Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $2,500.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Filed May 7, 2014 3:10 PM Division of Administratite Hearings ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this day of Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by Jaw, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct soppot this Final Ordgr was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this 7&—day of a4 Agency for Health Care Administration Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 2727 alth Care Administration oop, Agency Clerk Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 —T Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Alba M. Rodriguez, Senior Attorney Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Powell & Mack Agency for Health Care Administration 3700 Bellwood Drive (Electronic Mail) Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (U.S. Mail) Jessica E. Varn Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail)
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $5,000.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Filed June 28, 2013 3:38 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. Conditional licensure status is imposed on the Respondent beginning on January 17, 2013, and ending February 17, 2013. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 2+ day of Tene , 2013. Elizabe ae oo Agencyfor Health'Zare Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and comect apy ors Final Order_was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this2e> ay of Jane , 2013. p-AGE Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Thomas J. Walsh II Rick E. Harris, Esq. Office of the General Counsel Starnes Davis Florie LLP Agency for Health Care Administration 100 Brookwood Place — 7" Floor (Electronic Mail) Birmingham, Alabama 35209 (U.S. Mail)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D- 1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious? Mercy has also raised one issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Introduction. The HCCB and Its Hospital Grouping Function. The HCCB was formed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1979). The HCCB was created pursuant to the specific authority of Section 395.503, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to further the accomplishment of legislative intent contained in Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): It is the intent of the Legislature to assure that adequate health care is affordable and accessible to all the citizens of this state. To further the accomplishment of this goal, the Hospital Cost Containment Board is created to advise the Legislature regarding health care costs; inflationary trends in health care costs; the impact of health care costs on the state budget; the impact of hospital charges and third-party reimbursement mechanisms on health care costs; and the education of consumers and providers of health care services in order to encourage price competition in the health care marketplace. The Legislature finds and declares that rising hospital costs and cost shifting are of vital concern to the people of this state because of the danger that hospital services are becoming unaffordable and thus inaccessible to residents of the state. It is further declared that hospital costs should be contained through improved competition between hospitals and improved competition between insurers, through financial incentives which foster efficiency instead of inefficiency, and through sincere initiatives on behalf of providers, insurers, and consumers to contain costs. As a safety net, it is the intent of the Legislature to establish a program of prospective budget review and approval in the event that competition-oriented methods do not adequately contain costs and the access of Floridians to adequate hospital care becomes jeopardized because of unaffordable costs. As a part of its responsibilities the HCCB is required, "after consulting with appropriate professional and governmental advisory bodies and holding public hearings, and considering existing and proposed systems of accounting and reporting utilized by hospitals," to specify a uniform system of financial reporting for hospitals. Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes Suppl.) to: In order to allow "meaningful comparisons" of data reported by hospitals under the uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB is required by Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.) to group hospitals according to characteristics, including, but not limited to, a measure of the nature and range of services provided, teaching hospital status, number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff, percentage of Medicare inpatient days, average daily census, geographical differences, and, when available, case mix. In providing for grouping of hospital, the HCCB is required to establish ten general hospital groups and additional speciality groups "as needed." Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). No hospital group can contain fewer than five hospitals, however. Id. Grouping is to be provided by rule. Id. Pursuant to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), every Florida hospital is required to file its budget with the HCCB for "approval." The budget is required to be filed on forms adopted by the HCCB and based on the uniform system of financial reporting. Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). To determine whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, all hospitals in Florida are to be placed in groups. A hospital's budget is then compared to the budgets of the hospitals assigned to its group. Hospital groups for this purpose are established pursuant to Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The provisions of Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), are identical to Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). In determining whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, Section 305.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), establishes two initial "screens" which a hospital must meet based upon the hospital's gross revenue per adjusted admission. The term "gross revenue" is defined as: the sum of daily hospital service charges, ambulatory service charges, ancillary service charges, and other operating revenue. Gross revenues do not include contributions, donations, legacies, or bequests made to a hospital without restriction by the donors. Section 395.502(11), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). "Adjusted admission" is defined by Section 395.502(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), as: the sum of acute admissions and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues generated from acute, intensive, ambulatory, and ancillary patient services to gross revenues. Gross revenues per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA") is therefore the total hospital ambulatory and ancillary service charges and other operating revenue for all acute and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues from acute, intensive, ambulatory and ancillary patient services to gross revenue; or, stated more simply , inpatient revenue per admission. The "screens" which must be met in order for a hospital's budget to be approved upon initial determination are: (1) the hospital's GRAA must not be in the upper 20th percentile of the hospitals within its group; and (2) the rate of increase in a hospital's GRAA as contained in its current budget compared to the hospital's GRAA as reported in its most recently approved budget must not exceed a "maximum allowable rate of increase" if the hospital's GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of the hospitals in its group. If a hospital's GRAA is in the 49th percentile or less of the hospitals in its group, its budget is automatically approved. In determining whether a hospital's GRAA fails the screens, Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), provides: Percentile values for gross operating revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly by the board for each group established pursuant to s. 395.507(2) by ranking projected gross operating revenues per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. In determining the applicability of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), the board shall consider the basis of the projections by the hospital, including consideration of the following factors: any increase in patient admissions caused by the creation of preferred provider organizations or health maintenance organiza- tions, population increases, changes in the hospital case mix or in services offered, changes in technology, or other similar factors. If a hospital's GRAA fails either of the screens (its GRAA is in the upper 20th percentile of its group or its GRAA rate of increase is excessive and its GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of its group) that hospital's budget must be reviewed by the HCCB "to determine whether the rate of increase contained in the budget is just, reasonable, and not excessive." Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). Pursuant to Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB is authorized, if it first determines under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that the hospital's rate of increase is not just, reasonable and not excessive, to amend or disapprove any hospital's budget which does not meet the two screens of Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to establish a rate of increase which is "just, reasonable, and not excessive." The HCCB's authority under Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), applies only if the HCCB first complies with the following pertinent provisions of Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): The board shall disapprove any budget, or part thereof, as excess that contains a rate of increase which is not necessary to maintain the existing level of services of the hospital or, if the hospital increases its existing level of services, any amount not necessary to accomplish that increase. In making such deterioration . . . the board shall consider the following criteria: The efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the services and facilities provided by the hospital. The cost of providing services and the value of the services to the public. The ability of the hospital to improve services and facilities. The ability of the hospital to reduce the cost of services. The ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return. The accuracy of previous budget submissions by the hospital compared to the actual experience of the hospital the The number of patient days reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid. The number of patient days attributable to the medically indigent. The research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching hospital. The projected expenditures or revenues for or from construction of facilities or new services which are subject to regulation under s. 381.494 may not be included in the budget of a hospital until the construction or services are approved or authorized by the state health planning agency. The cost of opening a new hospital, for first 3 years. The Challenged Rules. In carrying out its duty to establish a uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB adopted Section 4D- 1.03, F.A.C., which provides: The Board, pursuant to Section 395.505, Florida Statutes, hereby adopts and establishes a uniform system for hospitals to file the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report of financial and statistical information. This system is described and the forms, instructions, and definitions therefor are contained in the Board's publication entitled Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual. The Chart of Accounts adopted pursuant to Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes, and this Chapter 4D-1, and as hereafter modified, shall be utilized by each hospital for submitting the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report and the budget report. In order to determine whether a hospital's budget should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB adopted Section 4D-1.12, F.A.C. Sections 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., provide: The staff shall review the budget report based upon the hospital's ranking for gross revenue per adjusted admission within its group and upon its rate of change in gross revenue per adjusted admission in the proposed budget as required in Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes, and the most recently Board approved budget. As part of the budget report review process, groupings of hospitals shall be established according to the characteristics and methodology as outlined in Chapter V, Section B, Hospital Unit Uniform Reporting System Manual and as outlined in Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes. Percentile values for gross revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly for each group by ranking projected gross revenue per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. 12. Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., are the rules challenged by Mercy. These rules, as quoted herein, were effective as of November 5, 1984. The rules were originally adopted effective June 30, 1980. The rules were amended to their present wording in response to "major" legislation enacted in 1984 which amended Part II, Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), and granted authority to the HCCB for the first time to approve, disapprove or amend hospital budgets under certain circumstances. Chapter 79-106, Laws of Florida. The challenged rules essentially provide that the HCCB, when grouping of hospitals for purposes of the uniform system of financial reporting and for purposes of reviewing and comparing budgets to determine if they should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), will apply the grouping methodology outlined in Chapter V, Section B of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"). Section 4D-1.18, F.A.C., also adopted effective November 5, 1984, incorporates by reference the Manual within each rule in Chapter 4D-1, F.A.C., which references the Manual. This rule has not been challenged in this proceeding. The Hospital Grouping Methodology and Its Development. Generally, Chapter V, Section B of the Manual, sets out the objective of the grouping methodology, the procedure for forming groups, a list of the variables considered in forming groups and the weight to be accorded each variable. The goals of the grouping methodology, as provided in the Manual, are to "facilitate comparison of hospitals with similar patient mix and market conditions" and to "develop groups of sufficient size . . . to assure statistically valid comparisons." Based upon the procedure for forming groups contained in the Manual, hospitals are grouped into nine, non-teaching, short-term hospital groups, one Major teaching hospital group and a number of specialty hospital groups. It is the method of grouping hospitals into nine short-term hospital groups which is at issue in this proceeding. Assignment of hospitals to the nine short-term hospital groups is accomplished through the use of the "McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm included in the cluster analysis t computer program package CLAN developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham (June, 1980 version)." A clustering analysis is a method of grouping a set of objects (in this case, hospitals) into relatively homogeneous groups. The goal of a clustering algorithm is to minimize the differences between the members of the group. The objects are grouped based upon a set of variables which are considered significant for purposes of comparing the objects. In order to account for the significance of each variable, the variables are weighted. The variables have a numerical score and after weighing, the weighted sum of the variables for each object is compared and the objects are grouped based upon their variable scores. There are a number of clustering algorithms which can be used to group hospitals. The HCCB chose to use the "McQueen's K-means" clustering algorithm. The use of McQueens K-means clustering algorithm has not bean challenged in this proceeding. Nor does the evidence establish that the selection of McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm is arbitrary and capricious. The clustering algorithm is performed by computer. The computer program utilized by the HCCB to perform the algorithm is called "CLAN" and was developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham. The evidence at the hearing supports a finding that the selection of this computer program is reasonable. Once hospitals are grouped, they are notified of their group designation and allowed to request reconsideration of their group assignment. The request must made within thirty days after notification. Following the creation of the HCCB in 1979, Price Waterhouse & Company was engaged by the HCCB as a consultant to assist in still establishing an appropriate hospital grouping methodology. The HCCB also created an advisory committee to assist the HCCB and Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology. This committee, designated as the Technical Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "TAC") was comprised of individuals from the hospital industry and academia and certified public accountants. The TAC worked with Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology and the uniform reporting system. Because of time constraints, the TAC's involvement with evaluating the methodology was limited. The HCCB ultimately decided to pattern the grouping methodology it adopted after the grouping methodology then being used by the State of Washington, as recommended by Price Waterhouse & Company. The Washington system was not adopted exactly; a number of changes to Washington's methodology were made to the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. Mercy has proposed several findings of fact beginning on page 35 and ending on page 38 of its proposed order concerning the "Differences in Washington Hospital Characteristics and Grouping Methodology Model." Those proposed findings of fact can be and are hereby disposed of by the following finding of fact: because of differences in the hospital industries of the States of Florida and Washington and other differences between the two States, Florida's grouping methodology cannot be justified solely on the basis that Washington's grouping methodology was used as a starting point in developing Florida's grouping methodology. Those differences, however, do not support a finding of fact that Florida's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious since the Washington system was not adopted without substantial modifications, including a reduction of Washington's eighteen variables initially to fourteen and ultimately to seven, and the use of unequal weighting of the variables. The TAC reviewed and discussed the grouping methodology initially approved by the HCCB prior to its approval. Some of Mercy's witnesses, who were members of the TAC, indicated during their testimony that the TAC never decided anything because no "vote" was ever taken of TAC members and that the TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. Their testimony in this regard has been given little weight. The fact that no formal "vote" was taken of TAC members does not mean that the TAC did not take a position on matters it discussed. The consensus of the TAC could be, and was, gleaned from its discussions. The staff of the HCCB in fact reported decisions of the TAC to the HCCB verbally and by minutes of TAC meetings. Although the accuracy of staff's reports was sometimes questioned, no question was raised about whether TAC had taken positions. The fact that the HCCB staff reported TAC actions to the HCCB also disputes the testimony to the effect that TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. While it may be true that TAC did not deal directly with the HCCB, its analysis was reported, to the HCCB. The HCCB ultimately adopted rules effective June 30, 1980, which incorporated by reference to the Manual, the general outline of the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. The TAC ceased to exist following adoption of the HCCB's initial rules. Two new advisory committees were formed: a Technical Advisory Panel (hereinafter referred to as "TAP") on grouping and a TAP for financial analysis. The grouping TAP was made up of individuals from the hospital industry. The grouping TAP met in November and December of 1980 and reviewed the results of test runs of the grouping methodology initially adopted by the HCCB. The results of the initial run were described as "bizarre." This run used equal weighting of the variables. Equal weighting was abandoned and three to four more test runs were made and reviewed by the grouping TAP. After each run the variable weights were adjusted until the results appeared to be "reasonable." The HCCB also established a committee consisting of members of the HCCB designated as the Research and Development Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "R & D Committee"). The R & D Committee reviewed the results of test runs and also found the final groups reasonable. The HCCB met in January, 1981, and adopted the grouping methodology with the adjusted variable weights arrived at as a result of the test runs for use in establishing hospital groups for use in 1981. The grouping methodology was reviewed every year after its initial adoption in 1980. The methodology was reviewed by the HCCB, HCCB's staff, the TAP's and the R & D Committee each year. Throughout the period from 1980 to the present, criticisms of the grouping methodology have been made. Some of these criticisms were agreed with and others were rejected by the HCCB or its staff. Following review of the grouping methodology by the TAP's and the R & D Committee in 1981, the original fourteen variables were reduced to eight. In January, 1982, the weight of one of the variables was changed and one variable was replaced by another variable. In December, 1982, a variable was deleted; seven variables remained. In 1983, clustering analysis was limited in its application to the formation of short-term acute care general hospital groups. In 1984, following the significant amendment of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), the HCCB adopted the present challenged rules. The rules were effective November 5, 1984. The only change in the grouping methodology approved by the HCCB was the substitution of the Florida price level index variable for percent of population over age 65. The weight assigned to the Florida price level index was the same as the weight that had been assigned to the percent of population over age 65. The changes made to the grouping methodology in 1984 were first suggested by the staff of the HCCB to the grouping TAP in June of 1984. The grouping TAP met on July 11, 1984 and considered and discussed the proposed changes. A number of problem areas were discussed. Although no test run results were presented at this TAP meeting, they were provided to TAP members before the HCCB adopted the grouping methodology changes. Concerns about the geographic or exogenous variables expressed at the grouping TAP meeting suggested a belief that too much or too little emphasis was being placed on geographic considerations. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact beginning on page 33 and ending on page 35 of its proposed order concerning the significance of the changes made by the Legislature in 1984 to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983). Those proposed findings of fact essentially deal with the fact that the powers of the HCCB after the 1984 amendments may have a more significant impact on hospitals and that, therefore, the grouping methodology is of greater interest to hospitals. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not, however, relevant in determining whether the challenged rules are arbitrary and capricious. The fact that the effect of the grouping methodology on a hospital may now be different does not mean that the use of the grouping methodology, as modified after the 1984 legislative changes to the law, which was developed when the purpose of grouping was different, is not an appropriate methodology. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. Therefore, to the extent that Mercy's proposed findings of fact under Section II, A, of its proposed order have not already been made, they are rejected as unnecessary. Mercy and the HCCB have proposed findings of fact as to whether Mercy has ever questioned the HCCB's grouping methodology since it was first adopted prior to instituting this proceeding. Those proposed findings of fact are not deemed relevant in determining whether the grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. If the grouping methodology is in fact arbitrary and capricious, the fact that Mercy did not challenge the methodology when it was first adopted will not make it any less arbitrary and capricious today. Mercy's Challenge. A. Introduction. Mercy is a not-for-profit, general acute care hospital with 550 licensed beds located in Dade County, Florida. Mercy has raised a number of points in this proceeding and its proposed order in challenging the rules in question. All of those points, according to Mercy, prove that the rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In determining whether the facts support such a conclusion, the following standard must be kept in mind: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within the grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Agrico Chemical Company v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (1979). Additionally, the following must be kept in mind: The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. . . . An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. . . . Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. . . . Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The witnesses who testified in this proceeding who were accepted as experts were qualified in a number of different areas. Those witnesses qualified as experts in statistical analysis or related areas and health care finance rendered opinions as to the appropriateness of the HCCB's grouping methodology. The method of grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB is a statistical method. Therefore, the determination of whether the HCCB's methodology is arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon whether the methodology is statistically sound. Mercy and the HCCB therefore presented the testimony of witnesses qualified in the area of statistics: Rick Zimmerman, Ph.D., an expert in statistical analysis and social science statistics (for Mercy), and Duane Meeter, Ph.D., an expert in economics and applied statistical analysis and Frank Fox, Jr., Ph.D., an expert in applied statistics (for the HCCB). All three witnesses were knowledgeable and credible. Dr. Zimmerman testified that the HCCB's grouping methodology was "clearly inappropriate." Dr. Zimmerman's opinion was based upon a three step analysis in which he determined: (1) whether the variables selected by the HCCB are appropriate; (2) whether the weights assigned to the variables by the HCCB are appropriate; and, (3) the effect changing the variables and/or weights would have on hospital groups. The results of Dr. Zimmerman's analysis, which formed the basis for his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology is not appropriate, are discussed, infra. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact in its proposed order concerning the credibility of Dr. Meeter's and Dr. Fox's testimony. Some of those proposed findings of fact have been considered in determining the weight given to their testimony. Both Dr. Meeter and Dr. Fox were, however, knowledgeable and credible. In addition to the opinion of its statistical expert, Mercy presented the testimony of three witnesses who were accepted as experts in health care finance: Messrs. Lawrence R. Murray, Jerry A. Mashburn and Anthony Krayer. All three are certified public accountants. All testified that it was his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology was arbitrary. The bases for their opinions are discussed, infra. Selection of "Seed" Hospitals. In order to use a clustering algorithm, a starting point is needed; the first object (hospital) to be placed in each group must be selected. The first objects selected are called "seed" objects. Mercy has attached the HCCB's method of selecting the nine "seed" hospitals in initially performing the McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm. Mercy has proposed the following findings of fact with regard to this point: While none of the parties challenged the use of McQueen's and the CLAN program, no support was offered during the hearing for the method by which the HCCB had selected the nine seed hospitals as initial clustering points. The HCCB's own statistician criticized the HCCB's selection method. The Rankis-Zimmerman report indicates that the final groupings based upon the HCCB's seed hospitals were vastly different than groupings based upon the utilization of seed hospitals selected on a statistical basis. Both the HCCB's and Mercy's statisticians proposed statistically sound methods for selecting seed hospitals, which had not been employed by the HCCB in the Grouping Methodology. [Citations omitted] These proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. The burden is on Mercy to show that the selection of "seed" hospitals was arbitrary and capricious; the HCCB is not required to show "support" for its method of selecting the seed hospitals. Additionally, whether there are other methods of selecting seed hospitals is not the test. The HCCB's interpretation of the statute need not be the sole interpretation or even the most desirable one; it only needs to be within the range of possible interpretations. Durrani, supra. Therefore, even if the Rankis-Zimmerman report does indicate that the final groupings of hospitals of the HCCB were vastly different than groupings based upon other methods of selecting seed hospitals, it does not automatically follow that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was not "within the range of possible interpretations. The weight of the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was arbitrary and capricious. Selection of the Variables. In delegating legislative authority to the HCCB to establish a grouping methodology, the Legislature provided that the following relevant characteristics are to be taken into account: A measure of the nature and range of services provided; Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff; Percentage of Medicare inpatient days; Average daily census; Geographic differences; and Case mix, "when available." In response to the Legislature's mandate, the HCCB has adopted seven variables or characteristics. The variables selected by the HCCB include five hospital- specific (endogenous) variables and two geographic (exogenous variables). The variables are as follows: Endogenous Variables: Average occupied beds. Available services. Physician mix. Number of residents. Percent Medicare days. Exogenous Variables: Florida price level index. Personal income. The following findings of fact are made with regard to each of the specific characteristics required to be taken into account by the Legislature and the variables adopted by the HCCB: 1. A measure of the nature and range of services provided. The HCCB has provided in the Manual that "available services" or a service index will be considered. The specific services considered are listed on Table B, Chapter V, of the Manual. Table B also weights or provides a score for each of the various services listed. Each hospital gets the specified score if it has a particular service available. The available services listed are based upon a survey of hospital administrators and chief financial officers in New York, New York, made in the 1970's. Problems with the list of available services have been pointed out to the HCCB and its staff. The primary problem is that the volume of services provided is not taken into account. The problems with the service index, however, relate to the fact that the service index is a proxy for case mix. To date, there is no alternative available which would be a better proxy for case mix. The Legislature contemplated this fact by providing that a measure of the services provided by a hospital will be considered and that case mix will be taken into account "when available." Therefore, while there are "problems" with the service index, consideration of available services is mandated by the Legislature and there are no acceptable alternatives available use for by the HCCB. 2. Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff. 52. The HCCB has provided that a physician specialties mix be considered in grouping hospitals. This physician specialties mix is based upon a list of twenty- six specialties for which a hospital gets a single credit for each specialty available regardless of the number of physician specialists available in each specialty or the volume of patients admitted by a physician. 52. Like the service index, the physician specialties mix is a proxy for ease mix and has problems associated with its use. Also like the service index, consideration of this factor is mandated and there are no acceptable alternatives available for use by the HCCB. 3. Percentage of Medicare inpatient days. 53. The HCCB has provided that "percentage Medicare days be considered in grouping hospitals. Consideration of this variable has not been shown to be arbitrary and capricious. 4. Average daily census. 53. The HCCB has provided that "average occupied beds" is to be considered in grouping hospitals. It does not appear that this variable's use was proper, as discussed, infra. 5. Geographic differences. The HCCB has provided that geographic differences be considered in grouping hospitals by providing for the inclusion of the Florida price level index, by county, and median income, by county, as variables to be considered. The only thing that the evidence established with regard to these variables was that they are not "very good" predictors, that "if" they are intended as a measure of input prices they are "poor substitutes," and that there may be "better" measures of the cost of doing business. The evidence does not, however, show that the use of these variables is arbitrary and capricious. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact concerning geographic influences in part II, H of its proposed order. The proposed findings of fact begin on page 29 and end on page 33. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not made in this Final Order because they are not deemed relevant or material and are unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact contained in part II, H of Mercy's proposed order purportedly show that the HCCB has inadequately accounted for geographic influences. The evidence does establish that the financial characteristics of Florida hospitals and GRAA are affected by the geographic location of a hospital. This is especially true in Florida because of the impact on parts of the State from tourism, language barriers, the number of elderly residents, the available labor markets, and competition. It is also true that the combined weights of the two geographic variables the HCCB has selected for consideration in the grouping methodology--the Florida price level index and median income--is only one-seventh of the combined weights of all the HCCB's variables. It is also true that the grouping methodology results in hospitals from different areas of the State being grouped together, i.e., Mercy's hospital group includes twenty- three hospitals, four of which are located in Dade County and three of which are located in Escambia County. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the HCCB has been arbitrary and capricious in designating only two variables to take into account geographic differences between hospitals. The evidence also does not support a conclusion that it was not proper for the HCCB to limit the weight of the geographic variables to one-seventh of the total weight of the variables. Nor does the evidence demonstrate that the inclusion of hospitals from different areas of the State in the same group is not a proper result just because geographic influences are important. The fact that a large percentage of Dade County and south Florida hospitals do not qualify for automatic approval of their budgets under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), because they are in the upper 20th and the upper 50th to 79th percentiles does not necessarily prove that geographic influences have not been adequately accounted for either, as suggested be Mercy on page 30 of its proposed order. The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion. Nor does it necessarily follow that because Dade County hospitals are "efficient" in the minds of some of Mercy's witnesses and yet are unable to achieve automatic approval of their budgets that the grouping methodology does not adequately account for geographic influences, as suggested by Mercy on pages 30 and 31 of its proposed order. First, the Legislature has provided that factors other than geographic differences are to be considered, which the HCCB has provided for. It may therefore be that some Dade County hospitals do not achieve automatic approval of their budgets because of the other variables. The fact that not all Dade County hospitals fail to achieve automatic approval of their budgets supports such a conclusion. Also, even though a hospital's budget is not automatically approved it does not necessarily mean that it is considered inefficient. If that were the case, its budget would probably be subject automatically to amendment or disapproval. That is not the case. If a hospital's budget is not automatically approved its budget is subject to further review under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). It may still be determined that the hospital is "efficient" based upon this review. The Legislature, in enacting Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, did indicate that it intended to promote competition and efficiency among hospitals in order to contain hospital costs. Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The grouping methodology and, in particular, the comparison of hospitals' GRAA under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), does not alone achieve that intent. Therefore the opinion of several of Mercy's witnesses that Dade County hospitals and in particular, Mercy, are efficient does not support a conclusion that the methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic influences are not adequately considered. On pages 31 and 32 of its proposed order, Mercy suggests that Dade County hospitals only compete with other Dade County hospitals and therefore grouping hospitals from all sections of the State is illogical. In support of this suggestion, Mercy proposes findings of fact to the effect that the HCCB has recognized that consumers are interested in comparing hospital charges on a regional basis and has provided information about hospital cost on a county-by- county basis in the past. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not accepted for essentially the same reasons that its proposed findings of fact with regard to the efficiency of hospitals were rejected. These proposed findings of fact do not support a finding that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic differences have not been adequately taken into account. Mercy's has also proposed findings of fact with regard to geographic differences to the effect that after the Legislature specifically required that "geographic differences" be considered in an amendment to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1981), in 1982, the HCCB has not added any additional geographic factors to be considered. Although no additional geographic variables have been added, geographic variables have been reviewed and have been changed since 1982. More importantly, these proposed findings of fact do not prove that the existing variables are not adequate. 6. Case Mix. 66. Case mix is to be taken into account "when available." The evidence does not establish that case mix is available at this time. 7. Other variables. The HCCB is not limited to a consideration of the factors which the Legislature specifically provided are to be considered. Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The only other variable the HCCB has provided for consideration is "number of residents." No evidence of significance concerning this variable was presented at the hearing. There was testimony at the hearing that there are other variables which would be appropriate for consideration in grouping hospitals. The evidence does not, however, establish that failure to consider other variables means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman opined that he had determined that the variables selected by the HCCB were not appropriate. Dr. Zimmerman based his opinion upon the fact that he had conducted a "multiple regression analysis." According to Dr. Zimmerman, a "multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relationship of a given set of independent, predictor variables (the HCCB's seven variables) to a single dependent variable (GRAA)." Based upon his application of multiple regression analysis, Dr. Zimmerman concluded that three of the variables used in the HCCB's grouping methodology are not statistically significant predictors of GRAA: available services, average occupied beds and median income. Two of these variables (available services and average occupied beds) are required by Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to be taken into account in the grouping methodology. These Sections also require that geographic factors, which median income is, be taken into account. This does not, however, mean that median income must be included as a variable by the HCCB. Dr. Meeter testified that the statistical significance of the HCCB's variables can be determined by the use of "log transformation." Based upon Dr. Meeter's use of log transformation, median income and available services are statistically significant variables; average occupied beds is not statistically significant. Although the HCCB was required to include "average daily census" as a factor in grouping hospitals, the HCCB was not required to use "average occupied beds." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's and Dr. Meeter's testimony, the use of average occupied beds as a variable was not proper. Whether the use of available services and median income as variables was proper depends upon whether log transformation is a proper method of determining the statistical significance of variables. Although the evidence on this question was in conflict, it appears that the use of log transformation was proper. The inclusion of available services and median income is therefore not arbitrary and capricious. A second problem with the variables used by the HCCB suggested by Dr. Zimmerman involves the correlation between the seven predictor variables or "multicollinearity." The existence of multicollinearity can invalidate a clustering program. Dr. Zimmerman determined that the correlation between the physician mix, available services and average occupied beds variables and between the Florida price level index and median income variables is large enough that there is a "potential" problem. Dr. Zimmerman's determination that there is a "potential" problem was made through two techniques. He first used "paired correlation." Based upon paired correlation, Dr. Zimmerman used a "rule of thumb" that a paired correlation of 0.7 or higher should be looked at closer. Finding a paired correlation between physician mix, available services and average occupied beds of .74 and between the Florida price level index and median income of .71, Dr. Zimmerman then calculated "R squared" to determine if a potential problem did in fact exist. Dr. Zimmerman indicated that the calculation of R squared is the most highly recommended method of determining if multicollinearity is a problem but agreed there are other methods of making such a determination. Dr. Meeter indicated that Dr. Zimmerman's rule of thumb that based upon paired correlations of 0.7 or higher indicates the problem should be looked at more closely is too strict. Other than Dr. Zimmerman's "experience" (which according to Dr. Zimmerman, consisted of a class he took), Dr. Zimmerman did not cite any authority which supported his rule of thumb. The only other source Dr. Zimmerman referred to--the "SPSS" manual--only indicates that the .82-1.0 range indicates that extreme collinearity exists. Another problem raised by Dr. Meeter with Dr. Zimmerman's conclusions as to multicollinearity, involves the use of "variance inflation factors" (hereinafter referred to as VIF is another technique used by statisticians to determine if multicollinearity is a problem. Dr. Zimmerman did not look at VIF. VIF can be determined by transforming R squared: VIF 1/1- R2. A VIF in excess of 5 or 10 is an indication that multicollinearity exists. One source quoted by Dr. Meeter even indicates that a much higher VIF is necessary to conclude that multicollinerity exists. Transforming Dr. Zimmerman's R squared calculations indicates that VIF is in excess of 5 in only one instance. As discussed more fully, infra, Dr. Zimmerman used a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals which he designated as "Schemes." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's "Scheme 3," Dr. Zimmerman found an R squared value of .819. The VIF for an R squared value of .819 is in excess of 5. Scheme 3, however, is not an application of the HCCB's grouping methodology; it is a grouping methodology in which the variables are assigned different weights. As indicated by Dr. Meeter, the weights used in grouping can effect the correlation of the variables. Therefore, the fact that Scheme 3 indicates a possible multicollinearity problem does not prove that multicollinearity is in fact a problem with the HCCB's grouping methodology. Based upon the foregoing it is found that multicollinearity does not exist sufficiently to conclude that the variables used by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman only testified that there was a "potential" problem. Additionally, although multicollinearity may invalidate a clustering program, the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's clustering program is in fact invalid because of any existing "potential" problem. In light of the foregoing findings of fact, it is clear that the HCCB's variables are appropriate with the exception of average occupied beds. The fact that this one variable is not statistically significant, however, does not by itself support a finding that the grouping methodology is inappropriate. The Lack of Testing of the Grouping Methodology. A third point raised by Mercy is entitled "Lack of Testing" in its proposed order and includes several proposed findings of fact on pages 17 and 18 of Mercy's proposed order. Mercy has essentially proposed findings of fact that: (1) it had been recommended to the HCCB when it originally adopted its grouping methodology in 1980 that a statistician be hired to test the grouping methodology; (2) that the failure to do so had been criticized in the past; that it had been recommended that the HCCB obtain assistance of individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate the grouping process but had failed to do so; (4) that the HCCB had not, until just prior to the hearing of this case, hired a statistician; (5) that the HCCB has not used multiple regression analysis or within-cluster co- variance weighting; and, (6) that the State of Washington's State Hospital Commission has employed a statistician to test its methodology and has effectively been advised by individuals knowledgeable with Washington's hospital characteristics. These proposed findings of fact do not establish that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious even if they were all correct findings of fact. All that these proposed findings of fact show is that the HCCB may not have gone about the adoption of its grouping methodology in the most appropriate manner. Any such shortcomings, based upon 20/20 hindsight, in the manner in which the methodology was adopted do not prove that the grouping methodology itself is not appropriate. Additionally, the evidence does not support all of these proposed findings. In particular, as was discussed, supra, the HCCB did in fact look to individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate its grouping methodology. The Weight of the Variables. The most significant and troublesome challenge made by Mercy to the HCCB's grouping methodology involves the weights assigned to the variables considered in grouping hospitals. The weights assigned by the HCCB to the seven HCCB variables are: Variable Weight Endogenous: Average occupied beds. 1.0 Available services. 2.0 Physician mix. 0.5 Number of residents. 0.5 Percent Medicare days. 2.0 Exogenous: Florida price level index. 0.5 Personal income. 0.5 The determination of whether the weights selected by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon the evidence presented at the hearing by those witnesses knowledgeable in the field of statistics. Three witnesses were qualified as experts in statistically related fields. All three were well qualified in their fields and were credible and persuasive. According to Dr. Zimmerman, "the weights used currently by the HCCB are clearly inappropriate." In Mercy exhibit 17, Dr. Zimmerman reaches the following conclusion with regard to the HCCB's variable weights: These weights clearly do not reflect the relationship of the various variables to GRAA and thus appear as arbitrary and inappropriate for use in clustering hospitals on the basis of cost-related variables. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion is based upon the use of "multiple regression analysis," which, according to Mercy exhibit 17, "assesses the relationship of each of the predictor variables to the dependent measure (GRAA)." The evidence, however, does not support a finding of fact that multiple regression analysis is the only statistically valid method of establishing weights to be used in clustering analysis. In fact, there are a number of statistically valid methods of establishing variable weights. One of those acceptable methods is the "subjective" method which was used by the HCCB. Doctors Meeter and Fox substantiated this finding of fact. The use of the subjective method involves the participation of individuals knowledgable in the Florida hospital industry in reviewing and commenting on the weights used. The evidence clearly supports a finding that individuals with such knowledge participated in the process of developing the HCCB's grouping methodology including the selection of variable weights. Even one of Mercy's witnesses provided testimony which supports this conclusion: Mr. Kenneth G. McGee testified that "[i] t was just a trial and error process of changing weights until we ended up with something that people considered more reasonable than what had been produced in the past." Mercy has questioned Dr. Meeter's testimony with regard to the use of the subjective method of weighting variables based upon a number of proposed findings of fact. First, Mercy has proposed findings of fact to the effect that Dr. Meeter indicated that the subjective method is "bad" if not carefully applied. What Dr. Meeter actually said was that any method should be applied carefully. Secondly, Mercy has proposed a finding of fact that in a book relied upon by Dr. Meeter in rendering his opinion about the subjective method--John Hardigan's 1975 book, Clustering Algorithms--the author describes the subjective method as an "unsatisfactory" one. What Dr. Meeter's testimony proves is that Hardigan's comment was a tongue- in-cheek comment that there are several appropriate methods of weighting variables all of which are unsatisfactory, including regression analysis (used by Dr. Zimmerman) and the subjective method (use by the HCCB). Dr. Meeter also relied upon other statistical literature in rendering his opinion as to the use of the subjective method in determining variable weights. Finally, Mercy has suggested that Dr. Meeter did not undertake any independent "statistical" analysis which would support his opinions. Based upon the nature of Dr. Meeter's testimony, it does not appear that such a statistical analysis is a prerequisite to concluding that the use of the subjective method is an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Mercy has proposed a finding that the subjective method of weighting is inappropriate based upon Dr. Zimmerman's testimony. Dr. Zimmerman was asked the following questions and gave the following responses concerning the subjective method: Q Now, in your understanding of how the Board arrived at its weights, is it your opinion that that is totally inappropriate methodology for clustering? Yes or no or maybe? A I am looking to counsel for counsel here. MR. PARKER: Do you understand the questions? THE WITNESS: I do understand the question. And let me give you my full answer as I best understand it. The weights -- and I think what I have commented on at great length -- the weights used by the Hospital Cost Containment Board are clearly on statistical grounds inappropriate. There's no question about that. BY MR. COLLETTE: Now, on these clustering grounds, you testified as to your familiarity with clustering grounds, on clustering grounds, are they totally inappropriate? A If the question is -- I wouldn't say that. Hearing that there is no objection, I will continue. I would rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as a final solution for cluster analysis. I think it might be one that would be considered at a very early step, but never used, as kind of a preliminary idea. However, I would clearly rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as something to be proud of and actually put into application. So, if that means yes to your question, I guess yes in that specific way. Dr. Zimmerman's responses are not totally clear with regard to whether the subjective method is, in his opinion, an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Nor would his response, if totally clear, overcome the weight of the evidence in support of a conclusion that the HCCB's method of determining variable weights is not arbitrary and capricious. Alternative Methods of Grouping Hospitals. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact under a section of its proposed order entitled "Alternative Variables and Weights Indicated by Statistical Analyses." Pages 22 to 29 of Mercy's proposed order. Some of the proposed findings included therein have been dealt with in other portions of this Final Order, including those findings of fact dealing with the use of multiple regression analysis and multicollinearity. In Dr. Zimmerman's report (Mercy exhibit 17) and during his testimony a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals were tested and evaluated. Dr. Zimmerman concluded that a number of these alternative methods would be preferable to the methodology adopted by the HCCB. Dr. Zimmerman tested twelve different methods (referred to as "Schemes" by Dr. Zimmerman): the HCCB's, the State of Washington's and ten other methods which used some or all of the seven variables designated by the HCCB. Scheme 3 used all seven variables selected by the HCCB but with different weights. Dr. Zimmerman rejected this scheme because of multicollinearity. In Scheme 4, Dr. Zimmerman used only the four variables which he found to be statistically significant: physician specialties mix, number of residents, percent Medicare days and the Florida price level index. Dr. Zimmerman recognized that this Scheme was not acceptable because of the statutory mandate as to the types of factors which must be taken into account. In order to recognize the requirement of Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that certain variables be taken into account and to alleviate the purported multicollinearity problem, Dr. Zimmerman combined the variables he considered highly correlated into two "scales." "Scale 1" combined physician specialties mix, available services and average occupied beds and "Scale 2" combined the Florida price level index and median income. The weights assigned to these scale were based upon the weights Dr. Zimmerman felt were more appropriate as discussed, supra. Dr. Zimmerman then used multiple regression analysis and a variety of combinations of variables and Scales in Schemes 6-12. Of these Schemes, Dr. Zimmerman testified that Schemes 6 and 10 were preferable, if Scheme 4 could not be used. Scheme 6 involved the use of all of the variables: percent Medicare days, number of residents and Scales 1 and 2. Scheme 10 involved the use of all of the variables except median income: percent Medicare days, number of residents, the Florida price level index and Scale 1. Dr. Zimmerman compared the results of using the HCCB's grouping methodology to the results from using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. The results showed that more Dade County hospitals had GRAA's, in comparison to the hospitals in the resulting groups under Schemes 3,4,6 and 10, which would result in automatic approval of their budgets than under the HCCB's methodology. Mercy's position within its group also improved as a result of using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. These proposed findings of and Mercy's proposed findings of fact concerning alternatives considered by Dr. Meeter do not prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. As found, supra, six of the seven variables selected by the HCCB are reasonable. The weights assigned to those variables have also been found to be reasonable and Mercy's suggested findings of fact with regard to multicollinearity have been rejected. Mercy has failed to prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, any alternative methods or Schemes and the results of using such methods cannot and do not overcome such findings. Conclusions. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the bases for the opinions that the HCCB's grouping methodology is inappropriate are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion, which was based upon a number of conclusions, was only supported by the fact that one of the variables selected by the HCCB is not proper. The evidence, however, does not support a finding that this fact alone means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is inappropriate. The facts do not support a conclusion that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is statutorily responsible for administering the Certificate of Need (CON) program and the promulgation of rules pertaining to tertiary health services. Promise Healthcare, Inc., is located at 999 Yamato Road, Third Floor, Boca Raton, Florida. Promise's wholly-owned subsidiary, Promise Healthcare of Florida III, Inc., has received approval to construct and operate an LTCH in AHCA Health Service Planning District (District) 3. See Promise Healthcare of Florida III, Inc. v. State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 06-0568CON (DOAH April 10, 2008; AHCA May 16, 2008). Select owns and operates an LTCH in Orlando, Florida, within District 7. Petitioners related corporations are currently and have been applicants in proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) seeking to establish LTCHs in the State of Florida. Id. See also Select Specialty Hospital - Marion, Inc. v. State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 04-3150CON (DOAH July 11, 2006; AHCA Sept. 23, 2006); Select Specialty Hospital - Broward, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 07-0597CON and Promise Healthcare of Florida X, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 07-0598CON (Consolidated). The Proposed Rule In December 2005 and September 2006, the Agency published separate notices of proposed rule development proposing to include long-term care hospitals within the rule definition of tertiary health service. On June 8, 2007, the Agency published a copy of the proposed rule at issue in this proceeding in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The proposed rule is one of several proposed changes to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.002, providing definitions. The stated purpose and effect of the entire proposed rule changes to Rule 59C-1.002 is "to amend the rule that defines terms in Chapter 59C-1, F.A.C. due to recent statutory changes " On July 13, 2007, a public hearing was held. Proposed rule 59C-1.002(41)(i) provides: "'Tertiary health service' means a health service. . . . .The types of tertiary services to be regulated under the Certificate of Need Program in addition to those listed in Florida Statutes include: . . . (i) Long-term care hospitals. The Agency relies on Sections 408.034(6) and 408.15(8), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for all of the changes to Rule 59C-1.002, including subsection(41)(i). All of the proposed rule changes implement Sections 408.033(1)(a), 408.036(1)-(3), 408.037(1), 408.039(1) and (2), and 651.118, Florida Statutes. See also endnote 3. ("'Law implemented' means the language of the enabling statute being carried out or interpreted by an agency through rulemaking." Ch. 2008-104, § 2, Laws of Fla.) Section 408.034(6) authorizes the Agency to adopt rules necessary to implement Sections 408.031-408.045, known as the "Health Facility and Services Development Act." See also § 408.15(8), Fla. Stat., providing similar authority. Section 408.033(1)(a) pertains to Local Health Councils. Section 408.036(1)-(3) include projects that are subject to CON review, including expedited review, and projects that are exempt from CON review. (The new construction or establishment of additional health care facilities, which includes long-term care hospitals by definition, see Section 408.032(8), Florida Statutes, are subject to CON review.) Section 408.037(1) pertains to CON application content. Section 408.039(1) and (2) pertains to CON review cycles and letters of intent, respectively. Section 651.118 pertains generally to the Agency's authority regarding nursing home beds and sheltered nursing home beds. Statutory Definitions "'Health services' means inpatient diagnostic, curative, or comprehensive medical rehabilitative services and includes mental health services. Obstetric services are not health services for purposes of ss. 408.031-408.045." § 408.032(9), Fla. Stat. In 2004, the Legislature amended the definition of "health services" as follows: "'Health services' means inpatient diagnostic, curative, or comprehensive medical rehabilitative services and includes mental health services. Obstetrical services are not health services for purposes of ss. 408.031- 408.045." Ch. 2004-383, § 2, Laws of Fla. (emphasis in original). "'Health care facility' means a hospital, long-term care hospital. . . ." § 408.032(8), Fla. Stat. "'Hospital' means a health care facility licensed under chapter 395." § 408.032(11), Fla. Stat. "Hospital" is defined in Section 395.002(12), Florida Statutes. "'Hospital' means any establishment that" offers "services more intensive than those required for room, board, personal services, and general nursing care, and offers facilities and beds for use beyond 24 hours by individuals requiring diagnosis, treatment, or care for illness, injury, deformity, infirmity, abnormality, disease, or pregnancy. " § 395.002(12)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. The parties stipulated that the Agency licenses LTCH facilities as Class 1 general hospitals. Generally, a Class 1 general hospital is a "basic multipurpose hospital." Like Class 1 general hospitals, LTCHs are subject to CON review and approval prior to offering those services. Unlike a Class 1 general hospital, a Class I LTCH seeks exclusion from the acute care Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient services. "'General hospital' means any facility which meets the provisions of subsection (12) and which regularly makes its facilities and service available to the general population." § 395.002(10), Fla. Stat. See also § 395.002(28), Fla. Stat. for a definition of "specialty hospital." For example, a freestanding children's hospital is classified as a Class 3 specialty hospital because it provides services to a specialized population related to gender or age. Comprehensive rehabilitation hospitals are classified as Class 2 specialty hospitals. Gregg deposition at 35-39. If a Class 1 general hospital desires to add a tertiary health service, such as pediatric cardiac catheterization, the hospital would need to obtain a CON. Aside from LTCHs and perhaps some referral hospitals, the Agency believes a comprehensive inpatient rehabilitation facility is an example of a facility providing services that are high in intensity, complexity, or a specialized or limited application at a high cost associated with the Medicare program. Gregg deposition at 36-37. The new construction or establishment of additional health care facilities, including an LTCH, is subject to CON review. § 408.036(1)(b), Fla. Stat.1 Conversions from one type of health care facility to another, including the conversion from a general hospital, a specialty hospital, or a long-term care hospital are also subject to CON review. § 408.036(1)(c), Fla. Stat. See endnote 5. Also, unless exempt, all health care-related projects requesting "[t]he establishment of tertiary health services, including inpatient comprehensive rehabilitation services" are subject to CON review. § 408.036(1)(f), Fla. Stat. An LTCH desiring to offer a tertiary health service is required to obtain a CON in order to provide the service. LTCHs, like other general hospitals, can add additional beds without CON review by filing an appropriate notice with the Agency. "'Long-term care hospital' means a hospital licensed under chapter 395 which meets the requirements of 42 C.F.R. s. 412.23(e)[2] and seeks exclusion from the acute care Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services." § 408.032(13), Fla. Stat. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.002(28), as amended, which mirrors the statutory definition. In 2004, the Legislature amended the definition of long-term care hospital in Section 408.032(13), adding the terms "acute care" before "Medicare." Ch. 2004-383, § 2, Laws of Fla.3 "'Tertiary health service' means a health service which, due to its high level of intensity, complexity, specialized or limited applicability, and cost, should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost-effectiveness of such service. Examples of such service include, but are not limited to, pediatric cardiac catheterization, pediatric open- heart surgery, organ transplantation, neonatal intensive care units, comprehensive rehabilitation, and medical or surgical services which are experimental or developmental in nature to the extent that the provision of such services is not yet contemplated within the commonly accepted course of diagnosis or treatment for the condition addressed by a given service. The agency shall establish by rule a list of all tertiary health services. § 408.032(17), Fla. Stat.(emphasis added).4 In 2004, the Legislature added "pediatric cardiac catheterization" and "pediatric open-heart surgery" to the statutory list of tertiary health services and deleted "specialty burn units". Ch. 2004-383, § 2, Laws of Fla.(emphasis in original).5 By its terms, the statutory list of tertiary health services is not exhaustive. The Agency reviews this list periodically. To accomplish the legislative purpose stated in the statutory definition of tertiary health service, the Agency includes a list of tertiary health services in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.002(41)(a)-(j). Like its statutory counterpart, Section 408.032(17), Florida Statutes, all of the items listed in Rule 59C- 1.002(41(a)-(j) are health services, which, by definition, "should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost- effectiveness of such service." Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.002(41). Over time, the Agency has added several tertiary health services, such as heart, kidney, liver, bone marrow, lung, pancreas, islet cells, and heart/lung transplantation, and adult open heart surgery. The Agency proposes to delete neonatal and pediatric cardiac and vascular surgery, and pediatric oncology and hematology, from the list and add pediatric cardiac catheterization and pediatric open-heart surgery to the list, the latter reflecting the 2004 statutory amendments. See proposed rule 59C-1.002(41)(a)-(j). The Agency's Rationale for the Proposed Rule According to the Agency, Section 408.032(17) provides a broad definition of tertiary health services and the Agency has the authority to decide if certain services, due to their complexity and cost, should be added to or deleted from the list of tertiary health services. Notwithstanding the stated purpose and effect of the proposed rule, see Finding of Fact 6, "[t]he Agency has proposed to include long term care hospital (LTCH) services as a tertiary service in the [CON] program because the services are intense, complex, specialized and costly." See AHCA's Motion for Summary Final Order, "Rationale for Proposing Long Term Care Hospital Services as a Tertiary Service in the CON Program" at 1. In attachments to its Motion for Final Summary Order, the Agency provided information that the Agency believes demonstrates that LTCH services are tertiary health services. The Agency contends that "[t]he undisputed evidence shows that a long term care hospital is a tertiary health service" and further asserts "[t]here are no genuine issues of material fact present in this case." AHCA's Motion at 2, ¶¶ 2 and 3. For the Agency, "[t]here is really no such thing as a tertiary hospital. Tertiary has to do with the services that are provided." Within the Agency's framework, tertiary health services are "a combination of specialized, complicated, complex services that are a high cost." Further, "[t]hey are somewhat unique. They are high-end services that are the most complex, the most technologically advanced, the most difficult to provide, the most resource intensive, and inherently limited as a result." According to the Agency, LTCHs are health services that provide a high level of intensity, treat complex patients, and have a high cost associated with the services provided. Gregg deposition at 30-33, 48-53. By the proposed rule, the Agency proposes to make services that are provided in an LTCH a tertiary health service. But, if those same services are provided in some other type of facility, they are not LTCH services. Gregg deposition at 48- 49.6 The Agency's approach is based in part on several reports published by, for example, MedPAC, which characterize the role of the LTCH to provide post-acute care to a small number of medically complex patients at a high cost and for relatively extended periods. Id. at 21-29, 67-68. (The MedPAC reports relied on by the Agency do not define tertiary services. Id. at 58.) The Agency's approach is also based on the experience of the Agency in reviewing LTCH CON applications and developing an understanding of the complex patient population treated at LTCHs. Id. at 29, 68. See also AHCA's Motion at Gregg affidavit and supporting information. The Agency's rationale for the proposed rule is informative and thoughtful, but not material to the disposition of this rule challenge in light of the facial challenge to the proposed rule as written. See endnotes 7 and 13. If the case was resolved on the current record, none of the parties would be entitled to entry of a final order as a matter of law if the issue was whether LTCH services within an LTCH are tertiary health services because whether LTCH services provided within an LTCH are tertiary health services requires the resolution of genuine issues of material fact. Compare, e.g., Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order, Exhibit 9 (Kornblatt affidavit) with AHCA's Motion for Summary Final Order, Gregg affidavit and supporting information. Rather, the challenge is resolved based on an evaluation of the proposed rule in light of the plain meaning of several statutory provisions.
Conclusions For Petitioner Promise Healthcare, Inc.: F. Philip Blank, Esquire Blank & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Petitioner/Intervenor Select Specialty Hospital- Orlando, Inc.: Mark A. Emanuele, Esquire Panza, Maurer & Maynard, P.A. Bank of America Building, Third Floor 3600 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 For Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration: Bart O. Moore, Esquire Shaddrick A. Haston, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue The issues are (a) whether petitioners' budget letters for fiscal year 1991-1992 should be accepted by respondent, and (b) whether the agency has utilized a non-rule policy in rejecting the letters, and if so, whether the policy has been adequately explained and justified.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioners are hospitals subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of respondent, Health Care Cost Containment Board (Board). As such, they are required to annually file their projected budgets with the Board for review and approval. This controversy relates to petitioners' fiscal year 1991-1992 budgets (1992 budget) and whether such filings conformed with the Board's requirements and should have been accepted. Budget letters for the fiscal year 1992 were filed by petitioners with the Board in May 1991. After the documents were reviewed by the Board's staff, on June 21, 1991, the Board issued virtually identical proposed agency action to each hospital advising the hospital that its budget letter was "nonconforming for the following reason: The hospital's maximum GRAA should be $ , instead of $ , ", with the appropriate dollar amounts inserted in the blanks. The letter went on to advise the hospital that it should resubmit a corrected budget document and until it did so, its submission would be considered incomplete. As provided for by agency rule, the hospitals then filed general and specific objections to this preliminary determination. After such objections were reviewed by the Board and presumably found to be without merit, petitioners requested a formal hearing to contest the proposed agency action. The Parties Petitioners are fourteen hospitals located throughout the State of Florida. Intervenor, Florida League of Hospitals, Inc., is a non-profit organization which is organized and maintained for the benefit of the proprietary hospitals which comprise its membership. The Board is a state agency charged with the responsibility of annually reviewing hospital budgets to insure that a hospital's charges do not exceed certain established thresholds. This is accomplished by an annual review of the budgets of all regulated hospitals. Intervenor, Citizens of the State of Florida, is represented by the Office of the Public Counsel. That office is charged with the responsibility of representing the citizens in all proceedings before the Board. The parties have stipulated that petitioners and the two intervenors have standing to initiate or participate in this proceeding. The Review Process As noted above, budgets must be filed on an annual basis at least ninety days prior to the beginning of a hospital's fiscal year. In these cases, all petitioners have fiscal years ending on August 31 and thus their budgets are due no later than June 1 of each year. There are two types of budget filings authorized by law. First, a hospital may file what is known as a budget letter, which is a one-page submission on a form provided by the Board. In the letter, the hospitals are required to acknowledge and certify to certain information contained in Subsection 407.50(2), Florida Statutes (1989). Secondly, a hospital may file a detailed budget which is more complicated than the budget letter and requires the completion of a twenty-seven page form. In a detailed filing, a hospital must provide, at a minimum, detailed information regarding the hospital's unit and hospital statistics, related party transactions, patient rates and discount policies, explanation of increases in revenue and expense, and prospective payment arrangements. The detailed budget filing is obviously a more expensive, complicated and time-consuming process than is the filing of a budget letter. It should be noted here that the current filing process was created by the legislature in 1988 when substantial amendments to the law were enacted. Those amendments provided, inter alia, that budget letters could be used for the first time beginning with fiscal year 1990. Prior to that time, all hospitals filed detailed budgets. Given the technical language which governs the Board's budget review process, a brief discussion regarding that process is appropriate. In very broad terms, the Board's principal function is to ensure that the revenues (charges) received by a hospital are not excessive or unreasonable. It performs this function by reviewing the budgets of each hospital during the annual budget review process. As is relevant to this controversy, the Board uses two major financial indicators in the review process. They are the gross revenues per adjusted admission and the maximum allowable rate of return, also known in regulatory parlance as the "GRAA" and "MARI", respectively. 1/ In order to measure the reasonableness of a hospital's charges, the Board requires each hospital to calculate a GRAA, which is the result of dividing the gross operating revenues of the hospital during a fiscal year by adjusted admissions. This financial indicator is basically a measure of revenue per case after adjusting for outpatient admissions and represents an average of all gross revenues per case. Except when authorized by the Board, a hospital may not increase its charges (GRAA) from one year to the next by more than its maximum allowable rate of increase. This percentage limitation, more commonly known as the MARI, is calculated pursuant to a statutorily defined formula. It is important to note that a budget letter is used when a hospital does not intend to increase its charges by more than the percentage amount specified in its approved MARI. Thus, in return for the hospital agreeing to operate within its MARI during the next fiscal year, the Board allows the hospital to have its budget approved through the less complicated budget letter process. Conversely, when a hospital intends to increase its charges from one fiscal year to the next by a greater percentage amount, it is obliged to file a detailed budget and subject itself to this more time-consuming process. In each budget letter filing, a "base GRAA" must be calculated. After that calculation is made, the base GRAA is then inflated by the hospital's MARI plus one, which produces what is known as the "budget letter GRAA". Thus, where a base GRAA is $10,000 and the MARI is 10%, the budget letter GRAA is $11,000, which is derived by multiplying the base GRAA ($10,000) by one plus the MARI (1 plus .10%, or 1.10). The budget letter GRAA represents the maximum projected gross revenues per adjusted admission the hospital can receive during the next fiscal year without having to justify the excess charges to the Board. The principal point of contention in these cases is the appropriate manner in which the base GRAA for each of petitioners' budget letters should be calculated. This in turn bears directly on the issue of whether petitioners are eligible to file a budget letter. There is no dispute as to the appropriate MARI, and the parties have agreed that the dollar figures and percentages applicable under each party's proposed calculations are accurately reflected in joint composite exhibit 1 received in evidence. Calculation of the Base GRAA Petitioners and supporting intervenor contend that the appropriate base GRAA should be calculated so as to most accurately reflect the GRAA from the previous fiscal year. In this vein, they have proposed three methodologies which are described on page 2 of joint composite exhibit 1 and are also discussed in greater detail in a subsequent portion of these findings. Petitioners cite the language in Subsection 407.50(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) as the authority for these approaches. On the other hand, the Board and its supporting intervenor assert that the GRAA base must be calculated by using the methodology identified as alternative 5 on page two of joint exhibit 1 and also described in Subsection 407.50(3), Florida Statutes (1989). In every case, this produced a smaller base GRAA than was proposed by petitioners, and unless they accede to the Board's calculation, they will be required to file detailed budgets. Like the petitioners, the Board and supporting intervenor also rely upon the language in Section 407.50, Florida Statutes (1989) as authority for their position. Even so, petitioners contend that respondent's methodology is actually a rule, not duly promulgated, and thus it must be justified and explained in this proceeding as is required of any non-rule policy. In a separate final order issued this same date in Case Nos. 91-4762R through 91- 4776R, the undersigned has determined that the methodology is in fact a policy having all of the attributes of a rule and thus it must be defended and explicated in a section 120.57(1) proceeding. Pursuant to a statutory amendment enacted in 1988, existing subsection 407.50(1) provided a so-called phase-in period for calculating a budget letter GRAA in fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and the manner for doing so was spelled out rather clearly in the law. The problem here lies in the fact that other provisions within section 407.50, which are not as clear as subsection 407.50(1), govern the filing of budget letters for fiscal year 1992 and beyond. The problem was recognized by the Board as early as July 1988 when its general counsel prepared a memorandum for Board members which compared the then existing law with amendments just adopted by the 1988 legislature. At that time, the Board was advised that for fiscal year 1992 and beyond, the base GRAA would be calculated in a manner generally consistent with the methodology proposed by the Board in these cases. This memorandum was placed in what is known as the "Board Book", a compilation of all documents considered by the Board at its meetings, and copies of the memorandum were later distributed to virtually all regulated hospitals in the State. The memorandum read in pertinent part as follows: For FY 1992 and beyond, will be determined as in following 1992 example. Base for 1992 budget will be 1990 actual GRAA unless 1990 actual GRAA exceeded 1989 actual GRAA by more than Board-approved MARI, 1991 base will be 1989 actual GRAA inflated by Board-approved rate of increase for 1990. In addition, at a technical advisory panel meeting held on November 7, 1990, hospital representatives were advised that while subsection 407.50(1) provided a phase-in period with a specified procedure for calculating a budget letter GRAA, the Board staff was in the process of developing a calculation of budget letter GRAA for fiscal year 1992 and beyond. Testimony at hearing established that the Board staff conveyed a description of the methodology to hospital representatives at that time. These actions suggested that the Board intended for the base GRAA for fiscal year 1992 to be calculated differently than the methodology used during the phase-in period. Not surprisingly, there is no agency precedent on this matter since these cases represent the first occasion on which 1992 budget letters were filed and reviewed. As noted earlier, a budget letter is appropriate when a hospital does not seek a rate of increase in GRAA in excess of the MARI for the hospital's next fiscal year. Whether the rate of increase in the GRAA is of such magnitude as to require detailed review is directly dependent on the manner in which the base GRAA is calculated, and this issue lies at the heart of the dispute. This is because the Board uses the results of the calculation (base GRAA x applicable rate of return) solely for the purpose of creating a so-called threshold GRAA, which if exceeded by the hospital's requested GRAA, triggers the need for detailed review. Thus, the calculation simply provides the Board with a means for determining whether the proposed increase in the GRAA falls within budget letter guidelines. 2/ In every case here, petitioners' GRAA exceeded the Board's threshold GRAA so as to trigger the need for a detailed budget. The Board's calculation of the base is done in a manner consistent with subsection 407.50(3). That subsection reads in pertinent part as follows: In determining the base, the hospital's prior year audited actual experience shall be used unless the hospital's prior year audited actual experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase in which case the base shall be the gross revenue per adjusted admission from the year before the prior year, increased by the applicable rate of increase for the prior year, and then inflated by the applicable rate of increase for the current year. Thus, the methodology requires that the prior year audited actual experience be used as the starting point unless such charges exceeded the applicable (approved) rate of increase. Although the parties agree that 1991 actual data would be the most desirable to use, that data is unavailable. Therefore, fiscal year 1990 results of operation, which are the most current audited actual experience, must necessarily constitute "the prior year audited actual experience" within the meaning of the statute. To determine whether the 1990 actual experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase, the Board measured the increase in the actual GRAA from 1989 to 1990. If the actual rate of increase did not exceed the approved rate of increase, the Board took the 1990 actual GRAA, inflated that amount by the applicable rate of increase for the current year (1991), and used the resulting number as the base GRAA. Conversely, if the 1990 actual GRAA exceeded the 1989 approved GRAA by more than the authorized rate, the Board used the 1989 actual GRAA (the gross revenues from the year before the prior year) inflated by the 1990 MARI, as further increased by the applicable rate of increase for the current year (1991) to produce the GRAA base. The Board has used the above described methodology for several reasons. First, it found nothing in subsection 407.50(2) which calculated a base for budget letter submissions. Indeed, the word "base" is found only in subsections 407.50(1) and (3), and by its own terms the former subsection does not apply to 1992 budget letter filings. Thus, the Board calculated the base in accordance with the method prescribed in subsection (3). Second, prior to the change in the law in 1988, the budget review process was "budget-based" in contrast to the present process which is tied to actual rates of increase. In other words, under the "old" process, the Board compared a budget under review with a prior budget number while the "new" process compares the budget under review with prior actual numbers. The Board's methodology is consistent with this philosophy and ties the base measurement to actual experience rather than estimated or budget figures. Third, for budget years 1990 and 1991, hospitals did not incur a penalty for exceeding their GRAA. The Board now intends to impose a penalty should this threshold be exceeded by hospitals in 1992 budget year and beyond. The Board's methodology is obviously geared toward this type of review process. Fourth, if a hospital's actual charges are less than its budgeted GRAA, by increasing the budgeted GRAA by the MARI as petitioners propose, a hospital's actual rate of increase would be greater than the MARI. Under the Board's methodology, a hospital would be required to justify such an increase. Similarly, if the Board's methodology was not used, a hospital could file a budget letter certifying a maximum GRAA which exceeds the threshold GRAA under subsection 407.50(3), thereby circumventing the detailed review process. Such a result should be avoided since to do otherwise would create an internal conflict within the terms of section 407.50 and would be contrary to the Board's mission under the law, as expressed in subsection 407.003(3)(a), which is to "contain hospital charges that exceed certain thresholds". Finally, Board experience shows that it is not unusual for a hospital to have a wide variance between actual experience and budget. Indeed, as many as one half of all hospitals have a marked variation between actual results and budget projections. Because of this, the Board methodology is a reasonable way in which to take these variances into account in the budget review process. Collectively, these considerations support a finding that, while not perfect or ideal in every respect, the Board methodology is logical, reasonable and appropriate. Petitioners have lodged several objections to the methodology. First, they point out that seven of the fourteen petitioners went through detailed budget review during their last budget filing and were required to justify all matters in their 1991 budgets. Thus, they contend that if they do not agree with the Board imposed budget letter GRAA, they must undergo detailed review a second time for some items that were already reviewed and approved in the prior budget year. However, the greater part of the review here will be of new projections for 1992 which were not included in the 1991 budget. Therefore, there will be little, if any, redundancy in the process. Moreover, detailed review is called for whenever a hospital seeks a rate of increase greater than its MARI even if this occurs in consecutive budget years. Secondly, petitioners contend that two hospitals were penalized by the use of the methodology simply because they had less charges than were budgeted. In other words, when actual results of operations became available, two hospitals learned that their actual charges were less than their budgeted charges. 3/ This resulted in at least one hospital receiving a smaller budget letter GRAA in 1992 than it had in 1991. Petitioners characterize this as a "perverse incentive" since the Board's methodology seemingly encourages a hospital to increase its charges to the budgeted level to avoid having its charges reduced in future years. However, the legislature recognized this anomaly by providing that if a hospital's GRAA increased at a rate of increase lower than its MARI, it would receive "banked" percentage points which it could carry forward in the form of credits to subsequent budget years. In these cases, no hospital elected to use banked credits. Then, too, if a hospital desires a greater rate of increase (and concomitant larger GRAA), it has the statutory mechanism to justify that increase through the detailed budget review process. Similarly, for those hospitals that exceed their budget, and under the Board's methodology are faced with a future reduction in revenue caps, they need only justify those excess charges in the detailed review process in order to avoid this dilemna. Petitioners also criticize the methodology because it does not consider the budget GRAA from the previous fiscal year even though a hospital has already gained approval to operate at the prior year budget level. However, this argument fails to recognize that the use of actual data over budget data is preferred since budgets are merely projections that are often times not attained. Petitioners next point out that the current detailed budget review scheme now codified in Chapter 10N-5, Florida Administrative Code, was not adopted until after subsection 407.50(3) became law in 1988. Thus, they suggest that the word "base" in subsection (3) represents a statutory directive to use a GRAA base specific to detailed budget review. However, the rules in question implement subsections 407.05(6) and 407.50(6) rather than subsection 407.50(3), and the challenged base GRAA calculation is not used during that subsequent detailed budget review process. In other words, even though subsection (3) pertains generally to detailed budget review and provides a calculation of a "base", the Board has opted to use a different methodology found in chapter 10N- 5 in the detailed review process. Although the legislature amended the law in both 1989 and 1991, it chose not to disturb this process or otherwise limit the Board's authority to continue to apply those rules. Therefore, the Board's rejection of petitioners' interpretation is found to be persuasive. Finally, it should be recognized that fiscal years 1990 - 1992 are so-called transition years after the major substantive changes in the law in 1988 and it is not unexpected to have some unusual cases arise. While petitioners have cited a few such cases occurring in budget year 1992, the appropriate remedy is to explain and justify these abnormalities through the detailed review process. Accordingly, these criticisms are found to be without merit. Alternative Proposals Petitioners have proposed three alternative methodologies to calculate the base. They are identified as alternatives 2, 3 and 4 on page 2 of joint composite exhibit 1. 4/ Petitioners assert their alternatives most accurately reflect the GRAA from the previous fiscal year and thus are in compliance with the language in subsection 407.50(2)(a) that requires a hospital to acknowledge its applicable rate of increase in its GRAA "from the previous fiscal year". Accordingly, in formulating their methodologies, petitioners have relied heavily on the words "previous fiscal year" and in some form or fashion have tied all of their calculations to the year 1991. Under petitioners' proposal, a hospital could presumably choose from one of the three alternatives depending on which one was best suited to that hospital's financial circumstances. Petitioners have first proposed to calculate the base by taking the 1990 actual GRAA and inflating it by the 1991 MARI. They contend that this alternative is reasonable because it uses the most recent actual data (1990) as well as reliable numbers (1991 MARI). While this methodology is the same as the Board's methodology for those hospitals whose 1990 actual GRAA did not exceed their 1990 budget GRAA, petitioners do not propose to use it in that manner. Rather, they intend to use it to calculate the base GRAA for two hospitals whose 1990 actual results exceeded budget projections. By doing so, however, those hospitals would be allowed to circumvent the otherwise required detailed review process. Secondly, petitioners suggest that the 1991 budget GRAA be used as the base for calculating a 1992 budget GRAA. This methodology was apparently designed for seven hospitals which underwent detailed budget review during the last fiscal year. Petitioners contend this formula is reasonable because the 1991 budget GRAA has already been approved by the Board, and the seven hospitals had extensive review of last year's budgets. Even so, there is nothing that prohibits detailed review, if warranted, in consecutive budget years, and in any event, actual data is generally preferred over budget projections. Lastly, petitioners propose that the same methodology described in subsection 407.50(1) and used for budget years 1990 and 1991 be used again on the theory that if it was reasonable in those years, it is still reasonable to use now. This methodology calls for the higher of fiscal year 1990 actual GRAA inflated by the 1991 MARI or 1991 budget GRAA to be used as the 1992 base GRAA. Pursuant to the methodology, five hospitals have used the 1991 budget letter GRAA as their 1992 base GRAA. However, by its own terms the methodology used in subsection 407.50(1) is specifically limited to budget years 1990 and 1991, and the law contemplates a change in the calculation of the base in all subsequent budget years. Moreover, the use of actual versus projected numbers is to be favored. In short, then, while the three methods arguably have some beneficial features, they still do not have all of the favorable attributes found in the Board's methodology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board confirming that petitioners' budget letters should be rejected as being non-conforming. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of October, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(4) (Rule) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.
Findings Of Fact The Parties VRBH is an existing hospital in Sarasota County. In the second batching cycle of 2016, VRBH applied to AHCA for a CON to establish a Class I Acute Care Replacement Hospital of up to 312 beds in AHCA District VIII, Subdistrict 8-6, Sarasota County. The CON application was preliminarily approved by AHCA on December 2, 2016. SMH is a public hospital system serving Sarasota County. In the second batching cycle of 2016, SMH applied for a CON to establish a new acute care hospital with 90 beds in AHCA District 8, Acute Care Subdistrict 8-6, Sarasota County. As with the VRBH application, the SMH application also received preliminary approval from AHCA on December 2, 2016. AHCA is designated as the single state agency responsible for administering the CON program under the Health Facility and Services Development Act, sections 408.031 through 408.045, Florida Statutes. The Challenged Rule In part, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(4) requires that CON applications contain the audited financial statements of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation. The Rule states as follows: Certificate of Need Application Contents. An application for a Certificate of Need shall contain the following items: All requirements set forth in Sections 408.037(1), (2) and (3), F.S. The correct application fee. An audited financial statement of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation if the applicant’s audited financial statements do not exist. The following provisions apply: The audited financial statement of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation, must be for the most current fiscal year. If the most recent fiscal year ended within 120 days prior to the application filing deadline and the audited financial statements are not yet available, then the prior fiscal year will be considered the most recent. Existing health care facilities must provide audited financial statements for the two most recent consecutive fiscal years in accordance with subparagraph 1. above. Only audited financial statements of the applicant, or the applicant’s parent corporation, will be accepted. Audited financial statements of any part of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation, including but not limited to subsidiaries, divisions, specific facilities or cost centers, will not qualify as an audit of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation. To comply with Section 408.037(1)(b)1., F.S., which requires a listing of all capital projects, the applicant shall provide the total approximate amount of anticipated expenditures for capital projects which meet the definition in subsection 59C-1.002(7), F.A.C., at the time of initial application submission, or state that there are none. An itemized list or grouping of capital projects is not required, although an applicant may choose to itemize or group its capital projects. The applicant shall also indicate the actual or proposed financial commitment to those projects, and include an assessment of the impact of those projects on the applicant’s ability to provide the proposed project; and, Responses to applicable questions contained in the application forms. The 2008 CON Legislative Changes In 2008, the Florida Legislature made numerous changes to streamline the CON application process for general hospitals. It is these changes that VRBH asserts removed the requirement for general hospitals to submit audited financial statements with CON applications. Section 408.035 was amended to provide as follows: 408.035 Review criteria.— The agency shall determine the reviewability of applications and shall review applications for certificate-of-need determinations for health care facilities and health services in context with the following criteria, except for general hospitals as defined in s. 395.002: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed. The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant’s record of providing quality of care. The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation. The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness. The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction. The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. The applicant’s designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility. For a general hospital, the agency shall consider only the criteria specified in paragraph (1)(a), paragraph (1)(b), except for quality of care in paragraph (1)(b), and paragraphs (1)(e), (g), and (i). (Emphasis added). Section 408.035 has not been revised since 2008. Additionally, section 408.037 was amended to read as follows: 408.037 Application content.— Except as provided in subsection (2) for a general hospital, an application for a certificate of need must contain: A detailed description of the proposed project and statement of its purpose and need in relation to the district health plan. A statement of the financial resources needed by and available to the applicant to accomplish the proposed project. This statement must include: A complete listing of all capital projects, including new health facility development projects and health facility acquisitions applied for, pending, approved, or underway in any state at the time of application, regardless of whether or not that state has a certificate-of-need program or a capital expenditure review program pursuant to s. 1122 of the Social Security Act. The agency may, by rule, require less- detailed information from major health care providers. This listing must include the applicant’s actual or proposed financial commitment to those projects and an assessment of their impact on the applicant’s ability to provide the proposed project. A detailed listing of the needed capital expenditures, including sources of funds. A detailed financial projection, including a statement of the projected revenue and expenses for the first 2 years of operation after completion of the proposed project. This statement must include a detailed evaluation of the impact of the proposed project on the cost of other services provided by the applicant. An audited financial statement of the applicant or the applicant’s parent corporation if audited financial statements of the applicant do not exist. In an application submitted by an existing health care facility, health maintenance organization, or hospice, financial condition documentation must include, but need not be limited to, a balance sheet and a profit-and-loss statement of the 2 previous fiscal years’ operation. An application for a certificate of need for a general hospital must contain a detailed description of the proposed general hospital project and a statement of its purpose and the needs it will meet. The proposed project’s location, as well as its primary and secondary service areas, must be identified by zip code. Primary service area is defined as the zip codes from which the applicant projects that it will draw 75 percent of its discharges. Secondary service area is defined as the zip codes from which the applicant projects that it will draw its remaining discharges. If, subsequent to issuance of a final order approving the certificate of need, the proposed location of the general hospital changes or the primary service area materially changes, the agency shall revoke the certificate of need. However, if the agency determines that such changes are deemed to enhance access to hospital services in the service district, the agency may permit such changes to occur. A party participating in the administrative hearing regarding the issuance of the certificate of need for a general hospital has standing to participate in any subsequent proceeding regarding the revocation of the certificate of need for a hospital for which the location has changed or for which the primary service area has materially changed. In addition, the application for the certificate of need for a general hospital must include a statement of intent that, if approved by final order of the agency, the applicant shall within 120 days after issuance of the final order or, if there is an appeal of the final order, within 120 days after the issuance of the court’s mandate on appeal, furnish satisfactory proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate. The agency shall establish documentation requirements, to be completed by each applicant, which show anticipated provider revenues and expenditures, the basis for financing the anticipated cash- flow requirements of the provider, and an applicant’s access to contingency financing. A party participating in the administrative hearing regarding the issuance of the certificate of need for a general hospital may provide written comments concerning the adequacy of the financial information provided, but such party does not have standing to participate in an administrative proceeding regarding proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate. The agency may require a licensee to provide proof of financial ability to operate at any time if there is evidence of financial instability, including, but not limited to, unpaid expenses necessary for the basic operations of the provider. The applicant must certify that it will license and operate the health care facility. For an existing health care facility, the applicant must be the licenseholder of the facility. (Emphasis added). Section 408.037 has only been amended once since 2008. The revisions are not relevant to the issue presented in this Rule challenge.2/ The Parties’ Positions In support of its argument that the Rule contravenes the statutes, VRBH asserts that the Rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the laws implemented. Simply put, VRBH contends that the Rule is contrary to sections 408.035 and VRBH advances three reasons for its position that the Rule modifies the laws implemented; all three center on the assertion that in 2008, the Legislature removed the requirement for the submission of audited financial statements with general hospital CON applications: Requiring a general hospital to comply with the requirements of section 408.037(1), Florida Statutes, by submitting an audited financial statement with its CON application violates the express provision of the statute which specifically excludes general hospitals from the requirements of subsection (1); Requiring a general hospital to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application directly contradicts the submission requirements set forth in section 408.037(2), Florida Statutes, which only requires a general hospital to provide a statement of intent that it will “furnish satisfactory proof of the applicant’s financial ability to operate” if the CON application is approved by final order of the agency. Requiring a general hospital to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application contradicts the 2008 legislative changes to section 408.035, Florida Statutes, which streamlined the application process for general hospitals by removing the short and long term financial feasibility of the project as a review criteria. (VRBH Petition, ¶¶ 15-17). AHCA’s ultimate position is that the Rule should be interpreted as not requiring audited financial statements for general hospital CON applicants. To reach this conclusion, AHCA relies on 59C-1.008(4)(a), which provides that a CON application must contain “all requirements set forth in Sections 408.037(1), (2), and (3), Florida Statutes.” AHCA interprets the introductory phrase contained in section 408.037(1)--“except as provided in subsection (2) for a general hospital, an application for a certificate of need must contain”--to mean that only subsection (2) of section 408.037 applies to an application for general hospitals. Because section 408.037(2) does not mention audited financial statements, AHCA reasons that they are not required. Therefore, despite the plain language of the Rule, AHCA contends that the Rule does not require the submission of audited financial statements because: the Rule references sections 408.037(1), (2), and (3); AHCA interprets only section 408.037(2) as applying to general hospitals; and section 408.037(2) does not mention audited financial statements. SMH contends that the Rule does not enlarge, modify, or contravene the laws implemented and, therefore, is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specifically, SMH contends that section 408.037 itself requires general hospital applicants to submit audited financial statements because subsection (2) does not wholesale replace subsection (1) for general hospitals. Subsection (1) applies to general hospitals, unless there is an exception to those requirements listed in subsection (2). Subsection (1) requires the submission of audited financial statements for all CON applicants; nothing in subsection (2) creates an exception to that requirement. SMH also argues that audited financial statements are reliable documents that AHCA can quickly access for relevant information, including an applicant’s provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent, both of which are prominent considerations during the review of a general hospital’s CON application. See § 408.035(1)(i), (2), Fla. Stat. Post 2008 Rule Challenged Rule 59C-1.008(4) does not expressly exclude or differentiate between general hospital CON applications and other CON applications. Instead the Rule cross-references to the statutory requirement. AHCA asserts that by doing so, the Rule incorporates the statutory scheme by reference and does not require a CON application for a general hospital to include audited financial statements. The above-cited statutory provisions clearly state that a general hospital CON application need not include an audited financial statement and that financial condition is not relevant to the CON application review process. Any rule that requires a general hospital CON applicant to provide an audited financial statement with the application would be contrary to the requirements of section 408.037. It follows, therefore, that a rule contrary to the requirements of a statute would be invalid as it would exceed AHCA’s delegated legislative authority. Requiring a general hospital applicant to comply with the requirements of section 408.037(1) would violate the provision of the statute, which expressly excludes general hospitals from the requirements of subsection (1). Further, requiring a general hospital applicant to submit an audited financial statement with its CON application directly contradicts the submission requirements set forth in section 408.037(2). AHCA’s interpretation of rule 59C-1.008 is that it must be read in conjunction with section 408.037, subsections (1), (2), and (3), and accordingly, AHCA does not require that a general hospital applicant submit an audited financial statement as part of its application. AHCA’s interpretation is consistent with the differences in the content of the CON application forms published by AHCA for general hospital applications when compared to non-general hospital applications, for instance, those seeking other beds and services such as comprehensive medical rehabilitation, psychiatric, hospice, and other CON- regulated beds in a hospital. The requirements of each application type correspond to the statutory requirements for each application type. Application forms for projects “except for general hospitals” correspond to the CON application content requirements of section 408.037(1), which requires a statement of financial resources that must include capital projects (Schedule 2 of the CON application); capital expenditures and source of funds (Schedules 1 and 3 of the CON application); and a detailed financial projection, including revenues and expenses for the first two years (Schedules 5 through 8 of the CON application). The general hospital CON application does not have these requirements. General hospitals are not required to submit proof of financial ability to operate at the time of the submission of the CON application. In accordance with rule 59C-1.010(2)(d), general hospitals are required to comply with the requirements of sections 408.035(2) and 408.037(2). Neither of those statutes requires that a general hospital applicant submit proof of financial ability to operate until 120 days after the issuance of the final CON to the applicant. AHCA’s representative, Marisol Fitch, testified that AHCA does not require applicants for general hospitals to submit audited financial statements in the CON application, and that proof of financial ability to operate is required within 120 days after the final approval of the CON application, consistent with the statutory provisions. She testified that the Rule being challenged, when read in conjunction with the AHCA CON application form (incorporated by reference into the Rule) and other AHCA rules, including 59C-1.010 and 59C-1.030, is consistent with the statute, and that no audited financial statements are required. SMH asserts that an audited financial statement for hospitals might contain useful information, such as information on a hospital’s current payor mix. However, the unrefuted testimony is that audited financial statements are not required to include payor mix information, and normally do not since they are typically used to look at an applicant’s financial feasibility to operate. Further, regardless of whether such information might be “useful,” the specific requirement of section 408.037(2) expressly “excepts” general hospitals from the requirement to include such statements in the CON application. Pursuant to rule 59C-1.010(2)(d), “an application for a general hospital must meet the requirements of Sections 408.035(2) and 408.037(2), F.S.,” neither of which require that a general hospital CON applicant provide audited financials or financial feasibility data with the CON application. However, the challenged language in rule 59C-1.008(4) does not contain the “exception” for general hospital applications. Rule 59C-1.008(4) provides, without qualification, that a CON application must contain audited financial statements. Therefore, rules 59C-1.008(4) and 59C-1.010(2)(d) are contradictory. The primary purpose of an audited financial statement in a CON application is to review the short-term and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. Requiring this financial information is contrary to the clear language of the 2008 changes to section 408.035, which removed the short-term and long-term financial feasibility of the project as review criteria in order to streamline the general hospital CON application process. AHCA has stated that their interpretation of rule 59C-1.008(4) is that it must be read in pari materia with rule 59C-1.010(2)(d) and sections 408.037 and 408.035, therefore, general hospital CON applicants are not required to submit audited financials with the CON application. According to AHCA’s interpretation, rule 59C-1.008(4) does not require a general hospital CON applicant to submit an audited financial statement with the CON application. However, regardless of AHCA’s interpretation, rule 59C-1.008(4) expressly states that a CON application must contain audited financial statements, in contravention of sections 408.035 and 408.037.
The Issue The issues in this case are (1) whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D-1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious and whether the gross revenue per adjusted admission screen should be adjusted by the geographic price level index adjustment factor? Mercy has also raised an issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact As a part of its responsibilities, the HCCB is required to specify a uniform system of financial reporting for Florida hospitals. Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). So that meaningful comparisons of data reported can be made, the HCCB is required by Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to provide a method of grouping hospitals. Pursuant to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), every Florida hospital is required to file a budget with the HCCB for approval. Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), requires that the budgets of certain hospitals be automatically approved based upon a comparison of the gross revenue per adjusted admission of hospitals within groups established pursuant to Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The language of Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), which requires the HCCB to establish a method of grouping hospitals, is identical to the language of Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The grouping methodology required by Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), is included in Chapter V, Section B of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"). This methodology has been incorporated by reference in Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D- 1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., as the method of grouping hospitals for purposes of the uniform system of financial reporting under Section 395.507, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), and the comparison of gross revenue per adjusted admission for purposes of budget review under Section 395.509, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). After hospitals are grouped, Chapter V, Section C of the Manual provides that the screens used to identify hospitals subject to further review are to be adjusted by adjustment factors. Two adjustment factors are provided; one is a geographic price level index adjustment factor. Mercy is a not-for-profit corporation which operates a general acute care hospital with 550 licensed beds located in Dade County, Florida. Based upon the application of the HCCB's grouping methodology as contained in Chapter V, Section B of the Manual, Mercy was assigned to group 9. Mercy was notified of its assignment by a memorandum dated October 10, 1984. Mercy challenged its group assignment by letter dated November 13, 1984. In its letter, Mercy challenged the grouping methodology used by the HCCB and requested a "more relevant and objective method of establishing the weights utilized in the grouping methodology . . . be developed." Further, Mercy requested that "new weights be applied and that the groups be reformulated," and that "the screening value, Gross Revenue per Adjusted Admission, be adjusted for geographic influences prior to ranking, as has been done in previous budget reviews." Mercy presented its reassignment request before the HCCB on December 13-14, 1984. The HCCB orally rejected Mercy's request. By memorandum dated December 19, 1984, the HCCB denied in writing mercy's request for reassignment. Whether Mercy should be reassigned to a reformulated group depends upon whether Mercy's challenge to Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C. is successful. If that challenge is not successful, the grouping methodology was properly applied to Mercy. The Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order holds that the grouping methodology is not arbitrary and capricious and therefore, the HCCB's adoption of Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislature authority. Mercy's assignment to group 9 was therefore proper. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, it does not appear that the point at which the geographic price level index adjustment factor is to be applied to Mercy has been reached. Despite the fact that the evidence shows that the HCCB has decided not to apply this adjustment factor, even though it is specifically provided for in the HCCB's own Manual, the HCCB has not yet failed to do so in Mercy's case. Therefore, the question of whether the geographic price level index adjustment factor should be applied to Mercy's 1985 budget is premature.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the request for reassignment to a reformulated hospital group and the request to adjust the gross revenue per adjusted admission screen for the geographic price level index adjustment factor be denied. DONE and ENTERED this, 28th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. Parker, Jr., Esquire PARKER, HUDSON, PAINER DOBBS & KELLY 1200 Carnegie Bldg. 133 Carnegie Way Atlanta, Georgia 30303 James J. Bracher Executive Director Hospital Cost Containment Board Woodcrest Office Park 325 John Knox Road, Building L, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Douglas A. Mang, Esquire Charles T. Collette, Esquire MANG & STOWELL, P.A. P.O. Box 1019 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire PARKER, HUDSON, RAINER, DOBBS & KELLY The Perkins House, Suite 101 118 N. Gadsden Street Tallahassee. Florida 32301
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency") concerning the preliminary approval of Certificate of Need (“CON”) Application No. 10199 submitted by Select Specialty Hospital-Daytona Beach, Inc., (“Select-Daytona”), to establish a 34-bed Long Term Acute Care Hospital (“LTCH”) in District 4. 1. The Agency preliminarily approved Application No. 10199 submitted by Select- Daytona to establish a 34-bed LTCH in District 4. 2. In response to the Agency’s decision, Kindred Hospitals East, LLC (“Kindred”) filed a petition for formal hearing, challenging the preliminary approval. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) where it was assigned Case No. 14-0121CON for hearing. Select-Daytona filed a Motion to Intervene in the DOAH and the case was styled with Select-Daytona being treated as an intervenor. Filed March 17, 2014 2:04 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. Subsequently, Kindred filed a corrected notice of voluntary dismissal of its petition in the DOAH, which closed the case. It is therefore ORDERED: 4. The preliminary approval of CON No. 10199 is upheld and will be issued subject to the conditions noted in the State Agency Action Report. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this IE day of far ch. Elizabeth Dudelj, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2014,
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules, The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the below- —_— named persons by the method designated on this SL ‘a day of LS ere 4 , 2014. Shoop, Agency Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 412-3630 Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Lorraine M. Novak, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) R. Bruce McKibben Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings www.doah.state. fl.us M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Cole cbryant@ohfe.com amooney@ohfc.com (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire James McLemore, Supervisor Ausley and McMullen Certificate of Need Unit mglazer@ausley.com Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail)
