Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Janet Truett was a former vocational rehabilitation client due to a hearing problem. After successfully completing the program, she was employed as a secretary by the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation in Tampa, a position which she retained for approximately five years. In 1983, petitioner often took annual leave, sick leave and leave without pay, usually calling in at the last minute. On October 13, 1985, her immediate supervisor advised her that "in the future, all leave must be approved in advance except for emergency sick leave." (HRS Exhibit 1). Due to an automobile accident and gall bladder surgery, Mrs. Truett was absent from work approximately one-fourth of the time from mid-November of 1984 through mid-April of 1985. On April 22, 1985, petitioner and her supervising counselor had a conference and discussed her continued use of leave without pay. Petitioner was advised that her absence put undue stress on the rest of the unit and that her physician was being consulted to determine if she was able to return to work on a full-time basis. Another conference was to be scheduled after receiving her doctor's response. By letter dated April 30, 1985, Dr. Michael J. Wiley advised petitioner's supervisor that petitioner had been discharged from care after recovering from her surgery on March 18, 1985, but had come back to his office on April 3, 1985, complaining of abdominal pain. She was instructed to stay home and return for a follow-up visit the following week. She did not return to Dr. Wiley's office after April 3, 1985. Petitioner received her annual performance evaluation on May 2, 1985, with an overall rating of "conditional". The areas of deficiency included dependability, quality of work and quantity of work. Petitioner was advised that her attendance at work would be monitored over the next sixty days and that she would "not be given any approved leave whether sick leave, annual leave or leave without pay without a written explanation. If she falls ill during the 60 days she must provide me with a doctor's report indicating her problem. If she is to take any other type of leave she must provide me with a written explanation. I will then make a determination as to whether or not I will approve this leave." (HRS Exhibit 3). On May 17, 1985, petitioner called her supervisor and indicated she had car problems. She did not come in to work for the entire day. A counseling session was held on May 20, 1985, and petitioner was advised by her supervisor that she was expected to take the city bus or arrange for other transportation should she experience further car trouble. On May 24, 1985, petitioner called her supervisor at 9:45 A.M. and requested leave because of an alleged family problem. She was told that her story would be verified and was reminded that she had been instructed to call in to request leave before 8:30 A.M. The stated reason for her absence on May 24, 1985 was not truthful. On May 28, 1985, petitioner called in at 8:20 A.M. and requested leave, stating that her car had broken down and that she had numerous family problems. She was told that the leave for May 24 and May 28, 1985, would not be approved. On May 29, 1985, she arrived to work late at 8:15 A.M. Also on that date, she received a written reprimand from her supervisor for taking unauthorized leave on May 24 and May 28, 1985. She was instructed to be honest and to call in by 8:30 A.M. if she was going to be out for any reason. On May 31, 1985, petitioner was granted approval for three hours leave in order to get her electricity turned on. On June 3, 1985, she called in requesting leave stating that she still had no electricity, that she had been up late the night before due to family problems and that she had no way to get to work anyway. Her daughter picked up some checks for her around 1:10 P.M. On June 4, she came to work but requested leave. This request was not approved and she received a second written reprimand for taking unauthorized leave on June 3, 1985. In this second reprimand dated June 4 but signed June 11, 1985, petitioner was advised that "further occurrences of unauthorized leave could result in a suspension or dismissal." (HRS Exhibit 5) A counseling session was held with petitioner on June 4, 1985, to review her job performance since the time of her conditional performance rating. She was advised that her attendance problem had not improved. She was referred to the Employee Assistance Program and was advised that the only way she could obtain future approved sick leave was to provide her supervisor with a doctor's statement. On June 14, 1985, a Friday, petitioner called in and requested sick leave. Her supervisor told her that in order for him to approve her sick leave, she must provide him with a doctor's report. On June 17 and 18, 1985, petitioner failed to report to work and failed to request additional leave. On June 19, 1985, she called in and said she was "too upset" to come to work. When asked if she had seen a doctor, she replied that she had not. Petitioner was then advised by her supervisor that he would not approve her leave for June 14, 17 or 18, 1985. When petitioner was absent from work, other secretaries in the office were required to perform her duties, as well as their own. This created a hardship on the other secretaries, and petitioner's frequent absences impaired both the quantity and the quality of her own work. By letter dated June 21, 1985, petitioner was advised that the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation was processing her resignation from her position as a secretary effective June 13, 1985 at 5:00 P.M. Citing Rule 22A-7.10, F1orida Administrative Code, it was assumed that petitioner had abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service since she had been on unapproved leave for three consecutive work days.
Conclusions Rule 22A-7.10(2t(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that "An employee who is absent without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the Career Service." The evidence clearly demonstrates that petitioner's absence on June 14, 17 and 18, 1985, was not authorized. Petitioner does not even contend that it was authorized, but merely urges that it was not "reasonable" for her supervisor not to grant her retroactive approval for these absences. Given the numerous amount of leave time utilized by the petitioner and the repeated warnings, both oral and written, concerning future absences, HRS's action can hardly be termed "unreasonable." Petitioner's supervisors and co-workers were aware that petitioner had medical and personal problems and attempted to work around those problems and provide help and counseling to her. Her absences were both disruptive to the operation of the office as a whole and affected the quality and quantity of her own performance. Petitioner was repeatedly advised and counseled concerning the problems her absences were causing and was instructed and warned of the proper procedure to follow should future absences be necessary. It is difficult to envision any further steps HRS could have taken to solve petitioner's problems with continued absences. She was fully aware of the consequences which would ensue should she fail to report to work without authorized leave. Nevertheless, she chose to do so in the face of two written reprimands within a one-week period, and the passage of less than ten days between the second written reprimand and June 14, the first of her three days of absence without authorized leave. Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code; is clear and mandates the action to be taken when an employee is absent without authorized leave for three consecutive work days. A review of the facts of this case clearly supports the conclusion that petitioner abandoned her position with HRS and must be deemed to have resigned from the Career Service.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner Janet E. Truett be deemed to have abandoned her position with HRS and to have resigned from the Career Service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 19th day of November, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Truett 1605 East Kirby Apartment B Tampa, Florida 33610 Robert Cox Regional Director, ASCME 4404 Westmoreland Court New Port Richey, Florida 33552 Claudia Isom-Rickert District VI Legal Counsel 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 Richard L. Kopel Deputy General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment as an educational support employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner employed Respondent as a food service worker at Lehigh Acres Middle School in Lee County, Florida (the school), from October 22, 1998, until August 2, 2004, when Petitioner suspended Respondent with pay and benefits. A food service worker is an educational support employee defined in Subsection 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner proposes to terminate Respondent's employment on the basis of facts alleged in the Petition for Termination dated August 11, 2004 (the petition). In relevant part, the petition alleges that during the 2003-2004 school year Respondent was guilty of excessive absences that affected Respondent's ability to carry out the essential functions of her position within the meaning of Section 9.015 of the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (SPALC agreement). During the 2003-2004 school year, Respondent's work day began at 8:30 a.m. and ended at 3:00 p.m. Each day included two paid 15-minute breaks and one unpaid 30-minute lunch break. Respondent's immediate supervisor adopted a policy identified in the record as a "ready-to-work" policy. The policy required food service workers, including Respondent, to put on their hair nets and aprons and wash their hands before beginning work. After a worker was ready to work, the worker then entered in a daily log sheet the time that the worker began work each day. The policy also required each worker to record in the daily log the time the worker left work and any period that the worker left and returned to work in the same day. The supervisor incorporated the "ready-to-work" policy in a revised employee handbook. The revised handbook was distributed to food service workers on September 26, 2003. On December 10, 2003, Respondent signed a form acknowledging that she had read the revised handbook. On 47 days from August 14, 2003, through May 20, 2004, Respondent was late to work, left work early, left for part of the same day, or was absent the entire day. Respondent was late to work on 20 days, left work early on 13 days, was absent 13 days, and left for part of one day for two hours and ten minutes. Petitioner deems all 47 instances to be "absences" within the meaning of Section 9.015 of the SPALC agreement. Assuming arguendo that all 47 instances are absences, the preponderance of evidence does not show that the absences were unauthorized. The supervisor testified at the hearing. The supervisor did not have authority to approve or disapprove absences. Rather, the head of the department or the school principal authorized requests for absences. Neither the head of the department nor the principal testified at the hearing. The supervisor did not know whether Respondent's absences were unauthorized. The supervisor merely reported the 47 absences to the "front office" and later determined they were unauthorized and excessive. Petitioner did not submit personnel records that may have documented which absences, if any, were unauthorized. Counsel for Petitioner argued during the hearing that even authorized absences can adversely affect Respondent's ability to carry out the essential functions of her position within the meaning of Section 9.015. However, counsel did not cite any legal authority in his PRO to support the argument. Assuming arguendo that all 47 absences were unauthorized, Subsection 9.016(a) of the SPALC agreement imposed an affirmative duty on Petitioner to inform Respondent, immediately upon her arrival to work following each absence, that Petitioner considered the absence to be unauthorized. The purpose of the requirement is to afford an employee such as Respondent with notice and an opportunity to show extenuating circumstances. If an employee demonstrates extenuating circumstances, the agreement requires Petitioner to change the absence to an authorized absence. It is undisputed that Respondent had several physical conditions, including skin cancer and a miscarriage, that affected her attendance during the 2003-2004 school year. The preponderance of evidence shows that Respondent was absent from work due to medical conditions. During the hearing, Petitioner stipulated that it was withdrawing several dates as a basis for its proposed termination of employment. The withdrawn dates include all 13 days on which Respondent was absent for an entire day; the day that Respondent left and returned to work for part of the day; and ten days that Respondent left work early on August 25 and September 10, 2003, and between October 20, 2003, and March 26, 2004. The stipulation reduced the contested absences on which Petitioner based the proposed termination to 20 days when Respondent was late to work and three days when Respondent left work early. As previously found, Petitioner failed to submit testimony or documentation that the contested absences were unauthorized or that Petitioner informed Respondent upon her arrival to work that Petitioner had determined the immediately preceding absence to be unauthorized. Assuming arguendo that the contested absences were unauthorized and that Petitioner provided timely notice to Respondent, the contested absences present other evidential concerns for the trier of fact. On 12 of the 20 days that Respondent was late to work, Respondent was no more than five minutes late. Being late five minutes or less did not affect Respondent's ability to carry out the essential functions of her position within the meaning of Section 9.015. Another food service worker testified for Petitioner that being late five minutes or less did not affect any employee's ability to do his or her job. For the remaining eight late arrivals, Respondent was 15 minutes late on two days, 30 minutes late on two days, and was late the remaining four days between seven and 12 minutes. The preponderance of evidence did not show that Respondent failed to telephone her supervisor when Respondent was going to be late 15 or more minutes. During most of the remaining four days, Respondent was at the school getting ready for work or otherwise within view of her supervisor. The co-worker called as a witness by Petitioner, testified that Respondent's tardiness in excess of five minutes did not adversely affect the witness' job responsibilities, but did adversely affect the supervisor or other workers. However, the witness erroneously thought that Respondent's work day in the 2003-2004 school year began at 8:00 a.m. It is undisputed that Respondent's shift began at 8:30 a.m. The witness never really knew Respondent's actual start time. When Respondent was late to work, Respondent made up the time by working into her lunch or break periods. This was a custom that similarly situated workers practiced regularly. The assistant principal for the school did not testify. However, documents in the record indicate that the assistant principal met with Respondent on October 20, 2003. At that time, Respondent had been late to work approximately 15 times, absent approximately two times, and had left work early approximately two times. The documents indicate the assistant principal "talked with [Respondent] . . . about being on time to work." The supervisor who testified at the hearing was not present at the meeting. Following the meeting with the assistant principal, Respondent's attendance improved. The supervisor did not formally discuss Respondent's attendance with her again until the supervisor completed a performance evaluation for Respondent in March 2004. The performance evaluation, in pertinent part, authorized the supervisor to score prescribed categories of Respondent's job performance as "Effective level of performance observed," "Inconsistently practiced," or "Unacceptable level of performance observed." The supervisor did not score any of Respondent's targeted areas as "Unacceptable level of performance observed." She scored five areas as "Inconsistently practiced," including categories labeled "Is punctual in attendance," "Follows written and oral work schedule," and "Exhibits dependability." On April 22, 2004, the school principal signed a form recommending Respondent for reemployment for the 2004-2005 school year. On April 29, 2004, Respondent counter-signed the form recommending reemployment. On the date of the proposed reemployment, Respondent had been absent from work 43 days, including 19 of the 20 contested late arrivals and one of the three contested days when Respondent left work early. On May 20, 2004, Respondent left work three hours early. On May 21, 2004, the supervisor issued a written reprimand to Respondent for being late to work, leaving work early, or being absent from work approximately 47 times between August 14, 2003, and May 20, 2004. The written reprimand did not provide a clear point of entry for Respondent to contest the factual basis for the reprimand in an administrative hearing. The reprimand merely informed Respondent that Respondent was entitled to prepare a response to the reprimand. Respondent and her union representative did not challenge the factual basis of the written reprimand in a grievance procedure authorized in Article 5 of the SPALC agreement. However, Section 5.102 prohibits the grievance procedure from being construed to deny any rights that are otherwise guaranteed to Respondent by law. On May 24, 2004, the first work day following Respondent's receipt of the written reprimand, Respondent began work five minutes late at 8:35 a.m. Neither the supervisor nor any other representative for Petitioner spoke with Respondent to inform her that Petitioner had determined the late arrival to be an unauthorized absence. On May 27, 2004, the supervisor recommended that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment. This proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the petition, reinstating the employment of Respondent, and awarding Respondent full back pay and benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Coleman, Esquire Coleman & Coleman 2300 McGregor Boulevard Post Office Box 2089 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2089 J. Paul Carland, II, Esquire Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3916 Dr. James W. Browder, III, Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3916 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable John Winn, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a clerical worker, a permanent career service position, at all times material hereto. Prior to October 3, 1988, Petitioner experienced back problems which prevented her attendance at work. Dr. Brian M. Mitteldorf, a chiropractic physician, treated Petitioner beginning September 25, 1988, and continuing through all times material hereto. On October 3, 1988, Theresa (Terry) Bartelmo, Petitioner's supervisor, advised Petitioner in writing that Petitioner would be out of sick leave and annual leave the following day. Mrs. Bartelmo enclosed two copies of the form used to request a leave of absence and advised Petitioner that it was necessary to fill in all blanks and to return the form to her by no later than October 10, 1988. Respondent does not authorize any type of leave for unspecified or unlimited duration. Ms. Bartelmo further advised Petitioner that "... If I do not hear from you by that date, (October 10,1988) then I will assume you wish to terminate your employment with the Department and will process the necessary documentation." On October 3, 1988, Petitioner's husband, Edmund DeSilva, met with Ms. Bartelmo. During the meeting, Ms. Bartelmo gave to Mr. DeSilva the letter she had written to Mrs. DeSilva, together with the forms for the leave of absence. The form for leave of absence was signed by Petitioner on October 3, 1988. Mr. DeSilva hand delivered the form to Ms. Bartelmo prior to the deadline of October 10 set by Ms. Bartelmo. This form was forwarded by Ms. Bartelmo to Martha (Marty) Anderson, Respondent's district personnel manager. Ms. Bartelmo recommended that the leave of absence be granted. Ms. Anderson approved the leave of absence on October 13, 1988. The leave of absence form submitted by Petitioner and approved by Respondent contained a tentative return-to-work date of November 23, 1988. On October 3, 1988, the date Petitioner signed the leave of absence form, it was uncertain when Petitioner would be able to return to work because of her medical condition. On or about October 18, 1988, Ms. Bartelmo telephoned Petitioner to check on her progress. After Petitioner told Ms. Bartelmo that she did not feel well enough to talk, Ms. Bartelmo asked Petitioner to call her when Petitioner felt better. Ms. Bartelmo did not talk with Petitioner again until after Petitioner's employment was terminated. Dr. Mitteldorf called Ms. Bartelmo on November 22, 1988, at approximately 3:30 p.m. Dr. Mitteldorf told Ms. Bartelmo during that telephone conversation that Petitioner was too ill to return to work. Ms. Bartelmo asked Dr. Mitteldorf for a letter stating his opinion as to when Petitioner could return to work. Dr. Mitteldorf's letter was dated December 13, 1988. During their telephone conversation on November 22, 1988, Ms. Bartelmo did not tell or indicate to Dr. Mitteldorf that their conversation was tantamount to an extension of Petitioner's leave of absence. Ms. Bartelmo did not tell Dr. Mitteldorf that she was mailing to him the forms Petitioner needed to submit to request an extension of her leave of absence. Ms. Bartelmo can recommend approval of a request for leave of absence, but she does not have the authority to grant the approval. Ms. Bartelmo did not tell Petitioner or anyone acting on Petitioner's behalf, that Petitioner had any form of authorized leave after November 22, 1988. Other than having Dr. Mitteldorf call Ms. Bartelmo, Petitioner made no effort to have her leave of absence extended. Petitioner's authorized leave of absence ended on November 22, 1988. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave of absence beginning November 23, 1988, and continuing for more than 3 consecutive work days. By certified mailing on December 2, 1988, Petitioner was advised that her career service position was terminated as of December 1, 1988. Petitioner had been given a copy of Respondent's Employee Handbook on December 16, 1986, which provides in part: After an unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policies. Petitioner's request for a formal hearing was timely filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order concluding that Petitioner has abandoned her position with Respondent in the career service due to her unauthorized absence from employment for three consecutive workdays beginning November 23, 1988. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX The findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The findings of fact contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 15 and 16 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Administration Office of the General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Colomba DeSilva 2019 Southwest 29th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his position with the Respondent in retaliation for his filing of a national origin discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on August 17, 1988.
Findings Of Fact The Southland Corporation, d/b/a Southland Distribution Center, is an "employer" within the definition found in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Guillermo A. Barbosa was an "employee" of the Respondent as defined in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes, and was employed by Respondent for approximately sixteen (16) years. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these proceedings and the parties involved. All procedural prerequisites and requirements have been duly accomplished or satisfied. The Petitioner, Guillermo A. Barbosa, is fully competent to represent himself on a pro se basis. He exhibited clear understanding of the procedural requirements at the formal hearing and the legal import of his burden of proof on his claim of an unlawful practice against the Respondent. Petitioner exhibited comprehension of the English language, both spoken and written, and exhibited fluency in the speaking of English in the interrogation of witnesses at the formal hearings. Respondent, The Southland Corporation, d/b/a Southland Distribution Center, functions as a warehousing and distribution complex for a number of commercial customers including 7-Eleven convenience stores and restaurant chains such as Steak & Ale, Bennigan's, TGI Friday's, Krystal and others. In order to service its regional territory of four states, it employs approximately 630 employees in a large 440,000 square foot warehousing facility located on Sand Lake Road in Orlando, Florida. Respondent's warehouse operates 24 hours a day five (5) days per week. Respondent's work force stores a variety of goods and products and, upon order or request from a given customer or account, selects the indicated goods, packs them in appropriate containers and loads the order on tractor trailer rigs for transport and delivery to the final destination point. The Respondent places great emphasis upon the importance of time and schedules. Timely reporting for work and attendance as scheduled is emphasized by the Company so that the closely integrated operation of the complex can be maintained with efficiencies of labor and close coordination of schedules between warehouse operation, the transportation link and the store hours of the customer. The policies, procedures and work rules of the Company provide incentive programs to reward employees who report to work as scheduled in a prompt and consistent manner. Conversely, through its work rules, the Company provides that employees who demonstrate a pattern of tardiness or absence may be disciplined or discharged. For these same reasons, the work rules published to the employees and acknowledged by each worker also stress that a failure to report to work when directed or as scheduled for a period of 48 hours (no show/no call) will result in automatic termination of employment. The Respondent views employee reliability for reporting to work as scheduled and on time as a fundamental condition of employment. On August 11, 1988, Petitioner reported an on-the-job injury and was relieved of duty and, under directions from the Respondent's occupational health nurse, treated by an outside physician. On August 17, 1988, while on the medical leave of absence due to the work-related injury, Petitioner filed a discrimination charge alleging denial of transfer or promotion due to his national origin. A notice of the charge of discrimination was directed to the attention of the Personnel Manager of the Respondent and was received on September 7, 1988. On Friday, September 16, 1988, Petitioner was released by the treating physician and given "return to work orders" instructing him to return to work without restrictions. The following work day, Monday, September 19, 1988, the Petitioner resumed his normal duties and work routine. However, after approximately one to one and one half hours of work, Petitioner reported that he had either re- injured himself or had aggravated the prior injury for which he had been treated. The Respondent again placed Petitioner on medical leave of absence due to the work-related injury and directed him for treatment to the outside physician. On Friday, September 30, 1988, Petitioner was again released by the treating physician without limitations or restrictions and given instructions to return to work. On the next workday, Monday, October 3, 1988, Petitioner failed to show up at his scheduled time. After being absent without authority or explanation for five consecutive work days, the Warehouse Manager, Mr. Julius Dix, mailed a letter to Petitioner. The letter explained that pursuant to Rule 12 of the Company's "working conditions", specifically failure to report to work as directed and being absent without explanation or authorization for five consecutive work days, the Company was placing Petitioner on suspension pending further review. Although dated October 5, 1988, the letter drafted by Mr. Julius Dix was actually written and sent on Friday, October 7, 1988. However, the date of the letter was made retroactive to the actual point of job abandonment pursuant to the so-called "48- hour rule". On October 17, 1989 Petitioner mailed a copy of a medical form from an outside physician indicating that Petitioner had been disabled from working from October 13 to October 25, 1988. It was received by an employee of Respondent on October 19, 1988. A similar form was mailed October 26, 1988 and received on October 28, 1988. There was no letter or personal explanation accompanying the medical form. Petitioner stated that upon being released by the treating physician, he contacted the Warehouse Manager, Mr. Julius Dix, and upon explaining that his injury continued to disable him from returning to work, was given permission to continue on medical leave and seek treatment by another physician. However, Mr. Dix testified that he had never given such permission or directions, nor had he received any communications or contact from Petitioner on Friday, September 30, or during the subsequent week. The more credible testimony is that Petitioner made no communication with his employer during the week of October 3, 1988. Following corporate review, required for long-term employees, Petitioner's employment was formally terminated for violation of the "48-hour rule" (no show/no call) under a subsequent letter from Mr. Julius Dix dated October 25, 1988. On November 8, 1988, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination alleging retaliation. The Petitioner's work history demonstrates his knowledge of the 48- hour rule and prior compliance under similar circumstances. The 48-hour rule of Respondent has been applied in a consistent and uniform manner to a substantial number of other employees during a period of time immediately prior to the action taken with regard to the administrative termination of Petitioner's employment. The administration of this rule by the Company has resulted in termination of the non-complying employees.
Recommendation Based upon the testimony and evidence submitted on the record in the formal hearings on this matter and by application of the relevant or governing principles of law to the findings of facts established on such record, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be issued which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not file proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 (sic) -- accepted in substance. Paragraphs 7 and 8 -- rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Guillermo A. Barbosa Dana Baird 854 Long Bay Court General Counsel Kissimmee, Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Thomas C. Garwood, Jr., Esquire Building F, Suite 240 Garwood and McKenna, P.A. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 322 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida Margaret Jones Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Louis C. Germain, has been employed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Foster Care Unit-452 since late 1984 or early 1985. On the morning of February 3, 1986, the Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident during the course of his employment while enroute to pick up a client who had a court appointment. As a result of the accident the Petitioner sustained several injuries, including a nose injury, back pains, headaches and blurred vision. The Petitioner was taken to his physician's office. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on February 3, 1986, the Petitioner called his immediate supervisor, Ms. Shelia Weiner, and advised her of the accident and of his injuries. On Friday, February 7, 1986, the Petitioner went to his office to pick up his pay check. The Petitioner spoke with Ms. Weiner and informed her that he did not know when his physician would allow him to return to work. On Monday, February 17, 1986, the Petitioner returned to the office once more to pick up a pay check. Ms. Weiner told the Petitioner that he had to report to work on Thursday, February 20, 1986. The Petitioner told Ms. Weiner that he was still suffering from injuries sustained in the February 3, 1986 accident and that he did not know when he would be able to return to work. On February 20, 1986, Ms. Weiner wrote the Petitioner a letter stating that his absence from work since February 17, 1986 had not been authorized. The letter stated in part that: "You are directed to report to work immediately and provide an explanation for your absences." The Petitioner received Ms. Weiner's letter on Saturday, February 22, 1986. On Tuesday, February 25, 1986, the Petitioner had an appointment with his physician and obtained a medical statement from her. The Petitioner's physician indicated in the medical statement that Petitioner had been under her care since the automobile accident of February 3, 1986, that Petitioner sustained multiple injuries in the accident and that Petitioner was now able to return to work. The Petitioner returned to work on February 25, 1986 and was advised that he needed to speak with Mr. Carlos Baptiste, supervisor of the personnel department. The Petitioner presented the letter from his doctor to Mr. Baptiste, but Baptiste was not satisfied with the doctor's statement and felt that it was "insufficient." Baptiste asked the Petitioner if he had a towing receipt or an accident report to confirm the accident of February 3, 1986. The Petitioner replied that he did not. The Petitioner was not allowed to return to work. At the final hearing, Mr. Baptiste stated that: "If Mr. Germain had produced an accident report, he would still be working with HRS." The Petitioner's leave and attendance record maintained by DHRS reflected that the Petitioner was given sick leave from February 3 to February 6, 1986. From February 7 to February 20, 1986 the Petitioner was placed on leave without pay. On March 3, 1986, Ms. Sylvia Williams notified the Petitioner by certified mail that due to his absence from work since "February 17, 1986", he was deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order reinstating Petitioner to his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Foster Care Unit-452 in Miami, Florida. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3319 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein rejected as argument. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or argument. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as mis- leading. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Louis C. Germain 308 Northeast 117 Street Miami, Florida 33161 Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue - Suite 790 Miami, Florida 33128 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a career-service employee of Respondent. She served as a health service representative assigned to the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Her specific task was to investigate and follow up on contacts for sexually transmitted diseases. Petitioner's Employee Handbook, which Respondent received when she was hired, states: You may request annual leave for any purpose desired, but you must obtain Your supervisor's approval before taking annual leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask for verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work, complete the leave request form for your supervisor's signature. The Handbook also Provides that certain employees are entitled to one eight-hour personal holiday "at a time which is mutually agreeable to the individual and the immediate supervisor." The local policy of the Seminole County Public Health Unit required each employee to request leave by filling out the back of a timesheet. In this manner, the employee would show the type of leave requested, the date and time of the leave, the employee's initials. The form provided spaces for the signature of the supervisor and the date described in detail in the Paragraph 5 below. The back of the timesheet states: "All Leave and Overtime must be requested and approved in advance." The Handbook requires advance approval of annual leave. Although the blanket statement on the back of the timesheet requires advance approval of all leave and overtime, the Seminole County Public Health Unit routinely did not require advance approval for all types of leave. For instance, sick leave, overtime, and annual leave for less than a few hours were normally approved after the fact. On at least two occasions, including one involving Respondent, annual leave for an entire day was also approved after it had beef taken. However, the Seminole County Public Health Unit normally requires advance approval of annual leave for a Period of one day or more. The instructions on the timesheet direct that the date next to the supervisor's signature indicate the date of the request for leave. Consistent with the varying policies governing leave, the date beside the supervisor's signature on the timesheet was used to show the date of approval of a request for annual leave and the date of the request for sick leave and certain other types of leave. By negative implication, the Handbook also requires written approval of annual leave for nonemergencies because it expressly permits "verbal approval" for annual leave for emergencies. There are no requirements in the Handbook or the timesheets for written approval of requests for other forms of leave, and the Seminole County Public Health Unit did not maintain enforceable policies to that effect. Two persons were authorized to approve requests of Respondent for annual leave. The first person was Charlotte Blades, who was the coordinator of the sexually transmitted disease program of the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Ms. Blades was Respondent's immediate supervisor The other person authorized to approve requests for annual leave was Bernice Duncan, who was the senior community health nurse of the Seminole County Public Health Unit and Ms. Blades' supervisor. In practice, the written approval of Ms. Blades could be revoked by Ms. Duncan. On one occasion, Respondent requested eight hours' annual leave to attend her son's high school graduation on June 9, 1989. Ms. Blades signed the timesheet on May 23, 1989. Between that date and the date of the leave, Ms. Duncan told Respondent that, although Ms. Blades had signed the timesheet, the leave was not approved. Ultimately, Respondent received approval for leave through 2:30 p.m., rather than 5:00 p.m., on the day of the graduation. In late July or early August, 1989, Respondent submitted a timesheet requesting 32 hours' annual leave from August 28-31, 1989. About one week later, before Ms. Blades or Ms. Duncan had acted on the request, Respondent changed the request to September 1, which was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, and September 13-14, 1989. In addition, she requested leave with pay for September 15, 1989, as her personal holiday. According to the timesheets, Ms. Blades approved the September 1 leave request on August 25, 1989, which was a Saturday. She assured Respondent that she would discuss with Ms. Duncan the remaining requests for leave. Respondent followed up with Ms. Blades several times, explaining that she wanted the leave to attend her son's graduation ceremonies from military basic training in South Carolina. Despite her assurances, Ms. Blades had not mentioned Respondent's request to Ms. Duncan before Ms. Blades became sick and missed work from September 6-9. On the second day of Ms. Blades' absence, Respondent took her request to Ms. Duncan, who said that she had not been aware of Respondent's request. Ms. Duncan told Respondent that Ms. Blades was on sick leave and did not respond further. The following day, Respondent spoke again with Ms. Duncan, who this time assured her that if Ms. Blades were not at work on Monday, September 11, Ms. Duncan would sign the timesheet approving the leave requested for September 13-15. Ms. Blades returned to work on Monday, September 11. When Respondent asked her in the morning to sign the timesheet, Ms. Blades refused to do so and told her that it had not yet been approved. Consistent with her prior conversations with Respondent, though, Ms. Blades did not say that the request had been disapproved. Respondent then left the office for much of the day. When she returned, Ms. Blades and Ms. Duncan were both out. The next day, Tuesday, September 12, Ms. Blades spoke with Respondent, but still declined to say whether the request was approved or rejected. She continued to say merely that the request had not yet been approved. Tuesday afternoon, Respondent told a coworker to tell Ms. Blades that Respondent was going to South Carolina and would be back the following Monday morning. While still in town, Respondent telephoned both supervisors shortly after 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, but they had not arrived at work yet. Respondent asked the receptionist to remind Ms. Blades that Respondent had gone to South Carolina and would return the following Monday morning. Both messages were delivered to Ms. Blades, who relayed them to Ms. Duncan. Respondent then departed for South Carolina, where she remained through at least September 15. At the time of her departure, Respondent knew that her request for annual leave had not been approved and that she was taking unauthorized annual leave. When she arrived back in the office on September 18, Respondent received a copy of a letter dated September 15 that had been mailed to her the prior Friday. The letter states that Respondent had been separated from State service for abandonment of position, effective at the close of business on September 15, 1989. The second paragraph of the letter contains material misstatements of fact. It states that Respondent had been advised that, due to the present work situation, her leave could not be approved. The letter also states that she did not contact her supervisor that she would be absent. No one ever advised Respondent that her leave could not be approved or in fact was rejected until after her return from South Carolina. Also, Respondent informed both supervisors, directly and through third parties, that she would be absent, where she was going, why, and when she would return. However, she did not contact them during the three-day absence. Concerning the request for leave for a personal holiday, neither Ms. Blades nor Ms. Duncan ever informed Respondent that the date was inconvenient. Under the circumstances, Respondent could reasonably infer that the date was agreeable with Ms. Blades. At no time did Respondent intend to abandon her career-service position. The facts do not support a reasonable inference that Respondent abandoned her job during the three days in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not abandoned her position in Career Service employment with the State of Florida. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda L. Parkinson Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 701 Orlando, FL 32801 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Alva J. Barfield 1010 Locust Avenue Sanford, FL 32771
The Issue Whether Kennie W. McKay should be deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service on account of his absence from work on March 10, 13, 14, and 15, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Some 18 years ago, when petitioner Kennie W. McKay began working at the Dozier School in Marianna, he received a copy of the employee handbook the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) published at the time. A more recent edition, dated June 1, 1986, provides, in part: As soon as possible on the first day of absence, it is your responsibility to notify your supervisor that the absence is due to illness, injury, exposure to a contagious disease, or the illness or injury of a member of your immediate family. Your supervisor should also be given an estimate of the length of the absence. Medical certification may be requested. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, p. 19. It was not clear from the evidence either that this language appeared in the edition Mr. McKay was furnished when he began work, or that he had ever seen the edition which came into evidence without objection. On June 1, 1983, the Dozier School adopted "POLICY AND PROCEDURE #:035" requiring advance approval of leave, except when "illness or a bona fide emergency" occasions the absence. In that event, the policy specifies that the employee must contact his/her supervisor as soon as possible. If he/she is unable to contact his/her immediate supervisor, the employee must contact the next higher level supervisor or someone in his/her normal chain of command. Leaving messages with the switchboard, coworkers, or other uninvolved staff will not be considered adequate notice. The employee is to notify his/her supervisor and only in situations where the employee is unable to contact the supervisor himself/herself will a call/contact from another person be acceptable. * * * (6) Employees displaying a pattern of unplanned absences may be suspected of abusing their leave privileges and may be subject to appropriate corrective action in accordance with HRSP 60-1 State Personnel Rules (Chapter 22A-8 and HRSR 60-51). Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, pp. 1 and 2. HRS has not promulgated this "policy and procedure" as an administrative rule. Direct evidence did not establish to what extent, if at all, petitioner McKay was aware of its existence or its provisions. But his efforts to reach the man he thought to be his immediate supervisor, James R. Kersey, suggest he believed he was required to try to do so. In his letter of February 23, 1987, the Dozier School's superintendent, Roy C. McKay, no relation to petitioner, advised petitioner McKay that Mr. Kersey would become his immediate supervisor upon petitioner's demotion from carpenter to house parent. In part, the letter stated: This is official notification that you are being demoted from Carpenter, position number 01082, to Houseparent, position number 01188. You are to report to Friendship House on the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, effective Friday, February 27, 1987, or the first day you return back to work. 1/ Your immediate supervisor will be Mr. James Kersey, Houseparent Supervisor I; and your days off will be Wednesday and Thursday. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Like Mr. Kersey, Mr. James Pyles and Mr. Jethro Pittman were house parent supervisors I assigned to Friendship House. Each supervised a different shift. Houseparent supervisors I reported to Norman Harris, who reported to assistant superintendent Pate, who reported to superintendent McKay. On every shift, an administrative duty officer has campus-wide responsibility. The administrative duty officer is also in the chain of command. Petitioner McKay did not learn until after he was told he no longer had a job that Mr. Harris was to be in the chain of command, because he did not see Mr. Harris' memorandum of March 10, 1987, until after March 16, 1987. In this memorandum, Mr. Harris advised: YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WILL BE JAMES PYLES, HOUSEPARENT SUPERVISOR I. YOUR NEXT HIGHER SUPERVISOR BILL BE ME, MR. NORMAN HARRIS. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Written communications addressed to petitioner McKay dated on and after March 10, 1987, were placed in "his box," but Superintendent McKay was aware that petitioner McKay did not see them on or before March 16, 1987. Before the superintendent's letter of February 23, 1987, gave "official notice" of the demotion, the two Messrs. McKay and others met in the Dozier School's conference room, on February 20, 1987. Petitioner McKay told those present that he had a doctor's appointment in Columbus, Georgia on March 10, 1987. As the superintendent understood it, the doctor had earlier warned against petitioner's overexerting himself, even against his walking too far. Everybody knew he was on leave on account of his medical condition at the time of the conference; he was, in fact, demoted because he was not physically able to discharge the duties of a carpenter. Evidently because he told the superintendent that he had a "sick slip through the ninth," the superintendent directed him to report on the tenth. Whoever drew the work schedule put him down as beginning his new assignment on March 9, 1987. As it happened, somebody in the doctor's office in Columbus called petitioner McKay's wife on March 9, 1987, and rescheduled the appointment for March 11, 1987. Deciding not to report for work before seeing the doctor, Kennie McKay telephoned the Dozier School on the tenth to let them know. Twice he reached Mr. Bridges, who was working the day shift as a house parent at Friendship House. He told Mr. Bridges he was not coming in to work that night. He asked each time to speak to Mr. Kersey. Each time Mr. Bridges told him Mr. Kersey was not there. Although Friendship House is the most secure cottage at the Dozier School and the locus of the school's "intensive supervision program," which is designed to calm boys down who are "in an uproar," the work on the night shift is not physically demanding. The boys are supposed to be asleep, and a house parent can call for reinforcements if problems arise. The houseparent can lock himself in a "crime cage" out of reach of the inmates, and could do his duty, which is mainly to observe, on crutches, if necessary. Nevertheless, when petitioner McKay visited the doctor in Columbus on March 11, 1987, he obtained a form from the doctor's office stating "out of work until next visit in 3 wks." Respondent's Exhibit No. 12. After he reached Marianna, he telephoned the Dozier School at 7:46 p.m. that evening. Charles Gardner, Jr., who was working as a house parent at Opportunity Cottage, took the telephone call. Mr. McKay told him he could not come to work that night, that he had been to see a doctor, that he had a doctor's excuse, and that he needed to talk to a night supervisor. While they were talking, Luther L. Spurlock, a house parent supervisor II in charge of a cluster that did not include Friendship House, entered the room, and took the phone from Mr. Gardner, who handed it to him. Petitioner McKay told Mr. Spurlock, "I'll be in tomorrow with a doctor's slip for Danny." After the phone call was over, Mr. Spurlock said to Mr. Gardner, "I'm not McKay's supervisor," or words to that effect. A form filled out toward the end of the shift stated: Kenny McKay called and said that he would be at the school tomorrow with a doctor slip to give Mr. Pate. Everything went well tonight no major problems. Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. Mr. Spurlock did not tell the petitioner that he ought to notify anybody else about his continuing absence. Kennie McKay had not been scheduled to work on March 11, 1987, in any event. His next scheduled work day was March 13, 1987. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. On March 13, 1987, he telephoned the superintendent's office but, when told he was in a meeting, asked to speak to Bruce Gambill, Dozier School's business manager , instead. Mr. Gambill answers directly to the superintendent. He told Mr. Gambill "that he had been to the doctor and had a sick slip to be out of work." Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Gambill asked him to bring a copy of the slip to the business office for Workers Compensation purposes ... [and] instructed Mr. McKay to contact his supervisor concerning the sick slip and being out of work. [Petitioner] said he had tried to call, but there was no answer. [Mr. Gambill] told him he needed to let his supervisor know about the sick slip. Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Petitioner had telephoned that morning at 10:24 from Marianna, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he had not reached Mr. Pittman, the supervisor, who testified he might have been on an errand then. Whether Petitioner tried again to reach a supervisor after speaking to Mr. Gambill is not clear. James Pyles, the man who, although petitioner did not know it at the time, became the latter's supervisor on March 10, 1987, asked superintendent Roy McKay's permission to use a state car about three o'clock that afternoon to find out if Kennie McKay was going to come to work. Mr. Pyles drove to Dothan, Alabama, where he found petitioner walking around without crutches in an establishment known as Shag's. He did not tell petitioner that he had been made his supervisor or suggest that, since he did not seem to need crutches, petitioner come to work. The following night, as well, Mr. Pyles saw Mr. McKay getting around without crutches. On that occasion, too, Mr. Pyles refrained from any discussion relating to work at Dozier School. When Kennie W. McKay brought the doctor's slip, Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, to Dozier School on March 17, 1987, he was informed he no longer had a job.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration rule that Kennie W. McKay has not abandoned his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and has never lost his membership in the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1987.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner should dismiss Respondent from her employment as a bus driver for an eight-day absence from work that was allegedly unauthorized.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner employed Respondent as a substitute bus driver on November 18, 2002. From February 10, 2003, through the date of the hearing, Petitioner employed Respondent as a bus driver. A bus driver is an educational support employee. Respondent was absent from work for eight days from February 2 through 11, 2005. The absence was not authorized. The unauthorized absence from February 2 through 4, 2005, comprised three days of unauthorized absence within one pay period. The unauthorized absence from February 7 through 11, 2005, comprised five days of unauthorized absence within one pay period. The eight-day unauthorized absence occurred during the regular school session. Respondent's supervisor scheduled a substitute bus driver to drive Respondent's assigned bus route. Respondent was absent from work for a vacation cruise in Chile. The unauthorized absence was not needed for medical or family reasons or for some other emergency. The terms of Respondent's employment are prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Petitioner and the Service Employee's International Union (SEIU). The terms of employment are further explained in a document identified in the record as the Bus Driver Handbook. Respondent had actual knowledge that she was entitled to only four personal days off from work with prior approval from Petitioner. Sometime in August or September 2004, an SEIU representative advised Respondent, in response to her inquiry, that the CBA authorized a maximum of four personal days off upon approval of Petitioner. Respondent did not disclose that she intended to be absent from work for a vacation while school was in session. On January 3, 2005, Respondent asked the dispatcher to approve eight personal days off for a vacation. The dispatcher explained that his authority to approve or disapprove leave requests was limited to requests for up to four personal days. Only the compound supervisor had authority to approve a request for authorized personal days in excess of four days. The compound supervisor denied Respondent's request before Respondent left for her vacation, and Respondent had actual notice of the denial. The denial was based in part on the ground that Respondent had no contractually authorized personal days in excess of four days during the regular school session. Even if she were to have authorized personal days in excess of four, the compound supervisor needed all of his bus drivers because school was in session. There was a shortage of bus drivers. February was a busy period in the school year. It was imperative that students have transportation to their schools. Absences in excess of authorized personal days must be requested on a form entitled Request for Leave of Absence, identified in the record as PCS Form 3-137. Respondent never requested a leave of absence on PCS Form 3-137. Rather, Respondent utilized the form authorized for requesting up to four personal days for the purpose of requesting a leave of absence of eight days. A request for a leave of absence on Form 3-137 would have been submitted to the director of transportation for Petitioner. The director never received such a request. Several aggravating circumstances are evidenced in the record. Respondent did not take the unauthorized absence for medical or family reasons or for some other emergency. Respondent took the unauthorized absence for her own leisure. Bus drivers, including Respondent, are nine-month employees. Respondent had other opportunities during the school year for vacations, including summer, a week at Thanksgiving, two weeks during Christmas, and a week during spring break. When school is in session, Respondent had no contractual right to more than four paid personal days. Respondent took the unauthorized absence with knowledge that her action would adversely affect her employer during a busy time of the school year. Respondent knew that the unauthorized absence would result in disciplinary action. Prior to her vacation, Respondent's supervisor suggested Respondent may want to remove her personal items from her bus before leaving for her vacation because she probably would face disciplinary action when she returned. Petitioner has imposed previous discipline against Respondent. Petitioner issued a letter of reprimand to Respondent for segregating black and white students on her bus.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of committing the alleged violation and dismissing Respondent from her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Timberly S. McKenzie 446 Fifth Street, South Safety Harbor, Florida 34695 Laurie A. Dart, Esquire Pinellas County School Board 301 Fourth Street, Southwest Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Timberly McKenzie 125 Rhonda Drive Clayton, Georgia 30525 Dr. Clayton M. Wilcox, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable John Winn, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Barbara Calhoun, Respondent, is a Career Service employee with permanent status. She has been employed by the Petitioner since approximately 1969 and is presently employed in the capacity of a Resident Lab Assistant (RLA). Mary Ellen Weaver, Nursing Director at Sunland Center at District VII, is in charge of the nurses and other staff personnel at the Sunland Center in Orlando. Mrs. Weaver testified that she approved initially the recommendation by Mrs. Calhoun's supervisor that she be suspended for a continued pattern of absenteeism which had been documented by three previous reprimands, the first of which occurred approximately September 16, 1976. The first reprimand was an oral reprimand of September 16, 1976, and was based on an excessive pattern of sick leave in conjunction with days off. The second one occurred on November 29, 1976, and was submitted by a Mrs. Renner, R.N. and the reviewing officer on that reprimand was Mrs. Graham, R.N. III. The third reprimand occurred on February 5, 1977, a written reprimand the basis therein was excessive absenteeism, with the reviewing officers being Mrs. Renner and Mrs. Graham. (See Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1, 2 and 3.) Documentary evidence introduced reveals that from February 11, 1976, to June 23, 1977, the Petitioner accumulated approximately 19 days of unscheduled absences with the majority of such absences occurring in conjunction with days off and most of which were leave without pay (LWOP) because during the Respondent's approximately eight year employment tenure, she had accumulated no annual or sick leave. (See Joint Exhibit 1.) Without going into a recitation of all of the numerous days in which the Respondent was absent, the following is illustrative. On February 11, 1977, Respondent called in sick which was also without pay because she had accrued no leave. The following day the Respondent called in sick and again this absence was without pay and unscheduled. On March 6, 1977, Respondent had a friend call to advise that she was sick with the flu and again a message was sent the following day, on March 7, 1977. On March 26 the Respondent called in sick which was before she was off for two days. On April 18 the Respondent again called in ill. On May 2 Respondent requested annual leave, which was granted. On May 3 the Respondent called in sick and obtained permission to use annual leave since there was no more sick leave accrued. On May 12 Respondent called in sick and again there was no annual leave accrued to cover the absence. The following day the Respondent called in sick, which was prior to her weekend off. On June 1, 1977, Respondent called in sick after being off on May 30 and May 31. On June 16, 1977, Respondent was off and used an annual leave day, which was unscheduled and without prior approval. On June 23 Respondent called in sick, which was unscheduled. It was at this juncture that Respondent's supervisor recommended a suspension, which was approved by Mrs. Weaver and ultimately sent to a Mr. Windsor for final approval. The Respondent offered no explanation to explain, refute or otherwise contradict the numerous absences nor did she offer any proof of any kind to establish that she was in fact sick in such a sporadic form which occurred in conjunction with her days off. 1/ In view of the above, the undersigned concludes that there is competent and substantial evidence to support the Petitioner's disciplinary action directed toward the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended the personnel action of the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, be sustained. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1978.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, Petitioner Bynoe was a Career Service Employee, and was employed by the Department of Corrections at Hendry Correctional Institution in Immokalee, Florida, as a Correctional Officer I. In February 1989, the Petitioner submitted a written request for annual leave from June 9, 1989 to June 17, 1989. The leave was approved by the Petitioner's supervisor, Captain Jody Davis. June 6, 1989, Petitioner Bynoe was informed by Captain Davis that he did not have enough hours of annual leave accrued to cover the vacation period which was to begin on June 9, 1989. The prior written approval to the Petitioner for annual leave was revoked as the previously anticipated hours of accrued annual leave did not exist. The Petitioner had only eight hours of annual leave accrued at the time the approval of annual leave was revoked by Captain Davis. In an attempt to accommodate the Petitioner, who had already scheduled vacation plans, Captain Davis told him that the work schedule could be rearranged to allow Petitioner Bynoe to have five days off in a row from June 7, 1989 through June 11, 1989. This work schedule would give Petitioner Bynoe his regular days off of June 7th and 8th. His regularly scheduled days off of June 14th and 15th could be moved to June 9th and 10th, and the eight hours of annual leave available to Petitioner could be used on June 11th. Thus, Petitioner could have time off from work, and Captain Davis could act within his supervisory authority with regard to his approval of leave requests from the Petitioner, who was under his direct supervision. During the discussion between the Petitioner and Captain Davis, the Petitioner requested that he be allowed to take the full vacation period previously scheduled, and that the time from June 12, 1989 through June 17, 1989, be granted as leave without pay. Captain Davis informed Petitioner Bynoe that he did not have the authority to approve such a request, and that such an approval would have to come from someone higher in command. Although the two men ended their conversation with the clear intention to discuss the matter later during the work period on June 6, 1989, they were unable to discuss the matter again on that date. After the Petitioner completed work on June 6, 1989, he left for South Carolina as he had originally planned. On June 9, 1989, Petitioner telephoned Colonel Page at Hendry Correctional Institute. As Colonel Page was on leave, the call was transferred to the personnel manager, Mr. Dick Vollmer. During the conversation, the decision made by Captain Davis to revoke the Petitioner's leave from June 12, 1989 to June 17, 1989, was discussed. Captain Davis' decision was not modified by Mr. Vollmer or anyone else at the correctional institution. The Petitioner did not return to work on June 12, 1989. No additional contact with the institution was initiated by Petitioner until June 19, 1989, when he informed Captain Davis that he was to begin jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989. Captain Davis expected the Petitioner back to work on June 12, 1989. Petitioner Bynoe was scheduled to work from June 12, 1989 to June 20, 1989. The Petitioner did not report to work nor did he contact anyone at the institution until June 19, 1989, when he began jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the evidence, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration issue a Final Order finding that Petitioner Bynoe abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accept that Captain Davis spoke with Petitioner. See HO #3 - HO #6. Reject the finding that Captain Davis had not informed the Petitioner that his previously approved leave request had been rescinded. Contrary to fact. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #7 and HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. This testimony not believed by the Hearing Officer. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. 19.-27. Rejected. Immaterial to these proceedings. Also, Daugherty's testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer, and was rejected in full. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #3. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See preliminary statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Stewart, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Perri M. King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
