officer and director of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation nor his ability to continue to maintain stock ownership of shares of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. The provisions of this paragraph shall serve as notice to all interested parties that said statute does not apply to Jack I. Etheridge, individually, nor in his capacity as an officer, director and stockholder in F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. Subsequently, in a case in the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1, Jack Etheridge pled guilty and was found guilty and convicted of the offense of mail fraud, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1341-2. For this offense, he was imprisoned for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $237,393.83. The sentence was imposed on April 6, 1990. At that time, Jack Etheridge was not licensed by Petitioner. Respondent had separated from Mr. Jack Etheridge in 1986. She was reunited with her husband in 1989. Respondent was aware that her husband had been convicted in Florida in state court, the offense for which he sought relief in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and that he had committed the federal offense in Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1. In August or September, 1992, federal probation officers came to the Crews Bonding Agency and spoke to Respondent about her husband's pending release from federal prison. In particular, those persons indicated that Mr. Jack Etheridge was going to be released in December of 1992. In this conversation, the probation officers told Respondent that they expected the husband to work for Crews Bonding Agency in a capacity that did not involve the handling of bail. Respondent told them that her husband could not work at the agency because she did not wish to jeopardize her Florida insurance license and livelihood. This is taken to mean that she was concerned about having a convicted felon working for her at the bail bond agency. In the conversation with the probation officers, Respondent was persuaded that the probation officers had the authority to place her husband with the bail bond agency to give the husband employment in some capacity, other than dealing with bail bond activities. The probation officers did not indicate the specific authority for requiring this placement. Respondent replied to the probation officers that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. In offering that arrangement, Respondent operated on the assumption that the probation officers were familiar with the requirements in the Florida Insurance Regulations and Statutes. In the conversation between Respondent and the federal probation officers, Respondent made no mention of the ruling in the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, concerning her husband's exemption from Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and its effects, or any subsequent law. After the conversation with the probation officers, and prior to her husband's release from prison, Respondent sought advice of counsel concerning the propriety of having her husband employed by Crews Bonding Agency. Robert Persons, Esquire is corporate counsel for Crews Bonding Agency. He incorporated the business. He has done work for the business as corporate counsel, beginning in 1988. He was aware that Mr. Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in the federal corrections system. Before Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Persons reviewed the previously-quoted language in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, in response to Respondent's request for legal advice. Respondent had told Mr. Persons that it was possible that she was going to hire her husband to run the parking lot for the Crews Bonding Agency. She wanted to know if there would be a problem with Petitioner's statutes that prohibited a bonding agency from operating with a felon working for it. Specifically, Respondent asked Mr. Persons if her husband could work in the parking lot. Mr. Persons told Respondent that his interpretation of the order was that the statutory prohibition against felons working for a bonding agency did not apply to her husband. For that reason, he did not believe that there would be a problem having the husband work at the parking lot. Moreover, he told Respondent that he did not believe that it presented a problem, in that the activities by the husband, when running the parking lot business, did not involve employment with the bail bonding operation. When he gave this advice, Mr. Persons was familiar with the parking lot concessions operation, having used the parking lot himself. He was also familiar with the bail bond business conducted by Crews Bonding Agency. John Gary Baker, Esquire was retained to assist Mr. Jack Etheridge in meeting the terms of the federal parole granted the client. This included correspondence with the probation office in an attempt to obtain early release. Once Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Baker went with the client and spoke to probation officer, Diane Thomas. This conversation took place sometime in late August or early September, 1993. Ms. Thomas told Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to obtain a job as a means to meet requirements for restitution. In this conversation, Ms. Thomas inquired concerning Respondent's income in an attempt to determine the amount that Mr. Etheridge should pay in the way of restitution. Mr. Baker tried to impress Ms. Thomas with the fact that Respondent's income and business were separate from Mr. Etheridge's circumstance. In the conversation, Mr. Etheridge told Ms. Thomas that he wished to be a bus driver. That was his profession prior to being involved in the insurance business in Louisiana, which led to his incarceration. Ms. Thomas would not agree to that arrangement. She indicated that Mr. Etheridge had to be located in a place where the probation officers could come and see him at anytime, day or night. Ms. Thomas asked the question about whether Mr. Etheridge could work for his wife at Crews Bonding Agency, and Mr. Etheridge stated that he did not wish to work for his wife. Ms. Thomas responded to these remarks by saying that she had an order that indicated that Mr. Etheridge could work at the Crews Bonding Agency. This refers to the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Ms. Thomas further told Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to work at Crews Bonding Agency. Before the date upon which the meeting was held with Ms. Thomas, Mr. Baker had not been acquainted with the circuit court order. When Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge left the meeting with Ms. Thomas, they went to the Crews Bonding Agency office; and Mr. Etheridge produced a copy of the circuit court order. Respondent was there at that time. Mr. Baker reviewed the order and expressed an opinion to Respondent and her husband that the husband could work at Crews Bonding Agency in any capacity, other than giving out forms or advice about bail bonds. At that point, there was conversation about the husband running the parking lot. That arrangement was one which Mr. Baker stated would be acceptable and would satisfy the terms of Mr. Etheridge's probation. Moreover, Mr. Baker offered the advice that the circuit court order would allow the husband to attend to clerical matters, such as answering the telephones. David R. Fletcher, Esquire was acquainted with Respondent. Mr. Fletcher was aware that Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in a federal facility. Mr. Fletcher was approached by Respondent, who asked Mr. Fletcher about the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and the meaning of the order. In particular, Respondent made Mr. Fletcher aware that she was concerned about the federal probation office's instructions or the condition upon which Mr. Etheridge's probation would be served as an employee at Crews Bonding Agency. Respondent told Mr. Fletcher that she was concerned that this would create a problem because of the husband's prior record, taken to mean felony record. When Mr. Fletcher read the order, he expressed the opinion that the husband was exempt from the disqualifying provisions for felons working in a bail bond agency. At the time the conversation was held between Mr. Fletcher and Respondent concerning the husband's status as a felon, Mr. Fletcher understood that the husband would be returning from incarceration and working at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. Respondent relied upon advice of counsel in deciding to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency. His duties included running the parking lot, vacuuming the building where the bond agency was located, and answering the telephone at the bail bond agency. When he would answer the telephone, Respondent noted that Jack Etheridge would state that he was not a bail bond agent and that the person who was calling would need to speak to the "bonds man". At times, Respondent received calls that had been patched through from the bail bond agency to another location, through efforts by Jack Etheridge. Respondent is aware that her husband took messages for the bail bond agency, as well. Respondent observed that Jack Etheridge principally stayed in the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, when he worked for the Crews Bonding Agency as parking lot attendant. Specific remarks made by Jack Etheridge in receiving calls for the bonding agency would be "Crews Bonding, would you hold please". If someone needed to speak to Respondent immediately, Mr. Etheridge would state "she is busy, hold please, if you will give me your number, I will have her call you back". Once while Jack Etheridge was employed at the Crews Bonding Agency, following release from federal prison, Ms. Thomas came to the agency to check on his status. Upon that occasion, Respondent spoke to Ms. Thomas and asked if her husband could drive a bus, instead of being employed by the bail bond agency. Ms. Thomas replied in the negative and stated that the husband had to stay with the agency and work with Respondent. Ms. Thomas told Respondent that Mr. Jack Etheridge had to be paid a check from the bonding agency. Respondent honored that request. The reason given for requiring that Mr. Jack Etheridge be paid a check was based upon the statement by Ms. Thomas that the husband had to take evidence of the check being issued and present that to the probation office. According to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Jack Etheridge was paid $800.00 for four weeks worked in the third quarter of 1993; $2,800.00 for 13 weeks worked in the fourth quarter of 1993; $2,419.23 for 12 weeks worked in the first quarter of 1994; $2,854.61 for 13 weeks worked in the second quarter of 1994; and $3,080.00 for 13 weeks worked in the third quarter of 1994. Jack Etheridge, Jr. observed that his father, upon taking the position as parking lot attendant, worked in the kitchen area of the premises most of the time for a period and then moved into the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, later on. The kitchen area is separated from the room where the bail bonding business is conducted. The room on Liberty Street is where Respondent has traditionally conducted her bail bond business. Jack Etheridge, Jr. never observed his father work in a bail bond capacity once the father returned from incarceration. He did observe that when a car came into the parking lot, his father would direct the driver where to park the car and then return to the building. Jack Etheridge, Jr. made these observations while working in the front office, where bail bond business was conducted, and never noted his father being in that front office. Jack Etheridge, Jr. was at the premises most every day before attending the police academy. After attending the police academy, he spends most of his time at the bail bond agency, pending employment as a policeman. Mr. Persons goes to the location of the bail bond agency two to three times per week and uses a parking space in the parking lot. On those occasions, he sees Jack Etheridge in the parking lot. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge at the location of the Crews Bonding Agency numerous times, following Jack Etheridge's release from prison. Mr. Persons has gone to that location 150 times within two and one-half years, and it would be uncommon for Jack Etheridge not to have been at the location when Mr. Persons came by. On some visits Mr. Persons has spent as much as 15 or 20 minutes with Respondent and her son at the bail bond agency. On occasions when he visited the bail bond agency, he has never observed Mr. Jack Etheridge do anything related to the bail bond business, unless one considers that answering the telephone at the bail bond agency, when Respondent is unable to, constitutes bail bond business. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge put a caller on hold and then refer the call to Respondent. The observation by Mr. Persons, where Mr. Jack Etheridge was involved with answering the telephone in the bail bond office, was not the usual circumstance. In the past, when Mr. Persons observed the operation at the bail bond agency, the door separating the room that faces Liberty Street and the room that faces Forsyth Street was open. More recently, that door has been closed between the two rooms. Mr. Persons observed that in the more recent circumstances, Jack Etheridge was using the office that fronts Forsyth Street. Mr. Persons observed that at the time the hearing was conducted, Jack Etheridge was still maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Persons observed that prior to the creation of the Star Legal Research business, Jack Etheridge, when not located in the parking lot, would be found in the office which fronts Forsyth Street. In summary, under the present circumstances, it is unclear what Mr. Jack Etheridge is principally involved with at the premises primarily associated with Crews Bonding Agency and its businesses. Following advice by Mr. Baker that it would be acceptable for Mr. Jack Etheridge to work at the bail bond agency, he has been in the Crews Bonding Agency office approximately 100 times. On almost every occasion, Jack Etheridge would be in the back room on Forsyth Street. Nine out of ten times, Jack Etheridge would be in that location when observed by Mr. Baker. The only times that Mr. Baker would observe Jack Etheridge in the front office, where the bail bonding business was being conducted, would be if other bail bond agency employees were out making a bond or something of that nature. In that instance, Jack Etheridge would be sitting in the front office, where the bail bond business is conducted; and if someone came to park their car, he would take care of that business. If someone came into the office and asked about a bail bond, Jack Etheridge would remark, "Look, Anne (Respondent) is going to be back in a half hour, she is making a bond, or Clara will be back. Come back, or you can sit over there and wait". Clara refers to another employee of the bail bond agency. Mr. Baker also observed that on the occasion on which Jack Etheridge was in the front office, he would refuse to give information about bail bonds and limit himself to handling parking duties and answering the telephone if no one else was available to answer the telephone. Mr. Fletcher has seen Jack Etheridge at the bail bond agency location approximately twice per week, following Mr. Etheridge's release from incarceration. On these occasions, Mr. Fletcher would give Jack Etheridge keys to Mr. Fletcher's car and seek assistance in parking. In these visits to the agency, Mr. Fletcher never observed Jack Etheridge perform work as a bail bond agent. In fact, he never observed Jack Etheridge work anywhere other than in the parking lot. Respondent and her husband brought further action in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, assigned to Division CV-F. At that time, the previous judge, who had issued the aforementioned order on March 27, 1984, was not presiding in the case. That refers to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., who now serves as a federal district judge. The judge who presided in the reopening of the circuit court case was the Honorable Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Judge. On October 30, 1995, Judge Fay entered an order in Case No. 82- 10537CA, Division CV-F, enjoining consideration of Count I to the present administrative complaint, in which he ordered: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by GRANTED with respect to Count I of the Administrative Complaint and First Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Defendant against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, and Defendant shall be enjoined from proceeding against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, as to Count I of same in DOAH Case No. 95-3964. Judge Fay also ruled: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by DENIED with respect to the filing of any complaints under Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, relative to convictions, guilty pleas, or no contest pleas by Jack I. Ethe- ridge entered subsequent to March 27, 1984. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust adminis- trative remedies. Based upon the orders by Judge Fay, administrative prosecution has proceeded to resolve Count II to the administrative complaint addressed in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3964 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties. Petitioner's Findings: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 constitutes legal argument. Respondent's Findings: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is established through the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found, with the exception that several other local attorneys were not contacted for advice. One additional attorney was sought out for advice, Mr. Baker. Paragraph 8, the first sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 9 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15-16 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, FL 33166 Judy Groover, Esquire 24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

USC (1) 18 U.S.C 1341 Florida Laws (12) 120.57120.68648.44648.45648.46648.49648.52648.53648.57775.082775.08390.801
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. RUSSELL BRUCE MONCRIEF, 79-001641 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001641 Latest Update: Dec. 20, 1979

Findings Of Fact Russell Bruce Moncrief is licensed with Respondent as a general lines agent (2-20) and at all times here relevant was so licensed. Shortly after Respondent opened his bail bond office, he was approached by Sams who represented himself as a bounty hunter who could pick up "skips" and others the bail bondsman wanted for surrender under their bonds. Sams represented that he was a member of the Florida Assurity Association, that he so worked for several bail bondsmen and was qualified to pick up skips for bail bondsmen. Sams produced an impressive badge, business cards and arrest forms for the bondsman to sign which would authorize Sams to pick up the individuals who had skipped out on their bonds. At this time Respondent had no skips to pick up and suggested Sams contact him later; and, during the period between June and September, 1978, Sams picked up some five (5) to eight (8) individuals on whom Respondent had written a bond and returned these people to Respondent. For these services, Respondent paid Sams a percentage of the bond. This relationship with Sams terminated when the latter gave Respondent a worthless check. Subsequently, Sams learned that his "bounty hunting" was unauthorized and applied for licensure as a bail bond runner. During Petitioner's investigation of Sams' application, his association with Respondent became known and Respondent told Petitioner's agents of his relationship with Sams. This led to an investigation of Respondent and to the charges here preferred. On March 9, 14, 15 and 20, 1979, agents of Petitioner visited the office of Respondent during the morning hours and found the office closed. These times the office was visited were generally between 9:00 A.M. and 12:00 Noon. On March 9, 1979, Nelson Messimore waited at Respondent's office from 6:00 A.M. until 2:00 P.M. before the office was opened. This individual tried numerous times to call the phone number shown on a sign inside Respondent's office but received no answer. He obtained the bond desired when the office was opened. From the time he opened his bail bond office in early 1978, until he learned of the charges being investigated, Respondent had his office opened around noon by his secretary who stayed at the office until 6:00 P.M. Respondent usually arrived between 2:00 and 4:00 P.M. and kept the office open until nearly midnight. During this period he had an answering service to answer his calls 24 hours per day when the office was not open and a paging service to "beep" him when someone was trying to contact him. After learning that Petitioner's agents deemed his office hours to be in violation of Petitioner's regulations, Respondent engaged the services of another bail bondsman and had the office opened at 8:00 A.M. and it remained open during the normal working day. Respondent continued to keep the evening hours he previously used. On or about February 28, 1978, Respondent was given the jail card of Willie Frank Boone by the booking officer to use in preparing a bailbond. Boone had previously been bonded by Respondent and he was somewhat familiar with Boone's record. While the card was in his custody, Respondent thought one entry on the card was an error and interlined that item. Further perusal of the card led Respondent to realize the card had not been in error. When he returned the card to the booking officer, he told the booking officer of the changes he had made to the card. This caused considerable consternation in the booking officer and led to procedural changes to not allow custody of the jail cards to be given to bail bondsmen. The change to the jail card made by Respondent could not benefit Respondent financially or otherwise. However, the change could have affected the sentencing of the accused.

Florida Laws (4) 648.25648.30648.34648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs FREDERICK WENDELL JOHNSON, 02-002258PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 05, 2002 Number: 02-002258PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs EMILIO GALLOR FAROY, 10-003185PL (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 11, 2010 Number: 10-003185PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs. LEROY ELLSWORTH HARDMAN, 79-001297 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001297 Latest Update: Oct. 08, 1979

Findings Of Fact Respondent Leroy Ellsworth Hardman has been licensed by petitioner as a limited surety agent since 1974. In January of 1976, he opened an office in Sanford, Florida, under the name of Action Bail Bonds. By December of 1978, he had qualified with the clerks of court in Orange, Seminole and Volusia Counties, and had written bonds in all three counties. Respondent decided to open an office in Deland, in addition to his office in Sanford. He leased office space on December 1, 1978, and began renovation. He had arranged for an advertisement to appear in the yellow pages of the Deland telephone directory, effective December 18, 1978, but did not succeed in opening the Deland office until December 19, 1978. Respondent hired Barbara Linkel to be in the office weekdays until four o'clock in the afternoon. He himself visited the office daily. Respondent, who had a 24 hour answering service and wore an electronic pager, instructed Ms. Linkel to notify him if anybody wanted a bond written. Respondent had charge of his Deland office while continuing to have charge of his office in Sanford. On January 29, 1979, John Wolmac, a limited surety agent, registered at the courthouse and began working for respondent, taking charge of the Deland office. On January 31, 1979, respondent executed the first bond written at the Deland office. Respondent's exhibit No. 8. Records of all bonds written at the Deland office were kept on file there until that office closed on May 31, 1979, when the records were transferred to respondent's office in Sanford. At all pertinent times, respondent's records were complete and open to the public for inspection. At the time of the hearing, respondent still had records of every bond executed or countersigned by him.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Office of the Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James C. Weart, Esquire 201 West Firth Street Suite 206, Paulucci Building Sanford, Florida 32771

Florida Laws (2) 648.34648.36
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs MICHAEL EDWARD RICHARDS, 95-002128 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 02, 1997 Number: 95-002128 Latest Update: Apr. 29, 1997

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance related activities in Florida. Petitioner is the agency responsible for regulating any licensed or unlicensed person engaged in activities prohibited under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. 1/ Respondent is licensed as an independent adjuster. Respondent's license number is 289505173. Gilmore Wimberly & Associates, Inc. (GWA) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of insurance adjusting. GWA's principal place of business is 1033 Oak Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32204. All billing for independent adjusting services is processed in the Jacksonville office. However, GWA maintains branch offices to adjust claims throughout the state. One of the branch offices is located at 251 Maitland Avenue, Suite 110, Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 (the "Altamonte office"). In March and April, 1994, Respondent was employed by GWA as an independent adjuster in charge of operating the Altamonte office. Respondent supervised one secretary and an appraiser. Respondent issued five unauthorized invoices to GWA clients in the aggregate amount of $2,329.92. Respondent altered the address on the face of the invoices so that payment would be made to the Altamonte office rather than the home office in Jacksonville (the "altered invoices"). 2/ Respondent received payment for the altered invoices on drafts or checks ("checks") from insurance companies that employed GWA to provide adjusting services. Each check was made payable to GWA. Respondent endorsed the checks on behalf of GWA. Respondent had no authority to endorse the checks. Respondent endorsed the checks to himself. Respondent then deposited the checks to his personal bank account. 3/

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the charges in the Administrative Complaint and revoking Respondent's license. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1995.

Florida Laws (2) 626.611626.621
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JACK MITCHELL vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 84-003293 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003293 Latest Update: May 23, 1985

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Jack Mitchell is a native-born Floridian, now forty-seven years old and is married with one child. He has a degree in sociology from the University of Central Florida and presently works for a nonprofit community organization called Young Blacks in Action. Be has been doing work in the areas of civil rights and social justice for some twenty years, and was formerly an ordained minister and a district executive for the National Boy Scouts of America. He has also worked for Martin Marietta in the area of quality control. On December 24, 1983, petitioner was in Albertson's Food Store doing some last-minute Christmas shopping for his wife. He picked up two bottles of cologne. He claims that, after shopping for a while, he became concerned that he did not have his wallet and that, with the cologne in his hand, he began checking the inside pockets of his coat to look for his wallet. At that point, he was placed under arrest for shoplifting. He further testified that he had no intent to leave the store without paying for the merchandise. Without an attorney, petitioner pled nolo contendere to retail theft. He asserts that he entered this plea in order to avoid the publicity and embarrassment of a trial, since he is considered a public leader in his community. By Judgment and Sentence recorded on January 23, 1984, the Orange County Court adjudged petitioner guilty of retail theft and ordered him to pay a fine of $100.00, and other fees and costs in the amount of $34.00. Petitioner has never before been convicted of a crime. In March of 1984, petitioner applied for licensure as a limited surety agent. The respondent denied his application, citing as grounds therefore Section 648.45(2)(e) and (k) , Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for licensure as a limited surety agent be DENIED, without prejudice to petitioner to reapply for such licensure after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the Final Order entered in this proceeding. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Clark Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Fla. 32301 Scott Sterling, Esquire 311 N. Rosalind Avenue Orlando, Fla. 32801 Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Fla. 32301

Florida Laws (2) 648.34648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs DOYLE CARLTON NEWELL, 94-000694 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 08, 1994 Number: 94-000694 Latest Update: Jun. 23, 1994

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing was whether Respondent's license as a life and health debit agent and a general lines, (fire), agent should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance, was the state agency responsible for the licensing of commercial insurance sales agents and the regulation of the insurance industry and profession in Florida. Respondent, Doyle Carlton Newell, was licensed in Florida as a life and health (debit) agent and a general lines agent limited to industrial fire. On April 26, 1991, Respondent entered into an agency contract with United Insurance Company of America, (United), which authorized him to sell authorized insurance policies for the company in Florida within his assigned territory. The terms of the agency contract obligated Respondent to remit to the company, on a weekly basis, all premium money collected by him on the company's behalf. For reasons not stated, United terminated Respondent from employment on May 11, 1992 by use of company form 38A, and Respondent's agency contract was cancelled immediately. The termination was followed by an audit of Respondent's account because for some time, company management had had some concern as to the condition of those accounts. Respondent had admitted to improperly taking money belonging to the company, and the audit was conducted during the period immediately following his termination in May, 1992 through August, 1992. Either prior to or as a part of the audit, Respondent submitted a list of all discrepancies he could recall. The audit revealed an actual deficiency of $3,731.67. After application of the bond submitted by and on behalf of Respondent, the ultimate shortage was $3,257.67. Respondent had, the day he left employment with the company, indicated he would reimburse it for any shortage when he overcame some personal matters and gambling problems. After the exact amount was determined, he was again asked, both orally and, several times through certified mail, to satisfy the obligation but as of the date of hearing, he had made no payments. All policies written by Respondent were honored by the company regardless of the fact he had not remitted the premiums paid therefor.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of all misconduct and violations alleged except that relating to a lack of knowledge or technical competency, and revoking his license as an insurance agent in Florida. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Childers, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0222 Doyle Carlton Newell 8414 Waterford Avenue, T3 Tampa, Florida 33604 Doyle Carlton Newell 2106 Two Lakes Road, Apartment 2T Tampa, Florida 33604 Doyle Carlton Newell 13637 Twin Lakes Lane Tampa, Florida 33624 Doyle Carlton Newell American General Life and Accident Insurance Co. 802 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (4) 120.57626.561626.611626.621
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