The Issue Should the certificate of registration of Petitioner, Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. PMC 296, as a privately-owned pain management clinic, be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. 296, is a pain management clinic (PMC) subject to the requirements of sections 458.3265 and 459.0137, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ PMC 296 is not wholly-owned by medical doctors (M.D.s), osteopathic physicians (D.O.s), or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. PMC 296 is not a health care clinic licensed under chapter 400, part X, Florida Statutes. PMC 296 has three equity shareholders. Their names and percentages of ownership interests are: Robert Ciceles (20 percent); Terra Hom (40 percent), and Erez Cohen (40 percent). None of the three equity shareholders is a physician, M.D. or D.O. Erez Cohen is, and at all pertinent times, has been president of PMC 296. He is not an M.D. or a D.O. Since at least August 2010, the owners and officers of PMC 296 were aware of the requirement that it be wholly physician-owned, effective October 1, 2010. PMC 296 was, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, not wholly-owned by physicians, M.D.s, D.O.s, or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. A dispute among the shareholders arising out of a dissolution of marriage proceeding has prevented PMC 296 from establishing ownership by a M.D., a D.O. or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. Management of PMC 296 plans to transfer ownership to physicians at an unspecified future date once the shareholder dispute is resolved. There was no evidence of any exemption from the operation of sections 458.3265 and 459.0137 presented at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health issue a final order revoking the certificate of registration of Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. PMC 296. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Laura Drinkwater, Respondent, was employed as a LPN by the Bond Clinic in Winter Haven, Florida in 1973 and has worked continuously at the Clinic since that time. At all times here relevant she assisted Dr. Erde, who specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. Respondent renewed her license annually from 1973 through 1976 but neglected to forward her renewal application to Petitioner in time for renewal prior to April 1, 1977. Respondent continued to be carried on the records of the Clinic as a LPN after 1 April 1977 and to perform the same duties she performed prior to 1 April 1977. On 18 October 1977 the Board of Nursing contacted the executive Director of Bond Clinic, learned that Respondent was still employed there, and advised the Executive Director (by phone) that Respondent could not continue to work as a LPN without a current license. Respondent submitted the application for renewal of her license bearing date of 6-2-77 which was received by the Board of Nursing on 31 October 1977 (Exhibit 2). By letter dated November 21, 1977 (Exhibit 1) to Respondent at an Alabama address, which had not been Respondent's address registered with the Board for several years, the Board advised Respondent that her reregistration was being denied because she had been working without a license and she could request a hearing on this denial of reregistration. This letter was never received by Respondent, nor was it returned to the Board. The Board instituted criminal proceedings, through the State's Attorney's office, against Respondent on charges stemming from her continuing to work as a LPN subsequent to the expiration of her license. This resulted in a trial at which Respondent was acquitted on 1 May 1978. On 11 May 1978 Respondent again requested reregistration as a LPN with the Board which was denied by Board's letter dated May 19, 1978 (Exhibit 3). Thereafter by letter dated May 26, 1978 Respondent requested an administrative hearing, the Administrative Complaint was filed and these proceedings followed. Upon receipt of information from the Board that Respondent was no longer licensed, the Executive Director of Bond Clinic contacted the Executive Director, Florida Board of Medical Examiners, who advised him that so long as Respondent was working under the supervision of a doctor at the Clinic she could, in his opinion, legally perform any medical task assigned by this doctor. Upon advice of counsel the Executive Director advised Respondent to remove indicia of LPN (cap, pin, etc.) and to cease giving injections to patients. Respondent gave no injections from 18 October 1977 until her acquittal in the criminal proceedings on 1 May 1978. Since Respondent had not worn the indicia of LPN before her license expired, no change in this regard was required. After 18 October 1977 Respondent's title was changed from LPN to Medical Assistant. Respondent was advised by her employer that she could continue her duties as an unlicensed assistant to the doctor, perform all duties previously performed except give injections, and after her acquittal on 1 May 1978 Respondent was authorized to resume giving injections. Several witnesses testified without objection regarding their interpretation of the Medical Practices Act, Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Such "evidence" is disregarded as invading the province of this tribunal. All testimony of this nature purporting to show the practices of the profession is, of course, admitted. While Exhibit 5 purported to express the opinion of the Florida Board of Medical Examiners that "a licensed M.D. may employ any person to assist him in his office and in his medical practice and he may delegate to this employee any tasks which he feels are commensurate with that employee aptitude, proficiency and demonstrated abilities," the author of that opinion retracted the broad implications of the statement under cross-examination. Many unlicensed individuals are employed by medical doctors as their assistants and are given some training by these doctors. Some obviously receive more training than others and, regardless of the legality of the practice, many of these doctors assign tasks to these unlicensed employees that constitute the practice of nursing. The prevailing concept in this regard is expressed in th ultimate sentence of Exhibit 5 that "Otherwise, there is nothing in the laws pertaining to the practice of medicine which prevents any licensed physician from hiring anyone whom he chooses to perform any tasks in his office which he so designates or delegates to these employees." Unlicensed employees are normally paid lower wages than are licensed personnel and approximately one-third to one-half of the employees in doctors' offices and clinics are unlicensed.
Findings Of Fact The following facts were stipulated by the parties and required no proof at hearing: Petitioner, University Hospital, Ltd., is a Florida limited partnership and is the licensee of University Hospital and University Pavilion Hospital, both located on North University Drive, Tamarac, Florida. Petitioner Sebastian Hospital, Inc., is a Florida corporation, and is the licensee of Sebastian Hospital and SandyPines Hospital. Both hospitals are located on separate premises. Petitioner Haines City HMA, Inc., is a Florida corporation, and is the licensee of Heart of Florida Hospital, Inc. and Palmview Hospital. Both hospitals are located on separate premises. Petitioners timely filed their respective Petitions to determine the invalidity of the proposed rules at issue. Petitioners would be regulated by the proposed rules and are substantially affected parties with standing to challenge the proposed rules at issue. No proof is necessary to prove the standing of these Petitioners. Prior Rule 59C-1.004(2)(i) (the "License Consolidation Rule") required CON application and approval for license consolidations pursuant to Section 395.003, F.S. It was declared invalid in University Hospital, Ltd., et al. v. AHCA, 16 F.A.L.R. 3312 (final order dated July 22, 1994). [This decision is referenced throughout as University Hospital.] Prior to invalidation of the License Consolidation Rule, six CON applicants sought issuance of a single, or consolidated, license to replace former separate licenses held by the same licensee for facilities located on separate premises. Each of these six prior applicants involved a general acute care hospital and a specialty psychiatric hospital. Those applicants resulted in an issuance of CON numbers 7303, 6954, 7712, 7311, 7167, and 7047. Each of those six applications was ulti- mately approved in the form of a single license. When the single licenses were issued, no restrictions were placed on the licensees regarding eligibility for Medicaid reimbursement. As reflected in the respective SAARS, a significant result of approval of each of these applications was that the formerly separately licensed psychiatric hospital became eligible for Medicaid reimbursement for treatment of Medicaid patients. All of these prior applicants had licenses issued and became eligible for Medicaid. Such Medicaid reimbursement was not available to the separately licensed psychiatric facilities prior to issuance of a single, or consolidated, license. Aside from the rules under challenge, there has been no change in pertinent state statutes or rules subsequent to the final order in University Hospital Ltd., v. AHCA 16 F.A.L.R. 3312. After invalidation of the Consolidated License Rule, AHCA's interpretation is that issuance of a single, or consolidated, license for a general acute care hospital and a psychiatric hospital does not result in Medicaid eligibility. Petitioners did not participate in any of the rule workshops conducted on June 22, July 7, and November 2, 1994 or the public hearing held on February 13, 1995. Petitioners did not send in any written comments, questions, or materials, or request an economic impact statement. A holding of the Final Order in University Hospital, was that a Certificate of Need was not required prior to the issuance of a single consol- idated license for multiple premises. University Hospital, 16 F.A.L.R. at 3321. The Agency has no discretion regarding rule- making pursuant to Section 120.535. (Joint Prehearing Stipulation, filed 3/14/95) Approximately eighteen months ago and well before the University Hospital decision, the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) commenced a major rewrite of the hospital license rules that had been promulgated by its predecessor agency, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). After a series of public workshops, the revisions were noticed in the January 20, 1995, Florida Administrative Weekly. These substantial revisions of rule chapter 59A-3 comprise about fifty pages of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The challenged portions comprise only several paragraphs of the revisions. The challenged portions of the proposed rules are: 59A-3.203 Licensure Procedure. (2) All persons requesting licensure for the operation of a hospital under the provisions of Chapter 395, F.S., shall make application to the Agency, on forms provided, AHCA Form 3130- 8003-January 1995, and AHCA Form 3130-8001-January 1995, and shall receive a regular or provisional license prior to the acceptance of patients for care or treatment. * * * (e) An application for the addition of beds or off-site outpatient facilities to a hospital's license must include: A valid certificate of need or letter of exemption as required by ss. 488.041 - 408.045, F.S., and Approval from the Agency's Office of Plans and Construction. * * * (i) A single license will be issued to a licensee for facilities located on separate premises, upon request of the applicant. The license will specifically state the location of the facilities, their services, and the licensed beds available on each separate premises. Such a license shall also specifically identify the general or specialty classification of hospitals located on separate premises. (6) Each license shall specifically state the name of the licensed operator of the hospital, the class of hospital, and the name and location of the hospital. Any beds in the hospital which are regulated under the certificate of need program, as specified in Chapter 59C-1, F.A.C., shall be listed, including the number of licensed beds by type. The license for hospitals having facilities on more than one premises shall specifically state the location of each facility, their general or specialty classification, their services, and the licensed beds available on each separate premises. * * * Specific Authority 395.003, 395.004, 455.239, F.S. Law Implemented, 395.001, 395.003, 395.004, 395.1005, 408.035, 408.036, 455.239, F.S. History New. (emphasis added) Prior to the decision in the University Hospital case in July 1994, the proposed revisions did not include the requirement that the license for facilities on separate premises identify separately the general or specialty classification of each. That provision was added by the agency because it concluded that when it could no longer require a CON for "consolidated" licenses, then general acute care beds and free-standing psychiatric beds could not be "consolidated" on a single license. It is uncontroverted that the substantial effect of the requirement that each facility retain its prior classification is that a facility classified as a class III (specialty) facility is not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. The agency agrees that proposed rule is based on, and is compelled by section 395.003(2)(d), F.S., which provides as follows: (d) The Agency shall, at the request of a licensee, issue a single license to a licensee for facilities located on separate premises. Such a license shall specifically state the location of the facilities, the services, and the licensed beds available on each separate premises. If a licensee requests a single license, the licensee shall designate which facility or office is responsible for receipt of information, payment of fees, service of process, and all other activities necessary for the Agency to carry out the provision of this part. (Emphasis supplied). It is immediately obvious from a comparison of the text of the proposed rule and the text of the law implemented that the law does not require that the license state the general or specialty classification for the separate facilities. This distinction was not lost on the agency since it included in its legislative package for the 1995 legislative session a proposed amendment to section 395.003(2)(d), F.S. that would cure the inconsistency by adding the proposed rule language to the statute. (Petitioner's exhibit number 16, p. 25) There is a statute which restricts Medicaid reimbursement for treatment in free-standing psychiatric hospitals. The agency argues that the proposed rules give effect to that statute, section 409.905(5), F.S., which provides, in pertinent part: . . . A licensed hospital maintained primarily for the care and treatment of patients having mental disorders or mental diseases is not eligible to participate in the hospital inpatient portion of the Medicaid program except as provided in federal law. . . . (emphasis supplied). Reliance on Section 409.905(5) is misplaced, however, because it is nowhere cited in the proposed rules as authority or law implemented. Moreover, evidence presented at hearing describes federal policy that when two hospitals are consolidated under one license and have a total capacity that is less than 50 percent psychiatric in nature, the premises are both eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, even though one remains primarily for the treatment of mental disorders. (Petitioners' exhibits number 20-22) The federal policy on Medicaid reimbursement was in effect in 1993, prior to the University Hospital decision and prior to the current version of the proposed rules. Section 409.905(5), F.S. has been in effect since 1991, before the six consolidated licenses referenced in paragraph 1, above, were issued. Section 395.003(2)(d), F.S. has been in effect in its current form at all times material. Nothing in the law has changed to support the agency's contention that, after the University Hospital decision, it can no longer issue a single license with a single license classification for separate premises. No evidence nor specific argument was presented with regard to the alleged invalidity of proposed rule 59A-3.203(2)(e), which on its face relates to the addition of beds or an outpatient facility to a hospital's license. Issues related to that portion of the proposed rule are not the issues invoked in this proceeding with regard to Petitioner's facilities. (See Petitioners' exhibit 26, p. 71, deposition of Tanya Williams)
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the State of Florida agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2004). As set forth herein, the Respondent was a physician licensed to practice medicine in the area of critical need (ACN), and holding Florida license number ACN144. A physician holding an ACN licensed must practice in a facility that meets certain statutory requirements or which is designated by the State Health Officer as an entity providing health care to an indigent population, and must submit documentation establishing employment at an ACN-designated facility for licensing. The secretary of the Florida Department of Health is the state health officer. Prior to the events at issue in this proceeding, the Respondent practiced medicine as medical director at "Mariner's Medical Center" (Mariner's), which closed in October 2002. Mariner's was an approved ACN facility. After the closure of the Mariner's facility, the Respondent accepted a position in Miami at Jackson Memorial Hospital (Jackson) in October 2002; however, prior to commencing his employment, circumstances at Jackson changed and the Respondent's position at Jackson was eliminated. The Respondent's employment contract at Jackson was terminated and, he received payment under the terms of the agreement. The Respondent subsequently returned to central Florida, apparently intent on opening a medical practice. By letter to "Sandy Condo," from the Respondent dated July 17, 2003, the Respondent sought responsibility for Mariner's medical records. The letter did not further identify Sandy Condo, but the address was that of the Petitioner. The letter, which identified the practice as an entity called "Boriquen Healthcare Plus," stated as follows: This is to certify my desire for the responsibility of the medical records of Mariner's Medical Center, where I was the Medical Director until October 24, 2002. I am willing to be the custodian of these medical records and I would like the computer data base (sic) be transferred to my care. I intend to follow up on the care of all these patients. In August 2003, the Respondent opened a private practice at 931 West Oak Street, Suite 103, Kissimmee, Florida, and began treating patients. The practice was initially named "Boriquen Health Care" (reflecting the historical name for Puerto Rico), but within a few days of opening was renamed "Physician's Health Care Plus." Towards the end of August 2003, the Respondent made efforts to acquire the ACN designation for his practice. Materials seeking the designation were submitted by Glenda E. Gonzalez-Cortes, M.D., the Medical Director for Physician's Healthcare Plus, to the Board of Medicine (Board). Although the materials were received by the Board, the Board was not the agency responsible for ACN facility designations. It is unclear whether the Board forwarded the materials to the appropriate office within the Department of Health for processing. It is likewise unclear whether the Respondent understood the distinction between the "Department of Health" and the "Department of Health, Board of Medicine." In any event, the fact that materials were submitted seeking ACN designation for the practice clearly establishes that the Respondent was aware that the practice was not designated as an ACN facility. A memo dated October 2, 2003, from Melinda K. Gray, Regulatory Supervisor of the Board of Medicine, to Larry McPherson, Jr., Executive Director of the Board of Medicine, stated as follows: Attached please find a letter dated July 17, 2003, from Dr. Jose A. Gutierrez, expressing his desire to take responsibility for the medical records of Mariner's Medical Center. Based on my conversation today with Dr. Gutierrez, he again expressed his desire to take responsibility of the medical records and to follow-up on the care of these patients who received medical treatment at Mariner's Medical Center Please be advised of the following: Mariner's Medical Center is closed. Mariner's Medical Center is owned by a non-health care licensee. The medical records located at Mariner's Medical Center are currently inaccessible and are being maintained by a leasing company. Dr. Gutierrez or the patients do not have access to these medical records. Dr. Gutierrez is willing to take custody of these records, which are located on a computer hard drive, and paper records. The hard drive is necessary to be able to link between the patient's name and patient identification numbers. Dr. Gutierrez indicated he intends to follow the care of these patients. Dr. Gutierrez holds a clear active medical license in the area of critical need in the state of Florida and reflects no prior discipline. Dr. Gutierrez indicated that either the leasing company or the owner of Mariner's Medical Center would not release these records to him until the Board of Medicine reviews his request to take custody of the records and the Board grants his request. Dr. Gutierrez agrees, accepts and acknowledges the responsibility to maintain the medical records and follow-up patient care of the patients who received medical treatment at Mariner's Medical Center, beginning July 17, 2003. By letter dated October 7, 2003, from the executive director of the Board of Medicine, the custodial request was approved. The letter stated as follows: It is my pleasure to advise you that, pursuant to your request, the Board of Medicine voted on October 4, 2003, to permanently appoint you as the Custodian of Records for the former Mariner's Medical Center. This appointment is pursuant to Section 456.057(19), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Board of Medicine to permanently appoint a person as a custodian of medical records in the event of the death of a practitioner, the mental or physical incapacitation of the practitioner, or the abandonment of medical records by a practitioner. The custodian appointed shall comply with all provisions of this section, including the release of patient records. The Respondent suggests that the release of the records to his custody constituted approval of his July 17 request to provide treatment; however, the October 7 letter clearly did not address issues regarding provision of patient care. The statutory citation referenced in the letter addresses only custody, maintenance, and use of medical records. There is no credible evidence that the ongoing dialogue between the Respondent and representatives of the Petitioner constituted approval of the Respondent's request to provide medical care to Mariner's patients. Further, there is no evidence that the Respondent's practice at "Boriquen Health Care" or "Physician's Health Care Plus" was limited solely to patients who had received care at Mariner's. By letter dated November 25, 2003, to Kimberly Rivers, Regulatory Supervisor for the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, the Respondent referenced a conversation of November 21, 2003, wherein a discussion allegedly occurred regarding the requirements for ACN designation. The letter clearly establishes that the Respondent was aware that the practice had not yet received the ACN designation. The Respondent's ACN license was due to expire on January 31, 2004. On January 30, 2004, the Respondent submitted his ACN re-licensure application. Because he was not practicing at an ACN facility as of the expiration date, the ACN license was not automatically renewed. By letter dated February 5, 2004, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that his ACN license renewal could not be completed until submission of a letter from "your employer in an area of critical need." The letter referenced an enclosure that allegedly identified the ACN-designated facilities. An email dated February 16, 2004, from Joanne Davis-Trexler to the Respondent references a prior conversation and advises that the Respondent's license can not be renewed without "proof of employment in a facility approved as an Area of Critical Need." The email further advises that the Respondent's license is "delinquent" and that "practice with a delinquent license is a violation of Florida Statutes." An exchange of email between the parties indicates that subsequent to February 16, 2004, additional information, including Medicaid/Medicare billing records, was submitted by the Respondent to the Petitioner to document the patient population being served by the Respondent. On March 8, 2004, the secretary of the Department of Health, acting as the state health officer, approved Physician's Health Care Plus as an ACN-designated facility based on the staff's recommendation. On March 24, 2004, following the facility's ACN designation, the Respondent's ACN licensure was renewed. Between August 2003 (when the Respondent's practice began operating absent the ACN designation) and March 8, 2004, the Respondent failed to comply with licensure requirements limiting his practice to ACN-designated facilities. Between February 1 and March 24, 2004, the Respondent failed to comply with requirements related to timely renewal of his ACN licensure. The Respondent has moved to Texas, is no longer practicing medicine in Florida, and has placed his Florida license into a "retired" status.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, enter a final order issuing a letter of concern to the Respondent related to the licensing violations cited herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick L. Butler, Esquire Katharine B. Heyward, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 George F. Indest, III, Esquire Joanne Kenna, Esquire The Health Law Firm 220 East Central Parkway, Suite 2030 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 Timothy M. Cerio, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, a licensed physician, committed a violation of Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary sanctions should be imposed against his license.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Grayson C. Snyder, a licensed physician at all times pertinent to these proceedings, holding medical license number ME 0004035. Respondent's last known address is 635 West Central Avenue, Blountstown, Florida 32424-1909. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. On December 29, 1994, the Board of Medicine issued a final order against Respondent. The final order suspended Respondent’s license to practice for at least 6 months, pending his demonstration to the Board that he could practice medicine with skill and safety by undergoing an evaluation by a psychiatrist approved by the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN). The final order also required Respondent’s completion of a period of probation after reinstatement and his payment of an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000 within 30 days of the final order. Respondent has consistently failed to comply with the final order, inclusive of the payment of the $5,000 administrative fine. Other requirements of the final order relating to psychiatric evaluation and completion of a probationary period have also not been met.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing and in accordance with Petitioner's penalty guidelines set forth in Rule 64B-8.001, Florida Administrative Code, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the violation alleged in the administrative complaint and revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol Lanfri, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Michael Stone, Esquire 116 East 4th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Sandra Ann Lindstrom (“Ms. Lindstrom” or “Respondent”), a licensed physician assistant, prescribed Lorcet, a medication containing a controlled substance (hydrocodone), in violation of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed at the Department of Health in DOH Case No. 2006-36542 on October 27, 2014. If so, what is the appropriate discipline?
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department of Health is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of physician assistants in the State of Florida. The regulation is pursuant to both chapter 456 (“Health Professions and Occupations, General Provisions”) and chapter 458 (“Medical Practice”), Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed as a physician assistant by the Board of Medicine. Her license number is PA 9103823. The license was effective on August 3, 2006, with an expiration date of March 31, 2008. Her license has been continuously renewed since its effective date. See Pet’r’s Ex. A. Ms. Lindstrom is not licensed to practice medicine as a physician. Id. Physician Assistants Physician assistants are governed by section 458.347, a section within the chapter of the Florida Statutes that governs Medical Practice. Physician assistant licensure is provided for in section 458.347(7), and the Board of Medicine is authorized to “impose any of the penalties authorized under ss. 456.072 and 458.331(2) upon a physician assistant if the physician assistant or the supervising physician has been found guilty of or is being investigated for any act that constitutes a violation of this chapter [Ch. 458] or chapter 456.” § 456.347(7)(g), Fla. Stat. A physician assistant’s supervisory physician may delegate authority to conduct aspects of medical practice to a physician assistant under circumstances expressed in the statutes. The limited medical practice that may be delegated to a physician assistant includes certain practices at county health departments. Whether conducting the delegated practice of medicine at a county health department, or not, physician assistants may be delegated authority to prescribe medications provided they are not listed on a formulary created pursuant to section 458.347(7)(f). See § 458.347(7)(d) and (e), Fla. Stat. The formulary must include “controlled substances as defined in chapter 893.” § 458.347(7)(f)1., Fla. Stat. In sum, physicians may not delegate to physician assistants the prescription of medications which are controlled substances as defined in chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The Department’s Investigative Office The Department has an investigative office charged with looking into regulatory complaints. In a typical regulatory investigation, the investigator discloses his identity to any party interviewed, whether the party is the source of the complaint, a witness, or, if amenable to an interview, the licensee who is the subject of the complaint. Aside from interviews, the investigations include record reviews, the obtaining of evidence, and the preparation of an investigative report. In addition to investigating complaints of regulatory violations by licensed health care practitioners, the investigative office looks into cases of unauthorized practice by unlicensed individuals. Investigations of unlicensed activity are conducted by what is known as the “ULA” section of the office. Commonly, ULA investigations are done by investigators who are “undercover,” that is, the investigators hide their identity as investigators and use pseudonyms rather than their actual names. Typically, undercover ULA investigators present at the offices of the subjects of investigation. If the unlicensed subject of the investigation offers to perform services that require a license or engages in practice that requires a license, the Department pursues remedies, including an order that the subject cease and desist from the unlawful, unlicensed activity. Investigations of a licensee for practicing outside the scope of the licensed activity may be viewed as something of a hybrid of a typical regulatory investigation and a ULA investigation. It is regulatory since the subject is a licensee, but it is usually done undercover in the same manner in which a ULA investigation is conducted. One such investigation was conducted by Ryan Heal, an employee of the Department between August and December of 2006. Mr. Heal conducted the investigation undercover using a pseudonym referred to in Department documents as “RJ.” RJ and the 2006 Investigation of JHS Mr. Heal has been a medical malpractice investigator for the Department since November 2000. During the course of his more than 15 years as a Department investigator, Mr. Heal has investigated both regulatory violations and unauthorized practice violations. In 2006, allegations reached the Department that prescriptions were being written at Jacksonville Health Systems (“JHS”), a clinic located on Baymeadows Road in Jacksonville, Florida, by a physician assistant without the supervision of a physician. In response, the Department launched an investigation. The investigation was conducted undercover by Mr. Heal using his pseudonym RJ. Commenced in August of 2006, the investigation lasted until the following December. August 10, 2006 On August 10, 2006, Mr. Heal, using his fictitious name, presented at JHS. A woman behind the counter in the reception area accepted a cash payment for the visit. She took RJ’s blood pressure and requested the name of the pharmacy for any medicine prescribed. To the best of Mr. Heal’s recollection, the receptionist recorded some of the information. After the interaction with staff in the reception room, Mr. Heal took a seat and waited to be called back to the examination room. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Lindstrom emerged and asked for RJ. Mr. Heal “stood up and went over to her.” Hr’g Tr. 19. Ms. Lindstrom identified herself by her first name and said, “I’m the provider here.” Id. Ms. Lindstrom accompanied Mr. Heal to the examination room where only she and Mr. Heal were present. After Mr. Heal complained of back pain, Ms. Lindstrom asked where in his back the pain was located and what caused it, but she did not conduct a physical examination. As Mr. Heal testified at hearing, “[t]here was no examination. She never touched my back. Never took vitals or anything.” Hr’g Tr. 20. Ms. Lindstrom suggested that Mr. Heal use a chair with lumbar support, try stretching, lose weight, and have an MRI. Ms. Lindstrom then stated that she would prescribe medication to treat the pain: Lorcet, Flexeril, and Motrin. With the visit in the examination room concluded, Ms. Lindstrom took Mr. Heal back to the receptionist. The meeting in the examination room and his first visit to the JHS offices being over, Mr. Heal departed the JHS facility. He did not return until the following October. October 31, 2006 Mr. Heal returned to the JHS facility on October 31, 2006. The process during the second visit was similar to the one followed during the visit the previous August. He presented as “RJ.” A staff member took his blood pressure in the reception area and he paid her $90 in cash. Mr. Heal sat down and waited to be called. Again, Ms. Lindstrom appeared in the reception area and took him to the examination room in the back. The visit was shorter than it had been in August. Ms. Lindstrom asked if his pain had improved and if an MRI had been done. With the intention of calling in his prescriptions, Ms. Lindstrom showed Mr. Heal a list of five pharmacies from which to choose. Mr. Heal, however, took a tack that was different from Ms. Lindstrom’s intention and from his first visit: I explained to her that I did not have reliable transportation and asked [for] . . . handwritten prescriptions . . . so that I could take them to whatever pharmacy was convenient . . . . She agreed that she could write them that time, but that on the next visit, I would have to arrange for proper transportation to get to the pharmacy or wherever they needed to be called into. Hr’g Tr. 23. Ms. Lindstrom wrote out three prescriptions: Two of them were for “Flexeril 10mg (ten) #30 (thirty)” and “Ibprofen (sic) [Ibuprofen] 800mg #120 (one twenty).” Pet’r’s Ex. B. The third prescription was for “Lorcet 10/650 #90 (Ninety).” Id. Ms. Lindstrom explained to Mr. Heal that he should use one of the five pharmacies on her list because “several [of the Clinic’s patients] had been kicked out of pharmacies . . . [that] were refusing to fill the prescriptions.” Hr’g Tr. 25. Ms. Lindstrom also “mentioned that a couple of her patients had been arrested for forging prescriptions.” Hr’g Tr. 25-6. At no time during his visit to JHS on October 31, 2006, did Mr. Heal see a physician. No one entered the examination room where Ms. Lindstrom met with Mr. Heal that day. Nor did Ms. Lindstrom leave the examination room while Mr. Heal was present in the room. Like the first visit the previous August, Ms. Lindstrom recommended that Mr. Heal have an MRI. She explained that results from an MRI were needed “in case the DEA wanted to look at the file, to show that [she and JHS] were actually treating [Mr. Heal] for something.” Hr’g Tr. 28. December 1, 2006 Little more than a month later on December 1, Mr. Heal made a third visit to JHS. The reception process was the same. The receptionist took his blood pressure, he paid $90 in cash, and waited in the reception area for Ms. Lindstrom to call him back. While waiting, he was informed that the number of pharmacies that would accept JHS prescriptions had been drastically reduced. Only one pharmacy would now accept JHS prescriptions: a pharmacy called New Horizon. Subsequent to the third visit, Mr. Heal presented to the pharmacy identified as New Horizon. In the company of law enforcement and with its supervision, Mr. Heal had the prescriptions filled for three medications: Flexeril, Ibuprofen at a prescription-strength dosage, and Lorcet. Supervising Physician and Other Claims At hearing under oath, Ms. Lindstrom admitted that she treated Mr. Heal once at the JHS facility and admitted that she prescribed Flexeril and Ibuprofen for him. She claimed under oath that the supervising physician for the 2006 visit in which she prescribed the two medications was James Hendrick, M.D. The Department produced documentation in the Department’s official business records that shows that Dr. Hendrick cancelled his Professional Liability Insurance Policy effective October 1, 2005, the year before Ms. Lindstrom claims to have seen Mr. Heal at the JHS facility under Dr. Hendrick’s supervision. The reason for the cancellation of the policy is listed on the letter from the insurer to the Department as “Retired.” Pet’r’s Ex. F, letter dated October 17, 2005, from FPIC, First Professionals Insurance Company. Department records also include an “Address Change” form that contains a section entitled “Financial Responsibility” dated November 21, 2005, the year before the incidents in this case. No boxes are checked in the section that shows “Financial Responsibility Coverage.” Under a section on the form entitled, “Category II: Financial Responsibility Exemptions,” Dr. Hendrick checked a box that indicated he was “retired or maintain[ed] part-time practice,” id., at least as of late November 2005, 11 months or more before the October 31, 2006, visit by Mr. Heal. Ms. Lindstrom made other claims with regard to RJ’s visit that she asserted occurred on October 3, 2006, rather than October 31, 2006, as charged. Among them was that she left the examination room after completing the prescriptions for Flexeril and Ibuprofen and partially completing a third prescription by inserting all the information, including her signature, except for the medicine to be prescribed and how often it should be taken. Ms. Lindstrom claimed that she intended to write a prescription for Lodine, but failed to write down “Lodine” on the third prescription form because she was distracted by a discussion with Mr. Heal about the need for RJ to have an MRI. She says she left the room to make arrangements for an MRI and when she returned, RJ was gone, together with the two filled out prescriptions, the third incomplete prescription, and her prescription pad. Ms. Lindstrom’s testimony about the theft of the pad and other details about the event, including when it occurred, is not credible. In contrast, Mr. Heal’s testimony about the visits he made to the JHS facility, seeing Ms. Lindstrom, and her prescription of Lorcet, is credited as truthful. Lorcet Lorcet contains hydrocodone, which is a controlled substance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent Sandra A. Lindstrom, P.A., violated section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2006), by violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-30.008 (2006), as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; Imposing a $2,500 fine; and Revoking Respondent’s license as a physician assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra Ann Lindstrom 6726 Pomeroy Circle Orlando, Florida 32810 Yolonda Y. Green, Esquire Maciej Lewandowski, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Andre Ourso, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 (eServed) Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
