Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence produced at hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to practice optometry by the State of Florida, Board of Optometry. On or about May 8, 1980, Respondent entered into a lease agreement with Cole National Corporation to lease 154 square feet of space as an optometric office in the location of the retail store of Sears, Roebuck and Co. at 1420 Northwest 23rd Boulevard, Gainesville, Florida. Respondent practiced in that location approximately two days per week until on or about October 1, 1982. Respondent's optometric office was located in a Sears, Roebuck retail store next door to the "Sears Optical Department," in which eyeglasses and contact lenses and other optical merchandise could be purchased. Respondent's office was identified by a large sign overhead reading "Optometrist," in the same print as the sign above the Sears Optical Department. In addition, a small plaque on the door leading into Respondent's examination room read "Dr. L. A. Schwartz, Optometrist." During the time he practiced at the 1420 Northwest 23rd Boulevard location of Sears, appointments could be made with Respondent by calling the Sears Optical Department telephone number. The phone was answered "Sears Contact and Lenses Center" by employees of Cole National Corporation, which controlled and owned the Sears Optical Department. The Cole employees were not paid for this service by Respondent. Respondent had no telephone listing in either the yellow or white pages of the Gainesville, Florida, telephone directory between May, 1980, and July 12, 1982, the date of the Administrative Complaint. The Cole National Corporation employees maintained Respondent's scheduling book and made tentative appointments for his prospective patients, although Respondent customarily would call the patient back to confirm the date and time of the appointment prior to the time of the scheduled visit. Respondent's hours of service and fee information were also given to prospective optometric patients by Cole National personnel. Respondent accepted the Sears, Roebuck and Co. credit card as payment for optometric services. Sears then billed the patients directly and Respondent received monies billed to the patients in full through Sears on a monthly basis, regardless of whether the patient paid the bill fully monthly or carried the debt over to succeeding months. Respondent, pursuant to his lease with Cole National Corporation, was precluded from selling optometric supplies to his patients. Rather, Respondent would in all cases issue prescriptions for optometric goods and supplies, such as glasses and contact lenses, which in most cases were placed on a prescription blank bearing his name. At times, however, when Respondent did not have prescription forms available bearing his own name, he would use such a form from the Sears Optical Department, crossing out all references to Sears and inserting his name and address in place of that of Sears Optical Department. On or about February 22, 1982, the Sears Optical Department mailed letters to various consumers in the Gainesville area. These letters, in part, advised that Respondent, an independent doctor of optometry, was available for eye examinations in his private office in the Sears building and that he could be reached for appointments at a telephone number which was listed in the telephone directory for Sears Optical Department. The evidence in this cause establishes that Respondent's office location at all times material hereto was maintained separately from both Sears, Roebuck and Co. and the Sears Optical Department. In addition, the record in this cause fails to in any way establish that Respondent ever held himself out as an employee or representative of either Sears, Roebuck and Co. or the Sears Optical Department. In fact, the record clearly establishes that both Respondent and employees of the Sears Optical Department always indicated to the consuming public that Respondent was an independent optometric practitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr., has never completed a course of study at a recognized school of opticianry. On April 2, 1957, however, he began working and training under Ralph C. Cronbaugh, a licensed optician, at Daytona Optical Center in Daytona Beach, Florida. He learned how to read a lensometer, interpret prescriptions for eyeglasses, figure base curves, measure the seg height and various physiognomic features, cut and edge lenses, fit lenses to the frame and so forth. Petitioner worked under Mr. Cronbaugh's supervision an average of 48 or 50 hours a week continuously until June of 1961, even though the training program as such ended after three years. Some time before June of 1961, petitioner registered as an apprentice with and paid a fee to the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. On June 3, 1961, petitioner became a member of the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. Some 15 years later the Florida Board of Opticianry instituted its own apprenticeship program for the first time. From June of 1961 until at least June of 1963, petitioner remained at the Daytona Optical Center under the supervision of Steve Stevenson, a licensed optician. For nine months or a year longer, he worked under a third licensed optician at the Daytona Optical Center, Andrew H. Hollaway. Petitioner moved to Alabama from Daytona Beach. There he managed an office for Bausch-Lomb in Birmingham, then went into business for himself under the name Jasper Optical Center in Jasper, Alabama. He actively practiced as a dispensing optician in Jasper for more than three years immediately preceding his application for licensure in Florida. Petitioner is a past vice-president of the Alabama Society of Dispensing Opticians and a former member of the board of directors of the International Society of Dispensing Opticians. He is now licensed as a dispensing optician in Alabama and has been for the last 18 years. Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. Although the licensing scheme in Alabama is different from Florida's, petitioner's uncontroverted testimony was that he holds and has held a state occupational license in Alabama. This is corroborated by the affidavit of an Alabama judge, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, and a copy of petitioner's 1981-1982 license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. For the past six years, petitioner and other dispensing opticians have worked to establish a state board to regulate opticianry in Alabama, but these efforts have been stymied by optometrists who have successfully opposed the legislation. As a matter of policy, respondent refuses to let dispensing opticians licensed in Alabama and other states with similar regulatory arrangements take the Florida dispensing opticianry examination. In preparing the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing officer has had the benefit of petitioner's post-hearing correspondence and respondent's proposed recommended order. Proposed fact findings that have not been adopted have been rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent admit petitioner to the dispensing opiticanry examination and license petitioner as a dispensing optician if he successfully completes the examination. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr. Post Office Box 1127 Destin, Florida 32541 Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Suite 1602 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Opticianry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DYER KEMP GARVIN, JR. Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 82-484 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, Respondent. /
The Issue At issue is whether Petitioners, Albert F. Williams and Stitch Enterprises, d/b/a Skycrest Pharmacy, are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act," and if so, what amount would be reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of pharmacy pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, Chapter 456 (formerly 455), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 465, Florida Statutes. Prior to July 1, 2002, the Department of Health, pursuant to the authority of Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, contracted with the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter "AHCA") to provide consumer complaint, investigative, and prosecutorial services required by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance, councils, or boards, as appropriate. Petitioner, Albert F. Williams (hereinafter "Williams"), is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pharmacist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PS 0008425. Petitioner, Stitch Enterprises, d/b/a Skycrest Pharmacy (hereinafter "Skycrest"), is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pharmacy in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PH 0012143. Before the initial final hearing, Skycrest was administratively dissolved by the Florida Secretary of State. On March 31, 1998, Respondent received a complaint from AHCA investigator William H. Herbert, Investigation Specialist II (hereinafter "Herbert"), alleging that a March 26, 1998, pharmacy inspection of Skycrest by Herbert, revealed that Williams and Skycrest were in violation of multiple pharmacy regulations. Pursuant to Subsection 455.621(1), Florida Statutes, Respondent conducted an investigation into the alleged conduct of Williams and Skycrest. On April 10, 1998, as a part of the investigation, Herbert notified Williams and Skycrest of the investigation. Herbert's letters, written on AHCA letterhead, one addressed to Williams and the other letter addressed to Skycrest in care of Williams, invited Williams and Skycrest to submit separate written responses to the pending investigations. On May 8, 1998, Williams and Skycrest both filed three- page responses to the pending investigations with AHCA. Both responses were written and signed by B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire (hereinafter "Johnson"), the attorney for both Williams and Skycrest. During the investigations, Herbert took pictures of various medications that were misbranded or repackaged and took possession of various medications indicated on the survey forms that were completed and filed. During the investigations, Herbert spoke at length with Johnson regarding the violations that were discovered at the time of the inspection of Skycrest. On July 31, 1998, Respondent's investigations of Williams and Skycrest were completed. The completed investigative reports regarding Williams and Skycrest were forwarded to Respondent's legal department and received on August 3, 1998. The AHCA attorney, after reviewing Herbert's entire investigative reports and files, drafted two proposed administrative complaints and made recommendations to the Probable Cause Panel for their consideration. Copies of the entire investigative file, including the proposed administrative complaints, were made available for each member of the Probable Cause Panel. Respondent called John Taylor, R.Ph., as an expert in pharmacy law, and he testified that based on the information available to the Probable Cause Panel, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Williams and Skycrest had both violated the provisions cited in the Administrative Complaints filed by Respondent. Mr. Taylor's testimony was uncontested by Williams. On April 15, 1999, Respondent presented the investigative reports and files to the Probable Cause Panel and recommended that probable cause existed that Williams and Skycrest violated multiple provisions of Chapter 465, Florida Statutes (the Pharmacy Act). On April 15, 1999, after review of the entire investigative files, discussions with staff counsel and discussions with the Department of Health's expert in pharmacy law, amendments to the proposed administrative complaints were suggested by the Probable Cause Panel, and they subsequently found probable cause that: Williams had violated Section 465.016(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by violating 465.018, Florida Statutes, by violating Section 499.005(1), Florida Statutes, by repackaging, holding or offering for sale any drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded or has otherwise been rendered unfit for human or animal use. and Skycrest had violated Section 465.023(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by violating Section 499.005(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by repackaging, holding or offering for sale any drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded or has otherwise been rendered unfit for human or animal use. The Probable Cause Panel directed the Agency to file an Administrative Complaint against Williams and file an Administrative Complaint against Skycrest. The findings of the Probable Cause Panel were confirmed in writing by the chairperson of the Probable Cause Panel. On June 23, 1999, pursuant to the Probable Cause Panel's findings of probable cause, Administrative Complaints (DOAH Case Nos. 00-0220 and 00-0315) were filed against Williams and Skycrest. Both Williams and Skycrest requested formal hearings before the Division of Administrative Hearings. On November 17, 2000, a formal hearing on DOAH Case Nos. 02-0220 and 02-0315 was held in Clearwater, Florida, before the undersigned. At the November 17, 2000, final hearing, Skycrest stipulated it would, within 30 days, voluntarily relinquish and surrender its license. Respondent accepted Skycrest's stipulation and in return agreed to not prosecute charges against Skycrest, but to prosecute charges only against Williams. The undersigned accepted the stipulation of the parties, and the parties are bound thereby in the case at bar. Skycrest, by virtue of this stipulation and Respondent's subsequent dismissal of the Administrative Complaint against Skycrest, was not a prevailing small business party as defined by statute in that proceeding. On August 17, 2001, counsel for Williams and Skycrest filed the Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and the Affidavit as to Reasonable and Necessary Attorney Fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, now at bar. At the hearing on the case at bar, counsel for Williams and Skycrest elected not to present testimony nor evidence when given the opportunity to establish entitlement to attorney's fees and costs. Counsel elected to rely exclusively on the documents filed: (1) Affidavit as to Reasonable and Necessary Attorney's Fees and (2) the Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, reserving the right to call rebuttal witnesses after the presentation of evidence by Respondent. Respondent defended the Probable Cause Panel's action of finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Complaints against Williams and Skycrest as substantially justified. Respondent presented testimony of two witnesses, both of whom addressed the process undertaken by the Probable Cause Panel that concluded in findings of probable cause against both Williams and Skycrest. At the conclusion of Respondent's substantial justification defense, counsel for Williams and Skycrest called a Stetson University law professor as Petitioners' rebuttal witness. When requested to provide a proffer of the rebuttal testimony, counsel stated that the witness would testify regarding corporate law in Florida, its application to the administratively dissolved Skycrest Pharmacy, and Williams' use of Skycrest pharmacy as a "small business." Respondent objected to Williams' rebuttal witness' proffered testimony as beyond the scope of Respondent's defense of "substantial justification" for the Probable Cause Panel's filing of the Administrative Complaints. After hearing arguments of counsel and considering the parties' binding stipulation that Skycrest was administratively resolved and would voluntarily surrender its license in return for Respondent's not prosecuting the charges against Skycrest, Respondent's objection to the proffered rebuttal testimony was granted. Counsel for Williams and Skycrest was afforded an opportunity to place the proffered testimony on the record for appellate purposes after the close of this hearing, but chose not to do so. Counsel for Williams and Skycrest, introduced no evidence in support of his Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and has accordingly not met its burden of proof demonstrating entitlement to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether alleged statements attributed to the Board of Optometry were made by the Board, and if so, whether the statements constitute unpromulgated rules prohibited by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated as a matter of fact that: The FOA is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, to practice optometry in Florida. All FOA members are subject to and regulated by the Board of Optometry and its rules. The FOA has approximately 1,022 members. The Board of Optometry is the agency responsible for regulating the optometric practice of all FOA members. Board rules and agency statements of general applicability regulate the optometric practice of all FOA members. Individual members of the FOA, being subject to and regulated by the rules and policy of the Board of optometry, are persons whose substantial interests will be affected by the alleged agency statements and are thus substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 120.56(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1966). As all members of the FOA are subject to and regulated by Board rules and statements of general applicability, a substantial number of the FOA’s members would be substantially affected by the alleged statements. The objective of the FOA is to promote and protect the interests of the general public and licensed optometrists in ensuring the availability of high quality eye care at an affordable price. The FOA represents its members through the provision of education and training, and by participation in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation. Petitioner, Brian Lloyd Weber, O.D., is an optometrist licensed and practicing in Florida. Petitioner, 29/49 Optical Inc., (29/49), is a corporation which operates optical establishments in Florida. The Board of Optometry is the state agency in Florida which licenses optometrists and regulates the practice of optometry in this state. On January 29, 1992, the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Optometry determined there was probable cause to discipline the license of Dr. Weber because of an alleged violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statutes, involving the corporate practice of optometry. Thereafter, on February 2, 1992, an Administrative Complaint was filed with the Board which alleged that Dr. Weber had violated the cited statute by engaging in the practice of optometry with a corporation not composed of other health care providers; by entering into a corporate arrangement which permitted an unlicensed person to practice optometry through Dr. Weber, in violation of Rule 21Q-3.008, (now Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code); and by holding himself out to the public as available to render professional services in a manner which implies he is professionally associated with an entity which is not a licensed practitioner, also in violation of the Rule. The investigation conducted by the then Department of Professional Regulation, which led up to the action of the panel and the filing of the Administrative Complaint indicated that Dr. Weber owned 250 shares of stock in 29/49, along with an optician, Anthony Record, not licensed to provide optometry services, who also owns stock in the corporation. Allegedly, the corporation operated at five different locations, at one or more of which eye examinations were performed. It was also alleged that 29/49 had publicly advertised itself as an entity which provided complete eye examinations, and that Dr. Weber performed the eye examinations described in the advertisements. In fact, Dr. Weber is a director and officer of 29/49. He holds a 75% ownership share in the corporation. Both Dr. Weber and Mr. Record control the corporation and share the duties and profits of the operation. The firm provides optitianry services, as defined in Sections 484.002(3) and (7), Florida Statutes. Dr. Weber asserts that the operations of 29/49 are separate from the operations of his optometric practice, and claims that the Board’s direction to him to change the corporate structure of 29/49 so as to dissolve his partnership with a lay person is a continuation of what he claims is a long-standing policy of prohibiting the joint ownership of an optitianry between and optometrist and a lay person. Before a hearing was held on the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Weber and counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation which, if accepted by the Board, would have resolved the pending disciplinary action. The stipulation was presented to the Board at its July 8, 1993 meeting, at which time the Board voted to reject it and to propose a counter-stipulation. At that meeting, the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue here nor did it take a position as to what Dr. Weber must do to rectify the practice situation to its satisfaction. Nonetheless, by Order dated September 9, 1993, the Board formally rejected the proposed stipulation and proposed its own stipulation. On September 12, 1996, Dr. Weber and the Agency’s counsel presented a second stipulation to the Board for settlement of the disciplinary matter, but again the Board voted to reject the stipulation and to offer its own second counter- stipulation. This counter-proposal called for Dr. Weber to change his corporate structure so that he no longer violated the statutory prohibition against practicing optometry with non- licensed individuals, and that he no longer practice with a lay person. This second counter-proposal by the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue herein. This second counter-proposal was promulgated in an Order of the Board issued on October 15, 1996. Sections 463.014(1)(a)&(b), Florida Statutes, provide: No corporation, lay body, organization, or individual other than a licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry through the means of engaging the services, upon a salary, commission, or other means or inducement, of any person licensed to practice optometry in this state. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the association of a licensed practitioner with a multidisciplinary group of licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of which is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. No licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry with any corporation, organization, group or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit licensed practitioners from employing, or from forming partnership or professional associations with, licensed practitioners licensed in this state or with other licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of whom is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. Consistent therewith, the Board of Optometry has promulgated Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, which implements the provisions of the statute. Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, restates the intent of the legislature regarding the need for licensure of practitioners of optometry, defines a “licensed practitioner”, and thereafter outlines with particularity those actions which may and those which may not be carried on by licensed optometrists in Florida. The rule is quite clear in its definitions and leaves little room for misunderstanding regarding what constitutes the practice of optometry and optometric services; those individuals who must be licensed; what professional activities a licensed practitioner may perform and what activities constitute a violation of Section 463.014,Florida Statutes. Of specific relevance to the issues herein are: (15)(b) Entering into any agreement (whether written or oral) which allows, permits or facilitates an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner to practice optometry, to offer optometric services to the public, or to control through any means whatever any aspect of the practice of optometry. Allowing, permitting, encouraging, forbearing, or condoning any advertisement including those placed in a newspaper, magazine, brochure, flier, telephone directory, or on television or radio, which implies or suggests that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated or affiliated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. Occupying or otherwise using professional office space in any manner which does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his/her practice of optometry is independent of and not associated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. , (I), and(j), [which all refer with specificity to some action which relates to the practice of optometry by a licensed practitioner with an entity which itself is not a licensed licensed practitioner.] This rule has been challenged in the courts and determined to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner claims that pronouncements by the Board of Optometry since the passage of the relevant statute and the promulgation of the relevant rule, including a Declaratory Statement by the Board in response to a Petition therefore by Phillip R. Sidran, O.D. in 1991, found at 13 FALR 4804; and in discussion of members at various meetings of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel; all indicate that the Board has formulated a policy regarding the instant issue which is neither a statute nor a properly promulgated rule. In 1991, Dr. Sidran, a licensed optometrist, sought a declaratory statement from the Board regarding the propriety of having a licensed optician share the revenues and responsibilities deriving from the optical portion of his practice. In its Declaratory Statement, issued on October 9, 1991, the Board specifically referred to and quoted the controlling portions of the statute and the rule which it then interpreted as indicating such an arrangement was prohibited. At no time did the Board promulgate new guidelines or expand the strictures imposed by the existing statute and rule. It applied an existing statute and rule to the factual situation posed by Dr. Sidran and concluded that under the facts of that case, the existing statute and rule prohibited the proposed relationship. The subsequent discussion of that opinion at the meeting of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel, convened on January 29, 1992, to consider proposed disciplinary action against Dr. Weber for the situation described here with 20/49, again interpreted existing statute and rule but did not formulate policy. Petitioner further refers to two additional meetings of the Board of Optometry at its meetings on July 8, 1993 and September 12, 1996, at both of which the members present discussed the situation regarding Dr. Weber’s business relationship in 29/49. He claims that in both situations, the Board members made policy statements which should have been formalized through the promulgation of a rule amendment or supplement. Review of the transcripts of those meeting does not support Dr. Weber’s position, however. It is clear that in each case the Board members examined the facts presented to them, applied the existing statutory and rule provisions to those facts, and concluded that the Petitioner’s actions constituted a violation of existing law. The Board’s position vis a vis Dr. Weber’s business arrangement was made a part of the Board’s counter-proposal to the stipulation of settlement initially agreed to by Dr. Weber and the Department’s counsel. In it’s counter-stipulation, which came out of the September 12, 1996 Board meeting, the Board required Dr. Weber to “... change his corporate structure so he is no longer in violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statues, and that [his] practice be changed so that he is no longer practicing with a lay person.”
The Issue Whether the proposed changes to proposed Rule 64B-5.001 published in the Florida Law Weekly (FAW) on December 17, 2004, (the proposed changes), constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.56(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2004).1 Whether the proposed changes are inconsistent with the Final Order entered in DOAH Case 04-3172RP on November 23, 2004.
The Issue The issue for consideration herein was whether Petitioner was properly graded for her performance of the Procedure in the Binocular Indirect Ophthalmoscopic testing on the Florida Optometry Examination conducted in Miami, Florida, on September 16 - 18, 1988.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues contained herein, Respondent, Board of Optometry, (Board), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of optometrists in this state. Petitioner, Rhonda L. Wicks, graduated from the Southern California College of Optometry in 1985. She was licensed as a registered optometrist in California in 1985 and was thereafter commissioned in the United States Air Force in the grade of Captain. She was assigned as an optometrist at the MacDill Air Force Base Hospital in Tampa immediately thereafter, and in 1987, was made the Chief of the optometry service at that hospital, a position she still holds. In that capacity, she supervises several other optometrists and, in addition, sees approximately 20 patients per day for a total of over 14,000 patients since assuming that position. Approximately 10% of these involve the administration of the binocular indirect ophthalmoscopic, (BIO), procedure. In addition to passing the licensure examination in California, while still in school she passed the IAB, an internationally recognized certification examination, and, in addition, passed her national boards. Dr. Wicks took the 1988 Florida optometry examination given on September 16 - 18, 1988 at the Baskin-Palmer Eye Institute in Miami, Florida. When graded, she was found to have passed all portions of the examination except the clinical portion for which, on protest, she received an additional 2.5 points which raised her score to 73.5 out of a possible 100. The passing grade in this portion of the exam is 80. Primarily, her difficulties were in the area of the BIO procedure, worth 15 points, for which she was awarded only 2.5 points. She also experienced difficulty on the retinoscopy section for which she received 0 out of 8 possible points, but does not contest her score on that portion. She contests only the evaluation and grading of the BIO procedure. Dr. Wicks was graded by two examiners on the BIO procedure, each of whom gave her a "yes" or "no" grade on each of three sections. One examiner gave her three "no's" for a 0 score. The other examiner gave her two "no's" and a "yes". As a result, she was awarded one half credit or 2.5 points for the "yes" score given her by one examiner on one third of the procedure. In preparing for the written portions of the examination, she studied the materials furnished by the Department. She also considers her taking of the IAB as preparation for this examination. As for the clinical section, she felt comfortable using the practice she has carried on for three years as appropriate preparation except for 2 procedures for which she sought and received help from two ophthalmologists on staff at the MacDill Hospital. Prior to taking the examination, she read that portion of the study guide dealing with patient criteria, and was also familiar with that portion dealing with requirements of the BIO process. To her recollection, the study guide did not mention the required position of the patient during the accomplishment of the procedures but merely outlined what the candidate would be required to demonstrate. Examination of the study guide confirms Petitioner's understanding. The Department relies on that portion of the guide found on page 7 thereof which refers to the criteria for the patient supplied by the candidate and indicates that the patient must be willing to undergo a dilation procedure in the reclined position. The Board contends this indicates "advance notice" of the requirement that the BIO procedure be accomplished in the reclined position. This does not necessarily follow, however. The morning of the examination, one of the examiners briefed the candidates on the layout of the room in which the procedures would be done and the conditions under which they would be accomplished. It was at this time that Petitioner got her first notification that the BIO procedure would be done with the patient in the reclined position. It was also at this time, during the briefing, that the candidates were advised that they were not to be permitted to move the chair in which the patient was placed. At this point another candidate, who is, as is Petitioner, short of stature, asked if the candidate could sit the patient up in the chair and this candidate was advised that she could not. Under these conditions Petitioner attempted to perform the BIO procedure. When she found she could not do it because she was not tall enough, she notified her examiners of the problem and was told by one to "do the best you can." Her complaint of inability to accomplish the procedure because of the physical problem of her height was reiterated 3 times, and on each occasion, she received the same response. In the BIO procedure, the doctor examines the patient's eye through a lens in an attempt to get a view of the patient's retina. Petitioner contends that in order to properly and accurately accomplish the procedure, the doctor has to be 23 inches away from the patient's eye. This 23 inches is made up of the following segments: the distance between the instrument lens and the patient's eye must be approximately 2 inches; the lens in the instrument has a thickness of 1 inch; and the examiner should be approximately 20 inches away from the lens. Petitioner demonstrated through a diagram that the chair in which her patient was reclined placed the back of his head 30 inches from the floor. Added to that is the average 7 inch thickness of a human head from the back to the front of the eyeball. When that 37 inches is added to the 23 inches described, (patient's eye to examiner's eye), a total of 60 inches, (5 feet), is shown. To accomplish the procedure, the candidate must bend over so that the plane of his or her face is parallel to the floor in order to allow the candidate to look, with the instrument used, down through the lens into the patient's eye. According to Petitioner, when she places her head in the appropriate position to look down through the instrument, into her patient's eye, her eye is 53 inches from the floor. This is 7 inches below where it should be in order to properly accomplish the procedure with the patient reclined on the chair as it existed the day of this examination. Petitioner is 62 inches tall when standing straight, and 53 inches is insufficient to allow her to properly accomplish the procedure. She was not allowed either to move the chair or do the procedure with the patient sitting up. The day of the examination, Petitioner tried to accomplish the procedure by standing on her toes, by leaning back, and by taking other measures in an attempt to give her an appropriate view of the patient's eye. Nothing seemed to work. It was at this time she advised the two examiners observing her that she was physically unable to accomplish the procedure due to the height situation and was told, "do the best you can." Candidates are advised, prior to the examination, that if they experience difficulty of any nature during the examination, they are to bring it to the immediate attention of the examiner, and if that does not result in correction of the problem, to fill out and submit a comment card at the end of the examination whereon the candidate outlines the nature of the problem experienced. In this case, Petitioner did not fill in the comment card because she did not think it applied to her situation. She was of the opinion the card was to be filled out only when equipment did not work or the examination, for some other reason that could be corrected, was not appropriate. Here, the equipment worked as it should and the test was appropriate. In addition, the examiners also did what they were supposed to do. Gregory M. Smith served as a patient for Dr. DeFrank at the same examination taken by the Petitioner. During the course of Dr. DeFrank's testing, she performed the BIO examination on him just as Petitioner attempted to do with her patient. However, Dr. DeFrank, also a short woman, was allowed to have Mr. Smith sit up for her performance of the procedure and as a result, was able to accomplish it properly. Mr. Smith had been examined by the examiners prior to Dr. DeFrank's performance of the procedure, and one of the examiners performed the BIO procedure on him while he was in a reclined positions. However, before Dr. DeFrank entered the examination room with the other examiner, Smith was returned to the upright position and Dr. DeFrank did her procedure with him in that position. Dr. James J. Murtagh, an ophthalmologist and Chief of the Ophthalmology service at the MacDill hospital, and Petitioner's supervisor, has observed her in the performance of her duties for a period of two years. He is satisfied she is fully competent to do the procedure in question and, in fact, does it on a daily basis. In his expert opinion, there is no requirement that the BIO be accomplished with the patient in a reclined position. In fact, he feels it is best that the procedure be accomplished with the patient in a position most comfortable and convenient to both the patient and the doctor. The position of the patient, reclined or erect, has no bearing on the doctor's ability to do the procedure properly from an optometric or ophthalmological standpoint. The purpose of the BIO procedure is to examine the back side of the retina. It is necessary to extend the view out to the sides and, admittedly, this can best be done with the patient reclined. He is satisfied, however, that the major portion of the back of the eye, that portion to be observed through this procedure, can be seen easily in either the reclined or the upright position. Dr. Den Beste, Respondent's expert, is of the opinion that because of the nature of the area sought to be examined, it is best that the patient be reclined so that the doctor can, without discomfort, easily move to examine all portions of the retina from the top to the bottom and from side to side. Which procedure is better, however, is of little consequence here since the issue is not which procedure is better but whether the procedure legitimately can be accomplished in an upright position. In this regard, Dr. Murtagh's opinion that it can be is not necessarily inconsistent with Dr. Den Beste's opinion that it is better done in a reclining position. In its answers to Petitioner's Request For Admissions, the Respondent admitted that the BIO procedure can be accomplished on a patient seated in an upright position. The statute does not require that the supine position be utilized for an examination but the Board requires it in its examination because: (1) it is felt the supine position is better for examination purposes, and (2) it is easier for the examiners to observe the candidate's performance of the procedure. On the other hand, a representative of the manufacturer of the instrument utilized by the optometrist in performing the BIO procedure indicated that the instrument is best used in an upright position. Nonetheless, Dr. Den Beste disagrees with this when the instrument is to be used in a qualification examination situation. Under the physical conditions confronted by the Petitioner at the examination site, however, Dr. Murtagh is convinced it would be impossible for her to have accomplished the procedure with the patient reclined. Both Dr. Den Beste and Dr. Loewe, the Department's examination specialist, indicate that when Petitioner experienced her difficulty, she should have immediately pointed out her problem and called for help. They contend that Petitioner failed to do this. The evidence clearly shows, however, that after attempting the procedure, Petitioner, on at least three occasions, advised her examiners she was unable to accomplish the procedure because of the height and distance constraints, and was advised to do the best she could. The purpose of the comment card is to afford the examiners the opportunity to look into a problem situation, take corrective action on the spot if appropriate and possible, and to take future corrective action to prevent a recurrence of the problem at some later time. If the problem complained of is merely related to candidate technique, the examiners can do nothing about it. In the instant case, however, both Den Beste and Loewe feel the Petitioner should have filled out the form when she experienced the difficulty now reported and had she done so, something might have been done at that time. Both Den Beste and Loewe, however, indicate that to the best of their knowledge, the issue of the distance, as experienced by Petitioner here, has never been raised by any examinee in the past. At the hearing, Dr. Den Beste, while denying any prior knowledge of Petitioner's inability to perform the procedure because of her short stature, indicated that if someone did claim the procedure could not be accomplished because he or she was too short, there were some options open which included (1) lowering the chair, (2) adjusting the headset, or (3) pulling the patient's head into a different position so that the procedure could be accomplished. To now state that adjustments to the chair would have been acceptable provides no benefit to Petitioner here who, the evidence does not controvert, was told at the examination she was not allowed to adjust the chair at any time. According to Dr. Loewe, the test as it is configured is not designed to trick candidates. Tests are designed with the hope of fairly testing the skills of all candidates. If it appears there is a problem area, then test officials try to correct it or warn of it in the study guide. Dr. Loewe's inquiry into the examination conditions subsequent to Petitioner's examination revealed that there were several candidates who asked if it were necessary to do the BIO procedure with the patient in a supine position. She also admitted that filling out a comment card is not a prerequisite to filing a formal challenge to the grading or scoring. Dr. Loewe further indicated that if a legitimate reason existed to allow a candidate to perform the BIO procedure on a patient seated in an upright position because of some physical handicap, such as the candidate being confined to a wheel chair, they would make arrangements to accommodate the candidate. There appears to be little difference to be shown, from a practical standpoint, between someone who cannot examine a patient in a supine position because of their confinement to a wheel chair and one who cannot perform the examination appropriately because of his or her physical shortness and the resultant inability to get in a proper position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be retested on the BIO procedure only, without payment of additional fee, either at a special examination held for that purpose or at the next regularly schedule optometry examination administered by Respondent Board of Optometry. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of October, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-1912 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to S 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: 1. - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. - 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. 30. & 31. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. & 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. - 46. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 51. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 54. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 59. Accepted and incorporated herein. 60. - 62. Accepted. 63. & 64. Accepted and incorporated herein. 65. - 67. Accepted. 68. - 70. Accepted and incorporated herein. For the Respondent: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of the Petitioner's position. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. & 7. Not Findings of Fact but a restatement of Petitioner's testimony. Accurate. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted as an accurate summary of the evidence on that point. Accepted that the problem could have been corrected. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard M. Hanchett, Esquire Trenham, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye & O'Neill, P.A. 2700 Barnett Plaza Post Office Box 1102 Tampa, Florida 33601 Laura P. Gaffney, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel DPR 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Patricia Guilford Executive Director Board of Optometry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact On July 31, 1987, DOA mailed a Request for Proposal, (RFP), to various Health Maintenance Organizations, (HMOs), soliciting proposals for the providing of HMO services in the Orlando service area. Petitioner, Cigna, and the various Intervenors herein, submitted proposals which were opened by DOA on August 28, 1987, with a contemplated date of award of September 14, 1987 and an effective date of contract on January 1, 1988. Section 2 of the RFP defined the general purposes of the procurement as being to meet benefit objectives of DOA and to provide high quality benefits and services to state employees. Specifically, the objectives of the RFP were: A proactive approach to cost containment, including an emphasis on aggressive claims management, utilization review, and superior statistical reporting. Quality medical care which encourages health promotion, disease prevention, early diagnosis and treatment. Stability in the financial structure of offered health plans. Professional, high quality service in all administrative areas including claims processing, enrollment, membership services, grievances, and communications. Competitive premium rates which take into account the demographics and, if appropriate, the claims experience of state employees. Other stated objectives included: Have each county or contiguous group of counties be considered one service area. Award no more than two contracts per service area; however, the awards will be based on the HMO's ability to respond to the needs of employees and on accessibility by employees. Have reciprocal agreements between locations, if an HMO has multiple service areas. Enter into a two year, non-experience rates contract. A provision will be included tying renewal action at each of the two renewals to the consumer price index, (CPI), for medical care services. In order to be considered as a "qualified" proposer, an organization had to be licensed by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Part II, Chapter 641, Florida Statutes. Section IX of the RFP listed five major criteria for evaluation of the proposals. They were: Premium Cost Extensiveness of service area - by county and/or contiguous counties. Plan Benefits as follows: Covered services Limitations and exclusions Co-payments, deductibles, and coinsurance features Range of providers including specialists and numbers of hospitals D. Out of service area coverage F. Grievance procedures Accessibility as follows: Reciprocal agreements Provider locations Number of primary care physicians and specialists, in relation to membership Completeness of proposals The first four of the above objectives were called for by the Legislative action providing for these procurements to be effective January 1, 1988. The fifth, completeness of proposals, was not identified by the Legislature but was added by DOA. The Department reviewed and evaluated all the proposals submitted by Petitioner and the various Intervenors. Each proposer was evaluated by three individual evaluators. Two separate sets of evaluations were performed; the second coming upon the direction of the Secretary who, after the first evaluation and recommendation of award, concluded the standards for evaluation had been too subjective and directed a second evaluation utilizing more objective standards. During this second evaluation process, after the actual evaluations had been done but before the recommendation was forwarded to the Secretary, several computer treatments of the raw scores were accomplished by Mr. Nye because of additional unidentified factors brought to his attention. The final computer run identified that Central Florida Physicians, not a party to this action, received the highest point total followed by Health Options, Pru-Care, and Petitioner, Cigna. Mr. Nye, who had designed and supervised the evaluation process, recommended to the Secretary that Central Florida Physicians, Health Options, and Pru-Care receive the award even though the guidelines called for only two recommendees. Central Florida Physicians was recognized to be in financial difficulties though it received the highest rating, and in order to provide two viable candidates in the event that provider should be disqualified, Health Options and Pru-Care were added. Central Florida Physicians was, in fact, subsequently disqualified due to financial insolvency. This left Health Options and Pru-Care as the two providers with the highest evaluations and the Secretary made the award to them. At the final count, Health Options received a point total of 64.635; Pru-Care, 57.415; and Cigna, 56.83, or a difference of .585 between Pru-Care and Cigna. According to Mr. Black, an administrator with the Department of Insurance and responsible for the licensing of HMOs and other health care facilities, as of January 12, 1988, Pru- Care was not licensed in Volusia or Lake Counties and department records show that Pru-Care has never been or requested to be licensed in those counties. Mr. Beckerink, the Director of Planning for Cigna of Florida, who oversaw Cigna's proposal for the Orlando area and who reviewed DOA's evaluation of the various proposals submitted, carefully examined the evaluation forms for both Cigna and Pru- Care and concentrated on scores relating to costs, benefits, accessibility, service area, and completeness. He noted that Pru-Care received 10 points for proposing service in Orange, Seminole, Osceola, Lake, and Volusia Counties though it is not licensed in the latter two, whereas Cigna received only 4 points for Orange and Seminole Counties. Cigna is licensed in all five counties and has hospitals and physicians in Seminole, Osceola, and Orange Counties. He contends Pru-Care received credit by the evaluators for five counties when it is licensed only in three, an unearned award of 4 points, and Cigna was awarded credit for only two counties when it is licensed in five, an improper denial of 6 points. According to Mr. Nye, the award to Pru-Care was based on its representation it would provide service in five counties. The Department of Insurance could not tell him, at the time, in which counties Pru-Care was licensed. As a result, he took the proposal, which indicated the five counties, at face value. Credit was given only for full counties to be served and Cigna's proposal indicated it would deliver service to two full counties and to only portions of three counties. The evidence indicates that Pru-Care's facilities are primarily in Orange and Seminole Counties with some service offered in the extreme northern portion of Osceola County, too far away for those individuals living in the southern portion of that county reasonably to take advantage of it. Mr. Nye indicates that driving time, which would be the problem here, is not a consideration in assessing accessibility, but merely a factor in quality of service. The department is not concerned with whether it is convenient for the employee to get to the service but merely whether the service will be offered to anyone residing in the county. For this reason, Pru-Care was awarded credit for Osceola county since it proposed to enroll any eligible employee living in the county whether service was convenient to that party or not, whereas Cigna, which limited it's enrollment in certain counties to those personnel living in only a part of the county, was not given any credit for those partially served counties. Mr. Nye admits that had he known Pru-Care was not fully licensed, he would have deferred to legal counsel, but would most likely not award points if a provider is not licensed in a county for which it proposes service. Mr. Breckerink identified additional areas in the evaluation wherein he believes errors were made, the correction of which would result in an adjustment of the award of points. For example, in evaluating plan benefits, the evaluator gave Pru- Care 20 points when only 10 points are available for award without a demonstration of additional services. For emergency room availability, Cigna was awarded 5 points when it should have received 10. In the area of co- payments, Cigna was awarded points and should have received 23. Concerning range of providers, Cigna's proposal lists seven hospitals yet the evaluation form only reflects six, resulting in a shortage of 10 points. As to turnaround time, Cigna indicated it would accomplish payment in 60 days whereas Pru-Care indicated it would in "an average" of two weeks. As a result, Mr. Breckerink, who points out Cigna's actual time is 30 days and it therefore should have been given 30 points, contends there is no opportunity for a valid comparison here since Pru-Care's answer is not responsive to the RFP's call for" an "expected" time. His point is well taken. With regard to accessibility, Mr. Breckerink states that Cigna got only 20 points for its two allowed counties but should have received 30 points since it has hospitals in three counties in the service area. DOA's rationale on this point is identical to that on the issue of full counties served. He also alleges that Cigna was shortchanged by at least 2 points on the number of counties in which specialty providers are represented and by at least 1 point on the number of providers. Mr. Nye admits Pru-Care should have received 5 points instead of 10 for benefits. This would reduce its' raw score in this area from 258 to 253 points. Nye contends, however, that the points awarded Pru-Care for its' turnaround time were correct. He does not consider the question to be a bad one since it was asked equally of all providers and each responded as it saw fit realizing that its response might become a part of a contractual obligation. This reasoning is specious at best and does not address the real question of the fairness and appropriateness of the question asked. Further, Mr. Nye also admitted that under certain circumstances, if Pru-Care were to lose credit for those two counties in which it was not shown to be licensed, the change could result in a difference sufficient to reverse the relative standings of Pru-Care and Cigna. Mr. Breckerink alleges, and Mr. Nye admits that multiple computer runs were made utilizing the raw scores developed by the evaluators before the recommendation as to award was forwarded to the Secretary. On the first run for the second evaluation, Cigna was in second place with a point total of 71.1 and Pru-Care was third with 65.86 points. On the second run, which Nye contends was done to make the computer run consistent with what had been said at the pre-bid conference and in the RFP, Cigna dropped from second place to third with 58. 2 points and Pru-Care went from third to fourth with 57.195 points. In the third run, which ultimately formed the basis for the award, the positions of Cigna and Pru-Care reversed with Cigna dropping to 56.83 points and Pru-Care rising to 57.415. Central Florida Physicians remained in first and Health Options in second. When Central Florida Physicians dropped out due to insolvency, Health Options became number one and the other two each went up one place in the standings without changing relative positions. According to Mr. Breckerink when the mistakes were identified and changes made in the raw scores, Cigna got a total of 23 more points but Pru-Care still got 16 more points than it should have. He contends that if the mistakes were accurately corrected, if Cigna were to get all the points it should and Pru- Care lose all it should not legitimately have, Cigna would come out higher in the overall ranking than Pru-Care. However, he admits there are factors involved about which he does not know which may affect the standings. What is clear is that while Mr. Breckerink could not clearly follow the evaluation procedure, neither can others charged with evaluating it. What is more, notwithstanding the direction given in the objectives of the procurement that only two providers be awarded contracts, the department continuously has been unable to abide by this guideline. In its September 11, 1987 recommendation after the first evaluation sequence, Mr. Nye recommended, for the Orlando service area, awards to Central Florida Physicians, Cigna, and Pru-Care for a part of the service area and an additional award to Health Options and Florida Health Care for other counties in the service area. When the Secretary directed the objective second evaluation, no change was made to the number of providers to be recommended (two), but again, on October 6, 1987, Mr. Nye recommended three providers, Central Florida Physicians, Health Options, and Cigna. No evidence was presented as to why this recommendation was not implemented, but it is seen that on October 26, 1987, Mr. Nye submitted his third set of recommendations to the Secretary, this time recommending only Central Florida Physicians, and Health Options. Being still unable to finalize the process, on October 30, 1987, Mr. Nye submitted his fourth set of recommendations to the Secretary recommending, for the most part, three providers, but specifically recommending Pru-Care for award in Lake and Volusia Counties, where it was arguably not even licensed. No justification or explanation for this vacillation was forthcoming from the Department and the exercise appears to have been clearly capricious.
Recommendation In view of the foregoing, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a Final Order rejecting all proposals submitted for the Orlando service area and readvertise for new proposals if deemed appropriate. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of April, 1988 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-5525BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By Petitioner Cigna: 1 - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence not a Finding of Fact. Second sentence accepted except for conclusion as to legal license status of Pru-Care. Rejected as a restatement of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. First three sentences rejected as restatements of testimony. Balance accepted with the assumption that "those counties" indicates Lake and Volusia counties. First and second sentences rejected as restatements of testimony. Third sentence accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First and second sentences rejected as restatements of testimony. Third sentence accepted as a possibility and, not a fact. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence rejected. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted except for use of word "awarded" in last sentence. Award is a function of the Secretary. A better word would be "recommended". Accepted. Reject Accepted. Rejected. Accepted except for word "significantly". First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as not being a proper Finding of Fact. For Respondent, DHRS: 1 - 14. Accepted and incorporated as appropriate. 15 - 16. Accepted. 17 - 19. Accepted. First, second, and fourth sentences accepted. Third sentence rejected as not supported by the evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted except for the last three sub-paragraphs which are not supported by the evidence. Absent. 25 - 26. Accepted except for last sub-paragraph which is rejected as a conclusion. 27. Absent. 28 - 29. Accepted. 30. Accepted. 31 - 37. Absent. 38. Accepted. For Intervenor, Pru-Care: 1 & 2. 3. Rejected as a restatement of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. 4 - 5. Accepted. 6 - 7. Rejected as not being a Finding of Fact. 8 - 10. Accepted. 11. Accepted. 12. Rejected as not being a Finding of Fact. 13 - 14. Accepted. 15. Rejected as not being a Finding of Fact except for 16 - 17. last sentence which is accepted. Accepted. 18. Accepted. For Intervenor, Health Options: 1 - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4 - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. Accepted except for the seventh sentence which is rejected. 12 - 13. Accepted. 14. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 15 - 16. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: David Yon, Esquire 315 South Calhoun Street Suite 800 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399 John Buchanan, Esquire 118 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jann Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Stanley Chapman, Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom, & Kitchen Post Office Drawer 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Larry Carnes, Esquire 515 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact The following facts are based upon the stipulation of the parties (Exhibit 1): Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was licensed as an optician by the State of Massachusetts in 1979. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was licensed as an optician by the State of Connecticut in 1980. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was an apprenticed optician with various licensed opticians in the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the past four to five years. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, on or about May, 1980, while living and employed in Connecticut, made a telephone call to the Board of Opticians in the State of Florida, with reference to her eligibility in taking the examination for a dispensing opticians license. After Petitioner detailed her formal training and work experience, she was advised that she was qualified to take the Florida Opticians Examination as the result of her having been licensed in both the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut and having five years apprentice experience. The Board of Opticians then mailed her an application form which she filled out and returned to them with a seventy five dollar ($75.00) money order for the examination and twenty dollars ($20.00) to register with the State of Florida. As a direct result of this telephone conversation with a representative of the Board of Opticians of the Department of Professional Regulations of the State of Florida, the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, quit her job in Connecticut and moved to Florida anticipating taking the aforesaid examination. After she had moved to Florida in reliance of the representations made to her by the Board of Opticians, she was notified that she was not qualified to take the said examination. Petitioner's application was considered by the Board of Opticianry on July 10, 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida and it was found that the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, did not meet the statutory requirements of s. 484.007(1), Florida Statutes (1979), although at the time she contacted the Board, she did meet the requirements of s. 484.03, Florida Statutes (1977), which was the prior licensing statute for the Board of Opticianry and was no longer in effect at the time. The Board further held that they did not have the authority to admit Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, into the examination .for licensure as an optician in the State of Florida since she did not qualify under the current statute, s. 484.007(1), Florida Statutes (1979), even if they felt she had relied on the Board's prior representations that she would be allowed to take the examination to her detriment. The sole issue for consideration at this hearing is whether the Board of Opticianry has the authority to allow the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, to sit for the next examination for a license to be a dispensing optician in the State of Florida on the basis that the Board of Opticianry is estopped for asserting the new statute as a denial of her right to sit for the next exam since she has detrimentally relied on their representation that her qualifications under the old statute, s. 484.03, Florida Statutes (1977), qualified her to sit immediately for said examination." The following are additional Findings of Fact based upon testimony adduced at the hearing: When Petitioner made her telephone call to the Board of Opticians in May, 1980, she asked to speak to one of the Board members, but was assured by a woman who answered the phone that she could answer any questions Petitioner might have concerning her qualifications. At this time, Petitioner informed the person taking the call that she planned to move to Florida if she was qualified to take the examination for a dispensing optician license. Petitioner thereafter moved to Florida and is now employed by Sheppard Optical at Delray Beach, Florida where she is earning $200.00 a week. She was making approximately $300.00 a week when she left Connecticut and anticipated a higher income when she commenced practicing under her opticians license in Connecticut. (Testimony of Petitioner) Prior to the consolidation of the various state licensing boards into the Department of Professional Regulation in 1979, the practice of the Board of Opticianry, under the apprentice requirements of Section 484.03, Florida Statutes, (1977) was to permit individuals who had apprenticed in another state, but not in Florida, for the specified time of not less than three years, to register with the Board, and then make application for and take the examination for licensure. This was frequently done by means of telephone calls authorizing the individual to make application. In some cases, letters were sent which contained a similar authorization. Subsequent to Petitioner's telephone call to the Board in May, 1980, the new Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry, Herbert F. Varn, changed this practice to conform to the applicable statute which requires individuals to register as an apprentice with the Board and not admit such individuals to examination until after they had thereafter completed the requisite three year period of apprenticeship. In some isolated cases, the Board had permitted individuals who had previously received a letter authorizing them to take the examination, even though they had not been registered in Florida for the requisite three year period, to take the examination. However, after reorganization, the Board did not permit individuals to take the examination based solely upon any oral assurances received from persons in the prior Executive Director's office. (Testimony of Varn) The order of the Board of Opticianry, dated September 2, 1981, denying Petitioner's application stated that she had not met the statutory requirements for licensure by examination pursuant to Section 484.067(1), Florida Statutes, because she had not completed the requisite two school year course of study in a recognized school of opticianry, had not actively practiced as a licensed optician in another state for more than three years preceding the application, and had not registered as an apprentice with the Department and served not less than a three year apprenticeship under appropriate supervision. The present Executive Director of the Board is of the opinion that there would be no detriment to the public if Petitioner was allowed to sit for the examination based on her prior training and experience, but acknowledges that this is a matter for Board determination. (Testimony of Varn, pleadings)
