Findings Of Fact Respondent (all references to Respondent are to Respondent Simmonds) is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license numbers 0404486 and 0245930. His most current licenses are as a broker, c/o the corporate Respondent. He has been licensed about six years in Florida. The corporate Respondent (all references to the corporate Respondent are to Respondent L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc.) is a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license number 0245825. At all material times, Respondent was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of the corporate Respondent. He is the sole shareholder of the corporate Respondent and the only broker employed by the corporate Respondent. Respondents were brokers in three sales transactions in which they received competing claims for earnest money deposits that they held in trust. The three contracts are the sale from Durant to Durant by contract dated February 13, 1987, and amended December 7, 1987; the sale from Dyer to James by contract dated August 27, 1988; and the sale from Kollar and Nilands Bar & Package, Inc. to Hamilton by contract dated October 11, 1988. Each of the three contracts is on a standard printed form. Each contract requires the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit in escrow and disburse it at closing, at which time the corporate Respondent earns its commission. Each contract provides that the corporate Respondent may interplead the funds in circuit court in the event of a dispute and further provides that the corporate Respondent shall comply with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Durant contract provides for the corporate Respondent to hold a $1000 earnest money deposit. A dispute between the parties to the Durant contract arose, and Respondent contacted the Florida Real Estate Commission for advice. By letter dated November 22, 1988, Respondent informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of a demand by the seller for the deposit because the buyer had failed to follow through on his mortgage application. The letter states that Respondent is convinced that the seller is entitled to the deposit and that Respondent intends to pursue interpleader. By Notice dated February 2, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of the unenforceability of certain contractual language. Referring to Rule 21V-10.32, the letter advised Respondents that, within 30 days of receipt of the letter, they must pursue arbitration, with the consent of all parties, or a judicial adjudication, such as through interpleader. At some point, Respondents obtained an application for arbitration and sent it to the parties. By letter dated June 12, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they had sent an arbitration contract on March 21, 1989, to the seller, who had not yet responded to the request to arbitrate. Subsequently, Respondents retained counsel at their expense to discuss interpleading the funds in circuit court. Counsel advised them that the relatively modest sum involved, as a practical matter, precluded the judicial remedy because the attorneys' fees would exceed the amount in dispute. Eventually, the parties to the Durant contract settled their dispute, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondent failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Dyer contract also involved an earnest money deposit of $1000, which was later increased by addendum to a total of $3000. The Dyer contract, which also failed to close, provides for the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit. By letter dated March 2, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that, as of the same day, they had received conflicting demands for the earnest money deposit. By Notice dated August 28, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of factual disputes that the Commission is not empowered to resolve. The Notice states that Respondents must "immediately" choose one of the remaining alternatives--arbitration or interpleader in circuit court. By letter dated September 8, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they would seek help through the Arbitration Society of Florida, Inc. It is unclear whether Respondents sent an arbitration application to the parties in the Dyer contract, but no arbitration ensued. The parties to the Dyer contract resolved their dispute in March, 1990, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Kollar contract resulted in the receipt by the corporate Respondent of an earnest money deposit of $10,000. This contract also failed to close. By letter dated January 19, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of conflicting demands received the same day. The Commission issued an Escrow Disbursement Order on August 16, 1989, with which Respondents promptly complied. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposit, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. On January 30, 1990, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondents' office pursuant to a complaint that never provided any basis for disciplinary action. Respondent said that he was ill and asked her to reschedule the visit. They agreed to reset it for February 6, 1990. On February 6, 1990, Petitioner's investigator met Respondent at his office and asked for copies of all pending contracts, bank statements, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and similar materials so that she could reconcile the trust account. Respondent supplied her with all of these materials except for the cancelled checks, which he said were at the accountant's office. Respondent gave the investigator access to his office copier so that she could copy whatever she needed. She apparently copied various documents, but failed to copy the pending contracts. From February, 1988, through February, 1990, Respondents held 6-10 earnest money deposits. On February 6, Respondents had only three pending contracts for which they held deposits. These were the Dyer contract and two unidentified contracts with $3500 and $500 earnest money deposits. Respondents did not handle other trust funds, such as property management funds. Petitioner's investigator determined that the trust account was short $2897.73. She found pending contracts indicating that Respondents should be holding a total of $7000 in earnest money deposits, but she found a bank balance of only $4102.27, which included a deposit of $1392.26 made on February 5. Respondents' trust account has been short previously. For example, in August, 1989, the Dyer, Durant, and Kollar contracts, which were still outstanding, generated a trust account liability of $14,000, but the account balance was as low as $700. Respondent admits that he improperly removed funds from the trust account, without the parties' knowledge, to apply toward personal medical expenses that he had incurred. In the fall of 1989, he deposited into the trust account proceeds from a loan he had recently received. However, he removed additional trust funds when he later incurred more medical expenses. By February 6, Respondent knew that the trust account was short, but evidently did not know precisely by how much. His repeated vagueness concerning the specifics of trust account withdrawals and deposits from August, 1989, through February, 1990, discredits his testimony that he never withdrew more than the amounts of pending commissions, which were unearned in any event when withdrawn by Respondent. On February 7, Respondent deposited $2897.73 into the trust account to eliminate the deficiency found by Petitioner's investigator. During the following week, the investigator returned to Respondents' office. She requested Respondent to produce the same documents that she had examined previously, but Respondent refused on the grounds that he had already produced all the documents once and he was seeking legal counsel. The investigator contacted Respondent a couple more times concerning the requested documents, but Respondent continued to refuse to cooperate. Petitioner next tried to compel the production of the requested documents by service of an administrative subpoena. By subpoena duces tecum issued February 19, 1990, and served February 21, 1990, Petitioner demanded that Respondents produce, on February 26, 1990: All current pending sales contracts, on L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #144100004792 all bank deposit slips from 2/1/88-2/1/90, the check book for account #14410004792. Upon receipt of the subpoena, Respondent contacted his attorney, who prepared a petition to invalidate subpoena, which was served by mail on February 25, 1990, and received by Petitioner on February 28, 1990. The basic objections are that the subpoena is "unreasonably broad in scope and/or requires the production of irrelevant material" and that Respondents are entitled to know what complaint is being investigated prior to producing the information. Petitioner issued another administrative subpoena on March 12, 1990, which was served upon Respondents on March 26, 1990, and requested, by March 30, 1990: On L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #14410004792: All sales contracts for which L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc. is holding escrow deposits, the 1/90 and 2/90 bank statements, cancelled checks, number 177 through 270. On March 29, 1990, Respondents' attorney served the same objections to the petition, and Petitioner received the objections on April 4, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order reprimanding Respondents; imposing on each Respondent an administrative fine of $3000 (for a total from the two Respondents of $6000); requiring Respondent to complete an approved 60-hour course; suspending the licenses of both Respondents for a period of six months, commencing retroactive to when their licenses were revoked pursuant to the emergency order; placing both licenses on probation for a period of three years commencing the conclusion of the suspension; and requiring, during the period of suspension, that Respondents provide the Florida Real Estate Commission, or its signated representative, with escrow account status reports at such intervals as the Commission shall require. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4438 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-7: adopted. 8: rejected as subordinate. 9-10 (first sentence): adopted. 10 (second and third sentences): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. In fact, Respondent supplied the investigator with copies of the contracts on February 6, but refused subsequent requests to produce them. He indicated that he wanted to obtain advice of counsel. 11: rejected as subordinate. In addition, the implication that files of the Division of Real Estate were the sole source of information regarding the contracts is rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. The investigator found in the EDO files of the Division of Real Estate a copy of the Dyer contract, which, as noted in the recommended order, was one of the three contracts generating the escrow account liability that the investigator calculated on February 6. Although she saw the other two contracts (in order to generate the liability), she never received copies of them, even through the final hearing. 12-19: adopted or adopted in substance. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, first sentence and first clause of second sentence): adopted. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, remainder): rejected as irrelevant. 22: adopted. 23: rejected as irrelevant. 24-27 and 30-33: adopted. 28 and 34: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and unnecessary. 29: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondents 1-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as subordinate. 14-15: adopted. 16 and 19: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 17: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18: adopted. 20: rejected as irrelevant. 21: rejected as subordinate. 22: adopted. 23-24 and 26-27: rejected as recitation of testimony. 25: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 28-33 (first clause of second sentence): adopted. 33 (second clause of second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 33 (remainder): adopted. 34-35: except as to the fact of the issuance of the subpoena and petition to invalidate, rejected as unnecessary. 36: rejected as unclear. Respondent gave the investigator a chance to see the three pending contracts generating the February 6 trust account liability, but never gave her copies of any of them when she later discovered that she had failed to copy them. She found a copy of the Dyer contract in the EDO file, but she never received copies of the other two contracts, even at the final hearing. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The determination in the recommended order on this point was not dependent upon Respondents' handling of the subpoenas, but on their handling of repeated and reasonable requests for relevant information. 37: rejected as irrelevant. 38: adopted. 39: rejected as unnecessary. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: adopted. 45: rejected as unnecessary. 46-49: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Thomas V. Infantino Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, Florida 32790-0030 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Attorney James H. Gillis Division of Real Estate Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 *Previously assigned DOAH Case No. 90-4319 closed as a duplicate.
Findings Of Fact Introduction At all times relevant hereto, Fidelity Standard Mortgage Company (Fidelity Standard) and First Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. (First Fidelity) were mortgage brokers licensed by respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division). In or around early 1983, Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, Title 11, United States Code. By virtue of this action, numerous investors lost substantial amounts of money invested with the two brokers. In 1977 the legislature established in chapter 494 a mortgage brokerage guaranty fund from which payment is made to persons "adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to have suffered monetary damage as a result of any (unlawful) acts by a mortgage broker... who was licensed under, this chapter at the time the act was committed." Certain conditions must be met in order to establish eligibility for payment from the fund, and payments for claims are limited in the aggregate to $50,000 per mortgage broker, regardless of the number of claimants. 1/ Among other things, section 494.043 requires that a claimant must have (a) received a final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction against the broker, (b) caused to be issued a writ of execution upon the judgment and the return indicates insufficient assets to satisfy the judgment, (c) made a reasonable search to discover assets of the broker, and has found none, (d) applied any amounts recovered from broker to the damages awarded by the court, and (e) given notice to the Division by certified mail at the time the action was instituted. Where as here, the broker has filed for bankruptcy, steps (b) and (c) need not be taken by the claimant, except to file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. There is also a two year period in which investors may perfect their claims. These persons receive first priority to payment from the fund. In the case of both Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity, this period expired on June 18, 1986. Thus, in order to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund, a claimant had to satisfy the above criteria by that date. In addition to these criteria, a claimant must assign to the Division any interest in the judgment received once all criteria in section 494.043 have been met. The statute imposing this requirement (s. 494.044) provides that this must be done after the claimant has received payment from the fund. In its proposed final order concerning Fidelity Standard entered on August 7, 1986, the Division concluded that the following claimants should receive payment from the fund in the amounts specified below: Claimant Claim Allowed David Swid $ 2,321.00 William & Olivia Petruzel 2,321.00 Vera G. Marino 2,321.00 Benjamin Rosenberg 2,321.00 Lee Rosenberg 2,321.00 Shasha Enterprises 2,321.00 Eli Krause 1,995.00 Eugene Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,321.00 Eugene Brooks 2,321.00 Steven Jankovich 2,100.50 Stacy Sher 2,100.50 Frederick Low 2,321.00 Patricia Worthley 2,321,00 Alfred Vanderlaan 2,321.00 Ben Sakow 2,048.00 Thomas Shisler 1,229.00 David Irving 2,321.00 Betty Burwell 1,662.00 Alisa Kreimer 2,321.00 Samuel Rudnick 2,321.00 Bonnie & Howard Lenkowitz 1,204.00 Larry & Sally Lenkowitz 525.00 Stuart & Barbara Schrager 2,321.00 Helen & Eugene Loos 2,321.00 Total Payments $50,000.00 In a second order entered the same day involving First Fidelity, the Division proposed that the following claimants receive payment from the fund as indicated below: Claimant Fund Award Swid $ 2,620.00 Morton 2,620.00 Ghane 2,620.00 Petruzel 2,620.00 Marino 2,620.00 B. Rosenberg 2,620.00 L. Rosenberg 2,620.00 Shasha Enterprises 2,620.00 Krause 2,254.00 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,620.00 Brooks 2,620.00 Jankovich 2,372.00 Sher 2,372.00 Low 2,620.00 Worthley 2,620.00 Vanderlaan 2,620.00 Sakow 2,313.00 Shisler 1,389.00 Irving 2,620.00 Loos 2,620.00 Total Payments $50,000.00 After the entry of the proposed final order in Case No. 86-3575, petitioners, David Swid, Vera G. Marino et al., Samuel Rudnick et al., and William and Olivia Petruzel, who are named as recipients from the fund, requested a hearing to either contest or support the proposed payout from the fund. In addition, petitioners, Merele Dunne, Ida Orlick and Ilene Kirshner, whose claims were denied, challenged the proposed action. In Case No. 86-3576 involving First Fidelity, petitioners, William and Olivia Petruzel, David Swid, Esmail Ghane and Vera G. Marino et al., who are named as recipients of the fund, have requested a formal hearing to either challenge or support the agency action. Petitioners, Harry and Yetta Neiderman, Harold E. and Eva L. Roys and Harold S. Johnson, whose claims to participate in the initial distribution of the fund were denied, also requested a hearing to contest the action. The Claimants David Swid -- Swid satisfied all statutory criteria in section 494.043 for perfecting his claim against both Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity by June 18, 1986. His partial assignment to the Division of the judgment against the brokers was also filed on June 18, 1986, but was not furnished to the Division until July 9, 1986. Even so, Swid has satisfied all criteria, and is eligible to participate in the initial payout from the fund. Marino et al. -- This group of claimants includes fifteen investors. 2/ Marino et al. received two identical judgments against First Fidelity and Fidelity Standard and otherwise satisfied all statutory criteria by June 18, 1986. Because the group is not entitled to a double recovery, the amount awarded by the court has been divided in half. An assignment of the judgments was filed with the Division on June 12, 1986, but did not reflect the page and book number where the judgments were recorded. However, the judgments were filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, and records of that court are not kept by book and page number. Therefore, the assignment was in proper form, and all statutory criteria have been met. William and Olivia Petruzel -- The Petruzels obtained final judgments against First Fidelity and Fidelity Standard on April 11, 1985, in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Partial assignments of the judgments dated April 4, 1986, in favor of the Division were filed with the Division in April 1986. Therefore, all pertinent criteria have been met, and the Petruzels are eligible to share in the initial payout from the fund. Harold E. and Eva L. Roys and Harold S. Johnson -- These parties are claimants against First Fidelity. There is no evidence that they perfected their claims prior to June 18, 1986. Therefore, their claim to participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be denied. Rudnick et al. -- This group of claimants includes six investors in Fidelity Standard. 3/ They obtained a final judgment against Fidelity Standard on June 10, 1986, in Broward County circuit court. Assignments of this judgment to the Division were executed in August 1986, and later filed with the Division. Therefore, Rudnick et al. have qualified for participation. Ida Orlick and Merele Dunne -- These two claimants were investors in Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity. They did not obtain a final judgment against those brokers until June 25, 1986, or after the two-year period to perfect claims had expired. Therefore, they are not entitled to participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. 4/ Harry and Yetta Neiderman -- These claimants were investors in First Fidelity. They obtained a final judgment in bankruptcy court against the broker prior to June 18, 1986. The Division proposed to deny the claim on the ground no documentation was submitted to prove that a claim had been filed with the bankruptcy court. At final hearing, the Neidermans submitted a proof of claim which reflected such a claim was previously filed with the court on July 15, 1982. Therefore, all statutory criteria have been met. Irene Morton -- Morton was an investor in First Fidelity who, like the others, lost her investment by virtue of illegal acts of that broker. She has perfected her claim in a timely manner and is entitled to participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. Esmail Ghane -- This investor lost approximately $30,000 due to the illicit acts of First Fidelity. He has subsequently obtained a judgment against the broker and has satisfied in a timely manner all other statutory criteria. Therefore, he has perfected his claim and is eligible for payment from the fund. At the same time, it is noted that Ghane's cause of action against the broker arose prior to October 1, 1985, and that he must share in the lower aggregate award ($50,000) that applies to claims arising before that date. Computation of Payments In addition to obtaining judgments for their lost principal, virtually all of the claimants were awarded either prejudgment or post-judgment interest, or both, by the courts adjudicating their claims. Further, some of the claimants have previously received payments from the fund for illegal acts occurring on the part of Franklin Capital Corporation, an affiliated corporation of First Fidelity and Fidelity Standard. By stipulation of counsel, the following amounts are the correct amounts due the claimants for losses arising from illicit acts by Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity assuming their claims are both timely and valid. The amounts are computed after deducting prior payments and by using only the principal amount awarded by the courts, and by including principal and pre- judgment interest. Fidelity Standard (without interest) Fund Claimant Award Swid $ 3,021.00 Petruzel 3,021.00 Marino 3,021.00 B. Rosenberg 3,021.00 L. Rosenberg 3,021.00 Shasha Enterprises 3,021.00 Krause 1,435.00 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,870.00 Brooks 1,888.00 Jankovich 1,511.00 Sher 1,511.00 Low 1,813.00 Worthley 1,813.00 Vanderlaan 2,417.00 Sakow 1,511.00 Shisler 906.00 Irving 2,553.00 Burwell 477.00 Kreimer 1,081.00 Rudnick 2,290.00 B & H Lenkowitz 1,686.00 L & S Lenkowitz 70.00 Schrager 3,021.00 Loos 3,021.00 $50,000.00 Fidelity Standard (with prejudgment interest) Claimant Fund Award Swid $ 2,279.50 Petruzel 2,279.50 Marino 2,279.50 B. Rosenberg 2,279.50 L. Rosenberg 2,279.50 Shasha Enterprises 2,279.50 Krause 1,959.50 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,279.50 Brooks 2,279.50 Jankovich 2,062.50 Sher 2,062.50 Low 2,279.50 Worthley 2,279.50 Vanderlaan 2,279.50 Sakow 2,011.50 Shisler 1,206.50 Irving 2,279.50 Burwell 1,531.50 Kreimer 2,219.50 Rudnick 2,279.50 B & H Lenkowitz 2,279.50 L & S Lenkowitz 474.50 Schrager 2,279.50 Loos 2,279.50 $ 50,000.00 Fidelity (without Standard interest) Claimant Fund Award Swid $ 3,021.00 Petruzel 3,021.00 Marino 3,021.00 B. Rosenberg 3,021.00 L. Rosenberg 3,021.00 Shasha Enterprises 3,021.00 Krause 1,435.00 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,870.00 Brooks 1,888.00 Jankovich 1,511.00 Sher 1,511.00 Low 1,813.00 Worthley 1,813.00 Vanderlaan 2,417.00 Sakow 1,511.00 Shisler 906.00 Irving 2,553.00 Burwell 477.00 Kreimer 1,081.00 Rudnick 2,290.00 B & H Lenkowitz 1,686.00 L & S Lenkowitz 70.00 Schrager 3,021.00 Loos 3,021.00 $50,000.00 Fidelity Standard (with pre-judgement interest) Fund Claimant Award Swid $ 2,279.50 Petruzel 2,279.50 Marino 2,279.50 B. Rosenberg 2,279.50 L. Rosenberg 2,279.50 Shasha Enterprises 2,279.50 Krause 1,959.50 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,279.50 Brooks, 2,279.50 Jankovich 2,062.50 Sher 2,062.50 Low 2,279.50 Worthley 2,279.50 Vanderlaan 2,279.50 Sakow 2,011.50 Shisler 1,206.50 Irving 2,279.00 Burwell 1,531.50 Kreimer 2,219.50 Rudnick 2,279.50 B & H Lenkowitz 2,279.50 L & S Lenkowitz 474.50 Schrager 2,279.50 Loos 2,279.50 $50,000.00 First Fidelity (without interest) Claimant Fund Award Neiderman $ 2,995.00 Swid 2,995.00 Morton 2,995.00 Ghane 2,995.00 Petruzel 2,995.00 Marino 2,995.00 B. Rosenberg 2,995.00 L. Rosenberg 2,995.00 Shasha Enterprises 2,995.00 Krause 1,422.50 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,845.00 Brooks 1,872.00 Jankovich 1,497.25 Sher 1,497.25 Low 1,797.00 Worthley 1,797.00 Vanderlaan 2,396.00 Sakow 1,497.25 Shisler 898.25 Irving 2,530.50 Loos 2,995.00 $50,000.00 First Fidelity (with prejudgment interest) Fund Claimant Award Neiderman $ 2,489.80 Swid 2,489.80 Morton 2,489.80 Ghane 2,489.80 Petruzel 2,489.80 Marino 2,489.80 B. Rosenberg 2,489.80 L. Rosenberg 2,489.80 Shasha Enterprises 2,489.80 Krause 2,140.44 Brooks, M.D., P.C. 2,489.80 Brooks 2,489.80 Jankovich 2,253.44 Sher 2,253.44 Low 2,489.80 Worthley 2,489.80 Vanderlaan 2,489.80 Sakow 2,197.44 Shisler 1,318.44 Irving 2,489.80 Loos 2,489.80 $50,000.00 The inclusion of post-judgment interest in the calculation of the awards has an inconsequential effect on the amounts to be paid and accordingly has been disregarded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the initial payment from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund for damages arising from illicit acts by Fidelity Standard and First Fidelity be made in accordance with the schedules set forth in finding of fact 16, said amounts to include prejudgment interest. All other claims for relief should be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Robert & Gilman, Inc. at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate broker by the State of Florida. Delair A. Clark at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate salesman by the State of Florida. Residential property owned by William L. and Frances Crummett was listed with J.B. Steelman, Jr. real estate broker and put on Multiple Listing Service. On June 17, 1972, immediately after the For Sale sign was erected, Respondent, Delair A. Clark, presented an offer to the sellers on this property which was accepted by sellers on the same date presented (Exhibit 9). This contract provided the purchase price of $28,500 with a $300 earnest money deposit, the usual clauses in a form contract for sale and purchase, and two special clauses to wit: "A. Subject to: Buyer being reassigned to central Florida prior to June 22, 1972. In the event the assignment does not materialize by June 23, 1972 deposit will, be returned in full and contract will be null and void. B. Subject to: Buyer obtaining a 90 percent conventional loan for a period of 25 years or an FHA loan for 30 years." By telegram dated 6/20/72 (Exhibit 8) buyer confirmed re-assignment to Orlando, thus satisfying condition A in the contract. Buyers thereafter asked for earlier occupancy than originally called for. Since special arrangements would have to be made by sellers, Mr. Crummett asked for an amendment to the contract to increase the earnest money deposit to $1,000 of which $500 would be non-refundable if contract was not consummated. This amendment was duly executed by the buyers on July 15, 1972 and by the sellers. A copy thereof was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 which provides: "SPECIAL CLAUSE" "C. An additional deposit of $700 will be made on July 17, 1972, of which $500 will be non-refundable in the event the referenced contract is not consumated (sic)." This amendment was forwarded to the sellers by Respondent's Roberts & Gilman letter of July 17, 1972 which amendment was executed by the sellers upon receipt and mailed back to Roberts & Gilman. The July 17, 1972 letter was signed by Judy L. Rostatter of the sales processing department. A copy of the check received from the buyers was not enclosed although the letter stated it was enclosed. Prior to receipt of this amendment Crummett was advised by Richter, the buyer, that he had mailed a $700 check to Roberts & Gilman made payable to Crummett. Crummett was also advised by Respondent Clark that the check had been received. Since closing was scheduled to be held within a couple of days Crummett requested Clark to hold the check and he would endorse same at closing. Crummett never saw the original check for $700. On the day originally scheduled for the closing (circa July 18, 1972) Crummett received a telephone call from Respondent Clark to the effect that the appraisal on the property had come in some $3,000 below the asking price and inquiring if Crummett would accept $26,000 for his property. The latter advised he would not and, after some heated words, Crummett hung up. At this time it was evident to Respondent Clark and the sellers that the sale would not be consummated. Clark put a memo in the file dated July 28, 1972 saying: "Return checks of $700 + $300 in estrow (sic) to Richter. Seller advised we had no contract." A few weeks later, on August 3, 1972, after making several phone calls to Roberts & Gilman without success, Crummett had the listing broker, J.B. Steelman, write a letter (Exhibit 7) to Gilman making demand for the $500 deposit refund. By letter dated August 11, 1972 (Exhibit 6) Roberts and Gilman replied that they considered the contract had been terminated by the seller and saw no "justification by the seller to claim any escrow that has been returned to the buyer". This letter was signed "Dan T. Gilman /b.c." Several months later, in the spring of 1973, Crummett went to the office of Roberts and Gilman and obtained a photostatic copy of the check dated 7/15/72 that had been made by J.A. Richter in the amount of $700. This was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12. At the hearing Dan G. Gilman, President of Roberts & Gilman, Inc. denied any recollection of any part of this transaction or ever having heard of the incident prior to the investigator from the FREC coming to inquire about the incident. At the time of this transaction the realtor's office was very busy with several branch offices and some 120 salesmen handling transactions in eight or ten counties in central Florida. He has no recollection of dictating Exhibit 12 or anything about the incident but his secretary at that time was Beverly Cass. It was standard practice for a broker to review every contract before trust account money was disbursed or refunded. His initial testimony that numerous people in the office had authority to sign his name to letters going out of the office was recanted when he was recalled as a witness after the close of the Commission's case. He then stated he never authorized anyone to sign his name to a document having legal implication. Clark testified that the first time he ever saw Exhibit 11, the amendment to the contract, was when shown to him by the investigator for the FREC. Likewise he claims never to have seen or received the $700 check signed by Richter. With respect to the return of the deposit to Richter, (after being shown Exhibit 13) his recollection of the cancellation of the contract was that Richter was not re-assigned to the Orlando area. This was the only contract ever handled by Clark which involved the return of an escrow deposit. He has no recollection of talking to any member of the realty firm regarding clearing the return of the escrow deposit to Richter. Exhibit 5 is a photocopy of the check by which the $300 earnest money deposit was returned to Richter. It is obvious that the contract for the sale of the residential property herein involved was amended to provide for an additional deposit from the buyers and a clause which required the buyer to forfeit one half of his deposit in the event the transaction was not consummated. It is incomprehensible that such an amendment to the contract could be made without the knowledge of the salesman or the broker. It therefore appears that the Defendants either: (1) are not telling the truth; (2) have faulty memories; (3) allowed the duties normally performed by brokers to be carried out by secretaries; or (4) operated a realty company in a slipshod manner without due regard to the duties and responsibilities imposed upon brokers and salesman by the real estate license law.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d), (e), and (k), Florida Statutes, 1/ by committing the acts alleged in two administrative complaints; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0377781. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker at Wilson Realty International, 1059 Aurora Road, Melbourne, Florida 32935. The Myrie Transaction On July 22, 1993, Respondent negotiated a property management agreement with Harold E. and Bernia L. Myrie (the "Myries") who are residents of New York. Pursuant to the property management agreement, Respondent agreed to manage a rental house owned by the Myries and located in Florida (the "Myrie property"). On August 20, 1993, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement for the Myrie property with Mr. Eric A. Bogle and Ms. Jearlene Davis, as tenants. The tenants paid Respondent $2,590.60 in rental payments for the period August 20 through November 18, 1993. Respondent failed to deposit the rental payments into her escrow account. On November 19, 1993, Respondent issued check number 1501 to the Myries in the amount of $562.50. Respondent represented to the Myries that $562.50 was the net amount due them. The Myries deposited check number 1501. However, the check was returned for insufficient funds. Respondent replaced check number 1501 with another check for $562.50. There were sufficient funds to cover the second check. On December 29, 1993, the Myries cancelled their property management agreement with Respondent. They demanded the balance of $2,028.10. Respondent claimed that $562.50 was the total amount Respondent owed the Myries. Respondent represented that she had incurred expenses for repairs and maintenance to the Myrie property. Respondent never provided an accounting of either the rental proceeds received from the tenants or the alleged expenses for repairs and maintenance. 2/ Respondent failed to produce documents Petitioner needed to conduct an audit of her escrow account. Respondent failed to produce deposit receipts for rent and cancelled checks and written receipts for expenses incurred by Respondent. After Respondent failed to comply with two requests to produce the records Petitioner needed to conduct an audit, Petitioner subpoenaed Respondent's records on August 1, 1994. 3/ Respondent agreed to produce her records for review and audit on August 12, 1994. However, Respondent failed to keep her appointment and never produced the documents subpoenaed by Petitioner. 4/ Respondent misappropriated $2,028.10 paid to her by the tenants and converted those funds to Respondent's personal use. The tenants paid those funds to Respondent in trust for the Myries. The Myries authorized Respondent to collect those funds in trust and to remit the funds to them. Respondent breached the trust of both parties in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds for personal purposes. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of the escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for escrow funds paid to her in the Myrie transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account is culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Myrie transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(1). 5/ Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 2. The Timoll Transaction In June, 1993, Respondent negotiated a property management agreement with Lawrence and Sheila Timoll (the "Timolls") who were residents of New York. Pursuant to the property management agreement, Respondent agreed to manage a rental house owned by the Timolls and located in Florida. (the "Timoll property"). On July 14, 1993, Respondent procured tenants for the Timoll property. William and Sambri Dulmage (the "Dulmages") executed a one year lease. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, the Dulmages agreed to pay a security deposit of $625 and rent at the monthly rate of $600. Respondent received $4,800 from the Dulmages as payment of rent, a security deposit, and expenses associated with the Timoll property. Respondent never delivered any part of the $4,800 to the Timolls. Respondent represented to the Timolls that they were not entitled to any of the $4,800 because the Dulmages had vacated the property and stopped paying rent. Respondent also represented that she had incurred expenses for repairs and maintenance to the Timoll property. 6/ The Dulmages in fact occupied the Timoll property for the duration of the lease and timely paid all amounts in accordance with the terms of the lease. The Timolls knew that the Dulmages were complying with the lease and arranged for the rent to be paid directly to the Timolls in February, 1994. With three minor exceptions, 7/ Respondent did not incur expenses for maintenance and repairs to the Timoll property. 8/ From July 14, 1993, through February 22, 1994, the Timolls made repeated demands for Respondent to deliver the rent and security deposit, and to account for the expenses allegedly incurred by Respondent. Respondent produced property accounting forms describing expenses for maintenance and repairs to the Timoll property. With three minor exceptions, the accounting forms provided by Respondent contained fabricated expenses for maintenance and repairs. 9/ Respondent misappropriated $4,419.45 10/ paid to her by the Dulmages and converted those funds to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were paid to Respondent in trust for the Timolls. The Timolls authorized Respondent to collect those funds in trust and to remit the funds to them. Respondent breached the trust of both parties in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds for personal purposes. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow funds paid to her in the Timoll transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Timoll transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2- 14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 3. The Veil Transaction On November 29, 1993, Respondent entered into a short term lease agreement between Respondent, as the landlord, and Herman J. and Joyce Veil (the "Veils") as tenants (the "Veil transaction"). The Veils lived out of state. They paid Respondent a deposit of $1,919.36 to secure the seasonal rental of Unit 511, Ocean Walk Condominiums ("unit 511"). On March 1, 1994, the Veils traveled to Melbourne and discovered that unit 511 was not available. Respondent never provided the Veils with a rental unit of any kind. The Veils demanded the return of their deposit. On March 11, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1127 in the amount of $1,394.01. Respondent represented to the Veils that $1,394.01 was the total amount due. Respondent deducted $525.35 for motel charges allegedly incurred by Respondent to provide the Veils with temporary lodging for 11 days while Respondent attempted to procure an alternate rental for the Veils. The deduction of $525.35 was not authorized by the Veils. The Veils did not agree to pay for their own motel room. In addition, the motel charges deducted by Respondent included charges for two nights paid by the Veils. After Respondent issued check number 1127 for $1,394.01, Respondent ordered the bank to stop payment on the check. The bank erroneously cashed the check and subsequently requested the Veils to return the proceeds. The Veils refused. Respondent misappropriated $525.35 paid to her by the Veils and converted those escrow funds to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were paid to Respondent in trust for the Veils' seasonal condominium. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds belonging to the Veils. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of the escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for escrow funds paid to her in the Veil transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's accounts constitutes culpable negligence. When all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Veil transaction are considered, Respondent's attempt to stop payment of her check to the Veils constitutes dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 4. The Sella Transaction On February 14, 1994, Respondent procured a construction contract between Militano Construction, Inc. (the "seller"), and Mr. Lino Sella, (the "buyer"). The buyer lived in Italy and required an interpreter for his negotiations with Respondent. On February 14, 1994, the buyer entrusted Respondent with an escrow deposit of $12,250. The buyer authorized Respondent to administer funds entrusted to her because the buyer was in Italy. 11/ On February 15, 1994, Respondent cashed the check for the escrow deposit. Respondent obtained a cashier's check for $12,250 made payable to "Wilson Realty." Respondent then endorsed the cashier's check for her personal use. 12/ In July, 1994, the buyer authorized Respondent to release the escrow deposit to the seller upon issuance of a certificate of occupancy ("CO") by the City of Indian Harbour Beach, Florida (the "city"). The city issued the CO on September 1, 1994. After the city issued the CO, the seller repeatedly made verbal demands for Respondent to deliver the escrow deposit. On September 9, 1994, the seller wrote a letter to Respondent demanding the escrow deposit. On September 13, 1994, the buyer physically inspected the house, found that it was acceptable, and again authorized disbursement of the escrow deposit. The seller again demanded the escrow deposit. Respondent never delivered the escrow deposit. Respondent never accounted for the deposit to the seller, the buyer, or Petitioner. The seller was unable to pay approximately $9,000 to subcontractors used to construct the buyer's house. The subcontractors recorded mechanics' liens against the Sella property and precluded the seller from delivering good and sufficient title to the buyer. The seller's failure to provide the buyer with good and sufficient title precluded the seller from satisfying its obligations under the terms of the contract with the buyer and caused the seller to breach the contract. The buyer incurred legal expenses in an attempt to quiet title to his house. The seller incurred legal expenses in an attempt to recover the escrow deposit from Respondent. Respondent misappropriated a $12,250 escrow deposit in the Sella transaction and converted that escrow deposit for personal use. The escrow deposit was given to Respondent in trust. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of the escrow deposit in the Sella transaction. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow deposit and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's escrow account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Sella transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 5. The Stanley Transaction In March, 1994, Respondent procured a construction contract between Atlantic Construction, Inc. (the "seller"), and Trevor and Carol Stanley (the "buyers") who are residents of New York. The buyers entrusted Respondent with an escrow deposit of $7,800. The buyers were unable to qualify for a mortgage and terminated the agreement in accordance with the terms of the construction contract. The buyers agreed to forfeit $500 of the escrow deposit to Respondent as real estate commission. On July 12, 1994, the buyers demanded that Respondent return $7,300 of their escrow deposit. Respondent claimed the entire $7,800 escrow deposit and neither delivered the $7,300 agreed to by the buyers nor accounted for any of the escrow deposit. Petitioner was unable to audit Respondent's escrow account. The bank where the escrow account was maintained closed the account because the account was overdrawn. The bank charged off $3,483.45 in overdrawn funds. Respondent misappropriated a $7,300 escrow deposit in the Stanley transaction and converted the escrow deposit to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were given to Respondent in trust. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds in the Stanley transaction. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow deposit and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Stanley transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 6. Respondent's Conduct Respondent evidenced a gross disregard for the rights and property of others, applicable laws, and the legal process. 13/ Respondent's conduct demonstrated culpable intent to commit the offenses for which she is charged. Respondent has made no attempt at restitution to any of the five clients she harmed, and has made no attempt to pay the overdraws charged off by the bank. Respondent has made no attempt to pay the Sella subcontractors or otherwise remove any cloud on the title to the Sella property. Respondent ignored valid subpoenas issued by Petitioner. Respondent engaged in dilatory acts and misrepresentations. Respondent delayed this proceeding through repeated false pretenses that she was represented by counsel who was unable to appear for previously scheduled formal hearings. Respondent participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact in Respondent's defense. Respondent's defense was baseless and a sham. It was no more than a stonewall defense presented for the purpose of delay. Respondent failed to show any of the facts asserted in her defense. She called no witnesses and submitted no material exhibits for admission in evidence. Respondent's cross examination of Petitioner's witnesses nominally attempted to create issues but failed to produce any competent and substantial evidence to support those issues. Respondent repeatedly attempted to establish issues either by unsworn representations or by arguing with witnesses during cross examination. Respondent's sworn testimony at the formal hearing was not credible and was unpersuasive. No competent and substantial evidence supported her testimony. Any evidence that Respondent adduced during her testimony, her cross examination of other witnesses, and in her exhibits was immaterial. Respondent's conduct in this proceeding constituted a reckless waste of quasi-judicial resources as well as a waste of the time and money of Petitioner and its witnesses. Many of those witnesses had already lost time and money as a result of Respondent's conduct before this proceeding began.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d)1., (e), and (k); and Rule 61J2- 14.012(1); revoking Respondent's real estate license; and imposing a fine of $20,000. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November 1995.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of issuing checks from his escrow account without sufficient funds so as to constitute culpable negligence, breach of trust, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; failing to reconcile escrow accounts, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e) and (k), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code; employing an unlicensed person, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes; failing to maintain business records, in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes; and violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission by failing to pay a citation within the required time, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these allegations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson in 1987. The following year, he became a licensed real estate broker, and he has remained a broker continuously since that time. From September 30, 1996, through January 30, 2000, Respondent was the qualifying broker of Express Realty and Investments, Inc. (Express Realty). At no time relevant to this case was Novellete Faye Hanse a Florida-licensed real estate broker or real estate salesperson. At all relevant times, Ms. Hanse was the office manager of Express Realty. Respondent formed Express Realty in 1995. Respondent was the sole director and president. Ms. Hanse's son was an officer of Express Realty from the time of its formation. Respondent met Ms. Hanse in 1991. She informed Respondent that she was a licensed mortgage broker. Respondent and Ms. Hanse agreed in late 1991 to form a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation in a single office. However, when Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992, Respondent, who has been a licensed general contractor since 1978, engaged exclusively in construction until 1995. Respondent formed Express Realty to pursue the prior plan of a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation. The two businesses occupied an office building owned by Ms. Hanse, who did not charge Respondent's business any rent. The address was 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. Express Realty served as an escrow agent in a contract dated May 9, 1999, for the sale and purchase of real property located at 6360 Southwest 23rd Street in Miramar. In this capacity, Express Realty, held various funds in escrow for the closing. For the closing, Express Realty issued two checks payable to the closing agent, totaling $19,169.08, and drawn on its escrow account. The checks, which are dated July 15, 1999, and signed by Ms. Hanse, bear the name, "Express Realty & Investments, Inc. Escrow Account" and bear the address 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The bank failed to pay these checks due to insufficient funds. After receiving a complaint that Express Realty had failed to produce these escrow funds at the closing, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Respondent's escrow account. At the audit, which took place the day prior to the day scheduled, the investigator found Ms. Hanse, but not Respondent, at the Express Realty office. Despite repeated requests on and after the day of the office visit, the investigator could not obtain relevant records from Ms. Hanse or Respondent concerning the real estate transaction for which Express Realty had issued escrow checks with insufficient funds. On August 23, 1999, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a citation to Respondent at 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The citation was served on Respondent within one week of the date of issuance. The $100-citation was for the failure to give the required disclosure or notice in a real estate transaction. The citation gave Respondent 30 days to contest the citation or 60 days to pay the citation. After the deadline, the investigator contacted Respondent and asked him about the citation. Respondent stated that he had forgotten about it. When Respondent still failed to pay the citation, the investigator called again, and Respondent stated that he had mailed the money, but it had been returned due to a faulty address. Respondent paid the citation approximately four months after it had been served on him. Shortly after Respondent belatedly paid the citation, Petitioner received another complaint concerning a contract for the sale and purchase of real property located at 850 Southwest 9th Avenue in Hallandale. In this transaction, Ms. Hanse represented herself to be a licensed real estate broker, showed the property to prospects, and accepted $5000 in escrow on behalf of Express Realty. In July 2000, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Express Realty's escrow account. Again, the investigator was unable to find any documents by which he could undertake an independent reconciliation of the account or otherwise document the role of Express Realty in the subject transaction. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was unaware that Ms. Hanse had been conducting real estate business without his authority in the name of Express Realty. Although he admitted that she was an employee of Express Realty, he disclaimed any knowledge that she had removed him from the escrow account and otherwise taken over the management of the real estate broker company. However, Respondent could not explain why, after his claimed discovery of these misdeeds in the summer of 1999, he did nothing to prevent Ms. Hanse from continuing to use Express Realty as the means by which to conduct unlicensed real estate activities, as she did a few months later. Under the circumstances, Petitioner proved that Respondent was at all times aware that Ms. Hanse was conducting unlicensed real estate activities through Express Realty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I-IV and VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, imposing a $5000 administrative fine, and suspending his license for three years; provided, however, if Respondent fails to pay the fine in full within 180 days of the final order, his license shall be revoked without further notice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Hisey, Deputy Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Dean Saunders, Chairperson Florida Real Estate Commission Division of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Carstarphen Watkins Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Wayne Wagie 11900 North Bayshore Drive, Unit No. 5 Miami, Florida 33181
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing real estate licenses and regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent, Gregory T. Franklin ("Franklin"), is licensed in the state as a real estate broker; license number 0314387. The last license issued was as a real estate broker, c/o Equity Realty of South Florida, Inc., t/a Equity Realty, 5809 Southeast Federal Highway #200, Stuart, Florida 34997. Respondent, Equity Realty of South Florida, Inc. ("Equity"), is a corporation registered as a real estate broker; license number 0229264. Respondent, Franklin, is the qualifying broker for Respondent, Equity. On or about January 26, 1990, Mr. Robert Warren (the "buyer") entered into a contract to purchase real estate from Ms. J. Zola Miller and Ms. Adrianne Miller Hill (the "sellers"). The buyer gave Respondent an earnest money deposit in the amount of $1,000. On or about April 17, 1990, a second contract was executed by the buyer and sellers. The buyer gave Respondents a second earnest money deposit in the amount of $24,000. Both earnest money deposits were timely deposited to Respondents' escrow account, number 0194101404, Florida Bank, Stuart, Florida. The buyer and sellers had difficulty in closing the contract due to disagreements concerning conditions in the contract. At the buyer's request, Respondents used the earnest money in the amount of $25,606.04 to purchase a certificate of deposit ("CD") in the name Robert Warren Century 21 Equity Realty Escrow Account #050-215-76, located at the First Marine Bank of Florida, Palm City, Florida ("First Marine"). Respondents received the sellers' verbal approval, but not written approval, for the purchase of the CD. Respondents notified the Florida Real Estate Commission (the "Commission") on August 28, 1990, that there were conflicting demands for the $25,000 earnest money deposit. Respondents stated their intent to claim a portion of the earnest money as an earned commission and stated that they were preparing to file an interpleader action to resolve the parties' dispute over the earnest money deposit. The Commission acknowledged Respondents' notification. Negotiations between the buyer and sellers continued until December 12, 1990. At that time, the parties reached an impasse, and each made written requests for the escrow deposit. Respondents maintained the earnest money in the CD until February 8, 1991. On February 8, 1991, Respondents were notified by First Marine that the buyer was attempting to obtain the escrow monies directly from First Marine. Respondents opened a CD in the name of Robert Warren Escrow Account for Equity Realty by Gregory Franklin, Account #200-517-7320, First Union Bank of Florida, Stuart, Florida. When the CD matured on May 15, 1991, the amount of the deposit was $25,989.57. On May 15, 1991, Respondents removed the earnest moneys and invested them in CD #10696954 at Community Savings Bank. On June 19, 1991, Respondents withdrew $500, paid a penalty of $6.21, and closed the CD. The remaining balance was used to open CD #10707413 at Community Savings Bank. On June 21, 1991, Respondents withdrew $600 and paid a penalty in the amount of $8.67. Respondents used half of the $600 withdrawal to pay an attorney to initiate a civil interpleader action without the knowledge or consent of either the buyer or seller. On August 23, 1991, Respondents closed the CD and withdrew the balance. On August 23, 1991, Respondents opened CD 310725647 in the name of Equity Realty, Inc., with the balance at Community Savings Bank. On October 30, 1991, Respondents made a withdrawal in the amount of $175. On November 23, 1991, the CD was renewed. The account was closed on November 27, 1991, with a balance of $25,456.94, and deposited into the court registry. The interpleader action was ultimately resolved pursuant to a settlement agreement between the parties. Respondents obtained the consent of both parties, though not the written consent of both parties, before placing the escrowed funds into an interest bearing account on August 15, 1990. The uncontroverted testimony of Respondent, Franklin, concerning this issue was credible and persuasive. Neither the sellers nor the buyer ever revoked their consent. Respondents deposited the earnest moneys into an interest bearing account without designating who was to receive the interest from such an account without the consent of both parties. Respondents took appropriate action to resolve the conflicting demands made upon the earnest moneys deposited with Respondents but failed to take such action in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of placing escrow funds in an interest bearing account without designating who is to receive the interest in violation of Florida Administrative Rule 21V- 14.014. It is further recommended that Petitioner should issue a written reprimand to Respondents and require Respondent, Franklin, during the next 12 months, to document to the satisfaction of Petitioner that he has completed 14 hours of the Brokerage Management Course. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3323 Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1.-6. Accepted in Finding 1. 7.-8. Accepted in Finding 2. 9.-11. Accepted in Finding 3. Accepted in Finding 4. Accepted in Finding 5. Accepted in Finding 3. Accepted in Finding 6. Accepted in Finding 7. 17.-20. Accepted in Finding 8. 21.-22. Accepted in Finding 9. 1.-6. Accepted in Finding 1. 7.-8. Accepted in Finding 2. 9.-11. Accepted in Finding 3. 12. Accepted in Finding 4 13. Accepted in Finding 5. 14. Accepted in Finding 3. 15. Accepted in Finding 6. 16. Accepted in Finding 7 17.-20. Accepted in Finding 8. 21.-22. Accepted in Finding 9. 23.-24. Accepted in Findings 10.-11. Respondents' Proposed Findings Of Fact. 23.-24. Accepted in Findings 10.-11. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N 308 Hurston Building North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Gregory T. Franklin, pro se %Equity Realty of South Fla., Inc. 5809 S.E. Federal Highway, #200 Stuart, Florida 34997 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3323 All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
