The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent, a licensed insurance agent, is guilty of violating the statutes regulating the conduct of an insurance agent, and if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been eligible for licensure and licensed as a life and health insurance agent and as a dental health care contract salesman. For many years, Respondent had also been licensed to solicit general lines -- property, casualty, surety, and miscellaneous lines -- insurance in this state. Respondent was unaware that this license expired on March 24, 1987. At all times material hereto, Respondent was, however, eligible for licensure as a general lines agent. At all times material hereto, Respondent was one of the officers of Johnson's Model City Insurance Agency #1, Inc., a Florida corporation. That corporation was involuntarily dissolved on November 4, 1988. On December 30, 1986, Respondent telephoned Petitioner to discuss the propriety of an insurance agent charging a consulting fee. Following that telephonic conversation, an attorney for Petitioner directed correspondence to Respondent confirming that telephone conversation, advising that a consulting fee could legally be charged under certain circumstances. Those circumstances included the use of a separate consulting contract between the agent and the insured so that the insured would fully understand that he or she was entering into a separate contract and paying a separate consideration in advance of the performance of consulting services. Additionally, the services rendered must be other than those normally provided by an insurance agent. Further, if a separate consulting contract were effectuated, an agent could set up a separate consulting corporation to enter into such contracts. Hartford Insurance Company sells automobile insurance in the State of Florida by use of a toll-free telephone number. People who know the telephone number can call Hartford directly, obtain a quote for automobile insurance, and purchase a policy directly from Hartford. Hartford has no insurance agents in the State of Florida and pays no commissions to insurance agents in Florida for the obtaining of automobile insurance customers. A person can obtain a quote in writing from the Hartford in advance of purchasing a policy. Sometimes, the quotation card and the policy are issued and mailed simultaneously by Hartford to its new insureds. On September 20, 1987, Patricia Moss telephoned J. M. C. Insurance Consultants pursuant to an ad in the telephone yellow pages. She inquired about obtaining automobile insurance to replace her current policy which would expire on September 22, 1987. She spoke with an employee named Betty who advised her that she could obtain replacement insurance at a cost of $927. Since the cost quoted to her was substantially lower than the prices she had been quoted by the other agencies she had consulted, Moss went to the offices of J. M. C. on September 21, 1987. Betty presented Moss with a number of documents to sign. She signed a Power of Attorney appointing Johnson's Model City Insurance, Inc., doing business as JMC Insurance Consultants as her attorney-in-fact to obtain insurance for her, specifically ratifying and confirming actions taken on her behalf by J. L. Johnson- consultant. She also executed an Agreement with Consultant specifying the services that JMC Insurance Consultants would perform on her behalf. She signed a further statement which provided that: "I understand that JMC Insurance is acting as Consultants for my insurance placement and is entitled to any and all consultation fees." She also signed a document written in boldfaced type which states: IMPORTANT NOTICE THIS LETTER IS TO INFORM YOU THAT JMC INSURANCE CONSULTANTS ARE NOT AGENTS NOR DO WE REPRESENT HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER. WE REPRESENT "YOU" THE CLIENT AND WE ACT IN YOUR BEHALF WITH THE RIGHT THAT YOU GIVE US THROUGH A POWER OF ATTORNEY. WE ENDEAVOR TO PLACE YOUR AUTO INSURANCE FOR YOU ON YOUR BEHALF. WE ARE YOUR CONSULTANT. IF YOU HAVE A PROBLEM PLEASE CALL US WE ARE HERE TO HELP AND ACT IN YOUR BEHALF. CALL US FIRST. LET US HANDLE IT. CLIENT. I HAVE READ AND I UNDERSTAND. Moss gave JMC Consultants a check in the amount of $262.50 for which she was given a receipt which carried the specific notation that the money she had paid was for an insurance consultant's fee. She was also given a small card entitled Insurance Identification Card on which Betty filled in information showing that she would be insured by Hartford effective on the following day and specifically describing the coverage provided, the automobile insured, and the name and address of Moss. Within a week she received directly from the Hartford an insurance policy for the benefits which she sought. The policy itself reflected that the premium for the policy was $632 and that she would be receiving a bill from Hartford for that amount. She telephoned Betty, demanding a refund of her $262.50, which demand was refused. Betty explained to her that the amount was for the consultant's fee for obtaining the low- cost coverage for Moss. Hartford's direct marketing program does allow people to purchase insurance on someone else's behalf utilizing a Power of Attorney. Although Hartford's records do not reflect a Power of Attorney from Moss to J. M. C. Consultants or Respondent, Hartford's records regarding their policyholder Moss are not accurate. For example, they erroneously reflect that they quoted a rate to Moss on September 15, a week before they received any contact on her behalf. Although Moss testified that Betty told her the $262.50 was the down payment on her insurance premium, her testimony is not credible in view of the numerous documents that she signed stating that she fully understood that Respondent was not an agent for Hartford, that Respondent would be acting on her behalf pursuant to the Power of Attorney and Consultant's Agreement which she had signed, and the other documents reflecting that the $262.50 was a consultant's fee which she was paying to Respondent to act on her behalf. Her testimony that she did not understand is refuted by the documents she signed saying that she did. There is no allegation that Moss, a retired registered nurse, was unable to read. Rather, it is concluded that Moss voluntarily chose to pay the Hartford premium plus Respondent's consulting fee since the total price for the two charges was still substantially less than she could have obtained insurance for from other sources. Allstate Insurance Company is an insurer which sells insurance policies through their agents in the State of Florida. It also has a division which participates in Florida's Joint Underwriting Association (hereinafter "FJUA"), a program through which high-risk drivers who cannot obtain insurance in the regular voluntary insurance market can obtain automobile insurance. Prior to the time that his general lines agent license expired, Respondent participated in that program and was assigned to write insurance for Allstate for policyholders participating in the program. The Producers Contract entered into between Respondent and the FJUA, which assigned him to Allstate Insurance Company, provided that it would automatically terminate if an agent's general lines license expired. On July 22, 1988, James Tillie came to the office of J. M. C. to procure automobile insurance for the van that he used in his business. After meeting with Respondent, Tillie gave Respondent a check in the amount of $204 as a down payment on an automobile insurance policy. The check was endorsed and deposited into the business bank account of J. M. C. Respondent gave James Tillie an automobile insurance binder which reflected that his insurance policy was to be issued through Allstate Insurance Company. Under the terms of Respondent's contract with the FJUA, Respondent was required to submit James Tillie's application and premium to Allstate within 24 hours. The FJUA application acts as a binder. Once the application is completed and the premium is paid to the agent, the insured has automatic coverage for 30 days during which time the carrier, Allstate in this case, can act on the application. There is no evidence as to when Respondent forwarded James Tillie's application to Allstate; however, Allstate has no record of ever receiving the application. Respondent did tell James Tillie that within a couple of months he would receive from Allstate his policy and instructions for payment of the balance of his premium. After a month or two had elapsed, James Tillie became concerned since he had not yet received his insurance policy. He contacted Respondent who assured him that he did have insurance coverage. Shortly thereafter, James Tillie received in the mail from Respondent a card entitled Insurance Identification Card. On that card information had been filled in showing a policy number, the effective date, the insurance company as Allstate Insurance Company, a description of the insured vehicle, and the name and address of James Tillie. This is not an official Allstate identification card, and no one purported it to be such. An official Allstate Insurance card is issued by Allstate as part of the policy issued by it. On September 23, 1988, Sina Tillie, James' mother, visited J. M. C. for the purpose of purchasing automobile insurance for her new automobile. Sina Tillie is an elderly person who had never before owned an automobile or possessed a driver's license. She wished to purchase insurance on a brand- new automobile. Sina Tillie gave Respondent $1,828 in cash as full payment of the policy's annual premium. Respondent gave her an insurance binder which reflected that her insurance was placed with Allstate. Allstate has no record of receiving Sina Tillie's application and premium from Respondent. Subsequently, Sina Tillie became concerned when she had not yet received her insurance policy. She asked her daughter to contact Respondent. Respondent advised her daughter not to worry. He then mailed to Sina Tillie an Insurance Identification Card similar to the one which he had provided to James Tillie reflecting James' coverage. He also telephoned Sina Tillie to assure her that if anything happened, all she would need to do would be to show the card saying that she was covered and to contact him. Since neither he nor his mother had received a policy from Allstate, James Tillie called Allstate. He did not know that there were, in effect, two Allstates. The Allstate office which he contacted was a regular Allstate office which markets insurance to customers who call or come in, and not an office affiliated with the FJUA program. The person with whom he spoke told him that neither he nor his mother were insured by Allstate and that the policy numbers reflected on the Insurance Identification Cards given by Respondent to James and his mother were not Allstate policy numbers, but rather were binder numbers. James Tillie then contacted Respondent who consistently maintained that both James and Sina were insured. Respondent contacted Allstate regarding James' and Sina's policies. James Tillie came to the office of J. M. C. and met with Respondent. He advised Respondent that he and his mother had obtained insurance elsewhere and requested refunds of the premiums that he and his mother had paid. Respondent told Tillie that he could not refund the premiums since both James and his mother were insured in exchange for those premiums. Respondent eventually told James Tillie that he would refund the premiums if the Tillies would sign releases. James Tillie maintained that he would sign releases only after he had received the refund of the premiums. The meeting ended in stalemate. James Tillie contacted Petitioner, and Petitioner contacted Respondent. Respondent maintained that he would refund the premiums in exchange for a release. Petitioner forwarded a copy of Respondent's letter to James Tillie. Respondent eventually made arrangements with James and his mother to refund the premiums in monthly payments since he did not have the money to refund the premiums in full. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, Respondent had only refunded the total amount of $600 to the Tillies. At the time that Respondent's general lines agent license with Integrity Insurance Company was cancelled on March 24, 1987, he believed that he was being re-licensed by Fortune Insurance Company. However, he never received a license for or from Fortune and never checked to ascertain why.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of statutory violations as set forth in this Recommended Order and suspending Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for a period of 60 days from the date of the Final Order entered in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 7-9, 14-19, 21-26, and 28-32 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4-6, 10, 11, 13, 20, and 27 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact number 12 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Johnny L. Johnson 17120 Northwest 27th Avenue Opa Locka, Florida 33056 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation and licensing of general lines insurance agents. Its responsibility includes the duty to sanction those licensed under the insurance code for violations of the code. At all times relevant, Respondent was a licensed general lines insurance agent and possessed license #265736194 issued by the Petitioner on December 21, 1990. Respondent's license is presently active. On June 5, 1992, an order of liquidation, injunction and notice of automatic stay was entered in Case No. 92-1766, Circuit Court, Leon County, Florida, In Re: The Receivership of First Miami Insurance Company, a Florida corporation. On December 14, 1992, Salma Zacur, the operations manager for the receiver for First Miami Insurance Company, mailed a letter to Respondent. On June 7, 1993, a summary order directing immediate delivery of funds was entered in Case No. 92-1766, Circuit Court, Leon County, Florida, In Re: The Receivership of First Miami Insurance Company, a Florida corporation. On June 8, 1994, an order on receiver's motion for entry of final judgment was entered in Case No. 92-1766, Circuit Court, Leon County, Florida, In Re: The Receivership of First Miami Insurance Company, a Florida corporation. Petitioner failed to produce evidence of the contents of the December 14, 1992 letter which was non-hearsay and, therefore, failed to establish the relevance of the court orders of June 7, 1993 and June 8, 1994 in this matter. The Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Section 631.155, or Chapter 626, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(b)9., Florida Statutes. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 (in part), 12 (in part). Rejected as not proven by clear and convincing evidence: paragraphs 6, 7 (in part), 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 (in part) 13. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Michael K. McCormick, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Jed Berman, Esquire Infantino and Berman O. Drawer 30 Winter Park, Florida 32790
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident general lines insurance agent and a nonresident surplus lines insurance agent should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact On August 4, 2006, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a "09-20" nonresident general lines insurance agent and a "91-20" nonresident surplus lines insurance agent. By Notice of Denial dated December 11, 2006, the Respondent denied the Petitioner's application for licensure. The Notice of Denial, in material part, sets forth the factual basis for the denial as follows: You, Brian D. Boneck, at all times pertinent to the facts set below, were licensed in this state as a resident general lines insurance agent. You, Brian D. Boneck, at all times pertinent to the facts set forth below, were the owner of Brooke Agency Services of Bradenton, Florida. You, Brian D. Boneck, at all times pertinent to the facts set forth below, were the President and owner of Sierra Insurance Underwriters, Inc. On or about the last week of December, 2005, Christopher Waters of Port Charlotte, Florida, called the Brooke Agency in Bradenton, Florida, and spoke to you, Brian D. Boneck, regarding the renewal of a commercial general liability insurance policy for Waters Developers, LLC. On or about, January 4, 2006, Mr. Waters delivered a check to you in the amount of $809.30, payable to Sierra Underwriters. This check was to pay the down payment on the premium for renewal of Mr. Waters' general liability policy. Sometime in April 2006, Mr. Waters was notified by Mid-Continental [sic] Casualty Company that the policy was cancelled for non-payment of premium. You, Brian D. Boneck, failed to submit the money paid to you by Mr. Waters to the insurer, Mid-Continental [sic] Casualty Company, or to the insurer's general agent, Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency, Inc. You, Brian D. Boneck, misappropriated the down payment made to you by Mr. Waters. To this date, you have not returned the money to Mr. Waters or paid the money to Mid- Continental [sic] Casualty Company, or to the Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency, Inc. Your ownership of Brooke Agency Services of Bradenton, Florida, was through a franchise agreement with Brooke Franchise Corporation. Brook Insurance and Financial Services is a subsidiary corporation that manages business for Brooke Franchise Corporation. Pursuant to this relationship, you, Brian D. Boneck, were required to pay a share of the commissions received by Brooke Agency Service of Bradenton to Brooke Insurance and Financial Services and were required to provide information on insurance sales to Brooke Insurance and Financial Services. According to a sworn affidavit by Marian Ann Eupizi, who was formerly employed by you at Brooke Agency Services, you, Brian D. Boneck, also misappropriated premium payments made to you by other customers whose insurance was written by you or other agents of Brooke Agency Services of Bradenton, Florida, through the Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency. You, Brian D. Boneck, did this by having customers write premium checks payable to your other company, Sierra Insurance Underwriters, Inc. By doing so, Brooke Insurance and Financial Services was unaware of your actions and you also misappropriated commissions owed to them. Also according to Ms. Eupizi, you, Brian D. Boneck, in mid- 2005, misappropriated a refund check issued for a policy on Callis Construction in the amount of approximately $1200. The Respondent offered no reliable evidence at the hearing to support the allegations which served as the factual basis for the denial. As to the allegation that Christopher Waters delivered the check to the Petitioner, the Respondent offered only the sworn affidavit of Mr. Waters and various attachments in support of the allegation. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that he did not accept premium checks from customers and that the office staff accepted and processed premium checks. The Respondent offered no credible evidence to the contrary, and, for purposes of this Order, the Petitioner's testimony is credited. The Petitioner testified that the Waters account was one of 35 transferred to the corporate franchisor when the Petitioner sold the agency back to the Brooke Agency Services. Negotiations for the sale occurred over a period of time and concluded with a bill of sale executed in August 2006. Although the Petitioner's testimony regarding the chronology of the sale was poorly defined, there was no evidence that the Waters account was not included within those transferred. As to the allegation that the premium was misappropriated and not forwarded to Mid-Continent Casualty Insurance Company, the Respondent offered a copy of a sworn statement wherein a Mid-Continent Casualty representative alleged that the company's investigation indicated that the Waters premium was never forwarded through the Brook Agency to the Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency, which initially issued and then ultimately cancelled the policy. Additionally, the Respondent offered a copy of an email to the Respondent's investigator from a representative of Florida Home Builders Insurance, Inc., wherein the representative restates information provided to the email writer from unidentified representatives of the Brooke Agency and AmGro Premium Finance Company (with whom the remaining premium due from Mr. Waters had been financed). The Respondent also offered banking records apparently provided in response to a subpoena that indicate the Waters check was deposited into the Sierra Insurance Underwriters Account, to whom the check was made payable. The Respondent offered no credible evidence that the deposit of the Waters check into the Sierra account was improper. As to the allegation that no money had been refunded to Mr. Waters as of the December 11, 2006, Notice of Denial, the Petitioner testified that the money was refunded by a check to Mr. Waters and had a check to Waters Developers from Sierra Underwriters, Inc., dated July 24, 2006, for $1,471 admitted into evidence. It is unclear why the refund amount exceeded the initial premium amount, but there is no evidence contrary to the Petitioner's testimony that the check was issued as a premium refund. As to the allegations related to the ownership structure of the Petitioner's agency, the Respondent offered no credible evidence regarding the interrelationship between the Brooke entities or how the Brooke entities operated with the Petitioner’s Sierra Underwriters, Inc. Regarding the allegations attributed to sworn affidavit of Marian Ann Eupizi, the Petitioner testified that Ms. Eupizi was a customer service representative who was not involved in the fiscal operation of the agency and whom he had fired for falsification of documents. There was no credible evidence contrary to the Petitioner's testimony, and it is credited. Ms. Eupizi’s affidavit has been disregarded in its entirety. There was no credible evidence to support the assertion in the affidavit that the Petitioner misappropriated premium payments from other customers, misappropriated commissions due to Brooke Insurance and Financial Services, or misappropriated a refund check to an entity identified as Callis Construction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order granting the application of Brian D. Boneck for licensure as a nonresident general lines insurance agent and a nonresident surplus lines insurance agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian D. Boneck 70 East Horizon Ridge Parkway, No. 140 Henderson, Nevada 89002 William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent was licensed as an Ordinary Life and General Lines Agent (Exhibit 1) and was the agent for Dixie Insurance Company at the Bartow office. As such, he had the authority to write policies binding the insurer. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was president and principal stockholder of Friendly Insurance Companies of Bartow, Winter Haven, Lake Wales and Haines City. The corporate records (Exhibit 3 for Polk County) show this to be the same as Friendly Auto Insurance of Lake Wales, Inc. Respondent was the agent for Dixie Insurance Company only at the Bartow office. Dixie Insurance Company qualifies agents, not offices, to sell their policies. Respondent had no authority to act as agent for Dixie Insurance at any of these offices other than the Bartow office as the insurance company has but one agent per office. To support the allegations in count 34 of the Administrative Complaint, Edward Bland testified, and Exhibits 21 through 23 were admitted. Bland applied for automobile insurance at Friendly Auto Insurance at the Winter Haven office, which he paid for by check in the amount of $728 (Exhibit 23) as full payment for the one year premium. Subsequent thereto, a Premium Finance Agreement was prepared on which Bland's signature was forged showing $546 of the premium to be financed. This finance agreement was signed by T. R. Shaw as agent. Upon learning that the finance agreement had been issued on his coverage, Bland contacted the Winter Haven office manager, and after a few weeks of "run around" contacted the Department of Insurance and "got his money back." Bland never saw Shaw or Respondent. Rafael Gomez, M.D. purchased automobile insurance on his three cars from Friendly Auto Insurance of Winter Haven in December 1985 for which he paid $3452.71 for the annual premium. Subsequently thereto, he received a call from the Barnett Bank, which had financed one of the cars, to tell him that the bank needed evidence of insurance on the financed auto. Dr. Gomez contacted Ruth Kent, the office manager at the Winter Haven office, who assured him she would supply the bank with the necessary documentation. When the bank contacted Dr. Gomez later to again demand proof of insurance, Gomez went to the Winter Haven office and demanded to see his file. He made copies of certain documents which he took to the bank. Dr. Gomez subsequently learned that a finance agreement had been entered into on his behalf, but without his knowledge or consent, and that the address shown on the agreement under his name was that of Ruth Kent. Although when accosted by Dr. Gomez with this information, Ms. Kent denied such an intentional act, this would have allowed her to hold the finance coupons and get all information supplied by the finance company to the borrower without Dr. Gomez learning that the policy for which he had paid in full was subsequently financed. After learning of the subterfuge, Dr. Gomez contacted the Department of Insurance. Ruth Judd was office manager at the Friendly Insurance Agency of Haines City for a period of time ending in 1987 when she was terminated by Respondent. Ms. Judd contends she was only the office manager, and Respondent was the boss of the office and hired all employees. During the time she worked in the office, Ms. Judd testified several different people served as the licensed agent for the office, but they spent little time in the office with Donald Leroy Flentke, towards the end of his tenure, coming in only for his weekly paychecks. No evidence was presented from which a determination could be made that for a specific period of time any of the four offices were not being supervised by a licensed agent. Ms. Judd testified she was aware of one policy for which the insured had paid the premium in full being submitted for a premium finance agreement with forged documents. She also was aware that monthly financing payments were made by the Haines City office on some three or four other premium finance agreements. Ms. Judd testified on March 2, 1988, that she was presently unemployed. Respondent called one witness that testified and produced documentary evidence (Exhibits 24 through 26) that on March 2, 1988, this witness purchased insurance from Ms. Judd at New Horizons and was required to buy an accidental death policy in order to obtain PIP coverage. Exhibit 7 shows that an automobile insurance policy was issued to Jackie Bryan, the policy was sold through Friendly Insurance of Winter Haven, Inc., that the premium was financed, the borrower owed an additional $142.66 on the finance agreement, and the policy expired 2-26-86. Respondent acknowledged that his signature appears on the premium finance application. Some 5000 policies are sold by Respondent's agencies per year, and Respondent has no independent recollection of that finance agreement. Dixie Insurance Company issued a policy to Johnny Davis which was also financed through Envoy, but this application was signed by Shaw. Although Dixie Insurance Company had their own premium finance organization and, if the premium is financed, preferred to do the financing, Respondent testified that occasionally, if a client did not want to finance their premium through Dixie, the agency would go through another premium finance company such as Envoy. Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12 show premium finance agreements were contracted for on behalf of Raymond Scott, Mark Turner, Kathy Smith and Cathy Phillips, but no auto insurance policies were issued by Dixie Insurance Company to these individuals. Only one of these finance agreements (Exhibit 12) purports to be prepared at the Bartow office, and two of the drafts (Exhibits 9 and 12) purport to be signed by Respondent. Respondent testified he neither signed those drafts nor authorized someone else to sign for him. The forgery on both Exhibits 9 and 12 appear to have been perpetrated by the same person. Cathy Phillips, a friend of Ruth Kent, testified without contradiction that the signature purporting to be hers on Exhibit 12 was forged, that she never entered into a premium finance agreement with Envoy Finance Corporation, and that she had never seen Exhibit 14 until presented to her by the Petitioner's attorney. Ms. Phillips did receive a past-due notice on one occasion and called Ruth Kent who told her not to worry about it, that everything was taken care of. Subsequently, Ms. Phillips' husband wrote a letter to Envoy Finance Corporation denying any knowledge of any insurance policy written by Friendly Insurance of Bartow. Considerable testimony was submitted regarding the activities of Chuck Evans who was, at one time, employed by Respondent at the Winter Haven agency as a non-licensed employee with authority to write checks on the Trust Account. While the statements made by Evans to Department of Insurance officials contributed to the initiation of the investigation of Respondent's agencies, none of this testimony was relevant to the charges here at issue.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of various violations of the Insurance Code and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent has been licensed as a Life & Variable Annuity Agent (2-14), Life, Health and Variable Annuity Agent (2-15), Life Agent (2-16), Life and Health Agent (2-18), General Lines, Property and Casualty Agent (2-20), and Health Agent (2-40). Respondent holds license number A164221. Petitioner has disciplined Respondent on two prior occasions. By Consent Order filed November 28, 2000, Petitioner imposed an administrative fine of $7500 against Respondent and placed her licenses on probation for two years. The Consent Order arose out of allegations that Respondent failed to place insurance coverage and failed to supervise adequately her employees. By Consent Order filed April 30, 2002, Petitioner imposed an administrative fine of $2000 against Respondent. The Consent Order does not describe the underlying allegations. At all relevant times, Respondent has been a director, officer, and sole owner of AIA. She has owned the corporation since 1993. At all relevant times, Respondent was the only signatory on the AIA bank accounts. Customarily, Respondent markets the insurance and then sends customers to one of the AIA customer service representatives. A high-volume agency with over 15,000 active clients, AIA, which employs 10 persons, has issued about 50,000 policies since November 2001. For most, if not all, of the relevant period, AIA employed Tony Decambre as the primary agent, and customer service representatives performed much of the work in processing insurance applications. Petitioner attempted to prove that Respondent was the primary agent. Rather than produce copies of forms by which Respondent may have designated herself as the primary agent, Petitioner offered only copies of prints of screens of data maintained by Petitioner. The Administrative Law Judge excluded from evidence these data compilations. Respondent testified that Mr. Decambre was the primary agent. Petitioner's investigator testified that Respondent was the primary agent, at least the last time that he had checked. The investigator's testimony failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was the primary agent. On December 28, 2001, Fernando Gomez visited AIA to pay for a workers' compensation insurance policy to be issued by Florida United Businesses Association/Workers Compensation (FUBA). Respondent met with Mr. Gomez, who required the presence of another employee to translate into and from Spanish. As the producer, Respondent signed the application. FUBA bound the coverage on December 31, 2001. Among the three persons present on December 28, only Respondent testified. The application bears the date "December 28, 2001," although this handwriting is lighter than the remainder of the handwriting on the application and could have been written at a date subsequent to the date on which the application was taken. Petitioner contends that Respondent took the application on November 6, 2001, or somehow tried to bind FUBA as of November 6, 2001. The sole evidentiary basis for this contention is Petitioner Exhibit 9, which purports to be a certificate of liability insurance, bearing a date of December 28, 2001, but showing effective dates for general liability and workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Gomez of November 6, 2001. The certificate holder is stated to be Universal Drywall & Plastering, and the producer is stated to be AIA. The workers' compensation insurer is stated to be FUBA. Petitioner Exhibit 9 was admitted solely to prove what Universal Drywall & Plastering sent to FUBA to confirm the existence of Mr. Gomez's workers' compensation coverage. The certificate is false because it confirms workers' compensation insurance as of a date that neither FUBA nor AIA contends is correct. However, the failure to obtain testimony from Mr. Gomez, the AIA employee who translated, or an employee of Universal Drywall & Plastering who could explain how he or she obtained a copy of the certificate precludes a determination that Respondent is in any way responsible for the production or transmission of this false certificate. The certificate suggests that the person responsible for its preparation may not have had Respondent's presumed level of familiarity with FUBA. The person preparing the false certificate used a policy number that is not of a type used by FUBA to identify the workers' compensation policies that it issues. The false certificate bears an expiration date of November 6, 2002. In fact, the actual coverage issued by FUBA ended on April 1, 2002, because all of its workers' compensation policies expire each year on April 1. It appears that Universal Drywall & Plastering presented the false certificate to FUBA on January 2, 2002, so, as of that date, Mr. Gomez had workers' compensation coverage from FUBA. The record also fails to disclose why Mr. Gomez might have desired an earlier effective date. The information might have facilitated a determination of who was responsible for the fraudulent preparation of the certificate. Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Count I. On October 25, 2002, AIA issued an Evidence of Property Insurance to Meryl Levin, showing an effective date of October 25, 2002 for homeowners and flood insurance in the amount of $114,000. The document states that "United" would provide the homeowners insurance at $910 per year and flood insurance at $247 per year. On October 30, 2002, AIA received a check in the amount of $910 from Stephen J. Allocco, P.A., and AIA deposited that check into its noninterest-bearing bank account at Wachovia Bank. On November 8, 2002, United Property & Casualty Insurance Company (United) sent Mr. Levin a notice that he owed $810 for his insurance policy, which bore an effective date of November 8, 2002. The due date is "upon receipt." On January 14, 2003, United canceled the insurance because it never had received the $810. United received a check for $810 on February 26, 2003, but the accompanying package failed to contain a "no loss" statement, which would have assured United that the insured had not suffered a loss between the purported coverage date and the date of receipt of the premium check. Absent such an assurance, United routinely declines to provide coverage because it will not cover losses retroactively. United thus returned the check. Mr. Levin did not testify as to this transaction, nor did anyone from AIA except Respondent, who disclaimed any direct involvement with the matter. There is no evidence of any loss suffered by Mr. Levin, nor is there any evidence of any intentional wrongdoing by Respondent. The determination as to whether Respondent negligently failed to satisfy all applicable duties imposed on her is frustrated by Petitioner's failure to call an expert witness who could have explained office practices in insurance agencies and proved what is reasonable and unreasonable to expect of Respondent. The record does not establish that United sent a copy of its November 8 statement to AIA. Count II portrays a single case in which AIA failed to pay a premium to an insurer for over three months--nothing more. The determination of whether Respondent has demonstrated unfitness for this omission is impossible absent a basis for determining an appropriate minimum standard of agency office practice. Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Count II. On October 9, 2002, Respondent sent a letter to Gerald Kirby bearing the letterhead of AIA stating that "we" have reviewed your homeowner needs and "determined the best possible rate for you." Showing homeowners coverage of $518,000, as well as associated coverages, the letter quotes a total policy premium of $3278. The letter warns that "this quotation is an estimate and is not legally binding." At the bottom of the letter is: "Thanks!!!Joanne." The record reveals no other persons employed at AIA named "Joanne" besides Respondent. On the same date, AIA produced an evidence of property insurance, which shows homeowners and flood insurance with the same effective date of October 11, 2002, in the respective amounts of $518,000 and $250,000, and bearing respective premiums of $3278 and $411 annually. On October 11, 2002, AIA received a check in the amount of $3278 from Capital Abstract & Title and deposited that check into its noninterest-bearing bank account at Wachovia. AIA was to use these funds to purchase homeowners insurance from United, with coverage of $518,000 and an effective date of November 11, 2002 (according to the parties' stipulation, which misstates the year as "2001"). However, the premium for $518,000 of coverage from United was $1890 at the time. The proper amount of premium due for $518,000 of coverage was mooted by the fact that AIA, like all of United's agents at the time, lacked authority to bind United to more than $300,000 coverage without specific approval from a United representative. Such approval required, among other things, documentation of the value of the insured property. AIA sent United a check for $1777, which United received on November 12, 2002. This check was the proper premium for $300,000 of coverage. At the same time, AIA sent paperwork for the issuance of coverage to $587,000, but failed to send the documentation that United required. Thus, United issued only $300,000 of coverage, and Mr. Kirby was due a refund of $1501, which is the difference between the premium that he paid and the cost of the insurance that he received. AIA paid Mr. Kirby $1501 on February 24, 2003. After AIA or a United marketing representative submitted the required documentation, United approved on February 19, 2003, the increase of coverage to $518,000. It is unclear who paid the additional premium--AIA or Mr. Kirby. For the same reasons discussed in Count II, Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Count III. Although AIA's handling of the Kirby transaction was flawed, again, the acts and omissions are not so stark as to eliminate the necessity of expert testimony to establish the minimum standard, against which to measure Respondent's performance of her duties. Mr. Kirby appears to have suffered no loss, and there is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing. Even though, as to this transaction, Respondent clearly had some personal involvement, it is impossible to determine her degree of responsibility for the uneven handling of the insurance transaction and short delay in sending the refund to Mr. Kirby or even whether these two aspects of the transaction demonstrate unfitness to transact insurance business. The remaining counts involve refunds from Pro Premium Finance Company (Pro Premium) to AIA and refunds from AIA to its customers. Pro Premium provides financing to persons purchasing insurance. Several customers of AIA borrowed money from Pro Premium to pay for insurance they were buying through AIA. For various reasons--typically, the cancelation of coverage--Pro Premium refunded portions of the premium to AIA, which subsequently refunded the unearned portion of the commission to the customer. Every two weeks, Pro Premium sends AIA refunds and statements, which clearly identify the insured, date of cancelation, amount of refund, and amount due the insured. The time that elapsed from when AIA received the refunds from Pro Premium to when AIA sent the customers their share of the refunds ranged from two to twelve months. AIA received the refunds from Pro Premium between April 15, 2003, and February 15, 2004, and AIA sent its customers their shares of the refunds between April 5, 2004, and May 12, 2004. The customer refunds are concentrated in a relatively short period of time because AIA discovered all of the unrefunded monies during a self-audit that it conducted during this six-week period. AIA performed the self-audit due to an audit underway at Pro Premium. Except as noted below, Respondent was not personally involved in any of these refund transactions. At the time of all of the Pro Premium transactions described in this recommended order, the policy of AIA was for the customer service representative to write the client within one week of receiving the refund from Pro Premium and ask for directions whether to apply the refund to new or existing insurance or to pay it to the customer. The customer service representatives were supervised by the agency manager, not Respondent. It is unclear what AIA's policy was if the customer did not respond. When AIA paid refunds, its policy at the time was for the agency manager to prepare the refund check, which Respondent would sign. In May 2004, AIA changed its handling of refunds by directing all Pro Premium refunds directly to the bookkeeper, who expedites the preparation of the refund checks, which can now be signed by Respondent or one of two other employees. As to Count IV, on April 15, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1361.03, which AIA deposited on May 7, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$117.21--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Erikna Guzman. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Guzman of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Ms. Guzman did not respond. On May 10, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Guzman a check for $117.21. Twelve months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Guzman the money due her. As to Count V, on May 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1538.36, which AIA deposited on June 10, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$43.83--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Shannon Campbell. By letter sent after obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Campbell of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Ms. Campbell did not respond. On April 17, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Campbell a check for $43.83. Ten and one-half months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Campbell the money due her. As to Count VII, on an unspecified date, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $720.38, which AIA deposited on July 8, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$347.35--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Marie Philippe. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Philippe of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Ms. Philippe did not respond. On April 5, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Philippe a check for $347.35. At least nine months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Philippe the money due her. As to Count VIII, on June 30, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1729.80, which AIA deposited on July 8, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$380.40--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Fernando Garcia. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Mr. Garcia of the refund and asked him to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. The first letter was returned by the postal service as undeliverable. Mr. Garcia had sold his house and moved. However, on April 7, 2004, AIA sent Mr. Garcia a check for $380.40. Nine months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Mr. Garcia the money due him. As to Count IX, on August 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1552.84, which AIA deposited on September 9, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$102.07--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Girline Reid. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Reid of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Ms. Reid instructed AIA to apply the refund to insurance issued to her husband, which AIA did. However, Respondent did not testify when AIA applied the refund to the account of Ms. Reid's husband. On May 7, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Reid a check for $102.07. Eight months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Reid the money due her. As to Count X, on August 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1552.84, which AIA deposited on September 9, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$169.06--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Guillermo Diaz, who is a significant customer of AIA. Respondent spoke with him shortly after AIA received the refund, and he instructed her to apply the refund to other insurance issued to him. Again, Respondent did not testify when Mr. Diaz instructed her to apply the refund to other insurance, but, given his importance as a repeat customer, he probably spoke with her shortly after AIA received the refund. However, on April 17, 2004, AIA sent Mr. Diaz a check for $169.06, to which he may not have been entitled. Eight and one-half months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Mr. Diaz the refund check. As to Count XI, on November 30, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $4994.25, which AIA deposited on December 9, 2003, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$143.18--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Bernardo Archibald. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Mr. Archibald of the refund and asked him to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Mr. Archibald directed AIA to keep the money to apply to insurance for which he owed additional premium because he had not yet obtained a four-point inspection (heating, wiring, roofing, and plumbing) of an older home, so as to be entitled to a reduced premium. However, Respondent did not testify when AIA received this direction from Mr. Archibald, although only five months elapsed from AIA's receipt of the refund from Pro Premium to its issuance, on May 7, 2004, of a check to Mr. Archibald for $143.18. As to Count XII, on an unspecified date, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $3881.67, which AIA deposited on January 13, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$488.83--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Danette Piscopo. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Piscopo of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that AIA sent a refund check, but Ms. Piscopo never cashed it. However, Respondent did not testify when it sent the earlier check, although only about three months elapsed from AIA's receipt of the refund from Pro Premium to its issuance on April 15, 2004, of a check to Ms. Piscopo for $488.83. As to Count XIII, on December 31, 2003, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $1988.58, which AIA deposited on January 13, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$294.60--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Allam Masief. Respondent testified that AIA mistakenly issued two policies to Mr. Masief for the same coverage from two insurers and mistakenly paid Pro Premium twice, even though Mr. Masief paid only one premium. Both policies were canceled. Mr. Masief asked AIA to reinstate one policy, but it was unable to do so. Respondent did not testify when these discussions with Mr. Masief took place, but only four and one-half months elapsed from AIA's receipt of the refund from Pro Premium and to its issuance, on May 12, 2004, of a check to Mr. Masief for $294.60. As to Count XIV, on January 31, 2004, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $3260.03, which AIA deposited on February 10, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$886.74--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Geraldine DeStefanis. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. DeStefanis of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Ms. DeStefanis "probably" asked AIA to try to reinstate the canceled policy, but AIA was unable to do so. On May 7, 2004, AIA sent Ms. DeStefanis a check for $886.74. Three months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. DeStefanis the money due her. As to Count XV, on an unspecified date, Pro Premium sent AIA a check in the amount of $4750.53, which AIA deposited on March 9, 2004, into its noninterest-bearing account at Wachovia. Part of these funds--$343.38--represented unearned commission, which was due the insured, Leslie Ramrattan. By letter sent within one week of obtaining the Pro Premium refund, AIA informed Ms. Ramrattan of the refund and asked her to instruct AIA as to whether to apply it to new insurance or send her a refund. Respondent testified that Ms. Ramrattan asked AIA to try to reinstate the policy, but AIA was unable to do so. On May 7, 2004, AIA sent Ms. Ramrattan a check for $343.38. About two months elapsed from when AIA received the refund and when it sent Ms. Ramrattan the money due her. Petitioner has failed to prove the material allegations of Counts IV-V and VII-XV, with one exception each as to Counts VI, V, and VII. In general, there is no evidence of any intentional wrongdoing by anyone at AIA, nor is there evidence that Respondent should have known of the failure of her staff to promptly refund the monies due their insureds. In several of these transactions in which AIA held the customers' refunds for relatively long periods of time, the record demonstrates that this was in accordance with the customers' directions or otherwise justified. For the shorter periods-- five months or less--the record provides no basis for determining that Respondent should have known of this failure within this relatively short period of time. In several counts, AIA failed to meet its obligation, under Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-196.010(2)(b), which is cited below, to refund or apply the unearned commissions within 15 days of receipt of the refund and statement from Pro Premium. These are Counts IV, V, VII, XIV, and XV. It is impossible to determine if AIA violated this rule in Count VIII, where the insured had moved; Counts IX-XI, where the insureds told AIA to apply the refunds to new or other insurance and presumably AIA did so, perhaps within the required 15 days; and Count XIII, where AIA appears to have paid for one policy out of its own funds and the insured may have received a windfall. As to Counts IV, V, VII, XIV, and XV, the question is whether Respondent is professionally responsible for the violations by AIA. These counts fall into two groups. In Counts IV, V, and VII, AIA wrongfully retained the refunds for long periods--12 months, 10 and one-half months, and at least nine months, respectively. In Counts XIV and XV, AIA wrongfully retained the refunds much shorter periods--less than three months and less than two months, respectively. Perhaps expert testimony could have established that Respondent should have detected, within a period of less than 90 days, the wrongfully retained funds, but, absent such testimony, an inference to this effect is impossible, especially when the standard is clear and convincing evidence. However, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish Respondent's professional responsibility for failing to detect this situation for 9-12 months. Given the long durations of time, the clarity of the Pro Premium's refund statements, the relatively small number of employees, Respondent's integral involvement in the daily operations of AIA as the only person authorized to sign checks, and the importance of restoring funds of customers to customers promptly, it is a reasonable inference that Respondent should have known that AIA staff had wrongfully failed to send these refunds to its customers for 9-12 months. Any suggestion by Respondent that the absence of a response from these customers justified retaining these moneys fails to account for the fact that AIA later sent the refund checks to the customers, even though they had still not contacted AIA, according to the record. Thus, for Counts IV, V, and VII, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent has demonstrated her unfitness to transact insurance business.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I-III and VIII-XV of the Administrative Complaint; finding Respondent guilty of three violations (Counts IV, V, and VII) of demonstrating unfitness to engage in the insurance business, in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes; and suspending her insurance licenses for 30 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Sevices The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Robert Alan Fox Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thompkins W. White White & Chang, P.A. 1650 Summit Lake Drive, Suite 1013 Tallahassee, Florida 32317
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent's Licensure and Work History Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, licensed by Petitioner as a general lines (property and casualty) insurance agent. At no time material to the instant case has he been licensed as a surplus lines agent. In the 30 plus years that he has been in the insurance business, no licensing agency has taken any disciplinary action against him. From January of 1997 until July of 1997 (which includes the entire period during which the events described in the Administrative Complaint took place), Respondent worked as an insurance agent for Braishfield of Florida, Inc. (Braishfield), an insurance agency/brokerage firm. (In July of 1997, he started his own insurance agency/brokerage firm, Bandel and Associates, which he still operates.) The Saxony Condominium Association The Saxony Condominium Association (Association) consists of the owners of the 672 units (located in 14 buildings) in the "Saxony" section of the Kings Point condominium development in Delray Beach. The development is approximately seven to ten miles from the Atlantic Ocean. For the past six years, Elinor Lichten has been the president of the Association. The Association's Insurance Committee In August of 1992, before Ms. Lichten became president of the Association, Hurricane Andrew made landfall in the South Florida area and caused extensive property damage. In the years that followed, the premiums that the Association paid for insurance increased dramatically. In February of 1996, in an effort to contain these escalating insurance costs, the Association formed an insurance committee. Ms. Lichten named Dan Miller to serve as the chairman of the committee. Mr. Miller appointed the remaining members on the committee. Ed Greenbaum was among those Mr. Miller appointed to the committee. Ms. Lichten was not a voting member of the committee, although she did attend some (but not all) of the committee's meetings. The Association's Fireman's Fund Policies At the time the insurance committee was formed, the Association was insured by Fireman's Fund. It obtained this insurance coverage through Sedgwick James of Florida, Inc. (Sedgwick). The insurance agent who represented Sedgwick in its dealings with the Association was J. Simione. In October of 1996, the Association received a notice that the Fireman's Fund policies would not be renewed. Upon receiving the notice, Ms. Lichten telephoned Mr. Simione, who advised her that he was "negotiating to reinstate that policy and that in all probability it would be reinstated." Mr. Simione subsequently contacted Ms. Lichten and advised her that the negotiations had been successful. The Fireman's Fund policies were thereafter renewed. The renewed policies had an effective date of December 1, 1996, and an expiration date of December 1, 1997. The Association agreed to the renewal notwithstanding the renewed policies' high premiums and deductibles. Members of the insurance committee, who had met with Mr. Simione "between three to five times" prior to the renewal of the policies, had advised the committee members that there were no better options available and that they should "be absolutely delighted [to] have the coverage [they] had since insurance companies were not renewing policies." When they asked Mr. Simione to "find [a] layered program [for the Association, like those other condominium associations in the area had] where the [risk] is divided so that the premiums are reduced," Mr. Simione told them that it "wasn't possible," explaining that "all of the layering programs [they] had referred to had since fallen apart." The Insurance Committee's Discussions with Respondent Following the renewal of the Fireman's Fund policies, members of insurance committee, at the direction Mr. Miller, "start[ed] to interview" other insurance agents "to see whether or not Mr. Simione's comment to [them concerning the unavailability of a layered program for the Association] had any validity." Respondent was the second agent to be "interview[ed]." He was initially contacted by Ed Greenbaum, who told him that the insurance committee "was very upset by the current coverage package they had" and wanted to see if "there was something better." Respondent spoke subsequently with both Mr. Greenbaum and Mr. Miller. Following this conversation, he sent Mr. Greenbaum the following letter, dated February 23, 1997: It was pleasure talking to you and Dan Miller and I appreciate your candor. Based on the information you provided on the phone, it appears the premiums and deductibles that are currently in force are excessive. My comment is based on what is available in the marketplace today. It appears that the earliest I can sit down and discuss this with the board is in May. My recommendation is that we move our meeting up to March or April. This will enable us to obtain the best possible terms and conditions as we will have ample time prior to the beginning of the hurricane season. The association has nothing to lose and potentially a lot to gain. My evaluation requires a minimum amount of time. After our meeting and a review of the current program and losses, I will be in a position to confirm in writing what improvements can be made. I look forward to hearing from you. Respondent provided the "marketing person" at Braishfield with the information he had been provided by Mr. Greenbaum and Mr. Miller concerning the Association's insurance needs and loss history. The "marketing person" thereupon canvassed the market to determine if there were any alternatives to the Fireman's Fund policies. Such canvassing revealed that there did exist an alternative to the Fireman's Fund policies, in the form of a layered program in which three of the participating insurers were not "authorized insurers," as that term is used in Florida's "Surplus Lines Law." The "marketing person" prepared the following "Statement of Diligent Effort" for Respondent's signature as the "producing agent": Pursuant to [sic] Section 626.914(4), Florida Statutes, requires producing agents to document that a diligent effort has been made to place a risk with at least three (3) authorized insurers prior to contacting a surplus lines agent to export the risk in the surplus lines market. The following form, prescribed by the Department, must be completed IN FULL for each risk. Name of person contacted and telephone number are MANDATORY. COUNTY OF RISK: Palm Beach County NAME OF INSURED: Saxony A-N Condominium Association TYPE OF COVERAGE: Property AUTHORIZED INSURER #1 NAME- Hartford Insurance TELEPHONE NUMBER- 800-824-1732 PERSON CONTACTED- Ben Wilson DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Type of Risk/Property Location AUTHORIZED INSURER #2 NAME- General Accident Ins. TELEPHONE NUMBER- 407-660-1985 PERSON CONTACTED- Bob Rayser DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Type of Risk/Property Location AUTHORIZED INSURER #2 NAME- RISCORP TELEPHONE NUMBER- 800-226-7472 PERSON CONTACTED- Bryan Flowers DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Risk does not qualify for program Respondent signed this "Statement of Diligent Effort" on the line provided for the "[s]ignature of [p]roducing [a]gent." He did so in good faith based upon the representations made to him by the "marketing person." In April of 1997, Respondent met with members of the insurance committee and Ms. Lichten at Mr. Miller's residence to discuss the possibility of the Association obtaining, through Braishfield, the layered program of insurance described above to replace the Fireman's Fund policies that were then in effect. Respondent, on behalf of Braishfield, made a "conceptual" proposal at the meeting. After the meeting, Respondent sent the following letter, dated April 16, 1997, to Dan Miller: It was a pleasure meeting with you and the committee and again I want to apologize for arriving late. Per our discussions, we will provide our final proposal after receiving written confirmation regarding the three year loss history for property and liability. Our proposal will be effective June 1, however we will use whatever date is acceptable to the committee. We anticipate, it will take us approximately two weeks from the time we go into the marketplace until everything is finalized. It appears, there is minimal exposure for equipment, such as heating, cooling and electrical systems. Consequently, we will not include machinery and equipment breakdown in our final proposal. I strongly recommend that you obtain an updated appraisal on your buildings as it is extremely important that your replacement cost reflect today's cost. This will eliminate any potential coinsurance or under insurance problem in the event of a loss. I look forward to working with you and the committee and being appointed as your broker to assist you in all your insurance needs. In May of 1997, Respondent, on behalf of Braishfield, presented a detailed formal written proposal (Braishfield's Written Proposal) to the Association. Braishfield's Written Proposal contained an "Executive Summary" which read as follows: Executive Summary Per our conceptual proposal and correspondence of April 16, we are pleased to present our final program including terms and conditions. Our proposal is based on information provided by the Insurance Committee on policies that are currently in force. Our comparison of coverages incorporates this information. The differences are what we believe to be the key or salient features of each program. The bottom line is, we are offering a substantial premium savings, significantly lower deductibles with comparable coverage. Our recommendation is to appoint Braishfield of Florida as your broker to place all coverage in effect as soon as possible. The "final program" referenced in the "Executive Summary" was a layered program. The "[p]articipating [c]arriers" in the program and their "Best's Ratings" were listed as follows in Braishfield's Written Proposal: PARTICIPATING CARRIERS Property Insurance Carriers Best's Rating Lexington Insurance A++15 General Star Insurance A++7 Royal Surplus Lines A-7 General Liability/Crime New Hampshire Insurance A++15 Directors & Officers Liability Chubb Insurance Group A++15 Umbrella Liability Great American Insurance A+11 The three "carriers" providing "property insurance" coverage were not "authorized insurers," within the meaning of the "Surplus Lines Law." The "[b]enefits of the Braishfield [p]roposed [p]rogram [o]ver [c]urrent [p]rogram" were described in Braishfield's Written Proposal as follows: A Premium Savings of $42,529 Annually.* No Coinsurance Penalty. A 2% Deductible per building as respect to the perils of wind and hail. A $5,000,000 limit for Excess Liability A $5,000 AOP Deductible * Our premium savings is based on the following: Company Coverage Premiums Fireman's Fund Package $144,071 Fireman's Fund Umbrella $2,168 TOTAL $146,239 $ 12,966 (Agent's Fee) TOTAL $159,205 Proposal Cancellation Date June 1, 1997 Pro Rata Return Premium- $79,761 Short Rate Return Premium- $71,801 NOTE: A $1,000,000 Umbrella would produce a further savings of $3,395 Braishfield's Written Proposal also contained a "Program Comparison," which provided as follows: Coverage Current Proposed Program Program $20,454,000 Blanket As Per Limit on Schedule Real and Personal Property Coinsurance Yes No Demolition $250,000 Cost Law & $5,000,000 $500,000 Ordinance Deductible -Wind 3% of $20,454,00 2% Per Building -AOP $10,000 $5,000 Valuation Replacement Cost Re- Placement Cost Unnamed Yes See Note Storm Deductible Umbrella $1,000,00 $5,000,000 Limit NOTE: Our comparison does not include unnamed storm wind coverage. This will be discussed during the presentation. Respondent met with the committee members and Ms. Lichten for about eight hours on or about May 6, 1997. At the meeting, he explained Braishfield's Written Proposal in detail and answered questions. On or about May 9, 1997, Respondent sent the following letter to Mr. Miller for the insurance committee's consideration: The benefits to the association under Braishfield's proposal are: A $5,000 AOP deductible Significantly lower premium No co-insurance penalty A superior wind deductible in the event of a catastrophe such a hurricane. The elimination of any rate increase in 1997 even if this is a bad year for the insurance industry. Outstanding insurance service will include a renewal strategy meeting 120 days prior to expiration. This meeting will disclose options, market conditions and pricing projections. This will allow the committee to act proactively instead of reactively in the best interest of the association. -$5,000,000 Umbrella. One other point to consider involves the payment of premium. If you cancel the Fireman's Fund Package policy on June 1, the earned premium is estimated to be $72,035. If you include a short rate penalty this increases to $79,239. Including the May installment the association has paid $96,165. The difference or the return premium due the association is $24,130 which should be refunded within 60 days. Since you have paid more premium than is earned no payment should be made for June. This enables the association to apply June's payment of $12,015 toward the down payment under Braishfield's program of $26,557.16. The net amount the association has to come up with is $14,542.16. I trust this will be helpful to the committee. It has not been shown that that Respondent at any time knowingly provided the Association (through its officers and representatives) with any false or misleading information or that he knowingly, with the intent to deceive, hid any information from the Association. He disclosed, among other things, that Braishfield's proposed layered program, unlike the Fireman's Fund policies, included "unauthorized insurers" and explained the differences between "unauthorized" and "authorized" insurers. In explaining these differences, he talked about the Florida Insurance Guaranty Act, which protects those insured by "authorized insurers" in the event of insurer insolvency, but does not offer similar protection to those insured by "unauthorized insurers." Respondent also advised that the mid- term cancellation of the Fireman's Fund policies would result in a "short rate" penalty and, in addition, he discussed how Braishfield's proposed layered program would be financed and the interest rates that would be charged. The Association's Acceptance of Braishfield's Written Proposal The insurance committee brought Braishfield's Written Proposal before the Association's board of directors, which voted 15 to 14 in favor of accepting the proposal and replacing the Fireman's Fund policies with the layered program proposed by Braishfield. Post-Acceptance Activities After learning of the results of the vote, Respondent sent the following letter, dated May 27, 1997, to Mr. Miller: I was delighted to hear that the board has made their decision in favor of Braishfield. If we are looking at a May 31, 1997, effective date it is essential that the following matters be addressed immediately: The original finance agreement signed in the appropriate places indicated by "x." A check in the amount of $26,557.67 should be made payable to Braishfield of Florida for the down payment. Both the finance agreement and the check must be available to be picked up by me prior to May 31, 1997. A broker of record letter naming Braishfield on the Director's and Officer's liability policy must be executed and signed. The specific policy number should be included in the caption. A sample letter was included in our final proposal. We will be sending you a completed statement of values form which will require signature of a board or insurance committee member. I have taken the liberty of drafting a letter advising the agent to cancel all coverages effective May 31, 1997. Included is a request to confirm the return premium due the association as well as any unearned fee that will be returned. This letter should be written on Saxony letterhead and signed by you or the President of the association. In accordance with Respondent's suggestion, Ms. Lichten sent the following letter, dated May 28, 1997, to Mr. Simione: Re: Fireman's Commercial Insurance Pkg. Policy #S15MZX80662013 Fireman's Umbrella Insurance Policy #XSC 00074217738 Dear Mr. Simione: Effective May 31, 1997, please cancel above captioned policies. The Saxony Board of Directors at a Special Meeting held on May 27, 1997 voted to appoint a new agent. Please acknowledge the above cancellation in writing and also confirm the return premium due under each policy, including any penalty. Confirmation of any unearned brokerage fee should also be included. All calculations should be based on a May 31, 1997 cancellation date. Thank you for your cooperation and consideration you have given Saxony over the past few years. The following day, May 29, 1997, Ms. Lichten sent the following letter, with the described enclosures, to Respondent: Enclosed herewith please find the following: Duly signed Finance Agreement for our Insurance as agreed upon. Check #001 payable to Braishfield of Florida date May 28, 1997 drawn on Sun Trust in the amount of $26,557.67, which represents our down payment. Please send us [a] letter acknowledging receipt of the above together with [a] letter indicating that we will indeed have insurance as we agreed to commencing May 31, 1997. Looking forward to working with you. That same day, May 29, 1997, Respondent sent Ms. Lichten "copies of binders confirming coverage effective May 31, 1997 as per [Braishfield's] May 6th proposal." On June 5, 1997, Ms. Lichten sent Mr. Simione a signed (by Ms. Lichten) and dated (May 29, 1997) "Cancellation Request/Policy Release" form formally requesting cancellation of the Fireman's Fund policies, effective May 31, 1997. On or about June 20, 1997, Ms. Lichten was sent a Certificate of Insurance "certify[ing] that the policies listed [which had been described in Braishfield's Written Proposal] ha[d] been issued to the [Association] for the policy period indicated [May 31, 1997, to May 31, 1998]." On or about June 30, 1997, the appraiser that the Association had hired (Allied Appraisal Service) completed the "updated appraisal on [the Association's] buildings" that Respondent had recommended. Respondent reviewed the appraisal report and prepared a written analysis of the report, which he subsequently discussed with the members of the insurance committee and Ms. Lichten. In his written analysis, Respondent stated, among other things, the following: This proposal analyzes the appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service on June 30, covering the building and surrounding improvements at Saxony "E," Delray Beach, Florida 33446. The purpose is two fold. To ascertain if the values being reported to the insurance companies reflect as closely as possible the exposure at risk. This includes the impact on coverages such as limits and deductibles. The other area is the premium which includes various options. The property coverage is underwritten in a layered program using three companies. The total limit of coverage is $20,454,000, which is subject to a sublimit per building of $1,461,000. Based on the updated appraisal, the 100% replacement cost on buildings and improvements is $24,561,978 which breaks down to $1,754,427 per building. These amounts were arrived at by eliminating and or reducing those items that were not the responsibility of the association. Other adjustments were made regarding contingencies and contractor's profit which should be discussed. The breakdown is provided on Exhibit I attached. The difference or the amount of increase required to comply with the appraisal is $4,107,978. The change in values increases the wind deductible from $29,220 to $35,088 per building. On or about July 18, 1997, Respondent (who, by this time, had left the employ of Braishfield and had started his own insurance agency/brokerage firm) sent Ms. Lichten a letter, which read as follows: Per our meeting with the insurance committee on Wednesday, July 16, it was recommended the building values be amended based on the property appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service[] on June 30, 1997. The 100% replacement value including improvements is $24,561,978. The total amount of insurance in force is $20,454,000. The net result is a[n] increase of $4,107,978. Also included in the appraisal is the cost to change certain items revised by current building codes. This is known as law or ordinance coverage. We recommend an increase in the limit by $850,000 to $1,350,000 to cover the additional exposure. Both of the above increases place the property insurance in compliance with the appraisal. The underwriter has agreed to provide blanket coverage using 90% coinsurance. The blanket amount excluding law or ordinance coverage is $22,105,760. This is an improvement over the existing program as the blanket amount would apply to any one loss and the basis for determining the premium would be significantly less. Using an effective date of July 31, the additional premium including taxes and fees is $8,446.20. In addition to the improvement in coverage and key deductibles, our program provides a net savings in excess of $34,000 a year over the Fireman's Fund policy. The changes that Respondent had recommended based upon the "updated Appraisal" were "bound," as Respondent advised Ms. Lichten by the following letter dated August 12, 1997: This will confirm that effective July 31, the following changes have been bound: The total insurable value increased to $22,105,780. The Law or Ordinance coverage increased to $1,350,000. Coverage is on a blanket basis. The coinsurance clause has been amended to 90%. The 2% wind deductible per building is increased to $31,580. All of these changes were based on the property appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service on June 30, with some exceptions, such as Misc. & Contingencies and Overhead/Profits. It was agreed by the insurance committee not to include these items. Attached is our invoice amount of $8,446.20 representing the additional premium due hereunder. Please make your check payable to Braishfield of Florida and send it to me. In October of 1997, Respondent submitted a renewal proposal to the Association. The proposal was accepted and renewed coverage was bound, effective December 1, 1997, for a period of three years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was eligible for, and licensed as, an insurance agent in the State of Florida. The Respondent is currently eligible for, and licensed as, an insurance agent in the State of Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed agent for United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G). At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was an officer, director, and stockholder of D.E. Brewer and Company (Company), an incorporated general lines insurance agency primarily located in Jacksonville, Florida. On or about April 24, 1986, the Company entered into an agency agreement with USF&G whereby the Company was given authority to solicit and sell insurance on behalf of USF&C. This agency agreement was cancelled unilaterally by USF&G on November 24, 1986. At all times material to this proceeding, all funds received by the Company on behalf of USF&G represented premium funds paid by consumers for the purpose of obtaining insurance and were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity to be paid over to USF&G in the applicable regular course of business. Under the agency agreement with USF&G, accounts of premium funds received by the Company on behalf of USF&G were to be "rendered at the end of each month" and any "balance shown to be due to" USF&G was to "be paid to the designated reporting office not later than the twentieth day of the second succeeding month". On or about October 27, 1986, Southland Services of Jacksonville, Inc. (Southland) issued a check to the Company in the amount of $15,799.00 as a monthly installment for an auto policy and a general liability policy issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected by the Company on behalf of USF&G. On or about November 21, 1986, Southland issued a check to the Company in the amount of $13,785.00 as a monthly installment for auto policy and a general liability policy issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected by the Company on behalf of USF&G. On or about November 12, 1986, S. Gordon Blalock (Blalock) issued a check to the Company in the amount of $1,341.00 as a premium on an auto policy issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected on behalf of USF&G. On or about December 3, 1986, USF&G notified Blalock that USF&G had not received the premium and unless Blalock remitted the premium within 15 days his policy would be cancelled. This matter was cleared up by Blalock with USF&G and the policy was not cancelled. On or about November 5, 1986, Anita Grusenmeyer, on behalf of Grusenmeyer & Associates, Inc. (Grusenmeyer) issued a check to the Company in the amount of $2,810.00 as a premium payment for insurance policies issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected by the Company on behalf of USF&G. On or about December 15, 1986, USF&G requested documentation from Grusenmeyer as to proof of premium payment to the Company on these insurance policies since the Company had not rendered the premium payment to USF&G. This documentation was furnished and there was no interruption of the coverage. On or about November 24, 1986, USF&G unilaterally terminated its agency agreement with the Company due to the Company's failure to remit premium funds collected on behalf of USF&G. Prior to, and at the time of the termination of the agency agreement by USF&G, Respondent was Vice President, a director and stockholder (11%) of the Company, but on or about November 24, 1986, the date of the termination of the agency agreement, Respondent became president of the Company. By letter dated December 12, 1986 and addressed to Respondent, USF&G, under paragraph 9 of the agency agreement, made a demand on the Company for the records pertaining to business dealings between the Company and USF&G. This demand was again made by letter on January 21, 1987. However, there was some concern on Respondent's part in turning these records over to USF&G and it was determined that USF&G could make copies of such records with someone from the Company being present. Due to conflicts in schedules of both parties this was never accomplished, and, in the interim, USF&G concluded that it had the capability to reproduce the records on its computer. No further demand for the records was made and the records were never turned over to USF&G by the Company. Also in its letter dated January 2, 1987, USF&G advised the Company that the premium funds received in November, 1986, were overdue as well as the August, 1986, and October, 1986, account. The August, 1986, and October, 1986, account would be for premium funds received in June, 1986, and August, 1986, respectively. The September, 1986, account had been paid on or about November 20, 1986, using premium funds received from Southland on November 21, 1986, in the amount of $13,785.00 to cover a check previously issued by Donald Brewer on an account that did not have sufficient funds to cover the check. The deposit of the Southland check into the account made the check written by Donald Brewer "good". In accordance with the agency agreement, the premium funds received from Southland ($15,799.00) in October, 1986, were due and payable on December 20, 1986, and the premium funds received from Southland ($13,785.00), Blalock ($1,341.00) and Grusenmeyer ($2,810.00) during November, 1986, were funds due and payable on January 20, 1987. However, these premium funds had been disposed of prior to Respondent becoming president of the Company on November 24, 1986, and the Company having insufficient funds that could be used to pay USF&G after Respondent became president, the funds were not remitted to USF&G in the regular course of business set forth in the agency agreement. All the premium funds received by the Company from Southland ($15,799.00 and $13,785.00), Blalock ($1,341.00) and Grusenmeyer ($2,810.00) in October and November of 1986 were deposited in the Southeast Bank, N.A., of Jacksonville, Florida, Account No. 001632637, an account on which Respondent had no check writing authority. All of the above-referenced funds were deposited in that account prior to Respondent becoming president on November 24, 1986. The Respondent was not the responsible agent for the three insurance accounts: Southland; Blalock; and Grusenmeyer, and none of the premium funds remitted to the company by these accounts were "received by" the Respondent. There is no evidence that these premium funds were "received by" any employee of the Company who was under the Respondent's direct supervision and control. There is no evidence that Respondent had access to, or responsibility for, the premium funds paid by Southland, Blalock and Grusenmeyer during October and November of 1986. Likewise, there is no evidence that the Respondent diverted or appropriated any of such premium funds to his own use or to the use of anyone other than to those entitled to receive them. Upon becoming president, Respondent opened a new bank account with the Florida National Bank, but there was no evidence that the account ever had sufficient funds, other than possibly premium funds belonging to other insurers which had been received on their behalf by the Company, to pay USF&G the premium funds due it from the Southland, Blalock and Grusenmeyer accounts. There was evidence that the Respondent had paid salaries to the employees out of the account, but no amount was established. Upon becoming president, Respondent began negotiating a settlement with USF&G on the amount of premium funds due USF&G. There was a dispute as to the amount but a settlement of approximately $52,000.00 was reached. Some of this amount has been paid, but there is a remaining balance. There was no evidence that Respondent, prior to becoming President of the Company, took any part in the policy decisions or administration of the Company, such as determining the manner in which the Company's receipts would be spent or to direct, control or supervise the activities of the employees or other insurance agents of the Company.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, John Lanahan, Brewer in Case No. 87-2692. Respectfully submitted and entered this 26th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-2692 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 2, except that there was no evidence presented as to the types of insurance licenses Respondent held. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3.-9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 through 9, respectively. 10. Adopted in finding of Fact 10 but clarified to show the date of the check to be November 12, 1986, rather than November 21, 1986. 11-14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11 through 14. 15-16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 17-18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. 20-22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19 and 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 except that there is competent evidence to show that the Grusenmeyer payment was received and deposited prior to Respondent assuming the Presidency. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23, but although there was a sincere dispute as to the amount there was no competent evidence that that amount was $200,000 or that the settlement figure of $52,000 was not a fair representation of the amount owed to USF&G by the Company. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 19, and 24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 9, and 19 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 and 19. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 18 and 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21 and 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 11-12. Rejected as being argument, not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Judith S. Beaubouef, Esquire Peter L. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 4099 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer ana Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are (1) whether respondent's licenses as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent and health agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the amended administrative complaint, and (2) whether respondent's applications for the issuance and renewal of a resident license should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Stephen Schnur, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines, and health agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a property and casualty insurance agent for Clarendon National Insurance Company (CNIC) and had placed his license as a general lines agent with Devor Insurance Agency (DIA), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located at 6611 West Hillsborough Avenue, Tampa, Florida. He has been licensed by petitioner for approximately nineteen years. In August 1987 respondent was associated with Bill Ely Insurance (Ely) in Tampa, Florida. Because that firm was unable to write automobile insurance on young drivers, Schnur referred some of Ely's business to DIA, a firm owned by one Marcia Cline, who held no insurance licenses. In September 1987 Schnur received an offer from Cline of a weekly salary of $150 if he would place his property and casualty general lines agency license with DIA. After obtaining independent verification from petitioner that DIA had no pending "problems", and accepting Cline's representation, albeit false, that the firm had an errors and omissions policy, respondent accepted Cline's offer and placed his license with DIA effective that month. He continued to utilize his other licenses to sell insurance for Ely, his principal employer. It should also be noted that another unnamed general lines agent had placed her license at DIA during this same period of time. At first Schnur attempted to review all automobile insurance applications received by DIA. However, because of his duties at Ely, he was unable to devote more than a few hours per week to DIA. In view of this, he agreed to sign in blank applications and binders for Cline to use in his absence. In doing so, he relied upon Cline's honesty and integrity and assumed she would forward all applications and premiums to the insurance company and secure coverage for DIA's customers. Under this arrangement, Cline was considered to be an employee of DIA and operating under Schnur's direct supervision and control. In October 1987 five customers purchased various types of automobile insurance from Cline. 1/ Each customer gave Cline either cash or checks as payment for their policies. Although none of the customers met with or spoke with respondent, and dealt exclusively with Cline, each received a binder from Cline signed by respondent evidencing insurance with CNIC. In addition, Cline gave each customer a receipt of payment also carrying respondent's signature. As it turned out, Cline did not process the applications or forward them to CNIC. She also failed to remit any monies to the insurance company. Consequently, none of the customers received a policy from CNIC or any other insurance company. However, respondent had no reason to suspect anything since he periodically examined the office files during this period of time and found all documents in order. On January 3, 1988, respondent learned from other office personnel that there was a problem with Cline's handling of insurance applications. He immediately telephoned petitioner's Tampa district office the same day and advised that DIA applications were found unprocessed and in the waste basket. When Schnur asked if he should pull his license from DIA, he was told by petitioner's representative not to do anything. In the meantime, the other general lines agent at DIA pulled her license and left the state. On January 28, 1988 DIA sent a form letter to various customers, including the five who had purchased policies in October 1987. The letter read as follows: Dear We are writing you this letter concerning the insurance policy which you sought through our agency. Please consider this letter as official notification from our agency that you need to purchase insurance coverage from another agency or agencies as soon as possible. You have no insurance coverage on your vehicle or vehicles. Again, you must secure insurance on your vehicle or vehicles immediately, as in today!! Sincerely, Devor Insurance Agency It should be noted that none of the five customers received any refund of monies. In early February 1988 respondent pulled his license with DIA. Since then, he has worked full-time with Ely. Respondent has fully cooperated with the Department during the course of this investigation. At hearing, Schnur was can did and forthright and admitted he used extremely poor judgment in signing in blank the binders and receipts and relying on Cline's honesty. However, there was no intent on his part to violate the insurance code or otherwise harm the customers. He strongly desires to continue in the insurance profession, a field in which he has worked without a blemish for the last nineteen years. His present employer, Ely, has expressed complete trust and confidence in Schnur, allows him to handle all of the firm's money, and intends to reward him with a part ownership of that business. Other than the charges set forth in the pending amended administrative complaint, there is no basis upon which to deny the applications for renewal and issuance of a resident license.
Conclusions Paragraph 2 of Petitioner's exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Statement of the Issues, Preliminary Statement, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation because none of these sections of the Recommended Order address the April 9, 1990 denial of the renewal of Respondent's resident license to represent C M Life Insurance Company as a life and health insurance agent. Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation regarding the April 9 denial on April 17, 1990. Although the record contains no Order ruling on-the last motion for consolidation, it appears that the parties agreed that the April 9 denial be considered together with the administrative complaint and the denial of Respondent's application to represent United States Life Insurance Company of NY as a life and health insurance agent (February 14, 1990) and the denial of Respondent's application to represent Acceleration Life Insurance Company as a life and health insurance agent (April 6, 1990). Because the three denials of Respondent's applications for licensure or renewal of licensure were based upon the allegations in the administrative complaint in this case, all three denials (February 14, April 6, and April 9, 1990) will be consolidated with the administrative complaint for disposition by this Final Order. Accordingly, Petitioner's exception numbered 2 is accepted. RULING ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Paragraph 3 of Petitioner's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law numbered 4 because that Conclusion of Law refers to Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes, which was not alleged in the administrative complaint, and the Conclusion of Law does not refer to Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes addresses misrepresentations by insurance claims adjusters or agents in effecting claims settlements. Clearly, Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes has no application to the instant case, and violation of that section was not charged in the administrative complaint. On the other hand, Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes lists the demonstration of lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as grounds for the-suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license. This statute was included in the charges in each count of the administrative complaint. The hearing officer apparently considered Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, in his Conclusions of Law numbered 3 and 4. Accordingly, the citation to Section 626.611(6), Florida Statutes is deemed to be a typographical error and it is assumed that Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes was the intended citation. In light of the foregoing, Petitioner's exception in Paragraph 3 is accepted. RULING ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDATION Paragraph 4 of Petitioner's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation that Respondent's license be suspended for fifteen (15) days and that Respondent's applications for licensure be granted after the expiration of the fifteen-day suspension. After a complete evaluation of the record the hearing officer's recommended penalty of a 15-day suspension and acceptance of Respondent's applications after the 15-day suspension is hereby rejected for the following reasons: The Hearing Officer found, in Findings of Fact numbered 2, that Respondent accepted an offer to "place" his general lines insurance agent license with Marcia Cline, an unlicensed person. This finding is supported by the Respondent's testimony at hearing. (Tr. 71, 72) Respondent was compensated with a weekly salary of $150. (Tr. 72); The Hearing Officer found, in Findings of Fact numbered 3, that Respondent had signed, in blank, applications and binders for Cline to use in Respondent's absence. This finding is supported by Respondent's testimony at hearing. (Tr. 72, 79, 81); The Hearing Officer concluded, in Conclusions of Law numbered 4, that Cline wrongfully withheld premiums from the insurer, made willful misrepresentations to her customers, demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness, engaged in fraudulent and dishonest practices, and misappropriated monies belonging to others, as proscribed by sections 626.561(1), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9) and 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer further concluded that Respondent is responsible for Cline's wrongdoing pursuant to Section 626.734, Florida Statutes. (Concl. of Law #4); The Hearing Officer was of the opinion that Respondent was "the victim of circumstances which happened to place his license with the wrong person at the wrong time, and because of poor judgment, is now saddled with Cline's misconduct." (Concl. of Law #5). This circumstance, together with the facts that Respondent immediately notified the Department when he learned that Cline had misused his license (Finding of Fact #6) and that Respondent was candid and forthright under oath at the hearing of this matter and admitted that he used poor judgment (Finding of Fact *8), led the Hearing Officer to recommend the 15- day suspension. It should be noted that Respondent voluntarily "placed" his license with an unlicensed individual. (Tr. 71, 72). Not only was this "placing" of the license the result of poor judgment, but it is prohibited by Section 626.441, Florida Statutes. That section provides: 626.441 License or permit: transferability.--A license or permit issued under this part is valid only as to the person named and is not transferable to another person. S626.441, Fla. Stat. Accordingly, it is illegal to place an insurance agent's license on the wall of an agency in order to assist unlicensed persons in selling or servicing insurance policies in the absence of the licensed agent. However, because a violation of Section 626.441, Florida Statutes was not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, this final order does not rule on that issue. Additionally, agents are prohibited from supplying blank forms, applications and other supplies to unlicensed persons for use in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting contracts of insurance. S626.342, Fla. Stat. Respondent admitted that he signed blank applications and binders for Cline, an unlicensed individual, to use in his absence. (Fact Stipulation of March 5, 1990; Finding of Fact *3). Violation of Section 626.342, Florida Statutes was not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and is not addressed by this Order. While Respondent was not charged with violation of Sections 626.342 and 626.441, Florida Statutes in the Administrative Complaint, his "poor judgment" in becoming involved in this illegal arrangement is an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor in this case. Accordingly, this aggravating factor should be considered together with the mitigating factors referred to by the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer concluded that Respondent is liable for the acts of Cline while his license and signature were used by Cline, and that therefore, Respondent is guilty of violating five subsections of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. Section 626.611, Florida Statutes compels the Department of Insurance to deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent who commits any of the acts listed in Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. However, the mitigating factors found by the Hearing Officer in Conclusion of Law numbered 5, namely Respondent's immediate notification of the Department when he learned of possible wrongdoing and Respondent's cooperation in the investigation, make the 15-day suspension an appropriate, if lenient, penalty in this case. However, the aggravating factor of the improper situation entered into by Respondent in "placing" his license and supplying forms to Cline renders acceptance of Respondent's applications at the end of the 15-day suspension period inappropriate in this case. Petitioner's exception to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation is therefore accepted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: That the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer are hereby adopted in toto as the Department's Findings of Fact. That the Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Officer are hereby adopted in toto with the exceptions noted above; That the recommendation of the Hearing Officer is hereby rejected for the reasons set forth in paragraph 4 above, Ruling on Petitioner's Exception to Recommendation; That Respondent is guilty of violating subsections 626.561(1), 626.611(1), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), and 626.611(10), Florida Statutes; That as a result of Respondent's violations of the above referenced statutes, the licenses and eligibility for licensure of Respondent, Steven Schnur, are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of fifteen (15) days, effective upon the date of this Order. The denial letters dated February 14, 1990, April 6, 1990, and April 9, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED. Upon expiration of the suspension period, Respondent is free to reapply for any insurance licenses, and the Department of Insurance shall not deny Respondent's applications based upon any of the facts and circumstances at issue in this action. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120,68, Florida Statutes and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 412 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 0300, and a copy of the same with the appropriate district court of appeal within thirty (30) days of the rendition this Order. ORDERED this 21 day of June , 1990. TOM GALLAGHER Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Honorable Donald R. Alexander Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Alan J. Kerben, Esquire 8814 Rocky Creek Drive Tampa, FL 33615 C. Christopher Anderson, III, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is: RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating subsections 626.561(1) and 626.611(5),(6),(9) and (10) that his licenses be suspended for fifteen days. The other charge should be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that his applications for renewal and issuance of resident licenses be approved after the suspension is lifted. DONE AND ORDERED this 19 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of April, 1990.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's application for examination as a general lines agent should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings: On or about September 2, 1989, Petitioner, Kimberly L. Strayer, formerly known as Kimberly Lindsay, filed an application for examination as a general lines agent with Respondent, Department of Insurance. Since January 1988, Petitioner has been the sole owner and president of Central Florida Insurance Agency (Central). On or about December 28, 1989, Respondent informed Petitioner, by letter, that her application for examination as a general lines agent was denied for the following reasons: Petitioner operated Central Florida Insurance Agency without a licensed general lines agent in the full-time active charge of that agency from January 1, 1988 through August 31, 1988. During January 1988 Petitioner accepted applications and down payments from the following insureds: Robert Smallwood, Annelle Jones, Mickey Lawson, Donald Johnson, Thomas Jones, Manning O'Callahan and Christopher Stevens. Petitioner issued a binder and an automobile identification card for each insured indicating that coverage was bound with State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, as servicing carrier for the Florida Joint Underwriting Association (FJUA). At the time Petitioner had no authority to accept either applications or premiums on behalf of State Farm. Petitioner failed to forward such applications and premiums to the insurer until April 12, 1988. During January 1988, Petitioner accepted an application and premium payment of $274.00 from Tammy Clay. Petitioner issued a binder indicating that coverage was bound with State Farm and Union American Insurance Companies. Petitioner failed to forward either the application or the premium payment to any insurer. Petitioner issued a fictitious policy number to Ms. Clay and after nearly four months, submitted a money order to State Farm payable to Tammy Clay, on or about May 1989. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that she did not have a licensed general lines agent in full-time active charge of her agency; that she accepted applications and premium payments from the above-named insureds for auto insurance to be bound with State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and that she accepted an application for premium payment for automobile insurance from Tammy Clay in the amount of $274.00 for coverage to be bound by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. Petitioner was first employed in the insurance sales industry during the summer of 1987. At the time, she was only seventeen years old and had completed the eleventh grade. Petitioner's first employment in the insurance industry was with Friendly Auto Insurance (Friendly) which had several offices throughout Polk County, Florida. Friendly was owned by Petitioner's now husband, Larry Lindsay when she was hired. Petitioner formed Central during late 1987 and began operating Central on or about January 1, 1988. Petitioner received her supervision and training while employed with Friendly, primarily through on the job experiences. During late 1987, Petitioner's husband encountered problems with one of his business partners which resulted in strained relations. The resultant strained relations prompted Petitioner to organize Central. Central purchased several of Friendly's agencies of which her now husband had an interest, with Petitioner paying a nominal amount for the "book of business" that Friendly had generated. When Central commenced operations during January of 1988, Bob Seese was the licensed insurance agent who was authorized under the rules of the FJUA to accept applications and bind coverage through one of the FJUA servicing carriers, State Farm. Friendly and its successor, Central, generated a substantial volume of so-called high risk auto insurance business for drivers who could not obtain insurance through the regular market. Bob Seese had been associated with and served as the licensed agent for the Friendly agency in Lakes Wales which Central purchased in January 1988. At the time Petitioner commenced operating Central, she hired Bob Seese as the licensed general lines agent. She considered that Central was authorized to accept applications and continue to bind FJUA insurance coverage through State Farm. Petitioner forwarded all of the FJUA insurance applications which were bound by Bob Seese to State Farm within a period ranging from one week to approximately one month. State Farm refused to accept the applications submitted by Petitioner based on its contention that initially, Bob Seese was not authorized to bind coverage through Central, as he had not transferred his license to Central and Seese could only operate out of the Friendly agency of Lake Wales. 1/ Bob Seese was formally authorized by State Farm to conduct business through Central during February 1988. As a result of that authorization, all of the above-named insureds obtained insurance and none of the insureds suffered any monetary loss as a result of Seese's belated authorization. All of the premium payments that Petitioner received were, in time, forwarded to the respective carriers. Petitioner properly gave new insureds binder numbers which were serially dispensed in the order that premium payments were received. During January 1988, Petitioner accepted an application and premium payment for auto insurance from Tammy Clay for coverage to be bound by State Farm. Petitioner submitted Clay's application and premium payment to State Farm and it was returned on one occasion based on the fact that a facsimile stamp was used by the purported licensed agent (Seese). Petitioner resubmitted it and State Farm again returned it based on State Farm's contention that Seese was not authorized to conduct business through Central. Petitioner has now completed the required formal educational courses to demonstrate her eligibility to sit for the general lines agent's examination. Petitioner is now knowledgeable about insurance matters and is aware of the proper procedures for operating as a general lines agent. When Petitioner formed Central, she had less than one year's experience in the insurance business and was ineligible to sit for the general lines agent exam as she was not of majority age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for examination as a general lines insurance agent. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1990.
