Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure by endorsement. Specific to the grounds for denial are the issues of whether Petitioner is of good moral character and whether he is able to practice with skill and safety.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Norman M. Phillips, M.D., is a graduate of St. George's University School of Medicine, Grenada, West Indies, a foreign medical school. Petitioner holds a certificate from the Educational Commission on Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) and has passed the ECFMG examination. Petitioner obtained a passing score on the licensing examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc. (FLEX). Petitioner is licensed to practice medicine in New Jersey. Petitioner is over 21 years of age. Petitioner has completed at least one year of an approved residency. The Petitioner has not committed any act or offense in any jurisdiction which would constitute the basis for disciplining a physician, pursuant to Section 458.331(1) or (2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner applied for licensure by endorsement as a physician in Florida. On March 26, 1988, Petitioner appeared before the Credentials Committee of the Board regarding his application for licensure. The Credentials Committee recommended to the Board that Petitioner's application be denied. The basis for this recommendation was Petitioner's alleged inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety due to a mental condition and his prior performance during his medical training. The recommendation also claimed Petitioner was not of good moral character. The Board adopted the recommendation of the Credentials Committee and issued an Order stating its intent to deny the Petitioner's application. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed for an administrative review of the denial. After graduation from medical school, Petitioner was accepted into a residency program at St. Peter's Medical Center, New Brunswick, New Jersey. This program was in internal medicine and was to cover three years of postgraduate work. After the first year, Petitioner was evaluated and offered a contract for the second year of the program. Dr. Andrew L. Hahn was the program director of the internal medicine residency program. Dr. Hahn is an expert in the matter of residency training of medical students. Dr. Hahn evaluated Petitioner's performance as satisfactory. During the second year of the residency, Petitioner received an unfavorable evaluation which placed him on notice of a need to improve in order to receive a contract for the third year of the program. Petitioner ably made necessary corrections, improved his work performance, and, consequently, received a contract for the third year. After Petitioner had received notice of his contract for the third year, he was required to perform a rotation in radiology. This rotation was selected as it was the only available course given in the time period. While Petitioner would have preferred another topic, he accepted the assignment and agreed to the rotation. The rotation consisted of approximately three weeks of classroom lectures given at a location away from Petitioner's hospital assignments. After attending a few early sessions, Petitioner determined that he had already studied the subject matter of the course in medical school and that further attendance would not benefit him. Petitioner erroneously concluded attendance was not required. Instead of attending the rotation course lectures, Petitioner remained home studying other materials, performed his hospital duties, and made applications relating to future work. Petitioner's patients did not suffer as a result of the missed classroom sessions. Petitioner attended the clinic he was assigned to during the rotation period. When Petitioner's superiors were informed of the failure to attend the classroom sessions, they approached Petitioner for a satisfactory explanation which he was unable to provide. Since they (including Dr. Hahn) considered the failure to attend a serious breach of his professional responsibility, Petitioner was given the choice of either resigning his third year placement or being terminated. Petitioner agreed to resign his third year and was given a certificate for the two years he completed. At the time of his resignation Petitioner offered to repeat the classroom work but that option was rejected by Dr. Hahn. After resigning, Petitioner told his superiors that he had worked in a pharmacy (he is a licensed pharmacist) during the time he was supposed to have been in the radiology classes. He indicated he had done this because he needed money. Petitioner had not worked in a pharmacy, however, and had fabricated the story in a lame effort to excuse his nonattendance. Subsequently, Petitioner was interviewed by Dr. Bernard Sandler for a residency program in physical medicine and rehabilitation at the Robert Wood Johnson, Jr. Rehabilitation Institute of the John F. Kennedy Medical Center in Edison, New Jersey. Petitioner was accepted into the program and fell under the supervision of Dr. Thomas Edmund Strax. Petitioner successfully completed this program in December, 1987. Petitioner did not disclose the underlying facts of his resignation from the internal medicine program to either Dr. Sandler or Dr. Strax, however, neither physician questioned him at length about it either. Petitioner did not misrepresent any pertinent history; he simply did not volunteer embarrassing information. During his residency in rehabilitation, Petitioner was observed by Drs. Sandler, Harold Arlen, and Fazal Panezai. All of these physicians found Petitioner to be able to practice medicine with skill and safety. Petitioner did not exhibit any problem related to malfeasance or incompetence. Petitioner got along with staff and worked well with others. As a resident in the rehabilitation program, Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Strax who determined that Petitioner would require improvement in order to meet the high standards Dr. Strax maintained for his course of study. Petitioner was able to make the necessary improvements and satisfactorily met Dr. Strax's objectives. Dr. Strax is an expert in the matter of residency training of medical students. Dr. Strax had an opportunity to review Petitioner's work on numerous occasions. Dr. Strax recommended Petitioner for licensure and - found him to be qualified and competent. Petitioner is presently employed as a physician at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Miami, Florida. Petitioner is not required to be licensed in his present employment since such position is exempt from licensure. Petitioner's present supervisor is Dr. Dorothea Glass, Chief of Rehabilitation Services. Dr. Glass interviewed Petitioner and reviewed references Petitioner had given to her. Dr. Glass knows Dr. Strax who recommended Petitioner for the position which he currently holds. While Dr. Strax advised Dr. Glass to "keep an eye on him," Dr. Glass has done as she would with all young doctors. Dr. Glass has worked with Petitioner on a daily basis since February, 1988, and believes he is competent, hardworking and honest. Petitioner is able to practice medicine with skill and safety. Petitioner is of good moral character. Petitioner did not misrepresent material information when he appeared before the credentials committee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a final order approving the application for licensure by endorsement for the Petitioner, Norman M. Phillips, M.D. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1 through 9 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 11-16, paragraphs 10 through 32 are accepted. Paragraphs 33 through 36, are accepted but are irrelevant to the issues of this case. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraph 38 is rejected as speculation or argument. Paragraph 39 is accepted. Paragraphs 40 through 51 are accepted. Paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 53 through 63 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraph 21, paragraphs 64 through 68 are accepted. Paragraphs 69 through 71 are accepted. Paragraphs 72 through 73 are rejected as immaterial, recitation, or argument. Paragraphs 74 through 76 are rejected as recitation of testimony or argument. See findings of fact paragraph 20. Paragraph 77 is rejected as argument. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1 through 10 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as irrelevant to the extent that it refers to Petitioner's performance as "marginal." Petitioner was rated satisfactory and was permitted to continue. There were areas in which he required improvement, which he was able to correct. Paragraph 12 is accepted with the clarification that the radiology rotation was selected because it was the only one available to Petitioner at the given time. That portion of paragraph 12 which relates a fourth week work in the emergency room is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 13, that portion which states Petitioner did not attend the classroom radiology rotation is accepted, the remainder is rejected as either unsupported by the record, contrary to the weight of the evidence, or irrelevant. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 11-16, paragraphs 14 through 16 are accepted otherwise rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. It should be noted that any reference to emergency work deficiencies have not been credited nor are they supported by this record. Paragraph 17 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 18 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or argument. Paragraph 19 is rejected as argument, irrelevant, or immaterial to the issues of this case. Paragraph 20 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 21 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of credible evidence or argument. Paragraph 22 is accepted to the extent addressed In findings of fact paragraph 17; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraph 19, paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected as recitation of testimony, argument, or irrelevant. Paragraph 26 is accepted. Paragraph 27 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the credible evidence, irrelevant, or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Turk VALDES-FAULI, COBB, PETREY & BISCHOFF, P.A. Suite 3400-One Biscayne Tower Two S. Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Allen R. Grossman Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1603, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a Certificate of Need ("CON") authorizing establishment of an (ophthalmological) ambulatory surgical center in Palm Beach County, Florida. Subordinate issues are: Whether the proposed facility satisfies the CON criteria of Sections 381.494-499, Florida Statutes, as implemented by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS) rule and non-rule policy; Whether the proposed facility will result in unnecessary duplication of services, underutilization of existing services and increased health care costs to the community; Whether adequate resources are available for the construction and operation of the proposed facility; and Whether the proposed facility is financially feasible.
Findings Of Fact (Numbering corresponds to numbering used in proposed findings.) Preliminary findings: 1-4. Approved. On issue of compliance with applicable criteria: 1-7. Approved. 8. Approved, with caveat that this is subject to supplying an adequate record basis for the policy at hearing. 9-13 Approved. Approved but no presumption of correctness attaches to HRS earlier or more recent evaluation of the application. See, Boca Raton, supra. Approved. Approved but modified to more accurately reflect that HRS takes HMO's into account, but this factor was not used or relied on (in connection with the non-rule policy or standing alone) as the basis for granting Petitioner's application. Approved. 18-32. Approved, in the sense that an HRS expert witness at hearing offered conclusions as to compliance with each statutory criteria; rejected, in that his conclusions (except for those concerning quality of care, financial feasibility, the inapplicability of some criteria, and the cost advantages of modifying an existing facility instead of constructing a new one) are rejected as unsubstantiated by the facts. On the Issue of Need: 1-8. Approved. Approved. Modified to reflect that this is one estimate among several offered by experts. Rejected as unsupported by the credible evidence of record. Approved. Approved. First sentence, approved, in that this is the stated "attempt" of HRS' challenged non-rule policy. Second sentence, rejected as unsupported by the credible evidence; the profitable performance of outpatient surgery at a physician's office does logically compel a conclusion that his office should be licensed as an ambulatory surgical facility. On the issue of adequate resources: 1-8. Approved. On the issue of financial feasibility: 1-19 Approved. 20. Rejected as argumentative. RULINGS ON INTERVENOR'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1-4. Approved. 5. Approved except for reference to equipment costs, of which there will be none. 9-16 Approved. 17. Such broad-brush incorporation of all facts asserted in argument is not susceptible to explicit rulings. RULINGS ON POST-HEARING MOTIONS. Intervenor's "Motion to Stay Issuance of Recommended Order" is denied. Intervenor's "Request for Hearing Officer to Take Official Recognition" of the Final Order of Hearing Officer Robert T. Benton II, in consolidated DOAH Case Nos. 85-2962R, 85-2963R and 85-3193R (attached to a "Notice of Supplemental Authority" dated November 1, 1985) is granted. The order is made a part of the record of this proceeding. A final order entered by another hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings the authenticity of which is not in question, is an appropriate document to be accorded official recognition. See, Health Quest Realty XII v. HRS, 10 FLW 1729 (Fla. 1st DCA July 16, 1985, pet. for reh. pending). COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire 104 S. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee Florida 32301 William B. Wiley, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316
Recommendation Based on the foegoing it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for a CON authorizing establishment of an ambulatory surgical facility at his offices in Palm Beach County, Florida, be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1986.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a physician should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint filed on December 21, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Kenneth Aung-Din, is a licensed medical doctor having been issued license number ME 0051923 by petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine (Board). He is board certified in emergency medicine having received his certification in 1994. When the events herein occurred, respondent was an emergency room physician at Memorial Medical Center (MMC) in Jacksonville, Florida. On the evening of February 21, 1991, V. P., a thirty-five year old female who was then eight months pregnant, presented herself to the MMC emergency room complaining of lower abdominal discomfort, difficulty urinating, and a five-hour history of nausea and vomiting. After being examined and treated by respondent, and diagnosed as having a urinary tract infection, the patient was released the same evening. Less than an hour later, however, the patient went into labor and delivered a new born. On December 21, 1992, the Board issued a two-count administrative complaint charging that, while treating V. P., respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances in that he "failed to obtain fetal heart tones, determine fetal position, and ausculatate for fetal heart tones with a doppler that was available to him in the ER when he examined (the) patient, who was a high risk near term obstetrical patient." The complaint further alleges that respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of V. P., "including, but not limited to, patient histories; examination results; test results; records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or administered; and reports of consultations and hospitalizations." Respondent denied all material allegations and requested this hearing to contest these charges. Did respondent deviate from the standard of care? On presentment to the emergency room nurse around 8:53 p.m. on February 21, 1991, V. P. complained of generalized abdominal pain and pressure since around 3:30 p.m. that day, with nausea and two episodes of vomiting. She also complained that she was unable to urinate since approximately 2:30 p.m. An additional complaint was allegedly made by the patient, but it is not a part of the nurse's notes and thus is hearsay in nature. The patient further disclosed that this was her second pregnancy. After recording in her notes the patient's complaints, the nurse, on her own volition, conducted a nitrozine test which was negative. It later came to light that the test was improperly conducted by the nurse, but respondent was never told this fact. Respondent first observed the patient around 9:08 p.m. and recalled that she "was obviously in discomfort." Based on V. P.'s complaints, respondent initially suspected that she might be in preterm labor. After obtaining a patient history, respondent palpitated V. P.'s abdomen for any pain, tenderness, abnormalities or contractions. Although V. P. was eight months pregnant, she was nontender and exhibited no signs of active labor. The patient also denied that she was having contractions. Based on V. P.'s primary complaint of urinary retention, respondent asked the nurse to insert a Foley catheter in V. P.'s bladder. Before the nurse did so, V. P. was able to urinate on her own accord. Even so, respondent ordered a catheter inserted around 9:30 p.m. to empty any residual in the bladder. This procedure yielded approximately 200cc. of urine which was used for a urinalysis test. By now, having urinated at least once, and having her bladder emptied, V. P.'s pain and discomfort had gone away, and she appeared to be "totally comfortable and with no complaints." After seeing the results of the nitrozine test around 9:55 p.m., respondent conducted a pelvic examination. Still considering the possibility of preterm labor, respondent inserted a vaginal speculum into the patient to see if there was any bleeding or fluid. Neither was present, and a manual examination of the patient revealed that the opening to her cervix was thick and closed. A patient in preterm labor would generally present signs of bleeding or fluid, and the cervix would have begun to open and "thin out." Given these findings, and the fact that V. P. was exhibiting no signs of labor or discomfort, it was reasonable for respondent to conclude that V. P. was not in preterm labor. The results of the urinalysis were reviewed by respondent around twenty minutes before the patient's discharge. By that time, she had voluntarily urinated at least three times since first arriving at the emergency room. The test results revealed 1+ protein, trace ketones, and 0-2 white and red blood cells. Also, they indicated that a sterile (uncontaminated) specimen had been taken, and that trace bacteria were present. Because trace bacteria, if not treated, can lead to "a very significant" urinary tract infection, and V. P. had previously experienced abdominal "pressure" and an inability to urinate, both signs of an infection, respondent prescribed Ampicillin, an antibiotic, on the assumption V. P. had a urinary tract infection. This diagnosis is not unusual for pregnant women, and even petitioner's expert agreed that V. P. had presented some of the "classical signs" of a urinary tract infection. After having observed the patient for almost two hours, during which time V. P. exhibited no objective clinical signs of active labor, respondent discharged the patient around 10:50 p.m. In doing so, respondent relied not only on the above observations, but also upon the results of his pelvic and abdominal evaluations, the urinalysis test results, and the fact that all of V. P.'s complaints (pain, nausea and vomiting) had been resolved. It was also reasonable to conclude that had the patient been in preterm labor, her symptoms would have progressed, rather than abated, during the two hours she was in the emergency room. At the time of discharge, respondent gave V. P. instructions to make a follow-up visit that week with her primary physician at University Medical Center (UMC), and if her condition did not improve during the interim, to return to MCC or call the "emergency department right away for further assistance." She was also given a prescription for an antibiotic for the urinary tract infection. Just prior to leaving the hospital, V. P. urinated one last time and allegedly told the nurse that she had started "spotting." Even if V. P. actually reported this critical fact, the nurse failed to disclose this to respondent, and he cannot be faulted for the nurse's omission. Had respondent known, or even suspected, that she had just begun bleeding, he would have sent her upstairs to the obstetrical wing for further observation. The complaint levels a number of criticisms at respondent's conduct which, if true, indicate that he failed to meet the appropriate standard of care. In addressing these criticisms, it should be noted that petitioner's own expert agreed that, at best, this was "a difficult case," and one that all emergency room physicians "hate to see." The complaint characterizes V. P. as a "high risk near term obstetrical patient." The use of the term "high risk" is based principally on the fact that an ultrasound conducted at UMC on February 19, 1991, revealed that the fetus was in a breech position. But respondent was never told this fact, and even petitioner's expert conceded that without this information, it was reasonable for respondent to consider V. P. as a normal risk pregnancy. The complaint first alleges that respondent "failed to assess the status of the fetus by neglecting to auscultate for fetal heart tones with a doppler that was available to him in the Emergency Department." A doppler is a device used to listen for fetal heart tones and, while not as effective as other monitoring devices, is nonetheless useful in detecting fetal distress or preterm labor. Here, respondent did not assess the status of V. P.'s fetus because her pain and discomfort had disappeared after her urinary tension was resolved, and she no longer exhibited any signs, clinical or otherwise, of preterm labor. At the same time, while doppler machines were available in emergency rooms, including MMC, during the early 1990's when this incident occurred, it was not prevailing protocol for emergency room physicians to automatically conduct fetus monitoring for what they perceived to be normal risk pregnancies. While the standard for emergency room physicians has subsequently changed, and fetal heart tones are now routinely monitored on all pregnant women twenty weeks and above, respondent did not deviate from the prevailing standard of care in February 1991 by failing to use a doppler. The complaint next alleges that a prudent physician "would have telephoned (V. P.'s) treating physician from UMC, or the obstetrician- gynecologist on call in order to properly assess (her) condition." As to calling V. P.'s treating physician, however, the more persuasive evidence shows that it would have been imprudent to attempt to contact V. P.'s primary treating physician because she had been treated by an unknown resident at another hospital, and at that hour of the night the chance of speaking with that resident was highly improbable. Then, too, since her complaints had been resolved, there was no need to contact another physician. As to respondent's failure to obtain a specialist consultation, the more persuasive evidence shows that the diagnosis of urinary tract infection was reasonable under the circumstances, and after the patient exhibited no signs of distress for at least an hour and a half, her discharge was appropriate. While it is true, as petitioner suggests, that the initial complaints by V. P. of pressure, nausea, vomiting and abdominal pains can be signs of preterm labor, these complaints were resolved after the catheter was inserted, and there were no corroborating indications of labor. Then, too, based on the information at hand, respondent reasonably concluded that V. P. was a normal risk pregnancy. Finally, later inquiry disclosed that during her first pregnancy, V. P. was in labor for only fifteen minutes, a remarkably short period of time. Respondent was not aware of this fact at the time of treatment. As it turned out, V. P. experienced another remarkably short period of labor on the evening of February 21, 1991. In summary, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that, while treating V. P. in February 1991, respondent practiced medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which was recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. C. Adequacy of Medical Records The complaint generally alleges that respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient. In the history section of his notes for patient V. P., which have been made a part of this record, respondent made the following recordations: 2110 - 35-year old white female, eight months pregnant; complaining of unable to urinate; dysuria; feels like pressure; denies vaginal bleeding; no contractions; Under the physical examination portion of his notes, respondent reported as follows: white female, well developed, awake, alert, times 3. Abdomen, pregnant uterus equals 8 months; nontender. Pelvic - zero blood; oz thick and closed. Late entry - 2/26/91, Nitrozine Test performed, which was negative. Finally, under his diagnostic impressions and discharge instructions, respondent wrote as follows: UTI (urinary tract infection) Ampicillin 250 mg, q.i.d., for 7 times. Tylenol if needed. Follow up, UMC this week. Return if any problems. In responding to the charge that his notes were inadequate or incomplete, respondent agreed that the diagnostic impressions section would have been more accurate and complete if he had written "urinary retention- resolved/UTI" rather than "UTI" alone. This is because urinary retention was a secondary diagnosis which was resolved during the patient's visit. In this respect, the records are not adequate. In addition, because the records fail to note that V. P.'s symptoms of abdominal pain and pressure were resolved, they lack completeness. In all other respects, they are found to be adequate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as described above, and that he be given a reprimand. Count I should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Kevin W. Crews, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 W. Jerry Foster, Esquire 1342 Timberlane Road, Suite 101-A Tallahassee, Florida 32312-1775 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct. Whether her license as a registered nurse, certificate no. 8829 should be suspended or revoked or whether Respondent should be put on probation.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Christine Richter, who holds license no. 88294-2 was employed as a registered nurse at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, Tallahassee, Florida, during the month of February, 1977. She worked as a certified nurse and anesthetist under Ann Marie Connors, the chief nurse anesthetist. The chief nurse anesthetist reported to the Associate Executive Director April 11, 1977, that there were gross discrepancies in the narcotics record kept by the Respondent and at that time she presented him with some of the records. On April 12, 1977, Respondent was requested by the Associate Executive Director to report to his office for a conference. Nurse Connors, the chief nurse anesthetist, was also called to be present at that conference. At the conference the Associate Executive Director asked Respondent for an explanation as to the discrepancies between the narcotic and barbiturate administration record and the patient records. In reply the Respondent stated that she needed a hysterectomy and could not afford it. Upon the insistance of the Associate Executive Director that she give an explanation for the discrepancy in the hospital records, she indicated that she needed to improve her charting. She gave no explanation for discrepancies in the narcotics chart which she signed, and indicated that she would resign. The Director stated that he would accept her resignation and she left the conference. The Respondent mailed her written resignation to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital the following day. The Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 1976 edition, published by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals "Anesthesia Services" pages 59 through 64 is used as the standard for anesthetic procedure. A department standard book approved by the American Hospital Association and the joint commission on the accreditation of hospitals is required to be read by each employee of the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital as it pertains to the department in which the work is to be performed. The instructions in the department standards book are the same as in the Accreditation Manual for Hospitals as far as anesthesia services is concerned. Medical records of eight patients were introduced into evidence together with Narcotic and Barbiturate Record no. 081291. This shows the date, time, patient's name, room number, doseage, attending physician and administering nurse. The doseage of drugs secured by and signed for by the Respondent, Christine Richter, was more than the records show was administered to the various patients. No accounting was made for the difference between the amounts of drugs secured and the amounts, if any, administered to the patients, although it is the duty of the nurse checking out drugs to account for its use in writing on a form provided for that purpose. The Respondent offered no verbal explanation for the missing drugs when given the opportunity to explain her actions by the Associate Executive Director at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and her immediate supervisor, Ann Marie Connors, chief nurse anesthetist.
Recommendation Revoke the license of Christine Richter. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1005 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 647 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues for consideration in this case are those promoted by an administrative complaint in which the Petitioner has accused the Respondent of violating certain provisions within Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, pertaining to licensure. This relates to the contention by Petitioner that Respondent has obtained his license to practice medicine in Florida by fraudulent means. These allegations are more completely described in the conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician having been issued license number ME0043541. On or about September 9, 1983, Respondent submitted an application to the Board of Medical Examiners, now known as the Board of Medicine, seeking a license to practice medicine in Florida. This request was for licensure by endorsement. On the form application there is a section which refers to the applicant's medical education. It instructs the applicant to be specific and account for each year of the medical education calling upon the applicant to give the name of the medical school and the location. In response to this requirement, Respondent indicated that he attended the Universidad del Noreste in Tampico, Mexico, from July, 1977 to May, 1978; from July, 1978 to May, 1979 and from June, 1979 until May, 1980. He further stated that he attended Universidad Cetec, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, from June, 1980 until May, 1981 and received a degree of doctor of medicine from that university on June 8, 1981. In submitting the application for licensure by endorsement, he did so under oath and in the course of signing the application he acknowledged the following in his affidavit and oath: "I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservation of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me herein are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such action shall constitute cause for the denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Florida. As part of the application process, Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director to the Board of Medical Examiners, sent a letter to Dr. Traynor on September 30, 1983, requesting additional information. The text of that letter was as follows: Dear Dr. Traynor: With further reference to your application for licensure in Florida by you are required to provide to this office, in the form of an affidavit, a narrative report on all your activities relating to your medical education beginning with date of enrollment in medical school. Such report should include, but not be limited to, all classes attended (dates and name and location of institution) which were not conducted at the main teaching hospital of the medical school from which you received a medical diploma. You are also required to complete the enclosed form, providing additional information regarding your medical education and places of residence while in medical training. Upon receipt of the above requested material, you may be required to make a personal appearance before the Board for consideration of your application. The form referred to in the second paragraph of the correspondence from Ms. Faircloth is the form entitled: Attachment for Application for Licensure. Within that form it asks that the applicant "list all places of residence during medical school." This is broken down into various lines on the form requiring the applicant to state the city, state or country and the various period in which he resided in those places. A copy of the executed form offered by the Respondent on October 7, 1983 may be found as a part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. In the course of describing his residence, he refers to Tampico, Mexico in the period August, 1977 through July, 1978; August, 1978 through July, 1979 and August, 1979 through July, 1980. He then describes his place of residence during medical school as being Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in the period July, 1980 through June, 1981. The attachment for application for licensure form then has a section which states "Medical Education: be specific. Account for each year. List all universities or colleges where you attended classes and received training as a medical student." In response to this request, the Respondent provided the same information which he had given in his initial endorsement application form described before. In swearing to the accuracy of those matters set forth in the Attachment for Application for Licensure offered on October 7, 1983, Respondent gave the same oath as related to the endorsement application form acknowledging the possibility of denial, suspension or revocation of any license which was received by the giving of false information. In reply to the first paragraph of the September 30, 1983 correspondence from Ms. Faircloth, Respondent offered a document entitled "Clinical Training." A copy of that document may be found as part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. That document states: CLINICAL TRAINING Kevin M. Traynor Aug. '77 - July '79: Basic science courses at Del Noreste; Tampico, Mexico August - Dec. '79: Del Noreste Hospital, Tampico, Mexico Pulmonary Ear, nose & throat Cardiology Ophthalmology Jan. - June '80: Del Noreste Hospital; Tampico, Mexico Traumatology (orthopedics) Forensic medicine Gastroenterology Dermatology July - Dec. '80: University Hospital; Cetec School of Medicine, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Neurology Infectious disease Endocrinology General surgery Jan. - June '81: University Hospital; Uni- versity Cetec School of Medicine, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Psychiatry Internal medicine OB-GYN Pediatrics By the representations set forth in the statement of clinical training which were made by the Respondent, the impression is given that all of his activities related to his medical education from the point of enrollment to the completion of his medical school training were conducted at the Universidad del Noreste and University Cetec and the hospitals affiliated with those institutions. Given that the Respondent is silent on other activities outside those settings, a reading of his explanation leads one to believe that he had no such activities. This is not a true depiction of his training in medical school. In this respect, the Respondent has misled the Florida Board of Medical Examiners in that the vast majority of clinical rotations which the Respondent participated in during his medical school education occurred during externships in the United States. In addition, Respondent, in his comments in the endorsement application form and in the Attachment for Application for Licensure form, has misled the Board of Medical Examiners by describing his residence in medical school as Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in the period July, 1980 through June, 1981. He was not residing in the Dominican Republic until January, 1981. Respondent's domicile or official residence was in Tampico, Mexico, until the end of 1980. Respondent did not receive medical education in the sense of attending classes and receiving training as a medical student in affiliation with the Universidad Cetec until January, 1981. This is contrary to his representations about residence and medical education in which he describes his association with Universidad Cetec dating from July, 1980. Respondent had made an inquiry about being admitted to Universidad Cetec in December, 1980, and was given the impression that that request would be approved. Respondent's official acceptance by Universidad Cetec occurred on January 8, 1981. In referring to the activities related to medical education spoken to in the September 30, 1983 correspondence from Ms. Faircloth, the records reveal that Respondent did externship at St. Francis Hospital in Miami Beach, Florida from July 9, 1975 through November 20, 1979. He further did externship at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York, from January, 1980 through May, 1980, rotations involving medicine, pediatrics and surgery. In that same institution from June 30, 1980 through July 13, 1980, Respondent did a rotation in neurology. In the period July, 1980 through December, 1980, Respondent performed unofficial and uncredited externship at Kingsbrook. All of these activities occurred under the aegis of his status as a medical student at Universidad del Noreste. In the period February, 1981 through May, 1981, while at Universidad Cetec, Respondent did an externship at Brookdale Hospital Medical Center in New York in hematology and renal and electrolytes. In April, 1981, as an extern at Nassau County Medical Center in East Meadow, New York, Respondent performed a clerkship in urology. Under the circumstances in examining the places of residence during medical school, while Respondent may have been in official residence in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, his actual residence was in various locations within the United States in the periods described in the preceding paragraphs. Following his graduation, Respondent also participated in training programs at Brookdale Hospital Medical Center related to an elective in emergency services from the period August 10, 1981 through September 4, 1981. He performed an elective in the period September, 1981 through October, 1981 in the Division of Pulmonary Medicine at the Down State Medical Center which is affiliated with the Department of Medicine, AIE University of New York. From 1981 through June, 1984, Respondent was involved in an internal medicine residency at Jersey Shore Medical Center/Fitken Hospital in Neptune, New Jersey. Beginning in 1984 through June, 1986, Respondent completed a cardiology fellowship program in Jacksonville, Florida, at the University Hospital which is part of JHEP, a training program associated with the University of Florida medical school. In explaining why he has reported his residence in his medical education as commencing in July, 1980 at Universidad Cetec, Respondent indicates that he had been told by the dean of the medical school at Cetec, upon his admission there, that his enrollment would be back-dated to the beginning of the fall semester, or June, 1980. To this end Respondent paid Universidad Cetec $2,500 which represented a tuition payment for the seventh semester running from approximately June, 1980 to December, 1980. This payment for back-dating and credit for the seventh semester was made on April 23, 1981. There is no indication that those records were back-dated to show acceptance of a seventh semester under association with Universidad Cetec. Respondent did not undertake any clinical training in that period which could be credited, with the exception of his urology clerkship at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center in the period June 30, 1980 through July 13, 1980. He did not stand examination in any of the subject areas pertaining to his medical education in that seventh semester running from June, 1980 to December, 1980, having foregone the examination sessions given by Universidad del Noreste at the conclusion of that seventh semester. In the final analysis, Respondent did not accomplish anything toward advancing his medical education in the seventh semester running from approximately June, 1980 through December, 1980 as recognized by either medical school which he attended. There is evidence that part of the unofficial work done by the Petitioner in the fall of 1980 at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center related to dermatology and E.R. Even accepting the concept explained by the Respondent to the effect that both of the medical schools he attended would allow a student to stand examination in medical subjects at times not correlated with the performance of clinical clerkships, to the extent that the seventh semester unofficial clinical clerkships being performed are germane, they have not been credited. Respondent claims that the period from the end of the fall of 1980 was not crucial in that he had fulfilled enough weeks in clinical rotation to allow his graduation. In any event, Respondent did graduate, was certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates, passed the FLEX examination and has been licensed in the states of Georgia and New Jersey. In explaining his response to the requirements related to his application for licensure in Florida to practice medicine, Respondent indicates that he was of the persuasion that he need only provide information pertaining to his clinical training as credited by the two schools he attended. This is not a fair reading of the requirements expressed in the correspondence of September 30, 1983, in which all activities involving the medical education are sought. This contemplates that specific information as to the exact nature and location of the externship rotations performed in the United States should be explained. Respondent failed to do this and what he did offer by way of explanation is misleading in that clerkships are set forth pertaining to experience in the period July, 1980 through December, 1980 associated with the Universidad Cetec which did not occur at that time because the Respondent was not enrolled at Universidad Cetec during that period. In addition, the statement about clinical training given by the Respondent would have one believe that the training occurred in the affiliated hospitals associated with the two medical schools he attended which is erroneous. The clinical training statement by the Petitioner does not coincide with his actual clinical training, an example being that during the period January, 1980 through June, 1980 while affiliated with the Universidad del Noreste, he says that he received training in traumatology (orthopedics), forensic medicine, gastroenterology, and dermatology when in fact the training he was receiving at that time at Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center was in the fields of medicine, pediatrics and surgery. It appears that Universidad del Noreste gave him credit for those subjects he relates, but this was not the clinical training he was undergoing in that time sequence. During the period July through December 1980 where he indicates that he received clinical training in neurology, infectious disease, endocrinology and general surgery, the only official training he received was in neurology. It is debatable whether the requirements for establishing residence as described in the endorsement application form and the Attachment for Application for Licensure form sought the official residence, that is, his residence in the country where he attended medical school or the actual residence where externships were being performed as well as when he was actually at the university. In any event, if it was seeking the official residence, his information is misleading in that he describes his official residence as Santo Domingo in the period July, 1980 through December, 1980, when in fact his official residence was Tampico, Mexico. Respondent was given his medical license by the State of Florida on December 5, 1983, based in part upon the information as set out in the endorsement application form, the Attachment for Application for Licensure form and the narrative on clinical training provided by the Respondent. Before the occasion of the present administrative complaint, there is no indication that the Respondent has been disciplined by the State of Florida. At present, Respondent is practicing medicine in Florida and is a resident of Stuart, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 13, 1984, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a CON for an ambulatory surgical center (ASC). Respondent assigned CON number 3677 to Petitioner's application. Petitioner seeks to construct a two operating room, free standing ASC at 1710 West Colonial Drive in Orlando, Orange County, Florida. The primary area to be served by this application is Orange County, and the facility as proposed is reasonably accessible to Orange County residents. Orange County is located within Respondent's District VII, which is also comprised of Osceola, Brevard and Seminole Counties. Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz are owners of Y and S Management and are partners in the application here at issue. Y and S Management will provide medical management services at this facility, as it provides at nine other facilities throughout the country which performed approximately 17,500 outpatient surgical procedures in 1985, primarily gynecological. Two of the facilities managed by Y and S Management are licensed as ASCs under the laws of the states in which they are located. The chief operating officer of Y and S Management, Susan Hill, prepared the CON application which is here at issue. Financing for this project will be provided from the personal funds of Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. No funds will be borrowed for this purpose. They have sufficient liquid personal funds to fully finance the project cost of $473,000, as well as operating costs. Petitioner will lease 6,500 square feet on the first floor of a professional building to be constructed at 1710 West Colonial Drive in Orlando from West Colonial Properties, Ltd., at $12 per square foot. This property is owned by Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. An abortion clinic known as Orlando Women's Health Center, which they also own, is located next door at 1700 West Colonial Drive. The facility as proposed can reasonably be expected to meet licensure requirements for an ASC. Ambulatory surgical procedures to be performed at Petitioner's facility will include, but not be limited to abortions, tubal ligations, hernia repairs, diagnostic laproscopies, eye surgery for cataracts, hand surgery, plastic surgery, tonsillectomies, and dilatation and curettage. Equipment cost estimates for this project of $161,158 are realistic and complete. Staffing requirement estimates of 11.54 F.T.E., and salary requirements of approximately $182,000 annually are also realistic and complete. Petitioner estimates that for 1987 and 1988, 20% of all cases will be paid by Medicaid, 5% by Medicare, and 75% will be insurance and private pay, with 4% of this figure ultimately being bad debt or indigent care. With total cases estimated for 1987 and 1988 to be 1700 and 2100, respectively, total net revenues for 1987 and 1988 are estimated to be $732,000 and $903,000, respectively. Providing services to Medicaid patients in 20% of its cases would be beneficial to the community since this is a high level of service to patients who are typically underserved. Assuming that 20% of the cases handled at Petitioner's facility have multiple procedures, the projected charge rates for 1987 are $326 per case for Medicare and Medicaid, and $489 per case for private pay and insurance. These are reasonable and competitive charges. The projected charge rate for private pay and insurance is simply 150% of the Medicare and Medicaid rate, which in turn is based on the projected case mix considering the various levels of reimbursement. Petitioner will pay Y and S Management a fee of $50 per case for management services. The financial pro forma prepared for Petitioner demonstrates that using a conservative approach that somewhat overestimates expenses, Petitioner will reach the break-even point at 1400 cases, after allowing for management fees, depreciation and amortization. Using a less conservative, but more typical approach to estimating expenses, Petitioner will break-even at 1100 cases. Need in the service area exceeds the conservative break-even point and Petitioner estimates it will handle 1700 cases in its first year of operation and 2100 in its second. These are reasonable estimates. Respondent has not promulgated a rule setting forth a methodology for determining need for an ASC. However, Respondent has utilized an evolving non-rule policy in evaluating the need for such facilities. Reid Jaffe, Respondent's expert in health care planning, explained the methodology used in this case which resulted in his determining that in July, 1987, there will be a need for additional ambulatory surgical facilities in Orange County sufficient to recommend approval of Petitioner's CON application. Specifically, Jaffe's methodology is as follows: Acquire data from the local health council regarding the number of inpatient and outpatient procedures performed by existing providers, as reported for the current calendar year (1985) by hospitals in the appropriate service district (District VII). Acquire data from the Governor's Office of the population estimate for the appropriate service area (Orange County) for the current and planning horizon years. Using this data, calculate the current overall surgical and outpatient surgical use rates per 1000 population for hospitals in the service area. Using the projected population for the planning horizon year (1987) and the current use rates calculated in (c) above, calculate the projection of overall surgical procedures in the planning horizon year. Multiply projected overall surgeries by 40% to establish total number of out-patient surgeries to be performed in the planning horizon year. Subtract from (e) all outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in hospitals, other ASCs in the service area, as well as the financial break-evens of all CON approved free-standing outpatient surgery centers in the service area. After performing these calculations and subtractions, the number of outpatient surgical procedures remaining are compared to the break-even of the CON applicant at issue. If the remaining number is larger than the applicant's break even, a quantitative need is demonstrated. Applying Jaffe's methodology to this case and applying data he obtained from the Local Health Council of East Central Florida, as reported to it by hospitals in District VII for calendar year 1985, as well as population data for Orange County he obtained from the Governor's Office, it appears that a total of 83,054 surgical procedures were performed in District VII in 1985, with 21,084 of these being outpatient procedures performed in a hospital. Using a July, 1985, population estimate for Orange County of 556,384, the overall surgical use rate for Orange County is 83,054 divided by 556,384 over 1000, or 149.27 surgical procedures per 1000 population; the use rate for outpatient procedures performed in hospitals is 21,084 divided by 556,384 over 1000, or 37.89 outpatient procedures performed in hospitals per 1000 population. Multiplying the overall surgical use rate of 149.27 by 574,599 (projected Orange County population for July 1987) over 1000 and applying a factor of 40% yields a projection of 34,308 outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987. The use rate of 37.89 for outpatient services performed in a hospital is then multiplied by 574,599 over 1000 to obtain 21,722 which is the projected number of outpatient procedures which will be performed in a hospital in 1987. By subtracting this number (21,722) from the projection of total outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987 (34,308) you identify 12,536 procedures which could be performed in ASCs in 1987. The reported number of outpatient procedures being performed in existing ASCs and the break-evens of CON approved facilities are calculated to be 5,488 (Surgical Services 2,693; MediVision 903; AMI Single Day Surgery 1,832; Surgical Associates 60) which is then subtracted from 12,536 to leave a need of 7,048 outpatient procedures which could be performed in ASCs which are not now approved for this service area. Since Petitioner has a conservative break-even point of 1400 cases, and a more typical break-even point of 1100 cases, a quantitative need has been identified which far exceeds Petitioner's break-even point. Jaffe testified that in his experience this is the largest margin between break-even and available procedures he has seen in reviewing CON applications. A need analysis conducted by Howard E. Fagin, Ph.D., who was accepted as an expert in health care planning, facility planning and operations analysis, also confirms that there is a quantitative need for the ASC proposed by Petitioner. The methodology used by Dr. Fagin starts by calculating a target utilization for ambulatory surgical operating rooms. Assuming that a facility operates 250 days/year, 6 hours/day, it takes 1.25 hours/case and that there are 1.2 procedures/case with a utilization rate of 75%, a target utilization of 1,080 procedures/year for an ambulatory surgical room is thereby determined. In 1985 there were 10 approved hospital "dedicated" ambulatory surgical rooms in Orange County, and 9 approved rooms in free-standing ASCs (Surgical Services-5, AMI Single Day Surgery-2, MediVision-2) not counting the 2 rooms approved in CON 3313 for Surgical Associates which are used for no more than 60 cases per year. Multiplying these 19 rooms by the target utilization of 1,080 procedures/year results in a calculation of 20,520 total utilization in available dedicated and free-standing ASC rooms. Data from the Local Health Council of East Central Florida for 1985 indicates that 11,413 outpatient procedures were performed in hospital, non-dedicated, operating rooms. Therefore if we take Jaffe's projection of 34,308 outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987, and subtract 20,520 (total utilization in available dedicated and free-standing ASC rooms) and also subtract 11,413 (outpatient procedures performed in hospital, non-dedicated, rooms), we arrive at a need of 2,375 procedures in 1987 and 3,770 procedures in 1989. Since Petitioner's break-even is conservatively 1400 cases, and again assuming 1.2 procedures per case, Petitioner's conservative break-even is 1680 procedures, which is within the need which will exist in 1987, and well within the need in 1989. The need methodology and opinion of Intervenor's expert, Dr. Deborah Kolb, is rejected because she incorrectly: (a) considered Orange and Seminole Counties as comprising a two county service area; (b) included all existing inpatient hospital based operating rooms, regardless of whether they are dedicated to outpatient surgery, in arriving at her conclusion that there is excess capacity; and (c) assumed all hospital operating rooms are available for outpatient surgery without modification. Ambulatory surgery is typically performed in three types of facilities: hospitals which utilize their operating rooms for both inpatient and outpatient surgery; hospitals which maintain separate "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, sometimes even in separate facilities adjacent to the main hospital; and free-standing ASCs which are not associated with a hospital. There are definite disadvantages to serving outpatients in hospitals without "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, including the "bumping" of outpatients in emergencies and increased costs to the patient for services. On the other hand there are advantages and disadvantages to the other two modes of delivering ambulatory surgical services. Hospital based "dedicated" rooms are obviously closer to a hospital in case an emergency develops, and some patients may prefer this proximity to additional equipment and emergency medical staff. On the other hand, costs at a free-standing ASC are generally lower, and some patients prefer to avoid a hospital atmosphere altogether. Surgical procedures performed at ASCs have grown from 10% of all procedures in the early 1970s to 40% currently, and are projected to grow to 50% in the near future. This growth is somewhat the result of a change in Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement policies which now pay 80% for procedures performed in a hospital and require a 20% co-payment by the patient, but which pay 100% for procedures performed in an ASC and require no patient co-payment. The decision to have outpatient surgery performed at one or the other of these types of facilities is primarily the result of patient preference. However, it is clear that the increasing utilization of ASCs is a market force that is driving the cost of hospital outpatient services down. Respondent issued its original notice of intent to deny Petitioner's application on or about May 17, 1985, and on June 14, 1985, Petitioner filed its Petition for Formal Hearing. Thereafter, Respondent reconsidered its position and on March 6, 1986, notified the parties that it intended to grant Petitioner's application. The reason for this reconsideration was that when the initial denial was made, Respondent's projections of procedures were premised on the use of a 30% outpatient surgical factor. Subsequently, the Respondent began using 40% in its projection of the total volume of surgical procedures which might be performed on an outpatient basis. Given the fact that the reason Petitioner was initially denied was due to insufficient procedures, and utilization of the new projection of outpatient volume indicated there would be sufficient volume to support the facility, Respondent determined to support Petitioner's application. The notice of change of position was prepared by Reid Jaffe, who based his testimony at hearing on the 40% factor, and was approved by Robert E. Maryanski, Administrator of Community Medical Facilities, and Marta V. Hardy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Planning and Development. Since Respondent has not adopted a need methodology rule for ambulatory surgical centers, the increase in the factor used to calculate outpatient surgeries from overall surgeries performed was not accomplished through rule-making proceedings. In 1985 Respondent used a factor of 30%, but in early 1986 increased this to the 40% applied in this case.. Intervenor provides services similar to those which Petitioner will perform, and has four free-standing, "dedicated" operating rooms which are used for ambulatory surgery. It also has 17 operating rooms that are used for both in and out-patient surgery. The Intervenor opposes Petitioner's application. In 1985, Intervenor made a profit of $10.9 million on total revenues collected of $184 million; it had an actual total of $37.4 million in uncompensated care which includes partial or no payments, charity, bad debt, and contractual patients. For 1986, it projects an $18.9 million profit on collected revenues of $211 million, with projections of actual uncompensated care of approximately $52 million. In 1985, 2% of Intervenor's costs were for providing indigent care, and this totaled approximately $6 million. Petitioner projects net revenues of approximately $900,000, and it has not been established if this will have any impact on Intervenor's revenues. According to Billie June, Assistant Director of Operating Rooms at Florida Hospital who was accepted as an expert in surgical nursing, and the management and operation of surgical units from a nursing standpoint, Intervenor has had considerable difficulty attracting qualified nursing staff for its operating rooms, and has had to develop its own qualified staff through an internship program. However, Petitioner's facility will not contribute to this difficulty or result in higher salaries. Susan Hill testified based on her experience since 1973 of managing and hiring staff in the Orlando area of the type needed to operate an ASC, that she has had no difficulty obtaining the cooperation of physicians in the area and in attracting fully qualified staff. Based on Hill's experience with other ASCs managed by Y and S Management throughout the country as well as her experience in Orange County, it is found that the staffing needs of Petitioner's proposed facility can be met with nursing and medical staff available in the area. It is found as a matter of fact that there is a need in Orange County for the two operating room ASC proposed by Petitioner, that Petitioner has the ability and will provide quality care, the project is financially feasible, Petitioner will work with and help to meet the needs of health maintenance organizations and will promote cost effectiveness in Orange County. Petitioner's proposal is consistent with the goals, objectives and recommended actions in the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan and the local health plan. The State Plan encourages the existence of ASCs and the removal of obstacles to the use of outpatient surgery; the local plan provides that applicants for an ASC must demonstrate a willingness to provide services to underserved patient groups and considers the provision of ambulatory surgery to the underserved population to be a desirable objective. In this case Petitioner intends to provide 20% of its cases to Medicaid patients, and another 4% to indigents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for CON number 3677. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chris H. Bentley, Esquire Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. G. Boone, Esquire Jeffrey Boone, Esquire Gregory Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. 2,3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 14. 12,13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 15 but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. 23-25. Rejected in Finding of Fact 18 and otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12-14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14. 31-35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 36,37. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 39,40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 41. Rejected as a Finding of Fact since this is a request for further ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Limine which was granted at hearing. Petitioner filed a Motion in Limine on June 11, 1986 to exclude depositions taken of John Hutchens on April 23, 1986 and June 5, 1986. This is the motion dealt with at the prehearing conference on June 23, 1986. The only deposition of John Hutchens offered by Intervenor and admitted was one taken on June 20, 1986 (I-2). Therefore, Petitioner's motion and the prior ruling is moot since the depositions to which the motion was directed were not offered at hearing. 42-45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rulings on Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, as set forth beginning on page 3: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 2-16. Rejected in Finding of Fact 15, and otherwise irrelevant and cumulative. 17,18. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12-14, 22. 19-26. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14, but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 27,28. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 12, 13, but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 29. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12-15 and otherwise as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. 30-34. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 16 and otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 19, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14. 37,38. Rejected as irrelevant. 39,40. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 2, 3 but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 43,44. Rejected in Finding of Fact 22. 45-47. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected in Findings of Fact 3, 5, 7 and 22. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 53,54. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 22 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 57-59. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony, irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 13, 14 and 16 but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 62,63. Rejected in Finding of Fact 21 and otherwise irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Findings of Fact 11, 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 22 and otherwise irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 20, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16; rejected in Finding of Fact 21 and otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 5 and otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 72-75. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 19-21, but otherwise rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22 and as irrelevant. 76-79. Rejected as irrelevant, cumulative argument which does not provide citations to the record contrary to Rule 221-6.31(3), Florida Administrative Code.
