The Issue The issue in the case is whether, pursuant to sections 475.17(1)(a) and 475.181(2), Florida Statutes, Petitioner has the required honesty and good character to be entitled to take the examination for licensure as a licensed real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact On January 7, 2013, Petitioner filed the Application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. In response to a question asking if she had ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of no contest or guilty to, a crime, Petitioner disclosed one crime: exploitation of an elderly person. Although providing a detailed explanation of what she viewed as extenuating circumstances for the exploitation offense, Petitioner failed to disclose any other offenses. In addition to this offense, which is a 1999 conviction for the exploitation of an elderly person for more than $20,000, Petitioner was convicted at the same time of two other offenses that are undisclosed in the Application: organized fraud for $20,000 to $50,000 and grand theft. These three offenses are second-degree felonies bearing the same disposition date of May 12, 1999, based on Petitioner's plea of no contest to the three charges. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced Petitioner to three years' probation, 300 hours' community service, restitution of $1598, and court costs. These offenses arose out of Petitioner's persuading an aged neighbor to cosign a note, so that Petitioner could purchase a car. The neighbor also lent Petitioner $1000, so that Petitioner could obtain insurance for the vehicle. Fifteen years later, Petitioner continues to assert her innocence in this matter, although she does not deny the transactions described above in connection with these three convictions. Petitioner claims that she was poorly represented by a public defender and that the entire matter was the result of an overprotective out-of-state son who visited his aged mother and happened to notice a credit card charge for the insurance premium. At the very least, Petitioner lacks insight into the serious nature of her bad conduct in this matter. In addition to failing to disclose two of three of the offenses described above, the Application also fails to disclose two earlier criminal matters. In 1989, Petitioner was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence, both misdemeanors. The record is undeveloped as to these charges, although it appears that Petitioner pled no contest to at least one of them, and the court withheld adjudication on both of them. Also, in 1990, Petitioner pleaded no contest to a third- degree felony of grand theft, for which the court withheld adjudication and sentenced Petitioner to restitution of $450 and other special conditions. Petitioner claims to have forgotten about these older criminal matters. Without regard to the legitimacy of this explanation as to the 1989 misdemeanor offense, it is unlikely that Petitioner had forgotten about the 1990 felony offense because, in this case, she had stolen a gold bracelet owned by a woman with whom her husband was romantically linked. Under these circumstances, Petitioner has failed to prove, not only that she has the requisite honesty and good character for licensure, but also that sufficient time and subsequent good conduct provide the necessary assurance that her licensure would not present an undue risk to the public and investors.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying the Application. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Leslie Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Evelyn Lozado Apartment 305 3001 South Ocean Drive Hollywood, Florida 33019 Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against respondent be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dock Blanchard, Esquire Post Office Box 24 Ocala, Florida 32678 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint, as amended, filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been the holder of a Class "B" security agency license, number B 0001057. On July 27, 1995, Respondent was tried, was found guilty, and was adjudicated guilty of grand theft, a third-degree felony, in violation of Section 812.014(1)(a), Florida Statutes. On July 27, 1995, Respondent was tried, was found guilty, and was adjudicated guilty of perjury not in an official proceeding, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of Section 837.012, Florida Statutes. In the foregoing proceeding, the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, placed Respondent on probation for terms of five years and one year to run concurrently, and ordered Respondent to pay restitution in the amount of $15,783.67 to the victim.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint, as amended, and revoking Respondent's Class "B" security agency license number B 0001057. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 95-5217 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Daniel D. Goldberg 2812 Southwest 65th Avenue Miramar, Florida 33023 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses of malicious harassment, unlawful battery (two counts), and unlawful entry of a structure (two counts) as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated October 17, 1997. Whether Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his correctional officer's certification.
Findings Of Fact Christopher Horne (Respondent), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 29, 1989, as a correctional officer, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 70581. Respondent was employed by the Orange County Sheriff's Office, Department of Corrections, as a correctional officer during the period of October 1, 1990, until his termination on November 14, 1997. Patricia Johnson is currently employed with the Orange County Sheriff's Department of Corrections as a correctional officer and has been employed as such for the past twelve years. She is certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer. Johnson first met Respondent in the summer of 1993 at work. They became friends and eventually began dating each other in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. This relationship continued for approximately two and a half years, until Johnson made the decision to end it. Johnson told Respondent on New Year's Eve 1995 that their relationship was over. Johnson began dating another man. When Respondent found out that she was dating someone else, he began calling her repeatedly at work and at home. Respondent continued to harass Johnson by calling her late at night and by driving repeatedly past her home at night. This behavior began in January 1996 and continued through August 1996. The Respondent used abusive language when speaking with Johnson. He threatened harm to her date, if he found her with someone. Johnson was afraid of Respondent and was afraid that he might harm her. On July 21, 1996, Respondent went to Johnson's home unannounced and knocked on her door. When Johnson opened the door and saw who it was, she told Respondent to leave. He did not; instead he pushed his way into her home, physically struggled with her, and eventually pushed her onto her bed. Respondent pinned her down with his knees and threatened her. Johnson repeatedly told him to leave her home. Respondent eventually left the house. Johnson reported Respondent's actions to the police. They documented the incident in a report. She told the police that she did not want to press charges against Respondent, but did want someone to talk to him about his actions. The police contacted Respondent and discussed the incident with him, but did not arrest him. On November 10, 1996, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Johnson received a phone call at her house from a person she believed to be her brother. The person told her that he had forgot his keys and asked to be let into the house. A short time later, there was a knock at the door. When Johnson opened the door, Respondent was standing there. He said, "Bitch let me in" and proceeded to push his way into her home. He then grabbed her hair and hit her head against the wall several times. He continued to pull her hair and push her up against the wall. She begged him to leave and told him to stop hitting her. She broke free and ran to her brother's room and started banging on the door. Her bother, Bobby Hunter, came out. Johnson told him that she wanted Respondent out of her house. Her brother asked Respondent to leave. Eventually, Respondent did leave without further physical confrontation. Johnson reported the incident to the police. After investigating the incident, the police completed a report and arrested the Respondent. Respondent was charged with burglary, battery, and aggravated stalking. Respondent pled in circuit court to the misdemeanor charge of trespass to an occupied dwelling and was placed on one- year probation. Respondent was suspended for 10 days from his employment with the Orange County Sheriff's Department of Corrections as a result of his actions involving Johnson. He was later terminated from his employment on November 14, 1997. Respondent is currently not employed as a correctional officer. Respondent's description of the events from January 1996 through August 1996 and on the night of November 10, 1996 is not credible. On December 11, 1992, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issued an official Letter of Guidance to the Respondent. This prior action by the Commission is an aggravating factor in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission find Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and it is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Warren Turner, Esquire 609 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 11, 1983, and issued certificate number 19-82-502-08, which he still holds. For approximately the past eight years, Respondent has been employed by the Metro-Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department). During the first six years of his employment with the Department, he held the position of Correctional Officer I. His duties as a Correctional Officer I included supervising crews of inmates performing lawn maintenance work on public grounds outside the correctional facility in which they were housed. One of Respondent's supervisors was Jerry Meese, the Director of the Department's Operations Division. On September 26, 1986, while returning to his office from a lunchtime excursion, Meese observed a Department truck used to transport inmate work crews parked outside a private residence. The truck's presence in the residential area aroused Meese's suspicion. He therefore stopped to investigate. He soon discovered that Respondent and some inmates were in the area. One of the inmates was found to have some chewing gum in his possession. The inmate told Meese that Respondent had given him money to purchase the gum at a nearby store. A short walking distance from where Meese had encountered the inmate was a bag containing seven containers of beer. The containers were cold to the touch. Meese went to the store to which the inmate had referred and spoke to the store clerk. The store clerk advised Meese that the inmate, a short time before, had bought the beer that Meese had found in the bag. Meese discussed the matter with Respondent. It appeared to Meese that Respondent's speech was slurred and that his eyes were red. Upon his return to the office, Meese was provided with statements from inmates supervised by Respondent in which the inmates indicated that they had drank beer and smoked marijuana with Respondent. Shortly thereafter Meese learned that the inmates had tested positive for drugs. The Department had a policy which required a correctional officer to submit to drug testing if there existed a reasonable suspicion that the officer was involved in the illicit use of drugs. Based upon what had occurred that afternoon, Meese justifiably believed that he had grounds to invoke this policy and he therefore directed Respondent to submit to a drug test. He gave Respondent until Monday, September 29, 1986, to take the test. On September 29, 1986, prior to submitting to the test, Respondent was interviewed by Robert Sobel, an investigator with the Department's Internal Affairs Unit. Respondent freely admitted to Sobel that he "smok[ed] marijuana on a regular basis" and that he "would like to enroll in a program to overcome this problem." Later that day, at 3:10 p.m., in compliance with Meese's directive, Respondent went to the Consulab facility at the Cedars Medical Center in Miami and gave a urine specimen. The sample was screened by the use of an enzyme immunoassay testing procedure. The screening test was performed twice. On both occasions, the sample tested presumptively positive for cocaine and marijuana. The sample was then subjected to confirmatory testing. The thin layer chromatography (TLC) method was used. When performed by a competent technologist, TLC testing is accurate 95 to 99 percent of the time. The two technologists who tested Respondent's urine sample using the TLC method were highly competent. Their tests, which were completed at about 4:50 p.m., revealed the presence of cocaine metabolites 1/ and cannabinoids (marijuana). 15. The tests were accurate. Respondent had knowingly used cocaine and marijuana on or about the date of the testing. Notwithstanding the results of the testing, Respondent was not terminated by the Department. Instead, he was suspended. As a condition of continued employment, he was required to participate in a drug rehabilitation program and to remain drug-free. Respondent has met these requirements to the satisfaction of the Department. Not only has Respondent remained in the employ of the Department, he how occupies the position of corporal, a supervisory position to which he was promoted approximately two years ago. His post-September, 1986, employment record reveals that he has taken full advantage of the opportunity given him by the Department to rehabilitate himself.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character" in violation of Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, by virtue of his unlawful use of cocaine and marijuana on or about September 26, 1986; and (2) based upon such a finding, (a) suspend Respondent's certification for 30 days, (b) place Respondent on probation for a period of two years to commence upon the expiration of this 30-day suspension, and (c) include among the terms and conditions of his probation the requirements that Respondent submit to scheduled and monthly drug testing and that he agree to release the results of such testing to the Commission or its designee. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of May 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May 1990.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Victor Rudolph Cobham made application for filing for examination as a Life and Health Agent on February 12, 1987, (hereafter, "application"). Question 8 of that application and Petitioner's answers thereto read as follows: Have you ever been charged with a felony? Yes If YES, give date(s): Dec. 16, 1983 What was the crime? Possession of cocaine & cannabis Where and when were you charged? Dade County, Dec. 16, 1983 Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Nolo Contendere on Appeal Were you convicted? Yes - Conviction reversed by 3rd District Court of Appeal Was adjudication withheld? See attachments to application Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged. See attachments to application If there has been more than one felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. In response to the above question 8 Petitioner listed no other charges, convictions, or pleas, however he had, in fact, been charged on at least three other occasions. Petitioner was charged by an August 3, 1978 Information with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of cannabis in a felony amount, and possession or sale of a controlled substance implement (paraphernalia) in Case No. 78-7960 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. All of these charges were felony charges. Petitioner plead guilty to all charges. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. Petitioner was also charged by a September 18, 1978 Information with failure to redeliver a hired vehicle (rental car) in Case No. 78-10543 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, which charge constitutes a felony. Petitioner pled guilty. Adjudication was withheld. In 1967, Petitioner was also charged with passing a worthless bank check but the charges were dropped because the check was paid. Whether this was a felony or misdemeanor charge is not clear. On March 31, 1987, the Insurance Commissioner denied Petitioner's application to sit for the insurance agent's examination due to this failure to divulge in his responses to question 8 of his application the facts contained in findings of fact 4-6, supra. Petitioner's position was that he had subconsciously omitted the information on the two 1978 charges due to the lapse of time and that since these charges did not result in any "convictions" no fraud was committed by him in failing to disclose them in response to question 8 of the application. He further asserted that because the Third District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction in the 1983 case, he had a "clean record." He offered no specific explanation for failing to reveal the 1967 charges except that with respect to all charges, he also asserted that he had assumed the agency would do an extensive background check as a result of his admission concerning the 1983 charge and would therefore discover all the charges prior to 1983 as well. Having weighed the credibility of Petitioner's testimony; the undersigned finds that Petitioner committed a material misstatement, misrepresentation, and fraud upon his application and that his reasons for his misstatement, misrepresentation and fraud are neither logical nor credible as mitigation therefor. Petitioner was previously a licensed insurance agent but has allowed his licensure to lapse. He has worked in insurance in one way or another for most of his adulthood. He is now an articulate 56 year old man who has completed two years of college. By education, training, and experience, Petitioner knows the difference between a charge and a conviction. Question 8 on the application requested that he list and explain all charges, not just convictions. It asked for types of pleas entered and whether adjudication had been withheld, thereby giving Petitioner every opportunity to explain the status of his record. Petitioner is knowledgeable about the various nuances of the judicial dispositions of each of the charges brought against him, and his failure to reveal them on his application can only be construed as deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, and fraud.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for filing for examination as a Life and Health Agent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of September, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gunter Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Angelo A. Ali, Esquire 400 Roberts Building 26 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 1, 1990, in Case No. 90-233 CF, pending in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sumter County, Florida, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to: one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony under Section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes; one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, a second degree felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and one count of resisting arrest with violence, a third degree felony under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes. On the same day, the Petitioner also was adjudicated guilty on all three charges. Sentence was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed in an adult community control program for two years subject to certain conditions. The Petitioner's nolo plea was entered notwithstanding a June 26, 1990, "No Information" filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. On July 28, 1991, the Petitioner was arrested for alleged spouse battery. As a result, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of his community control conditions. On September 19, 1991, a "No Information" was filed in the battery case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Nonetheless, an Order of Modification of Community Control was entered on October 28, 1991, adding a condition that the Petitioner attend and successfully complete marriage/family counseling. On or about April 19, 1992, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged spouse battery. On July 21, 1992, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Notwithstanding the April 19, 1992, arrest, there was no evidence that the Petitioner's community control program was further modified, and the Petitioner successfully completed the two-year program, as previously modified on October 28, 1991. On April 29, 1993, the Petitioner's civil rights, other than the right to possess and carry a firearm, were restored by Executive Order of the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida. On or about October 4, 1993, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged battery. (The record is not clear as to the identity of the alleged victim.) On November 29, 1993, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. There was no evidence of any other criminal arrests or convictions after October 4, 1993. The undisputed testimony of the Petitioner and his character witnesses was that there have been none. The Petitioner and his character witnesses also testified persuasively and without contradiction that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and integrity. The Petitioner now understands the importance of avoiding the circumstances that can lead to violations of the criminal law, he appears to have learned how to avoid them, and he appears to be determined to avoid them. Meanwhile, he also has proven himself to be a responsible and caring single father for his children and has made valuable contributions to his community as an adult volunteer, especially in community children's programs. It is found that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and approved integrity so as to qualify for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvie Edwards, pro se 1544 Bay Street Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Jeffrey D. Ahl, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0155081. The last license issued was as a broker-salesperson, c/o Data Pak Systems & Services, Inc., 1050 South Federal Highway, Delray Beach, Florida 33483. On September 12, 1991, respondent was found guilty of eleven counts of lewd assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes. The Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, adjudicated the respondent guilty on each count and committed the respondent to the Palm Beach County Jail for a term of 364 days, followed by a term of probation of 10 years. Notwithstanding his conviction on September 12, 1991, it was not until March 13, 1992, that respondent, through his attorney, informed petitioner of his conviction of the aforesaid felony. According to respondent, whose testimony is credited, the myriad of personal problems that befell him during this time period, including the remorse he was suffering, his divorce, a foreclosure, and his conviction, preoccupied his mind such that he overlooked his obligation to notify petitioner upon his conviction. Notably, respondent did not practice such profession following his conviction, and upon receipt of the renewal notice for his broker's license immediately recognized his oversight and had his attorney promptly inform petitioner of his conviction. Respondent served eight months and one week of his 364-day sentence in the Palm Beach County Jail, and was released from custody in May 1992. Currently, pursuant to the court's commitment order, respondent is on probation for a term of 10 years, the first year of which he is under community control. So controlled, respondent is required to report to his probation officer every Monday and secure approval of his weekly schedule of activities. Except for work, church and two hours of shopping each week, respondent is confined to his residence. Following successful completion of community control, respondent will be on a more relaxed form of probation, with monthly reporting to his probation officer. The court's commitment order further required that respondent continue psychological/psychiatric treatment, pay any medical expenses for his daughter's psychological/psychiatric treatment, and remain current on his child support payments. Respondent has duly abided by such obligations. The offense for which respondent stood convicted involved the touching and fondling of his daughter during times when he believed her to be asleep. Such activity occurred during the period of time she was 9 to 13 years of age, and ceased in approximately 1986, when respondent realized his daughter knew what was occurring. Disclosure of his activities apparently occurred in September 1990, during the course of his divorce proceedings. Upon disclosure of what had occurred, respondent was referred by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to Helen Bush, a marriage, family and sex therapist, for counseling. Since such initial referral in September 1990, respondent has been regularly and responsibly counseled through Ms. Bush, except for that period of time in which he was incarcerated. In the opinion of Ms. Bush, which is credited, respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, regressed pedophilia, which, precipitated by stress, was the cause for his misconduct towards his daughter. Such disorders are treatable and where, as here, the offender is genuinely remorseful about what occurred, has the motivation to rehabilitate himself, and the support of his family, the likelihood of respondent being successfully treated is great. Currently, respondent has remarried, and continues to fulfill his responsibilities to continue treatment and to remain current in his support obligations. It is respondent's desire to once again practice as a real estate broker so that he might reasonably support his new family, as well as remain current with his obligations, and he would like to associate himself with William W. Harris, another licensed real estate broker. Mr. Harris testified at hearing, is aware of respondent's conviction, and is most amenable to respondent being associated with his office. Considering the quality of proof offered in this case, it is found that, notwithstanding respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, respondent possesses the requisite honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, good character and good reputation for fair dealing required for licensure as a real estate broker. In reaching such conclusion the seriousness of the offense with which respondent stands convicted has not been overlooked; however, neither has the fact that the conduct which precipitated such offense had its genesis in a psychiatric disorder that is treatable and that respondent is currently experiencing success in such treatment. Under such circumstances, respondent's conviction does not detract from the conclusion that he possesses those worthy attributes of honesty, trustworthiness and fair dealing the public is entitled to expect when dealing with a real estate broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered finding respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes, not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(n), Florida Statutes, and imposing the penalty set forth in paragraph 18, supra. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of September 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September 1992.
