Findings Of Fact Manatee Eye Clinic owns land adjacent to its existing offices and in close proximity to Manatee Memorial Hospital, on which it proposes to construct a freestanding ambulatory surgery center for ophthalmic surgery. On December 13, 1983, Manatee Eye Clinic filed an application for a certificate of need with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) for approval of a capital expenditure in the amount of $627,640 for construction of a freestanding ambulatory surgery center for ophthalmic surgery. On April 27, 1984, Petitioner received written notice that the Department had denied the application. Manatee Eye Clinic consists of five practicing ophthalmologists in Manatee County, each of whom are [sic] duly licensed and provide quality ophthalmic care in the area. Manatee Eye Clinic, and the members thereof, have available sufficient resources, including health manpower, management personnel, as well as funds for the capital and operating expenditures for the project. Petitioner's proposed medical facility would be constructed in a sufficiently cost-effective manner and makes adequate provision for conservation of energy resources and incorporates efficient and effective methods of construction. Should this certificate of need be granted, Manatee Eye Clinic will accept Medicaid, Medicare, third-party pay, private pay, and charity care. The relevant service area for the proposed facility is Manatee County. The five ophthalmologists at MEC perform approximately 1,200 eye surgeries per year involving cataract removal and lens implant. At present all of these surgeries are performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital. The founder of MEC, Dr. Robert E. King, has twice served as chief of surgery at Manatee Memorial. He is presently a director on the board of directors of the company that recently purchased Manatee Memorial Hospital and removed it from its former status of a not-for-profit hospital to its current status as a for-profit hospital. If this application is granted, Manatee Memorial Hospital will lose all of these patients. Cataract eye surgery, as it is performed today, is ideally performed in an outpatient surgery setting. The five ophthalmologists currently perform an additional 600 outpatient surgical procedures per year in the existing clinic. These procedures would be performed in the freestanding surgery facility if this application is approved. Manatee Memorial Hospital is located one city block from MEC. L. W. Blake Memorial Hospital, some seven miles from MEC, has five operating rooms available for outpatient surgery but is not currently used by any of the doctors at MEC. Additionally, Ambulatory Surgical Center/Bradenton was licensed in December, 1982. This facility has not been used by MEC doctors. During the latest reporting period, 1983/1984, Manatee County and the Ambulatory Surgery Center performed the following procedures; Hospital Inpatient Outpatient Total L. W. Blake Memorial Hospital 8,800 2,752 11,552 Manatee Memorial Hospital 6,766 1,654 8,420 Ambulatory Surgery Center -- 1,525 1,525 TOTALS 15,566 5,931 21,497 (Exhibit 19) There is no shortage of operating rooms in Manatee County available for outpatient surgery. Petitioner's primary argument against using the operating rooms at Manatee Memorial Hospital are: operating room nurses are rotated and this results in nurses not being as well qualified as they would be if their duties were limited to ophthalmic surgery; eye surgery is generally elective and such surgery may be bumped from a scheduled operation by emergency general surgery; the patients are generally older than 65 and are less comfortable in hospital surroundings than they would be at an outpatient surgical facility; access to the ambulatory surgical center would be easier for these elderly patients than is access to the existing hospitals for the same outpatient surgery; the hospital charges for the outpatient surgery are approximately twice the charges proposed by Petitioner; and Medicare will pay 100 percent of the charges in a freestanding surgical facility (up to a maximum) but only pays 80 percent in a hospital setting, thereby making the use of a freestanding facility cheaper for the patient and for Medicare. MEC doctors currently use their own scrub nurses during eye surgeries performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital leaving only the circulating nurse to be provided by the hospital. No incident was cited wherein one of Petitioner's patients was "bumped" from a scheduled operation. The complication rate for cataract surgery has dropped from 10 percent to 0.1 percent in recent years as surgical procedures have improved. As proposed, the partnership owning MEC will erect and own the surgery center, will lease the equipment, most of which is presently owned by MEC, to the Petitioner; and the rent for the building will be a fixed amount per month plus 50 percent of the net operating profits of Petitioner. Proposed charges by the freestanding surgery center will be $904 per patient (for cataract removal and lens implant) This does not include the surgeon's fee. There are no methodology rules to determine need for a freestanding outpatient surgery facility. DHRS has consistently determined need for ambulatory surgery centers by taking the most recent number of surgical procedures performed in all inpatient and outpatient facilities in the county and dividing it by the county's base population for the latest year, here 1983. This gives the rate of surgeries per 1,000 population for the latest year for which statistics are available and is projected forward to the second year of operation (here 1987). The same is done for outpatient surgeries. DHRS uses the figure of 29 as the percentage of surgeries that can be performed in an outpatient setting to determine the need for outpatient surgery facilities in 1987. From this is subtracted the number expected to be performed in existing hospital and freestanding outpatient facilities to determine net need through 1987 for freestanding outpatient facilities. Applying this procedure, to which Petitioner generally concurs, except for the 29 percent factor, the following need is shown. The 1983 population of Manatee County is 162,997. 21,497 surgeries performed in 1983 x 1000 4 162,997 131.9 surgeries per 1000 population. The 1987 projected population of Manatee County is 182, 120. Multiplying this population by 131.9 per 1000 equals 24,061 surgeries expected to be performed in Manatee County in 1987. HRS estimates that 29 percent of these surgeries could be performed in an outpatient setting in 1987. Multiplying 24,051 by .29 equals 6,978 outpatient procedures possible. In 1983 there were 4,406 outpatient surgeries performed in a hospital setting in Manatee for a rate per thousand of 27. Multiplying this rate by the projected population for 1987 yields 4,931 outpatient surgeries that can be performed in a hospital setting in 1987. Subtracting from this number the projected outpatient surgeries to be performed in a hospital setting in 1987 (6,978 - 4,931) shows 2,047 to be performed in a freestanding facility. Ambulatory Surgery Center performed 1,525 procedures from June, 1983, to May, 1984. When this is projected to 1987, Ambulatory Surgery Center is expected to perform 1,715 surgical procedures. Substracting this from 2,047 leaves 332 procedures as a net need through 1987. This is below the pro forma break-even point of Petitioner and indicates the project is not financially possible. The 29 percent factor was obtained from American Hospital Association report of 1981. In 1981, 18 percent of the total surgeries were done on an outpatient basis while it was estimated that 20 to 40 percent of all surgeries could be performed on an outpatient basis. DHRS averaged the 18 percent and the maximum of 40 percent to arrive a mean of 29 percent to project need for outpatient surgery facilities. The latest figures from the American Hospital Association report is for 1982 and this shows the latest percentage of surgeries performed on an outpatient basis to be 20.8 percent. If this figure is averaged with 40 percent, the mean would rise to 30.4 percent. This is the percentage Petitioner contends should be used. Using this figure, the outpatient surgeries possible in 1987 would rise to 7,315 and a need for 669 procedures would exist in 1987. This would meet the higher break-even number presented by Respondent of 556 procedures for the second year of operation. It is noted that the experts' estimated surgical procedures that could be performed in an outpatient setting varied from 20 to 40 percent. In arriving at the 29 percent used DHRS averaged the latest actual percentages available in 1981 with 40 percent to obtain an arbitrary figure of 29 percent to use in calculating need for outpatient facilities. It is further noted that between June of 1983 and May Of 1984 Manatee Memorial Hospital performed 1,654 outpatient surgery procedures and 6,766 inpatient surgery procedures (Exhibit 14) and Blake Memorial Hospital performed 2,752 outpatient surgery procedures and 8,800 inpatient surgery procedures (Exhibit 15). Accordingly, 23.8 percent of Blake's surgery procedures are done as outpatient surgery and 19.6 percent of the surgeries performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital are done as outpatient surgeries. If the 1,200 outpatient surgeries per year performed at Manatee Memorial Hospital by MEC had been removed during this period, the percentage of outpatient surgery would have been reduced to 6.3 percent for Manatee Memorial Hospital. No evidence was presented regarding the number of ophthalmic surgeries that were performed at Blake Memorial Hospital during this period. Regardless of the potential loss of outpatient surgery cases at Blake if this application is granted, the percentage of outpatient surgeries performed in a hospital setting in Manatee County is, according to the latest data available, 22.1 percent (combining Blake and Manatee Memorial). Using 29 percent of the total surgeries projected for 1987 in Manatee County to obtain an estimate of the outpatient surgery that can be expected to be performed in a hospital setting in 1987 results in a much higher figure than the current growth rate in outpatient surgeries would suggest. Accordingly, I find a 29 percent factor more credible than a higher percentage would be in forecasting need for outpatient surgical facilities in 1987. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that most ophthalmic surgery today is performed in an outpatient setting. This was not true only a few years ago. Accordingly, there can be little additional growth resulting from ophthalmic surgery procedures going from inpatient to outpatient procedures. As a consequence, future growth in outpatient surgery must come from other surgical procedures.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is qualified for licensure as a medical doctor in Florida by examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner graduated from the School of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania in 1955, following which he did a rotating internship at Abington Memorial Hospital before reporting for active duty in the U.S. Navy. Upon release from active duty in the Navy in 1959 he entered a residency program in general surgery at Hospital of University of Pennsylvania followed by thoracic surgery which he completed in 1965. Petitioner was certified by the American Board of Surgery in 1965 and by the Board of Thoracic Surgery in 1966. From 1965 to 1986 Petitioner was engaged in the practice of general, cardiac, thoracic and vascular surgery. In the latter part of this period, he headed a cardiothoracic surgery team at Lankenau Hospital, Philadelphia, which performed some 700-800 open-heart surgeries per year. It was during this period that most of the malpractice suits were filed against Petitioner, the hospital and other doctors on his team. As head of the surgical team Petitioner did the definitive surgery (bypass grafts) while other members of the team opened and closed the chest cavity. Petitioner is currently licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Arizona. At the time he first applied for licensure in Florida in 1988, he was licensed in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Arizona. No licensing agency has brought any charges against Petitioner's license. Petitioner took and passed the FLEX examination in 1988 scoring 84 and 83 on the two parts of the exam. In the past twenty years, 19 malpractice suits have been filed against Petitioner. Of those suits 9, have been dismissed by Plaintiffs without any recovery from Petitioner, and two were settled on behalf of Petitioner, one in 1979 for $50,000 and one in 1989 for $25,000. Those settlements represented little more than nuisance value. The hospital defendant settled one case for $225,000 and another for $2,500. Of the remaining eight suits the complete medical records of those cases were reviewed by another cardiothoracic and vascular surgeon who opined that five are without merit. For the remaining three, additional evidence is needed to fairly appraise the merits of those suits. This additional information will not be available until discovery is completed. Petitioner's testimony, that these remaining three cases did not involve a failure on his part to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, corroborates the Affidavit of the risk manager (Exhibit 3) and letters in the file (Exhibit 1) stating those cases are deemed to be without merit and will be vigorously defended. All of these suits were brought in Pennsylvania where the backlog of civil cases is such that civil cases are not scheduled for trial until approximately seven years after the suit is filed. Furthermore, the complaints filed in these cases contain general allegations that the Respondent's negligence, inattention, failure to adequately apprise the plaintiff of possible complications of the surgery, along with the negligence of the hospital and others involved with the surgery, directly resulted in the plaintiff's death, injury, etc. These are catch- all allegations and the specific nature of the malpractice claim cannot be discerned from these pleadings. Cardiothoracic and vascular surgery is a high risk field of medicine in that the patients are frequently very sick and elderly. Accordingly, the success rate for this type surgery is lower than for most surgeries, and this leads to a higher incidence of suits alleging malpractice. Many of these earlier suits were brought before the doctors began paying attention to documenting that they fully explained the risks of the surgery to the patient and thereafter the patient gave informed consent to the operation. Petitioner has been more assiduous in this regard in recent years than he was several years ago. This practice will have the effect of reducing the incidence of malpractice suits against surgeons. It is noted that several of the suits alleged the plaintiffs were not adequately advised regarding the risks involved and, therefore, they did not give informed consent to the surgery.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Horace MacVaugh III be granted a license to practice medicine in Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted, except: 8. Accepted only insofar as consistent with HO #5 and 6. 15. Rejected. No evidence was presented in this regard. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted except: 17. Second and third sentences rejected as not supported by any competent evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger Lutz, Esquire Robin Uricchio, Esquire HOLLAND & KNIGHT Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802 Allan Grossman, Esquire The Capitol, Suite 1602 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Florida Board of Medicine Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having license ME 0036704. He is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He has had no prior complaints of any kind against him since he began practicing medicine in Florida in 1980, and he has a reputation for being a competent and caring physician. On the morning of August 1, 1988, while making rounds at Morton Plant Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, the Respondent was paged by one of his partners, Belur Sreenath, M.D. The Respondent returned the call and was asked to see a patient whom Sreenath had just accepted and admitted on a 23-hour basis at Morton Plant. Sreenath reported that the patient was a referral from the Morton Plant emergency room. The patient's regular physician was on vacation, and the regular physician's on-call cover had recommended to the emergency room physician that the patient be referred to the Respondent and Sreenath to treat the patient for diagnosed fecal impaction. It was reported to the Respondent, through Sreenath, that the patient had come into the emergency room at about five in the morning complaining of abdominal pain and constipation. The emergency room physician, Jerry Julius Chase, M.D., had three X-rays done and had done his own "wet reads" of the X-rays before sending them to the radiology department for a definitive interpretation. According to Chase, the X-rays showed "much fecal matter, no obstruction." Chase did not mention any other significant findings. Chase's preliminary diagnosis was "fecal impaction." Sreenath also reported that he (Sreenath) had ordered enemas for the patient. Soon after the Respondent received the call from his partner, the Respondent called Chase, who was still in the emergency room and still had the X-rays. Chase confirmed what Sreenath had told the Respondent, again not mentioning any other significant findings. After talking to Chase, the Respondent visited the patient in his hospital room. By this time it was about 10:00 a.m. The Respondent took a history from the patient, examined the patient, and read the patient's chart. The chart included the results of lab work and the "ER sheet," which included the emergency room physician's diagnosis of abdominal pain and impaction and the results of his "wet-read" of the X-rays, but it did not yet include a report from the radiology department or the X-rays themselves. The Respondent did not contact the radiology department for a definitive interpretation of the X-rays or obtain the X-rays for his own review. By the time the Respondent saw the patient, the patient already had one enema and seemed to be responding to the treatment. Based on the information he had, the Respondent made a diagnosis of fecal impaction, confirmed his partner's orders for enemas for the patient, and added a stool softener. The nursing staff was ordered to monitor the patient's progress. The patient continued to respond satisfactorily to treatment during the day. Between ten and eleven in the evening of August 1, 1988, the patient complained of some abdominal pain or cramping (symptoms that are consistent with a diagnosis of fecal impaction and enema treatments) and the nurses on duty contacted the Respondent's partner, who was on call. Sreenath ordered a combination of demerol and vistaril as an analgesic. One small dose was enough to relieve the patient's pain, and the patient slept through most of the night. He ate 80% of his breakfast the next morning and was not complaining of pain or asking to see a doctor. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on August 2, 1988, a nurse telephoned the Respondent for a decision whether the patient was being discharged or was being admitted as an inpatient. The Respondent still had not seen the patient's X- rays, seen or had reported to him the radiology report on them, or spoken to the radiologist. On questioning, the nurse reported the patient's status to the Respondent. The nurse's report satisfied the Respondent that the patient was responding to the treatment for fecal impaction and could be discharged. The nurse was given orders to have arrangements made for the patient to see his regular physician within a week and to instruct the patient on symptoms to report if they occurred between discharge and seeing his regular physician. In accordance with the Respondent's telephone instructions, the patient was discharged at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 2, 1988. Although there were no clinical signs or symptoms of it during the patient's stay at Morton Plant, the patient had a large aortic aneurysm, approximately eight centimeters in diameter, in his abdomen just below the renal arteries. The aneurysm was readily apparent on the X-rays, yet Chase did not report it to either the Respondent or to his partner, Sreenath. The radiologist either did not contact Dr. Chase to point out to him that the report of Chases's "wet read" of the X-rays omitted the aneurysm or, if he did, Chase did not relay this information to the Respondent or his partner. The radiologist's written report, stating that the X-rays revealed the large aneurysm, was sent to Chase, not to the Respondent, and Chase did not relay the information in it to the Respondent or his partner. If the Respondent had known about the aneurysm, he would have considered the aneurysm to be the patient's most serious medical concern. He might not have accepted the patient or, if he did, he probably would have brought a vascular surgeon into the case and had the vascular surgeon, or perhaps a cardiologist, closely monitor the patient for possible leaking or dissecting or rupture of the aneurysm. The Respondent also would have had to give consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain. In addition to treating the aneurysm as the patient's most serious medical concern, giving consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain, the Respondent would have had to give consideration to altering his diagnosis for the patient had he reviewed the X-rays or the radiologist report, or had spoken with the radiologist. In addition to showing the existence of the aneurysm, the X-rays indicated that the patient technically may not have been impacted. (The gas pattern was non-specific.) With respect to this patient, the Respondent practiced medicine below that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physicians as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances (below the standard of care) in that he did not either personally review the X-rays on the patient, read or have reported to him the contents of the radiologist's report, or talk to the radiologist. Instead, he relied totally on the emergency room physician's "wet read." As a result, the Respondent's diagnosis of "fecal impaction" may not have been correct, and he did not give proper consideration to the aneurysm. However, except for the failure regarding the X-rays, the DPR otherwise did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent, who was treating the patient for fecal impaction, to discharge the patient without seeing him on the morning of August 2, 1988, based on the nurse's report to the Respondent. Although it was below the standard of care for the Respondent not to either read the X-rays himself or obtain the radiologist's definitive interpretation, it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that the emergency room physician would have told him, and noted in the "ER sheet," that the patient he was being referred had an aneurysm of the kind and size of the one the patient had in this case. Even if the emergency doctor had not initially communicated to the Respondent the existence of the aneurysm, either directly or through the "ER sheet," it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that, in the normal course, the radiologist reviewing the X-rays would have noted that, according to the "ER sheet," the ER doctor "missed" the aneurysm and would have contacted the ER physician to bring this to his attention, and that the ER doctor then would have contacted the Respondent to advise him of the omission. The patient did not experience abdominal pain after his discharge from Morton Plant, but he began to experience back and groin pain. The aneurysm was becoming symptomatic. The patient's symptoms markedly worsened in the early morning hours of August 4, 1988. The patient's wife had him taken to the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital at approximately half past midnight. The patient was confused, and was complaining of pain in the back and groin area. His blood sugars were three times normal. He was diagnosed preliminarily in the emergency room as having out-of-control diabetes and confusion and as being near sycope. No X-rays were taken in the emergency room at New Port Richey Hospital, and no information was obtained from Morton Plant Hospital. Because the patient and his wife did not know about the aneurysm, they were unable to report it when the emergency room physician took the patient's history. The patient was admitted to New Port Richey Hospital at approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 4, 1988. However, the admitting physician did not see the patient or order diagnostic medical imaging at that time. The admitting physician saw the patient at approximately 9:00 a.m., and ordered X-rays and a CAT scan. Before the X-rays or CT scan were taken, at approximately ten o'clock, the patient suffered an acute hypotensive event while in his hospital room. An emergency abdominal sonogram was ordered, and it was determined that the patient was suffering from the rupture of the abdominal aortic aneurysm (the same one that was evident on the X-rays taken at Morton Plant). Surgery was attempted to resect the ruptured aneurysm. The patient was a poor candidate for surgery of that kind due to his age and other health factors. The patient died on August 6, 1988. If the patient knew of the aneurysm, it is likely that his treatment on August 4, 1988, would have been far different. First, when the aneurysm became symptomatic, they probably would have contacted the vascular surgeon, who would have been on the case already, either immediately or on arrival at the emergency room. The aneurysm would have been closely monitored from the time of arrival at the hospital, and the vascular surgeon would have been prepared for surgery when indicated. 2/ At the very least, the patient and his wife probably would have reported the aneurysm during the taking of a history in the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital, and the emergency room surgeon could have immediately taken appropriate steps, such as contacting a vascular surgeon and immediately ordering appropriate diagnostic medical imaging. 3/ The Respondent did not dictate admission notes for the patient until August 17, 1988. The Respondent did not dictate discharge notes. The DPR did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent to delay the dictation of admission notes or for him not to prepare a discharge summary for a patient in the hospital on a 23-hour basis. The DPR also did not prove that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., guilty of one count of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), but dismissing the other count of the Administrative Complaint; reprimanding him; and (3) fining him $2,000. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(d), 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(ll), and 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2001),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of licensed physicians pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Dr. Dangl, whose address of record is 3900 Clark Road, Suite E-1, Sarasota, Florida 34233, was issued Florida license number ME 71286 to practice medicine in Florida. During all relevant periods of time, he was not board-certified by the American Board of Medical Specialties or by any agency recognized by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Dangl is the holder of a D.M.D. degree from the Washington University School of Dental Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri. He is not licensed as a dentist in Florida, but he has previously held dental licenses in Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. He is specialty certified by the American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. This specialty is related to the practice of dentistry. During all relevant periods of time, Dr. Dangl's office was fully and properly registered as an office surgical facility. During all relevant periods of time, Dr. Dangl did not have hospital privileges. On August 17, 2001, C.S., a female who was at that time 63 years old, came to Dr. Dangl's office for a consultation regarding facial rejuvenation and body contouring. Dr. Dangl saw C.S. and recommended "that she consider cervicofacial rhytidectomy with full face carbon dioxide laser resurfacing and autogenous fat transfer to the facial area." He further determined that the "degree of liposity in the abdomen and flanks is minimal and this can also be treated at the same time with low-volume tumescent liposuction." Prior to her consultation with Dr. Dangl, C.S. had seen an advertisement for Dr. Dangl in the "Sarasota Herald-Tribune." The advertisement listed Dr. Dangl as "Kurt Dangl, M.D., FAACS" and underneath his name appeared the words "Board Certified." From reading the advertisement, C.S. assumed that Dr. Dangl was board-certified in cosmetic or plastic surgery. C.S. returned to Dr. Dangl's office on August 21, 2001, for preoperative counseling. She signed consent forms for the procedures to be performed. The consent forms listed potential risks and complications involved with the procedures. Complications included infection, wound breakdown, and skin necrosis. The consent forms stated that Dr. Dangl did not guarantee specific results and that wound healing was outside the control of the patient and Dr. Dangl. On the printed consent forms the abbreviation "D.M.D." followed Dr. Dangl's name. No evidence was presented that the consent forms were being used as advertisements. C.S.'s medical records in Dr. Dangl's files indicate a blood sample was taken from C.S. on August 21, 2001, and sent to AccuLab. An AccuLab report dated August 22, 2001, indicated that C.S. had a slightly lowered hemoglobin level of 35.5. Based on a notation on the report, it appeared that Dr. Dangl reviewed the report on August 23, 2001. There is a handwritten note on the AccuLab report that the hemoglobin count was "ok for planned procedure." Dr. Dangl did not advise C.S. prior to the surgical procedures that her hemoglobin count was low. Dr. Dangl's records indicate that C.S. gave a medical history prior to the surgery and that Dr. Dangl performed a physical examination of C.S. prior to the surgery. C.S. advised Dr. Dangl that she had had her coccyx removed about six weeks before her scheduled cosmetic surgery. On August 28, 2001, C.S. returned to Dr. Dangl's office to have Dr. Dangl perform a face and neck lift, laser resurfacing of the face, removing fat from her abdomen and flanks, and transferring some of the fat from the abdomen and flanks to specific areas in her face. Betsy Shecter, who is licensed as an advance registered nurse practitioner in Florida, was the nurse anesthetist for C.S.'s procedures. Ms. Shecter's first contact with C.S. on August 28, 2001, occurred at 13:05, when she interviewed C.S. and then escorted C.S. to the operating room. At 13:15, C.S. was given valium, and an IV infusion of propofol and Sufenta was placed in C.S.'s arm around 13:20. Propofol is an anesthetic and Sufenta is a synthetic narcotic. C.S. was prepped and draped around 13:30, and a local anesthesia was injected at 13:35. Because the local anesthesia required about 20 to 30 minutes to become active, Dr. Dangl did not make the first incision until 14:05. The liposuction procedure to harvest the fat for a fat transfer occurred between 14:05 and 15:00. After liposuction, a local anesthesia was injected in the areas where the face lift would be performed. At 15:20, a garment was applied to the areas where fat had been harvested to keep the swelling down. Sequential leg compressions were put in place to avoid blood clots. The actual face lift started around 15:30 and ended around 20:20, when Ms. Shecter put Opticane ointment and corneal shields in C.S.'s eyes for the laser procedure. The laser procedure began around 20:25. At around 21:00, Ms. Schecter turned off the propofol drip to which Demerol had been added. The actual laser surgery stopped at approximately 20:55. The eye shields were removed at 21:15. The recovery time in the operating room commenced at 21:00 when the drugs were stopped and ended around 21:45. The recovery time continued until C.S. was discharged at 22:30. At the time of her discharge, C.S.'s vital signs were stable, and she was alert and oriented. C.S. was told prior to the surgery that someone would have to stay with her overnight after the surgery. C.S. made arrangements for her daughter and C.S.'s sister to stay overnight with her. C.S.'s sister had training and experience as a certified nurse assistant. Prior to the surgery, Dr. Dangl told C.S. that she would probably be ready to go home around four or five o'clock (16:00 or 17:00). She made arrangements with her daughter to pick her up around 17:00. When her daughter inquired from Dr. Dangl's office at 17:00 whether her mother was ready to leave, she was advised that surgery had not been completed. C.S. was not discharged until over five hours after her daughter first contacted Dr. Dangl's office. C.S.'s daughter became visibly upset when she saw her mother after the surgery and wanted to have C.S. admitted to a hospital. Because of the daughter's agitation, arrangements were made for a licensed practical nurse, Ruth Schneider, to stay overnight with C.S. C.S.'s daughter and sister had some difficulty in getting C.S. into the car for the trip home because of the sequential leg compressions, which C.S. wore home. Dr. Dangl and Ms. Shecter put C.S. in the car. At the time that C.S. was put in the car, C.S. was able to stand on her own and able to walk with support. When C.S. arrived home, Ms. Schneider assisted C.S. into her home. At that time, C.S. was alert and oriented and could ambulate with assistance. When C.S. got in her home, she was able to drink and take nourishment. Ms. Schneider helped C.S. ambulate to the bathroom. C.S. sat in a recliner and slept some during the night. At the close of Ms. Schneider's eight- hour shift, she left C.S. in the care of C.S.'s sister. C.S. was scheduled for a follow-up visit with Dr. Dangl on August 29, 2001, but C.S.'s sister was unable to arouse C.S. and get C.S. up to go to the doctor's office. Dr. Dangl's office was advised that C.S. could not come to his office. Dr. Dangl came to C.S.'s home around nine or ten o'clock in the evening of August 29, 2001, for a follow-up visit. He removed the dressings from her wounds and applied an antibiotic ointment. Dr. Dangl apparently did not have bandages with him that he could place on the surface of the wounds because he asked the sister for sanitary napkins to use as a dressing. C.S.'s sister retrieved sanitary napkins from the bathroom, and Dr. Dangl, using scissors from a nearby basket, cut the napkins up and used them to dress the wounds. He reused the Ace-type bandages which he had removed and placed them over the sanitary pads. C.S. was instructed to come to Dr. Dangl's office on August 31, 2001, for her 72-hour postoperative evaluation. On August 31, 2001, C.S.'s sister took C.S. to Dr. Dangl's office. C.S.'s sister did not accompany C.S. into the treatment room. Dr. Dangl removed the dressings and inspected the wounds. There was no evidence of hematoma, seroma, or infection. He noted that there was a "small area of devascularization immediately anterior to the left tragus on the left side" and described the areas as "about the size of a quarter." His notes indicate that the area would be "followed expectantly and debrided as necessary." He was to follow up with C.S. in 48 or 72 hours. When Dr. Dangl came out of the treatment room, he saw C.S.'s sister and asked her what was wrong with her. She explained that she was tired from being up all night with C.S. Dr. Dangl asked the sister why she did not take one of the sleeping pills that he had prescribed for C.S. The sister replied, "What? Why would you tell me to do that, take someone else's medicine?" Prior to this conversation, Dr. Dangl had not examined the sister in any way, gotten her medical history, or asked her whether she was taking any other medications. Over the next several days, C.S. complained to her sister that she was burning, hurting all over, and was not able to sleep or rest. On September 3, 2001, C.S.'s daughter called Dr. Dangl's office and advised that C.S. had a foul smelling discharge in front of her left tragus. Dr. Dangl called in a prescription for antibiotics for C.S. and told C.S.'s daughter that he wanted to see C.S. the following day. Dr. Dangl saw C.S. in his office on September 4, 2001. His examination of C.S. revealed that the size of the devascularized area in front of her left tragus had increased four times. There was some foul smelling yellow-brown discharge coming from this area as well as from several areas under the mandible approximately following the locations of the previously placed drains. He debrided the devitalized area and irrigated the discharge areas with an antibiotic solution and hydrogen peroxide. An intravenous antibiotic was administered, and wound cultures were obtained from various sites. Dr. Dangl again saw C.S. in his office on the evening of September 4, 2005. There was a minimal amount of drainage and no foul smelling odor. On September 5, 2001, C.S. again presented to Dr. Dangl's office for postoperative infection evaluation and treatment. There was a mild purulent discharge in the left anterior neck and at the left post auricular area. Dr. Dangl debrided the wound area and irrigated the wound area with sterile saline. C.S.'s pain medication was increased. Dr. Dangl saw C.S. in his office on September 6, 2001, for further wound treatment. The laboratory results of the wound cultures indicated a light growth of E. coli. Dr. Dangl administered an antibiotic intravenously and removed necrotic tissue. C.S. returned to Dr. Dangl's office on September 7, 2001. Her temperature was 100.6 degrees Fahrenheit, and she was complaining of significant discomfort. Dr. Dangl debrided the wound area. He examined the abdomen and flank incisions and found no evidence of infection or other signs of untoward wound healing. C.S.'s daughter accompanied her mother to Dr. Dangl's office on September 7, 2001, and expressed her concerns about her mother's condition. The daughter felt that her mother might benefit from hospitalization. Dr. Dangl referred C.S. to Dr. Manual Gordillo for evaluation and determination of the need for hospitalization. Dr. Gordillo treated infectious diseases. Dr. Gordillo saw C.S. and advised C.S. and her daughter that the treatment for the infection could be done in the hospital or on an outpatient basis, but expressed his opinion that admission to the hospital was borderline. C.S. opted for hospitalization and was admitted to Doctors Hospital of Sarasota on September 7, 2001. After C.S. was admitted to the hospital, additional cultures were taken of the wound sites as well as the sites in the abdomen where fat had been harvested. Based on the laboratory results, C.S. had a scant growth of E. coli from her face wound culture and a moderate growth of staphylococcus aureus from abdominal wound culture. C.S. was placed in isolation because of the staph infection. C.S. was experiencing a great deal of pain from her wounds while she was in the hospital. Because of her difficulty with pain management, she was put on a PCP pump to help control the pain. While she was in the hospital, Dr. Dangl visited her several times to observe. He did not perform any treatment on C.S. while she was hospitalized. C.S. told Dr. Dangl that she wished that he would not visit her while she was in the hospital, but he continued to come. The evidence is not clear and convincing that C.S. conveyed to Dr. Dangl that she did not want his services any longer, particularly in light of C.S.'s paying office visits to Dr. Dangl for treatment after she was discharged from the hospital. However, the evidence is clear and convincing that C.S. did not want Dr. Dangl to visit her in the hospital and that she told him so. Dr. Dangl's medical records do not establish a medical basis for continuing to see C.S. in the hospital after she asked him not to do so. C.S. was discharged from the hospital on September 13, 2001. At that time, she was feeling much better, her wounds were stable, and her wounds were not clinically overtly infected. She was directed to follow up with Dr. Dangl as soon as the following day and to follow up with Dr. Gordillo within a week. After her discharge from the hospital, C.S. continued to see Dr. Dangl on September 15, 17, 19, and 21, 2001. Dr. Dangl changed the dressings and, on two of the visits, did some minimal debridement. C.S. discontinued seeing Dr. Dangl after her office visit on September 21, 2001. On September 24, 2001, C.S. began seeing Dr. John Leikensohn, a plastic and reconstructive surgeon, for wound treatment. He diagnosed C.S. as having massive skin necrosis. When C.S. began seeing Dr. Leikensohn, she was asked to sign a medical release for her medical records from Dr. Dangl, and she did so. Dr. Leikensohn's staff contacted Dr. Dangl's office by telephone to get C.S.'s records. The medical release was sent by facsimile transmission to Dr. Dangl's office with a request for C.S.'s records. By October 2, 2001, Dr. Leikensohn had not received the records from Dr. Dangl. Dr. Leikensohn asked C.S. and C.S.'s daughter to stop by Dr. Dangl's office and get a copy of the records. C.S. went to Dr. Dangl's office and personally asked his staff for her records, but was not given the records. She also submitted a written request for her records, but did not receive them pursuant to the written request. Barbie Beaver, Dr. Dangl's office coordinator, does not recall when or from whom she actually received a request for C.S.'s records, but she does remember sending C.S.'s medical records to Barbara Dame, Dr. Dangl's risk manager, for her review on September 27, 2001. When Dr. Dangl's office received a request for a patient's records, she would advise Dr. Dangl and he would decide what to do. She gave a request for C.S.'s medical records to Dr. Dangl, and he instructed her to send them to Ms. Dame for review prior to releasing the records. Ms. Beaver does not recall when she actually sent C.S.'s records to the person who requested them. During his treatment of C.S., Dr. Dangl wrote several prescriptions for C.S. The prescription scripts contained the abbreviation "D.M.D." after his name. No evidence was presented that the prescriptions were intended to be used for advertising purposes. Dr. John J. Obi, a board-certified plastic surgeon, testified as the Department's expert witness. It is Dr. Obi's opinion that it would have been good medical practice to have advised C.S. of her low hemoglobin prior to surgery, but that because the blood level was not dangerously low, he could not "say that's a complete deviation from the standard of care." Dr. Obi further opined that Dr. Dangl exceeded the eight-hour limitation on elective cosmetic surgery in a physician's office when he performed the procedures on C.S. on August 28, 2001. Dr. Obi's opinion is based on his incorrect understanding that the anesthesia was stopped at 22:00. Thus, even if the time for calculating surgical procedures ran from the time the anesthesia was first administered at 13:15 until it was stopped at 21:00, the length of time for the surgical procedures was seven hours and forty-five minutes. Dr. Obi opined that the recovery time for C.S. was insufficient. Again he based his opinion in part on his incorrect assumption that the anesthesia was discontinued at 22:00. Dr. Obi creditably testified that Dr. Dangl's continuing to see C.S. in the hospital after she told him that she did not want him to visit fell below the prevailing standard of care. Dr. William Frazier, the expert who testified on behalf of Dr. Dangl, gave no opinion on whether Dr. Dangl's continued hospital visits after being told not to visit by C.S. violated the standard of care. Dr. Obi opined that it was a violation of the standard of care for Dr. Dangl to tell C.S.'s sister to take some of C.S.'s prescription sleeping pills without examining or taking a medical history of the sister. Dr. Frazier was of the opinion that the conversation between Dr. Dangl and C.S.'s sister did not fall below the standard of care. Dr. Frazier's opinion was based on his misunderstanding that C.S.'s sister had asked Dr. Dangl if it was appropriate for her to take a sleeping medication that she already had.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Dangl violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(ll), and 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes; finding that Dr. Dangl did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $3,500 for violations of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(ll), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes; suspending his license for two years; and requiring Dr. Dangl to attend continuing medical education classes to be specified by the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Respondent Lucien Armand, M.D., violated Section 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes (2006); Section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2006), by violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(2) and (4), and Section 458.351, Florida Statutes (2006); Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2006); and Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006), as alleged in an Amended Administrative Complaint filed by the Department of Health before the Board of Medicine on June 20, 2008; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. § 20.43 and Chs. 456 and 458, Fla. Stat. Respondent, Lucien Armand, M.D., is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 33997. Dr. Armand is board-certified in general surgery by the American Board of Surgery. Dr. Armand’s mailing address of record at all times relevant to this matter was 2071 Southwest 52nd Way, Plantation, Florida 33317. At the times relevant, Dr. Armand practiced medicine at 4100 South Hospital Drive, Suite 108, Plantation, Florida 33317. The office at which Dr. Armand practiced medicine was located very close to Plantation General Hospital (hereinafter referred to as “Plantation”). Dr. Armand has been the subject of three prior disciplinary matters arising out of five separate cases. Penalties were imposed in those three disciplinary matters. The Department summarized those disciplinary matters in paragraph 37 of its Proposed Recommended Order: In DPR Case Numbers 0019222, 0019123 and 0091224, Respondent was fined, received a reprimand, and was required to complete 30 hours of Continuing Medical Education (CME) in general vascular surgery and risk management within the surgical practice. In Case Number 94-10100, Respondent was required to submit to and comply with an evaluation at the University of Florida, to pay a fine, was reprimanded, was required to complete twenty hours of CME in general surgery in performing Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, and was placed on Probation for two (2) years. In Case Number 1999- 58474, Respondent was restricted from performing Level II or above office surgery as defined in Rule 64B8-9.009(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, until the Respondent demonstrated to the Board that he had successfully completed the University of Florida Comprehensive Assessment and Remedial Education Service (UF C.A.R.E.S.) course and complied with all recommendations, was reprimanded, was placed on probation for two (2) years, was required to attend the Florida Medical Association “Quality Medical Record Keeping for Health Care Practitioners” course, was required to perform 100 hours of community service, and was required to reimburse the Department for costs. Dr. Armand, who is 70 years of age, has been practicing medicine for 46 years. He has practiced medicine in Florida since 1979. During the eight months prior to the final hearing of this matter, Dr. Armand was working in South Sudan pursuant to contract with the United States State Department. October 6, 2006, Surgery on Patient W.C. On September 14, 2006, Patient W.C. presented to Dr. Armand and was diagnosed as having a slow-growing left inguinal hernia. Dr. Armand scheduled Patient W.C. for surgical repair of the inguinal hernia. The surgery was scheduled for October 6, 2006, at Dr. Armand’s office and, at the request of Patient W.C., under local sedation. At approximately 9:30 a.m., October 6, 2006, Patient W.C. arrived as scheduled at Dr. Armand’s office, accompanied by his wife and child. Patient W.C., who was not asked to execute any paperwork concerning the operation, was taken into a room where he was directed to lie down. There were two nurses in the room. Patient W.C. was given one shot of some form near the site of the procedure. This shot is the only medication he remembers receiving. He denied any recollection of having received medication intravenously, intramuscularly, or rectally. According to Dr. Armand, Patient W.C. was given “local anesthesia, Xylocaine 1% and ½% during the procedure and I gave some oral sedation, 10mg. of Valium, by mouth.” Page 171, Lines 19-21, Vol. II, Transcript of Final Hearing. At some point during the surgery, Patient W.C.’s intestines eviscerated, pushed themselves out through the hernia, making the hernia impossible to repair in the office. Due to the evisceration of Patient W.C.’s intestines, Dr. Armand eventually closed the incision and decided to transport Patient W.C. to Plantation to complete the procedure. Dr. Armand’s testimony that he closed and took patient W.C. to Plantation because Patient W.C. began “fidgeting” is not credited. While Patient W.C. did not have any clear recollection of the surgery while at Dr. Armand’s office, he did recall that “I was shaking myself and one of the nurses put something on my head and I went to sleep.” Page 40, Lines 20-22, Vol. I, Transcript of Final Hearing. Patient W.C. later indicated that “[o]ne of the ladies sprayed something on my face,” at which point Patient W.C. “went to sleep.” Page 41, Lines 23-24, and Page 42, Line 8, Vol. I, Transcript of Final Hearing. Patient W.C. did not remember anything else from this point in the surgery until he awoke at approximately 2:00 p.m., October 6, 2006, in a room at Plantation. Patient W.C. was transported to Plantation after he “fell asleep” by Dr. Armand. When Patient W.C. arrived at the Plantation emergency room, he was noted to be “sleepy” and, based upon Dr. Armand’s representation to the emergency room physician, Cornell Calinescu, M.D., was described as “somewhat sedated secondary to Valium and Clonidine.” Patient W. C. was also described by Dr. Calinescu and an emergency room nurse as able to speak. Upon admission to Plantation, Dr. Armand performed emergency surgery on Patient W.C. under general anesthesia, completing the procedure he had begun in his office. The surgery was completed without further complication. As noted above, Patient W.C. has no recollection of arriving at the Plantation emergency room, how he got to the hospital, or anything else that took place after falling asleep in Dr. Armand’s office, until he awoke in a hospital room later in the afternoon. Dr. Armand’s Medical Records for the October 6, 2006, Surgery. Dr. Armand’s office notes for Patient W.C. lack any documentation as to what took place in his office on October 6, 2006. Dr. Armand did not record the date of the procedure; the type of procedure performed; pre-operative care; any drugs that were prescribed, dispensed, and/or administered; the type and dosage of anesthetic sedation used; or post-operative care. Dr. Armand’s medical records for Patient W.C. also failed to include any informed consent for the procedure performed on October 6, 2006. As noted above, Dr. Armand did complete an operative report after the emergency surgery performed on Patient W.C. at Plantation. Office Surgery; Level of Anesthesia. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009 (hereinafter referred to as the “Office Surgery Rule”) prescribes standards for the performance of office surgery. In providing those standards, the Office Surgery Rule defines three levels of sedation and the conditions under which each level may be achieved and must be performed. Level II and Level III office surgery require registration of the physician’s office to perform. Dr. Armand’s office was not registered to perform Level II or Level III office surgery at the times relevant to this proceeding. Only the first and second levels of office surgery are relevant to this case. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(3) describes the types of procedures appropriate for “Level I” office surgery, which Dr. Armand has argued he performed on Patient W.C., as follows: Minor procedures such as excision of skin lesions, moles, warts, cysts, lipomas and repair of lacerations or surgery limited to the skin and subcutaneous tissue performed under topical or local anesthesia not involving drug-inducted alteration of consciousness other than minimal pre- operative tranquilization of the patient. Liposuction involving the removal of less than 4000cc supernatant fat is permitted. Incision and drainage of superficial abscesses, limited endoscopies such as proctoscopes, skin biopsies, arthrocentesis, thoracentesis, paracentesis, dilation of urethra, cysto-scopic procedures, and closed reduction of simple fractures or small joint dislocations (i.e., finger and toe joints). . . . . 5. Chances of complication requiring hospitalization are remote. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(4) describes the types of procedures appropriate for “Level II” office surgery, which the Department argues Dr. Armand utilized on Patient W.C., as follows: Level II Office Surgery is that in which peri-operative medication and sedation are used intravenously, intramuscularly, or rectally, thus making intra and post- operative monitoring necessary. Such procedures shall include, but not be limited to: hemorrhoidectomy, hernia repair, reduction of simple fractures, large joint dislocations, breast biopsies, colonoscopy, and liposuction involving the removal of up to 4000cc supernatant fat. Level II Office surgery includes any surgery in which the patient is placed in a state which allows the patient to tolerate unpleasant procedures while maintaining adequate cardiorespiratory function and the ability to respond purposefully to verbal command and/or tactile stimulation. Patients whose only response is reflex withdrawal from a painful stimulus are sedated to a greater degree than encompassed by this definition. [Emphasis added]. While the Department relies in part upon the language of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(4) that “[s]uch procedures shall include, but not be limited to . . . hernia repair . . .” to support its argument that the procedure performed by Dr. Armand on Patient W.C. was in fact performed as Level II surgery, this reliance is misplaced. Regardless of the proper interpretation of this language of the Rule (whether it clearly puts physicians on notice that all hernia repair surgery must be conducted as Level II surgery or not), at best it establishes a proscription. Such a proscription, cannot, however, be relied upon to establish the “fact” that Level II surgery was performed or not. The question of whether Dr. Armand performed the procedure defined as “Level II” office surgery is the disputed issue of fact in this case. Resolving this factual dispute requires an ultimate factual determination, which involves the application of a legal standard (the Rule) to the historical facts (what Dr. Armand actually did) as found by the trier-of-fact based upon the evidence. The Rule is not evidence of what Dr. Armand did; rather it is the yardstick against which Dr. Armand’s conduct must be measured and, ultimately, judged. The evidence either way concerning the level of surgery performed by Dr. Armand consisted of his testimony denying that Level II surgery was performed, the testimony of Patient W.C. concerning his condition, the description of Patient W.C.’s condition by emergency room personnel, and the opinion of the Department’s expert witness, Christian Brikedal, M.D., as to the level of surgery. Dr. Armand’s denial that he performed Level II surgery was not convincing because it was inconsistent with the patient’s description of his condition on October 6, 2006, and the description of his condition by emergency room staff when arrived at Plantation. Patient W.C. had no recollection of going to the hospital or anything that transpired there until he awoke at about 2:00 p.m. the afternoon of October 6, 2006. Emergency room staff noted that Patient W.C. was able to talk when he arrived. These facts, convincingly proved, are more consistent with what constitutes Level II surgery: “the patient is placed in a state which allows the patient to tolerate unpleasant procedures while maintaining . . . the ability to respond purposefully to verbal command and/or tactile stimulation.” This finding is further supported by Dr. Brikedal opinion that Patient W.C.’s condition was consistent with having undergone Level II sedatopm. Dr. Brikedal, whose testimony was convincing and uncontroverted, was asked the following question and gave the following answer at Page 22, Lines 7-14, Vol. I, Transcript of Final Hearing: Q Assuming W.C. is going to testify that as soon as the complication occurred that he was put to sleep and didn’t wake up until he was in the hospital, are you able to reach any conclusions about the level of sedation that occurred? A He would have to have been given a sedative I.V. or I.M. to be that sleepy. This opinion, as to Patient W.C.’s condition on October 6, 2006, supports a finding that Patient W.C. was under Level II anesthesia while surgery was being performed in Dr. Armand’s office. Having found that Patient W.C. was under the level of sedation described in the definition of “Level II” office surgery, leads inescapably to the finding that Dr. Armand administered Level II sedation to Patient W.C. The foregoing finding is further supported by the portion of the Office Surgery Rule quoted, supra, in finding of fact 24. Dr. Brikedal explained during the hearing why it is “appropriate and necessary to do an inguinal hernia repair” as Level II surgery: “Sedation to the point that the patient’s comfortable so they’re able to or they’re not pushing against you, inhibiting you from performing this very safely.” Page 24, Lines 20-22, Vol. I, Transcript of Final Hearing. As a board- certified general surgeon who has previously registered and had his office accredited as an office at which Level II surgery could be performed, Dr. Armand must have been aware of why it is prudent to perform hernia repairs as Level II surgery. While Dr. Armand may have begun the surgery as Level I, when Patient W.C.’s intestines eviscerated, Dr. Armand must have realized that taking Patient W.C. to Level II sedation would give him a better opportunity to correct the problem. Unfortunately for Dr. Armand, it was too late. Office Surgery Rule Procedures. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(2) prescribes requirements for conducting “office surgery,” taking into account of the level of sedation utilized during a procedure. The hernia repair performed by Dr. Armand on Patient W.C. constituted “surgery” as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(1). Performance of the surgery in Dr. Armand’s office constituted “office surgery” as those terms are defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(1)(d). The “office surgery” performed by Dr. Armand on Patient W.C. failed to comply, as required, with all the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(2), applicable to conducting Level II office surgery and, in some instances, Level I office surgery: Dr. Armand failed to “maintain complete records” of the surgical procedure as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.003, or a written informed consent from the patient as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8- 9.009(2)(a)(applicable in part to Level I and Level II surgery); No log of Level II surgery was kept as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(2)(c); No adverse incident report was filed as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009(2)(k). This portion of the rule requires that “[t]he surgeon shall report to the Department of Health any adverse incidents that occur within the office surgical setting. . . .” (Emphasis added). This requirement is separate from any requirement that a hospital report adverse incidents and the burden of reporting is put directly on the surgeon; and Dr. Armand did not have an established risk management program as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8- 9.009(2)(j). The Standard of Care. Dr. Birkedal provided an opinion to the Department and testified at the final hearing as to whether Dr. Armand’s treatment of Patient W.C. met the “level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers ” (Hereinafter referred to as the “Standard of Care”). In his original opinion dated December 22, 2007, Dr. Birkedal indicated that he did not believe that Dr. Armand’s care of Patient W.C. violated the Standard of Care. There were caveats or assumptions, however, which Dr. Birkedal recognized in his written opinion could change his opinion if not correct. In particular, at the time of his original opinion, Dr. Birkedalk had incorrectly assumed that the procedure performed on Patient W.C. was a Level I procedure. Dr. Birkedal recognized in his original opinion that, if his assumption were incorrect, that his opinion would change: “[i]f he did give an IV sedative, then he may have violated the standard of care if his office is not licensed to give IV sedatives.” At hearing, Dr. Birkedal was of the opinion that Dr. Armand had not simply performed Level I surgery and, therefore, opined that he had violated the Standard of Care because his office was not a properly licensed office surgery suite. Dr. Birkedal also offered other opinions at hearing concerning what he perceived were violations of the Standard of Care, but those “violations” were not alleged by the Department in the Amended Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that Lucien Armand M.D., has violated Section 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes (2006); Section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2006), by violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009 and Section 458.351, Florida Statutes (2006); Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2006); and Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, to the extent found in this Recommended Order; and indefinitely suspending his license to practice medicine in Florida, but allowing him to continue to practice medicine outside the United States through his relationship with the United States Department of State after full disclosure of the Board’s final order to the United States Department of State. Should a medical license not be a condition of employment by the United States Department of State, his license should be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Kiesling Assistant General Counsel Robert A. Milne Assistant General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Sean Ellsworth, Esquire Ellsworth Law Firm, P.A. 1501 Collins Avenue, Suite 208 Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0040318. Respondent completed a residency in internal medicine and later was a nephrology fellow at Mayo Clinic. He was recruited to Florida in 1952 by Humana. In 1984 he became associated with a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) in an administrative position but took over treating patients when the owner became ill. This HMO was affiliated with IMC who assimilated it when the HMO had financial difficulties. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was a salaried employee of IMC and served as Assistant Medical DIRECTOR in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency Room at a nearby hospital. He was examined and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. When the ambulance with EMS personnel arrived they examined Stroganow, and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when he was transported to the emergency Room, and refused to again take Stroganow to the emergency Room. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to check on Stroganow. Upon arrival, she was admitted by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, and apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not engage in conversation to determine his condition. She called for a Cares Unit team to come and evaluate Stroganow. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her evaluation on visual examination. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit, and, after examining Stroganow, both members of the team agreed he needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady revealed his income to be above that for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold-Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, Respondent, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement because Stroganow was not ambulatory, but felt he needed to be placed in a hospital or nursing home and not left alone with the weekend approaching. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, who was in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic, and, they thought, was Stroganow's doctor. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic as well as by EMS personnel. There were always two, and occasionally three, doctors on duty at South Pasadena Clinic between 8:00 and 5:00 daily and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor he was treated by the first available doctor. Stroganow had not specifically requested to be treated by Respondent. When the Cares unit met with Respondent they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the previous evening but did not advise Respondent that the EMS squad had refused to return Stroganow to the emergency Room when they were recalled for Stroganow the same evening. Respondent telephoned the Metropolitan General Emergency Room and had the emergency Room medical report on Stroganow read to him. With the information provided by the Cares unit and the hospital report, Respondent concluded that Stroganow needed emergency medical treatment and the quickest way to obtain such treatment would be to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency Room for evaluation. When the Cares unit arrived, Respondent was treating patients at the clinic. A clinic, or doctors office, is not a desirable or practical place to have an incontinent, incoherent, and non-ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to perform certain procedures that may be required for emergency evaluation of an ill patient. At a hospital emergency Room such equipment is available. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call being placed to 911 for emergency medical treatment and it was necessary that someone be with Stroganow when the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Respondent suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 to transport Stroganow to an emergency Room for an evaluation. Upon leaving the South Pasadena clinic the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem with Stroganow. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC Tampa Office to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus HMO patients had an emergency situation which was not being property handled. Respondent left the South Pasadena Clinic around noon and went to IMC's Tampa Office where he was available for the balance of the afternoon. There he spoke with Dr. Sanchez, the INC Regional Medical Director, but Stroganow was not deemed to be a continuing problem. By 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived the Cares Unit called 911 for EMS to take Stroganow to an emergency Room. Upon arrival shortly thereafter the EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow. The Cares team communicated this to their supervisor who contacted IMC Regional Office to so advise. At this time Dr. Sanchez authorized the transportation of Stroganow to Lake Seminole Hospital for admission. Although neither Respondent nor Sanchez had privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had contracted with Lake Seminole Hospital to have IMC patients admitted by a staff doctor at Lake Seminole Hospital. Subsequent to his meeting with the Cares team Respondent received no further information regarding Stroganow until well after Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital. No entry was made on Stroganow's medical record at IMC of the meeting between Respondent and the Cares Unit. Respondent was a salaried employee whose compensation was not affected by whether or not he admitted an IMC Gold-Plus patient to a hospital.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a medical doctor, in his treatment of Patient M.A., failed to keep legible medical records in violation of section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2007); prescribed or administered inappropriate or excessive quantities of controlled substances in violation of section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes (2007); committed medical malpractice by practicing below the standard of care in violation of section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2007); failed to perform a statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician in violation of section 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2007); and violated any provision of chapter 458 or chapter 456, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto in violation of section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2007), as Petitioner alleges in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint; if so, whether (and what) disciplinary measures should be imposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Paul M. Goldberg, M.D., violated sections 458.331(1)(g) and (nn), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts IV and V of the Complaint; Dismissing Counts I-III of the Complaint; Imposing $20,000 in administrative fines; issuing a reprimand against Dr. Goldberg's medical license; requiring Dr. Goldberg to complete the "Laws and Rules" Course; suspending Dr. Goldberg's medical license until such time as Dr. Goldberg undergoes a "UF CARES" evaluation; and placing Dr. Goldberg's license on probation for three years under indirect supervision with 100 percent chart review of cosmetic surgery patients and 25 percent chart review of all other patients. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2015.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D. (Respondent or Dr. Saadatmand), has violated section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes (2013), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties Petitioner, the Department of Health, is the agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to chapters 20, 456, and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Saadatmand holds Florida license number ME 114656. Respondent graduated from the University of Maryland, College of Medicine, in 1988, and completed his residency at Case Western Reserve. He then completed a residency in emergency medicine at Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent was board-certified in internal medicine, but no longer holds that certification because at the time it was due for renewal, he was no longer eligible because his practice was devoted to emergency medicine as opposed to internal medicine. He remains board-certified in emergency medicine. Respondent has held positions that required him to supervise residents and give lectures at Yale University, New York College of Medicine, and Indiana University. Dr. Saadatmand chose to practice emergency medicine as a traveling physician for the last three years, because of the financial benefits available by doing so while he gained additional experience in emergency medicine. However, he has since or now accepted a position as the assistant program director of the emergency medicine residency program at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida, where his job responsibilities will include the supervision of residents. Dr. Saadatmand holds a medical license in several other states in addition to Florida, and has not been disciplined in any state where he is licensed. Dr. Saadatmand’s Treatment of R.D. In June and July of 2014, Respondent was working as a traveling physician at Parrish Medical Center in Titusville, Florida. While most of his assignments in various emergency facilities have been six months long, the assignment at Parrish Medical Center was for approximately one month. Respondent treated patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, at Parrish Medical Center emergency room. R.D. was accompanied by his wife, C.D. R.D. was a 52-year-old male when he presented to Parrish Medical Center. He had a history of T-cell lymphoma and had been treated for his cancer through the Space Coast Cancer Center. Just days before his presentation to the emergency room on June 27, 2014, he had been cleared to return to his place of employment. However, on June 27, 2014, R.D.’s supervisor called R.D.’s wife, C.D., and asked her to come get R.D. as he was too ill to be at work. R.D. arrived at Parrish Medical Center in the early afternoon, and was triaged by a nurse at approximately 2:13 p.m. The notes from the triage nurse’s assessment recorded, among other things, R.D.’s vital signs upon arrival; his chief complaint, including its duration and intensity; a brief medical history; a list of his current medications; and a drug/alcohol use history. Registered Nurse Sharon Craddock was the emergency room nurse who completed the initial assessment, or triage assessment, of R.D.’s condition. According to her triage notes in the Parrish Medical Center records, R.D.’s chief complaint upon arrival was constipation, which was described as constipation for three days, with bilateral abdominal pain. The pain was described as aching, pressure, shooting, and throbbing, and R.D.’s pain level was reported in Ms. Craddock’s notes as being an eight on a ten-point scale. Her description of his abdomen was “soft, non-tender, round, and obese.” Nurses are directed to record the pain level reported by the patient, and not to alter the pain level based on the nurse’s observation.1/ R.D.’s vital signs were taken upon his arrival at Parrish Medical Center and were recorded in the electronic medical records as follows: temperature, 98.4F; pulse, 127H; respiration, 20; blood pressure, 120/70; and pulse oximeter, 95. The only abnormal reading reflected in R.D.’s vital signs was his pulse, which was above 100, considered to be the upper limit of normal. R.D. reported that he had a medical history which included T-cell lymphoma and that he did not smoke or drink. His current medications were listed as aspirin, Zyrtec, Amaryl, Metformin, Prilosec, Percocet, Pravastatin, and a multivitamin. The Percocet dosage was listed as one tablet, three times daily, as needed for pain. Ms. Craddock also recorded a nursing note for R.D. at 3:37 p.m., and she was in the room when Respondent first went in to see R.D. Ms. Craddock’s nursing note indicates, “Pt with a hx of stomach CA with a recent ‘clean bill of health’ presents with ABD pain and constipation. Occasionally takes Percocet for pain. Wife at BS. Pt. sleepy, states he normally takes a nap this time of day. Pending MD eval with orders.” The Parrish Medical Center chart documents that R.D. was calm, cooperative, and asleep at 15:37 hours (3:37 p.m.). This presentation is generally inconsistent with a patient who is in severe abdominal pain. Dr. Saadatmand saw R.D. at approximately 3:56 p.m. Consistent with the custom at Parrish Medical Center, he worked with a scribe who took Respondent’s dictation for notes during his visit with the patient, and then loaded those notes into the electronic medical record. Respondent would then have the opportunity to review the notes as transcribed and direct the scribe to make any necessary changes. Dr. Saadatmand’s notes indicate that R.D. presented with abdominal pain, and was experiencing moderate pain that was constant with cramping. The description of R.D.’s pain as moderate was based upon Dr. Saadatmand’s observation of R.D. The chief complaint listed was constipation. Dr. Saadatmand took a history from R.D., who reported that he had been diagnosed with gastric lymphoma in 2013, and was treated with radiation and chemotherapy. R.D. and his wife, C.D., reported to Respondent that they feared his cancer might be returning, as his current symptoms were similar to those he experienced when his cancer was first diagnosed. He had returned to Space Coast Cancer Center for some additional screening two to three weeks before the emergency room visit, which included a CT of the abdomen and an upper and lower endoscopy. R.D. and his wife both believed that the results of the screening were normal. Respondent recorded this conversation in the electronic medical record as “[R.D.] had a recent follow up with Dr. Rylander and had normal EGD and colonoscopy. [R.D.] had recent CT scan with cancer center.” Space Coast Cancer Center does not use Parrish Medical Center to perform its CT scans or other testing, so the results of the recent CT scan were not available for Respondent to view. Respondent believed that R.D. and C.D. had followed the directions of R.D.’s oncologists, and R.D. had been a compliant patient. Respondent asked R.D. about his use of Percocet. He did not ask how much he was taking, but how often and whether the use had changed. He considered the answer to this question to be important, because a change in the use could indicate a change in R.D.’s pain intensity. R.D. did not report any change in the amount that he was taking, which was generally an “every other day thing for him.” Respondent testified that, given that the type of Percocet that R.D. was prescribed was an extra-strength as opposed to a standard version of Percocet, it was highly likely that R.D. would suffer from opioid-induced constipation. R.D. reported to Respondent that he had not attempted any laxatives. R.D. also denied having any nausea or surgical history. The lack of a surgical history is significant because patients with a recent surgical history and abdominal pain may be experiencing complications related to the surgery, which would account for the patient’s pain. There is no reference to R.D.’s diabetes in either the nursing triage notes or Dr. Saadatmand’s notes. The only reference in the past medical history is the report of cancer. The list of medications R.D. was taking at home includes Metformin HCI. No evidence was presented to establish whether Metformin is a drug prescribed only for diabetes or whether it is an accepted treatment for other conditions. Moreover, there is no evidence presented to establish how Respondent was to know that R.D. was diabetic if R.D. did not report the condition. In addition to taking R.D.’s medical history, Respondent performed a review of systems and a physical examination, including palpation of his abdomen. In his chart, the electronic medical record states under “review of systems,” “All systems: Reviewed and negative except as stated.” Under the category “Gastrointestinal,” the record indicates “Reports: Abdominal pain, Constipation. Denies: Nausea, vomiting, Diarrhea.” In the physical examination section of the electronic medical record, it is noted that R.D. was alert and in mild distress. The cardiovascular examination indicates that R.D. had a regular rate, normal rhythm, and normal heart sounds, with no systolic or diastolic murmur. With respect to his abdominal exam, Respondent indicated, “Present: Soft, normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” The notation that the abdomen was soft with normal bowel sounds is another way of noting that the abdomen is non-tender. Because R.D. was tachycardic upon presentation to the emergency room, Dr. Saadatmand noted R.D.’s anxiety about the possibility of his cancer returning, and checked his pulse a second time. When Respondent checked R.D.’s pulse, it had slowed to 90, which is within a normal range. In light of R.D.’s normal vital signs, normal abdominal examination, and the length of his pain and constipation, Respondent determined that the most likely cause for Respondent’s pain was constipation, and communicated that determination to R.D. and C.D. He asked whether R.D. had used a laxative and was told he had not. Dr. Saadatmand told R.D. and his wife that the pain medication that he took could be a source for his constipation, and that it would be prudent to try a laxative and see if that produced results before considering any further diagnostic tests. Respondent did not order any lab tests for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, because his vital signs and abdominal examination were normal. He did not order an EKG for R.D. because there were no symptoms to indicate a cardiac issue. Respondent also did not order a CT scan of the abdomen or pelvis for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014. He felt that, in terms of R.D.’s concern about cancer recurrence, there were tests available to R.D.’s oncologist that would be more useful in detecting any recurrence of R.D.’s cancer that are not available through an emergency room visit. For example, a PET scan would be the most helpful, but is not something that Respondent could order through the emergency room because it is not considered an emergent study. The Department has not alleged, and the evidence did not demonstrate, that R.D. suffered from any emergency condition that additional testing would have revealed and that went undetected by Dr. Saadatmand. Respondent did order a prescription-strength laxative, i.e., Golytely, for R.D., which is a laxative commonly used to treat constipation and to prepare patients for a colonoscopy. Dr. Saadatmand communicated his recommendation to R.D. and C.D., who seemed relieved that the problem might be limited to constipation. He also advised them to return to the emergency room should R.D.’s symptoms get worse or if he developed a fever, because those developments would indicate a change in his condition. R.D. received discharge instructions that are consistent with Dr. Saadatmand’s discussion with R.D. and his wife. The discharge instructions referred R.D. to his primary care physician, noted the prescription for Golytely, and provided information related to the community health navigator. The Patient Visit Information sheet received by R.D. specifically noted that the patient was acknowledging receipt of the instructions provided, and stated, “I understand that I have had EMERGENCY TREATMENT ONLY and that I may be released before all my medical problems are known and treated. Emergency medical care is not intended to be a substitute for complete medical care. My Emergency Department diagnosis is preliminary and may change after complete medical care is received. I will arrange for follow-up care.” R.D. also received printed materials about constipation and how to address the problem. These instructions stated that the patient should contact his or her primary care provider if the constipation gets worse, the patient starts to vomit, or has questions or concerns about his or her condition or care. It also instructed the patient to return to the emergency room if he or she had blood in his or her bowel movements or had a fever and abdominal pain with the constipation. R.D. signed the acknowledgment that he had read and understood the instructions given to him by his caregivers. The acknowledgment specifically referenced the instructions regarding constipation. The written instructions are consistent with the verbal advice provided by Respondent. R.D.’s Subsequent Treatment Unfortunately, R.D.’s symptoms did not improve. He developed a fever and his pain level increased significantly. As stated by his wife, his pain the following day was “way worse” than when he saw Dr. Saadatmand. After a call to her niece, a nurse that worked in the emergency room at Parrish Medical Center, C.D. took R.D. back to the hospital on June 28, 2014, at approximately 6:30 p.m. At that point, he had a heart rate of 125, a temperature of 101.6 degrees, and tenderness in the lower left quadrant of his abdomen. Testing indicated that R.D. had intra-abdominal masses and small collections of extra-luminal gas that suggested the possibility of a contained micro-perforation. There is no allegation in the Administrative Complaint that the micro- perforation existed at the time R.D. saw Respondent. R.D. died on August 23, 2014, as a result of end-stage T-cell lymphoma. The Expert Witnesses The Department presented the expert testimony of Annie Akkara, M.D. Dr. Akkara is board-certified in emergency medicine and has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida for approximately nine years. All of her practice has been in the greater Orlando area in the Florida hospital system. She worked full-time for one year when she first moved to Florida, and since that time approximately 80 percent of her practice has involved reviewing medical charts for Veracode Associates, to determine whether diagnostic codes are fully supported in the medical records. She takes emergency room shifts on an as-needed basis, and has supervisory responsibility over patient extenders, such as nurses and physicians’ assistants, but not over other physicians. Dr. Akkara has never served on any committee for a medical staff at a hospital or helped develop protocols for an emergency room, and has not conducted any type of medical research. Although her position requires her to review electronic medical records, she was not familiar with the program used by Parrish Medical Center. Dr. Akkara reviewed the medical records for the emergency room visits for both June 27 and 28, 2014, as well as the records from the inpatient admission after the June 28 visit. She also reviewed the expert witness reports of Drs. Orban and Smoak. Dr. Saadatmand presented the expert testimony of David Orban, M.D. Dr. Orban practices emergency medicine in the Tampa area. He attended medical school at St. Louis University and completed residencies in orthopedics and emergency medicine. Dr. Orban has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since 1982 and has been board-certified in emergency medicine since 1981. Before he practiced in Florida, Dr. Orban served as an instructor in surgery at the Washington University School of Medicine, and from 1970 through 1983, was an assistant professor of medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). In that position, he supervised residents in the emergency medicine program and helped to develop the program’s curriculum. Dr. Orban left UCLA in 1983 and moved to Florida, in order to help establish the emergency medicine residency program at the University of Florida. Currently, Dr. Orban is the director of emergency medicine for the University of South Florida (USF), College of Medicine, and the Medical Director Emeritus for the Tampa General Hospital Emergency Room. The USF emergency medicine residency program is a competitive program which receives approximately 1,200 applications each year for ten residency positions. Dr. Orban continues to spend approximately 20-24 hours each week practicing in the emergency room, in addition to his teaching responsibilities. He both sees patients on his own and supervises residents who are seeing patients. He has extensive experience in evaluating non-traumatic abdominal pain in the emergency room.2/ Allegations Related to the Standard of Care Dr. Akkara testified that in her opinion, Dr. Saadatmand’s care and treatment departed from the standard of care in a variety of ways. She agreed that Respondent assessed R.D.’s abdomen, but believed that he erred in not specifically documenting that the abdomen was not tender. In this case, the patient record specifically states, “Abdominal exam: Present: Soft, Normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” In Dr. Akkara’s view, the notes should have been more specific, and she found fault with the fact that the notes did not use the words “tender” or “non-tender.” Dr. Orban, on the other hand, noted that Respondent specifically documented the absence of guarding, rigidity and rebound tenderness, and described the abdomen as “soft, with normal bowel sounds.” Dr. Orban testified that assessing an abdomen for guarding, rigidity, and rebound are all forms of checking for abdominal tenderness. He did not hesitate to interpret Respondent’s medical records for R.D. as reflecting a normal exam, meaning no tenderness was discovered. Dr. Orban’s opinion is supported by the differences in the medical records from R.D.’s June 27 and 28 emergency room visits, and what options are provided in the electronic medical record when a positive finding for tenderness is chosen. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. The Administrative Complaint alleges and Dr. Akkara opined that Respondent departed from the appropriate standard of care by failing to obtain a complete set of normal vital signs before R.D. was discharged from the hospital. The only vital sign that was ever abnormal during R.D.’s June 27 visit was his heart rate, which upon arrival was 127. Respondent rechecked R.D.’s heart rate when he examined him, and upon re-examination it was 90, well within normal limits. Dr. Orban did not believe that the standard of care required the physician, as opposed to possibly supportive staff, to obtain a complete set of vital signs prior to ordering a patient’s discharge. The evidence established that while there is sometimes a nursing standard in emergency rooms requiring a nurse to obtain a second set of vital signs before a patient is discharged, there is no corresponding standard that requires the physician to repeat all of the vitals as well. Dr. Akkara admitted that while she attempts to get a complete set of vital signs before she discharges a patient, she does not always succeed in doing so. The evidence did not demonstrate a departure from the standard of care for not obtaining a second set of vital signs prior to discharge, especially where, as here, all of R.D.’s vital signs were normal when he arrived at the emergency room, except for his heart rate, and Dr. Saadatmand did, in fact, re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent fell below the standard of care by not ordering routine lab work for R.D. The Administrative Complaint does not allege what purpose the routine lab work would serve in the emergency treatment of R.D. Dr. Akkara testified that routine lab work should have been completed before discharge, and that it was a departure from the standard of care not to do so. She stated that the labs were necessary to assess white blood cell count, glucose levels, and kidney function, and in those cases where tenderness was noted in the upper right quadrant of the abdomen, also could indicate issues with the patient’s liver enzymes. Dr. Akkara acknowledged, however, that it is possible for a CBC (complete blood count) to be frequently misleading in patients with abdominal pain, and is often normal with patients with appendicitis. Blood work often cannot distinguish between serious and benign abdominal conditions, and Dr. Akkara admitted that with respect to R.D., given the records from the subsequent admission, any results from a CBC ordered on June 27 would not have altered the treatment of the patient or changed his ultimate outcome. Dr. Orban testified that in the majority of cases where a CBC is ordered in the emergency room, it is not helpful. Ordering a CBC is helpful where a patient has a fever because it would help identify infection, or where a patient appears anemic. Other than those instances, it is not all that useful and is over-utilized. A chemistry panel measures a patient’s serum levels for things like sodium, creatinine, and glucose. Dr. Orban testified that, even with a diabetic patient, unless the patient is experiencing vomiting, mental status changes, blurred vision, frequent urination, or other symptoms associated with diabetes, a blood chemistry panel would not be helpful for assessing a patient with non-traumatic abdominal pain. Records for R.D.’s June 28 visit (the day after Respondent saw R.D.) note that he was diabetic, while the June 27 records do not. However, it was not established that either R.D. or his wife ever told anyone, whether nursing staff or Dr. Saadatmand, that he was diabetic. There is no testimony that his prescription for Metformin was to treat diabetes, as opposed to some other condition, and there was no evidence to indicate that diabetes is the only condition for which Metformin can be prescribed. Dr. Akkara repeatedly referred to R.D.’s diabetes as a basis for her opinions, but never identified the records that formed a basis for her knowledge of R.D.’s diabetic condition. The evidence presented does not establish that ordering a blood chemistry or CBC was required by the appropriate standard of care related to the care and treatment of R.D. in the emergency room on June 27, 2016. Dr. Akkara also testified that Respondent departed from the standard of care by failing to obtain a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis. Her opinion is based, at least in part, on her belief that Respondent failed to document that R.D.’s abdomen was non-tender. She agreed with Dr. Orban that if a patient has no abdominal tenderness, then a CT scan is probably not warranted. In addition, Dr. Orban testified credibly that over the last ten years, there has been a trend toward over-utilization of CT scans, with the concomitant increased risk of radiation- induced cancer. In this case, R.D. had reported having a CT scan just weeks before this emergency room visit. His abdomen was not tender. In a case such as this one, where the patient presents with non-traumatic abdominal pain and a normal abdominal examination and no fever, a CT scan is not warranted. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. There is not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the standard of care required Respondent to order a CT scan under the circumstances presented in this case. Dr. Akkara testified that Respondent also violated the standard of care by not ordering an EKG for R.D. However, she acknowledged that R.D. did not present with any cardiac-related symptoms and denied chest pain. The purpose of an EKG is to explore any cardiac-related symptoms, and R.D. did not present with any. Dr. Akkara did not provide any protocols that dictate when an EKG should be ordered. Dr. Akkara also acknowledged that ordering an EKG would have no impact on the care provided to R.D., and that a patient does not need an EKG just because he or she walks in the emergency room with tachycardia.3/ The Department did not establish that the failure to order an EKG violated the applicable standard of care in this case. The Department also has charged Respondent with failing to arrange for follow-up care and failing to discuss follow-up care, as well as reasons for R.D. to return to the emergency room, if necessary. However, as noted in paragraphs 32-34, Dr. Saadatmand discussed follow-up care with R.D. and told him what circumstances would require a return visit to the emergency room. Dr. Akkara acknowledged that the discharge instructions given to R.D. were adequate. As stated by Dr. Orban, the role of an emergency room physician with regard to the assessment of patients is to identify emergency situations and treat them. Emergency situations are those that are acute, rapidly decompensating, and that require either medical or surgical intervention, with most likely a hospital admission for more definitive care. It is not the emergency physician’s responsibility to manage a patient’s chronic conditions. It is routine to advise patients with non- acute conditions to follow up with their established physicians and to provide written instructions to that effect. Dr. Saadatmand’s actions in providing instructions, both in terms of follow-up and possible return to the emergency room, were consistent with the standard of care. Finally, the Administrative Complaint finds fault with Dr. Saadatmand for not conducting another abdominal examination and not re-assessing R.D.’s vital signs prior to discharge. As noted previously, the only vital sign that was abnormal when R.D. arrived was his heart rate. Respondent did re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge, and it was normal. With respect to a second examination of Respondent’s abdomen, the Department did not establish that one was necessary. Here, Respondent’s initial examination was normal, and there was a reasonable explanation for his discomfort that Respondent believed needed to be addressed before going any further. Dr. Akkara offered no protocol or other authority other than her own clinical experience to support the opinion that serial examinations of the abdomen were required. On the other hand, Dr. Orban testified that where, as here, where the first examination was normal and there was no fever or vomiting, no second examination would be required.4/ Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. In summary, the Department did not establish that Respondent violated the applicable standard of care in his care and treatment of R.D. Further, his medical records, while not perfect, justify the course of treatment provided in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for a license by endorsement to practice medicine in the State of Florida should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a medical doctor. Petitioner graduated medical school from the University of Miami in Miami, Florida, in May 1994. Petitioner signed an application for medical licensure by endorsement with the Board on January 9, 2003. On or about January 16, 2003, the Department of Health received Petitioner’s application for medical licensure by endorsement. Following receipt and review of the subject application, Petitioner was required to provide some additional information to the Board. Petitioner was eventually required to appear before the Credentials Committee of the Board to answer questions about his application. On October 17, 2003, the Board issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Licensure, in which the Board notified Petitioner of its intent to deny his application. That notice read as follows, in pertinent part: This matter came before the Credentials Committee of the Florida Board of Medicine at a duly-noticed public meeting on September 13, 2003 in Tampa, Florida[,] and the full Board on October 3-4, 2003, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The applicant appeared before the Credentials Committee on September 13, 2003, and presented testimony regarding the application file. The application file shows: The applicant lied before the Committee and lied on the licensure application as to the following: the applicant took a leave of absence during his training; the applicant was placed on probation at 3 schools; the applicant did not finish his training in the normal time frame; and, the applicant answered #15 b, c, d and #31 incorrectly on the application. The applicant is guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes, for misrepresenting or concealing multiple material facts at any time during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process or procedure. Based on the foregoing, the Board may refuse to certify an applicant for licensure, or restrict the practice of the licensee, or impose a penalty, pursuant to Sections 458.3331(2) and 456.072(2), Florida Statutes. It is therefore ORDERED that the application for licensure be DENIED. Petitioner attended the following four postgraduate training programs (residency programs): Medical College of Pennsylvania; Sinai Hospital1; Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center; and University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (“UMDNJ”). Petitioner’s dates of attendance in those four residency programs were as follows: Medical College of Pennsylvania from July 1, 1994 to June 30, 1995. Sinai Hospital from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1999. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001. UMDNJ from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003. Question number 15a on the application for medical licensure by endorsement asks, “Have you ever been dropped, suspended, placed on probation, expelled or requested to resign from a postgraduate training program?” Petitioner answered “yes” to question number 15a and submitted a written supplemental answer which stated, “I was placed on probation regarding the expectations of running a University service in a manner that kept attending physicians informed of patients’ clinical changes in July of 2000. Specific goals were given to me that I immediately fulfilled and was taken off probation in September of 2000 and remained in good academic standing until the time of my graduation.” On his application for licensure, Petitioner only admitted to being on probation at one residency program, Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. During the processing of the subject application, an employee of the Department of Health, Wendy Alls, advised Petitioner as follows by e-mail: “We are in receipt of your response to the inquiry from Wayne State University [Sinai Hospital], regarding your Residency from 7/95 to 6/99. It indicates that you were placed on probation and received negative reports. It also stated that limitations were placed upon you due to academic incompetence. Please respond.” On May 6, 2003, Petitioner submitted an e-mail response to Wendy Alls regarding his probation at Wayne State University [Sinai Hospital] which stated: “It is true that I did receive negative reports during my residency training from 7/95 to 6/99 for my work ethic. However, I was never formally placed on probation as per the guidelines of the Wayne State University. I, as well as the Graduate Medical Education Office, must receive formal written notification identifying the areas of deficiency and the duration of the probation period. Written notification must be submitted to both the GME office and myself after successful completion of the probation period. This was never done. In addition, no limitations or restriction were ever placed upon me due to academic incompetence or for any other reason for that matter.” Petitioner did not admit this on his initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine. Sinai Hospital submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Board and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Sinai Hospital submitted a report to the Federation Credentials Verification Service (“FCVS”)2 and stated on the report that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Sinai Hospital reported that Petitioner was placed on probation during his residency in response to faculty concerns regarding both academics and behavior. While at Sinai Hospital, Petitioner was informed of the issues he needed to improve during his probationary period. These issues included, but are not limited to the following: Petitioner’s tardiness, sleeping during conferences, unavailability when on call, failing to follow hierarchy, and inability to carry his share of the workload. Petitioner admitted at the formal hearing he was told that he was on probation at Sinai Hospital. During his appearance before the Credentials Committee on September 13, 2003, Petitioner testified under oath, that he did not disclose the fact he was on probation at Sinai Hospital because he was never informed that he “was ever placed on probation.” A letter dated November 4, 1999, from Dr. Andrew Saxe (who was then the general surgery residency program director at Sinai Hospital) states that Petitioner was on “probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency from 1996 to 1997. Dr. Andrew Saxe also noted Petitioner’s probationary status in a memo dated April 28, 1999, which Petitioner himself signed. Petitioner signed a memo dated December 18, 1996, stating that he was on “probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency. Petitioner also signed a memo dated April 16, 1997, stating that he was “off probationary status” at Sinai Hospital during his residency. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Board and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency from 1999 to 2000. Petitioner failed to fully disclose all of the reasons why he was placed on probation at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center submitted a report to the FCVS and stated on the report that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency for four months beginning in September 2000. The report stated that the probation was based on evaluations which cited “inadequate performances in clinical application of knowledge especially recognitions of own capabilities and limitations. There were also concerns over attention to details and work habits.” Petitioner’s supplemental answer to question 15a does not fully disclose his deficiencies in clinical knowledge and work habits at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. At all times material to this case, Dr. Mark Granick has been the director of the plastic surgery program at UMDNJ. UMDNJ submitted a Training Evaluation Form to the Florida Board of Medicine and stated on the form that Petitioner was on academic probation during his residency “due to poor in-service exam scores.” After UMDNJ submitted the Training Evaluation Form, Petitioner contacted Dr. Mark Granick to discuss his probation at UMDNJ and the “program’s specifications in defining probation.” Dr. Mark Granick was prompted to send a second Training Evaluation Form to the Board, changing the substance of the first submitted Training Evaluation Form. The second Training Evaluation Form to the Board was submitted along with a letter from Dr. Mark Granick dated February 14, 2003, which stated he made an error in filling out the original form. When Dr. Mark Granick drafted Petitioner’s Fourth- Quarter Report on May 31, 2002, he was “documenting the reasons why I wanted him on a period of supervision, which I thought of as probation at that point in time.” Petitioner’s Fourth-Quarter Report dated May 31, 2002, was in fact signed by Petitioner. The Fourth-Quarter Report documented that Petitioner was “deficient on multiple occasions” with regard to Patient Care; Petitioner had a “poor acquisition of a central knowledge base in Plastic Surgery”; Petitioner’s tardiness needed to “stop”; Petitioner demonstrated “immaturity” in interpersonal skills; and, Petitioner had “been acting in an unprofessional manner.” Petitioner signed a memo dated January 8, 2003, stating that he was placed on “probation” at UMDNJ during his residency due to “poor performance on the in-service examination and overall perception of weakness in academic level.” Dr. Mark Granick testified that when he used the term “probation” in the January 8, 2003, memo, the word was consistent with his own thinking, and not consistent with university definitions. Dr. Mark Granick stated that Petitioner indicated to him during their meetings at UMDNJ that Petitioner understood he was on “probation” at UMDNJ. Dr. Mark Granick testified that in his mind he considered it “probation” when he put Petitioner under direct supervision, gave Petitioner academic support, and advised Petitioner of the areas in which he needed to improve. Although the period of academic supervision imposed on Petitioner did not qualify as probation at the university level, it did constitute “probation” in the mind of Dr. Mark Granick and was understood to be “probation” by the Petitioner himself. Petitioner misrepresented to the Board the circumstances which caused him to be placed on probation at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. He also misrepresented his understanding of his probationary status at both Sinai Hospital and UMDNJ. Question number 15c on the subject application asks: “Did you take a leave of absence during a postgraduate training?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15c on the application. But Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center documents show that Petitioner took a month-long leave of absence. Petitioner asserts that his month-long leave of absence from Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center was not a “leave of absence” because he used a combination of sick time and vacation time. However, Petitioner signed a Family Medical Leave Act Certification asking for a leave of absence due to his being “unable to perform work of any kind” while training at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Petitioner requested a leave of absence for one month from his training program at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center in March of 2001. While on leave in March 2001, Petitioner was hospitalized for benzodiazepine poisoning, pace maker insertion, and possible seizure disorder secondary to cardiac rhythm disturbance. After Petitioner’s hospitalization, Petitioner needed to have a letter clearing him to resume unrestricted activity. During this period of time Petitioner was also told that he should avoid driving motor vehicles. Once questioned by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner admitted to taking a leave of absence in 2001 while training at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Prior to being questioned by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner concealed from the Florida Board of Medicine that he took a leave of absence while at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center. Question number 31 on the subject application asks “In the last five years, have you been treated for or had a recurrence of a diagnosed physical impairment?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 31 on the application. However, after questioning by the Credentials Committee, Petitioner admitted he had a pacemaker. After his hospitalization, Petitioner had to be cleared by his doctors to return to his duties as a resident. Despite Petitioner’s own definition of “physical impairment,” he concealed his hospitalization, pacemaker, and possible seizure disorder from the Board. Question number 15b on the subject application asks “Was attendance in a postgraduate training program for a period other than the established time frame?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15b on the application. Petitioner attended the General Surgery postgraduate training program at Medical College of Pennsylvania for one year from July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1995. Petitioner attended the general surgery postgraduate training program at Sinai Hospital for four years from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1999. Petitioner attended the general surgery postgraduate training program at Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center for two years from July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2001. As indicated by the foregoing, Petitioner spent seven years attending general surgery postgraduate training programs. Physicians applying for licensure by endorsement in Florida are required to show that they have completed an “approved residency program” in a “slotted” position. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”) accredits postgraduate training programs, sets the standards for training programs, and determines the number of “slotted” positions a program has. The Board considers an “approved residency program” to be one that has been accredited by the ACGME. The Board relies on the ACGME in making determinations for licensure. The Board relies on the information provided in the ACGME directory when processing applications. The ACGME established time frame for completing a general surgery postgraduate training program is five years. The ACGME-established time frame for completing the postgraduate training program in general surgery at Medical College of Pennsylvania, Sinai Hospital, and Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center was five years when Petitioner attended these programs. Thus, a five-year general surgery residency was considered standard by ACGME, the Medical College of Pennsylvania, Sinai Hospital, Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center, medical educators, and residents like Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner would have had to complete all his postgraduate training in general surgery within five years in order to have finished his training within the “established time frame.” It took Petitioner seven years to complete all of his postgraduate training in general surgery. Petitioner’s attendance in his general surgery postgraduate training programs was for a period other than the normal time frame established by both ACGME and by the programs he attended. Question number 15d on the subject application asks, “Were you required to repeat any of your postgraduate training?” Petitioner answered “no” to question number 15d on the application. A memo dated December 3, 1997, written by Dr. Andrew Saxe (general surgery residency programs director at Sinai Hospital) and placed in Petitioner's training file, included the observation that "this is a consequence of his being asked to repeat the current clinical year." In a memo dated April 28, 1999, also written by Dr. Andrew Saxe and also placed in Petitioner’s training file, Dr. Saxe stated, “in light of prior probation and concerns regarding clinical competency an additional year of training would be of service to him.” At final hearing, Petitioner himself explained that each postgraduate year (“PGY”) runs from July 1st of one year to June 30th of the following year. On the Verification of Postgraduate Medical Education form submitted to FCVS, Sinai Hospital listed Petitioner as only completing PGY 2 through PGY 4 while attending their program. On the Verification of Postgraduate Medical Education form submitted to FCVS Wayne State University/Detroit Medical Center listed Petitioner as completing PGY 4 and PGY 5 in their program. While attending his postgraduate training programs, Petitioner was continuously evaluated, as evidenced in his training files. A review of Petitioner’s evaluation forms demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated as a PGY 2 from July 1995 through June 1997. That means Petitioner was a PGY 2 for two years. A review of Petitioner’s evaluation forms demonstrates that Petitioner was evaluated as a PGY 4 from July 1998 through June 2000. That means Petitioner was a PGY 4 for two years. Therefore, Petitioner repeated both PGY 2 and PGY 4 levels of training. As demonstrated by Petitioner’s postgraduate training files, Petitioner’s education levels of training did not consistently progress through the calendar years. Petitioner concealed from the Board that he had to repeat PGY 2 and PGY 4. Over the course of the last year, the Board has licensed at least 55 applicants who were found to have made one or more material misrepresentations on their licensure applications, or in the course of the licensure process.3 Over the course of the last year, the Board has licensed a number of applicants alleged to have made material misrepresentations regarding one or more of the issues raised in this matter. In a few cases that are arguably similar to the facts presented in this case, the Board has granted the license application, but with conditions that required the applicant to file a new application, to pay a new application fee, and to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for medical licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated section 478.52(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ by accepting and performing professional responsibilities that she knew or had reason to know she was not competent to perform; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed for the violations proven.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of electrolysis pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been licensed as an electrologist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number EO2650. Respondent is also licensed by the State of Florida as an acupuncturist, license number AP 1378. Respondent is a certified surgical assistant, having obtained certification through the American Board of Surgical Assistants. Documents in the record indicate that in 1998, Respondent completed medical school at Universidad Libre in Barranquilla, Columbia. However, Respondent is not a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. Respondent’s address of record is 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent owned and operated Orozco Medical Center (“OMC”), located at 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. Patient N.M. Patient N.M. is a female born in 1964. She testified that she was familiar with OMC because she had therapy there following a car accident in 2000. N.M. presented to OMC in early 2015 for consultation regarding a liposuction with fat transfer procedure, commonly called a “Brazilian Butt Lift” (“BBL”). Fat is taken from one part of the body and reinjected into the buttocks. N.M. testified that Blanca Cabrera, who performs massages at OMC, recommended a “doctor” at OMC named Marlon Barcelo to perform her BBL. Marlon Barcelo worked at OMC as a surgical assistant but was not a medical doctor. N.M. testified that she believed Mr. Barcelo would perform her BBL procedure and that she never knew that he was not a physician. Ms. Cabrera told her that Mr. Barcelo had been a very good doctor in Columbia. N.M. testified that at her initial consultation at OMC regarding the BBL, she met exclusively with Respondent, who showed her where the fat would be removed and where it would be injected. N.M. testified that she met with Respondent three times before her surgery. N.M. testified that, at the conclusion of the initial consultation, she was given an appointment card directing her to return to OMC on January 13, 2015, for an electrocardiogram, lab work, and the medication she would be expected to take before the procedure. The medical records indicate that N.M. was confused as to the dates. It appears from the records that her initial consultation was on January 13, 2015, that her EKG and lab work were performed on March 2, 2015, and the date of her surgery was March 13, 2015. N.M. testified that each time she visited OMC prior to the surgery, she met only with Respondent, who examined her and explained the procedure to her with no other persons present. N.M. testified that on the date of the surgery, her daughter drove her to OMC. After she checked in at the front desk, N.M. was taken to an exam room and told to change into a hospital gown. Respondent then marked her body to identify the locations where fat was to be removed. Respondent gave N.M. a medication to calm her prior to the procedure. The medical record indicates that N.M.’s pre- operative medications included Keflex (cephalexin, an antibiotic), lorazepam (a sedative and anti-anxiety medication), and Benadryl (diphenhydramine, an antihistamine with sedative properties). N.M. described the medication’s effect as “like a Xanax.” N.M. testified that the medication relaxed her but did not affect her recollection of the procedure. She testified that she was awake throughout the surgery and was allowed to use her cell phone during the procedure. N.M. did not recall meeting Dr. Mark Kantzler and denied ever meeting Dr. Amina Edathodu. She believed that Mr. Barcelo was going to perform the surgery, though up until the morning of the procedure she had not met him. N.M. was taken to the surgical room and placed on a table. She stated that there was a drape that blocked her view of the surgical area, but that it was low enough to allow her to see everyone in the room. She could see two men, Mr. Barcelo and someone identified as “Abel,” and Ms. Cabrera, the massage therapist, who appeared to be assisting. N.M. testified that Mr. Barcelo performed the liposuction. She testified that everyone in the room was wearing surgical gowns and gloves but no surgical masks. N.M. testified that during the liposuction procedure, Respondent told her that she would be performing the fat injections because she was very good at that procedure. N.M. testified that after the liposuction was completed, Mr. Barcelo called on Respondent to perform the fat injections into her buttocks. N.M. stated that she saw Respondent walk into the room carrying a syringe. During this portion of the procedure N.M was positioned on her stomach but stated that she knew from the conversation in the room that it was Respondent who was placing the injections into her buttocks. Upon conclusion of the procedure, Respondent gave N.M. pain medication for post-surgical pain. N.M. returned to OMC for a follow-up visit regarding the lack of drainage from her incision. During this visit, Respondent examined N.M. and gave her medication to reduce the swelling she was experiencing. Dr. Edathodu testified that she has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida for over 25 years. From 2015 through 2017, she worked as a contract physician at OMC and acted as medical director for the facility. Dr. Edathodu developed the protocols for OMC’s tumescent liposuction procedures and ensured they were followed. Dr. Edathodu remembered N.M. as a patient who had undergone previous surgeries and presented for further liposuction and fat transfer. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the liposuction procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu’s signature is on the cosmetic surgery consent form that was also signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015. The “Liposuction and Autologous Fat Transfer” consent form signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015, specifically names Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who will perform the procedure and was signed by Dr. Edathodu. Dr. Edathodu testified that she reviewed the procedure with N.M., discussing the risks and benefits. Dr. Edathodu does not speak Spanish and uses Respondent to translate with Spanish speakers such as N.M. She identified herself to N.M. as a surgeon through Respondent’s translation. Dr. Edathodu spoke to N.M. about having realistic expectations and cautioned her that she may not obtain an optimal result because of her previous procedures. Dr. Edathodu testified that, aside from her, the persons in the surgical theater were three surgical assistants: Respondent, Mr. Barcelo, and Pavel Cabanes. It is found that Mr. Cabanes must have been the “Abel” referred to by N.M. Dr. Edathodu testified that during the surgery, there is a drape between the surgical field and the patient’s face and head, to prevent the patient from being disturbed by the sight of the procedure. The drape is made of disposable paper and is about five feet high. When performing the surgery, Dr. Edathodu is unable to see the patient’s face and the patient is unable to see past the drape. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the entire surgical procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu made the site markings on N.M. while Respondent took photographs. Respondent did not perform any part of the surgical procedure. Respondent performed none of the fat transfer on N.M. Respondent did nothing other than what Dr. Edathodu specifically directed her to do. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with N.M. on four or five occasions after the surgery. Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. Perhaps because of her inability to speak English, N.M. appeared confused and inconsistent in her testimony, at least as it appeared in the Transcript. N.M.’s credibility was strained by her uncertainty as to dates and medications. She offered improbable details, such as the lack of coverage by the surgical drape and the failure of the surgical team to wear masks. N.M. was certain that Respondent was performing the fat injection, even though N.M. could not see what was happening. Though N.M. testified that she was awake and alert during the procedure, the undersigned cannot disregard that she had been given a medication that she likened to Xanax, most likely the lorazepam. The undersigned hesitates to rely upon N.M.’s disjointed testimony where it conflicts with the straightforward and credible testimony of Dr. Edathodu.3/ Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient N.M. Patient R.C. Patient R.C. is a female born in 1988. At the time of the hearing, she worked as a claims specialist. She testified that a friend from her previous job at HealthPlan Services referred her to OMC for a consultation. She first went to OMC on or about June 6, 2016. R.C. testified that this initial consultation was with Respondent. She told Respondent that she wanted liposuction on her back and waist and wanted the fat transferred to her buttocks. They discussed the procedure and pricing. From that point until the day of the surgery, R.C. went to OMC only to drop off periodic payments for the surgery. Her only contact was with the person at the front desk. She testified that she did not see Respondent again until the day of her surgery. R.C.’s surgery was scheduled for August 5, 2016. R.C. testified that she was dropped off at OMC by her children’s father. She went in and met Respondent and a few workers in the front of the facility. When she went to the back to prepare for the procedure, she met a man wearing scrubs whom she had never seen before. Two other staff persons were present, but R.C. stated she only talked with the one staff person who spoke English. R.C. testified that Respondent and the man in scrubs marked her body for the surgery. She believed that Respondent was going to perform the surgery. R.C. stated that she was not familiar with Dr. Edathodu. R.C. stated that she filled out the consent forms on August 5, 2016. An assistant gave her medication, saying it would calm her down. R.C. was not told the name of the medication, but testified that she took a blue pill and half of a white pill. The medical records indicate she was given Ativan (a brand name for lorazepam) and Benadryl. R.C. testified that the medications made her drowsy. R.C. was assisted to the room where the surgery would be performed. R.C. testified that she was placed on her stomach, face down. Everyone in the room was wearing a surgical mask. In the room were Respondent, the man in the scrubs, and two assistants. R.C. stated that she was awake during the procedure, but was drowsy and did not recall much about it. She could hear Respondent’s voice and the noise of the liposuction machine. She could not see who actually performed the procedure. After it was over, one of the assistants phoned R.C.’s driver and helped R.C. get up and walk. Respondent handed her a bag containing pills that R.C. believed were antibiotics. She received post-operative instructions. R.C. testified that she returned to OMC for a follow- up visit about a month after the surgery and met with Respondent. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the surgical procedure, called “tumescent liposuction,” on R.C. on August 5, 2016. On August 2, 2016, R.C. signed a “liposuction & autologous fat transfer consent” form that specifically named Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who would perform the surgery. Dr. Edathodu ordered, reviewed, and signed R.C.’s lab results. Dr. Edathodu met with R.C. prior to the procedure and completed a “pre-operative clearance” form to document R.C.’s fitness and willingness to go through the surgery. Both R.C. and Dr. Edathodu signed the pre-operative clearance form. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with R.C. three or four times post-surgery. As in the case of N.M., all of the medical records support the version of events described by Dr. Edathodu.4/ Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. R.C. frankly conceded that she did not remember much about the surgery and could not see who performed it. Dr. Edathodu clearly and credibly recalled performing the procedure. The greater weight of evidence supports the finding that Dr. Edathodu performed the surgery, assisted by Respondent and Mr. Barcelo. The evidence could not sustain a finding that Respondent performed a surgical procedure on R.C. R.C. was a more credible witness than N.M., and her testimony on some of the details regarding her consultations and pre-operative events was persuasive. However, it must be kept in mind that the only relevant factual question is whether Respondent performed an “invasive/surgical medical procedure” on R.C. The evidence on this question is not persuasive. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient R.C. Patient K.H. Patient K.H. is a female born in 1989. She learned of OMC from a friend at work. She first came into OMC for a consultation regarding a liposuction and fat transfer on November 29, 2016. K.H. testified that she met only with Respondent at this initial consultation. On November 29, 2016, K.H. signed an “information certification” form accepting Dr. Mark Kantzler as the physician who would be in charge of her liposuction procedure. K.H. came back to OMC on January 9, 2017, to make a $500 deposit and to schedule the surgery. The procedure was scheduled for February 11, 2017. Again, K.H. testified that she met alone with Respondent, who told her that she would need to come in a couple of days before the surgery to get medication and a list of things she would need for post-operative care. K.H. testified that she believed that Respondent was a physician and that she would be performing the liposuction procedure. The “liposuction and autologous fat transfer consent” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, authorized Dr. Kantzler to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedure. The “surgery certification” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, indicated that Dr. Kantzler reviewed the entire medical file with her before performing the procedure. On February 11, 2017, K.H. was driven to OMC by her mother. Shortly after arriving, K.H. noted the presence of a tall man with white hair and blue eyes. An OMC assistant escorted K.H. to a room with a bed and a chair. Respondent came in to the room and marked K.H. for surgery. Respondent then called in the tall man with white hair and blue eyes, who looked at the surgical markings and then asked K.H. some questions about her stretch marks. During her direct examination, K.H. testified that she was not given the man’s name. During cross-examination, K.H. was forced to concede that during an August 2017 interview, she told Department investigators that she had been introduced to the tall man with white hair and blue eyes and that his name was Dr. Mark Kantzler. K.H. testified that Respondent gave her a pill to take before surgery. She was taken to the surgical suite and was placed on the table. K.H. testified that the surgical drape prevented her from seeing the surgical area. The only people she had noted in the room were Respondent and “Claudia,” a woman K.H. recognized as a massage therapist at OMC. She could not be certain whether or not Dr. Kantzler was in the room. K.H. testified that she was awake during the surgery. She stated that she was in pain during the surgery and complained, in Spanish, to Respondent. K.H. stated that Respondent told her she had “a little stubborn fat” and continued the procedure without doing anything to alleviate her pain. K.H. testified that all conversation during the procedure was in Spanish. She heard no English being spoken. K.H. confirmed that Dr. Kantzler was the physician who signed the letter requesting that she be excused from work immediately after her surgery. Dr. Kantzler testified that he had no specific recollection of K.H. or of her procedure. He stated that he worked on a contract basis with OMC for about three years. He came in about once a week to perform liposuction procedures, conforming to the protocols established by Dr. Edathodu. He saw the patients only briefly before their procedures, relying on Respondent to perform the patient consultations and Dr. Edathodu to prescribe the pre-operative tests in her role as medical director. He was paid by the procedure. Dr. Kantzler testified that he does not speak Spanish, but that his surgical assistants, Respondent and Mr. Barcelo, would often converse in Spanish during surgery. Dr. Kantzler reviewed the medical records and confirmed that he signed the documents and performed the surgery on K.H.: Q. Is there any doubt in your mind about whether or not you performed these procedures? A. Not when I’m looking at the files, no. Q. And if you had not done the procedures, would you have signed off on the documentation? A. I wouldn’t have had them to sign. No. Dr. Kantzler’s lack of a clear recollection distinguishes this procedure from those involving Dr. Edathodu. However, an offsetting distinguishing factor is that K.H. had a clear recollection of seeing and speaking with Dr. Kantzler at OMC on the morning of her surgery. She did not see him enter the surgical suite or hear him speak during the procedure, but she was unable to say that he was not in the room. The medical record is replete with indications that Dr. Kantzler performed the liposuction and fat transfer procedure on K.H. Dr. Kantzler testified that he voluntarily relinquished his Florida medical license in 2017 “for my own reasons not relevant to this [case].” The Department’s Proposed Recommended Order suggests that this relinquishment was “in response to or in anticipation of disciplinary proceedings.” There is no record evidence to support the Department’s suggestion, and it is disregarded here. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient K.H.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Claudia Patricia Orozco-Fandino, E.O. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2019.
