Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs ALLSTATE CUSTOM CONTRACTING, INC., 17-004949 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 01, 2017 Number: 17-004949 Latest Update: Sep. 19, 2019

The Issue Whether Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order for Specific Worksite Only (“SWO”) and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (“AOPA”); and, if so, whether Petitioner correctly calculated the proposed penalty assessment against Respondent.

Findings Of Fact Background The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. The Department is the agency responsible for conducting random inspections of jobsites and investigating complaints concerning potential violations of workers’ compensation rules. Allstate is a corporation engaged in business in the State of Florida. Allstate was organized on May 23, 2005. Edgar A. Ezelle is the president and registered owner of Allstate. The address of record for Allstate is 8217 Firetower Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32210. In March 2017, Respondent was hired as the general contractor to renovate a hotel at a jobsite located at 3050 Reedy Creek Boulevard. When Respondent accepted the project, Prestige Handyworkers, LLC (“Prestige”), a subcontractor, was working on the jobsite. Although Prestige was hired by the previous general contractor, Respondent continued to work with Prestige. On June 15, 2017, the Department’s investigator, Kirk Glover, conducted a routine visit to the jobsite to conduct a compliance investigation. Mr. Glover observed six individuals performing construction-related work at the site. Mr. Glover conducted an interview of the individuals and took notes during the course of his interviews. Mr. Glover identified the individuals as: Luis Miguel Paz; Joseph A. Pizzuli; Roger Penley, Jr.; Georgios Rapanakis; Stavros Georgios Rapanakis; and Joseph Youngs. The six individuals were employed by subcontractor Prestige to perform work on behalf of Allstate. Luis Miguel Paz, Joseph A. Pizzuli, and Roger Penley, Jr., were engaged in painting work; Georgios Rapanakis and Stavros Georgios Rapanakis were supervising the other workers; and Joseph Youngs was engaged in cleanup of the construction site. The workers did not testify at the final hearing. Mr. Glover then contacted Allstate president, Edward Ezelle, who confirmed he was the general contractor for the jobsite and that he retained Prestige as the subcontractor for the site. Mr. Glover conducted a search of the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”), which revealed that Respondent did not have active workers’ compensation coverage for Prestige or its employees. Prestige did not have workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. The search of CCAS revealed that Mr. Ezelle had an active workers’ compensation coverage exemption, effective July 27, 2015, through July 26, 2017. Based on the results of his investigation, on June 16, 2017, Mr. Glover issued an SWO to Allstate for failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. On June 19, 2017, Mr. Glover hand-served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations (“Records Request”). The Records Request directed Respondent to produce business records for the time period of June 16, 2015, through June 15, 2017. Respondent did not provide any business records to the Department. Mr. Ezelle testified that Allstate did not conduct business in Florida for the period of September 2016 through March 2017. While the undersigned has no reason to doubt Mr. Ezelle’s testimony that his business was not active during that time period, Respondent failed to produce records in response to the Records Request to support his testimony. Penalty Assessment To calculate the penalty assessment, the Department uses a two-year auditing period looking back from the date of the SWO, June 16, 2017, also known as the look-back period. Generally, the Department uses business records to calculate the penalty assessment. If the employer does not produce records sufficient to determine payroll for employees, the Department uses the imputed payroll to assess the penalty as required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028. Eunika Jackson, a Department penalty auditor, was assigned to calculate the penalty assessment for Respondent. Based upon Mr. Glover’s observations at the jobsite on June 16, 2017, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) classification code 5474 to calculate the penalty. Classification code 5474 applies to work involving painting. Ms. Jackson applied the approved manual rates for classification 5474 for each of the six individuals working on the jobsite. The application of the rates was utilized by the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L- 6.027 to determine the penalty assessment. The manual rate applied in this case was $11.05 for the period of June 16, 2015, through December 31, 2015; and $11.02 for the period of January 1, 2016, through June 15, 2017. The statewide average weekly wage, effective January 1, 2017, was used to calculate the penalty assessment. Georgios Rapanakis and Starvos Georgios Rapanakis had a workers’ compensation exemption for the period of June 16, 2015, through June 10, 2016. However, they were not covered by an exemption from June 11, 2016, through June 15, 2017. Although Mr. Ezelle has an exemption, his exemption was not in effect for a short period of July 19, 2015, through July 26, 2015. None of the other employees had an exemption. Based upon the Department’s calculation, the penalty assessment for the imputed payroll would be $153,908.20. On November 17, 2017, the Department filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment (“Motion for Leave to Amend”). The Department sought leave from the undersigned to amend the penalty assessment. The Department, as a party, is not authorized to amend a penalty without leave from the undersigned after the matter was filed with the Division. See § 120.569(2)(a) and Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.202. Despite the AOPA reflecting an issued date of July 14, 2017, the record supports a finding that the AOPA was issued November 17, 2017, the date the undersigned granted the Department’s Motion for Leave to Amend. Thus, the Department issued the AOPA for the imputed payroll 105 business days after Respondent received the Records Request.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order as follows: finding that Respondent failed to secure and maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its subcontractors; and dismissing the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Christina Pumphrey, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Edgar Ezelle Allstate Custom Contracting, Inc. 8217 Firetower Road Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5740.02440.02440.10440.105440.107440.38 Florida Administrative Code (4) 28-106.20269L-6.01569L-6.02769L-6.028 DOAH Case (1) 17-4949
# 3
HIGH POINT OF ORLANDO/CALTON HOMES AND BREEDLOVE, DENNIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC. vs ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 92-003010F (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida May 18, 1992 Number: 92-003010F Latest Update: Dec. 31, 1992

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, High Point of Orlando/Calton Homes (High Point) and Breedlove, Dennis and Associates, Inc. (BDA) were among named Respondents in a petition for formal hearing filed by Central Florida Wetlands Society, Inc. (CFWS) in DOAH Case number 91-8339. High Point was a Respondent in DOAH Case number 92-0364, also initiated by a CFWS petition. BDA was retained as consultant for High Point for a project in Orange County involving wetlands and requiring the evaluation of impact and the mitigation of that impact on the wetlands. A permit for the project was granted by the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD). In late 1991 High Point requested a permit modification when it was determined that mitigation could not be accomplished within the deadlines in the permit conditions. There had been delays in planting caused in part by delays in construction of the project's stormwater management system and it was apparent that the required plantings could not grow fast enough to comply with the mitigation conditions. The technical staff report recommending approval describes the modification as extensions of the deadlines for successful establishment of forested and herbaceous mitigation. CFWS is a Florida nonprofit corporation according to its articles of incorporation filed with the Secretary of State on August 3, 1990. Article III provides these purposes for the corporation: To educate on the roll [sic] of wetlands with emphasis on the values of preservation of wetlands and the prevention of destruction of same. To implement the national policy of no loss of wetlands. To coordinate with other environmental groups to focus attention on wetland preservation. All other things that are lawful under the charter of this corporation and under the laws of the State of Florida. (Exhibit filed at DOAH 8/21/92) On October 7, 1991, CFWS filed a petition for administrative hearing with the SJRWMD in opposition to the district's proposed grant of permit modification to High Point. The petition was verified and signed by Michael W. Mingea as President of CFWS. The petition did not identify CFWS as a corporation, but rather "a not-for-profit private organization under the laws of the State of Florida". The petition named as Respondents, High Point, SJRWMD, DBA and another alleged consultant for High Point, Dyer, Riddle, Mills and Precourt, Inc., (DRMP). The petition was forwarded by SJRWMD to the DOAH for hearing on December 30, 1991, and was assigned DOAH Case number 91-8339. On January 8, 1992, CFWS filed a petition for formal administrative hearing with the SJRWMD disputing a proposed consent order between High Point and SJRWMD assessing $2,463.60 penalty and costs for violation of the mitigation conditions and requiring a mitigation survey. Like the petition described in paragraph 4, above, this petition was signed and sworn by Michael Mingea and did not identify CFWS as a corporation. The Respondent named in the petition was SJRWMD. This petition was forwarded to the DOAH by the district and was received at DOAH on January 21, 1992. It was assigned DOAH Case number 92-0364. A motion in opposition to the petition was filed on January 28, 1992 by counsel for SJRWMD requesting dismissal based on Petitioner's lack of standing, as the consent order does not authorize any activity subject to the district's permitting authority. Further, the motion argued, any issues regarding the proposed permit modification would be addressed in pending case number 91-8339. In an order dated January 28, 1992, the two cases, 91-8339 and 92-0364 were consolidated and set for hearing in Orlando, Florida on June 16 and 17, 1992. On March 5, 1992 a telephone conference hearing was conducted on various pending motions and an order was entered on March 6, 1992 granting motions to dismiss the two consultant parties, BDA and DRMP. The order denied BDA's and DRMP's motions for fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., F.S., based on a finding that the error in including the consultants as Respondents did not rise to the level of bad faith required for an award under 120.57(1)(b)5, F.S. The order granted SJRWMD's motion in opposition to the petition in number 92-0364 and closed the file in that case with remand of the petition to the agency. And finally, the order granted High Point's motion for a more definite statement in Case number 91-8339. The order required CFWS to file its amended petition within thirty days stating how the proposed permit modifications would adversely affect the waters of the state or otherwise violate statutes and rules governing management and storage of surface waters (MSSW) permits. On April 14, 1992 Karen West, Esquire, filed her notice of appearance on behalf of CFWS and a motion for extension of time of fourteen days to file a more definite statement. On April 21, 1992 Ms. West filed the Petitioner's notice of voluntary dismissal of the petition in number 91-8339, and an order closing file was entered. On April 28, 1992, High Point and BDA filed with the SJRWMD their motion for remand which resulted in the district's order of remand discussed in the preliminary statement, above. The sole issue for remand was these Respondents' entitlement to attorneys fees and costs. High Point and BDA also filed separate motions for sanctions dated May 21, 1992 requesting fees and costs of $6,766.88 for High Point and $1,096.49 for BDA. A telephone conference was conducted on June 11, 1992 on Karen West, Esquire's, motion to withdraw as counsel for CFWS. Michael Mingea, President of CFWS participated and stated that the society had no opposition to the motion. The Hearing Officer and parties then discussed procedural matters related to resolution of the fees case, DOAH Case number 92-3010F. Mr. Mingea asked for, and was given, two weeks to obtain substitute counsel prior to Petitioners commencing discovery. The parties agreed to conduct the final hearing by telephone on August 10, 1992. An order and notice of hearing was entered confirming these matters on June 17, 1992. Notwithstanding the parties' agreement, the August 10th hearing was continued because Petitioners were unable to effectuate discovery or serve subpoenas on Michael Mingea or Todd Swearingen, another CFWS board member. Despite frequent filings of well-drafted requests for extensions, responses to Petitioners' pleadings and similar documents, Michael Mingea never appeared at any of the several hearings scheduled in this case after his initial appearance on June 11th. Despite several explicit orders Mr. Mingea never appeared for deposition by Petitioners, either in person or by telephone. Yet, according to the testimony of other board members, Todd Swearingen and Marty Sharpe, only Michael Mingea initiated the petitions involving High Point and he, alone, was cognizant of the specific basis for those petitions. Marty Sharpe who appeared consistently on behalf of CFWS in this proceeding became a board member in February 1992, several months after the petitions were filed. Petitioners were wholly frustrated in their effort to obtain the discovery to which they were entitled with regard to the bases for the CFWS petition in Case number 92-8339 and its abrupt dismissal. In various written documents and attempts to provide evidence through affidavit CFWS argues that its motives were not bad faith; however, throughout this proceeding CFWS has effectively prevented Petitioners from testing those bare assertions through discovery or cross examination. Mr. Mingea apparently travels extensively with his regular employment and the organization's mail goes to a post office box where it is picked up by volunteers. Contact with the organization was most effectively made through Marty Sharpe who attempted, in turn, to reach Mr. Mingea and convey messages. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, the record in this and in the underlying cases, number 91-8339 and 92-0364 support a reasonable inference that the petition in number 91-8339 was filed for a frivolous purpose. The order granting CFWS leave to amend its petition acknowledged that the original petition was legally insufficient. The petition was not amended within the allotted period; but rather was voluntarily dismissed shortly after legal counsel appeared on behalf of the organization. This dismissal reduces, but does not eliminate exposure to liability for filing the initial petition. The fees and costs requested by the Petitioners here are reasonable. Those fees are supported by billing logs attached to the motions for sanctions and reflect an hourly rate of $100.00 for BDA and $160.00 for High Point. Douglas Rillstone testified to the reasonableness of a total of $9,592.00 for High Point, and $2,495.00 for BDA. Those totals are not supported by billing logs and it is not possible to determine the basis for those amounts beyond the original amounts requested.

Florida Laws (1) 120.68
# 5
RODNEY G. GREEN AND CHARTER REALTY, INC. vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 85-003501F (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003501F Latest Update: Dec. 05, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rodney G. Green and Charter Realty, Inc. (petitioners) are both small business parties within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984). This is not disputed by respondent. They are licensed real estate brokers actively engaged in the real estate business in Oveido, Florida. On February 1, 1985 respondent, Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate (Division), filed an administrative complaint against petitioners alleging that they had violated certain provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in connection with a real estate transaction that occurred in 1984. After hearing a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on July 3, 1985 dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The Recommended Order was adopted as a Final Order by the Division on August 20, 1985. There is no judicial review of that order. By adopting the Recommended Order, respondent's Final Order sustains petitioners' position that no impropriety or unlawful conduct occurred. The petition for attorney's fees and costs was filed on October 7, 1985 and is therefore timely. With leave of the undersigned an amended petition was later filed on October 25, 1985. Respondent filed its response on November 15, 1985. To defend against the Division's action, petitioners engaged the services of an attorney. According to an affidavit attached to the amended petition; petitioners have incurred $399.50 in costs and $2,287.50 in legal fees. These costs are found to be reasonable since respondent has not filed a counter-affidavit questioning their reasonableness. According to petitioners' affidavit, the disciplinary action in Case NO. 85-0735 was substantially unjustified because of the following reasons: The actions of the state agency in bringing this proceeding and prosecuting it through formal hearing were not substantially justi- fied and under the circumstances it would be just to award attorney's fees and costs to Respondents pursuant to Subsection 57.111, Florida Statutes. Respondent's affidavit responds in the following manner: The Petitioner acted within the scope of its judicatory responsibilities as prescribed in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, when it initiated and advocated that administrative disciplinary action be taken against the licensees of Respondent's Rodney G. Green and Charter Realty, Inc. In accordance with the pre-existing statutory and regulatory re- quirements, petitioner's actions in this matter conformed to and were consistent with the aforementioned delegated authority. At all times relevant, the Petitioner's acts were "substantially justified" in that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact that the Respondents had violated Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The administrative complaint in Case NO. 85-0735 generally alleged that petitioners had solicited and obtained a sales contract from certain prospective purchasers of property, that the purchasers had given respondents a $20,000.00 cash deposit to be held in escrow, and that when the transaction did not close petitioners failed to return the deposit to the purchasers until they complained to the Division. The complaint also charges petitioners with having failed to properly place the deposit in their escrow account, and with having failed to notify the Division when conflicting demands for the deposit were made. In an attempt to substantiate the charges, the agency presented the testimony of the principal purchaser and offered into evidence certain documentation concerning the transaction. The charges were ultimately determined to be without merit, and the complaint was dismissed.

Florida Laws (2) 120.6857.111
# 6
HHCI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A HARBORSIDE HEALTHCARE-PINEBROOK, D/B/A HARBORSIDE HEALTHCARE-SARASOTA, D/B/A HARBORSIDE HEALTHCARE-NAPLES vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 01-004283F (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 31, 2001 Number: 01-004283F Latest Update: Dec. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating skilled nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the underlying case, the Petitioner operated or controlled three licensed skilled nursing facilities: Harborside Healthcare-Pinewood, Harborside Healthcare-Sarasota, and Harborside Healthcare-Naples. In October of 2001, the Agency filed Administrative Complaints against the Petitioner's three facilities. As to each complaint the Agency relied upon its interpretation of Section 400.121(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The Agency's interpretation of the statute went beyond the plain and unambiguous language of the law. Moreover, such interpretation had not been promulgated by rule. If the interpretation was intended to be the policy of the Agency, the implementation of the policy was not authorized by the statute. The Petitioner pursued three legal strategies: it filed an injunction proceeding in circuit court, a petition to challenge the unpromulgated rule, and vigorously defended the administrative actions filed against its facilities. In so doing, the Petitioner incurred legal expenses and costs necessitated by the Agency's implementation of a policy that had not been established through rule-making procedures. Petitioner's rule challenge alleged that the Agency had failed to follow any rule-making procedures; had enlarged, modified, and contravened the specific provisions of the law; and had implemented a policy that was arbitrary and capricious. Due to the severity of the penalties the Agency sought to impose against the Petitioner, the damage to its reputation in the communities it served, and the resident fear and uncertainty at the facilities, the Petitioner sought and was granted an expedited hearing on the rule challenge. The "Wherefore" clause of the Petitioner's rule challenge clearly stated that Petitioner sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had retained outside counsel to pursue each of its legal strategies. On October 31, 2001, a Final Order was entered in the underlying case that directed the Agency to cease and immediately discontinue all reliance on the policy that had not been promulgated through rule-making procedures. That Final Order has not been appealed. The Final Order did not retain jurisdiction for purposes of addressing the Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees and costs. The instant case was opened when the Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs subsequent to the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU. The matter was assigned a new case number as is the practice of the Division of Administrative Hearings in ancillary proceedings. Accordingly, the instant case, DOAH Case No. 01-4283F, was designated a "fee" case (hence the F at the end of the case number). The initial order entered through the DOAH clerk's office erroneously designated that the fees were sought pursuant to Section 59.11, Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, after the time for appeal of the Final Order (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU) had elapsed, the matter was scheduled for final hearing. Carole Banks is an attorney employed by the Petitioner as an in-house counsel and director of risk management for the three facilities identified in this record. Ms. Banks is also a registered nurse and has been a member of the Florida Bar since April of 1998. Ms. Banks receives a salary from the Petitioner and is required to perform duties typically associated with her full-time job. Due to the filing of the Administrative Complaints against the facilities, Ms. Banks was required to expend additional time to assist outside counsel to defend the facilities. A portion of that time was attributable to the rule challenge case (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU). Based upon the testimony of this witness and the exhibits received into evidence it is determined Ms. Banks expended 19.8 hours assisting in the prosecution of the rule challenge case. An appropriate rate of compensation for Ms. Banks would be $150.00 per hour. There is no evidence, however, that the Petitioner was actually required to pay Ms. Banks overtime or an appropriate rate of compensation for her additional work. K. Scott Griggs is an attorney employed by the Petitioner. Mr. Griggs serves as vice president and General Counsel for the Petitioner and is located in Massachusetts. Mr. Griggs did not testify, was not available to explain his time-keeping records, and none of the exhibits in this cause indicate how Mr. Griggs is compensated for his services or what his specific duties entail. While it is certain Mr. Griggs assisted counsel in the prosecution of the underlying case, without relying on hearsay, no determination as to the amount of time spent and the hourly rate that should be applied to such time can be reached. In order to fully protect the Petitioner's interests and those of its residents, the Petitioner retained outside counsel in the underlying case. The law firm of Broad & Cassel was hired to defend the administrative actions, seek injunctive relief, file the underlying case, and pursue other administrative remedies to assist the client. By agreement, Petitioner was to pay the following hourly rates: partners were to be compensated at the rate of $245.00 per hour, associates were to receive $175.00 per hour, and paralegals were entitled to $90.00 per hour. In this case, four partner-level attorneys from Broad and Cassel expended time in furtherance of the client's causes. After reviewing the time records and testimony of the witnesses, it is determined that the partners expended at least 172.6 hours associated with the underlying rule challenge. Additionally, an associate with the Broad & Cassel firm expended not fewer than 12.1 hours that can be directly attributed to the rule challenge case. Additional hours expended contributed to the success of the rule challenge. The Petitioner also incurred costs and expenses associated with the rule challenge. A paralegal expended 4.6 hours (with a $90.00 per hour rate) making copies of the documents used at the hearing. Other costs included court reporter fees, transcripts, telecopy charges, and expert witness fees. It is determined that the Petitioner has incurred $5819.15 in recoverable costs associated with this case and the underlying rule challenge. The hourly rates sought by the Petitioner are reasonable. The time and labor expended by the Petitioner to vigorously protect its legal interests was reasonable given the severity of the penalty sought by the Agency and the circumstances faced by the client. The Petitioner benefited from the efforts of counsel. Due to the time constraints and immediate ramifications faced by the Petitioner, special time and requests were made of the attorneys performing the work for the underlying case. In some instances, the attorneys were required to devote an extensive amount of time to address the client's interests to the exclusion of other work. This was the first time the Broad & Cassel firm had been retained to represent the client. As a result, the attorneys did not have the benefit of a long-term understanding of the facilities and the client's needs. The Broad & Cassel firm and the attorneys assigned to this matter have considerable experience and demonstrated considerable skill, expertise, and efficiency in providing services to the client. Had the Petitioner not prevailed, its ability to honor its hourly agreement with counsel may have been jeopardized. The Agency's expert recognized the difficulties presented by the case and opined that a proper fee would be $42,908. Such amount did not include attorney time spent in preparing for, conducting the fee hearing, or post-hearing activities. Such amount did not cover the amounts depicted in the billing statement from the Broad & Cassel firm. The Petitioner was required to retain expert witnesses to address the fees sought. The calculation of attorney's fees in this cause is complicated by the fact that none of the fees sought would have been incurred by the Petitioner had the Agency not implemented an unlawful policy. That is, had the non-rule policy not been utilized to support Administrative Complaints against the three facilities, none of the fees sought would have been incurred. The Petitioner presented a "shot-gun" approach pursuing every avenue available (including the underlying rule challenge) to dissuade the Agency from pursuing its action against the facilities. Only the rule challenge proved successful. Had the rule challenge not proved successful, residents would have been relocated from their homes. The Petitioner would have incurred extensive financial loss. William E. Williams and Carlos Alvarez testified as experts on behalf of the Petitioner. Their testimony has been considered and their opinions regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought by Petitioner has been deemed persuasive. Based upon the totality of the evidence presented, it is determined that the Petitioner prevailed in the rule challenge. The Agency has not demonstrated that the non-rule statement was required by the Federal Government to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition governing the receipt of federal funds. The formal hearing for fees in this cause lasted 4.75 hours. Petitioner's counsel expended time in preparation for the hearing and in post hearing activities. A reasonable fee associated with that time would not be less than $15,000.00.

Florida Laws (5) 120.54120.56120.595120.68400.121
# 7
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs DIANA C. VERDI AND REALTEC GROUP, INC., T/A RE/MAX REALTEC GROUP, 95-001798 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Apr. 13, 1995 Number: 95-001798 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 1995

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein the Division of Real Estate was the state agency responsible for the licensing of real estate sales persons and brokers and the regulation of the real estate profession in Florida. Respondent, Diana C. Verdi, was licensed as a real estate salesperson under license number 0545114, and Respondent, Realtec Group, Inc., was licensed as a real estate broker under license number 0273784. Respondent, Verdi, was employed by Respondent, Realtec, at its office at 3474 Tampa Road, Palm Harbor, Florida. On October 23, 1993, Respondent Verdi, while working for Respondent, Realtec, solicited and obtained an offer from James and Maureen Herhold, to purchase residential property owned by J. and K. Griffin. The contract called for the placement of a $50,000 non-refundable deposit with Realtec, and allowed the Herholds to move in on October 30, 1993, with closing to be held on November 30, 1993. The contract also provided that once the Herholds moved into the house, the Griffins would no longer be responsible for any repairs or maintenance needed by the property. Prior to moving in, the Herholds requested that Respondent, Verdi, obtain for them a seller's disclosure statement which would list any material defects in the property known to the sellers. In that regard, the Griffins' listing agent, Marta Shank, had previously requested they prepare such a statement. The statement was prepared on August 20, 1993, and reflected that the only known defect was a shower leak which had purportedly been fixed and a shower wall which had purportedly been replaced. Notwithstanding the Herholds repeatedly requested the disclosure statement from Respondent, Verdi, and notwithstanding such a statement had been prepared by the Griffins, the statement was not furnished to Respondent, Verdi, by Ms. Shank and, thereafter, to the Herholds until after they moved into the property. Consistent with the terms of the contract, the Herholds were required to pay for the repairs to the shower and shower wall which, it appears, were not properly repaired prior to their move into the property. At closing the Herholds requested the Griffins reimburse them for the cost of the repairs, which was not done. In the interim, however, and before the Herholds moved into the property, Respondent, Verdi, as was her custom in all residential sales, insisted that the Herholds obtain an independent inspection of the home. Mr. Herhold admits she did this. She claims she would not sell a home without this being done. This inspection, conducted by an inspector of the Herholds' choosing, failed to disclose any defect in the shower or shower wall. Respondent, Verdi, also suggested that since her repeated efforts to obtain the disclosure statement were unsuccessful, Mr. Herhold contact the Griffins or their agent directly. She also suggested to him that if he were not satisfied with the condition of the house, or if he had any qualms about moving in without the disclosure statement, he should not move in until he received it. This was verified by Ms. Kissner. Herhold elected not to do this, however, because he feared he might lose his deposit. Respondent, Verdi, represents herself as being an experienced and successful real estate salesperson, and there appears little reason to doubt that representation. She contends that though she never went to Shank's office to pick one up, she repeatedly asked Ms. Shank, the selling agent, for a disclosure statement as she always does, and her testimony in this regard is supported by that of both Ms. Kissner and Mr. Scarati. Both repeatedly tried to contact the selling office to obtain a disclosure statement but their calls were either nonproductive or not returned. There is some indication that when Ms. Verdi asked Ms. Shank for a disclosure statement, she was told that none existed. After the closing, when Mr. Herhold was unable to obtain a reimbursement from the Griffins for the cost of repairs, he filed suit against Realtec, Verdi, Shank and her agency, Coldwell Banker and his own inspection service. He admits that, at court, when he was asked by the judge who he believed was responsible, he did not know. He sued Verdi because he had asked her for a disclosure statement which she did not give him. He claims the sale was not an "as is" sale. At hearing, he was awarded $835.20 plus costs against Verdi and Realtec. She did not pay right away and sought the advice of counsel. When Herhold found she was listing her own home for sale, he filed a lien against it. As a result of that action, because she determined that fighting the lien would cost more than the amount involved, she paid the judgement even though she believed the judgement to be in error. Realtec paid nothing. No evidence was presented as to exactly when the judgement was satisfied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter against Respondents Diana C. Verdi and Realtec Group, Inc., t/a Re/Max Realtec Group, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Diana C. Verdi 2474 Tampa Road Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Realtec Group, Inc. percentRe/Max Realtec Group 3474 Tampa Road Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
# 9

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer