Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mose Howard, Jr., was hired by the Respondent, K-Mart Corporation, as a night maintenance man at its store number 7339 located at 2620 N. Hiawassee Road in Orlando, Florida on July 10, 1984. According to Mr. Howard, his job was to help clean up after the store closed for the evening and to -notify the store authorities if and when the alarm went off during that period. His duty hours were from 9:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., Monday through Friday. He worked at the store for approximately six weeks during which time, according to him, he was never told by anyone in authority that his work was unsatisfactory. On August 16, 1984, Mr. Howard was called in by Mr. King who advised him that his work was not satisfactory. Mr. Howard contends that at the time in question, Mr. Ring gave him two pieces of paper to sign and advised him that if he didn't perform better, he'd be laid off. At the time, Mr. Howard looked at the papers and determined that his name was on them, but nothing else. The form in question was a Personal Interview Record consisting of two pages and Mr. Howard contends that that portion of the record dealing with the summary of discussion held between the parties at the interview was left blank. According to Mr. Howard, he signed the form in blank because he thought it was merely a notice that he was being placed on probation. In fact, though he may not have known it, he was on a probationary period from the time he was hired. During the course of the discussion, Mr. King advised him that the store had been receiving complaints about his work from undisclosed sources and also information that he had been sleeping on the job. Mr. Howard categorically denies having slept on the job at any time during the period of his employment and Respondent produced no evidence that he had. He admits, however, that his cleaning duties may have been, from time to time, accomplished in a less than satisfactory fashion. From time to time, when he was cleaning up paper and other debris from under the counters, crews of the contractor hired to maintain the floors in the store, whose job it was to strip and re-wax the floors periodically, were working on other aisles of the store. He contends that when this crew would go from one aisle to another, they would turn off and on the lights. Because he could not turn the lights on where he was working if the crew had previously turned them off, it was too dark for him to see and clean up well. He believes that it was this inability to clean up properly because of lack of lighting that formed the basis of the complaints against him. In addition, he states, the burglar alarms would periodically sound and when this happened, it would be necessary for him to call someone to come in and turn them off. This caused him to lose work time because when the alarm sounded, he felt he had to stop working and leave-the store because, had he stayed in there, the police might think he was breaking in. While denying, unequivocally, that he ever slept on the job, Mr. Howard admitted he would sit down from time to time in the break room but only on his two 15 minute breaks or during his 30 minute meal period. There were other times, he admits, that because of the lighting situation, he was unable to work in the store while the floor crew was there. In that case, he would sit down and wait until the crew would finish where it was working and he could go back to work. Sometimes this would be for an hour or even a couple of hours and during the period of enforced break from sweeping, he would try to find something else to do like cleaning the restrooms. In this regard, according to Mr. King, the cleaning of the restrooms was an integral part of Petitioner's responsibilities and his accomplishment of these duties was also periodically and repeatedly unsatisfactory. After the personnel interview conducted on August 16, 1984, Mr. Howard finished work for the evening and left. When he returned the following evening, a Friday, he was called in by another supervisor and advised that he was discharged. He says that at this point he was not given any reason for his discharge. However, he waited around outside the store until the closing time of 9:30 p.m. (approximately a half-hour after he came to work and was fired), went into the office, and picked up his paycheck from Payroll. The check he received that night was for all that was owed him up to the end of the pay period. A few days later, (the following Monday), he went back and was given another check for the day and a half wages owed him for the new pay period up until he was discharged. Mr. Howard denies having received a call in advance to advise him his work was unsatisfactory nor was he given a reason for being fired. Nonetheless, he did not question the basis for his firing either on August 17, or the following Monday, but merely accepted the pay due him and left. Even though Mr. Howard says he was not given a reason for his discharge and does not know why he was fired, he is convinced the discharge action was taken on the basis of his race because he always did his duty to the best of his ability and worked extra hours without pay on many occasions. It is because of his own satisfaction with his duty performance that he contends his discharge must have been racially motivated. However, he admits that no one from K-Mart Corporation or the store in which he worked ever gave him any indication of a desire to get rid of him or other black employees. Further, during the period of time he worked there, he never heard any racial comments or slurs from any employees, either upper management or low level, except from one young stockboy who used the term "nigger" frequently. He admits to being told on one occasion by an employee of the contractor that he had missed an area in his sweeping and had to go back and do it again and, on several occasions, he observed areas he missed and went back and cleaned them on his own, but aside from those instances, he contends no one from the corporation ever complained to him about the way he was performing his duties until the night of August 16, 1985, when he was interviewed by Mr. King about his performance. Even on that occasion, according to Petitioner, there were few specifics in Mr. King's comments. As he remembers it, Mr. King merely stated that he was deficient in keeping the floors, the walls, the restrooms, etc. clean but Mr. Howard states that these allegations are all lies. Mr. King, on the other hand, indicates that when Mr. Howard was hired, he was fully briefed on the nature and scope of his duties and was taken around the store and shown where and how things were to be done. At that time, the routine janitorial. duties such as wet mopping the floors, cleaning the restrooms and the cafeteria, and the other items of a similar nature were clearly made known to him. In the interim, Mr. King has personally discussed his performance, which was not up to par with Mr. Howard on at least three or four separate occasions, including in his comments such things as the stools not being kept clean, the floors not being mopped, spots being left on the mirrors. These duties and others of a similar nature were solely the responsibility of the Petitioner on the nights he worked. On each occasion, Mr. King found Petitioner's attitude to be negative. Mr. Howard gives the impression he feels he is performing satisfactorily and if management doesn't like the way he's doing his job, that's too bad. Though Mr. Howard contends that the problems he faced in accomplishing his duties were caused by the low availability of light in the store after closing hours due to the actions of the contractor's crew, he never complained to anyone about this. He didn't feel he had to say anything to the contractor's employees because he did not work for them and he felt that they could see the problem because it was obvious. He also contends that he cleaned the ladies' room as he was required to do and that any unsatisfactory condition may well have been caused by two white contractor's employees who would sleep in there from time to time. Again, he did not say anything to the contractor or anyone else about this because he thought what was happening was obvious. Petitioner's deficiencies and the counselings he received for them ultimately culminated in the personal interview reduced with a written memorandum on August 16, 1985. At that time, Petitioner was told that if he didn't improve, it would be necessary to get someone else to do the job. The personal interview on August 16, 1984 was the last effort on the part of K-Mart management to get Petitioner to do a better job. The description of his deficiencies, according to Mr. King, was placed on the interview form before the interview and was given to Petitioner to read at the time. Mr. King is quite certain that Petitioner looked at the form containing these comments and signed it. The personnel manager for the store was present at the time. When the work was not done properly that August 17, 1984 when he came to work, he recommended Petitioner's termination to the store manager. The other assistant manager, Mr. Avera, concurred in this recommendation on the basis that Petitioner was simply not getting the job done. Mr. King unequivocally denies that his recommendation for termination was racially motivated. He has, in the past, recommended only one other termination of an employee. This employee was white. The list of all employees terminated by this K-Mart store from August , 1983 through November, 1984, with reasons therefor, reflects that of the three other night maintenance personnel terminated during that period, two were white and one was black. The reasons for termination include sleeping on the job, unsatisfactory performance and drug possession. Of the fifteen total employees discharged during the period, at least ten were white, four were black, and one is not identified by race. On balance it is clear that Mr. Howard was terminated not as a result of any racial motivation but simply because he was a probationary employee and management was dissatisfied with his performance during the period of probation. Mr. Howard rejects Mr. King's evaluation of him on the basis that Mr. King did not personally supervise his work and that his analysis is based on matters outside his personal knowledge. He contends that his work was always done to the best of his ability and he does not accept the possibility that his performance could have resulted in his termination. Nonetheless, he does not know if any other black maintenance employees were discriminated against or, for that matter, if any other black employees in any job were discriminated against at this facility. Mr. Howard denies signing the separation report that was prepared on the night of his discharge even though, admittedly, it bears his signature. It is for this reason as well as because of his denial that any detail was included on the interview report when he signed it that a question is raised as to the accuracy of his analysis of the situation. In substance, there is ample evidence with specifics to establish the legitimate ground of inappropriate performance as the basis for his discharge and very little evidence other than his allegation to support a claim of racial prejudice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petition of Mose Howard, Jr. be denied. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of September, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED Mose Howard, Jr. 67 West Michael Gladden Blvd. Apopka, Florida 32703 Janice Paulsen, Esq. International Headquarters K-Mart Corporation 3100 West Big Beaver Road Troy, Michigan 48084 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F - Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Aurelio Durana General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F - Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is David L. Lucas. He was employed by Respondent, Marc Downs, Inc., a clothing store chain, from August of 1989 until January 28, 1990. Approximately two months before the conclusion of his employment with Respondent, Petitioner and other employees employed in the Marc Downs Store located in the Wal-Mart Shopping Center on East Apalachee Parkway in Tallahassee, Florida, began working under the supervision of a new store manager. The new store manager was Desiree DeVelder, a white female. In addition to DeVelder, there was one other white female employee on the store's sales staff. The remainder of the ten person sales force in the clothing store was black. Petitioner was the only black male member of that sales force. Petitioner and other employees became increasing aware of DeVelder's discomfort at working with a predominantly black sales force. She kept to herself when at all possible. She confided to Petitioner that she did not like the way that the black people acted and on one occasion she stated that there were too many blacks working in the store. On January 28, 1991, DeVelder called a meeting of the store employees after the store had closed for the day. She presented each of the black employees, but not the solitary white employee, with a form entitled "Employee Disciplinary Notice". The form had been filled out for each black employee recipient and documented that the employee was the subject of disciplinary action for "poor attitude and not following Marc Down's Employee Policy Manual". The form further documented that the corrective action was to be a 30 day probationary period for the employee and that unemployment compensation would not be paid if the employee quit or was dismissed from employment during the probationary period. Each form for each employee was signed by DeVelder. DeVelder asked each of the black employees to sign their individual forms. Petitioner asked for an explanation of the form. DeVelder refused to provide an answer and Petitioner said he would think about it and provide DeVelder with a decision the next day. As he turned to leave, DeVelder struck him in the back and began screaming at him that he was fired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the Petition for Relief and directing the payment to Petitioner by Respondent of back pay at the rate of $400 per month from January 28, 1990. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Shirley Arnold and Joannie Greer, are black females and were high school students at the time pertinent to this proceeding. They were employed by Burger Queen Systems, Inc. from the latter part of November, 1979 through January 8, 1980. Burger Queen Systems, Inc., at that time, operated a "fast food" restaurant at which the Petitioners were employed in Arcadia, Florida. The Petitioners complain that they were terminated from their positions because of their race. They assert in support of that position that they were not given as much training by their employer as white employees were given, nor that they were allowed to rotate through all job positions, with training in all job duties (especially operating the cash register and making sales) as were white employees. The Petitioners were enrolled in a vocational training program in their senior year of high school which allowed them to work up to 20 hours per week part-time and it was through this program that they received part-time jobs at the Respondent's restaurant in Arcadia. They were given training in food preparation and in preparing the various kinds of hamburgers and cheeseburgers sold by the restaurant. They were rotated through a number of different duties and given training in the performance of each one. In the case of Joannie Greer, however, it was established that in addition to receiving training in preparing the various kinds of sandwiches sold at the restaurant, she was given some training in operating the cash register; and indeed, was trained in most phases of the "fast food" restaurant's food preparation and sales, with the exception of operating the cooking grill and cooking hamburgers, cheeseburgers and the like. The Petitioners were informed by their Vocational teacher that they could work up to 20 hours per week, and in Joannie Greer's case, at least, she worked up to 16 hours per week, but both Petitioners worked varying numbers of hours according to a schedule provided them by their employer because they were part- time workers still attending high school. Both Petitioners knew they were part-time employees when they were hired and Joannie Greer admitted they were not excluded from any formal training course. Although the Petitioners did not rotate through and train for each duty involved in operating the restaurant, they were informed that they would be allowed to do so, but neither was employed for a sufficient period of time to train in all available duties. It was the restaurant's consistent business practice to train only management personnel in all duties required to operate the restaurant, including cooking and running the cash register, and that no part-time employees were given training in every field. It was not established by Petitioners that white part-time employees were given different or additional training than black part-time employees, including the Petitioners. All starting employees were paid the same rate. Both Petitioners knew they were part-time employees only and Joannie Greer acknowledged that they were not promised any definite length or hours of employment, but rather worked on a flexible, part-time schedule. During the time the Petitioners were employed at the restaurant, Burger Queen Systems, Inc. was in financial difficulties. It operated 19 stores at the time, but by July, 1982 was forced to close all stores due to insufficient revenue and excessive expenses. It was a regular management practice of Burger Queen Systems to send in a management person from its home office in order to attempt to make an unprofitable store profitable. The Arcadia store involved herein was operating at a loss at the time the Petitioners were employed. It was Burger Queen System's regular business practice in order to turn unprofitable stores into profitable operations, to change management and even change any or all personnel if that was required, in order to improve the profit and loss posture of a given restaurant. In any event, Ann West was dispatched from the home office to the Arcadia store to attempt to improve operations there so it would become profitable. As part of that process, both white and black employees were reduced in the number of hours they could work and employees who did not perform properly were dismissed. Satisfactory employees were dismissed as well for cost control-reasons. The Petitioners were dismissed because they performed their duties too slowly and in a substandard fashion. In this connection, Petitioner's witness Sonia Murphy, attributed an unsubstantiated statement as being made by Ann West to the effect that she had "to get rid of" some black employees. In other portions of her testimony however, Sonia Murphy acknowledged that Ms. West desired to keep some employees, including some black employees, and indeed, some black employees were retained after the Petitioners were terminated. Sonia Murphy was herself in charge of Joannie Greer's training and she, in conducting her training, was told by unspecified management personnel, to have the Petitioner do "other things," that is, rotate her through several jobs, training her in each. This testimony, coupled with that of Petitioner Joannie Greer herself, to the effect that she was well-treated by management personnel and was not excluded front any training programs as compared to other part-time employees, as well as Greer's testimony that a management employee by the name of "Dusty" actually informed her that she was terminated, coupled with Sonia Murphy's testimony that she could not remember the names of the store managers indicates no attempt by Ms. West or other management personnel to single out blacks, and particularly the Petitioners for dismissal, reduction in work hours or reduced training for racially discriminatory reasons. Thus, the totality of the testimony of these two witnesses, coupled with Witness Murphy's general demeanor on the stand, renders her testimony that this statement was made, unreliable and not direct, credible evidence of racially discriminatory practices. Even if the statement had been made by Ms. West, the evidence of record independently establishes that the statement did not represent the motivating factor for the termination of Petitioners. The Petitioners did not demonstrate that they were the only employees, black or white, terminated for the above reasons. Indeed, in the ensuing period of time prior to hearing, the Respondent ultimately closed all of its stores because of its financial difficulties, such that the Respondent corporation only retains one employee, Casey Richards, its accountant and home office manager, who established from contemporaneous personnel records the above reason for the termination of the two Petitioners. In short, the Respondent ultimately terminated all its restaurant employees due to its financial difficulties and in the case of the Petitioners, for the additional reasons of substandard job performance. There was no substantial prima facie evidence adduced to establish that the Petitioners were terminated solely for reasons of race, nor that, while they were employed, they were discriminated against through the provision of inferior training compared to other non-black employees, nor that the Petitioners got less desirable work than non-black employees. The Petitioners thus did not establish that the conditions of their employment, including training opportunities, nor the reasons for their termination, were due to their race and moreover, the Respondent employer established valid business reasons for their termination, and indeed ultimately for all its employees, that is, severe financial difficulties culminating in ultimate business failure, and in the case of these two Petitioners, substandard job performance. This last was the reason provided by the employer, in writing, to the Petitioners high school teacher in charge of their vocational training, part- time job program.
Conclusions For Petitioners: James F. Mensing, Esquire Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc. Post Office Drawer 1449 305 North Jackson Avenue Bartow, Florida 33830 For Respondent: Gilbert Bentley, Esquire Post Office Box 577 Maitland, Florida 32751 This cause arose when Petitioners Shirley Arnold and Joannie Greer filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging that they were victims of an unlawful employment practice by the Respondent, Burger Queen Systems, Inc. The petitions generally allege that the Petitioners were discriminated against because of their race (black) and were unlawfully terminated from their jobs with the Respondent for this reason. The petitions were filed on May 14, 1984 and were, in due course, transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing. On August 21, 1984, some three months after the case had been opened at the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action and that the Division of Administrative Hearings had no jurisdiction in the matter. That motion was denied by the Hearing Officer. On August 31, 1984, the Hearing Officer noticed the hearing for Tuesday, November 27, 1984. On November 20, 1984, the Petitioner filed a Motion for Determination of Facts Not In Dispute, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer which the Petitioner maintains is mandatory pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 22T-9.08. That rule provides that each Respondent shall file an answer with the Commission within 20 days from service of the petition, and that if a Respondent fails to timely answer, the failure shall be deemed to constitute an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition. That motion should be denied inasmuch as it was not timely raised. The petitions were filed May 14, 1984, accordingly the motion attacking the failure of the Respondent to file an answer was not filed until almost six months after the issue concerning the Respondent's failure to answer became ripe for determination by appropriate motion. During this time discovery was conducted, all parties conducted preparation for trial and the motion was never raised until one week prior to hearing, after significant expense in time and preparation was incurred by the parties. Further, the Petitioners were-on notice, through pre-trial preparation and no later than the date of filing of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, that the factual allegations of the petitions were genuinely disputed and showed no prejudice occasioned by the failure of Respondent to frame the disputed issues of fact in a formal answer. The hearing was held as scheduled on November 27, 1984 because the response time to the motion had-not elapsed prior to the time set for trial, thus, argument on the motion was heard at trial, at the conclusion of which, the Hearing Officer announced that his recommendation would be to deny the motion. Given the circumstances of this case, the motion clearly was not timely and to grant it would unduly prejudice the Respondent, thus it is denied. See Shepherd v. Board of Dentistry, 385 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). At the consolidated hearing, the Petitioners presented the testimony of Joannie Greer and Sonia Murphy and the Respondent presented the testimony of Harold Kite, the President and owner of Burger Queen Systems, Inc. and Casey Richards. Additionally, the Petitioners called Casey Richards as a rebuttal witness. Petitioner Shirley Arnold did not testify nor personally appear at the hearing. At the conclusion of the proceeding, Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the authority of McWilliams v. Escambia County School Board, 658 Fed. 2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981), asserting in effect, that the Petitioners had not established a prima facie case of employment discrimination for reasons of race. That motion is dealt with by the Conclusions of Law below. Additionally, at the conclusion of the proceeding, the parties requested the right to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after obtaining a transcript of the proceedings. No transcript was ever obtained and filed with the Hearing Officer however. All proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and supporting arguments have been considered. To the extent that they are in accordance with the findings, conclusions and views stated herein, they are accepted. To the extent that the proposed findings, conclusions and arguments asserted are inconsistent herewith, they are rejected. Certain proposed findings and conclusions are omitted as not relevant nor as necessary to a proper determination of the material issues presented. To the extent that the testimony of various witnesses c is not in accord with the findings herein, it is not credited. See, Sonny's Italian Restaurant v. Department of Business Regulation, 414 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Sierra Club v. Orlando Utilities Commission, 436 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). The issue concerns whether the Petitioners were the victims of unlawful employment practices inflicted upon them by the Respondent by virtue of their race.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Petitions for Relief filed by Shirley Arnold and Joannie Greer be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of June, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James F. Mensing, Esquire Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc. Post Office Drawer 1499 Bartow, Florida 33830 Gilbert Bentley, Esquire Post Office Box 577 Lakeland, Florida 32751 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F - Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Aurelio Durana, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F - Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Leatharine Leon. She has been employed by Respondent, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, for more than 13 years. In the fall of 1988, Petitioner was employed in the position of Criminal Justice Administrator. Petitioner supervised a section within the Crime Information Bureau. In October, 1988, Martha Wright, a white female, became the Bureau Chief of the Crime Information Bureau. After evaluating the needs and personnel of the Bureau, Wright consulted with other Respondent management personnel and began the implementation of organizational changes within the Bureau. On or about November 22, 1988, Wright notified Petitioner that she was to be reassigned to duties as an Administrative Assistant II. The position was specifically created to provide administrative support to the Bureau. Wright wanted Petitioner to accept the transfer voluntarily. After thinking overnight about the matter, Petitioner refused and the reassignment was made on an involuntary basis. Upon the expiration of a required 14 day notice period to Petitioner, Respondent effectuated the reassignment of Petitioner in the early part of December, 1988, to the administrative assistant position. Petitioner continued to enjoy her same salary and pay grade. As established by the Final Order of the PERC Commission in Case No. CS-89-238, Respondent's transfer to the Administrative Assistant II position was warranted, comported with procedural requirements and served a legitimate governmental interest. At the time of Wright's action transferring Petitioner, Wright had already determined to make other organizational changes to the Bureau. Subsequently, implementation of those changes resulted in the merger of two sections of the Bureau; the criminal history input section formerly headed by Petitioner, a black female, and the criminal history bureau section headed by a white female. The white female head of the criminal history bureau section, Judi Croney, became a unit supervisor within the new section and was given additional special projects. Iris Morgan, a senior management analyst employed in a position with a higher pay grade than that held by Petitioner, assumed Petitioner's previous supervisory duties. Further, Morgan assumed additional duties and responsibilities associated with determining the viability of the merger of the two bureau sections and then supervising the merger. Respondent's management wanted to continue a higher level manager position over the enlarged section resulting from the merger action. Wright envisioned that the new section supervisor position would require an individual adept at conceptual work, as opposed to operational management. Since she met all minimum qualifications for the position, Morgan was selected to continue as the new section head. Petitioner did not adapt well to her position as the Administrative Assistant II. She was unable to perform duties of the position in an independent fashion. Consequently, she received below satisfactory performance evaluations on March 28, 1989, May 2, 1989, June 1, 1989, and July 28, 1989. After the last unsatisfactory performance evaluation, Petitioner was demoted from the Administrative Assistant II position, a pay grade 18 position, to a technician position with a pay grade of 14. However, Petitioner's salary was not reduced and has not been reduced to date. After Petitioner was removed from the Administrative Assistant II position in July or August of 1989, the position was filled by Jerrie Bell, a black female, who is still employed in that position. Bell has performed satisfactorily in the position and has the ability to work independently without constant instruction and supervision. As a result of reorganization, supervisory positions were reduced from ten to seven positions within the Bureau. All other affected supervisors, a total of five individuals, were white. All but one of them voiced objection to Respondent's actions; however, none of the objections varied or prevented implementation of Respondent's proposed changes. Respondent does not have a work practice which discriminates with regard to compensation, conditions and privileges of employment on the basis of an employee's race. Further, Petitioner has not been subjected to such discrimination by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-4270 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-45. Adopted in substance, but not verbatim. 46.-48. Rejected as unnecessary to result. 49. Adopted by reference. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, Esq.. Acting Executive Director Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Leatharine Leon 1751 Centerville Road Tallahassee, FL 32317 Elsa Lopez Whitehurst, Esq. P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has committed an act of employment discrimination by totally reducing the employment hours of the Petitioner, such that the Petitioner was constructively discharged and whether such action was on account of his race, in the manner proscribed by Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Lavon A. Baker, was employed by the Respondent at a convenience store which operated in Jackson County, Florida, at times pertinent hereto. He performed various jobs involving cooking, cleaning, cashier duties, checking and maintenance of inventory at the "Jr. Food Store" involved. His employment record is without blemish, having no disciplinary incidents on his record with that employer, the Respondent. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor and employment decision-maker was Dina C. Bonine, the manager of the store involved. The Respondent, Jr. Food Mart of America, Inc., is a corporation headquartered in Jackson, Mississippi, which owns and operates convenience stores in various locations, employing more than 15 employees. The Petitioner is a black man. He was employed at the Respondent's store until October 1992 with no difficulties with his employer. His work record was good and free of disciplinary incidents. Beginning in early October 1992, he began to have his hours of employment per week reduced in number. This became a problem for him because he was earning insufficient income to meet his monthly expenses. He discussed the possibility of obtaining a second job so that he could earn sufficient income, but his supervisor, Ms. Bonine, advised him that he had to work "at her convenience" and would risk termination if he took a second job. Upon his hours of employment at the Respondent's place of business being reduced to approximately 8-10 hours per week, he was forced to take a second job at the Pizza Hut. He began working at the Pizza Hut for 28 hours per week at the minimum wage rate of $4.65 per hour, beginning in March of 1993. Although his supervisor, Ms. Bonine, cautioned him against taking a second job at the risk of being terminated from his job with the Respondent, she allowed a white female employee, Becky Baxter, and a white male employee named "Bobby", who were more recently hired than the Petitioner, to get additional hours of employment, while the Petitioner's hours were being reduced. At the same time, she allowed these two white employees to work at a second job with another employer, as well. Both Ms. Baxter and "Bobby" had been discharged by the Respondent, or Ms. Bonine, in the past, but had been rehired by her and given preferential treatment, in terms of working hours and accommodation of a second job, which treatment was not accorded to the Petitioner. In fact, Ms. Baxter worked in a second job at the Pizza Hut at the same time the Petitioner did, but received the overtime hours formerly given to the Petitioner at the Respondent's place of employment, while the Petitioner's hours were cut to nothing. The Petitioner testified that "she was already at 40 hours and she just got more". These employees, hired since the Petitioner, got all the working hours they wanted from the Respondent and convenient working time schedules, as well, compared to the Petitioner's hours. Ultimately in April of 1993, the Petitioner's working hours were totally eliminated and therefore his employment was effectively terminated. Upon taking the second job at the Pizza Hut, his employer at that facility allowed him to schedule his hours at the Pizza Hut so that he could still obtain all of the working hours he needed at the Respondent's facility. Nevertheless, his hours were constantly reduced by Ms. Bonine to the point that, in April, he had no hours scheduled for several weeks, effectively resulting in his termination. Debra McDaniel is a home health aide and certified nursing assistant. She is a friend of the Petitioner, and when he lost his automobile due to his reduced working hours and reduced income, she often transported him to and from his job. She therefore was able to observe on several occasions the work schedule placed at the Respondent's facility. She observed, for several weeks at a time, that the Respondent had given the Petitioner no working hours. She testified that Ms. Bonine told the Petitioner that she would post a new schedule with his working hours on it, but that never occurred. This observation was made sometime in April of 1993. Ms. McDaniel's testimony thus corroborates that of the Petitioner. Up until the first of October of 1992, the Petitioner earned $160.00 per week at the Respondent's employment facility, without overtime hours calculated in that figure. There is no evidence of what he earned in terms of overtime hours. His employment hours at the Respondent's facility were reduced to 8 hours per week by March 1, 1993. At that point in time, he took the job at Pizza Hut at 28 hours per week at a rate of $4.25 per hour. He worked at that job at Pizza Hut at the rate of 28 hours per week until the end of November, 1993. He was out of employment and looking for work until December 18, 1993, when he became employed with "Seminole Outdoors", at the rate of $5.00 per hour for 32 hours per week. He remained with that employer at that rate until February 28, 1994, when he resigned to return to school full time. He is in a law enforcement education program at Chipola Junior College. The Respondent adduced no evidence in this proceeding and failed to appear. The notice of hearing was issued on April 11, 1994 and served on the Respondent at its address of record, as previously mentioned in the above Preliminary Statement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding that the Petitioner has established that he is a victim of employment discrimination in the form of constructive discharge, following discriminatory reduction of his hours of employment, and opportunity to hold non-conflicting outside employment, all on account of his race, and that he be reinstated in his position with the Respondent and awarded back pay in an amount reflective of the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Lavon A. Baker Post Office Box 1276 Sneads, FL 32460 Ms. Cheryl Little Administrative Assistant Jr. Food Mart of America, Inc. P.O. Box 3500 Jackson, MS 39207-3500 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's position was properly reclassified from Career Service status to Selected Exempt status.
Findings Of Fact Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner, Jolly was employed in the Comprehensive Health Planning Section of the Programs, Regulation and Health Facilities Division of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in a Career Service employment position classified and titled Administrative Assistant II Career Service. At the time, Petitioner held permanent Career Service status. The Administrative Assistant II position was certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) as within the Career Service Administrative-Clerical collective bargaining unit, represented by the Florida Public Employees Council 79, AFSCME. In her position, Petitioner performed clerical functions. She did not supervise other employees, perform any managerial functions, or perform any confidential duties. She had no role in labor relations, collective bargaining, the adjustment of grievances filed by employees, or the imposition of discipline upon other employees for breaches of conduct. Similarly, Petitioner had no role in the preparation of agency budgets for collective bargaining, or for other purposes. Sometime around June 15, 2001, Petitioner was notified by DCFS that her position as an Administrative Assistant II would be reclassified as a position within the Selected Exempt Service (SES). The reclassification was effective July 1, 2001. No input from the Petitioner regarding the duties of her position was sought by the Department in its decision to reclassify Petitioner's position. Indeed, the Department reclassified the position based on the fact that Petitioner assisted or aided managerial employees and allegedly had access to confidential material. However, there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner's position involved any confidential matters. Petitioner was terminated from employment with DCFS, without explanation, on June 28, 2002. In terminating her employment as an Administrative Assistant II, DCFS represented that Petitioner had no appeal rights either to PERC or under the bargaining agreement between AFSCME and the State of Florida because her position had been reclassified. However, the evidence does not demonstrate that Petitioner's position was managerial, confidential or supervisory. Therefore, Petitioner's position should not have been reclassified to SES and she is entitled to her rights as a Career Service employee.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Karen M. Mallory, who is black, has been employed since June 1986 by respondent, Department of Corrections (DOC). On January 1, 1988, she was transferred to Tomoka Correctional Institution (TCI) in Volusia County, Florida. In a charge of discrimination executed on May 16, 1994, and later filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), petitioner has contended that she was subjected to harassment by her TCI supervisors by virtue of her race. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the Commission found probable cause that a violation of the law had occurred. On January 5, 1995, petitioner filed a petition for relief in which a general allegation was made that she had been "treated unfairly on a regular basis (by her supervisors) because of (her) race and this has caused a very uncomfortable and stressful work environment." The DOC denies this contention. This proceeding followed. The Allegations Petitioner was first hired by DOC in 1986 as a clerk typist. When she was transferred to TCI in January 1988, she assumed the position of fiscal assistant I. Within a few years, she was promoted to a fiscal assistant II in the accounting unit, a position she has retained since that time. From October 1991 until October 1993, Cynthia Griggs, a white certified public accountant (CPA), was employed by TCI as an accountant supervisor II. Griggs supervised eight employees in the accounting unit, including petitioner. During Griggs' tenure at DOC, the unit consisted of the following sections: inmate bank, major institutions, general inventory and health services. One of Griggs' primary goals was to cross-train employees in her unit so that personnel could move between sections to cover vacant positions caused by illness or termination. It is undisputed that, in comparison to the prior supervisor of the unit, Griggs was perceived by her subordinates as a "tough" manager. Upon assuming her role as supervisor, Griggs began enforcing a recently adopted policy that no two employees in a particular section could take breaks at the same time so that there would always be someone to answer the telephone. This policy, and other office disciplinary measures, were always applied in an even- handed manner by Griggs. Even so, Griggs' management style did not sit well with petitioner who speculated that she was being singled out for special treatment. This speculation, however, was just that and was not grounded on discriminatory reasons. Among other things, petitioner claims that in April 1992 she was unfairly and discriminatorily counseled by Griggs for misconduct and insubordination. However, the facts show otherwise. On April 6, 1992, Griggs orally instructed petitioner to implement a new procedure for her inmate bank duties, including making a telephone call to the mail room to verify certain information. The instruction was based on Griggs' experience as a CPA and her understanding of a recent audit of inmate bank accounting procedures. Petitioner became "very upset" with Griggs' instruction, and she stated that the instruction was not in comformity with the intentions of the audit. Griggs replied that she interpreted the audit differently and it was her intention that the new procedure be implemented. Petitioner then told Griggs not to talk to her that way and to come back when Griggs could talk to her in a "civil" manner. This exchange occurred in the presence of two other employees and an inmate. Griggs acknowledged that she became "very angry," especially since she had not spoken to Mallory in an "uncivil" tone. Because other persons were present, she asked Mallory to come to her office to discuss the matter privately. Petitioner refused saying she would be there in a few minutes. However, she never went to Griggs' office, and this prompted Griggs to issue a counseling memorandum for misconduct and insubordination. In doing so, Griggs was not motivated by discriminatory animus but rather she issued the memorandum for a legitimate reason. The record also shows that Griggs had issued a similar memorandum to another white female employee for tardiness. When the April 1992 incident occurred, Michael Gulnac, who is white and the TCI business manager, was Griggs' supervisor and was required to approve the counseling memorandum. Petitioner contends that because of her race, Gulnac refused to meet with her alone to discuss this and other grievances and, unlike his meetings with other employees, Gulnac always insisted that a third party be present. The evidence shows, however, that before this incident occurred, Gulnac had met privately with petitioner on several occasions. But after these meetings were held, petitioner would often misstate what Gulnac said during those meetings. Because of this, and for no other reason, Gulnac insisted that a third party be present in his office whenever petitioner requested a meeting. Contrary to petitioner's claim, there was no discriminatory animus on the part of Gulnac in requiring a third party to be present for meetings with petitioner. Petitioner further contended that, unlike other employees, she was not given specialized training to assist her in mastering her new cross-training duties and thus she was denied employment opportunities on account of her race. For example, she pointed that a white male employee, Tom West, had been sent to Tallahassee for specialized training. However, unlike petitioner, West had no prior accounting background before assuming his fiscal assistant II slot and therefore required more intensive training. Like other employees, petitioner was given on-the-job training as an aid to learning her new duties. There was no discriminatory animus on the part of DOC in failing to send her to Tallahassee for specialized training. Finally, petitioner contended that Griggs accused her of wasting time and engaging in too much socializing in the office while failing to treat white employees in the same fashion. Because there is less than a preponderance of evidence to sustain this allegation, this charge must also fail. In summary, the evidence does not support a finding that petitioner was subjected to a discriminatorily hostile and abusive environment at her workplace. While petitioner has been unhappy with her job since 1991, and she was particularly displeased with the management style of the now-departed Griggs, there is no evidence, or even an inference, that any actions taken against petitioner were because of her race. Therefore, she has not been discriminated against with respect to her terms, conditions and privileges of employment at DOC, nor has she been deprived of employment opportunities because of her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the petition for relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0270 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3-7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6-9. 8-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 12-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 16-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 21-22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23-24. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive and credible evidence. Respondent: The proposed findings submitted by respondent have been adopted in substance, albeit with considerable change. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Eddie J. Bell, Esquire 62 Springwood Square Port Orange, FL 32119 J. Yvette Pressley, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Respondent employs petitioner as a youth counselor II in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Petitioner attained permanent career service status in May of 1972. In addition to "carrying a normal caseload," i.e., supervising 85 to 88 youngsters in the customary fashion, petitioner met four times weekly with children who had been referred by courts or school authorities for intensive counseling. These groups counseling sessions began at six o'clock in the evening and lasted from one to one and a half hours. John B. Romano became petitioner's immediate supervisor on March 18, 1977. With the acquiescence of Mr. Romano's immediate predecessor, Ben Robinson, petitioner ordinarily reported for work between half past nine and half past ten in the morning. The week Mr. Romano started as petitioner's supervisor, he noticed that petitioner arrived for work between half past nine and ten in the morning. When he spoke to petitioner about this, petitioner told him of an accommodation that had been reached with Mr. Robinson, on account of petitioner's staying at work late to conduct group counseling. Mr. Romano told petitioner that he should report for work at half past eight in the morning, until a youth counselor's vacancy that then existed in the office could be filled. Subsequently, on at least one occasion before May 31, 1977, Mr. Romano spoke to petitioner about being late for work. On May 31, 1977, by which time another counselor had been hired, petitioner reported for work at approximately half past ten. On June 7, 1977, after petitioner had been suspended, Mr. Romano issued a written reprimand to petitioner, characterizing petitioner's arrival at half past ten on May 31, 1977, as "an insubordinate offense." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. One Harry Greene told Earl Stout, a service network manager for respondent and Mr. Romano's superior, that a boy whom petitioner had supervised had accused petitioner in open court of selling drugs and smoking marijuana. Messrs. Greene, Stout and Romano visited the facility at which petitioner's accuser was incarcerated and interrogated him. On May 13, 1977, a Friday, Mr. Romano told petitioner to meet him at nine o'clock the following Monday, but did not explain why. Present at the meeting on May 16, 1977, were petitioner, Mr. Romano, Mr. Greene and Mr. Stout. Petitioner was told of the accusations against him, but the accuser's identity was withheld. Mr. Stout gave petitioner the choice of resigning his position or taking annual leave for the duration of a formal investigation. Petitioner refused to resign. Mr. Stout instructed petitioner to tell no one that he had been asked to take leave or that he would be the subject of an investigation. When petitioner left this meeting he promptly told his fellow youth counselors that the had been suspended. For this petitioner received a written reprimand dated June 7, 1977. Respondent's exhibit No. 6. Petitioner subsequently availed himself of grievance procedures to raise the question whether he should have been permitted to take administrative leave instead of annual leave; and it was decided that he was entitled to take administrative leave. On June 8, 1977, Earl Stout wrote petitioner a letter which began "On June 1, you were advised by me that effective June 2, you were being suspended for insubordinate acts . . . ." This letter was sent to petitioner by certified mail. Mr. Stout testified without contradiction that blanket authority had been delegated to him to suspend employees under him.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the suspension be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Wayne Jennings, Esq. 2871 Forth-Fifth Street Gifford, Florida 32960 Mr. K.C. Collette, Esquire Forum 3, Suite 800 1665 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by VOTRAN from June 6, 1977, until his discharge on January 19, 1982. He started as Serviceman; was promoted to Mechanic B on October 31, 1977; to Night Leadman on August 7, 1978; to Mechanic A on January 13, 1980; and to permanent Night Leadman on November 30, 1981. He was the senior mechanic in the maintenance department and, prior to December, 1981, was Leadman on the day shift. Effective November 30, 1981, the position as Leadman on the day shift was abolished and these duties were absorbed by the Maintenance Superintendent, Owen Davis. Pursuant to the Union contract in effect at VOTRAN, available jobs are bid by seniority and go to the most senior qualified man seeking the position. When the Day Leadman position was abolished, Petitioner bid on the Night Leadman position and, as senior mechanic, was awarded the job. Working days (or nights) for the Night Leadman are Tuesdays through Saturdays, with Sundays and Mondays off. This was known to Petitioner at the time he submitted his bid and was awarded this position. After a short time as Night Leadman, Petitioner requested leave on Saturday to attend an uncle's funeral in Georgia. Davis told Petitioner this would leave them shorthanded. Petitioner then told Davis that he did not like working on Saturday and wouldn't come in. Davis reported this incident to the General Manager, Kenneth Fischer. Late in December Petitioner met with Fischer, at which time Petitioner told Fischer he was unable to handle the job of Night Leadman. Fischer offered Petitioner the option of swapping jobs with a Mechanic A on the day shift but that job paid less and Petitioner turned it down. On another occasion, Fischer learned Petitioner had called in and said he could not come to work on Saturday because he had to move furniture. That resulted in a memo of January 12, 1982 (Exhibit 3) memorializing the December 29, 1981, meeting between Petitioner and Fischer in which Fischer repeated his warning to Petitioner against calling in sick on Saturdays unless his illness could be documented. This memo was delayed getting into Petitioner's box and was not received by him until the following Friday. Fischer was off Saturday, Petitioner was off Sunday and Monday, and on Tuesday, January 19, 1982, Petitioner met with Fischer. After Fischer had entered his car in the parking lot around 6:00 p.m. preparing to go home, Petitioner approached the car and told Fischer he would like to speak to him. Fischer got out of his car, they walked back into the building, Fischer unlocked his office, and they entered. Petitioner tossed the memo of January 12, 1982, on the desk complaining that he thought he was being discriminated against and that if the rules respecting sick leave of less than three days were being changed they should apply to all employees and not just to Petitioner. The meeting quickly escalated into a confrontation with Petitioner telling the younger Fischer that Petitioner was a 40-year-old man with a family, and that Fischer was not man enough to fire him. Whereupon Fischer told Petitioner to "hit the door." Petitioner then told Fischer that he would get VOTRAN's "shit" together and for Fischer to get Petitioner's "shit" together, and Petitioner left. Petitioner's voice immediately prior to his departure was sufficiently loud to be heard by two employees from 200 feet down the hall from Fischer's office. Petitioner's testimony conflicted with the above finding of what went on at the fateful meeting of January 19. Petitioner testified that he remained calm during the meeting, that he never told Fischer that the latter was not man enough to fire him, that he told Fischer they should discuss the matter like grown men, that he used the word "shit" to indicate personal property, and that Fischer is the one who got angry and told Petitioner to "sit down" before he told Petitioner to "hit the door." Petitioner also testified that during the little ever a month he was Leadman on the night shift he missed one or two Saturdays, that the memo of January 12 made him feel he was being treated differently from others, and that he and Fischer had at least three conferences before January 19, 1982, when he was fired. VOTRAN is a publicly owned transportation company subsidized by Volusia County and originally financed by the Federal Government. While funded by the Federal Government VOTRAN was subject to and in compliance with all federal laws proscribing discrimination. Of the 83 employees of VOTRAN, 20 are black. In Volusia County blacks constitute approximately 13 percent of the population. While employed at VOTRAN, Petitioner attended three schools to improve his training and VOTRAN paid the tuition. Although there was a discrepancy between Petitioner's testimony that he was the only black mechanic employed by VOTRAN, and VOTRAN's testimony that there were two blacks employed as mechanics, the evidence was unrebutted that following Petitioner's discharge another black mechanic was hired by VOTRAN. To further support his claim that he was fired because of his race, Petitioner testified that as a Leadman he was never issued a white shirt, that white shirts and blue pants were provided supervisors (including leadmen) by VOTRAN, and that blue shirts were issued to other workmen except in the bodyshop where the workers were issued white pants and shirts. Petitioner mentioned this difference to one of the shop's stewards who told Petitioner that if he felt wronged he should file a grievance. Petitioner never filed a grievance and neither the Superintendent nor the Director of Maintenance was asked by Petitioner to provide him with a white shirt. Other witnesses testified that some leadmen wore white shirts, others wore blue shirts, and it was generally left to the choice of the leadman which color shirt he wore. One witness called by Petitioner testified that he once overheard a Fischer and Davis conversation at which the phrase "dumb niggers" was used. Both categorically denied ever making such a racial slur. No other witness testified to any incident which could lead to a conclusion that Fischer was in any manner prejudiced or racially discriminatory. His reputation among the bus drivers is that he "goes by the book." As another ground to support his charge of racial discrimination, Petitioner testified that while he was Night Leadman he was not provided a key to the Superintendent's desk which other night leadmen had been provided; and that when it was necessary to get into the desk for special tools kept there, it was necessary to call the Superintendent, who would come down and unlock the desk. The Superintendent, Davis, confirmed that Petitioner had not been issued a key because a short time before Petitioner started the night shift too many keys had been issued, all of these keys had been called in, and, when he found his presence was frequently required at night to open the desk, he reissued a key to the Night Leadman. By this time Petitioner had been terminated. The contract between VOTRAN and the Teamsters Union provided for arbitration of grievances. This document also provides that neither employer nor Union will discriminate against any individual with respect to recruitment, hiring, training, promotion, or other employment practice for reasons of race, etc. (Exhibit 1, Article 9). When Petitioner told the shop's steward (also black) that he had been fired, he did not indicate he was fired by reason of race. Petitioner was advised by the shop's steward that he could file a grievance with the Union and his firing could go to arbitration if not settled prior to that step. Petitioner was not a dues-paying member of the Union, and, although covered by the contract, did not feel he would get a sympathetic ear from the Union. The General Manager, William Barrett, who preceded Fischer, was called as a witness by Petitioner. Barrett was General Manager when Petitioner was hired, approved the various training programs taken by Petitioner at VOTRAN's expense, and found Petitioner to be a good and reliable employee. Barrett further testified that it was necessary to maintain discipline in order to operate effectively and that if an employee challenged his authority he would have no choice but to fire the employee immediately.
The Issue Did Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, commit an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 35-year-old Black male. Prior to December 1986, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in an OPS position in "Central Files". His work performance in Central Files was both superior and exemplary, and he was offered a State Career Service position as a Senior Clerk within Respondent's "Complaint Section". Upon accepting the Career Service position, Petitioner entered into a mandatory six months' probationary period. In the Senior Clerk position, Petitioner's primary duties were to answer the phone a specific 4-hour daily shift; to assist or act as backup for phone answering during Senior Clerk Terri Jones' (Black female) 4-hour daily phone shift; to prepare and distribute Class II complaint cases to Respondent's "Legal Section"; and to distribute mail and other materials as assigned by his immediate supervisor, Louise Bull (white female). On January 5, 1987, Petitioner took 4 hours unauthorized leave without pay for which he received a written reprimand on January 6, 1987. He had previously been orally reprimanded for the same practice. It was established by competent substantial evidence that Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Louise Bull, had had a number of absences without leave, some of which occurred before Petitioner's termination and some of which occurred after his termination, and that she also received at least one written reprimand for these absences. For some of her absences, Ms. Bull was required to reimburse money to the State, however it was not clear whether the reimbursement was because she was absent when she falsely claimed to be present or was standard reimbursement procedure when the leave actually taken is not covered by accrued leave time. Either way, Ms. Bull was not in a probationary status at any material time and, clearly, as Petitioner's supervisor, hers was not a substantially similar position to that of Petitioner. Petitioner and Cindy Dexter testified that many permanent employees in addition to Ms. Bull were playing fast and loose with tardiness and absenteeism, but their evidence is very indefinite and the race and gender of the employees accused was not established. Ms. Dexter's testimony was vague and not credible on this point. Their testimony on this subject was not confirmed by other credible witnesses nor was it ever established that any of the permanent employees accused by Petitioner held positions substantially similar to his. From almost the beginning of his probationary period, Petitioner had difficulty adjusting to his new position. He evidenced difficulty accepting supervision from Ms. Bull. This disrupted standard office practice. Over the probationary term, Ms. Bull orally counselled Petitioner approximately seven times concerning his lack of acceptance of her supervision as well as excessive tardiness and excessive personal phone usage. Diane Orcutt, the regular Complaint Office Supervisor and Ms. Bull's superior, described Petitioner as avoiding Louise Bull and coming directly to her about problems he perceived in the office operation. Petitioner and Terri Jones, his female job counterpart who is also Black, had an early but undefined job- related dispute, after which he sent her flowers to "make-up". On one occasion, after a loud and disruptive argument arose between Petitioner and Ms. Bull in the general office area, Evelyn McNeely, who was acting supervisor to them both during Ms. Orcutt's vacation, required Ms. Bull to prepare a memorandum clarifying Petitioner's job duties because, in Ms. McNeely's view, the Petitioner did not seem to understand his duties. This was done on June 17, 1987. This memorandum, headed "Performance Evaluation" from Ms. Bull to Petitioner also warned Petitioner that Ms. Bull would recommend extension of his probationary period because he was falling short on acceptable performance in several areas. Louise Bull prepared, delivered, and discussed with Petitioner her performance evaluation, indicating, based upon her personal observations, his failure to satisfactorily perform in the following areas: repeatedly tardy over the last several weeks; failure to properly handle routine telephone duties; failure to comply with their section's procedures for routing of case files; and continued failure to accept supervision under their section's chain of command. Ms. Bull admitted that she suffered emotional problems while Petitioner worked for her and apparently thereafter. She had crying jags and consulted a psychologist. She also received a prescription from some source for the tranquilizer valium. Ms. Bull denied that she and the psychologist ever identified a reason for her emotional state. Melinda Wagoner testified that Ms. Bull related to her that her emotional problems stemmed from living in a Black neighborhood and fighting with Black children when she was a child. The foregoing hearsay is admissible as an admission of a party (DPR) through its supervising agent (Louise Bull), but even if fully credible, this evidence would be insufficient to establish a nexus between Bull's behavior and the reason for Petitioner's eventual termination, in light of the record as a whole. Terri Jones, the permanent employee most substantially similar to Petitioner, was also a Senior Clerk. She is also Black. Her job duties were identical to those of Petitioner, except that they had primary responsibility for phone calls during different parts of each day. Ms. Jones had no supervisory problems of her own with Louise Bull. Ms. Jones asserted that Petitioner had excellent telephone manners but confirmed that Petitioner's regularity in answering the phone either on his shift or as her backup was often insufficient. The Complaint Section's phone was often placed on "hold" with no one waiting on the other end. Although anyone in the office could place a call on "hold" and any caller could hang up before an employee returned to the phone, the inference from all witnesses' testimony as a whole was that this "hold" procedure was being done excessively by Petitioner. Diane Orcutt, regular Complaint Office Supervisor, reviewed Petitioner's phone logs prior to evaluating him at the six months' point. The representative phone logs of the two substantially similar employees, Petitioner and Terri Jones, show that Petitioner logged only 34 calls in the same period that Ms. Jones logged 359. This vast discrepancy can be interpreted in a number of ways: either Petitioner was not answering the phone as directed, or he was not logging all calls as directed, or he was not maintaining the logs as directed. By any interpretation of this empirical data, Petitioner was not fulfilling a prime requirement of his job. At the time of his six months' evaluation, on June 22, 1987, Diane Orcutt made a joint decision with Louise Bull to extend Petitioner's six months probationary period by four months. Ms. Orcutt did this for a number of reasons: his early absences without leave, oral complaints from lower echelon employees that Petitioner would frequently neglect his telephone duties in one way or another, and the disruptive nature of his failure to accept Ms. Bull's supervision. In requiring the additional probation, Ms. Orcutt gave greater weight to the administrative/managerial friction and less weight to Petitioner's reprimanded early absences; however, with regard to the complaints of other employees, she testified that she felt sure Petitioner could do the work because of his past excellent performance on OPS and because of her personal observation but that he needed more time to actually do the job instead of engaging in uncooperative disputes with Ms. Bull. Additionally, Ms. Orcutt was giving Petitioner the benefit of any doubt by taking additional time to sort out whether the disruption problem arose from Ms. Bull or from Petitioner, because at that point, Ms. Bull had no problems supervising other Black or white employees; no oral complaints had been made by other employees against Ms. Bull; and oral complaints against Petitioner confirming Ms. Bull's unrecorded observations of Petitioner had been received personally by Ms. Orcutt. When presented with Orcutt's Mid-Cycle Appraisal and the 4 months' additional probation plan on June 22, 1987, Petitioner was hostile, refused to sign the appraisal, and another disruptive scene arose among Petitioner, Ms. Bull and Ms. Orcutt. Petitioner spent all of the workday of June 23, 1987 in "Personnel" complaining that his evaluation and the 4 months' additional probation was unjust. On two of the remaining successive days of that work week, Petitioner accomplished some work. On one of the remaining successive days in that week, he took his "Personal Leave Day". A weekend intervened, and on Monday, June 28, 1987, Diane Orcutt reassessed the situation, determined that Petitioner was not intending to cooperate, and terminated him, as had always been her option during his probationary period.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Human Relations Commission dismissing the complaint and petition for relief filed by Robert Baucham. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0712 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact None filed Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent's proposals have been accepted in substance and modified to conform to the record. Where they have not been accepted, they are rejected as misleading as stated or not supported by the record as stated. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Baucham Hearings 1021 Idlewild Drive, P-161 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. Harper Field Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
