The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), properly denied Petitioner's Application for Qualification to perform work on DOT contracts which exceed $250,000.00 pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Morse Diesel Civil, LLC ("Morse Diesel"), is a new company created to perform heavy civil construction, in particular large road and bridge projects. Morse Diesel is owned 80 percent by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., and 20 percent by KPG, Inc. Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., is owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. KPG, Inc., is owned by Richard Kelly ("Kelly") and Jack Palmer ("Palmer"). Together, Kelly and Palmer have over 50 years' experience in heavy civil construction. On October 8, 1998, Morse Diesel filed an application for qualification with the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") to perform all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. Since the company was new and had not yet performed any work, the letters of recommendation provided in the application related to Morse Diesel International, Inc. ("MDI"). MDI is a large commercial construction management company owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. Through DOT requests for additional information, Morse Diesel learned that DOT was interested in the experience of its principals and recommendations regarding their work. The work experience of Kelly, Palmer, John Zito, and Grant Ralston was provided to DOT in response to those requests. Under Rule 14-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, DOT thoroughly evaluated Morse Diesel and awarded it an Ability Score of 75 out of 100. DOT found that Morse Diesel had the necessary organization and management, adequate equipment, and a satisfactory work performance record which included an evaluation of the quality of completed work, any history of payment of liquidated damages, untimely completion of projects for which liquidated damages were not paid, cooperative attitude, contract litigations, claims, and defaults. Their score of 75 also included an evaluation of their integrity and responsibility. To date, Morse Diesel's ability score remains unchanged and in effect. On January 11, 1999, Morse Diesel was granted a Certificate of Qualification to perform all classes of work requested except major bridges and provided a maximum capacity rating of $200,000,000; that is, the total aggregate dollar amount of uncompleted work a contractor may have in progress at any time. Thereafter, Morse Diesel applied for a revised Certificate of Qualification to include major bridge classifications. DOT requested and was supplied additional information regarding the work experience of Kelly, Palmer, Zito and Ralston. DOT served a Notice of Intent to Deny the application for additional classes of work and Morse Diesel filed a request for a Section 120.57, administrative hearing. That case was dismissed as moot when Morse Diesel did not renew its Certificate of Qualification. On February 2, 2000, Morse Diesel applied for a Certificate of Qualification for all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. DOT denied its application on March 3, 2000. The decision to deny an application for Qualification is a very serious matter and each application is thoroughly evaluated by DOT. Less than one percent of all applications are denied. The decision to deny the February 2, 2000, application of Morse Diesel was made by the DOT pre-qualification engineer, Lewis Harper. The Notice of Intent to Deny the Application ("Notice of Intent") was written by Mr. Harper and Brian McGrail of the legal staff and identified the factual bases for the denial of the application and all the statutory and rule criteria utilized in the review of the application. Summary of Allegations The grounds for denial identified by DOT in the written Notice of Intent are: (a) a record of contract litigation, claims, uncooperative attitude, untimely completion of projects without payment of liquidated damages, and defaults by the management of Morse Diesel (Kelly and Palmer) when they worked for S. J. Groves and Sons, Inc., and Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc., on major bridge projects in Alabama, West Virginia, and Florida; (b) S. J. Groves was defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge Project by the State of Alabama; (c) Kelly and Palmer had substantial supervisory and management responsibilities for the Cochrane Bridge project and contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department; (d) The answer to Question 19-2 of the application regarding Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the Cochrane Bridge project does not accurately reflect their role and is considered false, deceptive or fraudulent; (e) Kelly and Palmer had responsibility for prosecuting work and making decisions for filing claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge project in the State of West Virginia and there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims; (f) Kelly and Palmer were litigious and claims-oriented when they were associated with Balfour Beatty in Florida; (g) MDI is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Norm Fornella is an officer is both companies and MDI was not listed in the application as an affiliate; (h) Morse Diesel did not advise DOT of the default of MDI; and (i) KPG is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Kelly is an officer in both companies and KPG was not listed in the application as an affiliate. The application was not denied due to a lack of adequate experience or equipment. Although Morse Diesel listed the same affiliates in its 1998 application as it did in its 2000 application, the 1998 application was partially granted and the failure to list affiliates was not a ground for denial of the request for additional classes. Allegations (a)-(d): Record of Contract Litigation, Claims, Uncooperative Attitude, Untimely Completion of Projects and Defaults by Management of Morse Diesel The right to submit a claim is a valuable right of the contractor. If a contractor contends he/she is due additional time and money, it is common for him/her to pursue his/her claims rights. If the liability for unforeseen circumstances falls on the owner, the contractor typically pursues claims based upon the increased cost associated with the extra time and expense occasioned by the unforeseen circumstances. Kelly and Palmer have been involved in very difficult, highly technical jobs throughout their careers. It is common for these projects to involve a number of problems and related change items. Industry-wide, complex projects often involve change item costs ranging between 12 percent and 20 percent of the contract price. The Cochrane Bridge Project; Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement; and Application Question 19-2 Construction on the Cochrane Bridge was begun in 1985. Kelly was an executive vice president of S. J. Groves at the time and was also responsible for 30 or 40 other projects. At the same time, Palmer was a vice president of operations for S. J. Groves responsible for 10 to 12 projects. The project manager for the Cochrane Bridge project reported to Palmer and Palmer visited the project every two weeks, mainly to solve problems. The Cochrane Bridge was one of the first cable-stayed bridges built in the United States. It was designed by an Italian design firm and could not be built in accordance with the method of construction proposed by the designer. Moreover, each time there was a design problem, the Italian design firm had to be consulted, which took a great deal of time and caused delays. The Cochrane Bridge was designed to withstand a certain maximum load after construction was completed. The bridge, however, was undergoing greater stress while it was under construction. Consequently, disagreement ensued over the sequence of erection, whose responsibility it was to develop the erection sequencing, whether additional strengthening was needed during construction and, if so, who would pay for it. While these issues were addressed, S. J. Groves stopped work on the project. The State of Alabama requested Groves to work on other areas of the project during the down-time, but Mr. Groves refused for economic reasons. Alabama threatened to default Groves if they did not return to work. Kelly and Palmer attended several high-level company meetings where the issue of whether to continue the project was discussed by Franklin Groves, the owner of S. J. Groves, as well as the company's president and general counsel. Although Kelly and Palmer recommended that S. J. Groves remain on the project, their recommendation was overruled and a default was entered by the State of Alabama. Kelly and Palmer left S. J. Groves within 6 months of the default and formed their own company, RNE, in 1989. There is no reliable evidence that they "contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department" as charged in the Notice of Intent to Deny. S. J. Groves pursued litigation against the Alabama road department regarding the default and a settlement was reached. The contractor chosen to take over the job after the Groves default, filed claims of approximately $10,000,000 to $12,000,000, and also wound-up in litigation with the State of Alabama. There were thirty to forty vice presidents of S. J. Groves. Neither Kelly nor Palmer understood that they served as a corporate officer of S. J. Groves until after Morse Diesel had filed the 1998 application and were shown corporate forms filed with the Secretary of State. In response to Question 19-2 in the application, Morse Diesel stated: "Richard Kelly and Jack Palmer were denominated vice presidents of S. J. Groves, which defaulted on a job in Alabama in 1989. S. J. Groves had a number of people denominated as Vice Presidents and neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. Palmer was at the level of management responsible for the decision to abandon the Cochrane Bridge Project. Both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Palmer recommended against abandoning the project and were overruled. They then left the company." There is no evidence which contradicts this finding. Allegation (e): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in the Wierton- Stubenville Project DOT presented no evidence to support its charge in the Notice of Intent that Kelly and Palmer were responsible for making the decision to file claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge in the State of West Virginia and that there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims. The only direct evidence is that Kelly was not involved in the preparation of claims or claims settlement on the Wierton- Stubenville project. The record is silent as to Palmer's involvement, if any. Allegation (f): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in Litigation and Claims at Balfour Beatty Kelly and Palmer were involved in Balfour Beatty's initial foray into the heavy civil construction business in Florida. In the early 1990's, Kelly met with DOT on Balfour Beatty's application for qualification to bid. At that time, DOT was on notice and inquired about Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the S. J. Grove's default in Alabama. The Cochrane Bridge project was discussed in detail during a meeting held at DOT headquarters in Tallahassee. After being qualified, Balfour Beatty bid $82,000,000 on a large I-95 project in Broward County and was the successful low bidder by $1,000,000. In the beginning of the project Kelly and Palmer acquired staff and equipment, wrote purchase orders for materials, and supervised the project. On December 31, 1991, Dan White was hired as the project manager and Palmer visited the site every couple of weeks until problems on the project escalated. As the project manager, Dan White was in charge of the job and was responsible for the filing of claims. There were right-of-way problems and contaminated soil which delayed the project from the beginning. An initial design problem resulted from the project having been designed by two different design firms operating from different types of surveys. Consequently, the road was not aligned at the same elevation to match existing structures. These elevation problems shut down the project for months. None of the design, right-of-way, or soil contamination problems was the fault of Balfour Beatty. Nonetheless, DOT rejected all change items and required Balfour Beatty to file claims. A lawyer for DOT eventually became involved in the project in an attempt to settle the disputes which resulted in the preparation of Supplemental Agreement Number 73. SA-73 settled the claims up to that date, set new dates for project completion and paid money for completion by those dates. SA-73 was entered into based upon DOT's assurance that a constructibility review had been completed to make sure that the remainder of the project could be constructed in accordance with the existing plans and there would be no further design problems. However, the constructibility review was not complete and new design problems occurred immediately. The design of the parking lots was changed as they were being built. Core holes, used to determine the depth and density of the pavement had not been drilled. This caused more delays and claims. Balfour Beatty filed a lawsuit against DOT, Morrison Knudsen, the CEI on the project, and DOT personnel on site. The case was settled against DOT and its personnel for $4,750,000 and a jury awarded $4,300,000 against Morrison Knudsen. Balfour Beatty remains qualified to bid on DOT projects and was awarded a contract to build the Fuller Warren Bridge in Jacksonville. Kelly and Palmer, as consultants to Balfour Beatty, participated in preparing the bid for the Fuller Warren Bridge and that project is currently staffed with many of the same personnel who worked on the Broward County I-95 project, including the project manager, Dan White. The Broward County I-95 project was awarded on a bid of $82,000,000. DOT paid Balfour Beatty $97,000,000. The completion of the I-95 project was one to two years late and resulted in over 100 claims being filed. The Fuller Warren Bridge project was awarded on a bid of $81,000,000 and has cost to date approximately $94,000,000 to $96,000,000. None of the problems on the I-95 project were caused by Kelly or Palmer. Neither Kelly nor Palmer was involved in the preparation of the lawsuit or its settlement. ALLEGATION (g): Statements in the Application on Affiliations According to DOT's application, "The term 'affiliate' means a predecessor or successor of a contractor under the same, or substantially the same, control or a group of business entities which are connected or associated so that one entity controls or has the power to control each of the other business entities. The term 'affiliate' includes the officers, directors, executives, shareholders active in management, employees and agents of the affiliate. The ownership by one business entity of a controlling interest in another business or a pooling of equipment or income among business entities shall be prima facie evidence that one business entity is an affiliate of another." In its application for bid qualification, Morse Diesel listed Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. as its affiliates. Morse Diesel did not identify either MDI or KPG as "affiliated companies" in response to question number 8 in the application. The application was prepared under the direction of Morse Diesel's President, Mitchell Becker who has a master's degree in civil engineering and a law degree. Based upon his interpretation of the definition, he determined in good faith that MDI and KPG were correctly omitted from the response to question 8 because neither met the criteria for "affiliate" as defined in the application. The answer to question 8 is the same in both the 1998 application and the 2000 application and DOT did not request additional information in the 1998 application related to the response nor did it list the failure to name MDI and KPG as affiliates as a ground for denial of the additional classes of work in 1999. There was a notation on page 2 of 19 in the 1998 application referring to MDI as a "sister company." The question requested letters of recommendation. Morse Diesel was a newly formed company, and did not have recommendations for projects it had completed. Instead, it supplied the recommendations of MDI. It became apparent to Morse Diesel through subsequent requests for additional information that DOT was interested in recommendations about the principals and management of Morse Diesel, not MDI. Consequently, when filing its 2000 application, Morse Diesel did not supply MDI letters of recommendation and instead provided recommendations on previous work completed by Morse Diesel personnel while associated with other companies. The only entities that are predecessor entities or have any control over Morse Diesel are Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. KPG is not a predecessor or successor of Morse Diesel and has no ability to control it with 20 percent ownership. Similarly, MDI is not a predecessor or successor entity and has no controlling interest in Morse Diesel. There was no intent to hide the nature of Morse Diesel's relationship with MDI or KPG. The fact that Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both Morse Diesel and MDI is clearly stated in their résumés in the application. It is DOT's policy to deny application for misrepresentation only when it is intentional. Morse Diesel listed MDI as an affiliate in its Virginia application because the definition of "affiliate" in that application was broader and appeared to encompass MDI. Footnote 3 on page 7 of the audited financial statements refers to a transfer of funds from MDI to Morse Diesel. Mr. Becker, as president of Morse Diesel testified that the footnote in the financial statement attached to the application was a mistake. MDI has never advanced money to Morse Diesel. The advances made to Morse Diesel were made by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. Mr. Becker as president of Morse Diesel is aware of the financial condition of the company and reviews the financial statements each month. There is no pooling of equipment or income between Morse Diesel and MDI. Allegation (h): Notice of the MDI Default Question 19-2 on page 16 of 23 of the application asks whether "any officer or partner of your organization has ever been an officer, partner or owner of some other organization that has failed to complete a construction contract?" In response to that question, Morse Diesel explained in the application that Kelly and Palmer had been associated with S. J. Groves when it defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge project in Alabama, but otherwise answered the question "no." Although Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both MDI and Morse Diesel, the application did not reveal the default of MDI on a project in St. Louis because the company is contesting the default and has not as yet failed to complete that construction contract; it is in litigation. There is no credible evidence that Morse Diesel or Mr. Becker intentionally omitted any information from the 2000 application. Allegation (i): See Findings for Allegation (g). Morse Diesel has demonstrated that it is competent and has experience to prosecute the work requested in the application. DOT has allowed at least one other applicant to amend its application to identify related companies as affiliates after DOT has denied certification on that basis. The résumés in the application and evidence presented at hearing reflect the work experience of the management of Morse Diesel and indicate extensive experience in heavy civil construction, including highly complex projects. The management of Morse Diesel has experience constructing all the types of road and bridges for which qualification is sought. Morse Diesel has been qualified in New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Pennsylvania qualified Morse Diesel on the condition that Mr.Palmer remain associated with Morse Diesel and involved in any project awarded there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Morse Diesel be permitted to supply DOT with corrections to the unintentional inaccuracies in its application and be pre-qualified in the classifications for which it applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Brian A. Newman, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Brian A. Crumbaker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Department of Transportation abused its discretion in deciding to replace an existing drawbridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge and whether the Department of Transportation violated the statutory requirement of public hearings with effective public participation prior to selecting, siting, and designing the fixed-span, high-level bridge. Prior to referring this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Department of Transportation determined as a matter of law that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the Florida Transportation Plan. The Department of Transportation therefore declined to refer to the Division Petitioners' challenge to the Florida Transportation Plan. For this reason, the recommended order does not address the issue whether the Florida Transportation Plan appropriately includes the proposed bridge or whether the Department of Transportation correctly determined that Petitioners lacked standing to raise this issue.
Findings Of Fact Parties Intervenor Save Anna Maria Island, Inc. (SAM) is a not- for-profit corporation organized to inform the residents of Anna Maria Island about the proposal of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge. The general purpose of SAM is to preserve the environment and character of Anna Maria Island by persuading DOT not to proceed with the proposed project and encouraging local officials to join SAM in opposing the project. Some members of SAM live in Sunbow Bay and West Bay Cove, which are condominiums near the proposed project. Most members of SAM and at least some Petitioners reside on Anna Maria Island. Intervenor Robert E. VanWagoner lives on Anna Maria Island. Petitioners, Intervenor VanWagoner, and members of SAM use the Anna Maria Island Bridge, driving motor vehicles across the bridge on errands to the mainland, fishing from the bridge, and walking, jogging, and bicycling on the bridge. Due to their proximity to the bridge and Sarasota Pass, Petitioners and Intervenors have a heightened interest in the environmental, cultural, and aesthetic ramifications of the replacement of the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge. Petitioners and Intervenors would be uniquely impacted by any abuse by DOT in the exercise of its planning discretion in deciding to build the fixed-span, high-level bridge. Petitioners and Intervenors have participated in the transportation- planning process culminating in DOT's decision to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high- level bridge. Petitioners and Intervenors would be expected beneficiaries of additional public hearings or enhanced public participation concerning the proposed project. Petitioners and Intervenors would be uniquely impacted by any violation by DOT of statutes requiring public hearings with effective public participation. Anna Maria Island Bridge and Proposed Bridge Manatee Avenue, which is part of State Road 64, connects Bradenton on the east with Anna Maria Island on the west. The road segment between the mainland and the island is a minor urban arterial. The road spans Sarasota Pass, which is also known as Anna Maria Island Sound, by the Anna Maria Island Bridge about 7.2 miles west of U.S. Route 41 (Business) in downtown Bradenton. The Anna Maria Island Bridge is a drawbridge or bascule bridge that was built 37 years ago. The deck of the drawbridge is 25 feet above the water at mean water, and the vertical clearance with a closed bascule is 17.5 feet at mean high water. (All elevations over the water and all water depths are relative to mean water, unless otherwise stated.) The bridge spans are 48 feet long, and the bascule span is 128 feet long. The bridge is scuppered so that untreated stormwater runs off the edge of the bridge into the water below. The Anna Maria Island Bridge is 3123 feet long and 37.4 feet wide. It contains two 12-feet traffic lanes, no shoulders, and two five-foot sidewalks separated from the traffic lanes by nine-inch curbs. The bridge is not lighted except for navigation lighting in its below-deck structure. Manatee Avenue consists of two lanes on both sides of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. A shorter, two-lane bridge lies between the Anna Maria Island Bridge and the mainland. The speed limit along the approaches and on the Anna Maria Island Bridge is 50 miles per hour. The approach roadway consists of two 12-foot traffic lanes with 8-foot gravel shoulders. There are no sidewalks or bicycle paths along the approaches to the bridge. Gulf Drive is the major north-south road on Anna Maria Island, intersecting Manatee Avenue one-half mile west of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. At least partly designated as State Road 789, Gulf Drive is a two-lane arterial under state jurisdiction south of Manatee Avenue and a two-lane collector under city jurisdiction north of Manatee Avenue. There is little if any opportunity to expand the capacity of Gulf Drive or other roads on the largely developed island; though heavily travelled during peak periods, most if not all of these roads are constrained. Average daily traffic across the Anna Maria Island Bridge in 1988 was 14,000-15,000 vehicles. A traffic signal at Gulf Drive is the major cause of traffic congestion on Manatee Avenue at the bridge. On Friday and Saturday nights, traffic at the light often backs up past the bascule. Compared to the Anna Maria Island Bridge, the proposed bridge would be a little longer, at 3372 feet long, and half again as wide, at 54 feet wide. On a 4 percent grade, the deck would be 75 feet high at the center with two 12-foot travel lanes, two 10- foot shoulders, and one six-foot sidewalk separated from the traffic lane by a sturdier divider than those separating the sidewalks from traffic lanes on the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The spans of the proposed bridge would be three times longer than the spans of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The tripling of widths between supports under the bridge would open up the view under the bridge and facilitate the bypassing of the channel by small boats cutting under the bridge. At mean high tide, the vertical clearance at the edge of the navigation channel would be 65 feet. At 800 feet from either shore, the slightly asymmetrical bridge would be 40 feet high at the west end and 45 feet high on the east end, according to the bridge profile in the Final Bridge Concept Report. The northern edge of the proposed bridge would be 20 feet south of the southern edge of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. Construction of the proposed bridge would take about two years. Demolition of the existing bridge would be by unspecified means, probably explosives, following completion of the construction of the new bridge. The proposed bridge would combine stormwater treatment with scuppers. The stormwater treatment would extend from the ends of the bridge 300 feet toward the center, leaving untreated stormwater along most of the proposed bridge. The untreated area on the proposed bridge would exceed the untreated area on the Anna Maria Island Bridge by over one-half acre. However, the additional amount of stormwater contaminants entering the water would be limited to road surface particles and road cleaners because no additional traffic would use the proposed two-lane bridge. Anna Maria Island and Sarasota Pass Anna Maria Island is a barrier island between Sarasota Pass to the east and the Gulf of Mexico to the west. For the most part, Anna Maria Island is less than one-half mile wide, except for a canalized area at the north end where a minor bridge connects the island to a small key. The Anna Maria Island Bridge connects the island to the mainland indirectly by way of Perico Island, a noncoastal barrier island to the east of Anna Maria Island. Sarasota Pass is about 6000 feet wide at the Anna Maria Island Bridge. However, when the bridge was constructed, the contractor deposited long fingers of fill at the east and west ends of the bridge. The west finger is about 2000 feet long, and the east finger is about 1000 feet long. Thus, as a result of artificial constrictions, Sarasota Pass at the existing bridge is a little over 3000 feet wide. The City of Holmes Beach lies at the west end of the Anna Maria Island Bridge, although its jurisdiction probably does not include the 2000 feet of fill added when the bridge was built. The City of Anna Maria lies to the north of Holmes Beach at the north end of Anna Maria Island. The Anna Maria Island Bridge is about three miles south of the north end of the island. About two miles south of the Anna Maria Island Bridge lies the Cortez Bridge, which is also a drawbridge of the same vintage as the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The Cortez Bridge, which is shorter than the Anna Maria Island Bridge, serves Cortez Road and connects the mainland to the island at the City of Bradenton Beach, which is the third municipality on Anna Maria Island. Bradenton Beach is a little less than two miles from the south end of the island. The remaining major bridge on Anna Maria Island connects Gulf Drive to Longboat Key to the south. A bridge at the south end of Longboat Key runs to Lido Key, which is joined to the mainland at Sarasota by the Ringling Bridge. The Anna Maria Island Bridge is about 9000 feet south of the confluence of Sarasota Pass and Lower Tampa Bay. The estuarine waters of Sarasota Pass connect the expansive Tampa Bay estuary to the north with the Sarasota Bay estuary to the south. Sarasota Pass and Sarasota Bay are Outstanding Florida Waters. The water in the vicinity of the Anna Maria Island Bridge is Class II water. Seagrass is a key component of the Sarasota Pass estuary. Seagrass is vital to water quality and provides essential habitat and food for wildlife, including wading and diving birds, fish, shellfish, and manatee. Seagrass beds provide nursery habitat for juvenile marine life of considerable importance at maturity to recreational or commercial fishermen and are important foraging areas for snook, spotted seatrout, and red drum or redfish. Seagrass aids water quality by filtering suspended material from the water column and stabilizing the bottom. The resulting improvements in water transparency increase the depths to which sunlight can penetrate. Seagrass is dependent on sunlight. Thus, the deeper that sunlight can penetrate due to water transparency, water color, and other water-quality parameters, the deeper the water in which seagrass can grow. Seagrass is not hardy and is especially sensitive to changes in the amount of light that it receives. Submerged in water, seagrass can be killed by reductions in water transparency, such as those typically accompanying nutrient loading, which can lead to phytoplankton in the water blocking light generally and epiphytes on the seagrass leaves directly interfering with the plant's absorption of light. Seagrass can also die off due to the introduction or resuspension of sediments in the water column, which may result from stormwater runoff, agricultural drainage, boat prop dredging, and construction (references to "construction" include demolition). Another source of seagrass mortality is the introduction or elevation of certain toxic substances in the water column or sediments by way of stormwater runoff, agricultural drainage, boat emissions, or construction activities. Toxic substances include heavy metals and petrochemicals, such as those associated with urban stormwater runoff. Discrete patches of seagrass may also be destroyed by the burrowing and feeding of marine life such as rays. Relatively small reductions in sunlight can destroy seagrass over a wide area. If, while all other factors remain constant, reductions in transparency or increases in turbidity reduce by one foot the maximum water depth at which seagrass can grow, the effects may be widespread in estuarine bottoms, which are often gently sloped. Two factors discourage seagrass recolonization following their destruction, even assuming the elimination of the cause of the seagrass mortality in the first place. First, the species of seagrass involved in this case spread very slowly. Second, even a temporary loss of seagrass may change background conditions to discourage recolonization. Once the seagrass in an area is destroyed, bottom sediments may build up, turbidity may increase, and water transparency may decrease. This process may effectively prevent seagrass recolonization at depths at which seagrass previously grew, regardless whether recolonization is through natural means or artificial transplantation. If an area is so well-flushed as to remove sediments, the loss of the stabilizing bottom vegetation may result in erosion, critically deepening the water depth so that seagrass cannot capture enough light to recolonize the area. The Anna Maria Island Bridge is at the north end of a flourishing seagrass meadow featuring Thalassia, Halodule, and Syringodium. Important areas of seagrass exist north of the bridge, but the dense, lush seagrass meadow to the south is more prolific. Near the Anna Maria Island Bridge, seagrass grows in water as deep as six feet. The record lacks evidence of a comprehensive, detailed bathymetry, but several important facts are clear from available evidence of water depths. First, the water in the middle of the pass under the existing or proposed bridge is too deep for seagrass. Seagrass would not grow in the middle of the pass at this location even if there were no bridge. Second, the water is deeper under the existing bridge than it would be under the proposed bridge. The only place where the water under the Anna Maria Island Bridge is not deeper than the water under the proposed bridge is the westernmost 100 feet, where the water depths are about the same. Most importantly, the depths under the Anna Maria Island Bridge are too great for seagrass growth along nearly the entire length of the bridge, even if the bridge were removed. On the other hand, seagrass thrives upon the bottom that would be under at least 1600 feet of the proposed bridge. Suitably shallow depths exist 800 feet along either end of the proposed bridge, and seagrass occupies these areas, which amount to about two acres of seagrass. Despite the known sensitivity of seagrass to changes in lighting, DOT and its consultants never considered how much the proposed bridge would shade these two acres of seagrass. There was no analysis of such factors as the area or duration of the shadow that would be cast at different times of the year by the proposed bridge or the variation in the shadow from the low east and west ends of the proposed bridge to the 40- and 45-foot heights where the seagrass ends. Thus, there is also no evidence of any analysis of the effect of such shading on the seagrass presently growing in the area that would be covered by the proposed bridge. It is more likely than not that the two acres of seagrass presently growing in the area that would be covered by the proposed bridge would be destroyed by the proposed project. If, as is probable, the seagrass did not survive disturbances from construction, including temporary turbidity, recolonization is unlikely due to shading from the new bridge and either long- term turbidity from stirred-up, destabilized sediments or deeper water from erosion. In the unlikely event the seagrass survived the construction, shading from the new bridge would likely kill it anyway and prevent recolonization. But more than two acres of seagrass are imperilled by the proposed project. The record is devoid of any analysis of bottom sediments. For 37 years, the scuppered Anna Maria Island Bridge has dumped untreated stormwater into the water below. The new bridge would add even more untreated stormwater to Sarasota Pass. Stormwater contaminants include a wide variety of potentially toxic materials, such as road materials, tire materials, lubrication, road cleaners, paint, building materials, and virtually anything that might be loaded onto vehicles using the bridge. Common runoff contaminants are heavy metals, hydrocarbons, oil and grease, zinc, and copper. Stormwater pollution of the sediments along the drip line of the Anna Maria Island Bridge is more than a theoretical possibility. Seagrass is generally absent at all depths in the 20 feet immediately south of the existing bridge. (Increased water depths account for seagrass conditions north of the bridge.) The general absence of seagrass in the 20 feet immediately to the south of the bridge is unlikely the result of shading because dense seagrass grows in the 20 feet immediately to the south of the west end of the bridge, and off-bridge shading appears to exist to the north of the bridge, not the south. The general absence of seagrass in the 20 feet immediately south of the bridge is unlikely the result of prop dredging because adjacent seagrass is dense. The general absence of seagrass along the south dripline may be attributable due to the biochemical or mechanical disturbance caused by the stormwater rushing off the bridge. To the extent of mechanical disturbance, the presence of seagrass in the adjacent 20 feet at the west end of the bridge may be due to a lack of proximity to an unblocked scupper drain at that location. To the extent the disturbance may be biochemically caused, this anomaly may reflect variations in flushing. At least 1000 feet of seagrass (500 feet at either end of the new bridge) just south of the proposed bridge would receive untreated stormwater rushing through the scuppers of the proposed bridge. The width of the affected band would presumably be the same 20 feet as the width affected by the existing bridge. It is more likely than not that this half acre of seagrass would not survive the proposed project, especially after consideration of additional seagrass losses from prop dredging caused by small boats bypassing the channel and running between the new bridge's widely spaced supports. Foundations for the proposed bridge would occupy 0.12 acres of seagrass. However, this seagrass would be under the deck of the proposed bridge, so this area has already been taken into account in the shading analysis. In addition to the likely permanent destruction of 2.5 acres of seagrass under, and 20 feet south of, the proposed bridge, it is more likely than not that construction would at least temporarily destroy additional seagrass farther to the south. The proposed project calls for the construction of large work platforms parallel to, and south of, the new bridge and small fingerplatforms running from the work platforms toward the new bridge. The work platforms would be placed in water shallower than six feet and would cover areas vegetated by seagrass. The platforms would be 1100 and 1200 feet long and 40 feet wide and would thus cover a little about two acres of seagrass. The platforms would be low on the water--lower than the existing bridge--and effectively shade the seagrass below them. DOT witnesses promised the use of slatted platforms to minimize shading, but, again, there was no showing that the slats would pass sufficient sunlight at critical water depths for sufficient periods of time. What seagrass survived the construction of the platforms would not survive the shading and turbidity during construction, as this area is well within the mixing zone allowed by the dredge-and-fill permit tentatively approved by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP; references to DEP include the predecessor agency, the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER), except where references to DER are necessary for clarity). The likely loss of the two acres of seagrass from the work platform would not be permanent absent permanent alteration of the bathymetry, introduction of persistent contaminants, or collection of substantial amounts of sediment during construction in the area under the work platform. Recolonization would probably begin upon completion of the project. The platforms would not remain in place during the entire two-year period of construction. There would be no need for the platforms on the south side of the proposed bridge during the demolition of the existing bridge to the north. It is also possible that the platforms would be removed as construction was finished along the bridge. However, the slow growth of the seagrass suggests that considerable time would be required for the recolonization of the two acres to the present density. There is no reason to calculate lost seagrass from the construction of the fingerplatforms. They will span the area from the south edge of the proposed bridge to the north edge of the work platforms. Thus, they cover the area already affected by the stormwater running off the bridge. The 600- by 20- foot area proposed to be served by the stormwater management system, where adjacent seagrass presumably would not be affected, might be affected by the fingerplatforms, but the small size of the platforms renders the loss unnecessary to consider for purposes of this recommended order. DOT has proposed mitigation to compensate for some seagrass losses. But DOT did not account for the permanent loss of 2.5 acres of seagrass and temporary loss of 2.0 acres of seagrass. The proposed mitigation is ineffective for a number of reasons. The seagrass transplant receiving area proposed for mitigation is too small. It is 0.19 acres as compared to the likely permanent loss of 2.5 acres and temporary loss of 2.0 acres. This is a dramatic departure from the normal seagrass mitigation ratio of 1:1 required by DEP. Although less important due to the gross inadequacy of the size of the transplant receiving site, there is also a major discrepancy between the densely vegetated donor area and the sparse transplantation pattern specified for the receiving area. The primary seagrass mitigation is too speculative. The transplant receiving area is near the natural western shore of the pass. Unlawful boat use of a nearby fishing pier and bioturbation have resulted in barren patches in the transplantation area, but the recolonization process is proceeding naturally. Consistent with the slightly more colored water and somewhat poorer flushing than is found at the bridge, natural recolonization in the transplant receiving area is already establishing as extensive and dense a seagrass bed as boating and bioturbation will permit. The natural recolonization process now taking place in the transplant receiving area will revegetate more quickly and completely the portion of the bottom capable of supporting seagrass than would DOT's mitigation effort. DOT's proposed seagrass transplantation might even disrupt the natural recolonization process. The success of the proposed seagrass transplantation is speculative at best. Seagrass transplantation is complicated and remains experimental. Under the best of circumstances, seagrass transplantation is a complicated process that has not consistently prevented net habitat loss. The DEP witness who reviewed DOT's application is an Environmental Specialist III who has been with DEP nearly nine years and has reviewed over 500 dredge-and-fill permits. Testifying against the permit and particularly the seagrass mitigation plan, he noted that DOT's seagrass mitigation plan promises uncertain benefits. Unsupported by comprehensive bathymetric and water-quality data, the primary seagrass mitigation plan, which is the only one sufficiently detailed to evaluate, more likely than not would fail. The overall seagrass mitigation plan is excessively contingent. The importance of alternative and contingent seagrass mitigation plans is underscored by the likelihood of the failure of the main transplant receiving site and the unlikelihood that seagrass will recolonize under the existing or proposed bridge. But the alternative and contingent mitigation plans are illusory. The alternative and contingent mitigation plans lack success criteria, detailed guidelines for identifying donor and receiving areas, and practicality. The alternative and contingent mitigation plans amount to nothing more than vague and unenforceable undertakings to find seagrass somewhere and transplant it somewhere else. Such a difficult task demands more detail. One of the two crucial functions of seagrass in the immediate area of the Anna Maria Island Bridge is that it is consumed by manatee. Manatee are especially prevalent in an area just north of the bridge. Between 1985 and 1991, there were 432 adult manatee sightings and 44 manatee calf sightings in the vicinity of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. About two-thirds of these 476 sightings were north of the bridge and one-third south of the bridge. Manatee use Sarasota Pass to travel between Tampa Bay and Sarasota Bay. The fill added during the construction of the Anna Maria Island Bridge already constrains the manatee passageway under the Anna Maria Island Bridge by artificially narrowing the pass by about one-third. Construction at either end of the bridge would tend to concentrate the manatee even more toward the center of the bridge where they would more likely encounter boats in the main channel. Estimates in 1987 were that Florida's manatee population is about 1200, with equal numbers on the east and west coasts. Manatee populations are slow-breeding. Gestation runs 13-15 months with one or sometimes two calves born. The breeding cycle is 3-5 years. The natural life expectancy and reproductive life of a female are unknown. The risk of extinction heightens when the low reproductive rate and manatee mortality attributable to collisions with boats and barges are combined with the permanent and temporary loss of seagrass, two-year constriction of the already-reduced passageway at the bridge, and permanent dispersal of small boats through shallow seagrass beds where manatee are likely to feed. The other crucial function of seagrass is in maintaining water quality through the assimilation of nutrients and stabilization of bottom sediments. The water-quality data in this case are limited. DOT never determined the extent to which sediments at the existing bridge may have been contaminated over the years by stormwater-borne heavy metals or oil and grease. DOT never analyzed these sediments by grain size and percentage of fine organic materials. Instead, DOT proceeded with the proposed project in Outstanding Florida Waters without knowledge of these sediments in terms of their chemical composition or susceptibility to resuspension into the water column. IV Planning and Hearing Process DOT's Project Development and Environmental Guidelines Pursuant to its Project Development and Environmental (PD&E) Guidelines, DOT conducts a PD&E study at the start of the planning process for projects of the scope of the proposed bridge. The PD&E manual, which "fully reflects the Department's policy for projected development . . .," assists project managers and district engineers by informing them of various requirements imposed by law on transportation projects and identifying the documentation required in the various stages of the transportation-planning process. Section 2-1 of the PD&E manual describes the Advance Notification process as the means by which DOT advises other federal, state, and local agencies of proposed projects. Chapter 25 of the PD&E manual explains DEP's role in determining whether a proposed project is consistent with the Coastal Zone Management Act. Section 25-2.4 warns that an agency finding of consistency may be changed. Section 3-1 divides proposed projects into three types in terms of environmental impact. Projects with the least impact qualify for a categoric exclusion. Projects with a categoric exclusion include actions that "do not have a significant impact on any natural, cultural, recreational, historic, or other resources [or] do not involve significant air, noise, or water quality impacts[.]" Section 18-2.4 states that a project qualifying for a categoric exclusion "may have an involvement with wetlands so long as this involvement is determined not to be significant." The next class of proposed projects are those subjected to an environmental assessment. For such projects, "the significance of the environmental impact is not clearly established." The environmental assessment is prepared "whenever there is a need to determine the appropriate class of environmental determination required." The last class of proposed projects are those subjected to an environmental impact statement. Such projects "significantly affect the human environment " Projects with a categoric exclusion typically require less public involvement and environmental review than projects requiring an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement. However, Section 8-2.7.2.3 provides: "A public hearing must be held to comply with Chapter 339 F.S. regardless of funding [federal or state] . . . [w]hen a project is controversial in nature." Section 8-2.8 describes public hearings: A public hearing is the official public forum used by the Department through which citizens and government officials express their concerns, opinions, and comments regarding a project. It is by no means the only opportunity whereby citizens have access to the Department about the project, but it is the official point in the project development process where information developed to date [is] shared with the community and the community can go on record officially concerning the project. Much of what is shared with the community has been developed with citizen and local government input during early stages of project development. Section 8-2.8.1 requires a DOT representative to appear at each public hearing to discuss briefly all alternates studied and the advantages of each. The DOT representative must outline the social, economic, and environmental impacts of the project. Revised Section 9-2.1 explains that the Project Concept Report marks the start of the "project development process." This report identifies the activities required to conduct the PD&E study. Section 9.1 describes the engineering reports to be developed during the planning process: The preliminary engineering report is prepared by the District or consultant during the early stages of project development .... After the public hearing has been held and a recommended alternative has been selected the final engineering report is prepared. The final engineering report is submitted after the recommended alternative has been approved by the Federal Highway Administration. . . . Section 9-2.2.1 explains that the Final Engineering Report must follow a sufficient amount of engineering so as to consider types of bridges. Section 10-2.4 identifies the Permit Coordination Package, which DOT sends to all agencies from which it must obtain a permit. The package evaluates the impacts of the project upon permittable areas, addressing such issues as the "elimination of habitat" and "destruction of vegetation." The package also contains a discussion of proposed mitigation. Section 10-2.5 directs DOT to submit permit applications when the "design of the project is 65 to 70 percent complete." Section 13-1 addresses nonfederally funded projects, which the proposed project eventually proved to be. The manual sets forth a number of policies and objectives which DOT "must address to comply with the [Florida Transportation Plan.]" These include provisions to "prohibit the destruction of endangered species and protect their habitats," "promote rehabilitation and reuse of existing facilities, structure and buildings as an alternative to new construction," and "encourage citizen participation at all levels of policy development, planning, and operations." These provisions guide DOT in the preparation of the Florida Transportation Plan and do not apply to individual transportation projects, such as the proposed bridge. Section 13-1 states: "It shall be the policy of the Department to develop environmental studies on all major transportation projects regardless of funding to comply with state and federal laws." Section 13-1 requires DOT to prepare a state environmental impact study on "all major transportation projects" in which state monies are used. Section 13-2.2 defines a "major transportation project" as, among other things, "Replacement of an existing bridge that could have substantial adverse effect on land use, community development patterns, community cohesion or natural ecological systems." If a project is a "major transportation project," DOT must prepare and circulate an Advance Notification Package and conduct a hearing, which must be announced by letters to all owners or property within 300 feet of the centerline of the alternates under consideration. Section 13-2.5 imposes upon DOT the same public hearing procedures as set forth in Chapter 8 of the PD&E manual. Proposed Project 1. 1987-89 In 1987, DOT started a bridge replacement program to identify bridges for possible replacement or widening. According to Robert Crim, DOT's project manager for the proposed bridge, one objective of the bridge program was to eliminate drawbridges. A statewide consultant, Sverdrup Corporation, studied numerous bridges of all types for inclusion in the program and ultimately recommended that DOT widen or replace some, but not all, of them. DOT submitted the Anna Maria Island Bridge to Sverdrup for possible inclusion in the bridge-replacement study program. But before doing so, DOT obtained the approval of the local Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for replacing the bridge. On the recommendation of Sverdrup to include the Anna Maria Island Bridge in the bridge-replacement study program, DOT included the replacement bridge in its five-year work program in 1988 and each subsequent year. DOT conducts annual public hearings on the work program. At the public hearing, DOT's representatives discuss each project, and members of the public may comment on projects. On March 29, 1988, Sverdrup issued a Project Concept Report, which is intended to identify the ideal transportation solution. The Project Concept Report starts the PD&E process, which eventually determines if it is feasible to implement the ideal solution identified in the Project Concept Report. The Project Concept Report proposes the replacement of the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge. The report refers to the proposed project as a "major bridge replacement project." The report anticipates a categoric exclusion for the project despite the classification of Sarasota Pass as Outstanding Florida Waters and the presence of considerable seagrass and manatee around the Anna Maria Island Bridge. In April 1988, DOT circulated an Advance Notification Package to interested agencies informing them that DOT was starting a study of the construction of a two-lane bridge. The Manatee County Board of County Commissioners responded to the April 1988 Advance Notification Package. By letter dated June 14, 1988, to DOT's then-Secretary Kaye Henderson, the County Commissioners expressed "strong support" for the replacement of the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed- span, high-level bridge. The letter cautions that two lanes are inadequate for existing and projected traffic. In a letter to Sverdrup dated October 3, 1988, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners emphasized the Board's position: "it is the unanimous feeling here that planning to build anything less than a four-lane replacement would be disastrous, or simply planned obsolescence." In August 1988, DOT hired Figg and Muller Engineers, Inc. (references to Figg and Muller include Figg Engineers, Inc., which prepared certain reports) to perform the PD&E study. The role of Figg and Muller in conducting the PD&E study was to identify the means of accomplishing a predetermined goal--in this study, the best way to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge. DOT asked Figg and Muller specifically to evaluate a fixed-span, high-level bridge, but, in discharging its duties, Figg and Muller considered all viable alternatives, including the no- build option, and considered all environmental impacts of these alternatives. After DOT issued the Advance Notification Package in April 1988, the MPO asked DOT to evaluate the possibility of expanding the facility to four lanes. Despite a strong preference to limit the new facility to two lanes, DOT evaluated the four-lane option to comply with local transportation plans. DOT thus directed Figg and Muller, which had already begun its work, to consider four-lane alternatives as well. Anticipating its formal retention in August 1988 to conduct the PD&E study, Figg and Muller had earlier retained an environmental subconsultant. On May 31, 1988, Figg and Muller sent a letter with a proposed contract and related materials to Peninsula Design and Engineering, Inc. (references to this company and Mangrove Systems, Inc. shall be to "Peninsula"; the same person, first employed by Peninsula and later Mangrove Systems, performed the environmental work). Figg and Muller described the proposed project as the "replacement of a two-lane bascule bridge . . . with a fixed- span, high-level bridge." Enclosed materials describe the new bridge as 54 feet wide with a 40-foot roadway, five-feet sidewalks on each side, and a 65-foot vertical clearance. The new bridge, which would be next to the existing bridge, is described, as it was then conceived, as a federal-aid project. The attachment warns that aesthetics, grassbeds, and manatees, among other things, would be important considerations during the study and design. The subconsulting contract requires Peninsula to quantify wetland encroachments and endangered species. The contract warns that the environmental sensitivity of the area requires the identification of an "intensive baseline environmental assessment" to identify the best environmental alternatives regarding alignment and construction techniques. The contract warns further that "accurate description of floral and fauna communities in submergent habitats requires a greater level of effort than is typically necessary in [terrestrial] habitat evaluations." Because environmental permits could be "challenging to obtain" without intensive evaluation of submergent communities, the contract requires Peninsula to develop transects of flora communities in the impacted area and identify endangered species and their habitats. The contract requires Peninsula to develop additional biological information necessary for environmental assessment, including sampling the bottom sediments for, among other things, heavy metal concentrations. The contract also requires Peninsula to prepare a Permit Coordination Package to develop proposed mitigation plans and evaluate project impacts, including the elimination of habitat, changes in sedimentation, and destruction of vegetation. Peninsula conducted a macrophyte investigation on September 27, 1988. The Peninsula employee established eight stations--four just offshore from the filled-in bridge approaches and four closer to the channel, north and south of the existing bridge. The Peninsula employee set 100-meter transects with ten data- collection sites along each transect. The transects for the stations near the approaches ran perpendicular to the bridge. The Peninsula employee followed a "similar" approach with the stations near the channel, although ambiguous language in the report leaves it unclear if the transects for the four "offshore" stations ran perpendicular or, as stated at one point, "parallel" to the bridge. In either case, the transects run on September 27, 1988 do not travel under the existing or proposed bridge. The fieldwork thus yielded information about seagrass in the general area of the project, but no data that could be directly used to study and analyze the effects of shading from the existing or proposed bridge. The Peninsula report notes a continuing chronic loss of seagrass south of the existing [bridge] in the vicinity of [two] stations. . . . The causal factors contributing to these losses include continuing historic degradation of water quality in the area and more importantly, the hydraulic conditions created by the configuration and construction of the [bridge] approach fills and the submerged borrow areas. The report also records "unusual foraging signatures" at one station, possibly indicative of manatee foraging. Figg and Muller, Peninsula, and other consultants prepared the Site Characteristics Inventory Report dated November 8, 1988, and updated December 20, 1988. The inventory report summarizes the data "necessary for adequate evaluation of the location, design and impacts of the project." The Site Characteristics Inventory Report describes various features of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. Stating that the bridge's overall vehicular accident rate is low, the inventory report notes the high percentage of rear-end collisions and concludes: "The high percentage of rear end collisions suggests a high amount of vehicle cueing [sic]. This could be attributed to vehicles stopped for a left turn, stopped for the SR 789 signalized intersection or stopped for a bridge opening." Peninsula prepared the Permit Coordination Package by May, 1989. The package misidentifies the waters around the Anna Maria Island Bridge as Class III waters, though it reports more importantly that these waters are Outstanding Florida Waters. However, the Permit Coordination Package grossly understates the area of subtidal and intertidal seagrass within 1000 feet of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The Permit Coordination Package considers seagrass mitigation only in passing, assuming without any analysis of water depths, water transparency, turbidity, or sediment composition, that seagrass would recolonize under the removed part of the existing bridge. The mitigation discussion is directed mostly to mangroves. The Permit Coordination Package contains an extensive discussion of manatee as an endangered species. Peninsula reported 163 manatee sitings north of the Anna Maria Island Bridge from 1985 through 1988 and 63 sitings south of the bridge during the same time. The Permit Coordination Package contains a reasonably detailed set of suggestions for minimizing construction-related impacts to manatee. Peninsula considered the impact of the proposed bridge on the seagrass beds upon which manatee feed. Peninsula reported that the impact on seagrass of the south alignment would be an order of magnitude greater than the impact on seagrass of the north alignment. The Permit Coordination Package reviews research suggesting that manatee mortality from boat collisions is higher when the mammals are feeding in seagrass beds, are in areas frequented by small recreational boats that operate at relatively high speeds and move in unpredictable ways in shallow water, and are in shallow, restricted navigation channels. The Permit Coordination Package notes that bicycles, joggers, and pedestrians use the Anna Maria Island Bridge, but not extensively. However, the Permit Coordination Package acknowledges that the bridge is "heavily used by fishermen, principally recreational or low volume commercial mullet netters using large castnets." These fishermen use the 400 feet at either end of the bridge and up to 200-300 feet of the margins of the pass. Figg and Muller conducted a study of ship impacts, culminating in the Ship Impact Analysis Data Collection dated November 7, 1988. The document describes the proposed project as the replacement of the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed- span bridge with a 65-foot clearance. The ship-impact study notes that, from January 1985 through September 1988, 650 vessels monthly required bridge openings to navigate the Intracoastal Waterway, which runs under the Anna Maria Island Bridge. Over nearly four years, these vessels comprised 24,889 sailboats (83.5 percent), 4447 powerboats (14.9 percent), 467 tugs/barges (1.67 percent). The tugboats were typically 35 feet by 195 feet. A variety of the sailboats had masts requiring a vertical clearance greater than 65 feet. Sailboats with masts as high as 80 feet-- including a number of boats manufactured in Florida--have passed through the opened drawbridge. The growing importance of a clearance greater than 65 feet is evidenced by the closing of other nearby passes into the Gulf and the increasing use of taller-masted boats. The ship-impact document includes a survey of bridge tenders and commercial boating interests. One tender, who had worked at the Anna Maria Island Bridge for 12 years, reported that he had never seen or known of an marine vessel colliding with the bridge. No one else reported any such collisions. In general, persons surveyed agreed that winds and currents present no navigational difficulties at the fendered channel of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. Figg and Muller prepared the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report dated December 20, 1988, and revised February 13, 1989, "to examine the most feasible and prudent locations and conceptual designs for the construction of the proposed bridge replacement structure . . . at Sarasota Pass ...." The study's objective was to "develop a bridge replacement that will provide an efficient, economical and safe transportation facility with minimal adverse impacts on both the human and natural element." The introduction to the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report notes that DOT has classified the Anna Maria Island Bridge as functionally obsolete. The draft report states that the proposed bridge replacement project is necessary to correct the primary deficiencies of a "lack of emergency shoulders, obsolete design load of H-15 and low overall clearance." The introduction to the draft report states that the current project would be either a two- or four-lane facility. The actual size and need would be consistent with the Manatee County comprehensive plan and MPO transportation plan. The next section of the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report describes existing conditions. This section accurately details most aspects of the existing condition of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The draft report identifies the bridge's H-15 design load, posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour, and absence of posted weight restrictions. The draft report reveals that the bridge has 36 scheduled daily openings most of the year. Based on a 1988 DOT inspection, the draft report states that the bascule is in "good" condition, meaning that there was "moderate incidence of significant early deterioration." Based on a 1987 DOT inspection, the draft report states that the deck, superstructure, and substructure are in "fair" condition, meaning that there was "early to moderate deterioration that does not reduce element capacity," and the channel protection was in "excellent" condition. The draft report collects detailed accident data for the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The draft report states that the 1988 average daily traffic "on the facility in the vicinity of the Anna Maria Island Bridge" was 14,300 vehicles with an average daily traffic of 17,000 vehicles projected for 2010. Based on accident data for 1984 through 1986, the draft report concedes that the accident rate for the bridge is low. For the two approaches, bascule, and remainder of the existing bridge, there were a total of 62 collisions during the three-year period, with the most prevalent being 27 rear- end collisions. None of these 27 rear-end collisions occurred on the bascule. Most of the rear-end collisions--17--occurred on the two approaches. The remaining ten rear-end collisions occurred on the bridge between the bascule and the approaches. The approaches were also the sites of more total collisions than the bridge itself, including the bascule. For the three-year period, 61 percent of the collisions occurred on the two approaches, 5 percent occurred on the bascule, and 34 percent occurred on the remainder of the bridge. There was only one collision involving a vehicle and a pedestrian during the three years in question. This took place on the eastern approach. There were no collisions involving bicyclists. The draft report states that a high percentage of the rear-end collisions occurred near a boat ramp on the west approach and a marina and convenience store on the east approach. The marina and convenience store are about one-quarter mile east of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The boat ramp is between the west end of the bridge and the signal at Gulf Drive. The draft report suggests that rear-end collisions on the approaches may involve vehicles slowing for right turns into these destinations. The draft report opines that the "high percentage of rear-end collisions on the bridge (39 percent)" may involve vehicles stopping quickly for a bridge opening. This suggestion ignores the queuing effect from vehicles turning into the boat ramp or convenience store and marina. The draft report tries to limit the effect of these traffic backups to rear-end collisions on the bridge approaches. However, attributing a high percentage of rear-end collisions on the bridge to bridge openings ignores the traffic backups from these off-bridge sources, as well as the traffic light at Gulf Drive. Figg and Muller's analysis of the sources of rear-end collisions lacks support, such as through analysis of accident reports. The analysis even cites the wrong figure. The 39 percent figure applies to total collisions on the bridge compared to total collisions; the percentage of total rear-end collisions occurring on the bridge is 37 percent (10/27). The draft report also falters when describing cultural and environmental features. Noting low pedestrian volumes on the Anna Maria Island Bridge, the draft report contends three times in one paragraph that "pedestrian activity is not a major consideration for this project," "pedestrian activity does not warrant special consideration on the project," and "sidewalks ... are used very little by pedestrians." As for environmental factors, the draft report incorrectly identifies the Class II waters surrounding the Anna Maria Island Bridge as Class III waters, although the draft report correctly notes that these waters are Outstanding Florida Waters. But the omissions in the draft report are more significant. The draft report omits any mention of manatee or the seagrass located under what would be the new bridge. The draft report does not discuss the effects of shading, water transparency, and water depth on seagrass. The section following the description of existing conditions is entitled "Need for Improvement." As the name of the section suggests, this part of the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report contains less data and more analysis of the existing and proposed bridges. The discussion is at times more promotional than it is analytic. This section of the draft report starts by noting that the existing bridge has had no significant upgrades to its two, 12-foot shoulder-less traffic lanes. The draft report finds that the lack of shoulders presents a traffic hazard when traffic is stalled on the bridge. The opening of the drawbridge is another source of danger to motorists due to stopped traffic, according to the draft report. The draft report argues that this hazard is "substantiated" by the previously discussed data on rear-end collisions. The draft report summarizes the above-described accident data "for the existing facility" without disclosing that more than half of the accidents occurred on the bridge approaches and not the bridge itself. The draft report adds that opening the drawbridge would also present a danger during evacuations by preventing people from evacuating the island. However, there is no discussion of Coast Guard policy, which is not to order bridge openings during an evacuation, nor is there any mention of the frequency of evacuations, which take place about once every six years. There is also no discussion of the widely known necessity of early evacuations from the island due to early flooding of island roads and bridge approaches. On incomplete data, the draft report merely contends that "evacuation efforts would be severely hampered" by the need to open the drawbridge. The draft report suggests that bicycle traffic would be better accommodated by a new bridge. The draft report observes that the two existing five-foot sidewalks on the Anna Maria Island Bridge create an unsafe condition by mixing bicycle traffic with pedestrians and fishermen. The draft report neglects to discuss the discouraging effects on bicyclists, pedestrians, and fishermen of using a single six-foot sidewalk running up a 4 percent grade to a final height of 75 feet over the water. The draft report states that the MPO's 2000 Plan identified a need for a four-lane facility over Sarasota Pass. However, the 2010 Plan, which was prepared after the draft report, identifies no such need. The draft report notes that the proposed project is also in compliance with the Manatee County comprehensive plan. Addressing social and economic issues, the draft report accurately describes the area surrounding the proposed project as a "naturally beautiful site" with the proposed project promising to be "highly visible from both land and water." The draft report assures that engineers would design a bridge profile "to ensure a pleasing visual effect." The draft report acknowledges that the proposed project is not directly needed to meet any economic demands. But the "social demands for the project would be based on a more efficient and convenient transportation system linking Anna Maria Island with the mainland." The draft report suggests that the improved link "could foster economic development in the area" and everyone would be served by a more dependable evacuation route. However, there is no evidence that the existing drawbridge has ever impeded vehicular or vessel traffic during an evacuation or that the proposed bridge would result in more traffic on Anna Maria Island by way of Manatee Avenue or other routes. The next section of the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report is the analysis of alternative alignments. This section first considers the no-build alternative. The cited advantages of not building the project are that there would be no disturbance to the environment, even though these impacts, according to the draft report, "are nearly all of short term duration and can be considered as minor over the life of the new structure." On the other hand, the benefits of building the bridge include the elimination of the inconvenience of the drawbridge to motorists and boaters and the cost of operation of the typical bascule bridge. The draft report states that maintenance costs for a typical bascule bridge are about $150,000 annually plus estimated major rehabilitation costs of $500,000 to $750,000 every 15-20 years. Additional reported benefits to replacing the Anna Maria Island Bridge are eliminating the safety hazards posed by the lack of shoulders and raising by 25 percent the design load from H-15 to H-20. The draft report concludes that the benefits of the no-build alternative are outweighed by the "substandard design and safety concerns." The draft report considers a two-lane bridge, a four- lane bridge, and two two-lane bridges. Additionally, the draft report considers alignments north and south of the Anna Maria Island Bridge with three structure levels: high-level fixed, mid-level bascule (i.e., a 45-foot closed vertical clearance drawbridge), and low-level bascule. These options account for 18 alternatives. Figg and Muller studied each of the 18 alternatives for traffic flow, ease of construction, bicycle accessibility, operation, safety, aesthetics, environmental impacts, right-of- way impacts, and project costs. As to the north alignment, the draft report notes several problems, including the need to relocate a power line and water line and modify two navigation channels. The draft report states that the boat ramp just west of the bridge and the marina on the east would be impacted if DOT constructed a single four- lane bridge, which would also impact right-of-way. As to the south alignment, the draft report notes several problems, including the need to relocate a water line. Any structure would also impact right-of-way. As to the low- and mid-level bascules, the draft report contends without significant supporting data that few boats could pass through an unopened mid-level bascule that could not also pass through an unopened low- level bascule. The draft report cannot justify any bascule options due to the "additional expenses of the bascule construction, bascule maintenance and bascule operations." The draft report cautions that the bascule alternatives are not "a practical, improved replacement to the existing bascule bridge." The final section of the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report is entitled "Preliminary Design Analysis." The draft report offers rough summaries of projected construction costs for various alternatives. The projections are of greater value for the comparison of differences in probable costs of various alternatives than they are for identifying the estimated cost of a particular alternative. According to the draft report, a two-lane, fixed- span, high-level bridge on the north alignment would cost $9.9 million, and a two-lane, mid-level bascule on the north alignment would cost $12.5 million. On the south alignment, these bridges would cost $10 and $12.6 million, respectively. Discussing the benefits of replacing the Anna Maria Island Bridge, the draft report states that the "most obvious" benefit would be the elimination of the delays to vehicular and vessel traffic from drawbridge openings. A fixed-span bridge also would offer a dependable evacuation route. The draft report suggests that shallow-draft boaters would find navigation enhanced by the tripling of the widths between the supports under the fixed-span, high-level bridge as compared to the more narrowly spaced supports under the existing bridge. The draft report again asserts that the new structure would also offer improved aesthetics, both in terms of the view of the proposed bridge and the view from the proposed bridge. Page VIII-13 of the draft report is missing from SAM Exhibit No. 32. In the final report, and possibly in the draft report, Figg and Muller admitted on this page that the proposed grade of the new bridge would "limit fishing activities and pedestrian use." A brief discussion of rear-end collisions and economic and community development was probably present on the omitted page, but this section generally summarizes discussions from earlier sections. The draft report also considers wetland impacts of new two-lane bridges on the north and south alignments. Relying on the understatements of Peninsula, the draft report states that the area of subtidal seagrass is only 0.63 acres 500 feet north of the existing bridge and 0 acres 500 feet south of the existing bridge. The draft report concludes that a two-lane bridge 25 feet north or 25 feet south of the Anna Maria Island Bridge would not impact any subtidal seagrass and would impact only 0.06 acres of intertidal seagrass on the north alignment and 1.65 acres of intertidal seagrass on the south alignment. The draft report also considers the impacts of new four-lane bridges on the north and south alignment. All of this analysis understates seagrass loss by considerable amounts. Based on these data and analysis, the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report concludes that [a]lignment se[le]ctions based solely on a vegetative impact evaluation would focus on the northern alternative. However, alignment selection will necessarily need to be tempered with a consideration of endangered species involvement and impacts to navigation, partic- ularly when addressing the northern alignment. Sverdrup reviewed Figg and Muller's Draft Preliminary Engineering Report prior to its revision in February 1989. Addressing the discussion of bascule alternates, one Sverdrup engineer stated in a Review Comment Sheet dated January 6, 1989: Information presented thus far does not support premature rejection of bascule options. Vessel height distribution may require some detective work. Consider visits to local marinas, corre- lation with vessel numbers/names on bridge tender logs, additional data recorded by bridge tenders for a few weeks. . . . Objective is to establish relations between traffic benefit vs. reduced openings for different vessel clearances. Ultimate rejection or viability of bascule alternate must have adequate foundation. . . . Sverdrup's environmental representative, Don Smith, reviewed the work of Peninsula. Despite Peninsula's excessively conservative estimates of seagrass loss, Mr. Smith rejected even these estimates as too pessimistic. By review comment sheet to Figg and Muller dated December 28, 1988, Mr. Smith wrote: "As presently written, this section grossly overestimates the extent of possible wetland impact & must be redone." Adamantly rejecting Mr. Smith's criticism, the Peninsula employee wrote on his copy of the review comment sheet: Table 7 does not grossly over estimate wetland impacts. . . . The acreage figures are not grossly overestimated at all. I resent the grossly! Does Sverdrup have any DATA! that reflects my gross overestimates! NO, SHIT A memorandum dated January 23, 1989, memorializes the conclusions of a meeting involving Sverdrup and Figg and Muller representatives. Figg and Muller argued that its subconsultant did not overestimate wetlands and asked Sverdrup to substantiate Mr. Smith's contrary assertion. Sverdrup appears to have relented, and the two consultants agreed to remove a drawing. On January 11 and 12, 1989, the value engineering (VE) team met to define the goals of the first phase of review. The VE team is a multidisciplinary group of engineers unrelated to the project who determine the suitability of the proposal and the feasibility of any more cost-effective proposals. VE responds to the design alternatives presented in the draft report. The VE team listened to a Figg and Muller representative discuss alignment issues, including the presence of seagrass beds immediately south of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The VE team understood that concerns about the north alignment included navigation and "occasional manatee sitings," and concerns about the south alignment included greater seagrass impact. The VE team visited the Anna Maria Island Bridge, which they found to be in "good condition." They found "no severe deterioration which would endanger the capacity of the bridge." Preliminary VE considers the maintenance and operation costs of bascule alternates, although the memorandum omits mention of the costs of the no-build alternate. Preliminary VE does not identify the no-build alternative as a viable option requiring further consideration. On February 27, 1989, DOT conducted its first public meeting on the proposed project. DOT conducted a public information workshop at the Manatee County public library in Bradenton. DOT regarded the February 1989 workshop as an opportunity for the public and DOT, as equal partners, to gather and make basic plans about whether to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge and, if so, with what. In March 1989, the MPO adopted an updated long-range transportation plan, which still showed State Road 64 as a four- lane road, including the segment over Sarasota Pass. A memorandum dated March 31, 1989, from a Sverdrup representative to a Figg and Muller representative transmitted new traffic data with the direction: "This data must be analyzed and documented in a revised Traffic Report in order to reach the conclusions necessary to proceed with the project development." The Sverdrup representative relieved Figg and Muller from the obligation of doing certain traffic calculations for bascule alternatives "since it is evident that the fixed high-level structure will be recommended due to lower overall cost." A review comment sheet dated June 13, 1989, from Mr. Smith to Figg and Muller suggested that they revise the draft report to state that the "no- build alternate is eliminated from further consideration; i.e, definitively close the door." On July 7, 1989, Mr. Crim, two Figg and Muller representatives, and two Sverdrup representatives, including Mr. Smith, discussed the north and south alignments to try to agree on the preferred alternative. Someone mentioned that they needed to take a closer look at the environmental impacts because a DEP representative had implied to Sverdrup that the "documentation must show very good reasons for selecting anything but the most environmentally sound alternative." A Figg and Muller representative added that manatee frequently use an area north of the bridge, but the participants felt this was not a significant issue for alternative selection "since manatees can be found throughout the area, north and south." The agenda for the July 7 meeting contains numerous items. Under seagrass, it identifies a need to confirm the area impacted, adding parenthetically "3.65 acres vegetated and 0.63 acres non-vegetated?" On July 7, 1989, Mr. Crim and a Sverdrup representative met with three representatives of the Federal Highway Administration to obtain their comments on the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report. The Sverdrup representative explained that the existing bridge was functionally obsolete due to the lack of shoulders and substandard design load. She explained that the proposed project would be a new four-lane bridge and did not identify a no-build alternative. She disclosed that seagrass impacts were 3.65 acres for the south alignment and 1.55 acres for the north alignment and said that the Federal Highway Administration would receive an application for a categoric exclusion in mid-September, 1989. On July 20, 1989, two Sverdrup representatives, including Mr. Smith, participated in a teleconference with five DOT representatives, including Mr. Crim. They discussed the north and south alignments to try to agree on a preferred alternative to present at the August 10 public hearing. The participants discussed the navigational problems with the north alignment and seagrass problems with the south alignment. Sverdrup tended to agree with Figg and Muller's recommendation of the south alignment. The participants agreed that it should be possible to negotiate an acceptable mitigation plan with DEP, even though one of the DOT representatives warned that DOT District 1, in which the proposed project is located, "has not had much success with seagrass mitigation in the past and that it can be very expensive and still not work." This DOT representative suggested that they present both alignments at the public hearing and defer the recommendation until after receiving public comments. The participants decided to do this. On August 10, 1989, DOT conducted the first public hearing on the project. The public hearing took place at the Anna Maria Island City Hall. DOT uses public hearings to present to the public a preferred alternate and give the public a chance to present information to show that DOT or its consultants have made any mistakes or omitted any considerations or that circumstances have changed materially. Transcribed by a court reporter, a public hearing is tightly structured. The hearing begins with opening remarks of representatives of DOT and its consultants describing the proposed project. These opening remarks are followed by a break during which members of the public may approach representatives of DOT or the consultants, ask questions, and presumably receive answers. However, these questions and answers are not recorded by the court reporter. Following the break, back on the record, members of the public may make oral comments to the DOT and consultant representatives, who almost invariably decline to respond to general questions or engage in any give-and- take with a speaker. Likewise, the DOT and consultant representatives almost invariably insist that speakers limit their comments to the individual project and not discuss other projects, even if relevant (e.g., the Cortez Bridge and a new bridge farther south). After the hearing is concluded, the public may submit written comments for a short period. After this period ends, DOT and the consultants meet privately, consider the record, make a decision on the project, and announce the decision publicly. About 50 persons attended the August 10 public hearing, which was held at Anna Maria City Hall. DOT, Sverdrup, and Figg and Muller provided comment sheets, displays, and reports for public inspection at the public hearing. Representatives of the consultants and DOT encouraged the audience to examine the materials, ask questions of knowledgeable individuals during the off-the-record break, and then make public comments. According to Mr. Crim, DOT intended the August 1989 public hearing to serve as a combined location and design public hearing. However, DOT had failed to give notice to owners of condominiums within 300 feet of the centerline of the west terminus of the proposed project. DOT instead had notified only the condominium association. In his opening remarks to the persons attending the public hearing, Mr. Crim stated that the Anna Maria Island Bridge was one of about 60 bridges in the statewide program "being studied for future replacement." He explained that DOT was "evaluating viable options for either improving or replacing these bridges, obtaining public input and then completing the environmental documentation and design for any recommended improvements." Mr. Crim told the audience: Our study to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge is nearing the completion of the project development phase. Tonight's hearing is an important step in that phase where we present preferred project alternates for your input prior to selecting a final alternate and then proceeding with preliminary design. Mr. Smith told the audience that DOT had three options: build a new bridge on the north alignment, build a new bridge on the south alignment, or not build a bridge. He stressed that displays in the hearing room did not represent "final plans" and that "absolutely no decisions have been made to this point." Later during the public-comment portion of the public hearing, Mr. Smith stated that there would be no more public hearings, unless so much time passed without construction that the project had to undergo additional review. A Figg and Muller representative told the audience that the 36 drawbridge openings daily "is a cause of a significant number of rear end collision accidents." She identified as the preferred alternative two fixed- span, high- level, two-lane bridges with a single such bridge initially. The Figg and Muller representative noted the seagrass impacts of both alignments. She stated that manatee are in the area, but that DOT expected no impacts due to the use of protective measures. After an hour and a half, the representatives of DOT and the consultants finished their initial presentations. During the break, members of the audience spoke with the representatives of DOT and the consultants. Public comments were divided as to the proposed fixed-span, high- level bridge. Speakers informed DOT of impending recreational and commercial development on the north side of the bridge, as well as navigational concerns, that would be adversely affected by the north alignment. Explaining DOT's practice of typically presenting a preferred alternate, Mr. Crim testified that DOT "can't go to a public hearing and say we don't know what we're going to do. Anybody got any comments?" Instead, DOT presents its recommendation to sharpen the focus of the public hearing. The February 1989 workshop was to help form the decision; the August 1989 public hearing was to show whether DOT should change a tentative decision. On November 1, 1989, Figg and Muller issued the Final Preliminary Engineering Report. The text of the final report is not materially different from the text of the draft report issued nine months earlier except as noted below. Mr. Crim testified that, at this point, DOT had decided to replace the bridge, but had not decided to build a fixed-span, high-level bridge. The final report recites the same "primary deficiencies" of the Anna Maria Island Bridge cited in the draft report, but adds a new deficiency--delays due to bascule openings. Acknowledging the existence of the marina and convenience store one-quarter mile east of the bridge, the final report suggests that collisions on the bridge approaches could be due to vehicles stopping for left turns, as well as right turns. Discussing traffic projections, the final report mentions that, when the draft report was first drafted in December 1988, traffic projections disclosed a need for a two- lane facility with possible expansion to four lanes at some future point. New traffic information demonstrated that the four-lane facility would be needed prior to 2015. The final report increases, without discussion, the 1988 average daily traffic "on the facility in the vicinity of the Anna Maria Island Bridge" to 15,400, from 14,300 vehicles reported in the draft report for the same period. The final report adds that the two-lane bridge would reach a level of service E in 2006, so "it is recommended that a four lane facility be constructed prior to this date." The final report contains a new section on endangered and threatened species. This section contains data showing that the area around the Anna Maria Island Bridge is frequented by manatee. The final report relays the information from the Permit Coordination Package that, from 1985 through 1988, there were 163 manatee sitings north of the bridge and 63 manatee sitings south of the bridge. Early in the section analyzing alternative alignments, the final report notes, as does the draft report, that the benefits of the no-build alternative are outweighed by the disadvantages of "substandard design and safety concerns." Recognizing that only the no-build alternative would avoid impacts to the wetlands, the Final Preliminary Engineering Report states: "this alternative is not feasible considering the structural deficiency of the bridge, the absence of shoulders (functional obsolescence) and projected traffic increases indicating the need for two additional lanes." The final report concludes: "Therefore, the No-Build Alternative is not a viable alternative and is hereby eliminated from further consideration in this report." The final report revises the comparative cost estimates, reducing the north and south alignment costs for a two-lane bridge by a little over $1 million. The final report continues to understate the area of subtidal seagrass north and south of the bridge. The final report describes the public involvement on the proposed project. Referring to the public workshop that took place on February 27, 1989. the final report states that, of the 36 individuals who supplied written comments on the proposed bridge, 21 favored a two-lane bridge, six favored a four-lane bridge, 30 favored a high-level, fixed-span bridge, 21 favored the south alignment, and two favored the north alignment. Summarizing the results of the public hearing held on August 10, 1989, the final report recounts that, among oral comments, five favored two lanes, three favored four lanes, five favored the south alignment, no one favored the north alignment, and seven favored the no-build alternative. Written comments were two favoring four lanes, one favoring two lanes, four favoring the south alignment, no one favoring the north alignment, and one favoring the no-build alternative. A new section of the final report is entitled, "Preferred Alternative." Recommending that four lanes be built, the final report recommends the south alignment, mostly on the basis of impediments to navigation posed by the north alignment. There is little discussion of seagrass impact. Relying on the needs of boat traffic, although ignoring the needs of high- masted boats, the final report recommends a fixed-span, high- level bridge and proceeds to analyze the projected costs in greater detail than did the draft report. The remaining material differences between the draft and final reports are that the final report drops the repeated references to the unimportance of pedestrian activity on the Anna Maria Island Bridge, the description of the area surrounding the proposed bridge as "a naturally beautiful site," the assurance that the proposed bridge would be "highly visible from both land and water," and the exhortation that DOT consider the "aesthetics or visual impacts of the project." The final report continues to misidentify the waters around the Anna Maria Island Bridge as Class III waters. On November 27, 1989, DOT circulated a revised Advance Notification Package, noting that the new proposal was for two two-lane, high-level bridges to be constructed in two phases. The notice states that the project is a federal-aid project and that DOT and the Federal Highway Administration would determine the degree of environmental documentation necessary. 2. 1990-92 Various state agencies responded in early 1990 to the revised Advance Notification Package. Several agencies expressed reservations about the proposed project, although ultimately all state agencies dropped their objections at this stage. By letter dated January 4, 1990, DER objected to the loss of seagrass from construction and shading. DER also warned that seagrass mitigation had met with little success in this general area. DER suggested that DOT consider rebuilding the bridge at its current location at or near its current width. The letter suggests that DOT take several steps. In particular, the letter states that the proposed project is in Outstanding Florida Waters, and DOT must, among other things, show that "existing ambient water quality will not be lowered." Representatives of DOT, Sverdrup, Figg and Muller, Peninsula, and DER met on March 23, 1990, to discuss DER concerns about impacts to seagrass and the ability to mitigate. The Peninsula employee estimated seagrass losses of 0.1 acre from pier placement, 0.5 acres (worst case) from construction, and an overshadow effect. Due to the greater height of the new bridge, someone at the meeting said that the overshadow effect would be minimized. As to mitigation, someone reported DER's concern that seagrass typically was already growing where conditions were favorable and, where seagrass was absent, conditions were unfavorable. The Peninsula employee suggested that they could fill holes in the area, raising the bottom elevation to a depth at which seagrass could grow. Someone reported DER's insistence to consider mitigation now, to avoid problems in the permitting stage. In response, DOT "proposed to commit to studying the overshadow effects of the new bridge and the rate of re- colonization of seagrasses in the alignment of the old bridge." DOT agreed to develop alternative mitigation prior to construction of the second two-lane bridge, if recolonization failed. DER agreed to this approach. The agreement between DOT and DER was memorialized by letter dated March 30, 1990, from a DOT representative to a DER representative. The letter promises that, after completion of the construction of the first two-lane bridge, DOT would start monitoring recolonization where the Anna Maria Island Bridge had stood and the effect of shading from the new bridge. If at the end of a monitoring period of unspecified duration an unspecified entity determined that recolonization had been unsuccessful, DOT would implement mitigation at an unspecified location. The letter concludes that DOT's commitment to this procedure will "alleviate DER's concerns regarding the impacts to seagrass and allow for a determination of consistency with the Florida Coastal Management Program." By letter from DER to the Office of the Governor dated April 13, 1990, DER stated that DOT had provided reasonable assurance of seagrass mitigation in part by assuring that seagrass would recolonize under the existing bridge once it was removed. DER noted that DOT promised to monitor recolonization and shading following removal of the existing bridge and construction of the first two-lane bridge. DER recommended a bathymetric survey and stated that a permit would contain success criteria for natural recolonization and require alternate mitigation plans. Withdrawing its earlier objection, the DER letter finds that the project is "consistent with our authorities in the Florida Coastal Management Program at this time." The letter concludes with the promise of a more detailed review during permitting. In the meantime, consultants continued to work on the project. Figg and Muller prepared a draft of the Final Engineering Report and submitted it to Sverdrup for review. In a Review Comment Sheet dated February 15, 1990, directed to Figg and Muller, Mr. Smith again protested high estimates of seagrass losses, stating: "Shading is a non-issue which is not even addressed in any agency regulations. Revise the document accordingly." Other work early in 1990 included final VE review of the project. The second VE memorandum was completed March 26, 1990. Memorializing a meeting that took place February 28, 1990, final VE describes the proposed project as a 65-foot clearance bridge 20 feet north of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The memorandum concludes that VE could offer no significant improvements to the proposed project. The memorandum does not consider the no- build alternative. However, the memorandum recommends that DOT consider relaxing the ship-impact standard at the ends of the bridge based on the shallow depths at the ends of the bridge, the absence of reported marine collisions with the bridge, and the existence of alternative access to Anna Maria Island. While Figg and Muller spent most of 1990 and early 1991 preparing the Final Engineering Report, consultants or subconsultants prepared additional reports, such as the geotechnical report and bridge hydraulic report. In December 1990, DOT made some changes to the new design, widening the shoulders and adding a sidewalk. Figg and Muller issued the Final Engineering Report about a year after the date of January 31, 1990, shown on its title page. The first paragraph of the Final Engineering Report makes the case for the replacement of the existing bridge, but without any mention of structural deficiency. The report states that the Anna Maria Island Bridge is narrow, without shoulders, and functionally obsolete. . . . In addition to safety concerns associated with a lack of shoulders, accident data show a high number of rear end collisions. One factor contributing to these collisions is the delays to the traffic caused by the opening of the bridge's drawspan. These factors, combined with a need for efficient and safe transportation routes to and from the islands, determined the need to replace the existing bridge at this time. The Final Engineering Report states that DOT and its consultants evaluated 18 alternatives, plus the no-build alternative, and describes the Final Preliminary Engineering Report. The Final Engineering Report notes that the Federal Highway Administration issued a categoric exclusion July 23, 1990. The categoric exclusion was based on, among other things, a DOT representation that the project had no "controversy potential," which may have seemed plausible at the time. DOT District 1 Secretary David May contended that such a representation, which preceded his appointment as District Secretary, would be correct if the controversy were based on unfounded information. In any event, the Federal Highway Administration did not withdraw the categoric exclusion in 1995, even after DOT disclosed the controversy surrounding the proposed project. The Final Engineering Report explains that the original traffic data were faulty. Correct data revealed that the "original concept of a two-lane replacement bridge was unworkable." Thus, DOT and the consultants decided to pursue a two-phase project with the first phase being the demolition of the existing bridge and construction of a single two-lane bridge. The Final Engineering Report states that the decision to build ultimately four lanes warranted reissuance of the Advance Notification Package. The Final Engineering Report states that, in a meeting between representatives of DER and DOT, DOT representatives suggested that the advance notification stage was premature for the development of mitigation commitments, but acceded to DER's insistence due to the availability of a "great deal" of information. The two agencies reportedly reached an understanding of what would be required to offset environmental impacts. The Final Engineering Report states: "Based on that agreement, DOT proceeded with completing the environmental study process and the final design at a cost of approximately $1,000,000 of public funds." The Final Engineering Report discloses that the consultants eliminated the existing alignment in the PD&E study and selected the south alignment due to fewer adverse impacts. The report notes direct and indirect impacts to 3.01 acres of vegetated wetlands, including 1.65 acres of seagrass. The report calculates the seagrass impacts as 0.25 acres from pier placement and 1.4 acres from shading. DOT and the consultants selected the south alignment based on "strong public support" and DER's suggestion that impacts could be offset. The Final Engineering Report explains that DOT eliminated the alternate of the existing alignment because of the loss of access to the island from Manatee Avenue during the two- year construction period. The Final Engineering Report does not mention the reasons for the elimination of the no- build alternative. On July 8, 1991, Figg and Muller issued the Final Bridge Concept Report. The concept remained the construction of two, two-lane fixed-span, high-level bridges in two phases and the removal of the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The purpose of the Final Bridge Concept Report is to provide detailed findings of different types of structures and recommend the appropriate alternatives for consideration in the "final phase of the design and plan preparation." The recommendation is based on comparative analyses of cost and design features. The Final Bridge Concept Report refers the reader to the Final Preliminary Engineering Report for information about environmental conditions. In a brief synopsis, the Final Bridge Concept Report continues erroneously to describe the waters around the Anna Maria Island Bridge as Class III waters, but recognizes that they are Outstanding Florida Waters, so "special emphasis must be placed on the water quality." The Final Bridge Concept Report notes that the total area of seagrass "involved" with the proposed bridge is 1.65 acres and that manatee use the area. Describing the two phases of the overall project, the Final Bridge Concept Report states that the first two-lane bridge would be constructed in the same "corridor alignment," just south of the existing bridge. DOT would build the second bridge when traffic warranted, which is projected to be 2006. In mid-1991, DOT entered into a new contract with Figg and Muller to prepare final design and construction plans for the proposed bridge. DOT included funding for construction of the bridge in its work program adopted in July 1991 with work scheduled for fiscal year 1996. In June and July 1992, the Peninsula employee conducted additional fieldwork to determine the extent of seagrass. This time, though, his work focused specifically on the area under the existing and proposed bridge. The resulting Baseline Seagrass Survey, which Peninsula submitted to DEP in November 1992, states that the purpose of the fieldwork was to collect sufficient baseline data so that DOT could determine the success of natural recolonization under the existing bridge and seagrass shading under the new bridge. The 1992 fieldwork is more intensive than the 1988 fieldwork. The Peninsula employee made ten north-south transects across Sarasota Pass. Although still lacking a bathymetric survey of bottom elevations and effective water depths, the employee calculated approximate water depths at each of 20 data- collection points along each transect and determined, for each point, the species, shoot density, and areal density of any seagrass. He also collected water-quality data for temperature, salinity, conductivity, dissolved oxygen, and water clarity (secchi depth) and recorded "incidental faunal observations." According to Mr. Crim, DOT had completed about 90 percent of its final design and construction plans in August 1992. At this time, DOT applied to the Army Corps of Engineers for a dredge-and-fill permit, DER for a dredge- and-fill permit, Coast Guard for a bridge permit, and Southwest Florida Water Management District for a management-and-storage-of-surface- water permit. In November 1992, residents of Anna Maria, Holmes Beach, and Bradenton Beach voted on a referendum concerning the 65-foot clearance, fixed- span bridge proposed to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The vote was 1961 opposed and 515 in favor. On December 11, 1992, the City Council of Bradenton Beach voted for DOT to place the proposed bridge project on hold pending further study. However, by memorandum dated December 1, 1992, to Mr. Crim, District Secretary May stated: You may be aware that there is concern currently being expressed by some local officials about the design of the Anna Maria Bridge replacement project. We will proceed with the fixed-span bridge concept as developed in the PD&E document. Please make every effort to render this project "production ready" as rapidly as possible. 3. 1993 Public opposition to the proposed bridge--in any alignment--continued in 1993. DOT participated in two MPO- sponsored public hearings on January 8, 1993, where numerous bridge opponents expressed disapproval of the proposed project. At the 1:00 pm meeting, a DOT representative disclosed that the bridge construction plans were 95 percent complete and right-of-way acquisition was underway. At the 7:00 pm meeting, the DOT representative responded to a question whether DOT could change its plans. He acknowledged that DOT and the MPO could change their plans, but a discussion of such a change three years earlier would have been better because dropping the project now would mean that "we have thrown away a million dollars of tax money." On January 13, 1993, a special MPO task force met and voted 4-3 to oppose the proposed bridge. There was some support on the task force for a 45- foot-high bascule bridge instead of a fixed-span, high-level bridge. On January 19, 1993, area mayors and city council members met with District Secretary May, who discussed the DOT five-year work program. Addressing the proposed bridge, District Secretary May said: . . . one of the primary components of the program is the Anna Maria Bridge and I know that's a great concern to all of you. It's a concern to the department too. So, rather than get into a big discourse on that, it is a 65', fixed span bridge. It's been designed as such. We're in the middle of purchasing right-of-way for that bridge. . . . In response to a question as to the extent of completion of design work and the ability of the MPO to stop the project, District Secretary May stated that 100 percent of the design was completed and, by law, both the MPO and DOT had to concur to stop the project. In response to criticism about the limited extent of public participation, District Secretary May conceded that DOT had improved public participation compared to seven or eight years ago, when DOT "didn't go to . . . near the level of public involvement that we do now." For the Ringling Bridge, for example, he said that he was "soliciting all sorts of input from all those people," referring to the public. Conceding that the Anna Maria Island Bridge is "not structurally deficient," District Secretary May explained that rehabilitation was not a cost- effective solution. When asked if it was a "done deal that the new bridge is coming in," District Secretary May answered, ". . . Yes, there's a new bridge going to be put there." Responding to a follow-up question, District Secretary May repeated the message: "Without a doubt. As opposed to rehabilitation. The MPO has not come to us with any requests yet so we'll respond once we get a request from them. Yes, ma'am." When asked what DOT would do if the MPO now suggested a 45-foot bascule, District Secretary May said he would "respond at that point in time. But that's a million dollars worth of throw-away design." Asked if public reaction to the proposed bridge would not justify dropping the project, District Secretary May replied: . . . First, if I IMPLIED that we were not doing a good job several years ago [in public participation], that, that is incorrect. We did as good a job as we could do then. We're trying . . . we're exceeding that now. He added that the results of the island-wide referendum were based in part on public misunderstanding of the safety issue and advised that the bridge is of interest to the region, not merely the island. Asked at the end of the meeting if he meant that the proposed bridge was "going to happen," District Secretary May answered, "A bridge is going to happen here." He added, "We need a replacement. We need to replace that bridge. We need to have a bridge replacement," rejecting rehabilitation as not cost effective. Still supported by the Manatee County Commission, the bridge was now opposed by the city councils of Anna Maria and Bradenton Beach. The executive director of the MPO mentioned that the Mayor of Holmes Beach reported that the city approved the 75-foot-high bridge, but this support was short-lived. About 40 residents spoke at an MPO meeting on January 25, 1993; nearly all of them opposed the bridge. A SAM attorney argued that DOT's notice preceding the August 1989 public hearing had been defective. Following discussion, with some support for a 45-foot-high bascule bridge, the MPO voted 10-4 to recommend that DOT proceed with the 75-foot-high bridge. Meanwhile, DEP was again expressing concern about the proposed project. By letter dated January 21, 1993, to James Wilt, the DOT district permit engineer responsible for the bridge project, a DEP administrator in the Tampa office advised that he could not recommend the project for approval. Although the letter was not final agency action, it was sent "to allow applicant time to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for this project." By letter dated February 3, 1993, Mr. Wilt informed the DEP administrator in Tampa that DEP had long known of seagrass impacts from the proposed bridge in the southern alignment. The February 3 letter complains that DEP neglected to mention the possibility that the bridge project might not be permitted in a September 1992 letter stating that the application was complete or in a December 1992 letter stating that processing of the application had begun. The February 3 letter also complains that a DOT representative called DEP in late December "to inquire about the anticipated date of issuance of the Dredge/Fill permit. [She] was advised that a final field review of the site had to be conducted and the DOT could expect to receive a permit the 2nd or 3rd week in January, 1993." Concluding the February 3 letter, DOT warned DEP: Based upon the early and extensive coordination that has occurred on this project, the absence of any adverse comments during the processing of the application and the fact that DER estimated the issuance of a permit in January of this year, anything other than the issuance of a permit for the southern alignment is unacceptable. On February 10, 1993, DEP issued a Notice of Permit Denial, stating that the proposed bridge would "run directly through the most productive and prolific seagrass nursery areas and impact approximately 2.5 acres of productive shallow bottom." Noting that DEP had expressed concerns about the likely inadequacy of mitigation three years earlier, it had recommended that any new bridge be located at the current location. The Notice of Permit Denial acknowledges that DEP had found the proposed project consistent with the Florida Coastal Management Program, "pending a more detailed review during the permitting stage." However, DOT had failed to substantiate its assurances to offset seagrass impacts, according to the Notice of Permit Denial. The Notice of Permit Denial reports that DEP expressed "significant concerns" about the project in January 1990, including the concern that DEP "'could not expect the applicant to be able to provide reasonable assurances that they could offset the loss of this valuable resource (seagrass beds) through mitigation.'" Thus, DEP recommended that the proposed bridge should be located at the location of the existing bridge. The Notice of Permit Denial denies the application because DOT failed to provide reasonable assurance that the project would be clearly in the public interest and would not significantly degrade Outstanding Florida Waters. DEP found that the project would be adverse to endangered species and threatened habitats, adverse to fishing and marine productivity, and adverse to the current condition and relative value of functions being performed because nutrient assimilation would be reduced by the loss of at least 2.5 acres of seagrass serving as viable nursery area. DEP also concluded that DOT had failed to provide a plan to protect Class II, Outstanding Florida Waters, from significant damage or to provide reasonable assurance that the project would not result in the violation of water-quality standards. The Notice of Permit Denial notes in particular that the project could not lawfully reduce below ambient conditions the following water-quality parameters: biological oxygen demand, dissolved oxygen, iron, mercury, nutrients, phosphorus, turbidity, zinc, and biological integrity. On April 27, 1993, the City Council of Anna Maria voted unanimously to reject the proposed bridge. On May 4, 1993, the City Council of Holmes Beach voted 4-1 to reject the proposed bridge. The mayor vetoed the resolution, and the City Council overrode the veto. On July 4, 1993, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune published the results of a survey asking if readers preferred replacing drawbridges on the Intracoastal Waterway with fixed-span, high- level bridges. The results were 73 percent favored replacement and 26 percent opposed replacement. The newspaper reprinted about 75 responses, ranging in emotion between the following: Yes. Don't let the old-timers sway the decision. Let's go with the modern time. Some of them will be long gone before the bridge is completed. No. Keep the unique and lovely part of our country as it was when you were first attracted to it--or move away. Environmental work on the proposed project stepped up after DEP denied the permit. On July 13, 1993, Peninsula forwarded to DEP the Seagrass Mitigation Plan, which later became part of the permit. At the same time, responding to public concerns about wind safety on high-level bridges, DOT retained Dr. Robert C. Sheets, former director of the National Weather Service, to advise on the effects of high winds at high elevations. Dr. Sheets explained why the higher bridge did not pose a significantly greater risk to bridge users than the lower bridge. According to Dr. Sheets, the vertical exchange of energy characteristic of predominantly convective storms like thunderstorms and hurricanes precludes much difference in wind speeds at the two heights in question. The difference in wind speeds during nonconvective storms like "no- name storms" or "storms of the century" is larger, but still not great. No-name storms lack the vertical exchange of energy of hurricanes and thunderstorms, so wind speeds at 75 feet are greater than at 25 feet. Local emergency management and law enforcement officials would close any bridge when wind speeds at the deck reach 45 miles per hour. A 75-foot-high bridge might encounter such winds in nonconvective storms about 20 minutes earlier than would the 25-foot-high existing bridge. In June 1993, Petitioners filed a petition alleging, among other things, that DOT's notice preceding the August 1989 public hearing was legally insufficient because DOT failed to send it to owners of condominiums within 300 feet of the proposed project. Abating any proceedings on the petition, DOT decided to conduct another public hearing on the project. Agreeing to requests of residents to schedule the public hearing in the fall when seasonal residents could attend, DOT scheduled the public hearing for October 26 and 27, 1993. On October 1, 1993, DOT mailed letters to all required persons, including owners of condominiums within 300 feet of the proposed project, advising them of the times, dates, and locations of the public hearing on October 26 and 27, 1993. DOT also advertised the public hearings. The letter and advertisement state: This hearing is being conducted to solicit input from area residents, local public officials, and other interested persons or organizations relative to the location, design, and social, economic and environmental effects of the proposed improvements. . . . The purpose of the project is to replace the existing bascule bridge with a fixed-span high level bridge. To encourage public participation, DOT conducted one public hearing on the mainland and another public hearing on the island. The two public hearings were really a single, two-day public hearing. About 200 persons attended the October 26 hearing in Bradenton and 550 persons attended the October 27 hearing in Holmes Beach. The hearing format for both nights was identical and tracked DOT's typical practice in conducting public hearings, such as the August 1989 hearing. However, each hearing began, after a brief introduction, with an eight-and-one- half minute videotape instead of a live project description. During a break following the videotape, persons in attendance could talk to representatives of DOT and the consultants and ask them questions off the record. The final part of the hearing was devoted entirely to recorded comments from the audience. At the start of the first night's hearing, the DOT representative identified the fixed-span, high-level bridge as DOT's preferred alternate, stating: The reason for holding the public hearing and the purpose of this public hearing is to allow you to present to us any new, any additional information that has not been considered in the past and was not looked at during the study that was held some several years ago on this bridge. At the start of the second night's hearing, the same DOT representative said: "This public hearing . . . involves the replacement of the Anna Maria Bridge. . . . The proposed improvement involves a replacement of the . . . Anna Maria Bridge with a 65-foot minimum clearance, high level, fixed span bridge." The DOT representative added, referring to the fixed- span, high- level bridge: . . . We refer to this as the DOT preferred alternative. It has been said that you did not have the choices that you hear that others have. The public hearing that was held, several people in this room remember that were there about five years ago, presented many different alternatives at that time. In the normal course of a project development and environmental study allows us to go through many different alternatives, and through the weeding out process we then select a preferred alternative based on all of the elements that we can possibly get into in making this decision. We did that. The preferred alternative was chosen and what we have here tonight, for you tonight is the preferred alternative, two level, high level-- 2-lane, high level, fixed bridge. With that, we will now have the presentation. The professionally produced videotape features background music, narration, computer graphics, and skilled editing and cinematography. The videotape begins by stating that DOT has determined the "aging drawbridge to be functionally obsolete because it fails to meet current design standards and has no emergency shoulders for breakdowns." The narration explains that traffic congestion is compounded by bridge openings for marine traffic. The videotape generates an artificial tone of anxiety by fast editing of closeups of existing road traffic and the drawbridge warning light, then zooming in ominously on the warning light and chipped-away concrete revealing steel-reinforcing bars. The narrator tells the audience that these obsolete conditions led DOT to recommend replacing the bridge. As the videotape explains, "Several alternatives were considered when plans for upgrading the Anna Maria Island Bridge were made." The videotape identifies these alternatives as the no-build option, north alignment, and south alignment. The videotape states that the no-build alternative would require extensive and expensive repairs, including the complete renovation of the drawspan and extensive substructure, but this is not economically viable. A new bridge using the existing alignment would eliminate Manatee Avenue access to Anna Maria Island for two years. The north alignment would impact the nearby boat ramp and require a new navigational channel, which would destroy seagrass. The videotape reports that the preferred alternative is the south alignment, which "affects about one and one-half acres of seagrass" that "will be closely monitored." The videotape assures the viewer that the "Florida Department of Transportation is committed to minimizing impacts to the seagrass in the project area." The narration and block letters on the screen add: "The benefits of the recommended alignment constitute the most favorable balance of environmental concerns, welfare of the community and achieving the objective of providing a modern and effective bridge." The videotape mentions that drawbridges require regular openings to allow vessel passage. A computer-graphic rendering of the bascule opening shows the bridge opening quickly without a gate or warning lights, a bus suddenly stopping less than a bus length from the vertical bridge span, and a convertible car stopping quickly behind the bus with a second car immediately queuing up behind the delayed bus and car passengers. The videotape concedes that a mid-level bascule bridge would "alleviate much of the traffic delay," but warns that it is a "greater financial burden." The videotape states that the initial construction cost of a drawbridge would be $11.4 million, and the annual operation and maintenance costs of a drawbridge average at least $150,000 plus a $500,000 major repair job every 20 years. On the other hand, the videotape states that the cost of a fixed- span, high-level bridge would be $8.4 million, so the preferred alternative would save at least $3 million over the life of the project. The videotape displays a sailboat with a mast under 65 feet cruising under the proposed bridge just as emergency vehicles pass cars pulled over onto the spacious shoulder. To the extent of any implication that emergency vehicles could be delayed by an opened drawbridge, the videotape ignores the radio coordination that exists between such vehicles and the bridge tenders. The videotape next considers emergency evacuations. Noting that wave effects and flooding on approaches would more likely close a bridge than would high winds, the videotape warns of conflicts between marine vessels and vehicles during evacuations. This warning ignores the Coast Guard practice not to order bridge openings so as to interfere with evacuations and the effect of the need of islanders to get off the island early due to the flooding of island roads and bridge approaches, typically well in advance of the worst of the storm. Displaying photographs from the same perspective of the existing bridge and the proposed bridge superimposed by computer, the videotape assures that "the bridge blends gracefully with the surrounding area." One photograph depicting the proposed bridge was on display with a photograph displaying the existing bridge, both as seen from the east, slightly south of Manatee Avenue. The actual photographs were also on display at the public hearings. The obvious purpose of the two photographs was to encourage viewers to compare the two bridges. However, the comparison was distorted so as to underrepresent the size of the proposed bridge. The photograph of the proposed bridge was taken with a wide-angle lens with the sides cropped, which removed the distortion and extra field of vision accompanying a wide-angle photograph. Because the photograph of the existing bridge was taken with a normal lens, the photograph of the proposed bridge underrepresented its height and width by 20 percent relative to the height and width of the existing bridge. The videotape concludes: An aesthetically appealing and environmentally sound structure that safely spans the Intracoastal Waterway is the Department's goal. A bridge that blends with the unique ambience of this island paradise while guaranteeing Manatee County's residents and visitors safe and efficient travel is of paramount importance to us all. Though not unanimous, public comment at the public hearings was vastly against the proposed project. Figg and Muller summarized the comments by stating that 374 persons favored the project and 940 persons opposed the project. The most popular reasons against the new bridge were in descending order: environmental problems, high-level wind problems, accelerated development, bad aesthetics, and failure to solve evacuation problems. Among the oral or written comments were comments from an orthopedic surgeon who has lived in Holmes Beach for 24 years, opposed the proposed bridge, and said that the existing bridge had never been a problem in treating his patients on the mainland. The Manatee Chamber of Commerce supported the proposed bridge. The Mayor of the City of Anna Maria complained that DOT took its direction from the MPO, from which the island municipalities had been denied voting membership until late 1989 when they obtained one voting member. The mayor also complained of a bridge-by-bridge approach to bridge construction, rather than a regional plan addressing the uniqueness of the barrier island. Mr. Crim testified at the January 1996 formal hearing in this case that DOT's position at the October 1993 public hearings, compared to the August 1989 public hearing, was "even more defined." Unless "something significant" came up, DOT was "going to build the bridge that it had already planned." Mr. Crim testified that the only other viable option at the 1993 public hearings was the no-build alternative. After the public hearings on October 26 and 27, 1993, District Secretary May reported to the MPO, during its meeting of November 22, 1993, that comments were about 3-1 opposed to the bridge. The MPO voted 6-8 not to reconsider its support for the 75-foot-high bridge. 4. 1994-Present Following the October 1993 public hearings, Petitioners filed a petition with DOT in January 1994 challenging DOT's decision to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge. The procedural history of this case is set forth in the Preliminary Statement and is incorporated by reference. Between the October 1993 public hearings and the formal hearing in this case in January 1996, the MPO dropped the four-lane bridge from its 2020 needs plan based on updated traffic projections that indicate no need for the additional capacity. The needs plan continues to limit Manatee Avenue to two lanes east of the Anna Maria Island Bridge to 75th Street, which is substantially east of the bridge. At the January 1996 formal hearing, Mr. Crim was unaware that the MPO had dropped from its 2020 needs plan the four-laning of Manatee Avenue over Sarasota Pass. However, DOT policy is that once a project has reached a certain stage of development, which this proposed project has, it can only be stopped if both DOT and the MPO agree. As District Secretary May testified, DOT no longer begins the planning process with the MPOs, as it did here, but instead starts with local communities. But even if the MPO voted to eliminate the proposed project, District Secretary May intends for DOT to proceed with the fixed-span, high-level bridge because, by the January 1996 formal hearing, DOT had spent over $2 million on the proposed project. DOT acceded to an MPO request to stop the Cortez bridge- replacement project, but this action preceded District Secretary May's appointment. After more than two years of discussions with DOT following the Notice of Permit Denial, on May 2, 1995, DEP issued an Intent to Issue a dredge- and-fill permit for the demolition of the Anna Maria Island Bridge and construction of a fixed-span, high-level bridge on the originally proposed south alignment. Intervenors filed petitions with DEP in June and July 1995 challenging DEP's Intent to Issue the dredge-and-fill permit. After the formal hearing in December 1995 and issuance of a recommended order recommending that DEP deny the permit, DEP has not yet issued a final order. Ultimate Findings of Fact DOT's Exercise of Discretion in Deciding to Replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a Fixed-Span, High-Level Bridge The proposed project would permanently destroy 2.5 acres of seagrass and temporarily destroy 2.0 acres of seagrass. Proposed mitigation is vague, contingent, and ultimate illusory. Degradation of water quality is likely, and DOT never obtained the baseline water-quality data from which analysis must begin. The proposed project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered species and their habitats; adversely affect navigation on the Intracoastal Waterway for tall-masted boats currently using Sarasota Pass; and adversely affect fishing and recreation values by destroying vast areas of seagrass and removing the existing bridge as a popular area for fishing, bicycling, jogging, and walking. A permanent improvement, the proposed project would be sited in a productive marine environment performing crucial functions of feeding endangered manatee and other wildlife and cleaning Outstanding Florida Waters through nutrient assimilation and stabilization of sediments. The proposed project would poorly serve important cultural and aesthetic concerns expressed by an overwhelming majority of island residents, who would be uniquely affected by the proposed project. A large majority of the people of Anna Maria Island do not want the proposed bridge. The island-wide referendum conducted by the three municipalities in November 1992 reveals that opponents outnumber proponents by nearly a 4:1 margin. Some residents reject the bridge because they believe that it is only the first of two bridges, which would double the lanes onto the island and result in greater traffic on the island. DOT does not presently intend to build a second bridge, nor is the MPO seeking such a bridge at present. Some bridge opponents distrust DOT and the mainland-dominated MPO on this point, but the record does not indicate that such plans are presently under active consideration. Most if not all residents opposing the bridge focus on the height of the proposed bridge from the perspective of wind safety, but these concerns are largely ungrounded. However, the concerns of bridge opponents about the height of the proposed bridge extend beyond wind-safety issues. Some residents oppose the proposed bridge because they believe that it is unsuitable for their small island community. A high-level bridge would not permit fishing from anywhere but the extreme ends. Many area residents--many of whom are older persons--who walk, bicycle, or jog on the existing bridge would find the 4 percent grade and bridge height forbidding. It is difficult to see how a single six-foot sidewalk on the proposed bridge would better accommodate walking, bicycling, jogging, and fishing better than the two five-foot sidewalks on the existing bridge. Objections to the bridge height involve more than reduced access for nonmotorists. Except for one condominium permitted under prior law, nothing manmade on the island stands over 38 feet high. Bridge opponents claim that the size and appearance of the bridge would not blend well with the subdued appearance and casual ambience of their island. Bridge opponents prefer their timeworn drawbridge, which allows motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians to view the water just a few feet below them as they approach or leave the island. Better scaled to the island community, the drawbridge, occasionally interrupting vehicular traffic, provides a marked boundary between the island and the mainland. Such a boundary is less apparent from a wide expanse of new roadway across a fixed- span, high-level bridge, from which motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians would have little if any view or feeling of the water separating the island from the mainland. Most if not all bridge opponents resist the bridge as a dramatic alteration of the daily gateway to their community. These residents are trying to preserve the special lifestyle-- the pace and rhythm of their lives--that they sought in moving to the island in the first place. At the same time, the reasons for the proposed bridge are insubstantial. Interestingly, DOT recently completed the rehabilitation of the Cortez Bridge. Abandoning earlier plans to replace the bridge, DOT instead repaired and rehabilitated the drawbridge without widening the bridge or bascule spans. The Anna Maria Island Bridge has not proved unsafe over 37 years. Collisions on the bridge approaches are 50 percent more numerous than on the bridge itself. Superficial analysis of the accident data does not alter the fact that the bridge's accident rate is low. Most of the rear-end collisions on the bridge and bridge approaches are attributable to traffic backups from the Gulf Drive light and turns into the boat ramp on the west and convenience store and marina on the east. The drawbridge has not been a material cause of collisions on the bridge and bridge approaches, and the fixed-span, high-level bridge therefore would probably not reduce the number of collisions in this area. If vehicular safety were a problem on the Anna Maria Island Bridge, the sensible response would be to analyze the data carefully. If, for instance, numerous collisions were at night, DOT should considering adding street lights to the bridge. If, as is likely, most of the rear-end collisions are attributable to traffic backups, then DOT should consider the effects of lowering the speed limit through an increasingly congested area with boat ramps, a marina, and a convenience store. Perhaps such a study would present DOT an opportunity to revisit the wisdom of maintaining a 50-mile-per-hour speed limit on a road segment that, to the west, quickly ends at the Gulf of Mexico on a narrow barrier island with constrained and congested roads and, to the east, passes through increasingly urbanized areas. In promoting the proposed bridge, DOT has oversold the planning and design standards that arguably militate against the Anna Maria Island Bridge. In reality, these standards reveal that the decision to add shoulders is conditioned on consideration of numerous other factors, including the environmental, cultural, and aesthetic factors militating in favor of retaining the Anna Maria Island Bridge. DOT claims that the Anna Maria Island Bridge is functionally obsolete in large part due to the absence of shoulders or breakdown lanes on the bridge. Although the safety of a road segment is enhanced by the presence of breakdown lanes, the added margin of safety is not as great as DOT implies in this case. Countering suggestions of greater safety, the shouldered approaches to the bridge have experienced 50 percent more collisions than the unshouldered bridge. The record contains three sources of design standards for bridges: DOT's Index No. 700 or Design Criteria Related to Highway Safety, dated September 1991 (SAM Exhibit No. 123); Chapters 1 and 2 of Volume I of DOT's Plans Preparation Manual (SAM Exhibit No. 126); and the 1990 standards of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) (SAM Exhibit No. 105). The Plans Preparation Manual specifies that through lanes should be "as wide as practical, up to 12 feet." Index No. 700 specifies that clear widths for bridges with undivided travel lanes on urban arterials with design speeds of 30-50 miles per hour, such as this road segment, should be the "travel lanes plus approach shoulder widths." The introduction to Chapter 1 of the Plans Preparation Manual states that projects are normally based on established design standards for the various elements of the project, such as width of roadway . . .. Selection of the appropriate standards is influenced by traffic volume and composition, desired levels of service, terrain features, roadside developments, environmental considerations and other individual characteristics. Addressing the aesthetics of road projects, Chapter 1 states that the designer should consider, after functionality, how a highway will be perceived by users, ensuring that "[h]orizontal and vertical alignment should be coordinated so that a driver has an opportunity to gain a sense of the local environment." Notes to Index No. 700 stress the conditionality of the design standards. One note states: "Values shown above shall be used on all new construction and on reconstruction projects to the extent that economic and environmental considerations and [right-of-way] limitations will allow." Another note adds for clear zones: Standard values are to be used for all new construction projects. These values may be reduced only where individually justified to mitigate critical social, economic, and environ- mental impacts or to lessen right-of- way costs. Standard values are also to be used for recon- struction projects; however values down to AASHTO minimum may be used where individually justified due to critical social, economic and environmental impacts and/or excessive right-of-way costs or when existing roadside obstacles are not considered hazardous as evidenced by field review and by accident history or accident potential. AASHTO standards call for a minimum width of the travel lanes plus three feet per side. But AASHTO standards recognize that reasonably adequate bridges . . . that meet tolerable criteria may be retained. Some of the nontechnical factors that should be considered are the esthetic value and the historical signifi- cance attached to famous structures, covered bridges, and stone arches. The bridge approaches have eight-foot gravel shoulders, although no design shoulders. However, the design standards do not require bridge shoulders of eight feet or even three feet without consideration of environmental, aesthetic, social, and economic factors. After consideration of all the factors, the cited design standards do not mandate the widening of the existing bridge to add shoulders. As for the failure of the Anna Maria Island Bridge to meet current load standards for bridges, the AASHTO minimum design standard for new bridges "should be HS-20." The existing bridge is rated HS-15. However, the same conditions attach to the load standard of a bridge as apply to the presence and width of shoulders. HS-15 is a "tolerable" criterion. There is nothing in the record suggesting that the current load limit of the Anna Maria Island Bridge is unsafe. If DOT were concerned about the load capacity of the bridge, it would have imposed weight limits on the bridge. After consideration of all the factors, the design standards no more call for a new bridge to increase the load rating to HS-20 than they call for adding shoulders to the bridge. As for the failure of the Anna Maria Island Bridge to meet current ship-impact standards, the record does not clearly establish that the existing bridge fails to meet these standards. Even if it fails to meet these standards, the VE team itself recommended relaxing the H-20 bridge-impact standard outside of the channel, partly based on the faultless marine safety record of the bridge and the availability of alternative access to Anna Maria Island. Even DOT does not cite a 25 percent improvement in ship- impact resistance as a compelling reason, in isolation, for a new bridge. The Draft Preliminary Engineering Report contends that the Anna Maria Island Bridge should be replaced due to its low overall clearance. But the proposed bridge would effectively close the Intracoastal Waterway at Sarasota Pass to a growing number of sailboats that can presently navigate the pass. And there is no evidence that the 36 daily bridge openings unduly delay vehicular traffic, especially in view of the traffic delays already caused by the traffic light at Gulf Drive. The Final Preliminary Engineering Report adds two more reasons for replacing the Anna Maria Island Bridge. The first is the need to accommodate traffic increases. However, updated analysis has reduced traffic projections, and the proposed bridge is now clearly limited to two lanes in any event. The second reason cited in the Final Preliminary Engineering Report is "structural deficiency." There is absolutely no evidence in the record suggesting that the Anna Maria Island Bridge is structurally deficient. Nine months prior to this statement appearing in the Final Preliminary Engineering Report the VE team inspected the bridge and found it was in "good condition" with "no severe deterioration which would endanger the capacity of the bridge." Coming from engineers, the assertion that the bridge is "structurally deficient," without support or qualification, was irresponsible. The driving force behind DOT's decision to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge seems to be cost. DOT contends that it is less expensive to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge now than it is to rehabilitate and repair it for the remainder of its useful life. When built, the Anna Maria Island Bridge had a life expectancy of 50 years. The bridge remains in "good condition," and traffic demands on this segment of Manatee Avenue can be satisfied by two lanes for a period in excess of the remaining useful life of the bridge. DOT projects the cost of the new bridge at $8.4 million. However, DOT has spent $2 million without commencing construction and still has not identified aspects of construction that might be dictated by environmental concerns, such as the construction of work platforms or use of specialized demolition techniques. The $8.4 million figure is probably low. The $8.4 million projection for the proposed bridge is definitely low once environmental costs are considered. Perhaps incapable even of approximation as to lost seagrass beds, degraded water quality, and reduced wildlife, including manatee, environmental costs can be partly quantified in terms of lost recreational opportunities, property values, and business income in the event of degraded waterbodies and increased governmental expenditures to reverse environmental degradation. It is even more likely that DOT's cost figures for retaining the Anna Maria Island Bridge are high. DOT projects "minor" (i.e., without widening) rehabilitation costs for the Anna Maria Island Bridge as $2.0-$3.8 million. They are based on general experience, which has not proved reliable for this bridge. General experience suggests that a bridge of this type and vintage should have needed to be rehabilitated at 20 years; yet, 37 years later, still without such a rehabil- itation, the Anna Maria Island Bridge remains in good condition. The Anna Maria Island Bridge could benefit from a "minor" rehabilitation costing at least $500,000. This probably would be the only substantial rehabilitation required for the remaining useful life of the bridge. DOT typically replaces rather than rehabilitates when rehabilitation will cost at least 60 percent of the cost of replacement. If so, using DOT's numbers, replacement would not be indicated unless rehabilitation were to cost over $5 million. Several provisions in the state comprehensive plan tend to sustain DOT's decision to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high- level bridge. Three of these provisions are in the transportation section of the state comprehensive plan calling for transportation planning to manage growth, enhance system efficiency, and ensure efficient access to services, jobs, markets, and attractions. A provision in the public facilities section calls for planning and financing new facilities in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner. These provisions favor the new bridge only to the extent of a need for the new structure. Absent a need, some of these provisions, such as favoring timely and efficient planning of new facilities, actually militate against the new bridge because DOT could advance the funding of another, needed project if it did not spend the money on the replacement bridge. Arrayed against these provisions of the state comprehensive plan are numerous other provisions clearly disfavoring the new bridge. Some of these provisions are in the sections on transportation and public facilities. One provision admonishes that, in addition to enhancing system efficiency, it is also important to minimize adverse environmental impacts. Another transportation provision is to promote timely resurfacing and repair of roads and bridges to minimize costly reconstruction and enhance safety. A final applicable transportation provision is to avoid transportation improvements that encourage increased development in coastal high-hazard or productive marine areas. According to the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report, the proposed bridge "could foster economic development in the area," meaning the barrier island. Provisions in the section on public facilities are to protect substantial investments in already-existing public facilities and promote rehabilitation and reuse of existing facilities rather than commence new construction. Numerous provisions of the state comprehensive plan disfavor the new bridge on environmental grounds. Florida must ensure that development in coastal areas does not endanger important natural or marine resources and must protect and restore long-term productivity of marine fisheries habitat and other aquatic resources. Other provisions are to conserve wetlands, fish, and marine life to maintain their environmental, economic, aesthetic, and recreational values; to prohibit the destruction of endangered species and protect their habitats; and to protect and restore the ecological functions of wetlands systems to ensure their long-term environmental, economic, and recreational value. One provision explicitly links Florida's environmental health with its economic health by requiring that Florida maintain the environment as one of its primary economic assets. The proposed bridge project is inconsistent with the state comprehensive plan, taken as a whole. The proposed project disregards the requirements to rehabilitate and reuse existing facilities where possible, to avoid transportation improvements that encourage development in coastal high- hazard areas, and to repair and resurface roads and bridges in time to avoid more costly expenses. The inconsistencies between the proposed project and environmental provisions of the state comprehensive plan are evident. Another group of provisions disfavors on a different basis the decision to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with the new bridge. These provisions call for improved intergovernmental coordination, maximized citizen involvement, and encouraged citizen participation at all levels of policy development, planning, and operations. The record does not support a finding that DOT seriously addressed the various elements in the state comprehensive plan that must guide state agencies in their capital expenditures. In so doing, DOT undermined citizen participation in this important planning process. DOT and its consultants collected some environmental data, but too little, too late. Also, DOT never subjected the environmental data to detailed, careful analysis. Motivated by cost considerations, which offer scant support for the proposed bridge project, DOT sought to replace old drawbridges and wanted to replace them as inexpensively as was reasonably possible. In pursuing its drawbridge-replacement policy in this case, DOT did not assess sufficiently the relevant environmental, cultural, and aesthetic factors. This failure undermined citizen participation and the planning process itself. For instance, before collecting the detailed seagrass data in June and July 1992, DOT had already proceeded far into the planning for the present project, rejecting the no-build alternative, selecting the south alignment, and possibly selecting the fixed-span, high-level design. Yet, informed consideration by DOT and the public of all of the alternatives demanded early knowledge of the area and functions of seagrass to be destroyed by the project. The seagrass issue came as no surprise to DOT. Sarasota Pass is Outstanding Florida Waters. A DOT representative had warned other DOT representatives in July 1989 that they had not had much success with seagrass mitigation. Over a year earlier, at the very inception of this long planning process, Figg and Muller amply identified in its subconsulting contract with Peninsula the various environmental problems posed by this project. In early 1990, DER warned DOT about the importance of seagrass and mitigation. Yet, DOT elected to avoid federal environmental review by obtaining in mid-1990 a categoric exclusion on the basis that the proposed supposedly had no significant impact on any natural, cultural, or recreational resources and had no significant impact on water quality. Instead of seriously confronting the seagrass issue, Sverdrup twice tried to influence Figg and Muller and its subconsultant to understate the amount of seagrass that would be destroyed by the proposed project. These efforts are not merely unreasonable in retrospect, but were unreasonable at the time, as evidenced by the angry reaction of the Peninsula employee and the more businesslike resistance of Figg and Muller. The resulting atmosphere was not conducive to a vigorous investigation of environmental conditions and thoughtful analysis of the impact of the proposed alternatives on these conditions. DOT and its consultants never obtained much data that various parties demanded. When entering into the subconsulting contract with Peninsula, Figg and Muller required Peninsula to do an analysis of bottom sediments for heavy metal concentrations, but this was never done. In early 1990, DER warned DOT about the strict water-quality standards applicable to the project. Yet, DOT and its consultants never obtained vital water-quality data. Still in the first half of 1990, DEP recommended that DOT obtain a bathymetric survey, which DEP promised to review in detail at the permitting stage. But DOT and its consultants never obtained this crucial data either. In fact, it was not until two years later--after DOT had rejected the no-build alternative and south alignment, if not also the bascule designs--that Peninsula obtained seagrass data of the level of detail even approaching what DEP had sought. The treatment of manatee in the planning process was also inadequate. Omitted entirely from the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report, manatee were discussed in later documents. But at no time did any consultant address two distinct threats posed to manatee by the proposed project. First, the wider-spanned bridge would, as promised by the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report, enhance navigation for shallow-drafter boats by facilitating their bypassing of the channel and cutting under the bridge. In addition to destroying seagrass by prop dredging, small boats cutting under the bridge would threaten manatee feeding in shallow water in exactly the manner described in the Permit Coordination Package. Second, construction of the new bridge would effectively narrow the pass, which has already been constricted by fill placed when the Anna Maria Island Bridge was built. This would drive manatee into a narrower area within the channel and increase the chances of injury from collisions with boats. 335. More than once in this planning process, DOT and its consultants tried unreasonably to wring support for the proposed project from unfavorable data and analysis. Mr. Smith's attempts to coerce the analysis of seagrass losses is perhaps the most glaring example of this unfortunate treatment of data and analysis. Another Sverdrup representative discouraged independent analysis of new traffic data by Figg and Muller when he sent Figg and Muller a memorandum with the instructions to analyze and document the data "to reach the conclusions necessary to proceed with the project development." A more pervasive example of this practice is in the treatment of the accident data. In the Site Characteristics Report prepared at the end of 1988, the consultants noted the low accident rate of the Anna Maria Island Bridge and suggested reasonably that the high percentage of rear-end collisions might be due to traffic backups, which might be due to backups from the Gulf Drive traffic light, nearby left turns, or drawbridge openings. A month or two later, in the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report, Figg and Muller tried, without detailed analysis of accident reports, to limit the effects of the boat ramp, marina, convenience store, and traffic signal to rear-end collisions on the approaches and attribute rear-end collisions on the bridge to the opening of the drawbridge. A later reference in the draft report to accident data "for the existing facility" is misleading for its failure to differentiate between the bridge and the bridge approaches. By the August 1989 public hearing, the Figg and Muller representative was telling the public that the drawbridge openings were a cause of a "significant number" of rear-end collisions. No evidence supports this conjecture, which does not rise to the level of analysis. DOT and its consultants failed to substantiate other vehicular safety concerns when they failed to account for the coordination that exists between drawbridge openings and emergency vehicles and drawbridge openings and hurricane evacuation. Yet, DOT and its consultants continued to cite these nonissues, like they cited rear-end collisions, prominently in their arguments about functional obsolescence and safety, at least through the rejection of the no- build alternative in the Final Preliminary Engineering Report issued on November 1, 1989. At the formal hearing, DOT tried to bolster its safety arguments with two new arguments that are hopelessly anecdotal. DOT presented evidence that bridge tenders are susceptible to crime: a DOT witness testified that the shelter of a bridge tender in Dade County was pockmarked by numerous bullet holes. Another DOT witness testified that a bridge tender was crushed by the gears of a drawbridge he was trying to fix when the power company suddenly restored power after an outage. Neither narrative establishes widespread problems with drawbridges. There is nothing to suggest that a bridge tender on the Anna Maria Island Bridge must contend with drive-by shootings. If so, motorists and other users of the bridge might be safer if a bridge tender were available to telephone the police. The death of the bridge tender crushed by the drawbridge gears was tragic, but easily avoidable simply by shutting down the power to the bridge before working on it. Likewise, DOT tried at the formal hearing to support the functional- obsolescence argument by contending that the additional lanes would hasten evacuation efforts by the ability to convert to more lanes one-way east. But island evacuation does not require the addition of two shoulders that could be converted into travel lanes during evacuations. Successful evacuations have taken place with the existing bridge, whose two lanes can be used one-way east in emergencies. The two-lane bridge is not a bottleneck considering the two- lane facility to the east and the floodprone bridge approaches and island road system to the west. DOT's premature commitment to project implementation discouraged objective analysis of the data. Nor was DOT receptive to DEP's role in reviewing the proposed project. When DER withdrew its early objections to the Advance Notification Package in April 1990, it promised a more detailed review during permitting. But the Final Engineering Report in early 1991 sounded what proved to be an ominous note when it stated that, based on the agreement with DER, DOT had spent about $1 million of public funds on the completion of the PD&E process and final design of the new bridge. Not applying for permits when the design work was 65- 70 percent complete, as directed by the PD&E, DOT waited instead until August 1992, when the final design and construction plans for the project were 90 percent complete. When DEP expressed concern about the project, DOT, ignoring another opportunity to focus on the substantive environmental and public welfare issues, responded instead with an insubstantial estoppel argument and stern warning that "anything other than the issuance of a permit for the southern alignment is unacceptable." Not every transportation project will serve all provisions of the state comprehensive plan. Some planning processes and decisions may even conflict with more provisions of the state comprehensive plan than they serve, but still not conflict sufficiently with the entire state comprehensive plan, construed as a whole, to constitute an abuse of discretion. But in this case, the proposed project is marginally consistent with a few provisions and markedly inconsistent with numerous, material provisions of the state comprehensive plan. And the inconsistencies appear to be the direct result of the repeated failures of DOT and its consultants to collect necessary data and their repeated efforts to wring support from unsupportive data and analysis. These inconsistencies with the state comprehensive plan amount to an abuse of discretion in deciding to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with the fixed- span, high-level bridge. DOT's Compliance with the Statutory Requirement of Public Hearings, Including Effective Public Participation, Prior to Selecting, Locating, and Designing the Fixed-Span, High-Level Bridge The replacement of the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge is a major transportation improvement. The proposed bridge would cost millions of dollars, destroy 2.5 acres of seagrass permanently and 2.0 acres of seagrass temporarily, imperil manatee, and degrade Outstanding Florida Waters. The proposed project has generated considerable public controversy, which triggers the requirement of a public hearing in the PD&E manual. The proposed project is a "major transportation project," under the definition in the PD&E manual requiring an environmental impact study. Sverdrup's Project Concept Report calls the proposed project a "major bridge replacement project." DOT was amenable to public input on all issues at the February 1989 workshop, but there is no indication that DOT provided sufficient notice as to permit the public to participate effectively. DOT was clearly amenable to public input at the August 1989 public hearing as to the location of the proposed bridge. DOT still was in the formulative stage of deciding the alignment of any new bridge. DOT opted for the south alignment only after hearing public comments concerning the impact of the north alignment on navigation, recreation, and business. The notice for the August 1989 public hearing, though insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement for a design public hearing, was reasonable in that it was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of effective public participation. It is less clear that DOT had not, prior to the August 1989 public hearing, already selected the facility-type--namely, a new bridge over the no- build option. But Petitioners and Intervenors failed to show that DOT had in fact already made this decision before the August 1989 public hearing. DOT announced the rejection of the no-build alternative on November 1, 1989, in the Final Preliminary Engineering Report. Although Mr. Smith's June 13, 1989, memorandum to Figg and Muller recommended the rejection of the no-build alternative, Figg and Muller proved able to resist Sverdrup's suggestions as to seagrass losses, and other evidence does not point clearly to an earlier rejection of the no-build option. But the preponderance of the evidence establishes that, long prior to October 1993, DOT had selected and committed to the design of the new fixed- span, high-level bridge over such alternatives as a low-, mid-, or high-level bascule bridge. DOT representatives and consultants thought that they had already conducted the design public hearing four years earlier. Only in early 1993 did DOT decide to hold another design public hearing after reconsidering the legal sufficiency of the notice before the August 1989 public hearing. So, for at least three and one-half years, DOT and its consultants operated on the assumption that DOT had satisfied the requirement of a design public hearing and could proceed to the next step. It is unreasonable to expect, given DOT's strong commitment to project implementation, that the project did not proceed through design in these three and one-half years. DOT spent $1 million on planning and design for this project through the Final Engineering Report issued on November 1, 1989. If the total cost of the fixed-span, high-level bridge on the south alignment was to be $8.4 million and construction had not yet begun, one would infer that the $1 million covered a lot of the required design. By the formal hearing in January 1996, DOT had spent $2 million on the proposed bridge. Although part of that sum may have gone toward litigation expenses, most of it presumably went toward additional design and construction planning. Additional evidence that DOT selected the design prior to the October 1993 public hearings comes from two sources: the preparation of documentary milestones in the planning process and statements of DOT representatives. According to the PD&E manual, DOT issues the Final Engineering Report after the public hearings and selection of the recommended alternate. The Final Engineering Report, which was issued in late 1990 or early 1991, follows the approval by the Federal Highway Administration of the recommended alternative, according to the PD&E manual. According to the PD&E manual, DOT applies for permits when the project design is 65-70 percent done. In August 1991, DOT applied for permits after retaining Figg and Muller in mid-1991 to prepare final design and construction plans. All this time, the Draft Preliminary Engineering Report had all but eliminated bascule alternatives in February 1989. Public comments of DOT representatives disclose with greater certainty than milestone documentation the design progress on this project. As early as March 31, 1989, Sverdrup advised Figg and Muller not to do traffic calculations for bascule alternatives "since it is evident that the fixed high- level structure will be recommended due to lower overall cost." Later comments consistently portray the bridge design as finished or all but finished by the end of 1992 and start of 1993; there is no doubt that DOT had selected and committed to a design by this time. When DOT submitted the dredge-and-fill application in August 1992, final design and construction planning was 90 percent complete, according to Mr. Crim. On December 1, 1992, District Secretary May, sensing increasing community resistance to the proposed bridge, acknowledged local resistance to the "design" of the replacement bridge and directed Mr. Crim that "we will proceed with the fixed-span bridge concept as developed in the PD&E document. Please make every effort to render this project 'production ready' as rapidly as possible." On January 8, 1993, a DOT representative told MPO representatives that construction plans were 95 percent done and acquisition of right-of-way had begun. Referring to the new bridge, District Secretary May told a meeting of local government officials on January 19, 1993, that "it's been designed" as a fixed-span, high-level bridge. He stated that 100 percent of the design work was done and changing to a 45-foot bascule bridge would mean that DOT had thrown away $1 million on design work. According to Mr. Crim, the options at the October 1993 public hearing were the fixed-span, high-level bridge or the no- build alternative; the bridge design was thus no longer in doubt. DOT's misplaced reliance on the August 1989 public hearing as a design hearing did not preclude the possibility that DOT could have conducted a design public hearing at a later date with effective public participation. The key factual questions would be whether DOT had already decided upon a design and, if so, whether it had restarted the design-selection process so as to approach the curative public hearing with no precommitment toward the fixed- span, high-level design. It is unnecessary to explore in any detail what restarting the design selection process would entail. DOT could have approached the October 1993 public hearing differently than it approached other public hearings. DOT could have engaged the public, on the record, in a give-and-take analysis of the engineering, traffic, environmental, cultural, and other data. DOT could have abandoned its customary approach requiring the public to show an error, an omission, or changed conditions, or else DOT's tentative decision would become final. Instead, DOT approached the October 1993 public hearing, as Mr. Crim admitted, with an "even more defined" position than usual. Unless something "significant" came up at the hearing, the fixed-span, high-level bridge was going in. Presenting a blatantly promotional videotape and a distorted comparative photograph, DOT tried to rescue the $1-2 million it had invested in this project rather than risk a wide-ranging public discussion on the design of the proposed bridge with a meaningful exchange of information and analysis. The resulting burden placed on the public to change DOT's mind was inordinate, precluded effective public participation, and revealed DOT's commitment to the fixed-span, high-level design.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order cancelling the proposed project to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge with a fixed-span, high-level bridge. ENTERED on May 6, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 6, 1996. APPENDIX Rulings on Proposed Findings of Petitioners and SAM 1-5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6: same rulings as in prior recommended order except to extent of any contrary rulings in this recommended order. 7: adopted or adopted in substance, during the early part of the planning process. 8: adopted or adopted in substance, except as to the date of the public hearing. 9-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 18: rejected as irrelevant. 19-23: adopted or adopted in substance. 24: rejected as irrelevant. 25: adopted or adopted in substance. 26: adopted or adopted in substance, except as to author and recipient of memorandum. 27: rejected as unnecessary. 28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29-35: rejected as unnecessary. 36-37: adopted or adopted in substance. 38-41: rejected as subordinate. 42-43: rejected as irrelevant. 44: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 45-46: rejected as subordinate. 47-54: adopted or adopted in substance. 55: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 56: rejected as recitation of evidence. 57: rejected as subordinate. 58-63: adopted or adopted in substance. 64: rejected as subordinate. 65-66: adopted or adopted in substance. 67-79: rejected as subordinate. 80-83: adopted or adopted in substance. 84: rejected as recitation of evidence. The selection of the type of facility in this case is a bridge--specifically whether to build a new bridge or rehabilitate the old one. 85: adopted or adopted in substance. 86: adopted or adopted in substance, except that DOT did not select the facility-type (a bridge) and the site (the south alignment) until after the August 1989 public hearing. 87: rejected as not finding of fact. 88: adopted or adopted in substance. 89: rejected as unnecessary. It is only necessary to find that DOT selected the fixed-span, high-level design prior to the October 1993 design public hearings. 90-91: rejected as subordinate. 92: adopted or adopted in substance. 93: rejected as subordinate. 94-98: adopted or adopted in substance. 99: adopted or adopted in substance, but the approaches have actual, gravel shoulders of eight feet. 100: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 101-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 144: rejected as subordinate. 145: adopted or adopted in substance. 146-47: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 148-53: adopted or adopted in substance. 154-57: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 158-60: adopted or adopted in substance. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Intervenor VanWagoner Any proposed findings referring to statements of counsel that have been adopted were adopted because of evidence in the record supporting such findings. Counsel's statements are not support for such proposed findings because these statements are not evidence. Any proposed findings referring to views taken by the undersigned that have been adopted were adopted because of evidence in the record supporting such findings, such as road maps. 1-11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12: rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. 13: adopted or adopted in substance, as to removal of four- laning project from MPO needs plan. 14: rejected as speculative. 15: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, as to safety being an issue. 16: adopted or adopted in substance. 17: rejected as subordinate, except as to a design change. 18: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 19-20: rejected as subordinate. 21 (first sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 21 (remainder): rejected as recitation of evidence. 22-24: rejected as unnecessary. 25: adopted or adopted in substance. 26-27: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 28-33: rejected as recitation of evidence. 34-37: adopted or adopted in substance. 38: rejected as recitation of evidence. 39: adopted or adopted in substance, except that proposed finding as to disclosure is rejected as unnecessary. 40-43: rejected as subordinate. 44: adopted or adopted in substance. 45-47: rejected as recitation of evidence. 48: adopted or adopted in substance. 49: rejected as unnecessary. 50-51: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 52-53: adopted or adopted in substance. 54-64: rejected as subordinate. 65-66 (first paragraph): rejected as recitation of evidence. 66 (remainder): adopted or adopted in substance. 67-70: rejected as recitation of evidence. 71: adopted or adopted in substance. 72-73: rejected as subordinate. 74: adopted or adopted in substance. 73 (second 73)-75: rejected as not findings of fact. 76: adopted or adopted in substance. 77 (first clause): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 77 (second clause): adopted or adopted in substance. 78: adopted or adopted in substance. 79-80: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 81-83: rejected as not findings of fact. 84: adopted or adopted in substance. 85: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 86: adopted or adopted in substance. 87: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Proposed Findings of DOT 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance except for the date of construction. Most references in the DOT documentation are to 1959, although there are some references to 1957. 3 (first two sentences): adopted or adopted in substance. 3 (last sentence): rejected as subordinate. 4-13: adopted or adopted in substance. 14: adopted as to 4 percent grade, but rejected as irrelevant as to remainder. 15: rejected as subordinate. 16 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. (second sentence): rejected as subordinate. (first sentence): rejected as subordinate. 17 (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 18-21: adopted or adopted in substance. 22-24: rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. 25-26 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 26 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 27: adopted or adopted in substance. 28: adopted or adopted in substance, except that there are conditions attached to the standard criteria. Also, replacement remains a factual determination requiring consideration of all the circumstances. 29: adopted or adopted in substance. 30: adopted in the sense that the decision to replace the Anna Maria Island Bridge accompanied the PD&E process. 31 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 31 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 32-34: adopted or adopted in substance. 35: rejected as subordinate, irrelevant, or unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 36-39: adopted or adopted in substance, except as to no foregone conclusions reached as a result of DOT's studies, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 40-53: adopted or adopted in substance. 54: adopted or adopted in substance, except the public lacked effective participation in the February 1989 workshop because of lack of notice and lack of factual background. If the references to "workshop" are to the August 1989 public hearing, this format too leaves something to be desired as to effective public participation given the refusal of DOT and consultant representatives to engage in any give-and-take with member of the public except off the record during the break and the refusal to discuss anything but the project under consideration. 55-60: adopted or adopted in substance. 61: adopted or adopted in substance, except willingness to continue with public involvement is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 62: adopted or adopted in substance. 63 (first two sentences): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 63 (third sentence): adopted or adopted in substance, as the sole reason for the October 1993 public hearings. 64-65 (first sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 65 (remainder)-68: adopted or adopted in substance. 69: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence; the fixed-span, high-level bridge was the selection, not merely a preferred alternative. 70-71: adopted or adopted in substance. 72 (first sentence): rejected as irrelevant. District Secretary May does not need to attend the public hearings or remain in the hearing room during the public hearings, if he attends. If he is to be involved in the decision, he needs only to familiarize himself with the public comments. 72 (second sentence)-74: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 75: rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. 76: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 77-78: rejected as subordinate. 79: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, although cost was a major factor in the design decision, whenever it was actually made. 80: rejected as subordinate. 81-82 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 82 (second and third sentences): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 82 (fourth sentence): adopted or adopted in substance, although this projection is probably too low. 83-84: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 85-87: adopted or adopted in substance, as recitals of DOT's reasoning-- not as persuasive reasoning under all of the circumstances. 88: adopted or adopted in substance, as recital of Final Preliminary Engineering Report. 89: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 90: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 91-92 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 92 (last sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 93-94 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 94 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 95: adopted or adopted in substance. 96: adopted or adopted in substance, as recital of DOT's thinking. 97: adopted or adopted in substance. 98: adopted or adopted in substance, except as to not meeting design standards. 99: adopted or adopted in substance, as recital of DOT's thinking. 100-04: rejected as irrelevant. 105: adopted or adopted in substance, as recital of thinking of these individuals. 106: rejected as repetitious. 107: adopted or adopted in substance. 108 (first sentence): rejected as irrelevant. 108 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 109: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 110: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 111: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 112: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 113 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 113 (second sentence): rejected as irrelevant and as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 114-16: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 117 (except second sentence): rejected as subordinate. (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. (first sentence): rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 118 (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 119: rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. 120: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 121 (first clause): adopted or adopted in substance. 121 (remainder): rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. 122-26: adopted or adopted in substance. 127-28: adopted or adopted in substance. 129-30: rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. 131 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 131 (remainder)-32: rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. 133 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 133 (remainder): rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, Mail Station 58 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 David M. Levin Icard Merrill 2033 Main Street, Suite 600 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Paul Sexton Chief, Administrative Law Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Francine Ffolkes, Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert E. VanWagoner Post Office Box 4121 Anna Maria, Florida 34216 Christine C. Stretesky, Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Leamington (Petitioner herein), is a road maintenance and construction contractor doing business since approximately 1985. John Hummell is Petitioner's President and is responsible for all bids submitted for contract awards. Petitioner contracts primarily with the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent herein). Since 1985, Petitioner has entered into approximately forty-one (41) contracts with Respondent. Petitioner was one of seven bidders on State Job #17030-3536, Contract E-1706, let by Respondent in District I. Respondent notified Petitioner of its decision to award the bid to the second lowest bidder, Simco, by notice posted on April 19, 1993 stating that Leamington's bid was rejected because it was considered not to be responsible and was not in the best interest of the Department (to contract with Leamington). The work in question involves the repairs of the bridge located at SR- 789 at Little Ringling Causeway west of Sarasota in Sarasota County. The work entails removal and replacement of silicone sealant on the bridge deck and replacement and rejacketing of piling with grout epoxy. The bid tabulations revealed that Petitioner's bid was approximately $500.00 less than that of the second lowest bidder, Simco, Inc., of Sarasota. The Department has a procedure called the "district contracts procedure". Part of the procedure calls for the awards committee to review bids and determine who the bid should be awarded to. The awards committee, which was chaired by Glenn Ivey, the District Director of Operations, reviewed the bid submitted for project E-1706. The awards committee voted unanimously to reject Leamington's bid on Contract E-1706. The decision to reject Petitioner's bid, by the awards committee, was based on Petitioner's performance on its more recent Department contracts. Specifically, the awards committee considered projects E-1649, for sidewalk repair in several counties; contract E-1545, a concrete repair job in Lakeland; and contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair job. Leamington's contract on the concrete repair job (E-1545) was rated as being poor when Leamington was, in effect, asked to leave the job. Based on Leamington's poor workmanship and difficulties encountered on that contract, Respondent terminated work on the contract after approximately sixty percent (60 percent) of the work was completed. The remainder of that project was completed by another contractor. Specifically, Job No. E-1545 called for Petitioner to remove and replace portland concrete slabs on Memorial Boulevard in Lakeland. Petitioner failed to restore the concrete slabs to a smooth surface, making it necessary for Respondent to have the slabs ground such that motorists had a smooth driving surface. After several warnings, Respondent cancelled the project and, as noted, approximately forty percent (40 percent) of the work was completed by another contractor. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair contract. On that project, Petitioner was advised that the shoulder had to be graded at a certain angle and was shown, by several of Respondent's engineers, the proper manner in which to accomplish the task. Petitioner failed to grade the shoulder at the correct angle as requested. Petitioner also routinely failed to provide proper traffic control during the performance of Contract E-1652 and frequently disputed Respondent's employees advice as to work instructions and ways to eradicate the poor workmanship on that project. Additionally, Petitioner failed to use skilled workers and did not have ample equipment on the job to perform the work on Contract E-1652. Initially, Petitioner had limited equipment at the beginning of the work on Contract E-1652. After Petitioner received a letter from Respondent advising that there wasn't adequate equipment to complete the project, Petitioner obtained additional equipment. The Department terminated Petitioner's work under Contract E-1652 because Petitioner had approached the contract deadline for completion and due to of the numerous problems the Department experienced with Petitioner in getting the work completed acceptably. Bobby Cranford, the Assistant Maintenance Engineer for the Petitioner's Sarasota Maintenance Unit, recommended that Petitioner not be awarded any more roadway shoulder repair contracts based on the difficulties experienced by Petitioner's "poor" workmanship on contract E-1652. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Petitioner's work performance on Contract E-1649, a sidewalk repair job which encompassed several counties. Petitioner did not have the required personnel and expertise to perform the sidewalk job correctly. Petitioner was kept informed of deficiencies and necessary corrections to correctly perform the sidewalk repair job, however, the proper repairs have not been made. The Respondent introduced a composite of twenty-three (23) photos showing the extent of the problems Petitioner needed to correct the sidewalk repairs with notes as to the corrective action that was needed. Specifically, Petitioner used little expansion joint materials and no edging tools were utilized on the project. Similar problems were found throughout the four county area in which Petitioner was engaged on the sidewalk project. By letter dated May 13, 1993, Respondent advised Petitioner of the numerous problems on contract E-1649. Specifically, Petitioner's President was told of visual inspections which showed substandard work on the original work as well as the work wherein Petitioner attempted to correct deficiencies which were discovered by Respondent. For example, Petitioner was advised that at 506 First and Main Streets in Wachula, there were sections of concrete sidewalk removed and scheduled for replacement with adjacent sections now damaged. Petitioner was further advised that workers had driven trucks on the sidewalk damaging several slabs not marked for replacement. Finally, Petitioner was asked to correct broken sprinklers at the work site and to resolve a claim filed by a Mrs. Campbell, which was registered with Respondent. The awards committee also relied upon an independent inspection report prepared by Bobby Cranford. That report is a forty (40) page report citing numerous deficiencies on the sidewalk repair project. Respondent requires that contractors employ english speaking superintendents at each work site to assist in communicating with its inspectors. Petitioner utilized superintendents who did not speak english and thereby created a language barrier making communication difficult with Respondent's personnel. Respondent had to monitor Petitioner's projects extensively and at a cost which increased the Department's overhead disproportionately when compared to other projects let to other district contractors. Based on a review of Respondent's work on Petitioner's recent contracts, no other contractors performing contracts in District I had a performance record as poor as Petitioner. When the awards committee made its decision to reject Petitioner's bid on the subject contract, it also relied on a memorandum from , Wally Clark, a District I attorney. In the memorandum it was concluded that Petitioner had subcontracted work to Hummell, Inc., a separate entity and that the required prior written approval of the subcontracting had not been obtained from Respondent. The investigation also revealed that the subcontractor, Hummell, Inc., had not been paid for its services (by Petitioner). An internal audit also prepared by Wall revealed that Hummell, Inc. was an unpaid subcontractor of Petitioner. The awards committee also considered allegations from Phillip Spears, a subcontractor of Petitioner, who had not been paid for work performed on Respondent's contracts. The committee also considers a newspaper article which stated that Petitioner was under investigation by local law enforcement officials for failure to pay subcontractors on the Interstate 75 project. Dennis Hall is the District Investigator for District I. Hall accompanied Wall, the author of the internal audit report, on investigations and interviews in compiling the audit report. One of the persons interviewed by Wall and Hall was Larry Zavitz. Zavitz was an inspector employed by Petitioner in excess of twenty- eight (28) years and had performed the inspection on Petitioner's sidewalk repair project under Contract E-1649. During the interview of Zavitz, he admitted to receiving a loan of $1,000.00 from John Hummell which Zavitz had not fully repaid at the time of the interview. Upon Zavitz admission of accepting the loan, he was asked and later resigned from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's protest of the rejection of its bid on Contract E-1706 be rejected and the Department enter its award of the subject contract to the second lowest responsible bidder, Simco, Inc. of Sarasota. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Haydon Burns Building 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William H. Roberts, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Michael E. Riley, Esquire 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact (Because the Petitioner's findings of fact were not numbered, a number has been assigned to each paragraph beginning with the first paragraph of page 1). Partially adopted in findings of fact 5, 6, 8 and 9. The proposed finding that "the Petitioner continuously notified her employer of her medical condition by telephone" is rejected as misleading and not supported by competent substantial evidence. The proposed finding that the Petitioner was released on August 31, 1985 with physician's instructions to "go home and have complete bed rest" is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in findings of fact 4, 11, and 19. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading and/or a recitation of testimony. Covered in conclusions of law section. Rejected as legal argument. Partially adopted in findings of fact 4, 6, 7 and 15. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in findings of fact 4 and 7. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Matters not contained therein are rejected as recitation of testimony. Adopted in findings of fact 11, 12, 13 and 14. RULINGS ON PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT (None submitted)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Department of Administration enter a final order re- instating Petitioner to her position as a toll collector at the Mathews Bridge toll facility in Jacksonville, Florida; and It is further Recommended that Petitioner's request for back pay and benefits from September 17, 1985 be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of March, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administration Hearings this 21st day March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esq. Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Brenda Washington 28 West 28th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Sharon A. Hood Staff Representative AFSCME, Florida Council 79 6308 N. Main Street Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Richard L. Ropel, Esq. Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kathryn L. Ward, Esq. 345 S. Magnolia Drive Suite F-21 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda H. Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens, Esq. General counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's operation of an overweight truck over the low-limit bridge involved herein is a violation and if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Transportation was the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutes involving commercial carrier and truck vehicle weights on covered vehicles operated on the streets and highways of this state. It does so through its Office of Motor Carrier Compliance staffed with uniformed certified law enforcement officers who have the authority to conduct random safety and compliance inspections of commercial vehicles being operated in this state. The parties agree that on August 8, 1991, Respondent, P.J. Constructors, Inc. was prime contractor to the Petitioner, Department of Transportation for the removal and replacement of a highway bridge over the Florida Turnpike where it intersects with Hood Road in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. At the time in issue, Respondent was operating a 1981 MAC tractor trailer low boy on which it was transporting a piece of heavy construction equipment. At the time in issue, Officer Neff stopped the vehicle for crossing over this bridge which was clearly posted as having a maximum weight limit for tractor trailers of 15 tons, (30,000 pounds). Following standard Department weighing procedures measuring weight at each axle and combining those weights to arrive at a total, and using portable Department scales which are calibrated every 6 months for accuracy, Officer Neff determined the vehicle weight at 54,800 pounds. This was 24,800 pounds over the legal weight and resulted in a penalty assessment of $1,240.00 at 5 per pound of overweight. The approaches to this bridge were clearly marked at several locations with signs indicating the maximum weight permitted for this type vehicle was 15 tons. These signs were located at sites which were far enough away from the bridge to give a driver ample notice of the restrictions and ample opportunity to turn around or to take an alternate route over roads situated between the signs and the bridge. In addition to the signs, however, earlier the same day, as warnings were issued to users of the bridge who were going to a construction site on the other side, Respondent's driver was specifically told of the bridge's low limits and advised of an alternate route to avoid it. Admittedly, the alternate routes would be longer than the route over the bridge, but no evidence as presented by either party as to how much the difference was. Respondent's General Manager, Mr. McAllester, claims the signs were not in position on the two occasions he visited the site during the bid process in February or March, 1991. He cannot say that he knew where the signs might have been located (away from the site), but avers only that he did not see any. However, officer Neff specifically checked to see that the signs were in place before issuing the citation on August 8, 1991 and it is, therefore, found that the signs were properly in place on that date. Mr. McAllester also urges in the alternative, however, that even if the signs were in place, as contractor on the bridge replacement project, the terms of the bid specifications, which directs contractors from operating equipment in excess of the maximum weights set out by law, exempts the contractor where the existing road or bridge is to be removed as a part of the work included in the project. The bridge in issue here was removed and replaced as a part of the project on which Respondent was contractor and the current bridge has no limit. Mr. McAllester admits that when the instant citation was issued, Respondent had no special permit to cross the bridge with an excess load. Once the citation was issued, however, Respondent quickly retained an engineer to do a structural analysis of the bridge in issue. Based on that analysis, Respondent thereafter sought and obtained permission to cross the bridge with an overload provided all other traffic was stopped on Hood Road while the excessively laden vehicle was on the bridge so it would be the only vehicle thereon at the time, and provided that vehicle kept to the center of the road while on the bridge. Subsequent to the citation and before the permit was issued, Respondent did not operate any excessively laden vehicles on the bridge. Respondent admits that at the time the citation was issued, there was traffic operating both on the Turnpike and on Hood Road. Therefore, a potential danger to the public existed. Nonetheless, traffic was maintained on both roadways throughout the entire project without incident. None of the weight limits or a need to maintain weight standards was discussed at the pre-bid conference, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a civil fine in the amount of $1,240.00 against the Respondent. P.J. Constructors, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Foster McAllester Vice President and General Manager P.J. Constructors, Inc. 4100 S.W. 70th Court Miami, Florida 33155 Ben G.Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel ]Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in this administrative proceeding is whether the Florida Department of Transportation’s ("DOT" or "the Department") denial of Petitioner’s, Network Engineering Services, Inc. d/b/a Bolton Perez & Associates ("BPA"), 2019 application for qualification pursuant to section 337.105, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-75, was for good cause due to Petitioner’s participation in the construction of the Florida International University ("FIU") City Prosperity Project ("FIU Bridge project").
Findings Of Fact DOT is the state agency responsible for coordinating the planning, construction, and maintenance of a safe, viable, and balanced state transportation system. DOT relies on qualified contractors and professional consultants to provide services for Florida’s transportation needs. Section 287.055(3), Florida Statues, requires that any firm or individual desiring to provide professional services to a governmental agency must first be certified by the agency as qualified, pursuant to law and the regulations of the agency. The agency must find that the firm or individual to be employed is fully qualified to render the required service. Among the factors to be considered in making this finding are the capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, and experience of the firm or individual. Each agency is also required to evaluate professional services, including capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, and experience of the firm or individual. Section 337.105 and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-75 also governs the qualifications of professional consultants and other contractual services providers to DOT. Section 337.105 authorizes DOT to deny or suspend an application for qualification based upon a determination of "good cause," which includes, but is not limited to, nine illustrative examples specified in section 337.105(1)(a)–(i). DOT may, for good cause, deny or suspend for a specified period of time a person or firm from consideration for award of a professional service contract for a particular type of work. BPA is a multidiscipline engineering firm specializing primarily in transportation related engineering services, including bridge design, roadway design, civil works, construction engineering inspection ("CEI"), and program and construction management. At the time of the hearing, BPA had approximately 38 employees. BPA was formed by Joaquin "Jake" Perez, P.E., and John Bolton, P.E., in 1997 to provide transportation-related engineering services. BPA’s CEI qualifications are independent from, and do not necessarily mirror, BPA’s design qualifications. In some instances, BPA was qualified to serve as a CEI for categories of structures that the firm was not qualified to design. This is because BPA was internally divided into two core groups: design and CEI. Since inception, BPA’s design group was and continues to be headed by Mr. Perez, and the CEI group headed by Mr. Bolton. The operations of BPA’s CEI and design groups were completely segregated within the firm. CEI personnel did not work on design projects, and design personnel did not work on CEI projects. As President, Mr. Perez was involved in pursuing contracts for CEI services, but CEI services were provided only by CEI personnel. In or about 1999 or 2000, BPA first became qualified to respond to DOT’s request for qualifications to provide professional services to DOT. Mr. Bolton qualified the firm to provide CEI services, and Mr. Perez qualified it to provide design services. BPA remained qualified with the Department on an annual basis for both CEI and design work for nearly 20 years until July 2019. At that time, DOT issued a NOID removing BPA from consideration for award of professional service contracts with DOT for 2019- 2020. DOT issued the NOID based solely upon a report issued by OSHA and the investigation of NTSB regarding the collapse of the FIU Bridge project on March 15, 2018. THE FIU PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE PROJECT In 2014, DOT entered into a Local Agency Program ("LAP") Agreement with FIU for its pedestrian bridge project, a Category II, complex bridge, that would be constructed along Southwest 109th Avenue and Southwest 8th Street in the City of Sweetwater, Florida (the "project"). As the supervising agency of the LAP program, DOT was responsible for supervising and authorizing work by the local agency. The design of a Category II structure required an independent peer review by a firm with no other involvement in the project, which was prequalified with DOT. In September 2016, FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc. ("FIGG"), the Engineer of Record ("EOR") for the project, hired Louis Berger to review FIGG’s plans for bridge foundation, substructure (end bents and center tower), and superstructure. Those plans included construction sequencing (including construction sequence drawings), the covered main span pre-casting, transport of main span, and placement of the main span between end bent 1 (south pier) and the pylon pier. The plans also included the post-tensioning stressing and destressing sequences. As the Local Agency, FIU was in responsible charge of the day-to-day activities, including project safety issues. Alfredo Reyna, P.E., was the Department’s LAP Coordinator for the project. Mr. Reyna is a licensed professional engineer, although he is not a structural engineer. In January 2016, FIU entered into a design-build contract1 with Munilla Construction Management, LLC ("MCM"), to design the bridge and to perform all work and furnish all materials, equipment, supplies, and labor necessary to construct the project. The bridge was designed by FIGG, a member of the MCM design-build team and the EOR. FIGG is a reputable designer who has been recognized internationally for its work. FIGG has experience in designing complex bridges, such as the Sunshine Skyway Bridge near Tampa, Florida. On September 23, 2016, FIU entered into a Standard Professional Services Agreement with BPA for CEI services (the "CEI Contract"). At the 1 The interaction of the local agency, contractor, designer, EOR, DOT, and the CEI is different between a "conventional" and a "design build" bridge project. In a conventional project, the designer is hired by DOT or owner to create a new bridge. The design goes through a review process at DOT and a final set of plans goes to bid for a contractor. By the time the contractor is selected, the EOR has completed the plans. The EOR is essentially "on call" for the construction phase of the project because the design work is complete. The CEI begins its work when the contractor begins construction. If there is a question in the field, the CEI makes a request for information from the EOR. DOT supplies design and construction managers throughout the process. In contrast, for a "design build" project, the owner has a conceptual plan for the project. The designer and contractor bid for the job based on the preliminary conceptual plan. The Designer/EOR and contractor work hand in hand from the beginning of the project and are in constant communication. The CEI begins work when the contractor starts work on the project. The CEI facilitates the resolution of any issues between the EOR/designer and the contractor who continue to plan throughout the duration of the project. Like a conventional build project, DOT has construction managers and design project managers involved from the beginning of the project. If concrete cracking occurs, it is the CEI's obligation to document the cracking and speak to people in the process who can assess and address the cracking. For a conventional build bridge, if cracking is observed, the CEI documents it, copies DOT, and sends it to the EOR for assessment. The EOR provides an assessment by conducting a site visit. The EOR then prepares an Engineering Assessment Report (EAR) for the project team. In a design build bridge job, if cracks are observed, they are documented by the CEI who notifies the EOR. The EOR, who is already on the job site, assesses the cracks and works with the contractor to devise a solution. time, John Bolton was the CEI qualifier for BPA. As CEI, BPA was to act as the liaison between the project owner (FIU) and the contractor (MCM). The CEI handles quality control, materials, schedules, payments, documents the entire process, and monitors the project. Jose Morales, P.E., worked under John Bolton as the Senior Project Engineer for the project. Mr. Morales first obtained his professional engineer’s license in 2006. He had approximately 12 years of CEI experience at the time of the collapse. Although he was the Senior Project Engineer for the project, Mr. Morales had little-to-no design experience. Mr. Morales was first involved in the early stages of pursuing the CEI Contract for the project. After the project was awarded, BPA was not involved in the design phase, but was later brought back into the fold beginning in October 2016, when BPA received the Notice to Procced and fully staffed its CEI scope of services when construction was scheduled to begin in or about March of 2017. The "Scope of Services" section (Exhibit B) to the CEI Contract required BPA to be prequalified with the Department in the following work categories: Work Type 10.1--Roadway CEI; Work Type 10.4--Minor Bridge and Miscellaneous Structures CEI; and Work Type 10.5.1--Major Bridge CEI- -Concrete. For the FIU bridge project, Categories 10.1 and 10.4 were considered to be the "major" type of work while 10.5.1 was considered to be the "minor" type of work. As expressly permitted by the Standard Professional Services Agreement, BPA satisfied the 10.5.1 prequalification requirement through its sub-consultant, The Corradino Group, Inc. ("Corradino"). BPA’s scope of services for the project did not include any design responsibilities. BPA performed constructability review of the plans as part of its CEI scope of work, but it did not review the plans or drawings on a technical level. The FIU bridge was a Complex Category II structure as defined by the Department’s Design Manual. The structure had a unique, complex design that was meant to be a signature, architectural feature for the area. The relevant construction sequence for the main span (Span 1) of the FIU bridge consisted of: casting the main span superstructure in the casting yard; installing post-tension bars in the diagonal and vertical members of the structure; stressing of the main-span post-tensioning while the main span is in the casting yard; removing the temporary formwork and supports; transporting the main span from the casting yard using a self- propelled modular transporter and placing the structure in a "simply supported" condition on the south pier and pylon pier; and de-tensioning truss members 2 and 11. Generally, cracks in concrete are common and are not, in and of themselves, a cause for concern. On a design-build job, when cracks manifest themselves in a concrete element, the CEI must document the cracking and report it to the design-build team, which includes the EOR. Depending on the nature of the cracks, the CEI may request an EAR from the EOR. This process is set out in section 400, subsection 400-21, of DOT’s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (the "Standard Specifications"). DOT's Construction Project Administration Manual ("CPAM") includes the procedures to be followed by a CEI in addressing cracks in concrete. The CPAM requires that the CEI identify and document its observations and convey the information to the EOR for a final disposition as to the potential danger of the crack or the need for further evaluation. The FIU Bridge Cracking and Inspections by BPA On or about February 6, 2018, while Span 1 of the bridge was still in the casting yard, BPA became aware of certain cracks that had developed in the structure. Mr. Morales personally inspected the structure after the tendons on truss members 2 and 11 were stressed, and he noted that cracks had developed in other locations on the bridge. The cracks observed were very small, approximately 0.004 of an inch wide. On February 13, 2018, BPA submitted Crack Report #1 to MCM, FIU, and Corradino, documenting the cracks that had developed in the concrete truss members after completing the post-tensioning operations in the casting yard. Despite the small size of the cracks, BPA requested that the EOR provide an assessment of the cracks. FIGG, the EOR, responded to BPA’s request by stating that the current condition observed was temporary in nature and that the cracks were not an issue. BPA exercised independent professional judgment when it exceeded the requirements of section 400 of the Standard Specifications and the CPAM by documenting and reporting these initial cracks. In late February 2018, before the placement of the main bridge span on the permanent pylon and south pier supports, cracks were observed in certain truss members. BPA prepared and submitted Crack Report #2 to FIU and MCM on February 28, 2018, documenting the size and location of these cracks and requested that FIGG evaluate the cracks and provide a disposition. In its report, BPA called attention to certain cracks that were significant in size. As CEI, BPA was not qualified to determine whether these larger cracks posed an imminent danger of collapse. Further, BPA’s design team was not involved in the design of the bridge and was not qualified to evaluate these cracks from a design engineering perspective due to the category and complexity of the bridge. At this point, the cracks were not "structural" as defined by Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. Cracks more than one-half inch in depth are deemed "structural" and trigger the obligation of the CEI to notify the EOR. Nevertheless, BPA, again, exercised its independent professional judgment above and beyond the requirements of the Standard Specifications and CPAM by requesting that the report be forwarded to the EOR and requesting that the EOR provide a response and disposition of the cracks. On March 7, 2018, FIGG replied to Crack Report #2, stating, in part, that the cracks appeared small, that they were not concerned about these types of cracks in the particular region shown in the report, and that MCM would need to seal the cracks in accordance with the Department’s specifications. As the EOR, FIGG did not have any structural concerns regarding the cracks in Crack Report #2. On March 7, 2018, FIGG representatives were on site and observed the cracks referenced in Crack Report #2. After observing the cracks, FIGG did not delay the bridge movement that was scheduled to take place three days later on March 10th. As of March 8, 2018, BPA had no concerns regarding the integrity of the structure or public safety because the EOR had looked at the cracks in- person and assured the project team that the cracks were not a safety issue or structurally significant. These assurances came two to three days prior to the bridge being moved over Southwest 8th Street and placed on the permanent pylon and pier supports. The bridge movement was not delayed due to the cracks observed by the EOR. On March 10, 2018, Span 1 was moved from the casting yard and placed on the permanent pylon and south pier supports. After the placement and de-tensioning of diagonal members 2 and 11, cracks began to appear at the construction joint of diagonal 11, the deck, and at the top of diaphragm II. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 13, 2018, two days before the collapse, BPA circulated a draft of Crack Report #3 to MCM, recommending further monitoring and documenting of the cracks to determine whether they were active or dormant, and requesting that BPA be informed of the outcome of the EOR’s EAR and course of action. At 5:18 p.m. on March 13, 2018, the EOR responded to MCM with additional recommendations and stated "[a]gain, we have evaluated this further and confirmed that this is not a safety issue." Because BPA’s design team was not involved in the project, no BPA design personnel were aware of the documented cracking on the structure until sometime after Crack Report #3 was generated. At that time, Mr. Morales provided Mr. Perez with a copy of a draft of Crack Report #3. Mr. Perez briefly reviewed the draft report and confirmed with Mr. Morales that the CEI team had elevated the issue to the EOR. At all times in the documented communication relating to the cracks, the EOR and members of the FIGG design team represented to BPA that the cracks were not a safety concern, without reservation. Starting on March 13, 2018, FIGG directed MCM to implement an initial, temporary measure to address observed cracking in the member 11/12 nodal region. At that time, BPA was not aware of this communication between the EOR and the contractor. To restore the temporary support conditions when the structure was in the casting yard, MCM placed shims between diaphragm II and the pylon on March 13, 2018. FIGG also directed re-tensioning the post-tensioning rods in truss member 11 to begin on March 15, 2018. The re-tensioning operation was made as a "rushed request" to the post-tensioning subcontractor by MCM on March 14, 2018. "FIGG recommends to stress these PT bars as soon as possible but again, this is not a safety concern." MARCH 15, 2018, AND THE BRIDGE COLLAPSE Rather than waiting for the EAR, BPA once again exercised its independent, professional judgment and went above and beyond the requirements of the Standard Specifications, CPAM, and Contract Documents when it further escalated the issue of the cracks by calling for a meeting with the EOR. On the morning of March 15, 2018, a meeting requested by BPA and coordinated by MCM, was held in Miami, Florida. Representatives of FIGG, MCM, DOT, FIU, and BPA were present. At the March 15th meeting, BPA first became aware of the EOR’s instruction to MCM to proceed with a second temporary measure. This subsequent temporary measure was to reinstate the post-tensioning compression force back in member 11 as per the previous construction phase. As explained by the EOR, both temporary measures (shims and re- tensioning) were intended to restore the temporary support conditions when the structure was in the casting yard. Prior to the start of the meeting, the EOR, other FIGG engineers, and DOT’s LAP Coordinator inspected the bridge and the cracks in the nodal region of members 11/12. Only FIGG had structural engineers at the meeting. No other engineers present at the meeting had a background in structural engineering, including those in attendance on behalf of BPA. The meeting was called for purposes of discussing the concrete cracking on Span 1, and specifically the concrete cracking in nodal connection between truss members 11 and 12 and the bridge deck. At this meeting, BPA informed FIGG that the cracks in the bridge were lengthening and growing daily. Though not formally invited, Mr. Reyna attended this meeting in his capacity as DOT’s consultant/Assistant LAP Coordinator. At the March 15th meeting, the EOR presented FIGG's assessment of the cracking after having reviewed the three BPA crack reports and having personally inspected the cracks on at least the following two occasions: (1) prior to the bridge being moved from the casting yard over Southwest 8th Street; and (2) on the morning of the March 15th meeting. The EOR’s presentation consisted of a lengthy and comprehensive PowerPoint slide presentation on the conditions of the bridge, structural analysis by calculations and 3D modeling of the loads and forces the area of member 11/12 nodal region cracks, and an evaluation of the safety of the span over Southwest 8th Street for workers and the public. Throughout the March 15th meeting, BPA exercised its independent professional judgment by actively participating in the EOR’s presentation, questioning and challenging the EOR. For example, BPA: inquired as to whether temporary shoring was needed; sought clarification regarding the mechanism being used to capture the load from the node and whether it would have to be integrated with the pylon diaphragm; requested clarification on the amount of transferred post- tensioning assumed for the nodal shear stability analysis; inquired as to whether there were any restrictions on load; inquired as to whether there would be a crack monitoring plan; requested a copy of the EOR’s presentation; inquired as to whether it had been peer reviewed and commented that it wanted more eyes on the presentation calculations; and BPA requested a copy of the stressing procedure that was being recommended by the EOR. Throughout the presentation, and during the question and answer phase of the meeting, the EOR assured BPA and the other attendees that the structure was safe. These assurances were based on statements made by the EOR as well as its calculations and modeling, which were part of its slide presentation at the meeting. In the presentation on the slide entitled "Safety," FIGG stated that "…[it] had conducted sufficient supplemental/independent computations to conclude that there is not any concern with safety of the span suspended over the road." At the end of the presentation, the EOR concluded the meeting with "[b]ased on conservative calculations, it is concluded that the design meets LRFD strength requirements for this temporary condition and therefore there is no safety concern relative to the observed cracks and minor spalls." During the meeting, the EOR stated that some cracking similar to the ones on the structure, were expected. The EOR further stated during the meeting that the top deck spalls could not be replicated, but that the spalled areas were minor and they should be repaired during the next phase of work when the pylon concrete was to be placed. No engineer at the meeting, including DOT's representative, Mr. Reyna, requested or recommended a complete road closure to protect the public safety or that the bridge be shut down. BPA had no reason to request a full road closure of Southwest 8th Street. There was no preplanned complete road closure, there was no maintenance of traffic ("MOT") deficiency, and, based on the EOR’s presentation, BPA was reasonably satisfied that no safety issues required a road closure. Towards the end of the meeting on March 15th, MCM informed BPA that a specialty contractor, Structural Technologies ("VSL"), was already onsite to conduct the re-tensioning operation. Without BPA’s knowledge, VSL had already mobilized on site to perform the remedial re-tensioning. BPA was not involved in pre-coordination for the re-tensioning operation. Therefore, BPA’s sub-consultant, Corradino, was not onsite to participate in monitoring of the re-tensioning procedure. Corradino’s role, as BPA's sub-contractor, was that of a 10.5.1 CEI (Major Bridge CEI--Concrete). Corradino was responsible for monitoring and documenting the post-tensioning operations. The post-tensioning operation after placement of the span had already occurred and therefore, Corradino was not on-site on March 15, 2018. Based on the safety assurances and conservative calculations presented by the FIGG EOR that the structure was safe, BPA, and the other professional engineers present at the meeting, including those representing FIU and DOT, followed the recommendations of the FIGG EOR to bring the main span condition back to its pre-existing state when the span was in the casting yard. BPA did not have the expertise or the contractual duty to perform its own analysis of the cracking on this complex bridge and override, or even call into question, FIGG’s unequivocal assessment that the bridge was safe. During the restressing operation of member 11, the roadway below the bridge had two westbound lanes closed as per the blanket, two-lane, closure permit issued by DOT. This blanket, two-lane, closure permit was obtained by MCM to provide workspace underneath the bridge to conduct the remedial action. MCM obtained the blanket, two-lane, closure permit from the Department the morning of March 15, 2018, before conducting the remedial action. A CEI’s authority to request a partial or complete road closure is defined by the contract plans and roadway closure permits, which is implemented using the procedures outlined by the CPAM and the CEI Scope of Services of the CEI Contract. A CEI is authorized to request the contractor to either partially or fully close a road if there is an MOT deficiency, as contemplated by CPAM Section 9.1.8--"Recommended Action to Shut Down a Project Due to MOT Deficiencies." Lastly, a CEI has authority to request a partial or full road closure if it is aware of a safety issue. None of these conditions existed on the project in the days leading up to the collapse in light of the EOR’s comprehensive presentation regarding the cracking conditions of the bridge, strength in the area of member 11/12 nodal region, safety of the span over Southwest 8th Street, and repeated, unequivocal reassurances that the structure did not pose a safety concern. Ultimately, BPA’s authority to request a partial or complete road closure on the project was a collective effort with the Department and FIU. BPA did not have the authority or ability to act on its own to close the road. The FIU Pedestrian Bridge collapsed during the re-tensioning of the truss member 11 post-tensioning rods on the afternoon of March 15, 2018. Six people died as a result of the FIU bridge collapse, including one bridge worker and five vehicle occupants. Ten people were critically injured as a result of the FIU bridge collapse, including two BPA employees, Mr. Morales and Carlos Chapman. Mr. Chapman was on the canopy of the bridge during the re- tensioning operation, observing the work being performed by VSL and communicating the progress to Mr. Morales who was on the deck of the bridge. Because of the representations made by the EOR, neither Mr. Chapman nor Mr. Morales was concerned for his own safety or well-being when they went on the bridge on the day it collapsed. BPA’s role, responsibilities, and scope of work on the FIU Bridge project as the CEI was that of a contract administrator, not as a structural engineer with the capability to analyze the structural behavior of the bridge sufficient to determine if the cracks posed any danger of collapse. BPA had no basis, ability, or contractual obligation, to perform its own analysis of this complex structure sufficient to override the FIGG EOR’s unequivocal safety assessment and recommendations. BPA performed its CEI duties and utilized its independent professional judgement when it documented and monitored the cracks and requested an immediate structural evaluation by the FIGG EOR. Ultimately, the bridge collapse was caused by a fundamental design error. THE OSHA AND NTSB INVESTIGATIONS Shortly after the collapse, both OSHA and NTSB began investigating the causes of the collapse. OHSA completed its investigation and released a written report of its findings in June 2019.2 The June 2019 OSHA report was 2 DOT failed to enter into evidence the OSHA report on which it relies. However, prior to the final hearing, DOT filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of Reports Issued by Federal Agencies Concerning the FIU Bridge Collapse ("Motion"). The Motion was opposed by BPA on the basis that the first OSHA report was not final because a second report was issued, and is hearsay. By Order dated January 24, 2020, the undersigned officially recognized both the issued without prior review or comments from all party members who willingly cooperated with and were involved in the investigation, including NTSB and BPA. OSHA released an amended report on the collapse of the FIU Bridge project in July 2019; however, none of the amendments in the report pertained to the actions of BPA on the FIU Bridge project. NTSB completed its investigation and issued its report in October 2019. Significantly, no evidence was presented at the final hearing regarding from whom either agency conducted the investigations or drafted the reports, the qualifications or expertise of the investigators, the methodology used in the investigations, or the ability of any of the participants in the investigation to rebut the findings or conclusions. BPA willingly participated in both the OSHA and NTSB investigations, working with investigators and providing them with information, photographs, and details on the FIU Bridge project. Both OSHA and NTSB also conducted interviews of BPA personnel involved with the FIU Bridge project as part of their investigations. In its report, OSHA found that BPA failed to classify the concrete cracks, which were structural in nature, in accordance with DOT requirements. OSHA determined that BPA, as CEI, was expected to exercise its own independent professional judgment in accordance with their contract with FIU and DOT requirements. With intimate knowledge of extensive initial OSHA report and the NTSB report. Accordingly, references to the report in this Recommended Order are based upon the official recognition. As noted in the Order on the Motion, official recognition of the OSHA and NTSB reports, however, does not make the statements contained therein automatically admissible. "The distinction between noticing the contents of a record and noticing the truth of the contents resembles the distinction in the hearsay doctrine between offering an out-of-court statement simply to show it was said, and offering it for the truth of the matter asserted." C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 201.1 (2011 Edition)(quoting Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6337). Although the existence of the report and its findings were officially recognized, the greater weight of the evidence supports that the contents were not accurate as to the exercise of independent judgment of BPA. cracking on the bridge, BPA failed to recognize the bridge was in danger of collapsing, and did not recommend to FIU, MCM, or others to close the street and shore the bridge, regardless of the opinion held by the EOR. As a result, OSHA imposed a monetary fine on BPA for its conduct and failure to take appropriate action in the days leading up to the collapse of the main bridge span. In its October 2019 report (issued after the NOID to BPA in this case), NTSB found that beginning with the cracking identified on February 24, 2018, the distress in the main bridge span was active, continued to grow, and was well documented by all parties involved in the design, construction, and oversight of the bridge. Neither FIU, MCM, FIGG, nor BPA took responsibility for declaring that the cracks were beyond any level of acceptability and did not meet DOT standards. Further, NTSB concluded that under the terms and conditions of the CEI Contract, BPA had the authority to direct or authorize partial or complete road closures as necessary, acting in concert with DOT and FIU; however, none acted to close the road under the bridge, contributing to the severity of the impact of the bridge collapse. BPA POST-COLLAPSE ACTIVITIES AND 2018 APPLICATION FOR QUALIFICATION On May 3, 2018, BPA submitted its Request for Qualification for the July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019, fiscal year ("2018 Application"). BPA’s 2018 Application was for the same Work Groups that would eventually be included in the 2019 Request for Qualification. Each work category is tied to a distinct job function. There is no relationship or similarity between CEI services (Work Group 10) and the other work groups. On June 27, 2018, DOT accepted BPA’s Request for Qualification in all work categories. In processing the application, the Department did not ask BPA any questions regarding its involvement in the project, offer any criticisms of BPA in response to the application, request to interview any BPA employees, or raise any concerns at all regarding BPA’s participation in the project. From the date of the collapse on March 15, 2018, to December 2018, DOT awarded two contracts to BPA directly for CEI and design services, respectively. During the same period, DOT allowed BPA to participate as a qualified sub-consultant on one CEI contract, three design contracts, and one traffic task work order contract. During the 2018-2019 fiscal year, before DOT attempted to suspend BPA’s qualifications, BPA was able to win several jobs in both the prime and sub-consultant role, including projects in which BPA would be providing CEI services. In October 2018, approximately seven months after the collapse, BPA applied to change its CEI qualifier from John Bolton to Jose Morales because John Bolton wanted to retire. DOT approved the request and did not object or raise any concerns with respect to Jose Morales serving as BPA’s qualifier for CEI services. On December 19, 2018, nine months after the collapse, DOT expressed concern for the first time about BPA’s role in the bridge project, staffing of current DOT projects, quality assurance/quality control ("QA/QC") plans, and professional liability insurance. DOT sent BPA a "Qualifications Letter of Concern," stating that it had "serious concerns regarding [BPA]’s involvement as the Construction Engineering Inspection consultant on the Florida International University (FIU) pedestrian bridge project[.]" DOT requested in its letter, among other things, "a detailed explanation of the firm’s actions on the FIU pedestrian bridge project and… any controls or changes in personnel, policies or practices that [BPA] has implemented subsequent to the collapse." On December 21, 2018, BPA responded to the Letter of Concern addressing each concern raised by the Department, in detail, including providing a copy of its Certificate of Liability Insurance demonstrating that there was no lapse in professional liability insurance coverage. On February 12, 2019, DOT responded to BPA’s correspondence dated December 21, 2018, requesting additional detail from BPA relative to its revised QA/QC plan and punctuated the correspondence by stating that DOT would refuse to process any further qualification requests from BPA, including ministerial prequalification name changes, until the matter was addressed to the Department’s satisfaction. Around this time, BPA submitted a request to change its name with DOT to reflect its business name with the Division of Corporations. BPA requested that DOT update this information on its website, but DOT refused to process the request due to its concerns with BPA’s qualifications. On February 20, 2019, BPA provided further detail regarding the specific policies and procedures that have been implemented to its CEI services. Specifically, BPA provided extensive detail regarding its revised QA/QC plan, which included a section dedicated to Category II type bridge structures and included a copy of the revised QA/QC program for DOT review. DOT never responded or requested any additional information in this regard. On March 15, 2019, one year to the day after the collapse, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Suspend BPA’s existing certificate of qualifications. DOT attempted to suspend BPA’s qualifications in all Work Groups and declare BPA non-responsible for a period of one year for good cause. DOT further claimed that BPA "failed to adequately address the Department’s concerns regarding the firm’s performance of the contract, and the [BPA] staff directly involved with the FIU project who continue to work on other Department structural contracts." No further explanation was provided as to how BPA failed to address these concerns. BPA timely responded to the Notice of Intent to Suspend by way of a Notice of Contest, requesting an administrative hearing on the issues raised therein. Despite the Notice of Contest, DOT suspended BPA’s qualification, and sent written notice to its various offices stating, among other things, that BPA had been removed from DOT’s prequalification list. Ultimately, DOT reinstated BPA’s qualifications, but never formally withdrew the Notice of Intent to Suspend. However, in reinstating BPA’s qualifications, DOT neglected to reinstate BPA’s Small Business Enterprise ("SBE") designation, which negatively affected BPA’s ability to obtain points for SBE participation. The points add value in scoring competing responses to Requests for Proposals for DOT contracts. BPA repeatedly requested that this be corrected. BPA’s requests went largely ignored for nearly two months. On April 2, 2019, after BPA had an in-person meeting with Courtney Drummond, DOT's Assistant Secretary of Engineering and Operations, BPA submitted a qualifications modifications package to replace Jose Morales, P.E., with John Bolton, P.E., as the qualifier for the CEI Work Group to address Mr. Drummond's and DOT’s concerns about BPA staff involved on the FIU project working on other DOT contracts. On April 5, 2019, in response to the Notice of Intent to Suspend, BPA provided specific facts in support of BPA’s proper performance of the CEI Contract. As an accommodation to DOT, BPA further proposed a solution to DOT's concern about the staff involved in the FIU project. BPA stated that it was "willing to immediately remove the BPA staff directly involved in the FIU Bridge project from working on any Department contracts or qualifying the company for CEI services" and resubmitted its qualifications application with those changes. 2019 BPA REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATION REJECTION On May 7, 2019, BPA submitted its 2019 Request for Qualification to the Department early due to the lack of response from DOT on BPA's April 5, 2019, correspondence. BPA sought qualifications for design work and CEI services in the same work categories it was qualified in for the prior fiscal year. On June 10, 2019, BPA’s counsel met with DOT representatives in Tallahassee to discuss several outstanding issues relative to BPA’s current qualification, the upcoming renewal, and DOT’s failure to reinstate BPA’s SBE designation. DOT responded by promising to correct the "mistake" that same day. Inexplicably, it took another two weeks and several reminders from BPA for DOT to finally correct the SBE designation. BPA’s 2018-2019 qualifications expired on June 30, 2019. The next day, on July 1, 2019, DOT untimely responded to BPA’s Request for Qualification with a letter titled "Incomplete Renewal Applications for Pre- Qualification." DOT's letter raised the same concerns regarding BPA’s involvement in the bridge project and, again, requested "a detailed explanation of BPA’s actions on the FIU pedestrian bridge project and…any controls or changes in personnel, policies or practices that BPA has implemented subsequent to the collapse." This is the same request that had been previously made by DOT in its December 19, 2018, Qualifications Letter of Concern, February 12, 2019, Qualifications Letter of Concern, March 15, 2019, Notice of Intent to Suspend, and April 26, 2019, denial of BPA’s Submittal for Modification. BPA had already provided the information requested several months prior to DOT's July 1, 2019, correspondence. On July 11, 2019, DOT issued its Notice of Intent to Deny Request for Qualification directed to BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification. In issuing its denial of BPA’s Request for Qualification, DOT relied solely on the findings and conclusions of the June 2019 OSHA Report as they relate to the CEI services provided by BPA on the project and referenced the pending NTSB investigation. The Department’s Notice of Intent to Deny was executed by William Watts, the Department’s Chief Engineer. Mr. Watts admitted at final hearing that he does not have the training or experience necessary to evaluate a CEI’s performance on a CEI contract. Moreover, neither Mr. Watts nor DOT retained or consulted with any individuals with CEI expertise prior to issuing the Notice of Intent to Deny. When he issued the Notice of Intent to Deny, Mr. Watts was completely unfamiliar with the following: the terms of BPA’s CEI Contract; BPA’s Request for Qualification; BPA’s past performance on CEI or any other Department contract; and BPA’s professional reputation. Mr. Watts did not evaluate BPA under the criteria required by Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code prior to denying BPA’s Request for Qualification for good cause. Mr. Watts did not receive any analysis from the Department’s prequalification staff regarding their evaluation of BPA’s application under the statutory criteria. Mr. Watts admitted that he was aware that BPA documented the cracking on the bridge, reported the cracking to the design-build firm, and requested an EAR from the EOR--actions which were all in accordance with BPA's obligations as CEI pursuant to the CPAM and its contractual obligations with FIU. Mr. Watts’ only reason for issuing the Notice of Intent to Deny, as Chief Engineer for DOT, was because BPA was under investigation by OSHA and the NTSB, and OSHA’s release of its June 2019 Report. However, Mr. Watts did not know the author of the June 2019 OSHA Report, whether the author of the report was qualified to evaluate the performance of a CEI under Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, or whether the author of the OSHA report did anything to evaluate BPA’s performance relative to any other CEI, at the same time, and/or in the same community. DOT did not investigate the structure or organization of BPA to determine whether the issues raised in the OSHA report, regarding BPA’s performance of the CEI Contract, would reflect negatively on other groups or divisions within BPA that provided services exclusively under other non-CEI work categories (design services). Prior to issuance of the NOID, Mr. Watts did not undertake a review of BPA’s past performance or professional reputation--both of which were beyond reproach. DOT evaluates its consultants’ performance on all projects approximately every six to eight months. These evaluations produce a score that ranges from one to five, five being the highest possible score. A perfect score of five is uncommon and a score of four is outstanding. In the five years prior to the final hearing, DOT evaluated BPA’s performance on projects involving both design and CEI services. Specifically, DOT scored BPA’s performance in Work Groups 3.1, 3.2 (Highway Design), 4.12 (Bridge Design), 5.1 (Bridge Inspection), 7.2 (Traffic Operations Design), and 10.1 and 10.3 (CEI). During that period, BPA averaged a score of outstanding to nearly- outstanding on all projects, including outstanding and nearly-outstanding scores for inspection services on bridge rehabilitation projects, which involved cracking concrete elements. In May of 2019, prior to denying BPA’s request for qualifications for the fiscal year July 1, 2019, through June 20, 2020, Mr. Drummond personally presented BPA with an award from the American Council of Engineering Companies ("ACEC"), for excellence in major urban reconstruction. Specifically, the award was for CEI services on the State Road 7 project, and the ACEC recognized two-and-a-half-years of excellence in CEI services from late-2016/early-2017 through 2019. DOT's District Construction Engineer, District 6 Secretary, and Headquarters were intimately involved in the selection and vetting process that, ultimately, resulted in BPA receiving the award. In September 2019, after denying its request and three months after the release of the June 2019 OSHA Report, DOT voted that BPA receive another award for excellence in CEI services. As a member of the selection committee, DOT chose BPA to receive an award from the Florida Transportation Builders Association ("FTBA"), for excellence on the Baker’s Haulover Bridge rehabilitation project. By this award, FTBA and DOT recognized BPA’s excellence in CEI services, which spanned from one year before the collapse to one year after the collapse. The Experts 3 Gustavo Quesada, P.E. At the Final Hearing, BPA presented the expert testimony of Gustavo Quesada, P.E., a CEI with over 30 years of experience. The ALJ finds that Mr. Quesada is a qualified expert on the standard of care for a CEI and his opinions in that regard are based on competent substantial evidence. As explained by Mr. Quesada, the role of a CEI with respect to cracks in concrete is to identify the cracks and make sure they do not go unseen or undetected and that an EOR is engaged for purposes of addressing the cracking. Pursuant to the CPAM, when a CEI encounters cracks in concrete, a CEI is required to document the observation and make a disposition on the cracks based on Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. Moving forward, the CEI is also required to monitor any changes in the cracks. A CEI is not responsible for making a determination as to whether a crack is potentially dangerous. This is a determination for the EOR, who has an understanding of the structure, its design, and how the structure is expected to behave. A CEI is not charged with making judgment calls on the design of a structure or whether its integrity has been jeopardized. BPA documented, monitored, and reported the cracks on the project in compliance with the industry standards for CEIs working on Complex Category II Bridges, as well as the relevant sections of the CPAM and Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. BPA’s Senior Project Engineer, Mr. Morales, exercised his independent professional judgment in elevating 3 DOT intended to offer Mr. Watts at hearing as an expert to testify to the "good cause" DOT had when issuing the NOID to BPA. BPA filed a Motion in Limine to exclude or limit the testimony of both Mr. Watts and Mr. Robertson. The motion was argued at the outset of the final hearing. The undersigned precluded Mr. Watts from testifying as an expert in the field of CEI. Mr. Watts was allowed to testify as to DOT's qualification process and did so as a fact witness, rather than an expert. the issue of the cracks to the EOR even before he was required to do so under the CPAM and Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. At the meeting called by BPA on the morning of March 15, 2018, BPA exercised its independent professional judgment and complied with the applicable standard of care when Mr. Morales asked the EOR a series of questions in response to the EOR’s presentation and evaluation of the cracks on the bridge. According to Mr. Quesada, professional engineers are expected to rely on other engineers with superior or specialized knowledge when exercising their independent professional judgment. BPA’s role, responsibilities, and scope of work on the project as the CEI was largely that of a contract administrator, and a liaison between FIU and MCM--not as a structural engineer with the capability to analyze the structural behavior of the bridge sufficient to determine if the cracks posed any danger of collapse. Robert V. Robertson, P.E. DOT presented the testimony of Robert V. Roberson as an expert on the standard of care for CEIs. Mr. Robertson has served as DOT's State Structure’s Design Engineer for 13 years. Mr. Robertson has been a professional engineer for 35 years. Although preliminarily accepted by the undersigned as an expert in this field, it became apparent through cross-examination that Mr. Robertson has no significant CEI experience. Mr. Robertson has not worked in the CEI industry in the last 26 years, nor has he ever graded a CEI’s performance. Mr. Robertson was not involved in the Department’s evaluation of BPA’s performance of the CEI Contract. Accordingly, Mr. Robertson's testimony was of limited value. Mr. Robertson acknowledged that the FIU bridge was a complex concrete bridge structure that required a separate design qualification and that BPA did have such qualification. Mr. Robertson admitted that BPA’s contract with FIU did not require BPA to be qualified to inspect complex concrete bridges because BPA was allowed to satisfy that particular qualification requirement of the contract through a sub-consultant (Corradino). Mr. Robertson testified that any licensed engineer with a college degree in engineering should have known, based on the photographs in Crack Report #3, that the cracks were dangerous and should have acted to stop work on the project and close the road. However, DOT's LAP representative at the March 15, 2018, meeting held prior to the bridge collapse, Mr. Reyna, a licensed professional engineer with a college degree in engineering, failed to raise any concerns at the March 15th meeting or act to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, or close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge. Mr. Robertson opined that the re-tensioning operation of the bridge should have been peer reviewed. In his opinion, BPA failed to use sufficient independent judgment. BPA, as the CEI, should have recognized the bridge was in danger and known to stop traffic and shut down the road. However, Mr. Roberston admitted that he did only a cursory review of the PowerPoint presentation provided on the morning of March 15, 2018, in which FIGG, as the EOR, stated it had no safety concerns. Mr. Robertson stated that he performed no analysis on anything other than BPA's CEI work relative to the FIU bridge. He had no information about BPA's design group or its qualification in any work category. However, he suggested the denial of BPA's application for qualification across the board, in all work categories because he questioned "the culture at BPA." Significantly, concerns regarding "the culture" of BPA was not cited by DOT as a basis for the NOID. Most significantly, Mr. Robertson testified that six months prior to the issuance of the NOID, he had a conversation with Mr. Drummond during which Mr. Drummond recommended that the qualification of all parties involved with the FIU Pedestrian Bridge project should be suspended. Importantly, this was prior to the issuance of either the OSHA or NTSB reports and seemingly with no analysis of the role of any party to the possible prevention of the bridge collapse, injuries, or loss of life. Ultimate Findings of Fact DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise its independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, or close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge in light of the documented cracking on the structure in the days leading up to the collapse. The evidence shows that BPA documented, monitored, and reported the cracks pursuant to the CPAM, Section 400 of the Standard Specifications, and industry standards. BPA involved the EOR in evaluating the cracks even before it was required by the CPAM, Section 400 of the Standard Specifications, and industry standards. BPA was assured time and again by the EOR that the bridge did not pose a danger to the travelling public and that the structure was safe. At the meeting on the morning of March 15, 2018, BPA inquired as to whether temporary shoring was needed, and the suggestion was rejected by the EOR who had inspected the cracks on the structure just moments before the meeting. There is no evidence that BPA deviated from the standard of care for CEIs on design-build projects or that BPA failed to exercise its independent professional judgment. To the contrary, BPA met all of its obligations pursuant to contract and state regulation. DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, and close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge pending a peer review of the re-tensioning plan proposed by the EOR at the March 15th meeting. At the March 15th meeting, BPA was reasonably convinced by the EOR that the structure was safe and that the re-tensioning plan was a temporary measure that should be implemented as soon as possible. BPA had already engaged the EOR to prepare an EAR to address the cracking observed on the bridge, which would have included signed and sealed calculations and a repair protocol that would have been implemented in a later phase of construction. On March 15, 2018, the cracks were not a safety concern such that BPA should have overridden the EOR’s directive to MCM and required that the re-tensioning operation be postponed pending a peer- review of the re-tensioning plan. There is no evidence in the record that BPA deviated from the standard of care for CEIs on design-build projects or allegedly failed to exercise its independent professional judgment by allowing the re-tensioning procedure to proceed as directed by the EOR. Conversely, the evidence supports a finding that BPA acted appropriately in relying on the recommendations of the EOR who was uniquely qualified to evaluate the safety of the structure and who had specialized knowledge of its design. DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, and close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge until the Corradino Group could arrive on the project site to observe the re-tensioning operation proposed by the EOR during the meeting on March 15, 2018. Corradino’s role on the project was to monitor and document post-tensioning operations. By the time the meeting was over, MCM’s specialty contractor, VSL, was mobilized and prepared to proceed with the re-tensioning operation. BPA was not involved in the pre- coordination of this work. Ultimately, the bridge collapsed due to an inherent design error in the plans and not due to Corradino’s absence from the re- tensioning operations. The findings of the OSHA report and the pendency of the NTSB investigation, standing alone, were insufficient "good cause" for DOT to deny BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Transportation finding that good cause does not exist to deny BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: George Spears Reynolds, IV, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Scott Kirschbaum, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 Anthony Lopez, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 George Richard Truitt, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 (eServed) John Ashley Peacock, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Erik Fenniman, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Kevin J. Thibault, P.E., Secretary Department of Transporation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact On January 20, 1988 the City made application to the Department for issuance of a dredge and fill permit to replace an existing wooden bridge known as the Lynnhaven Terrace Bridge which crosses Deep Bottom Creek in Duval County, Florida. At that time the existing bridge was a two lane timber bridge measuring approximately 20 feet wide, having two spans of 19 feet and 14 feet respectively with associated guardrails. The replacement bridge was to be 44 feet wide and 37 feet long. Subsequently, a revision was made to the permit application which called for reduction in the width of the bridge to 39 feet. A copy of the original application may be found as City's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence and the revision was received as City's Exhibit 3. The bridge in its revised format would include two paved lane and two sidewalks on the outside of those lanes. This bridge too would have guardrails. The bridge replacement project would involve the dredging of approximately 122 cubic yards of material from the creek bottom and the installation of 12 concrete pilings along the riverbank. Approximately 4.75 cubic yards of fill will be placed below the mean high waterline and 690 cubic yards above that line. Stabilization of the north and south banks of the side of the bridge will be accomplished with 160 linear feet of sheet pile wall. The total acreage to be filled is approximately 1.1 acres with 0.002 acres being in wetlands or open waters within the Deep Bottom Creek. By this arrangement, part of the activities are within waters of the state and the upward extent of those waters and confer jurisdiction on the Department to require a dredge and fill permit and water quality certification. The jurisdiction of the Department extends to the mean high waterline of the creek in accordance with Section 403.913(2), Florida Statutes, and this takes into account the opportunity to examine the implications of dredging and filling associated with the project. The waters at issue are Class III waters. Black Bottom Creek is part of a drainage basin leading to the St. Johns River, a major water body. The reason for this project concerns the present bridge's deteriorating condition as shown in the City's Composite Exhibit 1, a series of photos. The bridge is in such disrepair that it has been downgraded in its load rating to three (3) tons, which is inadequate to support heavy vehicles, to include emergency vehicles such as firetrucks. With the advent of the concrete bridge, this problem would be rectified. An attempt to effect repairs on the existing bridge is not a reasonable choice for the City. The Department, in response to the application, conducted an assessment of that application or appraisal to include biological and water quality concerns. A copy of the report rendered in response to the application may be found as the Department's Exhibit 1. That report favors the grant of a permit in water quality certification and at the date of hearing that opinion was still held by the Department. The report points out that the project would straighten out a problem with a curve in the creek course by the choice of location for the new bridge. This arrangement will assist in the flow pattern and give a positive influence in preventing shoaling underneath the existing bridge. It will also positively affect the problem of the erosion in the upland area of the existing bridge which causes deposition of material into the creek bottom. The report describes the fact that steps to contain turbidity during the construction phase can be achieved. Having been satisfied concerning this application, an Intent to Issue a Permit and water quality certification was stated on April 15, 1988. A copy of the Intent to Issue may be found as Department's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. The permit was to be issued on condition concerning the question of authority to operate in waters of the state as contemplated by Chapter 253, Florida Statutes. That matter is not one for consideration in the present dispute. It also refers to preservation of historical and archeological artifacts. There has been no demonstration that such artifacts exist in the area of this project. The turbidity control mechanisms were mentioned as a special condition and as suggested before, those matters can be attended by this applicant and are expected to be. There is reference to doing the work at periods of average or low water, and there was no indication that this could not be accomplished by the applicant. On April 19, 1988 the actual permit was rendered and had attached letters of April 18, 1988 advising the City that it could contest the permit terms and the fact that others might promote objections to the permit and water quality certification. In fact, a number of land owners in the general vicinity of the project have contested this permit application leading to the present hearing. The petition and challenge to the intention to grant a permit was timely made. The Petitioners are Mr. and Mrs. John Jordan, Mr. and Mrs. Ian Ablett, Mr. Keith Kelly, Ms. Dorothy Brown, Mr. Hal Moyle, Ms. Holly Baker, Ms. Beatrice Diomont, J. H. Cater, Mr. and Mrs. W. Reed, Mr. and Mrs. H. Carrell, Mr. Harvey Jay, Ms. K. C. Walsh and Donald Braddock. Only Mr. and Mrs. Ablett, Mr. Kelly, and the Carrell's attended the hearing and established their standing to challenge the intended agency action. Moreover, the nature of their challenge as set forth in their petition has been restricted by a ruling which struck reference to the alleged influence which this project has on property values associated with a lack of sensitivity for aesthetics in exchanging the wooden bridge for a concrete pile bridge. Otherwise, the Petitioners through the presentation at hearing spoke in terms of shoaling at the site as a matter of their concern. This problem is not one which is attributable to the City and its activities, it is related to commercial activities upstream from the project site. As described, if anything, the project will alleviate those problems to some extent. Additional reasons which the Petitioners advanced in opposition concern the belief that they did not need a new bridge, that the bridge was too wide and that they did not need sidewalks and guardrails. Notwithstanding their perceptions, the overall public needs would favor the replacement of the bridge to include wider lanes and sidewalks for safe pedestrian passage. Again, at present, there are no sidewalks with the existing bridge. The expression of opposition by the Petitioners beyond the reference to the shoaling problem and the effects on water levels is not a matter of environmental concern contemplated by the permit application review process under consideration here. On May 13, 1988, the Department of the Army issued a permit for this project, a copy of which may be found as City's Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence. In addition, the Coast Guard has no opposition to this project and has said as much in its correspondence of May 2, 1988, a copy of which may be found as City's Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. The immediate and long term impacts of this project are not violative of applicable state water quality standards, in that reasonable assurances have been given that those standards will not be exceeded. This project is not contrary to the public interest. It is not adverse to public health, safety or welfare or property of others. The project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, to include endangered or threatened species or other habitats. The project will not adversely affect navigation or the flow of water which will cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The project will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project. The project is permanent in nature but over time it will not have adverse impacts on the environment. Considering the current conditions and diminished value of environmental functions being performed by the area, they are not particularly significant at present and the project will not change that posture, in fact it may improve the circumstance. Specifically, at present no endangered or threatened species are found within the creek. There had been some wildlife activity, but continuing problems with silting or shoaling have occurred since the homeowners in the area dredged the creek bottom, and wildlife has decreased as a result. This relates to the upstream activities which continue to promote problems in the creek bottom. On the subject of navigation, limited navigation is available by small boats or canoes at present, and the elevations of the replacement bridge are such as to not interfere with that activity.
Findings Of Fact By application dated March 3, 1983, Respondent ITT Community Development Corporation (ITT) requested a permit from Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) to dredge 815 cubic yards of material from the Intracoastal Waterway In Flagler County, Florida, as part of the construction of a high-level concrete highway bridge over the intracoastal Waterway. The proposed bridge project will extend Palm Coast Parkway from the end of existing pavement to State Road A1A east of the Intracoastal Waterway, and thus complete the Interstate 95 connector link with coastal State Road A1A. At the present tine, there are two drawbridges across the Intracoastal Waterway some ten miles south at Flagler Beach. and approximately 15 miles north at Crescent Beach. Existing high bridges across the Intracoastal Waterway are further north and south of the proposed bridge project. (Testimony of Smith, ITT Exhibits 1, 9- 12) The proposed bridge is a fixed concrete bridge approximately 2,598 feet long and 52 feet, 7 inches in width. The bridge will have a minimum vertical clearance of 65 feet above mean high water and 66.4 feet above mean low water, with a horizontal clearance of 90 feet between fenders. It will involve a cast- in-place concrete deck set upon prestressed concrete columns. The bridge will be supported by sets of concrete beams and placed on top of pilings, which will be driven into the surface to a depth of approximately 80 feet. The center two support piers, which are the subject of the requested permit, will be set upon concrete seals constructed inside of cofferdams, which will be located within the right-of-way of the Intracoastal Waterway. It is the construction of these two piers within the limits of the cofferdam that involves the removal of material which is considered dredging pursuant to DER rules. (Stipulation) The cofferdams will be made of steel and will be driven into place to encompass the pier foundations, with the 815 cubic yards of material excavated from inside the cofferdams being placed on a barge and transported to the adjacent uplands as part of the bridge approach construction. During construction of each support pier, a turbidity curtain will be placed around the cofferdams and the barge. Bridge deck drains will be omitted over the Intracoastal Waterway, and first flush storm water runoff will be retained in a stormwater management system which meets the requirements of Chapter 17-25, Florida Administrative Code. Piles used in the construction of the two fenders shall be made of concrete rather than treated timber. Treated timber may be used for the horizontal wales, the catwalks, and other components of the fender system which do not extend below M.S.L. Reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the release of preserving chemicals by the timber components of the fender system will not adversely affect the waters of the Intracoastal Waterway in violation of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. Turbidity controls will be used during the the construction of the two piers in the Intracoastal Waterway if the level of turbidity produced exceeds 29 NTUs. (Stipulation, Greene) The bridge will connect two parcels of land under the ownership of ITT, and will facilitate access between Palm Coast Parkway and the State Road A1A. (Stipulation, ITT Exhibits 1, 9-12) After receiving the ITT application, DER solicited comments from adjoining landowners, the Flagler County Board of Commissioners, and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, but none were received. By letter dated April 13, 1983, the Department of Natural Resources gave its authority for the project under Section 253.77, Florida Statutes. An onsite inspection of the proposed site was made by DER in June 1982 and March 1983, who found that the project site was devoid of literal vegetation and that minimal impact could be expected from the project provided that turbidity is contained during construction. They further determined that the bridge pilings would not eliminate valuable habitat or alter the natural flow of the Intracoastal Waterway, a Class III body of water. Further, in view of the fact that the dredging activities would be isolated by the cofferdams, no turbidity problems re expected. On May 18, 1983, the DER District Manager issued a notice of its intent to issue the requested permit for the reason that reasonable assurance had been provided that the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed activity would not result in violation of water quality criteria under Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Cede, and that the proposed activity would not interfere with the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interests, or create an navigational hazard or impediment, or alter or impede the natural flow of navigable waters so as to be contrary to the public interests. The intent to issue provided that the permit would be subject to the condition that turbidity controls would be used during construction if the level of turbidity produced exceeds 50 JTU above background. (Testimony of Tyler, ITT Exhibits 2-5, 7) By Resolution No. 83-13, dated August 18, 1983, the Flagler County Board of County Commissioners expressed its support of the concept of the proposed project as long as the cost of construction is funded through ITT funds or bridge tolls. (ITT Exhibit 13) In their prehearing and posthearing stipulations, the parties agreed to the following: That reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the short-and long-term effects of the bridge construction will not adversely affect the surficial aquifer to such an extent that it will cause harm to its use by Petitioners as a potable water supply. That the construction and operation of the proposed bridge will not interfere with the conservation of the Florida Scrub Jay, the Gopher Tortoise, or the Indigo Snake. Reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the release of preserving chemicals by the timber components of the fender system will not adversely affect the waters of the Intracoastal Waterway in violation of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. Reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the short-term effects of turbidity will not adversely affect the waters of the Intracoastal Waterway in violation of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed bridge will not create a navigational hazard or a serious impediment to navigation, or substantially alter or impede the natural flow of navigable waters so as to be contrary to the public interests, and the proposed bridge will not result in the destruc- tion of oyster beds, clam beds, or marine productivity, including but not limited to destruction of natural marine habitats, grass- flats suitable as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life, and establish[ed] marine soil(s] suitable for producing plant growth of the type useful as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life or natural shoreline processes to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interests. If the permit is issued, it shall be issued with the following conditions: Turbidity controls will be used during construction of the two piers in the Intracoastal Waterway if the level of turbidity produced exceeds 29 NTUs above background. Piles used in the construction of the two fenders shall be made of concrete rather than treated timber. Treated timber may be used for the horizontal wales, the catwalks, and other components of the fender system which do not extend below M.S.L. In view of the above stipulations by the parties, the only remaining disputed issues of material fact are whether the proposed project will interfere with the conservation of the Florida panther and Florida black bear to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interests. The black bear is considered to be a "threatened" species of wildlife by the State of Florida. A wildlife survey of some 2,000 acres of land surrounding and including the project area during the period 1979-82 by an expert in the field of wildlife ecology revealed traces indicating the presence of the black bear on two occasions in a location east of the proposed project area. On those occasions, bear tracks were found east of State Highway A1A in a hammock area north of the bridge corridor in 1979. However, the signs were insufficient to indicate that there was a resident bear population in the area. Signs of the black bear are fairly common on the west side of the Intracoastal Waterway in swampy wilderness areas, such as Long's Creek area and Graham's Swamp. It is possible that, on occasion, a black bear may wander into or cross the bridge area; however, construction and operation of the bridge should have little or no adverse impact on any black bear population which is located either several miles south or north of the proposed bridge area. (Testimony of Brown) The Florida panther is classified as an "endangered" species by the State of Florida. The four-year survey of wildlife undertaken by ITT during the period 1979-82 failed to disclose any traces of the panther in the area surrounding the proposed project site. There are only approximately 20 to 30 Florida panthers in the state, and all are located to the south and west of Lake Okeechobee in the Everglades. The Florida panther requires a vast area of undisturbed habitat. Approximately 400 square miles are necessary for males and some 50 to 100 square miles for a female. They avoid populate areas. Several state personnel saw a tan catlike animal near the entrance to Washington Oaks State Gardens which is located a number of miles north of the proposed bridge site, on May 13, 1983. They reported to the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission that the animal was a Florida panther, and plaster casts of the animal's tracks were submitted to that agency for verification. However, the casts were insufficient upon which to base an identification of the animal as a Florida panther, and the park personnel admittedly lacked sufficient qualifications to determine if the animal was, in fact, a Florida panther. There have been other purported sightings of panthers in the general area during past and recent years by Petitioner Gerald D. Schatz and others who reported such sightings to him for investigation. However, it has never been confirmed that the said sightings were of the Florida panther. Although a suitable habitat for the panther is the Graham Swamp, that area is not large enough to be sustain the Florida panther, and It is unlikely that any of that species are present in the area of the proposed bridge. It is accordingly found that construction of the bridge would have no impact on the Florida panther. (Testimony of Brown, Wood, Ganson, Nichols, Schatz; Petitioner's Exhibits 3-5)
Recommendation That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the requested permit pursuant to Chapter 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, and Public Law 92-580, subject to standard conditions, and the special conditions set forth in paragraph 6 above of the Conclusions of Law herein. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a registered general contractor, (1) unlawfully and willfully committed fraud and theft, violated the Fictitious Name Statute, and violated Municipal and County Contractor Licensing Ordinances, and (2) violated other provisions of the Construction Industry Licensing Law relating to the name under which a qualifying agent may engage in business.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was the holder of Registered General Contractors License No. RG0013533 issued by the Board to Respondent, d/b/a Deltec Construction Co. (Stipulation of counsel). Respondent is a fifty-five year old general contractor who has worked in construction for thirty-seven years, and has never been disciplined for misconduct associated with construction activities. (Testimony of Respondent) Respondent, at all times material hereto, did not qualify or license with the Board Trendway Construction Co., Trendway Construction Inc., or Trend- Tech Construction Co. (Testimony of Respondent, P.E. 1, 2, 3) Respondent's Business Activities in Daytona Beach, Florida On May 24, 1978, Respondent, d/b/a Deltec Construction Co., contracted with Darcy A. Vernier to assist him in the formation and operation of a corporation to be known as Trendway Construction Inc. In exchange for $8,500.00, Respondent agreed to provide a broad range of business assistance, expertise, training, and equipment to Trendway Construction, Inc. Vernier was designated General Manager and President of the new Company, and agreed to be individually responsible for its overall management. Although the long-term goal of the new Company was to perform general contracting, Vernier and Respondent envisioned that the Company would first gain necessary knowledge and experience by limiting its construction work to masonry and flat concrete construction projects. Profits were to be equally divided between Respondent (Deltec) and Vernier (Trendway), and, as subsequently amended, the Corporation was to be wholly owned by Vernier. (Testimony of Vernier, Respondent, P.E. 4) Prior to executing the contract, Vernier met with Respondent and discussed their proposed business venture on three separate occasions during a ten-day period. Vernier had his attorney review the contract prior to his signing, and fully understood its provisions. The proposed contract was modified, at Vernier's request, to ensure that Vernier would be the sole owner of the Corporation. (Testimony of Vernier) Prior to executing the contract, Respondent took Vernier to observe a masonry or flat concrete construction job in Ormond Beach, which he had recently completed d/b/a Deltec Construction Co. (Testimony of Vernier, Respondent) On July 6, 1978, pursuant to his contractual obligation, Respondent paid $250.00 for and obtained a Masonry Sub-Contractor's License, in Vernier's name, from the Building Department of the City of Daytona Beach. (Testimony of Respondent, Holmes, Vernier) Conflicting evidence was presented on whether, in order to do sub- contracting, masonry and flat concrete work within the City of Daytona Beach, a sub-contractor must also secure a certificate of competency or license from Volusia County under Ordinance 69-3. By stipulation, the testimony of Fred Holmes, Building Official with the City of Daytona Beach, was subsequently taken by deposition and submitted to determine this question. However, the testimony of Holmes is inconclusive, conflicting and unclear. (Testimony of Respondent, Vernier, Holmes, P.E. 7) Respondent did not represent to Vernier that Deltec Construction Co.'s licenses could be used by Vernier d/b/a Trendway Construction, Inc., and that no further licenses would be necessary. Vernier testified that Respondent made such representation, and Respondent denied it. Vernier's testimony is inconsistent with the express contractual provision which required Respondent to affirmatively secure "initial licensing" for Trendway Construction, Inc. Furthermore, Vernier's demeanor as a witness reflected a level of bitterness and hostility toward Respondent which may have influenced his recollection. (Since his construction company failed, Vernier had demanded Respondent return his money and filed a civil suit for such purpose.) In contrast, Respondent's unequivocal testimony on this question is buttressed by his consistent actions in securing an additional license for the Company from the City of Daytona Beach), and his subsequent action in attempting to secure a local license for another company under a contract markedly similar to the one between Vernier and Respondent, post. (Testimony of Respondent, Vernier, Garr, Fortner) Respondent was aware, however, that the Company would eventually have to acquire a license from Volusia County; he concluded, though, that his contractual obligations to secure "initial licensing" encompassed only the license required by the City of Daytona Beach. (Testimony of Respondent) Trendway Construction, Inc., was never organized as a corporation as envisioned by the contract between Respondent and Vernier. Soon after the contract was signed, serious business disagreements arose between Respondent and Vernier. Vernier, then, unilaterally moved the business, including its equipment, furnishings, office forms, and principal employee from Daytona Beach and relocated in another community. From the execution of the contract to Vernier's ultimate closing of the business, Respondent never received any profits from its operation, and his non-participation in the business operations was acknowledged by Vernier. During September or October, 1978, Vernier changed the name of the Company to Pelican Construction Co. During its existence, Trendway Construction was not registered as a fictitious name with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Volusia County. (Testimony of Respondent, Vernier) Respondent's Business Activities in Ocala, Florida During September and October, 1978), Respondent operated a duly licensed masonry and flat concrete construction business known as Deltec Construction Co., in Ocala, Florida. (Testimony of Garr, Fortner, Respondent) On October 5, 1978, Respondent d/b/a Deltec Construction Co. contracted with Albert W. Latham to assist in the formation and operation of a corporation to be known as Trendway Construction, Inc. (In the Daytona Beach transaction, Trendway Construction Co. had never been incorporated by Vernier, and he had subsequently changed the Company's name, infra.) In exchange for $8,500.00, Respondent agreed to provide business assistance, expertise, training and equipment to Trendway Construction, Inc. Albert Latham was designated as General Manager and President of the newly formed Company, and agreed to be individually responsible for its general overall management. Although general construction was the Company's long-term objective, the parties invisioned that necessary knowledge and experience would be acquired by limiting their initial work to sub-contracting masonry and flat concrete construction projects. Profits were to be equally divided between Respondent and Latham, and 60 percent of the capital stock of the corporation was to be owned by Latham--the remaining 40 percent, by Respondent. (Testimony of Respondent, P.E. 13) On October 23, 1978, Trendway Construction, Inc., was officially organized and formed pursuant to the contract between Respondent and Latham. (P.E. 9) Under the contract between Respondent and Latham, Respondent was obligated to secure initial licensing for the new Company, Trendway Construction, Inc. Because Trendway Construction, Inc., was going to initially engage only in masonry and flat concrete sub-contracting work, the only license required was a certification of competency from the City of Ocala. Respondent made reasonable, diligent and earnest efforts to obtain the required certification from the City. First, he tried to apply for the license on behalf of Trendway Construction, Inc. But, since Latham owned a controlling interest in the Company, and was apparently considered its owner, City Building Department officials insisted that Latham must apply for the license on behalf of the Company. Respondent then obtained and delivered to Latham the necessary application forms and character reference letters, set up appointments for Latham at the Building Department, and repeatedly reminded him of the need to secure the local certification. Despite Respondent's efforts, Latham procrastinated, and failed to obtain from the City of Ocala the required license for Trendway Construction, Inc. It is probable that if proper application had been made for the license, it would have been issued to Latham d/b/a Trendway Construction, Inc., upon payment of the application fee and proof of insurance. (Testimony of Respondent, Garr, Fortner, P.E. 13) After formation of the Corporation, Respondent continued to provide assistance to Latham and Trendway Construction, Inc., but he did not dictate what construction work would be done or whore it would be undertaken. Latham directed two construction work crews and made those decisions. Nevertheless, Respondent warned Latham that no construction work should be undertaken within Ocala until the necessary City certification was obtained. (Testimony of Respondent) On October 24, 1978, Trendway Construction, Inc., poured a driveway slab for Herbert Adams at 2332 East Silver Spring Boulevard, Ocala, Florida, for $668.72. Adams dealt only with Jack Cook, an employee of Trendway, and neither knew nor had any dealings with Respondent. (Testimony of Adams, Garr) The name of "Trendway Construction, Inc.," has not been registered with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Marion County, Florida. (Testimony of Respondent) Respondent did not attempt to mislead Latham by representing that Trendway Construction, Inc., could operate under Deltec's local or state licenses. (Testimony of Respondent) There was no evidence that Respondent mislead or misrepresented any material fact to Latham or failed to diligently carry out his obligations under their contract; neither was any evidence presented to show Latham was dissatisfied, in any manner, with Respondent's contractual performance. Respondent's Business Activities in Gainesville, Florida Respondent sold a construction business to Valentine Webber of Gainesville, Florida, for $8,500.00. (Testimony of Respondent)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board find Respondent Not Guilty of the charges contained in its Administrative Complaint, and that the Complaint be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675
