Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
Findings Of Fact The parties further stipulated at the hearing that the billing for which Shands seeks payment does not include charges for services rendered during the months Linda Sue Austin was being treated as an out-patient at Shands. All other facts, as stipulated to by the parties and as set forth above, are hereby adopted.
Findings Of Fact In December 1982,, Ambulatory Care filed an application with the Department to be granted a certificate of need to construct a freestanding surgical center in Duval, Florida, to provide surgical treatment which does not involve overnight confinement, i.e. ambulatory or outpatient. The approximate cost of that project is $1,994,280. The proposed facility would be approximately 11,300 square feet in dimensions and contain four operating rooms with attendant substerile areas and scrub areas; necessary recovery, preoperative and postoperative areas; waiting areas; lounges staff changing areas; a business office area and physician space. The particulars of the description of the facility are more completely addressed in the application which is part of Department's Exhibit 1. The specific surgeries to be performed in this outpatient setting have not been determined; however, Ambulatory Care would anticipate proceeding on a basis similar to that of a freestanding ambulatory surgery center in Lexington, Kentucky, allowing for any differences in the two communities which might provide a different surgical mix by type. Information pertaining to that center was provided through the testimony of Dr. Edwin Nighbert, Transcript Pages 137-193. A further description of possible surgeries to be performed in the facility may be in the Department's Exhibit 1 through the Omission's Response of the applicant in an Appendix to that response numbered 1 entitled, "Types of Surgeries performed in an Ambulatory Surgical Facility." The surgeries to be performed are elective in nature and allow the patient to be discharged the same day of the procedure. The characterization of the facility as freestanding means that it is self-contained and not dependent upon other facilities in its normal operation. The exact location of that facility has not been established in that the purchase of property has not been concluded; however, Ambulatory Care intends to build the center in the Riverside area of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, as described by drawings and maps in the Omission's Response referred to before. Construction in this area would place the facility in the immediate vicinity of Saint Vincent's and Riverside Hospitals, which facilities also serve patients who undergo ambulatory surgery on an outpatient basis. Other hospitals in Duval County provide outpatient surgery, as more specifically described in latter portions of this Recommended Order. Following review, the Department issued a certificate of need for the project in its entirety, effective December 29, 1982. This action led to Petitioners' timely challenge to the proposed agency action. The Department simultaneously approved a certificate of need for another freestanding surgical facility in Duval County, Surgical Services of Jacksonville, Inc., with proposed expenditures of $2,500,000 and a plan to provide four operating rooms. That latter surgical center has not been challenged on the issue of the grant of its certificate, through protest from local hospitals. With the addition of Surgical Services and Ambulatory Care, outpatient surgery would be performed in Duval County in hospital settings, the freestanding centers, and physician's offices. The hospitals and Ambulatory Care are expected to provide the same surgical procedures either on an outpatient basis or inpatient basis. Saint Vincent's is a hospital which is owned by the Daughters of Charity, a religious order within the Catholic Church and is a nonprofit corporation. Riverside is a nonprofit hospital. Other hospitals in the area providing outpatient surgery at present or in the immediate future are Methodist Hospital, Jacksonville General Hospital, University Hospital, Baptist Medical Center, Memorial Medical Center, and Saint Luke`s Hospital. None of the hospitals referred to have freestanding outpatient surgery units, meaning all procedures provided by those institutions are hospital based. There being no rules promulgated in keeping with Section 381.494, Florida Statutes, related to the establishment of a methodology for considering the question of need for ambulatory surgical centers in Florida, the parties on this occasion attempted to establish a record basis for determining the need question. In this endeavor, objective and subjective observations and predictions were offered. Similarities and dissimilarities between hospital- based outpatient surgery centers and freestanding surgery centers were discussed and the relative merits of those sites ware debated. Given the novelty of this comparison in Florida, determination of need in the ambulatory surgery realm is less than an exact science. To accommodate this situation, factual determinations are based upon those elements of proof which tend to best describe the Duval County circumstance pertaining to the question of need for ambulatory surgeries at present and in the near future, with particular emphasis on the applicant's request for certificate. To begin, there is the issue of what constitutes a surgery for statistical purposes. In the State Agency Action Report related to the fiscal or calendar year reporting of procedures performed by Duval County hospitals ending in 1982, reference is made to the number of impatient and outpatient surgical procedures. There is uncertainty about some of the outpatient procedures reported, whether they are best described as surgical or diagnostic. As example, in Ambulatory Care's Omission's Response request it included certain procedures such as cysto which by exhibit were under a surgical heading. Subsequently, the applicant argued in the course of the hearings that these proceedings were diagnostic in nature and not surgical. One physician who testified believed that a cysto could be considered a surgery. Opinion was expressed that any procedure reported for insurance purposes as surgical should be accepted as such, even if primarily diagnostic in effect. A hospital official believed that procedures that are primarily diagnostic in effect are not surgeries. Another contributing element in the dilemma is the possibility that some procedures might be considered surgical at times and diagnostic at others depending on the intended result. Moreover, the record is not clear on whether some of the inpatient procedures reported for the 1981-82 reporting period by the Duval County hospitals would involve procedures which might arguably be described as diagnostic and not surgical. There being no consensus among the practitioners and the health care planners on the question of what constitutes a surgery and given the existence of a known statistical base, making allowances for adjustments related to numbers of outpatient surgeries in the reporting year ending 1982 which was made in the course of the hearing and consistent with Appendix 1 to the Omission's Response offered by the applicant, all procedures are considered surgical for purposes of this review, with the exception of endoscopic procedures. This determination takes into account that the applicant has not specifically delineated those procedures which it intends to perform. On a similar topic, Duval County has been identified as the service area for the Ambulatory Care facility. It is that population base which the Department used in trying to identify the surgical use rate for all surgeries and ultimately for ambulatory surgery by measure of surgeries per thousand population. This calculation fails to take into account the fact that patients from areas outside Duval County, especially from the surrounding counties use the hospitals in Duval County. It was not established in the course of the hearing what percentage or number of those patients from those outside areas were in the hospital for purposes of undergoing inpatient or outpatient surgery. Nonetheless it can be assumed based upon the facts presented that some portion of those patients did receive surgery thereby increasing the number of persons in the population base who underwent surgeries and decreasing the number of surgeries per thousand population. Moreover, the modification of statistics presented in the course of hearing to more correctly reflect the number of outpatient surgeries done in the reporting periods 1981-82 suggests that the total number of procedures was around 64,600, not the 68,000 plus first thought when the action report was prepared and the Department made its calculations. This change alone would reduce use rate for surgeries per thousand from 118 to 112. Having in mind a necessary adjustment in the population base to account for patients outside Duval County who receive surgery as well as adjustment in the outpatient surgery statistics in the 1982 reporting period, somewhat less than 112 surgeries per thousand could be expected. According to the applicant, the national experience has been an expectation of 55 to 90 surgical procedures per year per thousand population as a planning guideline. Those projections made as a result of research and data gathered are accepted as establishing the base from which more precise estimates may be made. In view of the national experience and the adjustments that are needed in the initial projection of the Department that 115 surgeries per 1,000 population would be the experience, 110 surgeries per 1,000 population is found to be a reliable figure both in 1982 and the succeeding years to include the critical years of 1985 and 1986, for Duval County, Florida, surgical procedures. This finding acknowledges the fact that 97 percent of the residents of Duval County seek their health care in Duval County. In trying to determine what percentage of all surgeries will be ambulatory or outpatient in the critical years 1985 and 1986, considerable testimony has been offered. That testimony tends to establish a potential for outpatient surgeries in the range 15 percent to in excess of 40 percent. During the reporting period for which data is available, as many as 15 percent of the surgeries performed in the Duval County hospitals have been performed on an outpatient basis. The Department has taken a median fraction or number between the extremes of 15 percent and 40 plus percent and anticipated 29 percent of all surgeries to be ambulatory surgeries in the years 1985 and 1986 in Duval County. In consideration of the dramatic increases in the number of outpatient surgeries being performed in local hospitals within the last two or three years, and the continuing improved reimbursement environment for those surgical procedures performed on an outpatient basis, 29 percent is a reasonable policy choice for making the projections. Based upon an analysis of the facts presented, it is not safe to assume that the number of outpatient surgeries performed in Duval County for its patients in the years 1985 and 1986 will approximate the 40 percent experience found in other communities outside Florida. The Department in its calculations has utilized mid-range projections of the University of Florida, BEBR, population studies showing a population in Duval County in 1985 of 387,500 and in 1986, 590,480. This midrange choice is sound. Employing the technique used by the Department, the following predictions are arrived at in terms of expected outpatient surgeries in Duval County in 1985 and 1986: 387,500 total populations x 110 procedures per thousand = 1,000 64,525 total procedures x .29 percentage of outpatient = 18,741 outpatient surgeries in 1985 * * * 390,480 total populations x 110 procedures per thousand = 1,000 64,953 total procedures x .29 percentage of outpatient = 18,835 outpatient surgeries for 1986. Who is to provide those outpatient surgeries in 1985 and 1986? In answering that inquiry, in 1981, excluding endoscopic examination, area hospitals performed 6,450 outpatient surgeries. This number increased to 9,527 in 1982 and based upon statistics provided for the first quarter of 1983 that number would approximate 11,000 outpatient procedures in 1983. This growth pattern in those reporting years reflects substantial increases in the delivery of health care related to outpatient surgeries; however, an extrapolation of percentage increases over the intervening year 1984 and into 1985 and 1986 does not give a reliable approximation of the level of outpatient surgeries to be provided by the several hospitals. Neither does the estimate by the Department that the increase in surgeries performed in the hospitals shall be only to the extent of the increase in population in Duval County in the intervening years. Therefore, the question of available capacity in the years 1985 and 1986 is considered on the basis of an inventory or audit of outpatient surgical suites which may reasonably be expected to provide outpatient surgeries in 1985 and 1986 based upon the selection or a utilization rate for those operating rooms. The applicant has initially indicated in its application that 1,200 ambulatory cases could be dealt with in one operating suite on an annual basis. Initial testimony of one of the applicant's witnesses, Andrew Miller, at transcript page 460, was to the effect that the range 1,200 to 1,250 cases approached the capacity for a single dedicated operating room performing outpatient surgery. In rebuttal testimony, Miller recanted and indicated that 1,300 cases per operating room was not a reasonable estimate for hospitals in Duval County. He suggested the use of lower figures, perhaps as low as 1,000 procedures per room. In the face of the evidence, it is determined that for purposes of this review 1,100 procedures per operating room are an acceptable approximation. Utilization of this number takes into consideration differences in the length of procedures, scheduling and turn-around time in the preparation of the operating suite for a subsequent procedure. By dividing 1,100 procedures into the 15,741 projected outpatient surgeries in 1985, there would he a need for 17 operating suites in that year. Realizing that same process of division against the 19,536 projected ambulatory surgeries in 1986, 17 plus surgery suites would be needed. At the point of hearing, there were 15 ambulatory surgery suites in the hospitals in Duval County, excluding endoscopic rooms and those rooms in which inpatients and outpatients were operated on. Eight of those rooms had capability of general anesthesia. St. Luke's, in the move of their hospital, would add two additional ambulatory surgery suites, both of which would have general anesthesia capability and both of which are under construction. The freestanding ambulatory center, Surgical Services of Jacksonville, Inc., would bring the total to 21 operating rooms with its four additional surgery rooms with general anesthesia capability. With inclusion of the St. Luke's and Surgical Center of Jacksonville, a total of 14 of the 21 operating rooms would have general anesthesia capability. This does not take into account the high number of outpatient surgery procedures which are being performed at Baptist Hospital in rooms which have an inpatient and outpatient mix, nor does it take into account future plans of area hospitals to increase their outpatient surgery capacity, which would provide even greater capacity for outpatient surgery. In summary, there is more than enough capacity to perform needed outpatient surgeries in Duval County in 1985 and 1986. Ambulatory Care and the Department have referred to the cost savings to the individual patient being treated and to the overall patient community should the Ambulatory Care Surgical Center be opened. If there was a demonstrated need for that center the proof tends to bear out the savings to the individual patient and arguably to the patient community as a whole. However, on this occasion, given the fact that the addition of Ambulatory Care's operating suites would bring the total to 25 operating rooms against the need for 17 plus operating rooms, the cost benefits to the individual patients being treated in the applicant's facility and the patient community at large, would not be realized. To the contrary, the inordinate duplication of services that would be experienced with the addition of the applicant's facility would tend to drive up health care costs in Duval County. Additionally, the applicant cannot be expected to survive financially in the overcrowded health delivery environment described in this paragraph. The innovative nature of a freestanding surgery center in matters such as ambience, related to the psychological well being of patients, especially younger patients and potential efficiency of operation of the applicant's surgical center are not sufficient to redeem its request for certificate in this instance. In a related vein, modifications to existing plans in the hospitals and the inconvenience occasioned by those adjustments are not such that those circumstances may be expected to impede the steady progress of increased outpatient ambulatory procedures in those hospitals and make them less than a viable alternative for performing the needed procedures in the 1985 and 1986 periods. Any competitive influence to be fostered by the addition of Ambulatory Care's facility would not be beneficial. Sufficient competitive influence is already present to promote quality care and cost effectiveness. Finally, if trends in outpatient surgery, particularly to be performed under general anesthesia increases beyond the predictions indicated, there is sufficient capacity in the hospitals to accommodate that eventuality by constructing new outpatient surgical suites or by conversion of inpatient surgical suites to perform outpatient surgeries to include ancillary space. This can be accomplished without having to resort to an application for certificate of need, given the $695,000 exemption or exclusion from the certificate of need review process. In view of the overburden that would be created in ambulatory surgeries by the additional capacity of the applicant, provision of needed construction of facilities is being met and can be met in the future in a less costly way then suggested by the applicant. On this occasion, the hospitals can provide more cost effective facilities. Ambulatory surgery is available and accessible in local area hospitals within Duval County in an appropriate and adequate setting. That service does not exclude any patient. Though not needed Ambulatory Care's contemplated facility addresses those contingencies set forth in this paragraph, with one proviso. That matter pertains to the fact that Ambulatory Care shall provide its services to all residents in the service area without regard for physical condition or financial standing, premised upon the willingness of the treating physician to admit those patients to the facility for treatment and subsequent screening to be done by the staff of Ambulatory Care to determine the appropriateness of that setting to achieve the surgery. This will cause a certain number of potential patients to receive their surgery in a hospital environment.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Flagler and St. Augustine have each applied for a CON to establish an inpatient cardiac catheter-ization program within HRS Service District IV. Each had the opportunity of responding to HRS' "omissions letter" for the cure of certain initial flaws. However, in its preliminary review of the applications, HRS denied both applicants and this proceeding followed. HRS initially denied Flagler's application, stating it had only partially complied with Sections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (i), (l), (n), and (2)(b) and (d) F.S. (1989) and Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)4.a, 4.c., and 8.b. F.A.C. HRS initially denied St. Augustine's application, stating it had only partially complied with Sections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (h), (i), (l), (n), and 2(b) and (d) F.S. and Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)4.a., 4.c., and 8.b. F.A.C. and that the applicant failed to demonstrate any compliance with Sections 381.705(1)(m) and (2)(a) F.S. Prior to formal hearing, the parties stipulated that there is a numerical need under Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)8. F.A.C. for one additional inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory in HRS District IV for the applicable planning horizon for these applications. That planning horizon is January 1992. The parties further stipulated that both applicants have provided quality care; that, except for existing inpatient catheterization laboratories, there are no alternatives to the proposed facilities; that health manpower and management personnel are available for operation of the proposed programs; that the salaries listed on each application are reasonable; that the costs and methods of construction proposed are reasonable; that either applicant, if approved, would meet the scope of services, hours of operation, and health personnel requirements of Rule 10-5.011(1)(e) F.A.C.; and that St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville provides open heart surgery and is within one-half hour ambulance travel time from either applicant. It was also stipulated at formal hearing that the equipment costs proposed by both applicants are reasonable and that the costs of construction, as proposed in the applications, are reasonable. Facilities operated by Flagler Hospital, Inc. and St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. are located in the city of St. Augustine, St. Johns County, Florida. The two facilities are less than 500 yards apart and, for all practical purposes, are directly across U.S. 1 from one another. Both facilities are 115-bed general acute care hospitals providing the same services except that Flagler provides obstetrics and St. Augustine does not. The service areas of the two hospitals consist of the five zip codes immediately surrounding the two facilities as the primary service area and St. Johns County, except the Ponte Vedra area, as the secondary service area. Flagler operates as a not-for- profit hospital. St. Augustine operates for profit. The applicant for CON 6011 is "Flagler Hospital, Inc." This corporation is based out of its only and local facility described supra and is locally operated. Regardless of any other terminology applied during HRS' review leading up to the formal Petition in DOAH Case No. 90-2035, and regardless of any inadvertent changes of the style of that cause thereafter, the "applicant" for CON 6012 is, in fact, "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P.," a limited partnership. The applicant's August 23, 1989 Letter of Intent in CON 6012 is in the name of "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. d/b/a St. Augustine General Hospital." The Identification of Principal Parties form submitted by the applicant states that the legal name of the applicant/parent corporation is "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P." and that the facility/project name is "St. Augustine General Hospital." As of the date of formal hearing, "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc." (no "General" in this name) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of "Healthtrust, Inc." and the only general partner in the applicant, and "Healthtrust, Inc." was the sole limited partner in the applicant. "Healthtrust, Inc." purchased the shares of all the other former limited partners in July 1990, only after this cause had reached the formal hearing stage. The Board of Directors of the general partner, "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc.," is located in Nashville, Tennessee, as is the Board of Directors of "Healthtrust, Inc." Health Corporation of America (HCA) owns a significant number of shares (approximately 30-34%) of "Healthtrust, Inc." "Healthtrust, Inc." is a nationwide hospital chain with approximately 90 hospitals, which "spun off" from HCA in 1987. Thus, "Healthtrust, Inc." is both the sole owner of the general partner and the sole limited partner in the applicant, a limited partnership. The past lineage of the several St. Augustine legal entities is somewhat convoluted, but it is a significant and material consideration for purposes of this CON proceeding that "Healthtrust, Inc." collects management fees from St. Augustine General Hospital, which is the applicant's d/b/a namesake, and that "Healthtrust, Inc." seems to have been underwriting St. Augustine General Hospital in one context or another for an uncertain period of time. St. Augustine General Hospital has been losing money annually. Its net loss for fiscal year 1990 was $2 million. By a September 25, 1989 letter from Stephen C. Brandt, "Healthtrust, Inc.," otherwise known as "The Hospital Company," has committed to loan "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc." sufficient funding to implement and provide cardiac catheterization services at "St. Augustine General Hospital." The proposed recipient of "Healthtrust Inc.'s" commitment, which is "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc.," is not the same entity or legal "person" as the applicant, "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P.," and the parties further agree that there is no such legal entity as "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc." (TR-132-133) Also, it is not clear from this record what other enterprises or ventures are attributable to "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc.," the general partner in the applicant. Therefore, even if the true intent of Mr. Brandt's letter was to show that the general partner, "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc." and not the nonexistent "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc.," would receive funding from "Healthtrust, Inc.," there is no guarantee that "Healthtrust Inc.'s" funding commitment to the general partner would be used as a simple conduit to St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P., the applicant. With regard to quality of care, either applicant is capable of providing high quality cardiac catheterization services. However, St. Augustine's proposed physical plant is less ideal than that proposed by Flagler. St. Augustine proposes a lab with a procedure room that contains only 314.5 square feet of floor space. The industry standard is 480 square feet. The State of Florida has not adopted by rule a standard for the minimum size of a cardiac catheterization procedure room. However, the Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources has issued a report, relied upon by architects in designing cardiac care facilities, which recommends a minimum size for a procedure room of 50.4 square yards, which equals 453.6 square feet. The State Health Plan has adopted the Inter-Society Commission Report. Undersizing the lab has the potential to downgrade the quality of care in St. Augustine's proposed lab in several respects. It limits the storage space necessary and required to conduct routine procedures and crash procedures in cardiac arrest situations and interferes with maintaining the "sterile field," essential to routine catheterization procedures, but more importantly, in the event of a cardiac arrest or other emergency situation, there may not be adequate room for as many as five additional persons to enter the room, together with emergency equipment, to resuscitate and stabilize the patient. Concerns about undersizing of space are not applicable to Flagler's proposed catheterization lab. St. Augustine submitted that it could convert space adjacent to its proposed lab for its cardiac catheterization program at a cost of approximately $33,000, but expert testimony was persuasive that such a conversion could be considerably more expensive. To the extent that St. Augustine's planning would need to be revised, additional drawings would have to be prepared to show the reconfiguration of the room with the cost increase. Even assuming, arguendo, that St. Augustine's $33,000 figure is correct and that $33,000 is a proportionately low cost of such a change of plans in relation to St. Augustine's entire proposed project costs, it is found that such a construction conversion as proposed would constitute a change in the St. Augustine application so substantial that it would require amendment of St. Augustine's pending application and therefore such a conversion cannot be considered anew and without prior HRS review at this stage of the CON proceedings. The State Health Plan contains certain preferences relevant to this comparative CON review. Both applications benefit from the State Plan's favoring of an applicant proposing to provide cardiac catheterization services in a county that does not presently have a catheterization lab if it can be demonstrated that patients are leaving the county for such services. Upon the credible evidence as a whole, including but not limited to the testimony of Messrs. Jernigan and Nelson, Ms. Dudek, and Drs. Matthews, Prakash, and Mehrotra, it is found that a minimum of 225 patients had to travel outside St. Johns County, primarily to Jacksonville, Duval County, for such services in 1988, and there is competent, substantial evidence upon which a reasonable person may infer that that number is increasing (See Finding of Fact 20). HRS' viewpoint that freestanding labs which do not require a CON in order to operate in the proposed service area now accommodate these patients or will soon take up this slack is not supported by credible, competent substantial evidence. (See Finding of Fact 19) The State Health Plan also favors disproportionate Medicaid providers. Flagler is a federally designated disproportionate share hospital and qualifies for this preference. (See, also, Findings of Fact 15 and 20). Both applicants have committed to provide services to all patients regardless of their ability to pay and therefore both applicants meet this State Health Plan preference. The Local Health Plan also contains criteria relevant to these applications, among which is that plan's preference for an applicant who proposes to provide catheterization services in an area of concentrated population which is currently without an existing program. The city of St. Augustine constitutes such a designated area, and since both applicants' facilities are located there, they are each entitled to such preference. Both facilities are located in the District IV subdistrict with the highest use rate, and both are entitled to the Local Health Plan's preference for an applicant in the area of highest catheterization use. St. Augustine would be the logical place to put a catheterization lab if need were shown, and HRS' own rule reveals the need for one lab. (See also Finding of Facts 4, 14, 20) The Local Health Plan also prefers the applicant who will provide the proposed services in the most cost effective manner. Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) figures suggest that Flagler is superior in this regard but are not persuasive in and of themselves. Historically, the applicants have been comparably cost-effective, dependent upon the procedure or service assessed. However, for the reasons set forth infra in respect to long-term financial feasibility in general, Flagler has the edge in this preference area. The Local Health Plan contains a preference for an applicant addressing a current access problem. HRS determines need for inpatient cardiac catheterization labs on a district-wide basis rather than a county-by-county basis. No cardiac catheterization subdistricts have been designed and promulgated by HRS rule. The Local Health Plan uses a subdistrict basis; subdistrict 3 contains St. Johns County without any inpatient cardiac catheterization programs and southeastern Duval County where three hospitals provide such services. Either applicant's facility meets the access standard of Rule 10-5.011(e)4.a. F.A.C., that is, access within one hour of automobile travel time under ordinary conditions for 90% of the district population. However, the access problem bears some further specific commentary. St. Johns County residents now regularly travel, primarily to Jacksonville, Duval County, and to a lesser extent, to Gainesville, Alachua County, to receive these services. Increased costs and duplicate procedures often accrue unnecessarily to patients who seek treatment outside the service area/county. Moreover, the need to travel probably depresses the number of catheterization procedures done on St. Johns County residents, either because of the genuine logistics of lack of continuity of care, travel costs to the patient and family, and stress on the patient and family caused by out-of-county procedures or because of the patients' perceptions that these problems exist. Health care of patients who forego catheterization for these reasons would be qualitatively improved if they could submit to the procedure in their own locale; likewise, health care and costs to all catheterization patients would be improved it they could access the procedure close by with lesser travel, stress, and peripheral costs. That an access problem exists has been thoroughly and conscientiously demonstrated by both applicants. It has also been established that the city of St. Augustine location of either applicant would enhance accessibility for the elderly, handicapped, and medically indigent who are the least likely patients to submit to travel for inpatient catheterization services. For those reasons and since the two facilities to be utilized by the applicants are in such close proximity, it can only be concluded that the award of a CON to either applicant would equally improve access to inpatient cardiac catheterization services on a geographic basis alone. Both applicants will be able to meet the personnel requirements of Rule 10-5.011(e)5.b. F.A.C. The premise that a de minimis higher FTE projection by St. Augustine automatically translates into better patient care was not proven and is suspect due to the size limitations of St. Augustine's proposed lab. (See Finding of Fact 10) Flagler's argument that because Flagler assigned a higher pay rate to different members of its catheterization team and because Flagler is willing to pay higher salaries overall does not translate into an advantage upon the state of this record as a whole. Either applicant will provide services to all persons in need, regardless of ability to pay, and each applicant further proposes serving Medicare, Medicaid, indigent, private pay, and HMO/PPO. Both applicants must, by law, comply with any conditions HRS may place on their CONs. In these respects, it is concluded that each applicant equally meets those respective Local Health Plan preferences, even though Flagler has clearly shown that its past "track record" in the area of Medicare, Medicaid, and indigent care exceeds that of St. Augustine in both quantity and quality. (See Findings of Fact 11 and 20) All capital projects or expenditures proposed by St. Augustine have to be approved by Healthtrust, Inc., although the hospital management can approve "substitutions" of capital items of less than $5,000 per invoice. This restriction on local management, St. Augustine's potentially imprudent freezing of its per procedure cost for two years, and its perennially low occupancy rate overall (42 out of 115 beds last year) impact unfavorably on both the short-term and long-term feasibility of its project. St. Augustine raised the valid point that since, due to litigation, neither applicant can meet its projected opening date, some adjustment of each applicant's pro forma, based on inflation, is in order, however what this adjustment should be was never persuasively quantified by the witnesses. St. Augustine challenged Flagler's pro forma statement on basically three grounds: that the nine-month earlier projected starting date (now past) for Flagler's lab projects an artificially lower patient charge due to inflation; that Flagler's supply expense of $200 is too low; and that Flagler did not amortize remodeling costs of $147,000. Both applicants' projections in the category of patient charge per procedure are found to be reasonable, but St. Augustine also suggested that Flagler's patient charge per procedure should be increased by 3.75%, which assumes a nine-month adjustment, at a 5% annual interest rate to increase Flagler's procedure charge from $1,385 to $1,437 for year one and from $1,475 to $1,530 for year two. Such a result would not render Flagler's proposal unreasonable and would have the effect of increasing Flagler's profitability. However, no evidence showed Flagler intended to increase its charge. Flagler's projected supply expense per procedure is reasonable. Assuming Flagler depreciates renovation costs over a 20 year period, the resulting minimal increase in depreciation is not a significant concern proportionate to Flagler's "bottom line" profitability. HRS opposes both applications in part upon its assertion that neither applicant can attain its proposed number of procedures so as to insure long term financial feasibility. One of HRS' premises for this assertion is its contention that there are few cardiologists residing or practicing in St. Johns County. This is a truism so far as it goes, but not a controlling factor in light of significant other forces at work. Rather than cardiologists' clientele "feeding" a cardiac catheterization lab, as HRS originally supposed, the undersigned finds, upon the greater weight and credibility of all witnesses, including HRS' Ms. Dudek, that the absence of an inpatient cardiac catheterization lab in the city of St. Augustine, St. Johns County, has, in fact, depressed the availability of cardiologists in the county. Upon the testimony of Mr. Conzemius and Dr. Lambert, it is found that because there is no inpatient cardiac catheterization lab available, cardiologists currently cannot be recruited by either applicant. Establishment of such a lab by either applicant would result in more cardiologists locating in St. Augustine and St. Johns County with a concomitant improvement in patient accessibility to cardiology services. HRS' assertion that neither applicant can attain its break-even use rate is not based upon any definitive or even cursory study by HRS of existing county use rates, CONs are not required for outpatient catheterization services which may be offered in freestanding facilities. The record does not establish with specificity the extent of utilization or service volume of outpatient cardiac catheterization labs, if any, in St. Johns County. There is expert cardiologist testimony that freestanding catheterization labs are not a medically acceptable alternative to inpatient programs in a hospital. HRS contended that neither applicant has projected reasonable patient utilization figures guaranteeing long-term financial feasibility of their respective projects, but conceded that either proposal would be financially feasible if it attracted the projected patient numbers. The greater weight of the credible evidence supports a finding that sufficient numbers of inpatient cardiac catheterization patients can be captured by either applicant. Typically, 20% of cardiac catheterizations are done on an outpatient basis, so the 225-patient figure demonstrated for 1988 understates the potential cardiac catheterization patients in St. Johns County by 20%. Thus, approximately 55 more patients obtained catheterization out of county in 1988 than are shown by the inpatient figures, so mathematically one could project 270 such procedures on St. Johns County residents actually occurred in 1988. Application of the statewide use rate of 8.9 such procedures per 1,000 people applied to the appropriate January 1, 1992 planning horizon with the predicted population increase would yield an even higher potential patient figure of 674. Subdistrict 3 has historically experienced a yet higher use rate of 10.1 cardiac catheterization admissions. Either Flagler's 250 (first year) and 300 (second year) or St. Augustine's 275 (first year) and 325 (second year) is a reasonable projection which meets the HRS recommended minimum volume of 300 procedures per year in the second year. See, Rule 10-5.011(e)8.a. and e. F.A.C. Having a cardiac catheterization program would complement the obstetrical care which is exclusive to Flagler. Both applicants indicated their willingness to make their services available to a broad payor mix. St. Augustine projects utilization by class of pay for both year one and year two of operation as 2.2% Medicaid, 56.9% Medicare, 38.9% insurance, and 2.2% indigent. Flagler projects utilization by class of pay for both years as 7% Medicaid, 60% Medicare, 31% insurance, and 2% indigent. St. Augustine's projection of 2.2% of its cardiac catheterization services for Medicaid patients is reasonable but its projection of that same percentage for charity is inconsistent with St. Augustine's prior service and is unreasonable. Considering Flagler's historical Medicaid and indigent service history, its several contracts to provide care to these classes of pay, and the comparable cardiac catheterization utilization experience of similar providers, Flagler's projections in this respect are reasonable. If Flagler has erred in this portion of its assessment, increased percentages of patients covered by insurance reimbursements would only improve Flagler's "bottom line" for long- term financial feasibility. Both applicants' pro forma statements are based on operation of the proposed cardiac catheterization lab only, not including ancillary services and other charges related to the entire patient episode of care. Both applicants will receive an incremental layer of profit from establishing a cardiac catheterization lab, but that amount was not quantified on this record. The greater weight of the credible expert evidence shows that St. Augustine's understatement of a number of expenses will result in its lab experiencing a net loss which it will be tempted to "pass on" through other hospital charges. St. Augustine's commitment to following Healthtrust, Inc.'s policies with regard to depreciation, amortization, and assigning useful life to equipment is not persuasive that these corporate principles are preferable to the generally accepted accounting principles used by Flagler. If St. Augustine's commitment to freezing its charge per procedure does not result in its raising fees elsewhere, this commitment may still aggravate instead of alleviate St. Augustine's financial predicament, for the entire facility currently operates at a net loss. Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)6. F.A.C. as amended, August 1988, requires that CON cardiac catheterization applicants who do not provide open heart surgery services include a written protocol for the transfer of emergency patients to a hospital providing open heart surgery which is within 30 minutes' travel time by emergency vehicle under average travel conditions. No statute, rule, or credible testimony herein defined "protocol" contrary to the interpretation given that term in Florida Medical Center et al. v. HRS, 11 FALR 3904 (1989). HRS' Ms. Dudek determined that each submittal met HRS' intent in the current rule. Her rule interpretation, based on agency expertise, is entitled to great weight. Flagler filed a protocol which is specific to cardiac catheterization patients in need of open heart surgery but did not specify which open heart surgery facility would be utilized. St. Augustine submitted a current transfer agreement between St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. and St. Luke's Hospital, Jacksonville, the closest open heart surgery provider. This agreement is not specific to cardiac catheterization patients. St. Augustine also has an agreement with doctors at St. Luke's for open heart services backup. St. Luke's is within one-half hour's emergency travel time from either applicant's facility. There was no valid reason advanced in this record to suppose that Flagler could not also obtain travel and backup services with St. Luke's if it were granted the CON applied-for. Therefore, it is found that both applicants have complied with the current rule. Inherent in all challenges to the applicants' respective financial projections is the completeness of each application, and evidence as to the completeness of both applications has been received. Upon the testimony of HRS' health planning expert and agency representative, Elizabeth Dudek, it is found that at the time both applications were filed and at all times material to these applications, there was no consensus at HRS as to what constituted a "capital project" pursuant to Section 381.707(2)(a) F.S.; HRS had no definitional rule in place; HRS regularly looked to an applicant's audited financial statements with respect to the impact statement required under that section; and HRS did not require that there be a separate page labelled "assessment" for compliance with that section. Ms. Dudek reviewed both applications in the context of Section 381.707(2)(a) for HRS against other information already internal to HRS (exemptions, determinations for exemptions, or non-reviewables) and determined for purposes of initial review that both applicants had "captured" what HRS needed to know under Section 381.707(2)(a). This remained her opinion at formal hearing. (TR-586-589, 591- 593) St. Augustine expressly stated in its omissions response that it "has no capital projects applied for, pending, approved or underway in any state" (emphasis in original). In fact, the HCCB reported that for the eight-month period ending August 31, 1989, St. Augustine had $59,000 in construction in progress. Moreover, St. Augustine failed to list a lobby and patient wings renovation project costing approximately $540,000. St. Augustine's application contained no mention of these projects and no assessment, discussion, or analysis of their impact. St. Augustine's own Comptroller, David Chapman, would have defined these as capital projects (TR-93-94), and a common understanding of the English language would suggest that his is a reasonable interpretation of the clear statutory language. Flagler provided a page titled "FLAGLER HOSPITAL, INC. CURRENT CAPITAL PROJECTS" (Flagler-10), which listed the following "capital projects," as their expert witnesses defined that term under the statute. Maintenance and Yard Service Facility $61,000 (Review exemption pending) Storage Room Improvements $75,000 (Review exemption pending) Flagler Hospital Replacement Facility CON #2883; $21,728,558 Cost overrun application is being developed Rick Knapp, a certified public accountant and Flagler's expert in health care finance, accounting, and financial feasibility, also testified that Flagler's inclusion of the replacement hospital in the application as a "capital project" when the replacement hospital was essentially paid out before Flagler's CON application was even filed was probably not necessary under the statute but was intended for full disclosure. In fact, the evidence at formal hearing shows that Flagler's $21 million-plus replacement facility was completed, occupied, and paid for prior to Flagler's submission of the CON application to HRS in September 1989. The audited financial statements submitted with Flagler's application also indicated that, as of September 30, 1988, there had been construction in progress of $17 million, and an estimated $7.5 million for expected completion of construction in fiscal year 1989. Evidence admitted at formal hearing showed that the construction had been completed and the facility occupied in February 1989. Flagler began to depreciate its replacement facility upon occupancy. An overrun of approximately four million dollars was accrued and paid as of February 1989, but determining its exact amount was delayed by litigation with the architect and retainage by the general contractor. It cannot be determined from the application and omissions response that the cost overrun had been financed in full, but the two smaller capital projects were considered in the preparation and submission of Flagler's omissions response and specifically, depreciation expenses are included in the omissions response for all three of the above-identified projects. The hospital-wide pro forma contained in Flagler's omissions response shows a "healthy bottom line" for Flagler, even after consideration of the then-pending capital projects. Mr. Knapp represented that pages R-1, 2 of Flagler's omissions response (Flagler-11) meet the requirements of Section 381.707(2)(a) F.S., requiring a complete listing of all capital projects and an assessment of the capital projects' impact on the applicant's ability to provide the proposed cardiac catheterization lab. However, a close reading of pages R-1, 2 reveals that pages R-1, 2 do not repeat the list of capital projects just described or "showcase" Flagler's capital projects' impact on Flagler's ability to provide the services of the proposed catheterization lab, but rather, they make the detailed evaluation of the impact of the proposed cardiac catheterization lab on the cost of other services provided by Flagler, which detailed evaluation is required by Section 381.707(2)(c) F.S. Indeed, R-1 is entitled "IMPACT OF PROPOSED PROJECT ON COSTS OF OTHER SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE APPLICANT." Flagler's own witnesses concede that pages R1, 2 must be read in conjunction with Flagler's audited financial statements in order to arrive at the analysis of how other "health facility development projects and health facility acquisitions applied for, pending, approved or underway" will affect Flagler's ability to finance its catheterization lab. However, when compared to the pro forma on Table 3.3 of the application, it is clear that there is no impact of the listed capital projects on the proposed program. According to Mr. Conzemius, Flagler applied to HRS in March 1989 (six months prior to the filing of Flagler's CON application) and was turned down for an exemption on its overrun, and in the future Flagler will be applying for a CON regarding it. Flagler has disguised none of its activities from HRS and resolved and paid out the cost overrun prior to formal hearing so that the overrun, if it ever could have impacted on Flagler's proposed project, cannot do so now. Flagler's proposed cardiac catheterization lab will be paid for by cash funds in hand; the application contained a typographical error indicating that the funds were assured, when in fact, they are in hand. There will be no debt incurred by Flagler for the construction of the project.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order granting CON 6011 to Flagler Hospital, Inc. and denying CON 6012 to St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of January, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 90-2034 and 90-2035 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner Flagler's PFOF (1-77): Accepted: 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 23, 30, 34, 58 Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and nondeterminative: 4, 5 Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary: 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 Accepted except where subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found; not necessarily adopted: 1-3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 65 Rejected as mere legal argument: 6 Subjects covered but proposals rejected in form proposed because they are mere legal argument or recital of unweighted, unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits: 71, 72, 73 Covered as modified to reflect actual stipulations and credible record evidence as a whole, eliminating subordinate matters and mere legal argument: 8, 9, 28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37, 43-52, 57, 60, 63, 74-77 The weight and credibility of all the evidence has been weighed within the RO and applies to all rulings. Petitioner St. Augustine's PFOF 6-(69)-73: [NOTE: St. Augustine numbered its preliminary matters 1-5 and its PFOF begin with #6; it also proposed two #69's] Accepted, except where subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found: 6-15, 17-24, 26, 27, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47 Accepted as modified to more closely conform to the material facts of record or to eliminate subordinate or unnecessary proposed facts or facts which were not proven: 31, 34, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 66, 67, 68, 69#2, 72 Accepted, except where subordinate, unnecessary or mere legal argument: 39, 43 Rejected as subordinate, immaterial or mere legal argument: 16, 25, 29, 32, 36 Subjects covered but proposals rejected in the form proposed because they are mere legal argument or recital of unweighted, unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits: 30, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 60, 70 Rejected as not proven for the reasons set out in the RO: 56 Accepted in part, the remainder is rejected in part as mere legal argument, recital of unweighted, unreconciled testimony and exhibits, and/or not proven: 57 PFOF 59: First paragraph cumulative. All paragraphs beginning with a dash on the same page under 59: Subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found or mere recital of unweighted or unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits and legal argument. Dash 1 on next page: Rejected as contrary to the credible record evidence as a whole. Remaining dashes beginning on that page: subordinate and not determinative and/or mere recitation of unweighted or unreconciled testimony and exhibits. Credibility determination made. Accepted but cumulative that historically Flagler has served more Medicaid patients than St. Augustine and is a disproportionate Medicaid provider. The remainder is rejected as mere legal argument or recital of unweighted or unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits: 61 Rejected that the same payor mix may be expected. The evidence supports Flagler's projected 7% Medicaid rate. The remainder is mere legal argument, subordinate and cumulative to the facts as found, and/or contrary to the weight of the credible record as a whole: 62-65 Accepted as modified to eliminate mere legal argument and to more closely conform to the material facts of record: 69#1 In all its parts, is rejected as mere legal argument and not determinative of any material fact: 71 PFOF 73: The subject matter is covered within the RO. Recital of deposition testimony in a belated attempt to impeach a witness who has testified has been rejected as not a proposed finding of material fact. The remainder is mere recitation of unweighted or unreconciled testimony/exhibits. The weight and credibility of all the evidence has been weighed within the RO and applies to all rulings. Respondent's PFOF (1-13): Accepted, except as subordinate or unnecessary: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13 Rejected in part as mere legal argument or unweighted or unreconciled testimony or exhibits (not proven upon the credible record evidence as a whole); otherwise accepted: 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 The weight and credibility of all the evidence has been weighed within the RO and applies to all rulings. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Patricia A. Renovitch Attorneys at Law Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Jay Adams, Esquire Attorney at Law 1519 Big Sky Way Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Patterson Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Proposed Rules 10N-6.002, 10N-6.003, 10N-6.004, 10N-6.005 and 10N- 6.006, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, Medivision, Inc., and Tampa Surgi-Center, d/b/a Ambulatory Surgery Center, have standing to challenge the proposed rules at issue in these cases. See the affidavits of Larry Cyment and Donna McMillan. Intervenor, Florida Hospital Association, Inc., has standing to participate in these cases. See the affidavit of Pat Haines. The following Intervenors have established their standing to participate as intervenors in these cases through testimony or affidavit: Cataract Surgery Center, Cortez Foot Surgery Center, Ambulatory Surgery Center of Bradenton, Tampa Outpatient Surgical Facility, Naples Day Surgery, Ambulatory Surgical Center, Specialty Surgical Center and Tallahassee Single Day Surgery. Eye Surgery Center, The Eye Associates, FW Associates and Cordova Ambulatory Surgical Center have failed to prove their standing to participate in these cases. The Proposed Rules; Purpose and Adoption. The Health Care Cost Containment Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), published Rules 10N-6.002, 10N-6.003, 10N-6.004, 10N-6.005 and 10N- 6.006 (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rules"), in Volume 16, Number 12, of the Florida Administrative Weekly (March 23, 1990). The purpose of the Proposed Rules is to collect data concerning the provision of ambulatory surgery services in the State of Florida. Data collected by the Board will allow a comparison of patient charges and will create an additional bases for the analysis of trends in the health care field. In particular, data collection will promote the analysis of shifts in the provision of health care from inpatient to outpatient settings. Data concerning patient identity, geographic location, diagnosis, procedures performed and charges for services is required to be collected and submitted to the Board pursuant to the Proposed Rules. In June of 1989, the staff of the Board presented a study to the Board concerning the growth of ambulatory health care services. Staff recommended that the Board direct that steps be taken to explore the possibility of collecting ambulatory surgery data. The Board accepted the recommendation and appointed a Technical Advisory Panel. The Technical Advisory Panel appointed by the Board consisted of nine representatives of various interested groups. Two members were from freestanding ambulatory surgery centers and two members were from hospitals providing ambulatory surgery services. At meetings of the Technical Advisory Panel in July, August, September and October, 1989, the collection of ambulatory surgery services data was considered. The Technical Advisory Panel discussed collection costs, the type of data to be collected, implementation dates, legislative authority, methods of submitting data and the scope of data collection. The Board was made aware of the Technical Advisory Panel's efforts through minutes of the Panel's meetings and other materials provided to the Board. The collection of ambulatory surgery services data was considered by the Board at its October, November and December, 1989, meetings. The Proposed Rules were approved by the Board at its December, 1989, meeting. There is no statutory authority which specifically provides that data may be collected by the Board from "freestanding ambulatory surgical centers." The Board cited Section 407.03, Florida Statutes (1989), as the specific authority for the Proposed Rules. The Board cited Sections 407.003, 407.03 and 407.08, Florida Statutes (1989), as the laws implemented by the Proposed Rules. Scope of the Proposed Rules. Ambulatory surgery services are provided in a variety of settings: hospitals (e.g., acute care, psychiatric and rehabilitation), licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, physician offices and other unlicensed health care facilities. The Proposed Rules provide that all licensed hospitals included in Groups 1 through 10 and Group 14 of the HCCCB Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual which provide outpatient surgery services and all licensed ambulatory surgery centers in Florida are required to collect and submit 45 data elements to the Board. Psychiatric hospitals and rehabilitation hospitals are not subject to the Proposed Rules. Physicians' offices and other unlicensed health care providers are also not subject to the Proposed Rules. The Proposed Rules are limited to licensed providers of ambulatory surgery services so that the Board's staff can insure that all members of the groups selected data actually collect and report data. The Board cannot insure that all unlicensed providers of ambulatory surgery services, such as physicians' offices, comply with the Proposed Rules. Therefore, if data was required to be collected and submitted by unlicensed providers, the data would be less reliable. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that only hospitals included in Groups 1 and 10 and Group 14 of the HCCCB Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual and licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers collect and submit data constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specific Data vs. Aggregate Data. The Proposed Rules require the collection and reporting of 45 specific data elements. Aggregate data concerning ambulatory surgery services could be obtained from insurance companies and used by the Board as an alternative to the more specific data required to be collected pursuant to the Proposed Rules. Aggregate data is a compilation of specific data. Aggregate data can be used to comply with the Board's statutorily required functions. If aggregate data is used, however, it is likely that reporting will be incomplete. Not all information is reported to insurance companies concerning outpatient activity. Therefore, aggregate data obtained from insurance companies would not cover 100% of ambulatory surgery services provided by reporting entities, resulting in the potential for presenting an incomplete or inaccurate picture of ambulatory surgery services. The recommendations and conclusions which can be reached from aggregate data are limited. Specific data allows more flexibility for research purposes. Specific data will assure greater accuracy and comparability of data. Recommendations and conclusions reached from specific data should be more accurate. In order to insure comparability of data, specific data concerning patients, geographic location, diagnoses, procedures and charges must be collected. The Board collected aggregate data concerning ambulatory surgery services through a special study. The Board collected the data from hospitals and, on a voluntary basis, from licensed ambulatory surgery centers. "Typical" charges for specified ambulatory surgery procedures was collected. This collection effort was flawed by the lack of specific data. The accuracy of the reports based upon the aggregate data was criticized publicly. The reports were even criticized by one of the witnesses called to testify by Intervenors, Cataract Surgery Center, et. al. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that specific data be collected and submitted instead of aggregate data constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Confidential Patient Data. Some of the data elements to be reported pursuant to the Proposed Rules constitute confidential patient information. Disclosure of confidential patient information is prohibited by Florida law. The Proposed Rules do not require or authorize disclosure of confidential patient information. The manner in which the data collected will be distributed has not yet been decided upon by the Board. The evidence failed to prove that the Board will not comply with prohibitions against disclosure of confidential patient information. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that confidential patient information be reported to the Board constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Computer Use. The Proposed Rules require that data be submitted by computer tape or computer diskette. Therefore, data will have to be input into a computer system. The Proposed Rules specify the format data must be in when submitted. Most of the language of the Proposed Rules is computer terminology. The terminology of the Proposed Rules will require some knowledge of computers to carry out the requirements of the Proposed Rules. The language of the Proposed Rules is intentionally designed to convey technical information. The general purpose and requirements of the Proposed Rules does not take any special knowledge to understand. Requiring the submission of data by electronic means is designed to assure the accuracy and confidentiality of the data. The requirement of the Proposed Rules that data be reported in computer form and the use of computer terminology does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Errors in the Proposed Rules. Proposed Rule 10N-6.002(2) defines "Ambulatory Surgery Services" as procedures "provided in a hospital in its dedicated ASC ..." [Emphasis added]. Instead of "ASC" the Board intended to use the terms "operating room." Proposed Rule 10N-6.005 contains a list of the data elements to be collected and reported to the Board. This Proposed Rule contains the following errors or unclear language: Item 20 is "Facility Fee - Pri. Proc." "Pri. Proc." is an abbreviation for primary procedure. Items 21-24, similar to Item 20, contains the abbreviation "Sec. Proc." instead of secondary procedure. Items 25-27 contain a reference to "Page 3". As published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, there is no page 3. Item 35, which deals with expected methods of payment, refers to "Comm. Ins. (incl. BCBS)." This reference is an abbreviation for commercial insurance (Blue Cross Blue Shield). Item 44, patient birth date, uses the abbreviation "MMYYYY." This abbreviation should be "MMDDYY." Proposed Rule 10N-6.006 refers to "Primary Diagnosis Code" and "Secondary Diagnosis Code." The Rule should refer to Primary and Secondary "Procedure" Code. The mistakes identified in findings of fact 38-40 are not significant enough to characterize the rule as vague. Nor are these mistakes sufficient enough to otherwise conclude that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Economic Impact. The Economic Impact Statement (hereinafter referred to as the "EIS"), issued with the Proposed Rules provided the following concerning the economic impact of the Proposed Rules on the Board: ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTATION: The agency will be affected by the costs of rule promulgation and by the demands placed upon staff time to assure compliance with the rules and to analyze the data collected. Costs for these activities are estimated to be approximately $85,000 per year. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this portion of the Board's EIS is unreasonable. The EIS provided the following concerning the economic impact of the Proposed Rules on persons affected by the Proposed Rules: ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTATION: Implementation by affected facilities will cost approximately $2.9 to $3.1 million. These funds will be used to develop the programs necessary to collect and submit the data required. On-going compliance will have a much less significant impact. . . . . ESTIMATE OF COST TO ALL PERSONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE RULE: The initial cost to Florida hospitals and freestanding ambulatory surgery centers (ASC) would be from approximately $2.9 to $3.1 million to develop the reporting system necessary to generate the necessary data elements. On-going annual cost to the hospitals and free standing ASCs would be substantially less after the first year's start-up procedures are adopted. . . . . The EIS is insufficient because it does not adequately discuss the costs (implementation and ongoing costs) to affected persons or the impact of the Proposed Rules on small business. The weight of the evidence proved that the Proposed Rules will have an economic impact on affected persons. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of the implementation cost affected persons can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. As indicated in the EIS, the Board's determination of the estimate of the economic impact on affected persons was based upon surveys the Board distributed to licensed ambulatory surgery centers, an estimate of costs that hospitals incurred in implementing the Board's detailed patient data collection rule, the Board staff's experience with computer costs (including the collection and entry of data) and consultation with a computer expert familiar with the Proposed Rules. The surveys relied upon by the Board were distributed to all licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers. A total of 91 surveys were distributed. The Board requested that the surveys be returned within one week. Forty-one responses to the surveys were received by the Board from licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers. The responses constitute hearsay. Findings of fact concerning whether the information contained in the responses is correct, therefore, have not been made. The responses to the surveys have, however, been relied upon to make findings of fact concerning what information the Board based its EIS on. The Board received the following pertinent responses to the surveys from licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers: (1) 26 of the responders use computers, 12 have no computer capacity and 3 have some computer capacity; 17 or 18 different software programs are in use; and, (3) the costs to implement the proposed collection of data ranged from $0 to $50,000.00. Twenty- six responders indicated that they did not know how long it would take for them to implement the proposed collection of data. The Board determined that the average implementation cost for licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers reported in the responses to its survey was $18,975.00 and that the average implementation time was 13 weeks. The Board rounded up the average cost reported to it in the surveys and estimated that the cost of implementing the Proposed Rules at licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers would be $20,000.00. Based upon the existence of 85 licensed facilities, the Board estimated the total implementation cost for licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers to be $1,700,000.00 ($20,000.00 x 85). The Board estimated that the maximum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules at affected hospitals would be $2.00 per patient record. This estimate was based upon the Board's estimate of the cost of hospital compliance with the Board's detailed patient discharge data rule. Based upon an estimate of 600,000 patient records a year which will have to processed as a result of the Proposed Rules, the Board estimated the total cost of implementation in affected hospitals to be $1,200,000.00. The Board concluded that the total minimum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules will be $2,900,000.00 ($1,700,000.00 cost for freestanding ambulatory surgery centers plus $1,200,000.00 cost for affected hospitals). The Board discussed the cost of implementing the Proposed Rules with J. Thomas Solano, an expert in computers. Mr. Solano estimated that the cost of modifying an existing computer system (small to mid-range computer) to comply with the Proposed Rules would be $4,000.00 to $10,000.00. The Board used the highest estimate, $10,000.00, and multiplied this cost by the number of affected persons (85 freestanding ambulatory surgery centers and 220 hospitals x $10,000.00). This resulted in a rounded-up estimated implementation cost of $3,100,000.00. The Board concluded that the total maximum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules will be $3,100,000.00. Some of the data to be collected and reported pursuant to the Proposed Rules is already being collected by affected persons. Therefore, the primary cost of complying with the Proposed Rules will be associated with modifying existing computer software and/or hardware. The cost of modifying an existing computer system can fluctuate widely. As a general rule, computer users with existing software must rely upon their existing software provider to make modifications. The cost of modifying software can, therefore, be much higher than Mr. Solano estimated. As an alternative to modifying existing systems, affected persons can acquire a freestanding personal computer and software which can be used to comply with the Proposed Rules. The cost of such an acquisition should be approximately $2,500.00 to $5,600.00. Intervenor, T.S.D.S., Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Single Day Surgery Center, estimated that it will have to spend approximately $14,000.00 to $20,000.00 to implement the Proposed Rules. This estimate is based upon a letter purportedly from the Intervenor's computer company. The information contained in the letter is hearsay. The estimated implementation costs are, therefore, not supported by admissible evidence. The estimate, even if supported by competent substantial evidence, is within the Board's estimated implementation costs and, therefore, fail to prove that the Board's EIS is unreasonable or that the Board failed to fully consider the economic factors or impact. Intervenor, Cataract Surgery Center, estimated implementation costs of $1,900.00. This amount is limited to additional maintenance fees, supplies and personnel costs. Cataract Surgery Center believes there will no charge from its computer vendor to modify its software. Cataract's estimated costs are reasonable and within the Board's estimates. Ambulatory Surgical Center of Lake County (hereinafter referred to as "Lake"), does not own a computer. It uses the computer system of its physician owners. Lake considered more than one method of complying with the Proposed Rules. It considered buying a personal computer and estimated it would cost $5,000.00. This cost is consistent with the estimates of the Board. Lake also considered purchasing an integrated hardware and software package. It estimated that such a system would cost $40,000.00 to $50,000.00. The estimate is based upon hearsay. Even if the evidence concerning the cost of an integrated system is accepted as correct, the evidence fails to prove that such costs are necessary to comply with the Proposed Rules. The estimate for this system is based upon Lake's decision that it would perform other functions with the computer system, including storing management information and performing billing functions. These functions are not required in order to comply with the Proposed Rules. Lake currently treats approximately only 300 patients annually. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority because of the implementation cost which will be incurred by affected persons. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the inadequate treatment of implementation costs in the EIS was fully considered by the Board. Therefore, the treatment of implementation costs in the EIS constitutes harmless error. Although the primary costs to affected persons caused by the Proposed Rules will be associated with implementation of the Proposed Rules, there will also be certain costs associated with ongoing compliance with the Proposed Rules. There will be ongoing costs for the collection of data, entry of the data into a computer and reporting data to the Board. Ongoing costs caused by the Proposed Rules will be greater if an affected person with an existing computer system acquires a freestanding computer system instead of using the existing system. The Board's statement in the EIS concerning ongoing costs was not based upon information from affected persons. The statement concerning ongoing costs does not indicate what the ongoing costs of compliance with the Proposed Rules will be. It only indicates that it will be less than the initial implementation costs associated with the Proposed Rules. Although the weight of the evidence did not prove the estimated total amount of ongoing costs to affected persons from the Proposed Rules, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that ongoing costs will be greater than the estimated total amount of implementation costs. T.S.D.S., Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Single Day Surgery Center, estimated that it would incur ongoing costs of approximately $6,000.00. This estimate is reasonable. Cataract Surgery Center estimated that it would incur ongoing costs of $41,600.00, or $20.00 per case, to comply with the Proposed Rules. Cataract Surgery Center's estimated costs include the following costs: reel purchase; handling; reel preparation; collection of billing data; process of sending information to the Board; clarification of errors; additional record production; and response to public inquiries. Cataract Surgery Center's estimated costs are not reasonable. The estimated time to comply with the Proposed Rules is excessive and some of the tasks, i.e., collection of billing data, are not required by the Proposed Rules. Cataract Surgery Center's conclusion that it may have an increase in maintenance fees is reasonable. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of the ongoing costs affected persons can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. Therefore, the treatment of ongoing costs in the EIS was harmless error. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority because of the ongoing cost which will be incurred by affected persons. The EIS contains a statement that the Proposed Rules should have no economic impact on small business. In reaching this conclusion the Board failed to take into account the legal definition of "small business" contained in Florida Statutes. The Board did, however, actually consider the impact the Proposed Rules would likely have on small ambulatory surgery centers subject to the Proposed Rules. The Board attempted to reduce the economic impact on small ambulatory surgery centers by allowing affected persons to file data on computer tape or on diskette. By allowing the use of diskettes for reporting data, the Board made it possible for affected persons to use personal computers to comply with the Proposed Rules. Delayed submission of some data elements was also allowed in order to reduce the impact on small facilities. It is unlikely that the Board would have made further modifications of the Proposed Rules had the legal definition of "small business" been considered. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what, if any, reasonable modifications should have been taken by the Board to accommodate any economic impact on small business. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether any of the entities that participated in the proceeding were small businesses. Those entities, although meeting the definition of small business with regard to the number of employees they have and their net worth, failed to prove whether they are "independently owned and operated." See Section 288.703(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The weight of the evidence failed to prove if any person affected by the Proposed Rules is a small business. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of small business which can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. Therefore, the treatment of the impact on small business in the EIS was harmless error. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because of the impact on small business. The Petitioners and Intervenors presented evidence concerning a number of actions which the Board did not take during its consideration of the economic impact and factors of the Proposed Rules and its preparation of the EIS. This evidence proved only that there were other steps which the Board could have taken during its preparation of the EIS. The Petitioners and Intervenors failed to prove, however, that the steps which the Board did take were not sufficient. The Petitioners and Intervenors therefore failed to prove that the steps which the Board did not take were required or necessary.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for a license by endorsement to practice medicine in the State of Florida should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a medical doctor. Petitioner graduated medical school from the University of Miami in Miami, Florida, in May 1994. Petitioner signed an application for medical licensure by endorsement with the Board on January 9, 2003. On or about January 16, 2003, the Department of Health received Petitioner’s application for medical licensure by endorsement. Following receipt and review of the subject application, Petitioner was required to provide some additional information to the Board. Petitioner was eventually required to appear before the Credentials Committee of the Board to answer questions about his application. On October 17, 2003, the Board issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Licensure, in which the Board notified Petitioner of its intent to deny his application. That notice read as follows, in pertinent part: This matter came before the Credentials Committee of the Florida Board of Medicine at a duly-noticed public meeting on September 13, 2003 in Tampa, Florida[,] and the full Board on October 3-4, 2003, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The applicant appeared before the Credentials Committee on September 13, 2003, and presented testimony regarding the application file. The application file shows: The applicant lied before the Committee and lied on the licensure application as to the following: the applicant took a leave of absence during his training; the applicant was placed on probation at 3 schools; the applicant did not finish his training in the normal time frame; and, the applicant answered #15 b, c, d and #31 incorrectly on the application. The applicant is guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes, for misrepresenting or concealing multiple material facts at any time during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process or procedure. Based on the foregoing, the Board may refuse to certify an applicant for licensure, or restrict the practice of the licensee, or impose a penalty, pursuant to Sections 458.3331(2) and 456.072(2), Florida Statutes. It is therefore ORDERED that the application for licensure be DENIED. Petitioner attended the following four postgraduate training programs (residency programs): Medical College of Pennsylvania; Sinai Hospital1; Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center; and University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (“UMDNJ”). Petitioner’s dates of attendance in those four residency programs were as follows: Medical College of Pennsylvania from July 1, 1994 to June 30, 1995. Sinai Hospital from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1999. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001. UMDNJ from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003. Question number 15a on the application for medical licensure by endorsement asks, “Have you ever been dropped, suspended, placed on probation, expelled or requested to resign from a postgraduate training program?” Petitioner answered “yes” to question number 15a and submitted a written supplemental answer which stated, “I was placed on probation regarding the expectations of running a University service in a manner that kept attending physicians informed of patients’ clinical changes in July of 2000. Specific goals were given to me that I immediately fulfilled and was taken off probation in September of 2000 and remained in good academic standing until the time of my graduation.” On his application for licensure, Petitioner only admitted to being on probation at one residency program, Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. During the processing of the subject application, an employee of the Department of Health, Wendy Alls, advised Petitioner as follows by e-mail: “We are in receipt of your response to the inquiry from Wayne State University [Sinai Hospital], regarding your Residency from 7/95 to 6/99. It indicates that you were placed on probation and received negative reports. It also stated that limitations were placed upon you due to academic incompetence. Please respond.” On May 6, 2003, Petitioner submitted an e-mail response to Wendy Alls regarding his probation at Wayne State University [Sinai Hospital] which stated: “It is true that I did receive negative reports during my residency training from 7/95 to 6/99 for my work ethic. However, I was never formally placed on probation as per the guidelines of the Wayne State University. I, as well as the Graduate Medical Education Office, must receive formal written notification identifying the areas of deficiency and the duration of the probation period. Written notification must be submitted to both the GME office and myself after successful completion of the probation period. This was never done. In addition, no limitations or restriction were ever placed upon me due to academic incompetence or for any other reason for that matter.” Petitioner did not admit this on his initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine. Sinai Hospital submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Board and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Sinai Hospital submitted a report to the Federation Credentials Verification Service (“FCVS”)2 and stated on the report that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Sinai Hospital reported that Petitioner was placed on probation during his residency in response to faculty concerns regarding both academics and behavior. While at Sinai Hospital, Petitioner was informed of the issues he needed to improve during his probationary period. These issues included, but are not limited to the following: Petitioner’s tardiness, sleeping during conferences, unavailability when on call, failing to follow hierarchy, and inability to carry his share of the workload. Petitioner admitted at the formal hearing he was told that he was on probation at Sinai Hospital. During his appearance before the Credentials Committee on September 13, 2003, Petitioner testified under oath, that he did not disclose the fact he was on probation at Sinai Hospital because he was never informed that he “was ever placed on probation.” A letter dated November 4, 1999, from Dr. Andrew Saxe (who was then the general surgery residency program director at Sinai Hospital) states that Petitioner was on “probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Dr. Andrew Saxe also noted Petitioner’s probationary status in a memo dated April 28, 1999, which Petitioner himself signed. Petitioner signed a memo dated December 18, 1996, stating that he was on “probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency. Petitioner also signed a memo dated April 16, 1997, stating that he was “off probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Board and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1999 to 2000. Petitioner failed to fully disclose all of the reasons why he was placed on probation at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center submitted a report to the FCVS and stated on the report that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency for four months beginning in September 2000. The report stated that the probation was based on evaluations which cited “inadequate performances in clinical application of knowledge especially recognitions of own capabilities and limitations. There were also concerns over attention to details and work habits.” Petitioner’s supplemental answer to question 15a does not fully disclose his deficiencies in clinical knowledge and work habits at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. At all times material to this case, Dr. Mark Granick has been the director of the plastic surgery program at UMDNJ. UMDNJ submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Florida Board of Medicine and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency “due to poor in-service exam scores.” After UMDNJ submitted the Training Evaluation Form, Petitioner contacted Dr. Mark Granick to discuss his probation at UMDNJ and the “program’s specifications in defining probation.” Dr. Mark Granick was prompted to send a second Training Evaluation Form to the Board, changing the substance of the first submitted Training Evaluation Form. The second Training Evaluation Form to the Board was submitted along with a letter from Dr. Mark Granick dated February 14, 2003, which stated he made an error in filling out the original form. When Dr. Mark Granick drafted Petitioner’s Fourth- Quarter Report on May 31, 2002, he was “documenting the reasons why I wanted him on a period of supervision, which I thought of as probation at that point in time.” Petitioner’s Fourth-Quarter Report dated May 31, 2002, was in fact signed by Petitioner. The Fourth-Quarter Report documented that Petitioner was “deficient on multiple occasions” with regard to Patient Care; Petitioner had a “poor acquisition of a central knowledge base in Plastic Surgery”; Petitioner’s tardiness needed to “stop”; Petitioner demonstrated “immaturity” in interpersonal skills; and, Petitioner had “been acting in an unprofessional manner.” Petitioner signed a memo dated January 8, 2003, stating that he was placed on “probation” at UMDNJ during his residency due to “poor performance on the in-service examination and overall perception of weakness in academic level.” Dr. Mark Granick testified that when he used the term “probation” in the January 8, 2003, memo, the word was consistent with his own thinking, and not consistent with university definitions. Dr. Mark Granick stated that Petitioner indicated to him during their meetings at UMDNJ that Petitioner understood he was on “probation” at UMDNJ. Dr. Mark Granick testified that in his mind he considered it “probation” when he put Petitioner under direct supervision, gave Petitioner academic support, and advised Petitioner of the areas in which he needed to improve. Although the period of academic supervision imposed on Petitioner did not qualify as probation at the university level, it did constitute “probation” in the mind of Dr. Mark Granick and was understood to be “probation” by the Petitioner himself. Petitioner misrepresented to the Board the circumstances which caused him to be placed on probation at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. He also misrepresented his understanding of his probationary status at both Sinai Hospital and UMDNJ. Question number 15c on the subject application asks: “Did you take a leave of absence during a postgraduate training?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15c on the application. But Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center documents show that Petitioner took a month-long leave of absence. Petitioner asserts that his month-long leave of absence from Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center was not a “leave of absence” because he used a combination of sick time and vacation time. However, Petitioner signed a Family Medical Leave Act Certification asking for a leave of absence due to his being “unable to perform work of any kind” while training at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Petitioner requested a leave of absence for one month from his training program at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center in March of 2001. While on leave in March 2001, Petitioner was hospitalized for benzodiazepine poisoning, pace maker insertion, and possible seizure disorder secondary to cardiac rhythm disturbance. After Petitioner’s hospitalization, Petitioner needed to have a letter clearing him to resume unrestricted activity. During this period of time Petitioner was also told that he should avoid driving motor vehicles. Once questioned by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner admitted to taking a leave of absence in 2001 while training at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Prior to being questioned by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner concealed from the Florida Board of Medicine that he took a leave of absence while at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Question number 31 on the subject application asks “In the last five years, have you been treated for or had a recurrence of a diagnosed physical impairment?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 31 on the application. However, after questioning by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner admitted he had a pacemaker. After his hospitalization, Petitioner had to be cleared by his doctors to return to his duties as a resident. Despite Petitioner’s own definition of “physical impairment,” he concealed his hospitalization, pacemaker, and possible seizure disorder from the Board. Question number 15b on the subject application asks “Was attendance in a postgraduate training program for a period other than the established time frame?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15b on the application. Petitioner attended the General Surgery postgraduate training program at Medical College of Pennsylvania for one year from July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1995. Petitioner attended the general surgery postgraduate training program at Sinai Hospital for four years from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1999. Petitioner attended the general surgery postgraduate training program at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center for two years from July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2001. As indicated by the foregoing, Petitioner spent seven years attending general surgery postgraduate training programs. Physicians applying for licensure by endorsement in Florida are required to show that they have completed an “approved residency program” in a “slotted” position. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”) accredits postgraduate training programs, sets the standards for training programs, and determines the number of “slotted” positions a program has. The Board considers an “approved residency program” to be one that has been accredited by the ACGME. The Board relies on the ACGME in making determinations for licensure. The Board relies on the information provided in the ACGME directory when processing applications. The ACGME established time frame for completing a general surgery postgraduate training program is five years. The ACGME-established time frame for completing the postgraduate training program in general surgery at Medical College of Pennsylvania, Sinai Hospital, and Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center was five years when Petitioner attended these programs. Thus, a five-year general surgery residency was considered standard by ACGME, the Medical College of Pennsylvania, Sinai Hospital, Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center, medical educators, and residents like Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner would have had to complete all his postgraduate training in general surgery within five years in order to have finished his training within the “established time frame.” It took Petitioner seven years to complete all of his postgraduate training in general surgery. Petitioner’s attendance in his general surgery postgraduate training programs was for a period other than the normal time frame established by both ACGME and by the programs he attended. Question number 15d on the subject application asks, “Were you required to repeat any of your postgraduate training?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15d on the application. A memo dated December 3, 1997, written by Dr. Andrew Saxe (general surgery residency programs director at Sinai Hospital) and placed in Petitioner's training file, included the observation that "this is a consequence of his being asked to repeat the current clinical year." In a memo dated April 28, 1999, also written by Dr. Andrew Saxe and also placed in Petitioner’s training file, Dr. Saxe stated, “in light of prior probation and concerns regarding clinical competency an additional year of training would be of service to him.” At final hearing, Petitioner himself explained that each postgraduate year (“PGY”) runs from July 1st of one year to June 30th of the following year. On the Verification of Postgraduate Medical Education form submitted to FCVS, Sinai Hospital listed Petitioner as only completing PGY 2 through PGY 4 while attending their program. On the Verification of Postgraduate Medical Education form submitted to FCVS Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center listed Petitioner as completing PGY 4 and PGY 5 in their program. While attending his postgraduate training programs, Petitioner was continuously evaluated, as evidenced in his training files. A review of Petitioner’s evaluation forms demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated as a PGY 2 from July 1995 through June 1997. That means Petitioner was a PGY 2 for two years. A review of Petitioner’s evaluation forms demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated as a PGY 4 from July 1998 through June 2000. That means Petitioner was a PGY 4 for two years. Therefore, Petitioner repeated both PGY 2 and PGY 4 levels of training. As demonstrated by Petitioner’s postgraduate training files, Petitioner’s education levels of training did not consistently progress through the calendar years. Petitioner concealed from the Board that he had to repeat PGY 2 and PGY 4. Over the course of the last year, the Board has licensed at least 55 applicants who were found to have made one or more material misrepresentations on their licensure applications, or in the course of the licensure process.3 Over the course of the last year, the Board has licensed a number of applicants alleged to have made material misrepresentations regarding one or more of the issues raised in this matter. In a few cases that are arguably similar to the facts presented in this case, the Board has granted the license application, but with conditions that required the applicant to file a new application, to pay a new application fee, and to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for medical licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated section 478.52(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ by accepting and performing professional responsibilities that she knew or had reason to know she was not competent to perform; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed for the violations proven.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of electrolysis pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been licensed as an electrologist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number EO2650. Respondent is also licensed by the State of Florida as an acupuncturist, license number AP 1378. Respondent is a certified surgical assistant, having obtained certification through the American Board of Surgical Assistants. Documents in the record indicate that in 1998, Respondent completed medical school at Universidad Libre in Barranquilla, Columbia. However, Respondent is not a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. Respondent’s address of record is 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent owned and operated Orozco Medical Center (“OMC”), located at 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. Patient N.M. Patient N.M. is a female born in 1964. She testified that she was familiar with OMC because she had therapy there following a car accident in 2000. N.M. presented to OMC in early 2015 for consultation regarding a liposuction with fat transfer procedure, commonly called a “Brazilian Butt Lift” (“BBL”). Fat is taken from one part of the body and reinjected into the buttocks. N.M. testified that Blanca Cabrera, who performs massages at OMC, recommended a “doctor” at OMC named Marlon Barcelo to perform her BBL. Marlon Barcelo worked at OMC as a surgical assistant but was not a medical doctor. N.M. testified that she believed Mr. Barcelo would perform her BBL procedure and that she never knew that he was not a physician. Ms. Cabrera told her that Mr. Barcelo had been a very good doctor in Columbia. N.M. testified that at her initial consultation at OMC regarding the BBL, she met exclusively with Respondent, who showed her where the fat would be removed and where it would be injected. N.M. testified that she met with Respondent three times before her surgery. N.M. testified that, at the conclusion of the initial consultation, she was given an appointment card directing her to return to OMC on January 13, 2015, for an electrocardiogram, lab work, and the medication she would be expected to take before the procedure. The medical records indicate that N.M. was confused as to the dates. It appears from the records that her initial consultation was on January 13, 2015, that her EKG and lab work were performed on March 2, 2015, and the date of her surgery was March 13, 2015. N.M. testified that each time she visited OMC prior to the surgery, she met only with Respondent, who examined her and explained the procedure to her with no other persons present. N.M. testified that on the date of the surgery, her daughter drove her to OMC. After she checked in at the front desk, N.M. was taken to an exam room and told to change into a hospital gown. Respondent then marked her body to identify the locations where fat was to be removed. Respondent gave N.M. a medication to calm her prior to the procedure. The medical record indicates that N.M.’s pre- operative medications included Keflex (cephalexin, an antibiotic), lorazepam (a sedative and anti-anxiety medication), and Benadryl (diphenhydramine, an antihistamine with sedative properties). N.M. described the medication’s effect as “like a Xanax.” N.M. testified that the medication relaxed her but did not affect her recollection of the procedure. She testified that she was awake throughout the surgery and was allowed to use her cell phone during the procedure. N.M. did not recall meeting Dr. Mark Kantzler and denied ever meeting Dr. Amina Edathodu. She believed that Mr. Barcelo was going to perform the surgery, though up until the morning of the procedure she had not met him. N.M. was taken to the surgical room and placed on a table. She stated that there was a drape that blocked her view of the surgical area, but that it was low enough to allow her to see everyone in the room. She could see two men, Mr. Barcelo and someone identified as “Abel,” and Ms. Cabrera, the massage therapist, who appeared to be assisting. N.M. testified that Mr. Barcelo performed the liposuction. She testified that everyone in the room was wearing surgical gowns and gloves but no surgical masks. N.M. testified that during the liposuction procedure, Respondent told her that she would be performing the fat injections because she was very good at that procedure. N.M. testified that after the liposuction was completed, Mr. Barcelo called on Respondent to perform the fat injections into her buttocks. N.M. stated that she saw Respondent walk into the room carrying a syringe. During this portion of the procedure N.M was positioned on her stomach but stated that she knew from the conversation in the room that it was Respondent who was placing the injections into her buttocks. Upon conclusion of the procedure, Respondent gave N.M. pain medication for post-surgical pain. N.M. returned to OMC for a follow-up visit regarding the lack of drainage from her incision. During this visit, Respondent examined N.M. and gave her medication to reduce the swelling she was experiencing. Dr. Edathodu testified that she has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida for over 25 years. From 2015 through 2017, she worked as a contract physician at OMC and acted as medical director for the facility. Dr. Edathodu developed the protocols for OMC’s tumescent liposuction procedures and ensured they were followed. Dr. Edathodu remembered N.M. as a patient who had undergone previous surgeries and presented for further liposuction and fat transfer. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the liposuction procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu’s signature is on the cosmetic surgery consent form that was also signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015. The “Liposuction and Autologous Fat Transfer” consent form signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015, specifically names Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who will perform the procedure and was signed by Dr. Edathodu. Dr. Edathodu testified that she reviewed the procedure with N.M., discussing the risks and benefits. Dr. Edathodu does not speak Spanish and uses Respondent to translate with Spanish speakers such as N.M. She identified herself to N.M. as a surgeon through Respondent’s translation. Dr. Edathodu spoke to N.M. about having realistic expectations and cautioned her that she may not obtain an optimal result because of her previous procedures. Dr. Edathodu testified that, aside from her, the persons in the surgical theater were three surgical assistants: Respondent, Mr. Barcelo, and Pavel Cabanes. It is found that Mr. Cabanes must have been the “Abel” referred to by N.M. Dr. Edathodu testified that during the surgery, there is a drape between the surgical field and the patient’s face and head, to prevent the patient from being disturbed by the sight of the procedure. The drape is made of disposable paper and is about five feet high. When performing the surgery, Dr. Edathodu is unable to see the patient’s face and the patient is unable to see past the drape. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the entire surgical procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu made the site markings on N.M. while Respondent took photographs. Respondent did not perform any part of the surgical procedure. Respondent performed none of the fat transfer on N.M. Respondent did nothing other than what Dr. Edathodu specifically directed her to do. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with N.M. on four or five occasions after the surgery. Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. Perhaps because of her inability to speak English, N.M. appeared confused and inconsistent in her testimony, at least as it appeared in the Transcript. N.M.’s credibility was strained by her uncertainty as to dates and medications. She offered improbable details, such as the lack of coverage by the surgical drape and the failure of the surgical team to wear masks. N.M. was certain that Respondent was performing the fat injection, even though N.M. could not see what was happening. Though N.M. testified that she was awake and alert during the procedure, the undersigned cannot disregard that she had been given a medication that she likened to Xanax, most likely the lorazepam. The undersigned hesitates to rely upon N.M.’s disjointed testimony where it conflicts with the straightforward and credible testimony of Dr. Edathodu.3/ Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient N.M. Patient R.C. Patient R.C. is a female born in 1988. At the time of the hearing, she worked as a claims specialist. She testified that a friend from her previous job at HealthPlan Services referred her to OMC for a consultation. She first went to OMC on or about June 6, 2016. R.C. testified that this initial consultation was with Respondent. She told Respondent that she wanted liposuction on her back and waist and wanted the fat transferred to her buttocks. They discussed the procedure and pricing. From that point until the day of the surgery, R.C. went to OMC only to drop off periodic payments for the surgery. Her only contact was with the person at the front desk. She testified that she did not see Respondent again until the day of her surgery. R.C.’s surgery was scheduled for August 5, 2016. R.C. testified that she was dropped off at OMC by her children’s father. She went in and met Respondent and a few workers in the front of the facility. When she went to the back to prepare for the procedure, she met a man wearing scrubs whom she had never seen before. Two other staff persons were present, but R.C. stated she only talked with the one staff person who spoke English. R.C. testified that Respondent and the man in scrubs marked her body for the surgery. She believed that Respondent was going to perform the surgery. R.C. stated that she was not familiar with Dr. Edathodu. R.C. stated that she filled out the consent forms on August 5, 2016. An assistant gave her medication, saying it would calm her down. R.C. was not told the name of the medication, but testified that she took a blue pill and half of a white pill. The medical records indicate she was given Ativan (a brand name for lorazepam) and Benadryl. R.C. testified that the medications made her drowsy. R.C. was assisted to the room where the surgery would be performed. R.C. testified that she was placed on her stomach, face down. Everyone in the room was wearing a surgical mask. In the room were Respondent, the man in the scrubs, and two assistants. R.C. stated that she was awake during the procedure, but was drowsy and did not recall much about it. She could hear Respondent’s voice and the noise of the liposuction machine. She could not see who actually performed the procedure. After it was over, one of the assistants phoned R.C.’s driver and helped R.C. get up and walk. Respondent handed her a bag containing pills that R.C. believed were antibiotics. She received post-operative instructions. R.C. testified that she returned to OMC for a follow- up visit about a month after the surgery and met with Respondent. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the surgical procedure, called “tumescent liposuction,” on R.C. on August 5, 2016. On August 2, 2016, R.C. signed a “liposuction & autologous fat transfer consent” form that specifically named Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who would perform the surgery. Dr. Edathodu ordered, reviewed, and signed R.C.’s lab results. Dr. Edathodu met with R.C. prior to the procedure and completed a “pre-operative clearance” form to document R.C.’s fitness and willingness to go through the surgery. Both R.C. and Dr. Edathodu signed the pre-operative clearance form. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with R.C. three or four times post-surgery. As in the case of N.M., all of the medical records support the version of events described by Dr. Edathodu.4/ Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. R.C. frankly conceded that she did not remember much about the surgery and could not see who performed it. Dr. Edathodu clearly and credibly recalled performing the procedure. The greater weight of evidence supports the finding that Dr. Edathodu performed the surgery, assisted by Respondent and Mr. Barcelo. The evidence could not sustain a finding that Respondent performed a surgical procedure on R.C. R.C. was a more credible witness than N.M., and her testimony on some of the details regarding her consultations and pre-operative events was persuasive. However, it must be kept in mind that the only relevant factual question is whether Respondent performed an “invasive/surgical medical procedure” on R.C. The evidence on this question is not persuasive. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient R.C. Patient K.H. Patient K.H. is a female born in 1989. She learned of OMC from a friend at work. She first came into OMC for a consultation regarding a liposuction and fat transfer on November 29, 2016. K.H. testified that she met only with Respondent at this initial consultation. On November 29, 2016, K.H. signed an “information certification” form accepting Dr. Mark Kantzler as the physician who would be in charge of her liposuction procedure. K.H. came back to OMC on January 9, 2017, to make a $500 deposit and to schedule the surgery. The procedure was scheduled for February 11, 2017. Again, K.H. testified that she met alone with Respondent, who told her that she would need to come in a couple of days before the surgery to get medication and a list of things she would need for post-operative care. K.H. testified that she believed that Respondent was a physician and that she would be performing the liposuction procedure. The “liposuction and autologous fat transfer consent” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, authorized Dr. Kantzler to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedure. The “surgery certification” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, indicated that Dr. Kantzler reviewed the entire medical file with her before performing the procedure. On February 11, 2017, K.H. was driven to OMC by her mother. Shortly after arriving, K.H. noted the presence of a tall man with white hair and blue eyes. An OMC assistant escorted K.H. to a room with a bed and a chair. Respondent came in to the room and marked K.H. for surgery. Respondent then called in the tall man with white hair and blue eyes, who looked at the surgical markings and then asked K.H. some questions about her stretch marks. During her direct examination, K.H. testified that she was not given the man’s name. During cross-examination, K.H. was forced to concede that during an August 2017 interview, she told Department investigators that she had been introduced to the tall man with white hair and blue eyes and that his name was Dr. Mark Kantzler. K.H. testified that Respondent gave her a pill to take before surgery. She was taken to the surgical suite and was placed on the table. K.H. testified that the surgical drape prevented her from seeing the surgical area. The only people she had noted in the room were Respondent and “Claudia,” a woman K.H. recognized as a massage therapist at OMC. She could not be certain whether or not Dr. Kantzler was in the room. K.H. testified that she was awake during the surgery. She stated that she was in pain during the surgery and complained, in Spanish, to Respondent. K.H. stated that Respondent told her she had “a little stubborn fat” and continued the procedure without doing anything to alleviate her pain. K.H. testified that all conversation during the procedure was in Spanish. She heard no English being spoken. K.H. confirmed that Dr. Kantzler was the physician who signed the letter requesting that she be excused from work immediately after her surgery. Dr. Kantzler testified that he had no specific recollection of K.H. or of her procedure. He stated that he worked on a contract basis with OMC for about three years. He came in about once a week to perform liposuction procedures, conforming to the protocols established by Dr. Edathodu. He saw the patients only briefly before their procedures, relying on Respondent to perform the patient consultations and Dr. Edathodu to prescribe the pre-operative tests in her role as medical director. He was paid by the procedure. Dr. Kantzler testified that he does not speak Spanish, but that his surgical assistants, Respondent and Mr. Barcelo, would often converse in Spanish during surgery. Dr. Kantzler reviewed the medical records and confirmed that he signed the documents and performed the surgery on K.H.: Q. Is there any doubt in your mind about whether or not you performed these procedures? A. Not when I’m looking at the files, no. Q. And if you had not done the procedures, would you have signed off on the documentation? A. I wouldn’t have had them to sign. No. Dr. Kantzler’s lack of a clear recollection distinguishes this procedure from those involving Dr. Edathodu. However, an offsetting distinguishing factor is that K.H. had a clear recollection of seeing and speaking with Dr. Kantzler at OMC on the morning of her surgery. She did not see him enter the surgical suite or hear him speak during the procedure, but she was unable to say that he was not in the room. The medical record is replete with indications that Dr. Kantzler performed the liposuction and fat transfer procedure on K.H. Dr. Kantzler testified that he voluntarily relinquished his Florida medical license in 2017 “for my own reasons not relevant to this [case].” The Department’s Proposed Recommended Order suggests that this relinquishment was “in response to or in anticipation of disciplinary proceedings.” There is no record evidence to support the Department’s suggestion, and it is disregarded here. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient K.H.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Claudia Patricia Orozco-Fandino, E.O. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2019.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Central Florida Surgical Ambulatory Center be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1985.
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 64B- 9.0092(2)(f), 64B8-9.0092(4)(a), and 64B8-9.0092(4)(c) constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority as defined by Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact In Florida, physicians who perform certain surgical procedures in their offices are required to register the office with DOH. Additionally, DOH must inspect such offices unless a nationally recognized accrediting agency or an accrediting organization approved by the Board inspects and accredits the offices every three years. See § 458.309(3), Fla. Stat. and Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-0.0091. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092, entitled "Approval of Physician Office Accrediting Organizations," establishes requirements that FLACS must meet in order to achieve the Board's approval to operate as an accrediting organization. FLACS is the only organization that the Board has ever approved as an accrediting organization. FLACS is a not-for-profit corporation, organized for the following purposes: (a) to promote office safety through its accreditation activities; (b) to promote cosmetic surgery; and (c) to provide continuing education courses related to office surgery. FLACS was formed in 1999 and, since that time, has participated actively in office surgery issues considered by the Board. FLACS began operating as an approved office surgery accrediting organization early in 2001. In January 2003 FLACS filed a complete renewal application, seeking the Board's approval to continue operating as an office surgery accrediting organization. The Board denied the application and, after a formal administrative hearing, entered a Final Order denying FLACS's application. See Florida Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc. v. Board of Medicine, Case No. DOH-04-0661-FOF-MQA (Final Order, June 18, 2004)(adopting Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 03-3349, April 15, 2004.) FLACS filed a new application for approval as an office surgery accrediting organization on July 12, 2004. The Board never advised FLACS whether its application was complete or incomplete. There is evidence that a member of the Board's staff, Melinda Grey, reviewed the application, finding it incomplete in many respects. On August 5, 2004, Ms. Grey prepared a spreadsheet entitled "Board of Medicine Staff Issues Regarding FLACS Application." The spreadsheet compared the application with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Florida Administrative Code, including Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092. Larry McPherson, the Board's Executive Director, was aware that Ms. Grey was reviewing FLACS's application. She did not tell Mr. McPherson that the application was incomplete. Instead, she informed the Board's legal counsel that FLACS had filed the application. Subsequently, Ms. Grey placed the application on the Board's next scheduled meeting agenda. On August 7, 2004, the Board voted to deny the new application. On August 23, 2004, the Board entered an Notice of Intent to Deny FLACS's new application on the following grounds: When participating in accrediting activities in the past, the applicant violated Section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes, by failing to comply with rules of the Board in the following manner: The applicant failed to provide copies of accreditation reports and corrective action plans to the Board office within 30 days of completion of accrediting activities in violation of Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to immediately report to the Department conditions in physicians' offices that posed a potential immediate threat to patients in violation of Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(f), Florida Administrative Code. When inspecting and accrediting facilities the applicant ignored its written accreditation standards and failed to provide the Board office with accreditation standards under which it was actually operating. Such facts reveal that the applicant operated in violation of Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(g), Florida Administrative Code. When inspecting the facilities, the applicant operated with inadequate or applied inconsistently its quality assurance program in violation of Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to provide evidence of an adequate quality assurance program as required by Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to provide evidence of an adequate ongoing anesthesia related accreditation and quality assurance processes as required by Rule 64B8- 9.0092(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code. The applicant failed to submit copies of all incident reports filed with the state that originated at FLACS accredited facilities as required by Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(f), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 64B8-9.0092(2)(f)--Incident Reports Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(2)(f) requires an application for approval as an office surgery accreditation organization to include copies of all incident reports filed with the state. The incident reports are defined by Section 458.351(4), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: (4) For purposes of notification to the department pursuant to this section, the term "adverse incident" means an event over which the physician or licensee could exercise control and which is associated in whole or in part with a medical intervention, rather than the condition for which such intervention occurred, and which results in the following patient injuries: The death of a patient. Brain or spinal damage to a patient. The performance of a surgical procedure on the wrong patient. 1. The performance of a wrong- site surgical procedure; The performance of a wrong surgical procedure; or The surgical repair of damage to a patient resulting from a planned surgical procedure where the damage is not a recognized specific risk as disclosed to the patient and documented through the informed- consent process if it results in: death; brain or spinal damage; permanent disfigurement not to include the incision scar; fracture or dislocation of bones or joints; a limitation of neurological, physical or sensory function; or any condition that required transfer of the patient. A procedure to remove unplanned foreign objects remaining from a surgical procedure. Any condition that required transfer of a patient to a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, from any facility or any office maintained by a physician for the practice of medicine which is not licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. The incident reports are further defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.001(1)(a), which states as follows in relevant part: . . . an event over which the physician or other licensee could exercise control and which is associated in whole or in part with a medical intervention, rather than the condition for which such intervention occurred, and which results in the following patient injuries: The death of a patient. Brain or spinal damage to a patient. The performance of a surgical procedure on the wrong patient. The performance of a wrong-site surgical procedure, the performance of a wrong surgical procedure; or the surgical repair of damage to a patient resulting from a planned surgical procedure where the damage is not a recognized specific risk as disclosed to the patient and documented through the informed-consent process and if one of the listed procedures in the paragraph results in: death; brain or spinal damage; permanent disfigurement not to include the incision scar; fracture or dislocation of bones or joints; a limitation of neurological, physical or sensory function; or any condition that required transfer of the patient. A procedure to remove unplanned foreign objects remaining from a surgical procedure. Any condition that required transfer of a patient to a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, from any facility or any office maintained by a physician for the practice of medicine which is not licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. FLACS understood that the "incident reports" referenced in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(2)(f) are the same as the "reports on adverse incident" defined by Section 458.351, Florida Statutes. FLACS's application specifically references adverse incident reports as defined by Section 458.351, Florida Statutes. FLACS filed two such adverse incident reports with its new application. FLACS has several methods to use in collecting incident reports. First, FLACS requires its accredited physicians and office surgery facilities to attest and acknowledge that they are required to provide FLACS with any and all adverse incident reports related to or following surgery in the accredited offices. Second, FLACS requires the staff of accredited offices to perform self-evaluation surveys after the first and second year of accreditation, said surveys to include such incident reports. Third, FLACS watches for information about adverse incidents as reported by news media or complaints from the public. Most important, FLACS can make quarterly public record searches even though the state system of record keeping for adverse incident reports is not computerized. There is no persuasive evidence that FLACS ever made an oral or written public records request for copies of incident reports related to its accredited practices. There is no statutory or rule requirement for physicians to file copies of incident reports with their accrediting organization. However, at least two of the nationally recognized accrediting agencies, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JACHO) and American Association for Accreditation of Ambulatory Surgical Facilities (AAAASF), have provisions in their accreditation manuals related to adverse incidents. JACHO's "Accreditation Manual for Office-Based Surgery Practices," Second Edition (2005), defines a "sentinel event" as follows: A sentinel event is an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Serious injury specifically includes loss of limb or function. The phrase "or risk thereof" includes any process variation for which a recurrence would carry a significant chance of a serious adverse outcome. Such events are called "sentinel" because they signal the need for immediate investigation and response. The terms "sentinel event" and "medical error" are not synonymous; not all sentinel events occur because of an error, and not all errors result in sentinel events. JACHO requires each accredited practice to define "sentinel event" for its own purposes in establishing mechanisms to identify, report, and manage these events. JACHO encourages, but does not require, its clients to report "sentinel events" to the accrediting agency within 45 days of the event or of becoming aware of the event. The report should include a root cause analysis and an action plan. If JACHO becomes aware of an unreported "sentinel event," JACHO will advise the accredited practice to prepare and submit the report within a certain time frame. If the accredited practice fails to file an appropriate report within that time frame, JACHO will not revoke accreditation, but will place the accredited practice on an "Accreditation Watch" list. AAAASF's "Standards and Checklist for Accreditaion of Ambulatory Surgery Facilities" contains forms for accredited surgery facilities to use in reporting "unanticipated sequela." The forms refer one to AAAASF's "Quality Assurance and Peer Review Manual" for questions relative to their completion. The record indicates that "unanticipated sequela" are the equivalent of adverse incident reports, including but not limited to, events that result in unplanned hospital admissions. In Florida, physicians are required to file adverse incident reports with DOH's Consumer Services Unit (CSU), which is part of DOH's Medical Quality Assurance Program. On at least a quarterly basis, the Board's staff requests CSU to provide it with copies of adverse incident reports filed during a certain time frame. The staff of the CSU has access to medical consultants who review the incident reports to determine whether there might have been a violation of law or a violation of a standard of care. If so, the matter is referred for further investigation, determination of probable cause, and possible disciplinary prosecution by the Board. The Board's staff places the incident reports in physician registration files and in office surgery inspection/accreditation files. The Board's staff also places copies of incident reports involving physicians or facilities in the respective file of their accrediting agency or accrediting organization. The Board's staff provides copies of adverse incident reports to DOH's state inspectors before they make office inspections of non-accredited facilities or facilities formerly accredited by a national agency or FLACS. The state inspector/risk manager uses the incident reports during inspections to recommend improvements so that such incidents can be avoided in the future. The Board's Surgical Care Committee, uses the incident reports for statistical purposes. The Surgical Care Committee reviews the reports to determine whether changes need to be made in administrative rules, including but not limited to, rules related to standard of care or physician registration. It is important for FLACS to be aware of adverse incident reports filed by its accredited physicians and office- surgery facilities. Such reports are an essential part of any accreditation program. Without such knowledge, FLACS cannot be assured that its accredited physicians and offices are taking steps to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future. Moreover, if FLACS is not aware of the adverse incidents occurring in the offices it inspects, FLACS cannot implement changes in its policies to improve the accreditation process. The Board has no policy or practice for routinely sharing incident reports with accrediting organizations. Nevertheless, requiring FLACS to file copies of incident reports with the Board could alert the Board to incidents that were known to FLACS but never reported to the state and vice versa. As stated above, FLACS could make routine public records requests for copies of reports filed with the Board but not reported directly to FLACS. Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(a)--Quality Assurance Program Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(a) requires an accrediting organization to "have a mandatory quality assurance program approved by the Board of Medicine." Though it is not apparent on the face of the rule, this provision relates to an "internal" quality assurance program used by the accrediting organization, not a quality assurance program implemented at a physician's office. The rule does not define a quality assurance program or describe the required contents of a quality assurance program necessary to achieve the Board's approval. There are no forms or instructions to provide guidance in designing an such a program. Mr. McPherson testified that FLACS could have used the quality assurance programs of national accrediting agencies as a reference when designing its own program. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the "internal" quality assurance programs of national agencies are proprietary and not available to the public. Public information from JACHO and AAAASF relates to the ways that they monitor the quality assurance programs of the offices they inspect. For example, JACHO's manual discusses quality management issues for accredited practices, including standards, elements of participation, and the rationale that supports each. There is no evidence to show what internal steps the national agencies take to assure the quality of their programs apart from monitoring the programs of the accredited practices. Therefore, the Board could not have compared FLACS's "internal" quality assurance program and processes with the "internal" quality assurance programs and processes of the national accrediting agencies. During the hearing, the Board presented expert testimony about quality assurance programs in general. The expert testified that a generic quality assurance program for healthcare providers requires the following: (a) identification of positive outcomes that one desires; (b) identification of undesired negative outcomes based on the service and risk profile of the facility; (c) evaluation of accrued adverse incidents to identify trends; and (d) identification of ways to prevent future problems. The Board's quality assurance expert based his testimony on the standards published by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The description of a quality assurance program in the CMS document forms a skeleton for national accreditation programs such as the AAAASF, JACHO, and the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC). The rule does not reference CMS, JACHO, AAAASF, or AAAHC as having established models for an "internal" mandatory quality assurance program that the Board would approve. FLACS's office quality improvement plan compares favorably to the one established by AAAASF in some respects. For instance FLACS requires its accredited physicians and offices to perform a random chart screen of five cases on a quarterly basis. AAAASF requires a minimum of six cases per surgeon utilizing a facility or two percent of all cases in a group practice every six months. AAAASF requires its clients to engage in a peer review process at least every six months. The review is done by a recognized peer review organization or a medical doctor other than the operating room surgeon. FLACS does not require peer review evaluations due to concerns that peer review documents would be subject to discovery in legal proceedings in Florida. Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(c)--Ongoing Anesthesia-related Accreditation and Quality Assurance Processes Involving the Active Participation of Anesthesiologists Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(c) requires an accrediting organization to have "ongoing anesthesia-related accreditation and quality assurance processes involving the active participation of anesthesiologists." The Board did not base its denial on FLACS's anesthesia-related accreditation standards and quality assurance processes required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.0092(4)(b). Instead, the denial is based upon the requirement for "active participation of anesthesiologists." The Board has no standards that describe or define the "active participation of anesthesiologists." There is no evidence that shows how the Board applied this requirement to FLACS's application. There are no forms or instructions to provide guidance for an applicant attempting to show the ongoing active participation of anesthesiologists. There is no evidence regarding the participation of anesthesiologists in ongoing anesthesia-related accreditation and quality assurance processes of national accreditation agencies. FLACS has an Anesthesia Review Committee, which is made up of three participating anesthesiologists, FLACS's inspectors, and FLACS's Executive Director. The committee meets quarterly to discuss current issues involving office surgery anesthesia, any anesthesia incidents involving FLACS's accreditees, new pharmacological agents available for outpatient anesthesia and, when available, additional information such as incident reports involving anesthesia mishaps of physicians who are not FLACS's accreditees. The Anesthesia Review Committee keeps written minutes. FLACS's Board of Directors reviews the minutes during regularly scheduled meeting. The Anesthesia Review Committee is responsible for updating FLACS's Anesthesis Parameters of Care on an annual basis. They also attend FLACS's educational meeting to update members on current practice in outpatient/office surgery anesthesia. The Board's quality assurance expert testified that he could not determine exactly how FLACS's anesthesiologists participated, i.e. what they did and how they came to conclusions. The expert could not say whether the participation of FLACS's anesthesiologists resembled the participation of anesthesiologists in the programs of national accreditation agencies. The expert acknowledged that for a relatively small number of physician's offices with a small number of anesthesia- related problems occurring within those offices, an evaluation of such problems on a quarterly basis might be quite adequate.
