Findings Of Fact On October 18, 1971, the Respondent through ordinance Number 201 (Respondent's Exhibit 1) established a civil service system. The ordinance in pertinent part provided that the civil service board shall "adopt, enact and amend a code of rules and regulations for each department covering, among other things, duties, hours of work, discipline and control, rules and regulations for appointment, employment, suspension and discharge of employees based on merit, efficiency, character and industry." Evidence reveals that the Civil Service Board took no action to "adopt, enact or amend a code" pursuant to Section 5 of ordinance Number 201 and, until the unilateral acts here complained of, Respondent had little in the way of written rules and regulations. However, within the Police Department there were "general rules of conduct" which had been promulgated by the Police Chief. (See G C Exhibit 8). Thereafter, the City Attorney drafted an ordinance amending ordinance Number 201 (see Respondent's Exhibit 8). Police Department representatives attended a meeting with the Mayor on June 15, 1975, for the purpose of discussing the proposed amendment to ordinance Number 201. After the meeting, George Slinkman, then President of the FOP, learned of its purpose and was given a rough draft of the proposed amendment. He was informed that the departmental representative had voiced objections to the Mayor concerning the amendment and on July 31, 1975, the proposed amendment came before the City Council at a workshop meeting. Present at that meeting was the President of the FOP who informed the council that the FOP was in favor of implementation of the original ordinance Number 201 rather than the proposed amendment to which the FOP objected. President Slinkman indicated that if the Respondent was proceeding with the new amendment as proposed, the FOP would like to provide some input into the proposal. No further action on the proposed amendment was taken by the City Council at that meeting nor did it appear on subsequent council agendas. On December 15, 1975, PERC certified the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative of Lauderhill Police Department Employees in the following unit. INCLUDED: Police Detectives, Officers and Sergeants. EXCLUDED: Police Lieutenants, Captains and the Chief. (See G.C. Ex. 7). Approximately two weeks later, the City Service Rules and Regulations, first part, through implementing resolution Number 511 (G.C. Ex.2) was presented to the City Council by the Mayor as an implementation of Civil Service Ordinance Number 201. The rules contained therein governed personnel recruitment and examinations for positions within the City. The Mayor informed the Council that there had been no employee input on such rules. While members of the Council received their copies approximately five days prior to the December 30th Council meeting, they were informed at the meeting that copies had not otherwise been distributed. City resolution no. 511 was passed by the City Council at the December 30, 1975, meeting and became effective immediately. Apart from the fact that witnesses George Slinkman, the former President of the FOP and President Elect Ralph Dean testified that Respondent failed to request input from the FOP on the rules as adopted, they also testified that no agent of the Fraternal Order of Police was made aware of the existence of the newly passed resolution until several days thereafter. (TR.401-402, 420-422). On or about April 22, 1976, Richard Witt, FOP State President, wrote to Mayor Cipolloni advising that he had been asked to represent the Charging Party in collective bargaining negotiations with the Respondent. Witt requested a meeting with the Mayor for the purpose of discussing negotiations. In response, the Mayor suggested the parties meet during the morning of April 28, in the Mayor's office. On Tuesday night, April 27, the Mayor introduced the City Service Rules and Regulations, second part, along with implementing resolution Number 571 to the City Council. This document contained numerous proposed changes in terms and conditions of bargaining unit employees including changes in appointments, lay-offs re-employment, evaluations, physical and mental exams, weight regulations, hours of work, vacations, holidays, sick leave, suspensions, demotions and grievance procedures. The Council was informed that employees had not provided input on the rules although the Mayor expressed his understanding gained from a recently attended labor relations seminar that Respondent needed a base for forthcoming negotiations with the Charging Party. When it was learned that the Civil Service Board had not been consulted with regard to the document, the resolution was tabled and Civil Service Board members were invited to be present the following evening when it would be brought up again, Richard Witt, the Mayor, and Police Chief Ramsdell met as scheduled on the morning of April 28, 1976. Witt requested that prior to collective bargaining the City furnish him with budget documents and other materials pertaining to police officers' health program, welfare and other employment working conditions. The Mayor responded, according to Witt, that it would take some time for him to assemble such but that the information would be forthcoming. That night, the City Council passed resolution no. 571, which adopted the City Service Rules and 7Regulations, save the sick leave policies which became effective January 1, 1977. (See G.C. Ex. 6). Ralph Dean, the President of the Charging Party testified that Respondent was not requesting input from the FOP on the rules and regulations, second part, nor had FOP representatives been furnished copies of the documents prior to their adoption. Additionally, he testified that the Charging Party was not notified of the pending adoption of the document and did not obtain a copy of such until after passage on April 28, 1976. Corroborative testimony on this point was given by Councilwoman Hatcher and employees Dean and Slinkman. The parties' first negotiation session was held on May 22, 1976 and at that time the Charging Party advised the Mayor and the City Attorney that in their opinion, some of their proposals were in violation of existing City ordinances, including the rules and regulations first and second parts. Two days thereafter, on May 24, 1976, the Charging Party filed with the Commission the instant unfair labor practice charges. The parties were again scheduled to meet on May 28, 1976. Upon receipt of the unfair labor charges, the City Council met with the Mayor in "executive session" and it was then decided that Respondent would "suspend bargaining" until the charges were disposed of. The Mayor arrived at the May 28th session and informed the Charging Party that Respondent would not return to the bargaining table until the pending charges had been resolved. A second charge was filed against the Respondent alleging essentially that the Respondent's suspension of bargaining constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith within the meaning of Section 447.501(a)(c) of the Act. The evidence also reveals that on approximately March 30, 1976, the Respondent adopted a pay plan for its police department employees who are in the bargaining unit in which the Charging Party was certified to represent. The pay plan, as adopted, represented a reduction in the existing pay plan. In adopting this plan, Frank C. Brown Associates, a management consulting firm, was commissioned to conduct a study to devise a pay plan for all city employees. The evidence reveals that the wage and job classification plan prepared by Frank C. Brown and Associates was not compiled based on any joint efforts by the Charging Party who had been certified to exclusively represent the police unit employees. Specifically, Ralph Dean objected to the new pay plan and in fact, Mayor Cipolloni testified that he gave no direction to Frank C. Brown and Associates to seek any input from the Charging Party and/or its agents. Based on the Charging Party's objections to the pay plan as submitted by Frank C. Brown on February 9, 1976, one pay grade was added to each of the ranks. The plan was submitted to the City Council on March 30, 1976 and was made effective immediately for all employees. Representatives of the Charging Party were present at this meeting and objected to the implementation thereof to no avail. Thereafter, and during the second negotiation session on May 28, 1976, the Respondent suspended negotiations with the Charging Party based on the fact that the Charging Party had filed unfair labor practice charges with the Commission.
Conclusions The essence of the collective bargaining relationship between public employers and its employees in the State of Florida is outlined in Chapter 447.309(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The dictates there mandates a bilateral decision making process which becomes effective after an employee organization has been certified by the Commission. At that juncture, the public employer is no longer free to make unilateral determinations with respect to items which are considered "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment". See for example District School Board of Hillsborough County and Hillsborough C.T.A., PERC order no. 76U-1181 (October 4, 1976). The Charging Party and/or its agents objected to the City Service Rules and Regulations first and second parts each time they were brought up before the Council. Respondent at no time requested any input from the Charging Party's agents respecting its position in fulfilling its obligation to represent the unit employees it was certified to represent. The Respondent's affirmative defense that the Charging Party's members were advised and participated in the enactment of the City Service Rules and Regulations and the pay scale as it relates to unit employees was considered. However, when an examination of the positive duty placed on the Respondent as it relates to its duty to bargain with the certified representative, such a position fails to withstand scrutiny and amounts to conduct representing an abrogation of its duty to meet with and confer with the designated certified representative. Absent an impasse, necessity or an express or implied waiver (all of which are absent here), the employer was expressly obligated to refrain from taking the unilateral action which it took on December 30, 1975, on March 30, 1976 and on May 28, 1976. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence which would permit the employer to unilaterally act as stated above, the conclusion is inescapable that the Respondent consciously abrogated its duty as set forth in Chapter 447.309(1), F.S., and engaged in conduct violative of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will bargain collectively, upon request, with the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit employees as stated above; that it will not make unilateral changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of said employees and that it will not suspend bargaining or fail to meet and bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative unless directed to do so by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Irving Weinsoff, Esquire Suite 804, Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Bruce A. Leinback, Staff Attorney for William E. Powers, Jr., General Counsel 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony J. Titone, Esquire 6299 West Sunrise Boulevard Suite 205 Sunrise, Florida 33313
Findings Of Fact The Respondent caused the experience increments which had been in effect for all adult education teachers to be modified or terminated, and reduced the hourly wage amounts paid to adult education teachers. However, the real question presented is whether adult education teachers were included within the bargaining unit. The position of adult education teachers was not mentioned either in the inclusions or exclusions of the descriptions of the bargaining unit. Whether they would be included therefore turns upon whether adult education teachers are regularly employed certificated personnel." Adult education teachers were not required to be certificated, one primary requirement for inclusion in the unit. In addition, persons employed in the adult education program included both certificated day-time teachers and administrative personnel specifically excluded from the unit. Their employment was not contractual and could be terminated if a particular class was cancelled or dropped based upon lack of student enrollment. In such a case the adult education teacher's employment would be automatically terminated. Adult education classes were presented at night and the maximum number of hours that any adult education teacher would work would be six (6) hours per week. For both groups, employment as an adult education teacher was in addition to their regular employment. From a budgetary standpoint, adult education teachers were compensated from a separate functional breakout within the school budget to which that portion of their compensation earned as an adult education teacher was charged. No deductions were made from the adult education portion of a teacher's salary for retirement or Social Security. Based on the foregoing facts, the Hearing Officer finds that adult education teachers are not "regularly employed certificated personnel" and therefore, are not within the bargaining unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that no action be taken on the charges as stated in Paragraphs 10(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)(J)(H) and Paragraphs 11(A) and (B). Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to Issue XI and Paragraph 10(H) of the complaint, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Commission enter its order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist its refusal to bargain upon request over mandatory items of collective bargaining. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Meyer, Esquire Frank & Meyer, P.A. Flagship Bank Building Tampa, Florida Norman J. Smith, Esquire Brinson and Smith, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1549 Kissimmee, Florida 32741 Austin Reed, Esquire Public Employee Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Leonard Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether there is just cause to terminate Respondent's employment with the Monroe County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity charged with the responsibility to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within Monroe County, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as a non-probationary air-conditioning mechanic in the Upper Keys. As noted previously, Petitioner initiated the instant cause against Respondent on January 19, 2012. In a letter signed by the superintendent of schools on that date, Petitioner advised Respondent that it intended to terminate his employment: [F]or willful violation of school board policy, 4210(I), (L) and (Q), by theft of time, inappropriate use of a District owned vehicle, and by making fraudulent statements in required District paperwork, all of which are grounds for discipline up to and including termination. * * * This action is being taken in accordance with School Board Policies . . . and the Collective Bargaining Agreement. (emphasis added). The above-quoted language notwithstanding, Petitioner's Administrative Complaint ("Complaint"), filed contemporaneously with the superintendent's letter, does not purport to discipline Respondent in accordance the collective bargaining agreement,1/ the terms of which are neither referenced in the Complaint nor included in the instant record——a fatal error, as explained later. Instead, Petitioner seeks in its Complaint to terminate Respondent's employment based solely upon alleged violations of School Board Policy 4210 (specifically, subsections I, L, and Q), which provides, in relevant part: 4210 – Standard for Ethical Conduct An effective educational program requires the services of men and women of integrity, high ideals, and human understanding. The School Board expects all support staff members to maintain and promote these essentials. Furthermore, the School Board hereby establishes the following as the standards of ethical conduct for all support staff members in the District who have direct access to students: A support staff member with direct access to students shall: * * * not use institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage. * * * L. maintain honesty in all dealings. * * * Q. not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with employment. (emphasis added). Significantly, the record is devoid of evidence that Respondent has direct access to students, and the nature of Respondent's position (an air-conditioning mechanic) does not permit the undersigned to infer as much; therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Respondent is subject to the proscriptions of School Board Policy 4210. In light of these unique circumstances——i.e., Petitioner has not proceeded against Respondent under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (as it should have), but rather, under a school board policy that applies only to employees that have direct access to students——it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the underlying allegations of misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Monroe County School Board enter a final order: dismissing the Administrative Complaint; and immediately reinstating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Overall organization. The City of Tarpon Springs has a mayor and four commissioners and operates under a city manager form of government. Neither the commissioners nor the mayor play an active role in the day to day operation of the City. The City Manager has the responsibility of operating the day to day affairs for the City. Collective bargaining relationships exist between the City and unions representing the Police and Fire Departments. The City Manager negotiates for the City in these relationships. Other than the Police and Fire Departments, there are approximately fifteen or sixteen departments with over 100 employees within the City. The actual number of employees varies seasonally, with the City employing more in the winter. At this time, the City employs approximately seventeen persons under the CETA program. The Public Works Department consists of ten or eleven separate departments, each of which, is headed by a foreman, and the Public Works Director has overall responsibility for the entire Department. His position is primarily one of assistant city manager. Four or five times a year, the City has supervisory meetings attended by the City Manager, the Public Works Director and the foremen of the various departments. Discussed at such meetings, are problems involving personnel, discipline and scheduling. Uniforms are available to most City employees on a voluntary basis. If, an employee chooses to wear a uniform, the City pays half the price of the uniform for the employee, with the exception of school crossing guards for whom the City furnishes uniforms and CETA employees for whom uniforms are not available. Uniforms worn by foremen have the word "foreman" written on them. Foremen. Each department under the Public Works Department is headed by a single foreman, with the exception of the Parks and Cemeteries Department which has two foremen. These various departments each have between three and eighteen employees, and include the departments of streets, sewer, sanitation, water distribution, building and maintenance, meters, water pollution control, and general maintenance. The City generally does not hire persons for the various departments without the recommendation or approval of the foreman. Under normal conditions, the foremen make the decision as to overtime work and the transfer of employees from one department to another. Written and oral evaluations and recommendations for wage increases are made by the foreman to the Public Works Director, which recommendations are normally approved. If an employee were caught drinking on the job, a foreman may fire the employee and then tell either the City Manager or Public Works Director about it later. The City then conducts an investigation into the matter to avoid possible future problems, but normally the decision of the foreman is approved. With a less offensive problem, such as absenteeism, the foreman issues a warning in writing. After the second warning, the foreman informs the Director or Manager that he is dismissing that employee and the City then terminates employment. Foremen make the decision as to time off for personal problems or emergencies and also grant approvals for vacation times. If there are complaints or grievances within a department, the foreman of that department normally takes care of it, very seldom do grievances come to the Public Works Director. An employee may be transferred from one department to another through the agreement of the two foremen involved. The primary duty of the various foremen is to direct the employees and supervise the activities within their respective departments. During shortages of personnel, foremen participate in the same type of work as their employees. Supervisory authority is one of the basis, along with longevity, for the pay differentials between foremen and other employees. Foremen assist in the formulation of policies and work schedules within their respective departments and are consulted with respect to the preparation of the budget. There are no supervisory-type personnel between the foremen and the Director of Public Works. Foremen handle grievances and would thus have a role in the administration of collective bargaining agreements. CETA employees. CETA employees work along with other City employees and the City is reimbursed for their salaries by the federal government. While they may have the same rate of pay as another person in their classification and do receive overtime pay, they do not receive raises nor do they have the fringe benefits which other employees have, such as hospitalization, uniforms, paid holidays, vacation, and sick leave. The CETA program presently extends through September 30, 1976, and such employees are hired until that time. If the City had a vacancy in a regular, permanent position, it would fill that position with a good CETA employee rather than going out and hiring another employee. Part-time employees. The City employs a number of part-time employees to work as school crossing guards, to police the beach, to do summer work with recreation, to work in the library and to do clerical and custodial work. Certain of these part-time employees are seasonal. In order to receive hospitalization benefits, an employee must work thirty or more hours per week. The three school crossing guards work 25 hours per week and receive uniforms fully paid for by the City. They are supervised by the Chief of Police. Other part-time employees fall under the supervision of the foreman or director for the department for which they work. Vacation and sick leave, as well as holiday pay, are prorated for part-time employees based upon the number of hours that they work. Their rate of pay is based upon the federal minimum wage though some regular part-time employees receive merit pay increases. In accordance with F.S. Section 447.307(3)(a) and F.A.C. Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Curtis Mack Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida Mr. Edward R. Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue, B-4 Tampa, Florida 33614 Mr. Allen M. Blake, Esquire Marlow, Mitzel, Ortmayer & Shofi 607 South Magnolia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should terminate Respondent's employment because she excessively used the internet for personal matters unrelated to her work while she was on duty at her assigned computer terminal.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governing board of the Marion County School District. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner had a written internet usage policy for its employees. The policy states as follows in pertinent part: District computers, network access, and other information resources such as electronic mail (e-mail) are provided for staff use to support the District mission and goals. All such resources are District property, and subject to the same rules for use as other physical property. In addition, the following rules shall apply: Use of information resources shall be limited to legitimate educational purposes. Programs for personal, commercial, or illegal purposes, including games, are not authorized. E-mail, World Wide Web pages, and other forms of electronic documentation: Will not be obscene, abusive, or contain other inappropriate material. Will require the same handling as other public records. User accounts and passwords must not be shared except where authorized. The person in whose name an account is issued in responsible for its proper use at all times. Copyright and license agreements will be respected; no unauthorized copies of programs or files will be made. Users shall not take unauthorized actions which gain access or attempt to gain access to, deny access or attempt to deny access to, disrupt, change, or destroy the data or service of the computer or network systems. However, the written policy was not disseminated or discussed with Respondent or any other employees. Instead, Petitioner's employees generally understood that they could use the internet for personal reasons during their two 15-minute breaks and their one-hour lunch break for a total of one and a half hours a day. Respondent worked for Petitioner for 12 years. She began working as a data entry clerk in the Applied Technology Department. In time, Respondent was promoted to the position of a computer lab technician in the same department. Respondent's job involved gathering data on students in Petitioner's middle and high school vocational programs and electronically transmitting the information to the Florida Department of Education (DOE). Her primary job required her to code and edit the information, correcting any problems identified by DOE so that Petitioner could receive the appropriate funding for its vocational programs. Respondent required more time to complete her primary duties at certain times of the year depending on DOE reporting requirements. At other times of the year, Respondent was able to complete her work with time to spare. Kathy Clarke worked with Respondent in the Applied Technology Department. Respondent showed Ms. Clarke and other people in the department how to protect the privacy of the department's computers by using a screen-saver password. Ms. Clarke chose "kiss" as the screen-saver password. Several employees, including Respondent, used the same screen-saver password so that, if necessary, they could access each other's computers. In June 1999, Petitioner furnished Respondent with a new Mackintosh desk-top computer that was delivered without the appropriate internal zip drive. Respondent immediately installed a software password protection program on her computer. When Petitioner received the zip drive for Respondent's computer, Petitioner arranged for outside computer technicians to install it. Respondent was not in the office when the outside computer technicians arrived. The outside computer technicians and Kathy Clarke waited 45 minutes for Respondent to return to the office because they did not know the software password to access Respondent's computer. When Respondent returned to her office, she installed the zip drive herself. At or near the end of 1999, Petitioner transferred Respondent from the Applied Technology Department to the Management Information Services (MIS) Department. The transfer from one department to another required the physical relocation of Respondent's desk and computer, but her duties in relation to transmitting information to DOE for the vocational programs remained the same. Anthony Burke became Respondent's supervisor in the MIS Department. He assigned Respondent additional duties on an as needed basis. These duties included answering the phone, passing out maps, mailing out notices, scanning records, greeting walk-in clients, and generally helping her co-workers when they got behind in their work. On some occasions, Respondent willingly accepted these assignments; on other occasions, she acted as if she resented doing any work except her primary responsibility of transmitting vocational educational data. In the latter event, Respondent would tell her supervisor that she was too busy to perform other duties. When Respondent set up her workstation in the MIS Department, she located her computer monitor with the screen facing a storage area. The position of the monitor made it difficult for others in the office to casually observe the monitor's screen. In April or May 2001, Mr. Burke decided to reconfigure the workstations within the MIS Department so that employees with highly specialized work would not be located in the flow of walk-in traffic. The reconfiguration of the workstations resulted in Respondent being moved to the front of the office and next to Tanya Eason. Respondent objected to being placed next to Ms. Eason with whom Respondent had a personality conflict. Respondent informed Mr. Burke about her displeasure over the move to the front of the office. She claimed that being in the new location with an obligation to back up Ms. Eason, the "office secretary and greeter," would interfere with Respondent's duties related to vocational programs. Mr. Burke responded that he intended to proceed with the reconfiguration plan as soon as possible. Respondent had a personal relationship with Jim Warford, Superintendent of Marion County School District, because he had taught Respondent's daughter. Based on that relationship, Respondent had a conversation with Superintendent Warford about her concerns with the changes in the MIS Department. Subsequently, Mr. Burke became aware that Respondent had spoken to Superintendent Warford about problems in the MIS Department. After discussing his concerns with Respondent and for at least a couple of months, Mr. Burke did not acknowledge or speak to Respondent except in the context of a departmental meeting. After the reconfiguration of the workstations in the MIS Department, Mr. Burke observed that Respondent was generally busy at her computer terminal. However, Respondent's workstation was once again set up so that one could not observe her monitor's screen without entering her work station and standing behind or adjacent to her. In October 2001, Mr. Burke and Christopher Mendola, Director of Information and Technology Services, discovered information that led them to question whether Respondent had breached Mr. Burke's e-mail security. After the close of business on October 16, 2001, Mr. Burke and Mr. Mendola took Respondent's computer off of her desk. When Respondent returned to work on October 17, 2001, she had no idea why her computer was missing. At approximately 4:00 p.m., on October 17, 2001, Respondent attended a meeting with Mr. Mendola, Mr. Burke, and Jim Noell, Petitioner's personnel director. At that time, Respondent was informed that her computer was taken because she had been seen trying to access Mr. Burke's e-mail in a web design class. Respondent denied that she had breached anyone's e-mail security. She explained that during a web-design class, her e-mail had been so easy to access through Outlook Express that she used Mr. Burke's name to see if other e-mail addresses were as easily accessible. During the October 17, 2001, meeting, Mr. Mendola asked Respondent whether she ever used the internet for personal reasons because it was inappropriate to do so on "company time." Respondent replied emphatically that she did not use the internet for personal reasons. Mr. Mendola was in possession of Respondent's computer for approximately one month. During that time, Respondent was assigned alternative duties. Because she did not have an office computer with internet capabilities, Respondent could not perform her duties related to the vocational program. Mr. Mendola had Respondent's computer placed in a secure location in his office. Mr. Mendola could start the computer but could not access the computer's contents due to a password protection program. Respondent would not provide Mr. Mendola with the password but she agreed to disable the password protection program. Mr. Mendola did not find evidence that Respondent had made any effort to access Mr. Burke's e-mail from her office computer. He did find evidence that a large number of internet websites, unrelated to work, had been extensively accessed on Respondent's computer. Among the information stored on Respondent's hard drive were "favorite" or "book-marked" sites organized into categories. Mr. Mendola began looking through the caché, a temporary storage area, in Respondent's computer. In the caché, he found pictures and documents, indicating that Respondent's computer had accessed at least 33 internet sites. The caché contained hundreds of photographs of people from internet-dating sites. The dating sites included "Welcome to Dating.com," and "www.Homecams.com." Access to the "www.Homecams.com" site was blocked by filter that Petitioner uses to prevent retrieval of inappropriate internet sites. Subsequently, a second password protection program appeared on Respondent's computer, preventing Mr. Mendola from accessing other areas of Respondent's hard drive. Respondent had to disable the second password protection program before Mr. Mendola could proceed with his investigation. Mr. Mendola's continued investigation revealed one internet site that was related to Respondent's work. The name of that site was "Work Force Development." Next, Mr. Mendola performed a hard drive recovery. He recovered thousands of internet files unrelated to Respondent's work. Some files could not be recovered because they had been written over. Mr. Mendola began looking for files that were recoverable and so large in size as to be significant. He found that approximately 25 percent of Respondent's hard drive contained at least 10,000 such files. Many of these files were bookmarked so they could be easily accessed at a later date. The files came from internet sites related to travel, perfumes, and other commercial sites, together with one education site. The files on Respondent's hard drive also included a lot of "see-me cam sites" where people had cameras set up, projecting pictures from their living rooms or bedrooms every five to ten minutes, or cameras to view cars crossing a bridge. Some of the "see-me cam sites" that were listed in Respondent's history list could not be retrieved from Mr. Mendola's office because of the filter that Petitioner uses to block inappropriate or pornographic internet sites. During the hearing, Respondent suggested that telephone repairmen who were working in the vicinity of her office might have accessed her computer after hours. She asserted that she installed a password protection program on her computer at that time. This would account for Respondent's having two such password protection programs on her computer. However, there is no credible evidence that any access by the repairmen would have resulted in the list of "bookmarks" and "favorites" found in Respondent's hard drive. Additionally, there was no credible evidence that the repairmen had access to her computer during the dates and times that print-outs of her internet usage show the activity to have occurred. To the contrary, Respondent had placed a password protection program on her computer as early as June 1999 such that Kathy Clarke and the outside computer technicians could not access Respondent's computer. At some point in the middle of November 2001, Mr. Mendola returned Respondent's computer to her desk. Mr. Mendola did not tell Respondent what he had discovered on her computer. Respondent was not aware that Mr. Mendola had installed a real-time monitor on the computer. During the time that Respondent's computer was being monitored, Petitioner's staff made daily reports regarding Respondent's internet usage. They found that her internet activity involved sites that were unrelated to work. A week or so later, Mr. Mendola informed Respondent that he was going to check her computer again. He asked her not to shut it off and to make sure that she disabled the password protection. Mr. Mendola's second check of Respondent's computer confirmed that Respondent was using her computer to access the internet for purposes unrelated to her work. For example, there were many files related to furniture shopping. Mr. Mendola also discovered that the hard drive had been changed so that some files previously stored on the computer were no longer located there. Respondent's hard drive had been erased and started over. On or about December 17, 2001, Mr. Mendola and Mr. Noell had a meeting with Respondent. At that meeting, Respondent was shown printouts showing her internet usage. Respondent was then suspended until the January 8, 2002, school board meeting at which time it was recommended that Respondent be terminated. The real-time monitoring of Respondent's computer revealed that she used the internet extensively for personal reasons during working hours. Her internet usage at these times was more than the time available in a normal work day during two 15-minute breaks and a one-hour lunch break. It may be that Respondent's computer remained connected to the internet while she performed her primary or secondary duties off-line. In that case, the internet site might have automatically sent additional unsolicited messages and files that were stored in Respondent's hard drive. At times, Respondent might have used the internet beyond the time allotted for breaks and lunch when she completed her job assignments. However, Respondent admitted during the hearing that she used the internet as much as four hours a day, or perhaps as much as all day, during the time that she was "looking for furniture." Petitioner has always been satisfied with Respondent's job performance. With the exception of one performance evaluation in May 2001, Respondent has received the highest evaluation possible from her supervisors. In May 2001, Respondent received a "satisfactory" performance rating in teamwork skills and an "excellent" performance rating in all other areas. There is no evidence that Respondent's internet usage ever interfered with the performance of her primary duties relating to the transmission of vocational school program data to DOE. However, Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Burke would have assigned her additional duties for the good of the department if he had known she was using so much of her time for personal activities after completing her assigned work. In fact, Mr. Burke testified that he would have told her to "knock it off" because such extensive internet usage was equivalent to reading a novel, watching television, or making personal telephone calls for several hours a day. Section 5.02 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner and the Marion Essential Support Personnel states that "[n]o bargaining unit member shall be disciplined without just cause." The agreement also contains a procedure know as "NEAT." This procedure, which is set forth in Section 5.03 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, states as follows in pertinent part: Section 5.03 Except in emergency situations and situations which threaten the health and safety of students or other employees, the NEAT procedure will be used when disciplining members of the bargaining unit or when a deficiency is defined. The NEAT Procedure is defined as follows: N - Notice - when a deficiency is defined, the building administrator will provide the employee with written notification of the deficiency. E - Explanation and Expectation - the building administrator will include in the written notification the nature of the deficiency and the performance level expected. A - Assistance - the building administrator will include in the written notification where information can be obtained to help the employee improve and/or will provide other forms of assistance as appropriate. T - Time - the building administrator will define for the employee an appropriate time frame for improvement to occur before any disciplinary action is taken. Petitioner did not use the NEAT procedure before suspending Respondent's employment. Mr. Mendola admitted during the hearing that Respondent's internet usage did not involve an emergency situation or threaten the health and safety of students or other employees. He also admitted that under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, he did not have discretion to ignore the NEAT procedure when disciplining an employee. Mr. Mendola was aware of the NEAT procedure; he had used it with other employees. In this case he did not implement the procedure because of Respondent's denials that she had ever used the internet for personal reasons. According to Mr. Mendola, Respondent's lack of truthfulness precluded the benefit of any assistance he could have provided Respondent in correcting her behavior pursuant to the NEAT procedure. Article 4.00 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth a four-step grievance procedure, the last of which is binding arbitration. Section 4.10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement states as follows in pertinent part: Section 4.10 For the purposes of this Article, the term "grievance" means any dispute between the Employer and one or more employees involving the interpretation or application of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. The following matters shall not be the basis of any grievance filed and/or processed under the Grievance Procedures of this Agreement. * * * 3. Any complaint respecting termination of employment for which there is another remedial procedure or forum established by law or regulation having the force of law . . . .
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order reinstating Respondent's employment with back pay and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Haldin, Jr., Esquire William C. Haldin, Jr., P.A. 808 Southeast Fort King Street Ocala, Florida 34471 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 2595 Tampa Road, Suite J Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Beverly Morris, Esquire Marion County School Board 808 Southeast Fort King Street Ocala, Florida 34471 James Warford, Superintendent Marion County School Board Post Office 670 Ocala, Florida 34478-0670
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Pinellas County is a public employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). The Charging Party is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(10). During December, 1975, the Charging Party filed a representation petition with the Public Employees Relations Commission seeking to represent a unit of employees of the Public Employer. Proceedings were conducted in accordance with the petition, and on February 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission, through its chairman, issued a Direction Of Election. A copy of the Direction was received into evidence at the hearing in this case as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The appropriate collective bargaining unit is therein described as follows: "Included: All eligible employees of the Pinellas County School Board employed in the ground maintenance, transportation, plant operations, warehouse and food-service departments. Excluded: All other non-instructional, instructional, and clerical employees; and all managerial/confidential employees of the Pinellas County School Board. See Attachment A." The election as conducted on or about March 11, 1976, and a majority of the employees in the unit described in the Direction of Election voted in favor of representation by the Charging Party for purposes of collective bargaining. The Public Employer thereafter filed objections to the conduct of the election (Respondent's Exhibit 4). The chairman of the Public Employees Relations Commission entered a report on objections on March 31, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 5). The chairman dismissed the objections on the grounds that they were not timely filed. On May 12, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission certified the Charging Panty as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit of employees described in the Direction of Election and in the Erratum issued by the chairman of the Commission on February 26, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 3). The Public Employer filed a request for review of the chairman's dismissal of the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 6). By decision issued September 7, 1976, the Commission dismissed the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 7). The Public Employer thereafter filed a Petition For Re-Hearing. Further proceedings respecting certification of the bargaining unit were not made a part of the record in this case; however, it is assumed for the purposes of this Recommended Order that the Public Employer is in the process of appealing the Commission's decisions. Following the election, on April 2, 1976, the Charging Party wrote to the Public Employer requesting that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 1). The Public Employer responded by letter dated April 27, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibit 2), as follows: "As you know, the school board, through the superintendent and my office, has taken appropriate steps to appeal certain procedures relating to the election held in the above matter. Until that procedure has been finalized before the Commission, we will not be in a position to enter into negotiations. It is further noted that you have not received an official notice that you are now the bargaining agent on behalf of a segment of the supporting services of the school board. Until such time as all the proper procedures have been taken before the Commission and a final determination has been made by the courts of the State of Florida, and you have been recognized by the school board as the bargaining agent on behalf of the supporting services employees, we would respectfully deny your request at this time." Following its certification as the collective bargaining representative, by letter dated May 17, 1976, the Charging Party again requested that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 3). Further requests were made by letters dated August 5, 1976, and August 26, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibits 4, 5). The Public Employer has not responded either in writing or verbally to the requests to open negotiations, other than through its letter of April 27, 1976. The Public Employer has refused to enter into collective bargaining negotiations with the Charging Party, and continues to refuse to enter into negotiations until a final determination is made by the courts respecting the Charging Party's certification, and until the school board has recognized the Charging Party.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Public Employees Relations Commission enter an order requiring the School Board of Pinellas County to recognize the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221 as the exclusive bargaining agent of the unit of employees certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission; that the School Board of Pinellas County cease and desist from refusing to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; that the School Board of Pinellas County forthwith enter into good faith collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; and that the School Board of Pinellas County advise the Public Employees Relations Commission in writing of what steps it has taken to comply with the final order of the Public Employees Relations Commission between 30 and 45 days following entry of an order by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Austin Reed, Esquire Public Employee Relations Commission Suite 300 - 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black female who has been continuously employed by the Respondent, at the Gretchen Everhart School since approximately February of 1975. Prior to that time she worked for approximately seven years as a licensed practical nurse. The Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner initially interviewed for an employment position with the Respondent in February, 1975. She was hired as a "pupil personal services worker," a combination social worker and guidance counselor. She was paid out of the Respondent's "social worker budget" and was not hired specifically as a nurse. The Petitioner maintains that upon her hiring she requested that her beginning salary be adjusted to reflect her prior work experience as a licensed practical nurse and that request was denied. However, the record reflects that she did not make any formal request for prior work experience pay credit at that time. Her formal complaint was not actually filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations until October 28, 1985, well in excess of the 180 day requirement for filing such an action imposed under Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes. Thus, even if she had made a formal request for such pay credit in 1975, its denial then would not now be actionable. Moreover, the Petitioner did not establish that any salary schedule, implementing regulation or collective bargaining agreement existed which provided for a salary adjustment of this type in 1975. On October 9, 1984, the Petitioner filed a written supplemental salary request with Dr. Paul Onkle, then the director of employee relations for the Respondent. She requested that she be given experience pay credit for seven years of prior experience as a licensed practical nurse at Sunland Hospital in Tallahassee, Florida. That request was denied. There is no evidence which would establish the date on which an initial, collective bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Leon Classroom Teachers Association (LCTA), was first ratified. The Petitioner has been employed in a position included in that bargaining unit represented by the LCTA ever since the date of the first collective bargaining agreement, however. Accordingly, the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment have been fixed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, ever since ratification of the initial agreement. On April 8, 1985, the Petitioner again wrote to Dr. Paul Onkle requesting his review of certain experience pay credit granted to Carolyn Peterson and Joanne Cox Arnette, in conjunction with which she requested his reconsideration of her request for experience pay credit. Ms. Peterson and Ms. Arnette are white female employees of the Respondent. Dr. Onkle instructed her on the proper means of filing a grievance and thereafter she executed a "Level I grievance" document on April 23, 1985, and delivered it to her immediate supervisor, Mrs. Susan Raker, the principal of Gretchen Everhart School. On April 24, 1985, Mrs. Raker denied the Level I grievance request on the ground that the Petitioner's salary had been set in compliance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect, the Petitioner filed a "Level II grievance" with Dr. Onkle, who was then the director of Employee Relations. Dr. Onkle denied that grievance on June 24, 1985. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time, the responsibility to pursue the grievance after this denial was upon the Petitioner and the LCTA. No further review of Petitioner's request was ever formally sought, however. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect when the requests for salary credit were filed in 1984 and 1985, no prior work experience credit was permitted for any non-teaching position, except for military service and certain work experience for vocational certification. The position in which the Petitioner was employed at that time did not involve any verified work experience which was required for vocational certification and there were no other provisions in the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time by which the Petitioner would be entitled to receive a salary increase based upon her prior, non-teaching, licensed practical nurse employment. The Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent discriminated against her on account of her race by refusing to compensate her for prior work experience, while allegedly compensating similarly situated white employees an additional amount based upon similar work experience, thus violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. In view of this allegation, the work experience credit granted to a number of white employees, and the circumstances under which it was granted, must be examined. Carolyn Peterson was a white employee who began working with the Respondent in 1974 and became a full-time Occupational Specialist in 1976. In 1979, she was granted a salary increase based upon her prior work experience as an area sales manager and assistant buyer for Maas Brothers Department Store. Her position with the Respondent that year required her to be vocationally certified by the Florida Department of Education, and she was so certified. The collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time she was granted the salary increase for prior work experience specifically allowed such credit for each year of verified work experience above that required for certification of vocational teachers. The Petitioner, on the other hand, has not, in her employment position with the Respondent, ever been required to be vocationally certified by the Florida Department of Education. Thus, the Petitioner and Ms. Peterson are not "similarly situated" nor or they comparable employees with respect to their entitlement to any salary adjustment for prior work experience. Joanne Cox Arnette is a white person employed by the Respondent who was initially employed as a teacher in 1977. On approximately April 21, 1977, she requested credit for certain prior work experience, including four years of teaching in a public school system in Florida, four years of employment with the Florida Department of Education, and one year of teaching experience at the Florida A & M University. Her position was among the positions included in the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. The collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time Ms. Arnette requested that credit specifically included and allowed for such credit for prior employees of the Florida Department of Education, by virtue of Section 238.01, Florida Statutes (1977) having been incorporated by reference in the terms of that collective bargaining agreement. That particular provision providing salary adjustment for prior work experience as an employee of the Department of Education terminated with the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Respondent and the LCTA in 1979. It has been the practice and policy of the Respondent, however, at least as early as 1977, to continue to maintain experience credit for prior employment to an individual employee who was initially qualified for such a salary increase based upon prior employment experience; even though subsequent collective bargaining agreements, entered into after that employee obtained that salary increase, no longer included provisions authorizing such increases. Further, it has been the policy and practice of the Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, to consider and determine any requests for salary increases, based upon prior work experience, in the context of the collective bargaining agreement or other appropriate provisions prevailing and applicable at the time the request is made. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Petitioner and Ms. Arnette are also not "similarly situated" employees and their positions are not comparable, within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Gary Coates is a white person who was employed by the Respondent in March of 1976. In 1982, he requested and was granted a salary increase based upon credit for certain prior work experience. He was employed at that time in a position which was included in the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. He was granted a salary increase for three years of teaching experience in a public hospital. An examination of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time Mr. Coates requested the salary increase reflects that credit was allowed for prior teaching experience in a public hospital or public institution. Mr. Coates met those requirements and was granted work experience credit for those three years. He also requested a salary increase for other work experience, and that request was denied by reason of the Respondent's determination that the experience involved did not qualify him under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the Petitioner and Mr. Coates are not "similarly situated" employees and their prior work experience was not comparable within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Mr. Tom Heiman, a white person, was hired in September, 1985. He was hired as a social worker, which is a non-teaching position, also included within the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. Social workers have been included within that unit since the unit was first certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission. In administering the collective bargaining agreement with respect to social workers, the Respondent has followed a policy and practice of interpreting that collective bargaining agreement to allow credit for prior social work experience as if such experience was in fact prior "teaching" experience. Mr. Heiman was granted work experience credit for six years of prior social work, although he was denied work experience credit for other prior work experience. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect in 1985, he was entitled to be credited with each year of teaching or social work experience in a public hospital or a public institution which required teacher certification in an area "in field" with a corresponding teaching position assignment. He was properly certified in that field and was otherwise entitled to receive work experience credit for his six years prior social work experience. Thus, Mr. Heiman and the Petitioner are not "similarly situated" employees either, and their work experience is not comparable. Mr. Gerald Torano, a white person, was first hired in October, 1985, as a social worker. His position with the Respondent was also included within the LCTA bargaining unit. He was granted a salary increase in 1985 based upon five years experience as a social worker in a public institution, as well as with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. He was granted a salary increase pursuant to the same collective bargaining agreement by which Mr. Tom Heiman became eligible for such an increase. Just like Mr. Heiman, Mr. Torano requested additional work experience credit for other past experience which the Respondent denied, based upon the fact that such additional work experience did not qualify him for increased salary credit under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement prevailing at the time he made the request. Thus, the Petitioner and Mr. Torano are also not "similarly situated" employees, nor was their prior work experience comparable. Ms. Jean Schneggenberger is a white person first hired by the Respondent in February, 1985. She was a registered nurse and was hired in that capacity as a Registered School Nurse. Her position is not included within the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA, rather, she is known as a "classified employee," which is a term used by the Respondent to describe those employees whose positions are not included within any accepted bargaining unit, for which there is a collective bargaining agreement in force. Although the Petitioner never asserted in these proceedings that Ms. Schneggenberger was an example of another white employee who had been treated differently and more favorably then Petitioner, the Petitioner offered substantial testimony in an attempt to demonstrate that she had in fact engaged in comparable "nursing duties" or in "nursing related duties" while engaged as a counselor and social worker at the Gretchen Everhart School. Thus, an examination of the manner in which Ms. Schneggenberger's salary as a nurse was computed is relevant to this proceeding. The record establishes that for the year 1984-85, the Respondent adopted a separate salary schedule and implementing regulations related to all "classified" employees. Those implementing regulations applicable to Ms. Schneggenberger are found in the Respondent's Exhibit 4, beginning at paragraph 2A. Ms. Schneggenberger is the only person employed by the Respondent in the position of "Registered School Nurse." Accordingly, neither the Petitioner nor any other employee of the Respondent is "similarly situated" or comparable in his position to Ms. Schneggenberger and her position.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief from an alleged unlawful employment practice filed by the Petitioner, Annie M. Francis, be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3185 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Accepted. 2-3. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. Accepted, but not for its material import. 6-7. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 8. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 9-13. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 14-16. Accepted. 17. Rejected as to its material import. 18-20. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 21-22. Accepted. 23. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 24-25. Rejected as immaterial. 26-27. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 28. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 29-30. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 31-33. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 34. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Accepted. 3. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 4-8. Accepted. 9. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 10-17. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Danni Vogt, Esquire 308 East Park Avenue, Room 209 Post Office Box 11301 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Charles Couch, Superintendent Leon County School Board 2727 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The City and Charging Party executed their first collective bargaining agreement on November 5, 1974. This agreement under its terms was made retroactive to October 1, 1974. Among the provisions of the agreement is Article 9, which sets forth the grievance procedure. Its last step is final and binding arbitration. Paul Williams, a firefighter employed by the City and covered under the agreement, had apparently had a history of pay problems going back to 1973 when Williams was allegedly placed in the improper pay classification based upon his years of service. The exact nature of the difficulty was not explored because it is not material to the issue present in this case. However, Williams subsequently sought to correct this situation, which apparently adversely affected his pay, by various means to include discussing the matter with various superiors in both the fire department and city administration. This matter was never officially resolved or a decision reached which was satisfactory to Williams. In December 1974, Williams received his first check under the newly negotiated contract. He went immediately to his union representative and complained that he was not being paid in accordance with the contract's terms and the service which he had. In short, the alleged error about which Williams had complained nearly 18 months had been continued under the computation of Williams' pay under the newly negotiated contract. Williams filed a grievance under the contract in December 1974, disputing his pay classification and seeking adjustment to his wages from October 1, 1974, the effective date of the contract. His grievance was therefore filed within six months of the date the alleged dispute arose regarding his classification and wage under the contract. The grievance was approved by the union grievance committee, as the first step in the grievance procedure. Thereafter, the grievance was submitted to the fire chief, who requested that he be given several days to check around and see what he could do. On or about December 20, 1974, the fire chief advised the men that he lacked authority to change the pay status of Williams, thus leaving the matter unresolved at the second level. The matter was pursued to the third step, referring it to the city manager. During the latter part of December and January, the city manager discussed the Williams' grievance with the union representative. By January 14, 1975, there had been no progress in resolving the matter, and the union representative notified the City of its intent to invoke Step 4 of the grievance procedure outline in Article 9, supra. The City has refused to move to Step 4, which is submission to a grievance committee whose decision is final and binding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends the Commission order the Employer to cease and desist from refusing to take Williams' grievance to the final step in the grievance procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Further, the Hearing Officer recommends that an appropriate public notice to employees of the Public Employer be posted in conspicuous placed where notices to employees are usually posted for a period of time determined by the Public Employees Relations commission. This report is respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Allen M. Blake, Esquire Alley and Alley, Chartered Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, Florida 33601 Tom Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert W. Vause, President Tarpon Springs Professional Fire Fighters, Local 2353 1408 Ledgestone Drive New Port Richey, Florida
Recommendation The General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgement is hereby granted. The Respondent shall cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the Charging Party. The Respondent cease and desist from interfering with, restraining and coercing public employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under the Act. That Respondent post an appropriate notice on forms provided by PERC in conspicuous places. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in an early retirement incentive program established by an amendment to the 1991-1994 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board of Pinellas County and the Pinellas Classroom Teachers Association.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Barbara Bates, is presently employed by the Pinellas County School Board, serving as a guidance counselor at the 16th Street Middle School. The Pinellas Classroom Teachers Association (P.C.T.A.) is the exclusive bargaining agent for all teachers employed by the School Board of Pinellas County (Board). The term "teachers", as used in that context, includes full time guidance counselors. At all times relevant, there was in force a collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the P.C.T.A., effective 1991-1994. During the 1991-92 school year, the Board experienced severe losses in revenue, and had to prepare for substantial budget cut backs in 1992/93 fiscal/school year. Among the measures taken by the Board to reduce expenditures was a reduction in the number of instructional personnel. To keep the number of instructional personnel involuntarily terminated as small as possible, the P.C.T.A. and the Board negotiated modifications to the existing collective bargaining agreement between them, providing for extended leave options, shared teaching responsibilities and early retirement incentives. The modifications stated in pertinent part: "ARTICLE 1 These proposed amendments to the agreement are in effect for 1992-93 only and cannot be extended without the mutual agreement of the parties . . . ARTICLE XX - TERMINAL PAY The following language will be implemented as part of the current language in Article XX, Section B: "Employees who are eligible for and accept regular retirement at thirty (30) years of creditable FRS service . . . shall receive a cash incentive of $8,500 payable upon retirement . . . IN WITNESS WHEREOF the aforesaid parties have hereunto executed this Agreement on the 11th day of March, 1992, to be effective on the 1st day of July 1992." Said language was ratified by the Board on March 11, 1992, and was subsequently ratified by a vote of the membership of the P.C.T.A. The amount of $8,500, as a retirement incentive, was arrived at as the average amount the Board would have had to pay in unemployment benefits to laid off teachers, and it was determined that it would be preferable to pay that amount to an employee to obtain voluntary retirement rather than to pay it to a former employee who had been involuntarily laid off, or terminated due to budget cuts. It was the understanding of the parties (the Board and P.C.T.A.), that in order to achieve that desired result, the individuals exercising the retirement option would have to be retired by the start of the school year, 1992/93, or else the position occupied by the retiring teacher could not be filled with a teacher who would otherwise have been terminated or laid off. The approved policy manual of the Board provides that the school year calendar begins July 1 of one year and ends on June 30 of the following year. Barbara Bates is a guidance counselor employed full time by the Board, and is thus a member of the bargaining unit represented by the P.C.T.A. Barbara Bates does not currently have thirty (30) years of creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), but will attain such on January 29, 1993. On April 20, 1992, Barbara Bates submitted an application to retire to be effective when she did attain thirty years of creditable service, and to receive the $8,500 cash incentive. Petitioner's application to retire and receive the incentive was submitted in a timely fashion. Initially, no individual other than Barbara Bates employed by the Board who would have attained thirty (30) years of creditable service after the start of the 1992/93 school year actually applied for the $8,500 retirement incentive; however, a number of individuals inquired as to the possibility of retiring shortly after the start of the 1992/93 school year. In order to clarify the intent of the March 11, 1992 amendment to the collective bargaining agreement, and to increase the number of individuals for whom the $8,500 incentive would be available, the Board and the P.C.T.A. approved another amendment to the collective bargaining agreement which stated in part: ". . . 6. The parties to the agreement concur that the intent of the retirement incentive program is to create vacancies to avoid laying off teachers in August of 1992. To this end, eligibility for participation in this incentive was limited to those educators who met eligible requirements on or before June 30, 1992. Subsequent to the receipt of applications, a number of exceptions were requested by those who were close to the June 30 deadline. In an effort to accommodate these requests and still satisfy the intent of the parties to create vacancies prior to the opening of school in the fall, the parties mutually agreed that the following exceptions will be allowed to the original requirement of thirty years service or ten years of service and age 62 prior to June 30, 1992: Employees who are not yet 62, but are willing to accept the State imposed penalty of 5/12ths of 1% per month, provided their date of retirement is on or before June 30, 1992, or in the case of 235 day contract teachers the last day of their July, 1992 quinmester. Employees on 235 day contracts who wish to work until the end of the quinmester in July, and who meet eligibility criteria prior to the end of that quin. Employees who become qualified during the summer of 1992 or prior to November 1, who are willing to accept alternative assignments, and who are approved by the Superintendent or his designees and the president of the association or his designee, provided that the retirement date will be the earliest date upon which the employee satisfies the established eligibility, requirements, such dates not to extend beyond November 1, 1992."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application to participate in the early retirement incentive bonus program for the school year 1992 should be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,11,12,13 Rejected: As against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 9,10,14 Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-17 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis Kwall, Esquire GROSS & KWALL 133 North Fort Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 34615 Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire Pinellas County School Board Largo Administration Building 301 Fourth Street, S.W. Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 34649 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C. 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Hon. Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sidney H. McKenzie, Esquire General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. J. Howard Hinsley, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board P.O. Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 33518
