Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner was employed by the respondent $` percent General Telephone Company in October of 1971. From November of 1980 to February 3, 1982, he was classified as a cable splicer. This position requires strenuous physical duties including climbing telephone poles, lifting and moving heavy equipment, handling compressed gas cylinders that weigh 150 pounds and digging splice pits. Performance of the duties of a cable splicer requires strong hands, arms, back and leg muscles. In November of 1980, petitioner suffered a back injury and was unable to perform the activities of a cable splicer. He was placed on Absent Injury status, thus receiving 80 percent of his salary, and returned to work on or about January 6, 1981. He then took left-over vacation time until January 19, 1981, and about one week later, a light duty assignment was located for him at the Seminole DART Center. Although this assignment required no driving, petitioner complained that the drive to and from the Seminole location aggravated his back condition and was difficult for him due to the medications he was taking for his physical problems. On or about February 17, 1981, petitioner was reassigned to duty as a clerk at the St. Petersburg main building. Due to several absences, complaints by petitioner that he could not sit, stand or bend for long periods of time and that alternating from sitting to standing was painful, petitioner was relieved of all duties on March 30, 1981. He was informed that he would again be placed on Absent Injury status until such time as respondent could verify with the treating physician exactly what petitioner was capable of doing. There is some indication that petitioner may have returned to work in a light duty position in May and June of 1981, though petitioner had no recollection of these dates. In any event, petitioner returned to Absent Injury status on or about June 23, 1981, and was paid Absent Injury benefits until approximately December 15, 1981. He was then advised that his Absent Injury benefits were exhausted, that he would be placed on vacation as of December 16, 1981, and that his benefits with respondent would expire as of December 31, 1981. Petitioner was further advised that he could request a 30-day leave of absence, provide a doctor's statement regarding his present condition and that, during that 30-day leave of absence period he could request an additional 5 month leave of absence. Upon the advice of his Union representative, petitioner did request and was granted a 30-day leave of absence, which expired on January 31, 1982. On January 19, 1982, a meeting was held with petitioner to discuss his medical condition. He was advised that there were no light duty positions available at that time and that his 30-day leave of absence would terminate at the end of January. Petitioner's supervisor suggested that he request further leave of absence without pay in order to protect his employment and continue his benefits. Petitioner became angry at this suggestion, refused to request additional leave without pay, and uttered some statement about a "personal tragedy." His supervisor felt that he had been threatened by Mr. Wiggins and notified the police. Petitioner was terminated on February 3, 1982. The reasons cited for the termination were failure to apply for an additional leave of absence before his last 30-day leave had expired and insubordination at the January 19, 1982, meeting. Petitioner presented no evidence that other light duty assignments were available in January of 1982. He made reference to two other light duty assignments held by other employees. He acknowledged that one such position held by a white employee required extensive driving, and admitted that he was unable to drive for long distances or long periods of time. The other light duty position that petitioner believed he could have filled was awarded to a black employee. Other than these two positions, petitioner was not aware of any light duty assignments which were available between May and December of 1981 and were not afforded to him. Petitioner also admits that he was unable to perform the duties of a cable splicer in 1981 and in January of 1982.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's charge that the respondent committed an unlawful employment practice be DISMISSED. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0606 The undersigned has carefully considered the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the petitioner and the respondent. The proposed findings of fact have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Petitioner: The document filed by the petitioner entitled "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" contains neither factual findings nor legal conclusions. Instead, petitioner complains of the procedural rulings at the final hearing. The undersigned would only note that the final hearing occurred on a Friday and that the parties were advised that if the hearing were not completed on that day, it would be continued to a later date. It was only after the petitioner announced that he had no further witnesses that respondent moved for a directed recommended order and elected not to present any evidence after that motion was granted. Respondent: (NOTE: Any reference to the hearing transcript and Mr. Wiggins' deposition transcript are rejected inasmuch as neither transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings.) 23 and 24. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: E. D. Wiggins 4843 Campenella Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Kathryn M. Lancaster, Esquire 501 First Avenue North Suite 626 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Leslie Reicin Stein, Esquires Post Office Box 110, M.C. 7 Tampa, Florida 33601 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Regina McGriff, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, certified Respondent as a correctional officer and, on February 17, 1988, issued to her Certificate number 03-87-502-08. On September 21, 1987, Respondent began employment with the Florida Department of Corrections as a correctional officer at Broward Correctional Institution (BCI). On May 16, 1988, Respondent's employment with BCI was terminated. Since Respondent was still in the probationary period with BCI, it was not necessary for BCI to provide an official reason for the termination of Respondent's employment. The unofficial reason for the termination was that Respondent had failed to report to work. BCI routinely uses an attendance and leave report form covering two calendar weeks as the basis for the issuance of salary warrants and for the accruement of leave and other benefits associated with state employment. These Attendance and Leave forms have a space for the hours worked during each day of the two week period, a space for the number of hours of authorized leave taken for each scheduled work day of the two week period, a space for scheduled days off, and a place to insert the code number for the type of leave taken. Among the several types of leave available to an employee (assuming that the employee had accrued leave available) were "annual leave", "family sick leave", "sick leave", and "unauthorized leave without pay." These leave forms are usually kept in the Lieutenants' complex in books according to shifts. Each correctional officer normally completes his or her form at the end of the pay period. It is not unusual for a correctional officer to sign and to postdate the leave form if the officer does not anticipate being at work on the last day of the pay period. Thursday, April 14, 1988, was the end of a two week pay period. On April 14, 1988, Respondent received a telephone call from her husband and was told by her husband that their two year old child, who had a history of extended illnesses, was sick and would require hospitalization. Respondent informed her supervisor, Lieutenant Bernstein of her child's illness. At that time, Respondent did not know how much time she would miss because of the child's illness. Lieutenant Bernstein told Respondent to be sure to sign her Attendance and Leave Form before she left. The form Lieutenant Bernstein referred to was for the period that ended April 14, 1988. Respondent misunderstood his instructions and thought he meant that she should sign the form for the upcoming two week pay period. For the two week period beginning Friday, April 15, 1988, Respondent was scheduled to work an 8-hour shift at BCI on each of the following days April 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 28, and was scheduled to be off April 19, 20, 26, and 27. Respondent did not report for work at BCI at any time during this two week period. On April 14, 1988, Respondent partially completed and signed an attendance and leave form covering the period April 15-28, 1988. She signed the form on April 14, 1988, but she wrote the date April 28, 1988, next to her signature. Her signature was directly underneath the following declaration: I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND THAT IT REPRESENTS A TRUE AND CORRECT RECORD OF THE REGULAR HOURS WORKED, AUTHORIZED OVERTIME AND AUTHORIZED LEAVE. Respondent left the form she had signed April 14, 1988, and dated April 28, 1988, in the book in the Lieutenants' complex. After Respondent completed her full shift on April 14, 1988, she left work and she did not again have access to her work area or to the leave form. Respondent partially completed the form before she left work on April She filled out the portions of the form that identified the form as being her form for the period April 15-28, she marked the days she was scheduled to be off, and she marked on the form the notation "4/15 - 4/28 Baby in Hospital" as the reason for the requested leave. There were three areas of dispute between the parties relating to the completion of the leave form. First, Petitioner contends that Respondent wrote on the form the notation "4/15 - 4/28 Baby in Hospital" in the space reserved for the insertion of the reason for the administrative leave. Respondent denies making that insertion. This dispute is resolved by finding, as contended by Petitioner, that Respondent did make that insertion on the form. The testimony of Petitioner's handwriting expert, who positively identified the handwriting "4/15 - 4/28 Baby in Hospital" as being the handwriting of Petitioner is found to be more credible than the denial by Respondent that she did not make that insertion. Consequently, the testimony of Petitioner's expert is accepted and the testimony of Respondent, on this matter, is rejected. Next, Respondent disputes Petitioner's contention that she inserted on the leave form the request for either family sick leave or sick leave for each of her scheduled work days during the two week period. Finally, Respondent disputes Petitioner's contention that she inserted on the form the number of hours of leave requested for each scheduled work day. These last two areas of dispute are resolved by finding that someone other than Respondent completed these portions of the form. Petitioner's handwriting expert did not refute Respondent's denial that she completed these portions of the form. Additionally, Respondent knew at the time that she signed the leave form on April 14, 1988, and dated it April 28, 1988, that she had only six hours of sick leave available for her use and that she had 40 hours of accrued annual leave. Respondent would have had no reason to fill out the forms so as to claim some 80 hours of sick leave when she knew that she had such a limited amount of sick leave. Upon termination, correctional officers are entitled to accrued annual leave, but not for accrued sick leave. Respondent's child was not hospitalized between April 15-18, but Respondent was home attending to her sick child on those days. Respondent spoke with Lieutenant Bernstein or Lieutenant Jackson, another supervisor, to keep them advised of her situation during these four days. April 19 and 20 were her regularly scheduled days off, so she made no effort to contact BCI. On April 20, 1988, Respondent was contacted by Metro Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation (MDC) about a job for which she had applied prior to her employment with BCI. Respondent was excited about this job opportunity because she had wanted to work for MDC for a long time. She reported to the MDC personnel office as instructed late on the afternoon of April 20, 1988. On April 21, Respondent began full-time employment with MDC and began orientation and training with MDC as a correctional officer. The reason for the short notice to Respondent was that there had been an unexpected vacancy in the MDC training class. Respondent's full-time employment with MDC continued until May 16, 1988. Respondent told MDC at some undetermined point in time that she had terminated her employment with BCI by the time she was hired by MDC on April 21. Respondent attempted to contact Lieutenant Bernstein on April 21 to advise him of her change in employment, but she was unable to reach him. The representation made by Respondent to MDC that she had in fact resigned her position at BCI by the time she was hired by MDC was false. On April 22, 1988, Respondent wrote a letter of resignation to BCI, had the letter notarized, and mailed the letter to BCI. BCI did not receive this letter and was not aware that Respondent was employed at MDC until an investigator with MDC contacted the BCI personnel office during the course of a routine background investigation of Respondent. On Saturday, April 23, Respondent attempted to return her uniform to BCI, but the booth officer told her that uniforms could only be returned to the personnel office between 8:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M., Monday through Friday. Following the close of the April 15-28, 1988, period, Lt. Jackson, another of Respondent's supervisors, reviewed the form that Respondent had left in the book in the Lieutenant's complex and affixed his initials to the form to indicate his approval of the requested leave. Lt. Jackson later changed the leave from authorized sick leave to unauthorized leave without pay after it was determined that Respondent had failed to submit a doctor's certificate following three days of sick leave as was required by BCI's personnel rules. Respondent did not receive compensation for her employment with BCI after she became employed by MDC. On April 28, 1990, Respondent talked by telephone with Joan McKinley, a personnel technician at BCI, and discussed with her overtime pay for a prior pay period. During the conversation, Respondent stated that she was out of town for two or three weeks. Respondent did not state the reasons she was out of town, and the record is not clear that Respondent made that statement to justify her absence from BCI. Respondent did not discuss her new job at MDC, nor did she ask whether her letter of resignation had been received. Respondent assumed that her letter of resignation had been received. On or about May 9, 1989, Respondent talked by telephone with Paula Bussier, the personnel manager at BCI. Respondent told Ms. Bussier that she was looking forward to returning to work soon and that her child's health had improved. Respondent did not discuss her new job at MDC, nor did she ask whether her letter of resignation had been received. Officials at BCI learned of Respondent's new job when a MDC background investigator appeared at BCI to check Respondent's work record there. On May 16, 1989, Respondent's employment was terminated by BCI and by MDC. On August 29, 1988, Respondent was rehired by MDC. Since that time her job performance evaluations have been satisfactory or better and she has earned a reputation for honesty and integrity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission, enter a final order which dismisses the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-2771 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner in Paragraph 5 are rejected to the extent the findings conflict with the findings made in Paragraphs 6-9 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner in the first sentence of Paragraph 6 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made in Paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order. All other proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are adopted in material part. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: The proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent in Paragraphs 13- 15 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in Paragraphs 6-9 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent in Paragraph 16 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in Paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent in Paragraph 23 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in Paragraph 11-12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent in Paragraphs 24, 25, 29, and 33 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent in Paragraphs 37- 45 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in Paragraph 19 of the Recommended Order. All other proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent are accepted in material part. Copies furnished: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard E. Lober, Esquire 10680 N.W. 25th Street Suite 202 Miami, Florida 33172 Jeffrey Long, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commssion Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Respondent employs petitioner as a youth counselor II in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Petitioner attained permanent career service status in May of 1972. In addition to "carrying a normal caseload," i.e., supervising 85 to 88 youngsters in the customary fashion, petitioner met four times weekly with children who had been referred by courts or school authorities for intensive counseling. These groups counseling sessions began at six o'clock in the evening and lasted from one to one and a half hours. John B. Romano became petitioner's immediate supervisor on March 18, 1977. With the acquiescence of Mr. Romano's immediate predecessor, Ben Robinson, petitioner ordinarily reported for work between half past nine and half past ten in the morning. The week Mr. Romano started as petitioner's supervisor, he noticed that petitioner arrived for work between half past nine and ten in the morning. When he spoke to petitioner about this, petitioner told him of an accommodation that had been reached with Mr. Robinson, on account of petitioner's staying at work late to conduct group counseling. Mr. Romano told petitioner that he should report for work at half past eight in the morning, until a youth counselor's vacancy that then existed in the office could be filled. Subsequently, on at least one occasion before May 31, 1977, Mr. Romano spoke to petitioner about being late for work. On May 31, 1977, by which time another counselor had been hired, petitioner reported for work at approximately half past ten. On June 7, 1977, after petitioner had been suspended, Mr. Romano issued a written reprimand to petitioner, characterizing petitioner's arrival at half past ten on May 31, 1977, as "an insubordinate offense." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. One Harry Greene told Earl Stout, a service network manager for respondent and Mr. Romano's superior, that a boy whom petitioner had supervised had accused petitioner in open court of selling drugs and smoking marijuana. Messrs. Greene, Stout and Romano visited the facility at which petitioner's accuser was incarcerated and interrogated him. On May 13, 1977, a Friday, Mr. Romano told petitioner to meet him at nine o'clock the following Monday, but did not explain why. Present at the meeting on May 16, 1977, were petitioner, Mr. Romano, Mr. Greene and Mr. Stout. Petitioner was told of the accusations against him, but the accuser's identity was withheld. Mr. Stout gave petitioner the choice of resigning his position or taking annual leave for the duration of a formal investigation. Petitioner refused to resign. Mr. Stout instructed petitioner to tell no one that he had been asked to take leave or that he would be the subject of an investigation. When petitioner left this meeting he promptly told his fellow youth counselors that the had been suspended. For this petitioner received a written reprimand dated June 7, 1977. Respondent's exhibit No. 6. Petitioner subsequently availed himself of grievance procedures to raise the question whether he should have been permitted to take administrative leave instead of annual leave; and it was decided that he was entitled to take administrative leave. On June 8, 1977, Earl Stout wrote petitioner a letter which began "On June 1, you were advised by me that effective June 2, you were being suspended for insubordinate acts . . . ." This letter was sent to petitioner by certified mail. Mr. Stout testified without contradiction that blanket authority had been delegated to him to suspend employees under him.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the suspension be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Wayne Jennings, Esq. 2871 Forth-Fifth Street Gifford, Florida 32960 Mr. K.C. Collette, Esquire Forum 3, Suite 800 1665 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners' layoffs from employment by the Respondent were lawful and if not, what remedies should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 2, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that their positions were recommended for transfer from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. On July 1, 2001, the Petitioners' positions were transferred from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. Prior to Special Legislative Session C of 2001, the Department's Office of Prevention and Victim Services consisted of 94 positions, organized into four bureaus: the Office of Victim Services; the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services; the Prevention Office; and the Intensive Learning Alternative Program. During Special Legislative Session C, the Florida Legislature passed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2-C, which reduced appropriations for state government for fiscal year 2001-2002. This special appropriations bill was approved by the Governor on December 13, 2001, and was published as Chapter 2001- 367, Laws of Florida. As a result of Chapter 2001-367, 77 positions were cut from the Office of Prevention and Victim Services budget entity. The appropriations detail for the reduction from the legislative appropriations system database showed that the reduction of positions was to be accomplished by eliminating the Intensive Learning Alternative Program, which consisted of 19 positions; eliminating the Office of Victim Services, which consisted of 15 positions; eliminating the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services, which consisted of 23 positions; and by cutting 20 positions from the Office of Prevention. Seventeen positions remained. Immediately after conclusion of the Special Session, the Department began the process of identifying which positions would be cut. A workforce transition team was named and a workforce transition plan developed to implement the workforce reduction. The workforce reduction plan included a communications plan for dealing with employees; an assessment of the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the residual program; a plan for assessment of employees, in terms of comparative merit; and a placement strategy for affected employees. Gloria Preston, Stephen Reid and Carol Wells were Operations and Management Consultant II's and worked in the Partnership and Volunteer Services Division. According to the budget detail from Special Session C, all of the positions in this unit were eliminated. Titus Tillman was an Operations and Management Consultant II and worked in the Prevention and Monitoring division. According to the budget detail provided from Special Session C, 20 of the positions in this unit were eliminated. On December 7, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that effective January 4, 2002, each of their positions were eliminated due to the Florida Legislature's reduction of staffing in a number of Department program areas during the special session. Petitioners were provided with information regarding what type of assistance the Department would provide. Specifically, the notices stated that the employees would be entitled to the right of a first interview with any state agency for a vacancy to which they may apply, provided they are qualified for the position; and that they could seek placement through the Agency for Workforce Innovation. The notice also provided information regarding leave and insurance benefits, and identified resources for affected employees to seek more clarification or assistance. At the time Petitioners were notified that their positions were being eliminated, Florida Administrative Code Rules 60K-17.001 through 60K-17.004 remained in effect. These rules required agencies to determine the order of layoff by calculating retention points, based upon the number of months of continuous employment in a career service position, with some identified modifications. However, by the express terms of the "Service First" Legislation passed in the regular session of 2001, the career service rules identified above were to be repealed January 1, 2002, unless otherwise readopted. § 42, Ch. 2001-43, Laws of Fla. Consistent with the legislative directive new rules had been noticed and were in the adoption process. On January 4, 2002, each of the Petitioners were laid off due to the elimination of their positions. At the time the layoff became effective, new rules regarding workforce reductions had been adopted. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60K-33, effective January 2, 2002, did not allow for the "bumping" procedure outlined in Rule 60K-17.004. Instead, it required the Department to appoint a workforce transition team for overseeing and administering the workforce reduction; assess the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the remaining program after the deletion of positions; identify the employees and programs or services that would be affected by the workforce reduction and identify the knowledge, skills and abilities that employees would need to carry out the remaining program. The workforce transition team was required under one of the new rules to consider the comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience of each employee, and consider which employees would best enable the agency to advance its mission. Although the Department created a workforce reduction plan and Career Service Comparative Merit Checklist, it did not complete a checklist for any of the Petitioners because it had previously reclassified their positions as Selected Exempt Service. No checklist is expressly required under Rule 60L-33. While no checklist was completed on the Selected Exempt Service employees, each employee in the Office of Prevention and Victim Services was assessed based on the positions remaining and the mission of the Department in order to determine which employees to keep and which to lay off. Of the 17 remaining positions, the Department considered the legislative intent with respect to the elimination of programs and the individuals currently performing the job duties that were left. It also evaluated the responsibilities remaining, which included overseeing the funding of statewide contracts and grants. The Department also considered which employees should be retained based upon their ability to absorb the workload, their geographic location, and their skill set. The Department determined that the employees selected for the remaining positions were the strongest in their field, had fiscal management and programmatic experience, and were best equipped to undertake the workload. At the time of the layoff, Petitioners were each long- serving, well-qualified and highly rated employees of the State of Florida. Each was prepared to move in order to retain employment. In April 2002, AFSCME Florida Public Employees 79, AFL- CIO (AFSCME), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) against the Departments of Management Services and Juvenile Justice. AFSCME alleged that the Department failed to bargain in good faith over the layoff of Department employees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, effective June 28, 2002. The settlement agreement required the Department to provide timely notice to AFSCME of impending layoffs, bargain over the impact of workforce reductions, and provide assistance for employees who were laid off between December 31, 2001, and January 4, 2002, but who had not attained other full-time Career Service employment. There is no evidence the Petitioners in this case were members of AFSCME. Nor is there any evidence that the Department failed to assist Petitioners in seeking new employment. In July of 2003, the First District Court of Appeal decided the case of Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), wherein the court held that employees whose employee classifications were changed from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service must be afforded a clear point of entry to challenge the reclassification of their positions. The Department notified those persons, including Petitioners, whose Career Service positions had been reclassified to Selected Exempt Service, that they had a right to challenge the reclassification. Each of the Petitioners filed a request for hearing regarding their reclassifications, which was filed with the Agency Clerk in August of 2003. However, the petitions were not forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings until May 2007. All four cases were settled with an agreement that their positions were reclassified as Selected Exempt Service positions in error, and that they should have been considered Career Service employees at the time their positions were eliminated. Petitioners and the Department also agreed that any challenge by Petitioners to the layoffs would be forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Gloria Preston began work for the State of Florida in 1975. Her evaluations showed that she continuously exceeded performance standards, and she had training and experience in managing and monitoring grants and contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, and it is unclear whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Stephen Reid began work for the State of Florida in 1977. He left state government for a short time and returned in 1984. With the exception of his initial evaluation with the Department of Corrections, he has received "outstanding" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Reid has experience in contract creation and management. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Carol Wells began employment with the State of Florida in 1975. Similar to Mr. Reid, all of her evaluations save her first one were at the "exceeds" performance level, and she has experience in writing and managing contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Titus Tillman began employment with the State of Florida in 1993. He was subject to a Corrective Action Plan in May 2000, but received "above average" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Like the other Petitioners, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Likewise, no evidence was presented regarding the retention points that were earned by any of the people who were retained by the Department to fill the remaining positions. No evidence was presented regarding the qualifications of those retained employees, in terms of their comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience in the program areas the Department would continue to implement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the petitions for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-100 Lezlie A. Griffin, Esquire Melissa Ann Horwitz, Esquire AFSCME Council 79 3064 Highland Oaks Terrace Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Manny Anon, Jr., Esquire AFSCME Council 79 99 Northwest 183rd Street, Suite 224 North Miami, Florida 33169 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in her employment based on her gender or disability, in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Respondent had employed Petitioner as a Toll Equipment Technician/OMST III for over ten years at the time of her termination. Her responsibilities included maintaining the equipment at the toll plaza, troubleshooting shop work, traveling to various work sites, and communicating with the public. On November 17, 1998, while working in the vicinity of traffic at a toll plaza, Respondent was struck by a passing truck. Petitioner went to a clinic where her injuries were examined. When Petitioner returned to work about three days after the accident, she performed light duty for three days. After three days, Petitioner worked without restrictions and performed her full job functions. On January 16, 2000, Petitioner reinjured her back while attempting to lift a monitor over her head while at work. On March 28, 2000, Dr. Hubert Aronson performed a surgery on Petitioner for a herniated disc. On June 6, 2000, Dr. Aronson determined that Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement, and he rated her with a permanent partial physical impairment of seven percent. He ordered a functional assessment test to identify any work restrictions, prior to releasing her for work. On June 22, 2000, staff of HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital conducted a functional assessment test on Petitioner. Based on the assessment, by note dated July 31, 2000, Dr. Aronson returned Petitioner to regular work duties, without restrictions, as of August 1, 2000. Unsure that Petitioner's physician understood the physical demands of Petitioner's job, Mr. Ayala ordered that the Division of Risk Management obtain another functional assessment of Petitioner. By report dated August 18, 2000, Options Plus noted that it had documented the demands of Petitioner's work and presented this material to Dr. Aronson, who again released Petitioner to return to her regular job. Although Mr. Ayala was doubtful of her ability to perform her regular job duties, Petitioner performed her work until Christmas 2000, when she went on leave. While on leave, Petitioner reinjured her back. Petitioner called in sick on January 7, 2001, and informed Mr. Ayala that her back was hurting. A workers' compensation representative called Petitioner and suggested that she visit Dr. Bernard Chapnick, who examined Petitioner on January 9, 2001. Dr. Chapnick restricted Petitioner to light duty and stated that she was not to work, if no light duty were available. Dr. Chapnick made a follow-up appointment for Petitioner on January 16, 2001. When Petitioner returned to work and gave Mr. Ayala the doctor's note, he responded that he had no light duty. He made an imaginary swing with a golf club, implying that Petitioner had injured her back while playing golf. Respondent then placed Petitioner on unpaid medical leave, and Mr. Ayala informed Petitioner that she would be required to resume her regular duties on April 23, 2001. On April 23, 2001, Dr. Aronson released Petitioner for work, but still on light duty. When Petitioner returned to work seeking light duty, Mr. Ayala informed her again that none was available. He offered her another period of unpaid medical leave, but Petitioner declined the offer. By letter dated May 10, 2001, Respondent informed Petitioner that it intended to dismiss her, effective no sooner than ten days from the date of the letter. The reason for dismissal, as stated in the letter, is Petitioner's inability to perform her duties and absence without leave for three or more workdays. Following a Predetermination Conference, by letter dated June 27, 2001, Respondent advised Petitioner that she was terminated, effective June 29, 2001, due to her inability to perform the duties of her position and absence without leave for three or more workdays. Petitioner's complaint that a disabled male coworker received preferential treatment is groundless. At all material times, he was medically cleared to lift up to 50 pounds, which was considerably more than was permitted by Petitioner's light duty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Roselisa Cocalis 15471 Southwest 110th Terrace Miami, Florida 33196 J. Ann Cowles Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Michael J. Osborn, has been employed by the City of Clearwater for 9 years, first as a Service Worker I and then a Service Worker II for the Water Division. He began work with the city on December 5, 1983. He was so employed at all times pertinent to the matters at issue herein. Before coming to work for the city he was employed as a construction worker and has an 8th grade education. His general duties with the Water Division ran the gamut of physical stress and included digging, jack hammering and other tasks of a like nature. Respondent admits that over the years, he has reported a number of injuries to his back. Records of the city reflect 11 reports of incidents involving such injuries. The first took place in March, 1986 and the most recent is the one in issue here. He claims the most serious of his injuries resulted from an automobile accident he had on duty in 1988 when he was rear- ended by a vehicle traveling at a speed of more than 40 miles per hour while he was driving a city truck. As a result of that injury, he was out of work for 3 or 4 days and while he underwent no surgery as a result thereof, he was given treatment and medications for it. When released by the physician, he returned to his regular duties but has complained of continuing soreness in his lower back. After that accident, Respondent complained to his supervisors about his back problems on 3 or 4 occasions and was given intermittent time off. He was also placed on light duty up to December, 1992. This included painting fire hydrants and line spotting, neither of which gave him any trouble unless it involved physical digging. However, he was also assigned to painting lockers and other areas which did cause him pain when it was necessary for him to stretch or bend to reach areas to be covered. He claims never to have been totally free of back pain and discomfort since the 1988 accident. However, he persisted in doing his work because it was his job to do and he claims he didn't want to complain. This latter assertion, however, is contradicted by the testimony of his coworker, Mr. Baxter, who related Respondent was always complaining about something. In any case, Respondent never sought lighter work and no one ever suggested it. On the morning of January 4, 1993, Respondent reported to work as usual. Though his associate, Mr. Baxter, was the one who usually filled the water cooler on their truck, on this morning Respondent did so. He took the cooler, which was about 2 - 3 feet tall, off the truck, dumped out the old water, and refilled it with ice and fresh water. When he thereafter stooped with bended knee to pick it up and carry it back to the truck, he experienced a shooting pain down his left leg. This had happened before, but on this occasion the pain was unusually bad. He immediately told Mr. Baxter what had happened and suggested the incident be reported. When he saw the supervisor, he was told to fill out the required paperwork and then see the nurse, which he did. When Respondent told the nurse what had happened, she questioned him about the incident and then sent him to the walk-in clinic to whom all mobile injured employees are sent. She did not offer him transportation so Mr. Baxter took him there in a city truck. The doctor at the clinic, after examining him, told him there was nothing they could do for him there and referred him to Dr. Sena, an orthopedic surgeon. Respondent's request to see a chiropractor was refused. When the clinic doctor released Respondent, Mr. Baxter drove him back to the city nurse's office where he picked up the paperwork to take to Dr. Sena's office when he met his January 7, 1993 appointment. In the interim, between January 4 and January 7, Respondent stayed at home and took it easy, taking the medications which had been prescribed for him. On January 7, 1993, Respondent drove himself to Dr. Sena's office, even though he had been told not to drive, because he had no other way of getting there. Usually, he did not see Dr. Sena but saw Dr. Rehme, Sena's associate, and also a qualified orthopedic surgeon, instead. After the examination on January 7, 1993, Respondent was given a duty excuse until January 13, 1993, reflecting a total disability. He took that document back to the city nurse's office and went home. The physician's notes of that first examination reflect a diagnosis of acute back strain and spondyolesythesis. He was placed on bed rest and given a duty excuse for one week along with appropriate medications. While Dr. Sena indicated in his testimony that he considered bed rest to mean staying in bed except for meals, toilet, and personal hygiene, Respondent claims he did not understand the doctor's instructions to mean staying in bed for longer than one night. He also asserts the doctor did not tell him what activities he might perform. In any case, he was scheduled to begin physical therapy after his next visit scheduled for January 13, 1993. On that visit, the physical therapy appointment was set up, and he commenced that regimen right away. The doctor's notes concerning the January 13 visit again reflect the Respondent was not to return to work. Dr. Sena indicated that the diagnoses rendered and course of treatment prescribed by either him or Dr. Rheme were based on the representations made as to his condition by the Respondent. Respondent was referred to Ms. Pearson, the physical therapist who first saw him and conducted an initial evaluation and assessment of his condition at her facility on January 27, 1993. At that time, Respondent showed an increased pulling in his lower back muscles, and he was complaining of back pain and pain down his left leg. He said he could not lift or work at that time. As a result, she prescribed very gentle exercises for him and scheduled him for a return visit on January 29, 1993. When she saw him that date, he claimed he had increased pain after exercise and soreness in his buttocks and legs. She repeated the previously prescribed exercises and added some new ones and started him on the treadmill to strengthen his muscles. On his next visit to Ms. Pearson on February 1, 1993, Respondent continued to complain of mid to low back pain and on that date and again on his February 3, 1993 visit, she continued the course of treatment. On the latter date, however, Respondent complained of pain in his left hip when standing or walking but he indicated his leg weakness was decreasing and his back felt stronger. During his visit on February 5, 1993, Respondent reported his back was still painful. He said he had seen the doctor that morning and was given a work excuse for an additional 3 weeks. During their conversation, Respondent said he was worried he would hurt himself more if he went back to work. When he came in on February 8, 1993, Respondent complained he had had pain all weekend and that walking was painful. On February 10 and February 12 Respondent cancelled his appointments due to a head cold and Ms. Pearson did not see him again until February 15, 1993 when he indicated his back was stiff and sore but his leg was "OK." On that date, Ms. Pearson observed him limping on his left leg. On his February 17 visit to the physical therapist, Respondent complained of continued back stiffness and soreness but claimed his leg pain was less. On the 19th he complained of a lot of back pain and spasm. Ms. Pearson verified the spasm through palpation of the muscles but his pain reports are based on his comments. Nonetheless, on February 22, Respondent reported being somewhat better. Ms. Pearson continued the exercises she had prescribed. On February 24, when he came in, he said his back pain was a lot less severe. He related he had been working around the house and on his trailer and reported he thought he'd been videotaped while doing so. At that point, Ms. Pearson advised Respondent that if he had been working on his trailer, he could go back to work and he agreed he could do light duty. He also claims that at one point, on or before February 15, 1993, before he knew he had been video taped, he advised Ms. Pearson he was starting to work on his trailer and she allegedly said it was a good idea. Nonetheless, he failed to show up for his scheduled February 26, 1993 appointment or thereafter. Ms. Pearson's prescribed treatment exercises contained neither lifting nor more than very light exercising. There was nothing she prescribed that was comparable to lifting a small child, pushing down on a seesaw, or unloading or lifting full sheets of plywood. None of those activities would be consistent with what Respondent reported of his condition or what she observed regarding him. For example, muscle spasm is not something that can be faked. If she palpated and felt spasm or no spasm, she would note as appropriate. Her records of Respondent's treatment show a fairly consistent hardness of muscle, more or less, most of the time she observed him. Respondent indicates, however, that he was usually supervised, during his therapy, by Pearson's assistant since Pearson was not there all the time. When he spoke with her, their conversation was casual. Her testimony as to continuing spasm is not particularly persuasive, therefor, and in any case, muscle spasm alone does not necessarily preclude all activity. During the course of his physical therapy, Respondent continued to be seen by the orthopedists. On January 22, the doctor noted he was improving nicely and noted the possibility he could return to work in 2 weeks. On February 5, the doctor continued the prescription for physical therapy and bed rest. Between that visit and the Respondent's next scheduled appointment on March 1, 1993, Dr. Sena was furnished the video tape of Respondent's activities which had been taken between January 13, and February 23, 1993 by a private investigator hired by the city to conduct a surveillance on the Respondent. When Mr. Osborn came in for the scheduled visit, the doctor noted that his lumbar strain was resolved and he could return to full time regular duty. Osborn indicates that when, toward the end of his series of visits, the doctor suggested he might go back to light duty, he, Respondent, said there was no such thing, and the doctor agreed to keep him off work for a few more weeks. This was the only time either doctor suggested he go back to work, however, prior to the termination of his duty excuse. In that regard, Respondent claims he had been placed on light duty after previous injuries and ended up in more pain than before. He claims he was required, as a part of his "light" duties, to bend and stretch, during painting, all of which, he contends, aggravated his condition. Respondent also admits to having been asked to give his testimony by deposition with regard to another litigation to which he is a party. Though his counsel in that action claims Respondent refused to attend the deposition because he was on bed rest, Respondent denies having given that reason. He claims he refused to be deposed because he felt that to do so might create a conflict in the lawsuit. The counsel's testimony, and that of her paralegal who also spoke with Respondent and recalls much the same as counsel, is considered the better evidence on that issue and it is so found. Respondent admits to having worked on his trailer but claims that at that time, when he was taped, he was recovered and felt he could return to full duty after he saw the doctor on his next scheduled visit. Because of this, he was trying to get himself into shape to go back to work. By that time, he claims he had no further physical problems and felt he was cured. With regard to the trailer work, however, Respondent claims someone else took the old paneling off and he was putting new paneling on. The trailer was parked in his front yard and he was making no effort to conceal what he was doing. As to the other matters appearing on the video tape, Respondent denies having pushed the child up and down on the seesaw. Though someone may have been assisting on the child's end, the tape clearly shows Respondent to be bending down and up repeatedly with his hands on the end of the seesaw. This tape, recorded on several different days over the period January 13, through February 23, 1993 shows Respondent walking without any evidence of a limp or of pain, even on the earliest date recorded. He is shown to bend over from the waist, and to squat to place a tag on his auto license plate. On February 15th he is seen carrying 2 filled large trash containers out to the curb, one in each hand and to bend over at the waist to pick up the newspaper. About the same time, he is seen reaching above his head with both arms to affix something to his trailer. Around the same time, he is shown lifting his young granddaughter from the ground, using his arms, and is observed repeatedly climbing up to the top of a slide to help her slide down. He used his arms and his back to push the child up and down on a seesaw, but in all fairness, it must be said he appeared to have been helped in that effort by someone else on the other end. On February 23, 1993, while at the city dump, he is shown to climb into the bed of his pickup truck and pull trash and scrap lumber, including what appear to be numerous 4 by 8 foot sheets of plywood, out of the truck by himself and toss them into the pit. Later that same day, he was observed working on the reconstruction of his trailer, carrying full sheets of plywood and affixing them to the trailer's frame without assistance. He used hand and power tools in his work and repeatedly sat, squatted, got down on his hands and knees, twisted his back and waist and did other things apparently inconsistent with his claimed condition, all without apparent pain or discomfort. His activity was not consistent with his continued limping and claims of pain to Ms. Pearson as she reported it. Dr. Sena opined, from his review of the video tapes referred to above, that if Respondent could do the things he was observed to be doing on the tapes, he would be capable of performing his regular duties and was not temporarily totally disabled from the first day shown on the tapes, January 13, 1993. The functions which Respondent could perform, consistent with his initially reported condition and the instructions as to bed rest given him by the doctor, would include driving to and from the doctor's office and light physical interaction with his grandchild. If Respondent could do those things other than driving to the office visits, however, in the doctor's opinion, he could do light duty. On the other hand, however, he should not be able to work on his trailer if that work included lifting and placing heavy sheets of plywood. If Respondent could accomplish the letter acts, he would most likely suffer no disability and could work at his regular job. It should be noted that none of the notes prepared be either doctor who saw Respondent, Rheme or Sena, specifically indicated what Respondent represented or portrayed his physical condition to be to them or the office staff. The notes are not detailed and reflect only diagnosis, and prescribed treatment. In light of Dr. Sena's comments that the physicians' notes are based, in great part, on what the patient relates to them, it must be found that Respondent made representations consistent with their diagnosis of continued pain and disability. These representations would appear, at least from February 15, 1993 on, to have been less than accurate. On January 4, 1993, Respondent filled out a notice of injury for Josephine Dixon, Water Distribution Operations Supervisor for the city, and a superior in Respondent's chain of supervision. She has observed Respondent come to the work place during his recuperation period driving his pickup truck with his lawn maintenance equipment in tow. He admits he operates a limited lawn maintenance service for four clients in his off-duty time, but denies having engaged in any lawn maintenance activities during the period in question however and there is no evidence he did. Ms. Dixon reiterates Respondent's long series of back injuries and indicates that in the year prior to the instant injury it was sometimes difficult to find a partner for him because of his reputation for not carrying his share of the workload. The only coworker to testify at the hearing was Mr. Baxter who related nothing either to confirm or contradict this allegation. The performance report rendered on Respondent just prior to the injury in question, however, reflects an overall rating of I. (Improvement Needed). Mr. Hackett, Respondent's overall supervisor, discussed his performance with Respondent's immediate supervisor. The general opinion is that while Respondent is technically very capable, he has a history of being somewhat lazy, and many employees did not want to work with him because he did not carry his share of the load. Mr. Hackett has no knowledge of any specific representations Respondent made to his doctor. However, when considering the Respondent's history of repeated back injuries; his apparent lack of disability shown in the tapes recorded by the private investigator, and the indications by coworkers that Respondent did not pull his share of the load, Hackett and other responsible city officials concluded that Respondent's claim was without merit. At this juncture he admits perhaps Respondent should have been counselled on his ability to do his job earlier on, but this was not done. In deciding to initiate the termination action, he coordinated with and secured the concurrence of the city's risk management staff. This action was approved by Richmond Smith, the city's Assistant Director of Public Works who saw Respondent on several occasions when he would come into the building to pick up his check. At no time did Respondent appear to him to show any major evidence of injury. It was Mr. Smith's decision to terminate the Respondent from his city employment for falsifying city records and for making a false claim. His decision was based in large part on his review of the video tapes previously discussed. He asserts, however, that if Respondent had come in with a supported determination that because of this injury he could not do his job, city personnel could and would have made an accommodation and given him alternative work. The initiative for this option rests with the employee, however, and Respondent at no time sought it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent herein, Michael J. Osborn, be terminated from employment with the City of Clearwater for cause, as outlined in the Record of Personnel Action dated March 18, 1993, effective March 26, 1993. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2819 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Petitioner's counsel submitted a Proposed Order which contains Proposed Findings of Fact which are not numerically identified. For the purpose of reference herein, they have been numbered in sequence from 1 to 42 as they appear. Upon review of each individual proposal, they have been accepted and, as appropriate, have been incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected. Balance accepted. First sentence accepted. Second and third sentences rejected. Fourth and fifth sentences accepted. Sixth sentence modified. Doctor's notes show Respondent to be improving nicely Respondent to be "improving nicely." Doctor's comments from notes accepted. Balance accepted. First through third sentences accepted. Fourth sentence rejected in part as it asserts the tapes serve as foundations of the city's charges. This is not totally accurate. They serve as evidence of Respondent's condition which appears inconsistent with the information given by his to his physicians. Balance accepted. First through fourth sentences are a restatement of testimony, not proper finding of fact. Fifth and sixth sentences are a comment on the evidence. Balance, through second next to last sentence, is a restatement of the testimony. Next to last and last sentences are comments on specific testimony. Paragraph is no more than a restatement of evidence. Rejected as contra to the better weight of the evidence. Rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah S. Crumbley, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Barry M. Salzman, Esquire Chambers, Salzman & Brannon Post Office Box 1191 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-1191 Michael J. Wright City Manager City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Gary Fernald, Esquire 501 South Ft. Harrison Clearwater, Florida 34616
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by denying Petitioner a promotion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. From 1990 through October 1996, she worked in Respondent's Child Welfare Legal Service (CWLS) office as an administrative secretary. The CWLS office handles a heavy volume of child dependency cases in the juvenile courts of several counties. The cases require the filing of certain pleadings in a timely manner. Failure to comply with the filing deadlines could result in the return of a child to an abusive or neglectful home environment. At all times material to this proceeding, the CWLS office consisted of one managing attorney, two staff attorneys, one administrative secretary, and two paralegal specialists. During Petitioner's employment, another African-American female, Martha Johnson, occupied one of the paralegal specialist positions. Ms. Johnson performed her responsibilities to the complete satisfaction of her supervisor who was also the managing attorney, Martha Berrera. The CWLS office required paralegal specialists, such as Ms. Johnson, to go to formal and informal court hearings with the attorneys. After the hearings, the paralegal specialists had to use their notes and the attorneys' notes to draft pleadings. They would also draft proposed orders for the courts. Sometimes the attorneys were in court three or four days a week. On those occasions, the paralegal specialists had to perform their duties with a minimum of supervision. In August 1994, one of the paralegal specialist positions in the CWLS office became vacant. Ms. Barrera developed a set of objective criteria to review applications for the vacancy prior to receiving them. Ms. Berrera based the review criteria on the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) required for the position. Ms. Berrera considered KSAs in the following areas to be especially important: actual paralegal experience, maintaining the dockets, preparing cases, gathering information, drafting orders and pleadings for court, and assisting attorneys in other case-related functions. Petitioner and a white male, Charles Atwell, applied for the vacant position along with 39 other applicants. Ms. Barrera reviewed all of the applications. She had every reason to expect that Mr. Atwell would perform well as a paralegal specialist. He had prior experience working as a temporary paralegal for a blind attorney at another state agency. Petitioner did not have prior experience working as a paralegal. She knew how to type pleadings and orders that the attorneys dictated. However, she was unable to draft these documents. Petitioner did not understand the distinctions in certain pleadings. Even though she had worked in the office since 1990, Petitioner did not understand the legal terminology used in court, i.e. review hearings, emergency hearings, and disposition hearings. The CWLS attorneys attempted to instruct Petitioner on how to prepare for these hearings without success. As an administrative secretary, Petitioner was in charge of filing. She let the filing pile up; consequently, attorneys had to search for documents to complete a file immediately before a court appearance. This was a considerable burden in an office that handled between 20 and 30 hearings per week. Petitioner never understood the meaning of "CC:" at the bottom of a letter. Ms. Berrera had to write notes telling Petitioner the names of people to receive copies. The CWLS attorneys attempted to teach Petitioner to prioritize her work. Petitioner followed their instructions for two weeks then reverted to her former less-efficient methods of organizing her work. The CWLS attorneys could not depend on her to help them meet certain case-related deadlines. Petitioner was not sufficiently motivated to learn a new job. She rebuffed the CWLS attorneys when they attempted to teach her how to perform the tasks of a paralegal. She complained that such tasks were not in her job description. In addition to the job-related problems referenced above, Petitioner spent as much as 20 percent of her time talking to her family on the telephone. At times she made lengthy chains out of paper clips. Ms. Barrera decided to hire Mr. Atwell. Petitioner received a letter dated August 18, 1994, informing her that she would not be hired for the position. Shortly after Mr. Atwell began working in the CWLS office, Ms. Barrera realized that his job performance did not meet the standards of the office. Ms. Barrera promptly fired Mr. Atwell. In September 1994, Petitioner requested training that would qualify her to become a paralegal specialist. Ms. Berrera responded that she would approve any training that the state provided. Ms. Berrera referred Petitioner to the personnel office for additional information regarding the training. There is no evidence that any paralegal training was available. The paralegal specialist position became available for the second time in March 1995. The following individuals were among the applicants: (a) Petitioner; (b) Brenda Parrish, a white female; and (c) Samuel Long, an African-American male. Ms. Berrera was a member of the committee that interviewed applicants in 1995. The committee initially offered the job to Mr. Long because of his experience as a temporary paralegal specialist in the CWLS office. Mr. Long declined the offer because he accepted other employment with a higher wage. The committee subsequently offered the paralegal specialist position to Ms. Parrish. Unlike Mr. Atwell, Ms. Parrish subsequently performed her duties very well. Petitioner was not qualified for the paralegal specialist position in March 1995. Moreover, she had not improved in her performance as an administrative secretary. The committee had no reason to believe that Petitioner would have been any more successful as a paralegal specialist. Ms. Berrera is a Cuban-American. She was born in Cuba and immigrated to the United States in 1961. She has multi- racial relatives. She did not harbor racial prejudice towards Petitioner or any of her minority subordinates. Ms. Berrera could be a difficult supervisor at times. Often she yelled at the personnel in the CWLS office. However, she never showed favoritism based on race. She yelled with equal intensity and fervor at males and females, whites and African- Americans. There is no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her race by refusing to hire her as a paralegal specialist in August 1994 or March 1995.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Marc Taps, Esquire Legal Services for North Florida, Inc. 2119 Delta Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment in the career service system of the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Helen L. Chappell, a career service employee of Respondent with the Polk County Public Health Unit at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Petitioner worked sporadically in Respondent's employment during the month of March, 1989. She was credited with a total of 28 hours of work during that month. Respondent's records reflect that Petitioner did not actually work any hours in the months of April or May, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent received notification from personnel of the Division of Risk Management of the Department of Insurance that Petitioner, a recipient of workers compensation benefits, had reached maximum medical recovery from a previous injury. Shortly thereafter, the Division provided Respondent with a copy of a medical report documenting the extent of Petitioner's recovery. The medical report, while noting Petitioner's recovery, also restricted her employment activities to preclude activities involving "a lot of head and shoulder movement." By certified letter dated May 11, 1989, the acting administrative director of the Polk County Health Unit informed Petitioner of the receipt of the medical report and the medical restrictions contained in the report. Further, the letter set forth Respondent's position that such restrictions would not interfere with Petitioner's performance of her duties as a clerk specialist. The letter concluded by directing Petitioner to return to work immediately to avoid the presumption that she had abandoned her position of employment with Respondent. The letter's certified mail return receipt reflects that Petitioner received the letter on May 15, 1989. In the course of a telephone conversation with the acting administrative director on May 25, 1989, Petitioner was informed that she must return to work no later than June 2, 1989. Petitioner did not return to work on June 2, 1989, or at any time thereafter. On June 15, 1989, the acting administrative director notified Petitioner by certified mail that Petitioner was presumed to have abandoned her career service employment position with Respondent as a result of the failure to report to work within three days of the June 2, 1989 deadline. The certified mail return receipt documents delivery of the letter on June 20, 1989. On August 1, 1986, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a copy of Respondent's employee handbook. Employees are placed on notice by contents of the handbook that any employee who is absent without authorization for three consecutive workdays may be considered to have abandoned his or her employment position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration concluding that Petitioner abandoned her position in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave for the period June 2-June 15, 1989. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4183 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. None submitted. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-5. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire HRS District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Fifth Floor, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33514 Helen L. Chappell Post Office Box 109 Lake Wales, Florida 33859 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aletta L. Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Petitioner was formerly employed as an Unemployment Compensation (UC) Adjudicator in Respondent's Miami UC office. In this capacity, he interviewed claimants seeking unemployment compensation and made initial determinations regarding the validity of their claims. Petitioner was often absent because of illness. When he was at work, however, he performed his duties competently. Petitioner and his fellow employees at the Miami UC Office were required to notify supervisory personnel no later than the beginning of the workday if they were going to be absent that day. Petitioner was made aware of this requirement on various occasions prior to the absences that led to the termination of his employment with Respondent. On Tuesday, September 5, 1989, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor and told her that he would be absent that day because of an ankle injury he had sustained. He did not indicate during the conversation whether he would be at work the following day. On Wednesday, September 6, 1989, and Thursday, September 7, 1989, Petitioner neither reported to work nor contacted his supervisor at any time during the day to give notification of his absence. On Friday, September 8, 1989, Petitioner again failed to report to work. He did, however, telephone his supervisor concerning his absence, but he did not do so until 4:50 p.m., 20 minutes after the shift to which he was assigned had ended. By letter dated September 11, 1989, Respondent notified Petitioner that it had determined that Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective the close of business September 8, 1989, in view of his unauthorized absence from work on September 6, 7, and 8, 1989. It is this determination that is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his UC Adjudicator position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of February 1990. STUART H. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact To the extent that Petitioner asserts in his letter that he contacted his supervisor on September 5, 1989, and again on September 8, 1989, his proposed findings of fact have been accepted and incorporated in substance in this Recommended Order. To the extent that he claims that he "did not have 3 consecutive days of unauthorized absences," his proposed factual findings have been rejected because they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact First Sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second Sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First and second sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Cooper 1601 Northwest 17th Street, #2 Miami, Florida 33125 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building, Suite 200 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
