Findings Of Fact During 1982 and 1983, Petitioner was licensed as a mortgage broker and real estate broker in the State of Florida. His mortgage broker's license expired in September, 1983. At all times material hereto, Petitioner utilized his mortgage broker's and real estate broker's license to engage in real estate development speculation. He worked closely with Jeffrey Graham, who was also licensed as a mortgage broker and who was a co-owner with Petitioner of Continental Development, Continental Mortgage Company and the Real Estate Spot. They were engaged in buying and selling existing residential properties and constructing new homes for sale. Financing for Petitioner's speculative real estate transactions was provided primarily by The Bank of Florida, located in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Bank provided financing on 80 to 85 percent of his transactions, but at some point in 1982 or 1983, Petitioner and Graham found themselves unable to obtain further construction financing from the Bank. In order to continue receiving financing from the Bank, Petitioner and Graham initiated the use of "stand-in" buyers. A "stand-in" buyer would not have to use any of his own money as a deposit or down payment, even though real estate contracts executed in connection with these transactions would show an earnest money deposit by such buyers. The buyer's role was simply to lend his credit to the transaction and to share in any profits on the eventual sale of the property. On or about March 25, 1983, Petitioner executed, as seller, a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Norman Tanner, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $25,000, with an earnest money deposit of $5,000 which the contract specified was to be held by Petitioner, as seller, until closing. Petitioner also executed a Settlement Statement on March 29, 1983, in connection with a loan obtained by Tanner from The Bank of Florida which indicated that Tanner had paid an earnest money deposit of $5,000. Based upon the testimony of Norman Tanner at hearing, it is found that he did not provide the earnest money deposit indicated on the sales contract or Settlement Statement which Petitioner executed as seller. Petitioner testified that this transaction was carried out in his individual capacity as a personal investment, and not under the authority of his mortgage broker's license. In fact, Petitioner did not deal directly with Tanner in this transaction. Tanner's dealings were with Petitioner's partner, Jeffrey Graham. Nevertheless, the evidence and demeanor of the witnesses establishes that Petitioner was aware of the fact that Tanner had not paid the deposit reflected on the instruments he executed, and that such instruments were used to induce the Bank to make a mortgage loan to Tanner. Petitioner, as seller, received $19,665.56 cash at settlement from this transaction with Tanner. On or about February 24, 1982, Petitioner executed a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Joseph Armendinger, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $48,000, with an earnest money deposit of $6,500 which the contract specified was to be held in escrow by The Real Estate Spot, Inc., until closing. Petitioner and Armendinger also executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor in connection with obtaining financing for this transaction, and said Affidavit also indicated the buyer's purported cash equity of $6,500 in the property. At the time, Petitioner was co-owner of The Real Estate Spot, and Armendinger was an electrician who was doing some work at The Real Estate Spot and became interested in the "stand-in" buyer transactions he observed while doing electrical work at Petitioner's office. On or about October 27, 1982, Petitioner and Armendinger executed another contract for sale and deposit receipt for a second piece of property, which reflects a total price of $85,000 and an earnest money deposit by Armendinger of $5,000. Thereafter, they executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor and Settlement Statement reflecting Armendinger's purported cash equity of $4,250.00. Petitioner used the proceeds from this transaction to pay off an existing mortgage and judgment on the property, and realized $1,607.46 in cash, which was shared with Jeffrey Graham, co-seller. Petitioner knew that the contracts for sale and Affidavits which he executed with Armendinger were to be presented to The Bank of Florida and used for the purpose of Armendinger obtaining financing for the purchase of these properties. Based upon the testimony of Joseph Armendinger at hearing, it is found he did not provide any earnest money deposit or downpayment in connection with these two transactions with Petitioner. Armendinger relied on Petitioner, a licensed mortgage broker and real estate broker, in these transactions, and was told by Petitioner that he would not have to put any money of his own into these transactions. Petitioner knew that Armendinger had not made any deposit or downpayments concerning these transactions at the time he executed the contracts for sale and deposit receipts, Affidavits and Settlement Statement. On December 16, 1982, Petitioner executed two mortgages in favor of Patricia G. Herren on property he had previously sold to Armendinger. These mortgages totalled $21,793.35, and were recorded in Pinellas County, Florida, on December 28, 1982. These mortgages were used by Petitioner, along with a $10,000 mortgage he executed in Herren's favor, to obtain a satisfaction from Herren of a mortgage she held on a piece of property she sold to Petitioner in October 1982 in St. Petersburg Beach. The $10,000 Herren mortgage was also recorded on December 28, 1982. Having obtained the satisfaction, Petitioner then sold the St. Petersburg Beach property to Juanita Murdaugh and Jeffrey Graham on December 17, 1982, prior to recording the $10,000 Herren mortgage. He did not disclose on the Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor which he executed that he had an outstanding $10,000 mortgage in favor of Herren on this St. Petersburg Beach property, although this mortgage should have been disclosed as "secondary financing." In each of the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser executed by Petitioner in connection with sales of property as described herein, there is the following statement in Item VII: The certifications of this affidavit are for the purpose of inducing the Lender named above or its assignees to make or purchase the first mortgage described by this affidavit.... By signing the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser, Petitioner, as the "Property Vendor," made the following certification: The PROPERTY VENDOR hereby certifies that to the extent PROPERTY VENDOR is a party, the Financial Terms, including Total Purchase Price, and the Liens are as set forth in Items III and IV above, [and] hereby acknowledges the inducement purpose of this affidavit as set forth in Item VII above....
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX (DOAH No. 87-0033) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1.(a) Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 4. 2.(a) Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 2.(b) Rejected in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 2.(c) Rejected in Finding of Fact 10. 2.(d) Rejected in Findings of Fact 6-10. 2.(e), (f) Rejected in Finding of Fact 11. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 3. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4. 5-6. Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 10. 10-11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 9, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 9, 10. 14-19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: John Swisher, Esquire Dillinger & Swisher 5511 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Office of Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Honorable Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Department of Transportation ("Department") erred by considering Willeby Construction, Inc. ("Willeby") a qualified bidder; whether the requirement to submit a bid bond or certified funds check or draft (hereafter "security on the bid") with the bid was a material requirement; whether the Department erred in treating Willeby’s failure to include security on the bid with its bid proposal as a minor, and, thereby, an irregularity which could be waived; and whether said decision of the Department was contrary to the terms of the bid, contrary to law, or arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact On November 14, 2000, the Department issued a bid solicitation notice for Financial Project No. 40509417201/Contract No. E3A78, a contract for routine mowing of grassed and vegetated roadside areas and litter removal from within the Department’s highway right-of-way in Gadsden and Leon Counties. The invitation to bid stated: In a letter dated November 17, 2000 from Richard Norris of the Department District Contracts Office to all prospective bidders, the Department reiterated the bid bond requirement stating "[i]f your bid is over $150,000, a Bid Bond of 5 percent of the bid amount is required and must be attached to your bid proposal. Failure to submit this with your bid will result in your bid being rejected." (Emphasis is in original.) The invitation to bid further stated: BID OR PROPOSAL BOND (If bid is over $150,000): Must be completely executed if bid is over $150,000. This 5 percent bid bond is required and must be included in your bid package. If bid is less than $150,000 no bid bond shall be necessary, however, the successful bidder shall be required to obtain a performance bond upon execution of the contract. The purpose of the requirement for security on the bid is to compensate the Department for damages in the event the low bidder fails to enter into the contract. The Department received bid proposals from six firms in response to its bid solicitation by the due date of December 7, 2000. The lowest bidder for Contract No. E3A78 was Willeby. Willeby submitted a business check drawn on Willeby’s business account no. 02-140168-01 with Farmers & Merchants Bank. This was an unsecured, personal check. At the time the bids were opened, Willeby’s Account No. 02-140168-01 contained insufficient funds to cover the check Willeby submitted as its bid bond in the amount of $11,996.52 for Contract No. E3A78. Willeby failed to submit the required security on the bid in the form of a cashier’s check, bank money order, bank draft of any national or state bank, or surety bond, payable to the State of Florida, Department of Transportation as required by the solicitation. The Petitioner, Phoenix, was the second lowest bidder. Phoenix submitted a bid bond equal to 5 percent of its total bid with its bid package. Phoenix fully complied with all the requirements of the invitation to bid. Bids for Contract No. E3A78 were opened on Thursday December 7, 2000. At that time, the Department's personnel discovered that Willeby had failed to submit security on bid as required by the terms of the bid solicitation. On December 15, 2000, eight days after the Department discovered that Willeby’s bid submittal was deficient, Starsky Harrell, the contract specialist with the District III office of the Department, telephoned W.J. Willeby, the president of Willeby Construction. Harrell informed Mr. Willeby that Willeby’s bid was non-conforming, and gave Willeby the opportunity to cure its non-responsive bid by submitting a check for certified funds or a bid bond as required by the bid solicitation. Willeby, at this point, had the opportunity to cure the defect or refuse to cure the defect, thereby, negating his bid. This gave Willeby an advantage not enjoyed by the other bidders. Willeby chose to cure its non-responsive bid, and submitted a certified check as its security on the bid. Willeby, thereafter, entered into the contract with the Department on Monday, December 18, 2000, eleven days after the bids were opened. The Department posted its intent to award Contract No. E3A78 on December 21, 2000, indicating its intent to award the contract to Willeby Construction. Phoenix timely filed this formal protest in opposition to the award of Contract No. E3A78 as contrary to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2000). Regarding the requirements for security on the bid required in the solicitation for the bid and accompanying materials, Richard Norris, the contracts administrator, made the decision to emphasize the language by having it in bold-face type and underlined. His purpose for underlining and placing in bold-face type this language was to "put some accent on it, to make it stand out." A basic tenet of competitive procurement is to protect the integrity of the bidding process and ensure open and fair competition. A responsive bid is one which meets all the requirements of the proposal documents. Mr. Willeby has entered bids on Department contracts seventeen times in the past. Willeby is an experienced participant in the bid process. A bidder who has the option of taking a contract or not taking a contract after the bidder knows what the other bids are on a project has a competitive advantage over other bidders. If the bidder has bid too close to the profit margin, the bidder can refuse to cure the bid defect and avoid performance on the unprofitable contract. It is not only less expensive for a person to submit a personal check for security on a bid, but a stop payment order can be issued on a personal check. The bid bond posted by the Petitioner cost $800.00. This amount is not refundable. However, the proposal provides alternatives to a bid bond to establish security on the bid; therefore, paying the cost of the bond is not a competitive disadvantage. It is noted that a personal check is not among the alternatives, and the bid proposal's provisions for bid security specifically provide that checks or drafts for less than 5 percent of the bid amount will invalidate the bid. The only checks or drafts permitted under the terms of the bid proposal are those checks secured by the banking institution's funds and not subject to stop payment orders of the person in whose behalf the check is issued. It is consistent with the stated terms of invalidation, that, in addition to an insufficient amount, that an instrument not meeting the stated terms of the provision would also invalidate the bid. If being a dollar short on the secured amount is disqualifying, being short the entire amount in secured funds would be similarly disqualifying. Evidence was received regarding whether Willeby was a qualified bidder. This information related to the nature and amount of the equipment which Willeby had, and its financial ability to obtain additional equipment. Although Willeby did not have some of the equipment necessary to handle this job and its other contract obligations, he had ordered this equipment and his bank indicated that it would loan him the money. It was not developed whether the bank's willingness was dependent upon the pendency of the challenged contract award, and it is concluded that Willeby is a qualified bidder.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the bid of Willeby Construction on Contract No. E3A78 be rejected, and the contract be awarded to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Julius F. Parker, III, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian A. Crumbaker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with violations of several provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. All of the violations charged relate to allegations that the Respondent failed to return certain personal property received by the Respondent as collateral security on a surety bond.
Findings Of Fact Facts admitted by all parties The Respondent, Sergio Roque, Jr., is currently licensed in this state as a limited surety agent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Administrative Complaint in this matter, the Respondent was licensed in this state as a limited surety agency. On or about July 19, 1990, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent, did, as agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company, post a $100,000 general surety appearance bond, power number X00-0-00000331, to obtain the release of defendant Domingo Arrechea from the Dade County Jail. In conjunction with the posting of the aforementioned surety bond, Respondent did on or about July 19, 1990, receive $10,000, which represented the premium payment for said surety bond. Respondent did in conjunction with the posting of said bond receive from indemnitor Lorraine DeVico a diamond engagement ring, a Rolex watch, and the title to a 1979 Mercedes automobile (ID#11602412149348) as partial collateral security for the aforementioned surety bond. On or about April 3, 1991, Respondent did cause to be surrendered back into custody the defendant Domingo Arrechea, thus terminating all liability for said surety bond. Respondent has failed to return to indemnitor Lorraine DeVico the collateral security described above; namely, the diamond engagement ring, the Rolex watch, and the title to the 1979 Mercedes automobile. Additional facts proved at hearing In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from the defendant Arrechea, and from the defendant's wife, a conditional mortgage on a condominium. In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from "Mike Farina" a conditional mortgage on real estate owned by Mike Farina. Mike Farina was a friend of the defendant Arrechea. "Mike Farina" later turned out to be a fictitious name. Lorraine DeVico was a very close friend of the defendant Arrechea. The Rolex watch Ms. DeVico put up as part of the collateral for Arrechea's bond was a watch that had been given to her by her father. Shortly after Ms. DeVico put the watch up for collateral, her father began to inquire as to the whereabouts of the watch. Because she felt that her father would disapprove of what she had done, and because her father was the source of most of her wealth, Ms. DeVico told several lies to her father about the whereabouts of the watch. As a result of continuing inquiries by her father, Ms. DeVico wanted her watch back and no longer wanted to be responsible under the indemnity agreement she had signed. Towards the beginning of February 1991, Ms. DeVico began to call the Respondent to advise that she was frightened that the defendant Arrechea was considering jumping bond. The Respondent received numerous calls from Ms. DeVico requesting return of her collateral and requesting to be off the indemnity agreement. Consequently, the Respondent hired MV Investigations on February 16, 1991, to locate the defendant Arrechea. On March 27, 1991, Ms. DeVico advised the Respondent that the defendant Arrechea was not answering his digital pager and that his telephone had been disconnected. She advised the Respondent that she sent her employee to look for Arrechea but could not find him. She asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and get her off the bond, agreeing to pay all the expenses. On April 1, 1991, Ms. DeVico again asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and again agreed that she would pay the costs associated with the pick-up. On April 3, 1991, the investigators hired by the Respondent located and picked up defendant Arrechea and surrendered him back to the Dade County Jail. The Respondent returned the collateral deposited by Mr. Farina and by the defendant Arrechea and his wife. After having the defendant Arrechea picked up and surrendered, the Respondent called Ms. DeVico to give her the information and advise her of the pick-up costs. Ms. DeVico verbally refused to pay any pick-up costs. On April 14, 1991, the Respondent sent by certified mail to Ms. DeVico a notice under Section 648.442, Florida Statutes, notifying her that he would be selling her collateral in ten days against his pick-up expenses. The Respondent sold the Rolex watch and diamond ring pledged as collateral by Ms. DeVico after expiration of the ten days. The indemnity agreement signed by Ms. DeVico in conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea included the following language: 2. The indemnitor(s) will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the Company and save harmless the Company from and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities, costs, charges, legal fees, disbursements and expenses of every kind and nature, which the Company shall at any time sustain or incur, and as well from all orders, decrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by reason or in consequence of having executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the indemnitor(s) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good to the Company, its successors and assigns, all sums and amounts of money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, costs, expense, suit, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason of the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitor(s) and before the Company shall be required to pay thereunder. The liability for legal fees and disbursements includes all legal fees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assert or defend its right to collect or to charge for any legal fees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings. * * * 7. The Indemnitor(s) agree(s) that the Company may at any time take such steps as it may deem necessary to obtain its release from any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings, and it shall not be necessary for the Company to give the Indemnitor(s) notice of any fact or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any such bond or undertaking, notice of all such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and further indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such bond or undertaking in any manner it may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses which the Company may sustain or incur or be put to in obtaining such release or in further securing itself against loss, shall be borne and paid by the Indemnitor(s). In conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea, Ms. DeVico also signed a Bail Bond Information Sheet which advised her in bold print that: When all agreements have been fulfilled and bond is discharged, in writing or by the court, and without loss expense on the bond, your full collateral will be returned to you.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4378 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected for two reasons; first, the proposed finding is irrelevant because it is not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, second, the proposed finding was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: First sentence accepted. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 6 through 13: Accepted in substance with some details clarified. Paragraph 14: First sentence accepted. Remainder rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting procedural details or conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: Rejected as constituting statement of position or legal argument, rather than proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 17: First sentence accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting conclusions of law or legal argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20: Accepted COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Martin L. Roth, Esquire Haber & Roth 1370 Northwest 16th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent, George G. Walsh, is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0117943. Mr. Walsh is the owner of and the qualifying broker for G. G. Jerry Walsh Real Estate, located in Panama city, Florida. In May 1989, Respondent was the acting broker for Howard Bilford of Miami, Florida. Mr. Bilford owned a five acre parcel of property located in Bay County, Florida. Around May 15, 1989, Tama and Paul Russ, through Mr. Walsh's office, entered into a contract for the purchase of Mr. Bilford's property. The purchase price of the property was $15,000. The Russ' gave Mr. Walsh a $500 binder for deposit in his escrow account. The $500 was placed in Respondent's escrow account. Simultaneous with the signing of the sales contract and deposit receipt agreement, Mr. Walsh also prepared an estimated closing cost statement. On that closing cost statement, Mr. Walsh estimated that a survey of the property would cost the Russ' $450. During this meeting, Mr. Walsh explained to the Russ' that, especially if a financial institution was involved in the financing of the property, there would be certain costs which they would probably have to pay up front. Part of those costs included a survey of the property. At about the same time, the Russ' made application for a loan to a credit union located in Panama City, Florida. At the time of the loan application, the loan officers Mrs. Stokes, prepared a closing cost statement estimating the loan closing costs which the Russ' would encounter. On the credit union's closing cost statement, the cost of a survey was estimated to be $150 to $200. Since it was the credit union that required the survey, the Russ' believed that that estimate was the more accurate. The Russ' simply could not afford a $500 survey. As part of the loan application, an appraisal of the property was required. The appraisal was ordered by the credit union on May 16, 1989, and was completed on May 31, 1989. Unfortunately, the property had been vandalized by unknown persons, and the mobile home which was on the property had suffered severe and substantial damage. The appraisal indicated that the real estate was worth $10,500. With such a low appraisal, the credit union would not lend the amount necessary to purchase the property at the negotiated price. In an effort to renegotiate the property's price, Tama Russ inspected the property and prepared a list of the items which would have to be repaired to make the mobile home liveable. At the same time, the Russ' placed no trespassing signs and pulled logs across the entry to the property. The Russ' also placed padlocks on the doors to the mobile home and removed the accumulated garbage inside the mobile home in an effort to secure the property. They made no other repairs to the property. On June 1, 1990, the Russ' told the loan officer to hold the loan application. At some point during this process, both Mr. Walsh and the Russ' became aware that the survey would cost a considerable amount more than had been expected. By using a favor with Mr. Walsingham of County Wide Surveying, Mr. Walsh obtained a survey price of $500 for the Russ'. In an effort to help the Russ' close on the property, Mr. Walsh contacted Mr. Bilford to see if he would agree to pay the $500 survey cost. Mr. Bilford so agreed, contingent on the closure of the transaction, and sent Mr. Walsh a check made out to County Wide Surveying in the amount of $500. At that point, the Russ' believed that they were no longer obligated to pay for the survey since Mr. Walsh told them that Mr. Bilford was to pay for the survey. On June 3, 1989, Mr. Bilford agreed to a renegotiated price of $10,500.00 on the property. Additionally the Russ' agreed to sign a ten year promissory note for $2,000 bearing 11% interest per annum. Since there were changes in the terms of the contract, the Russ' entered into a net contract with Mr. Bilford on June 3, 1989. The new contract expired on June 30, 1989. Around June 5, 1989, the Russ' learned that their credit had been preliminarily approved. However, such preliminary approval only indicated that the Russ' had sufficient income to proceed with the more costly loan underwriting requirements of the credit union. Such preliminary approval did not indicate that the loan would be finally approved by the financial institution. The preliminary approval was communicated to Mr. Walsh by Tama Russ. Ms. Russ intended the communication to mean that they had been preliminarily approved by the financial institution. Mr. Walsh in an abundance caution contacted Mrs. Stokes, the loan officer. Mrs. Stokes advised him that the Russ' credit had been preliminarily approved. She did not tell him that the loan had been finally approved. Through a misunderstanding of what Mrs. Stokes communicated to him, Mr. Walsh ordered the survey from County Wide Realty on June 7, 1989. There was no reliable evidence presented that the credit union had authorized him to order the survey. The credit union at no time during this process ordered the survey. Mr. Walsh testified that Ms. Russ told him to order the survey. Ms. Russ denies that she gave Mr. Walsh permission to order the survey. At best this evidence goes only to demonstrate Respondent's intent with regards to the actions he undertook in this case and removes this case from a Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, violation. At some point Ms. Stokes left the employ of the credit union. On June 16, 1989, as part of her leaving, she unilaterally closed the Russ' loan application file and cancelled the loan application. Neither the Russ' nor Mr. Walsh were notified of the closure or the cancellation. The credit union's file fell into the void created between a change of employees. Because Mr. Walsh was unaware of Ms. Stokes' actions, Mr. Walsh, on July 13, 1989, after the expiration of the Russ' sales contract, contacted the credit union in order to obtain the loan closing package from the institution. The credit union had to hunt for the Russ' file. The credit union president called the Russ' about the loan and he was advised that they did not want the loan. The credit union's president then reviewed the loan file and noted that the Russ' had insufficient income to come up with the amount of the promissory note. He also thought the real estate constituted insufficient collateral for the loan. The loan application was officially denied on July 15, 1989. The Russ' were notified of the credit union's denial credit. The real estate transaction never closed. However, sometime after July 15, 1989, Mr. Walsh received the survey from County Wide. The survey indicates that the field work for the survey was completed on July 17, 1989, and that it was drawn on July 18, 1989. 1/ There was no reliable evidence which indicated any attempt had been made to cancel the survey. Sometime, after July 15, 1989, Tama Russ contacted Mr. Walsh in order to obtain the return of their $500 deposit. After many failed attempts to get the Russ' to voluntarily agree to pay for the cost of the survey, Mr. Walsh, around October, 1989, unilaterally paid the Russ' deposit to County Wide Realty. Mr. Walsh followed this course of action after speaking with some local FREC members who advised him that since FREC was swamped with deposit disputes that nothing would happen as long as he used his best judgment. The payment of the deposit to the surveyor, without prior authorization from the Ruse' violates Section 475.25(1)(d) and (k) Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(d) and 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes, issuing a letter of reprimand to Respondent with instructions to immediately replace the Russ' trust deposit and forthwith submit the matter to the commission for an escrow disbursement order and levying a $250 fine. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the portions of the Administrative Complaint alleging violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund (fund) codified in Sections 494.042 through 494.045, Florida Statutes (1987). Among other things, the Division processes claims for payment from the fund by persons who were parties to a mortgage financing transaction and who have suffered monetary damages as a result of a violation of the law by a licensed mortgage broker. In this case, the perpetrator was Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation (Stackhouse), which held mortgage brokerage license number HB-0006527 from September 19, 1976 through August 31, 1986 and operated at least part of that time in the Brevard County area. In order to perfect a successful claim and be assured of participating in the distribution of moneys from the fund, a person must satisfy a number of statutory criteria within a specified time period after the first notice is filed. This proceeding involves a number of claims by various parties who suffered monetary damages as a result of the illicit acts of Stackhouse. The principal factual issues are whether petitioners, Robert Motes, Machiko Motes, Madge Chesser and Christiane E. Driscoll, all claimants, satisfied the required statutory criteria within the specified time period, and whether the first valid and complete notice of a claim was filed on January 20, 1987 as maintained by the Division, or occurred on a later date as urged by petitioners. These issues are crucial to petitioners' interests since the amount of money to be distributed from the fund for all claimants (on a pro rata basis) is $100,000, and all of that money has been proposed to be distributed to intervenors and other claimants because of the alleged untimeliness of petitioners' claims. The Stackhouse matter first came to the Division's attention on January 20, 1987 when it received by certified mail a letter containing a copy of a complaint filed against Stackhouse by intervenors, Richard S. and Althea M. Rucki, in the circuit court of the eighteenth judicial circuit in and for Brevard County. This filing constituted the first valid and complete notice of the matter. As such, it triggered a two year time period in which other claimants had to file such notice with the Division and then satisfy all statutory criteria in order to share in the first, and in this case the only, distribution of moneys from the fund. Intervenors eventually obtained a summary final judgment against Stackhouse on January 10, 1989 in the amount of $27,200 plus $1,972 in interest, $76 in court costs, and $2,000 in attorney's fees. Copies of the judgment, unsatisfied writ of execution and affidavit of diligent search were filed with the Division on January 19, 1989, or within two years from the date the first notice was filed. After the Rucki notice was filed, a number of claimants, including the other intervenors, filed their notices with the Division within the two year time period and thereafter satisfied all pertinent statutory criteria. Their names, dates of filing their final claims with the Division, and amounts of final judgment, including costs and fees, are listed below in the order in which the claimants filed their first notice with the Division: Claimant Date of Filing Claim Amount of judgment Roberts January 19, 1989 $84,562.30 Rucki January 19, 1989 31,248.00 Gantz January 19, 1989 15,634.28 Carman January 19, 1989 48,767.87 Thomas July 21, 1988 40,103.22 Hahn January 19, 1989 14,165.14 Ulriksson January 18, 1989 14,497.00 Choate January 18, 1989 28,994.00 Anderson December 22, 1988 84,443.20 Resnick December 22, 1988 32,912.22 It is noted that each of the foregoing claimants satisfied all statutory requirements prior to the date of the filing of their respective final claims with the Division. This included the obtaining of a judgment against the debtor, having a writ of execution issued upon the judgment which was later returned unsatisfied, and thereafter having made a reasonable search and inquiry to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possessed any property or other assets to be used in satisfying the judgment. Based upon the judgments obtained by the above claimants, those persons are entitled to distribution from the fund in the following pro rata amounts: Anderson claim - $10,950.00 Resnick claim - 10,950.00 Carman claim - 10,950.00 Thomas claim - 10,950.00 Ulriksson claim - 7,937.83 Choate claim - 10,950.00 Roberts claim - 10,950.00 Gantz claim - 7,697.63 Hahn claim - 7,714.54 Rucki claim - 10,950.00 $100.000.00 On July 27, 1988 petitioners, Robert and Machiko Motes and Madge Chesser, filed their notices with the Division. On August 2, 1988, they were advised by the Division that "the first time period for payment of the Guaranty Fund claims is `two years after the first claim.'" Even so, petitioners did not complete all required statutory steps and file their final claims with the Division until March 1, 1989, or after the two year period had expired. Petitioner, Christiane E. Driscoll, filed her notice, copy of complaint and final judgment on January 23, 1989. Thereafter, she completed all required statutory steps and filed her final claim with the Division on June 6, 1989. As a consequence, none of petitioners are entitled to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. An attorney who once represented Driscoll, Rafael A. Burguet, made inquiry by telephone with a Division employee in either late December 1988 or early January 1989 concerning the steps required to process a claim on behalf of his client. It was his recollection that the Division employee did not advise him that the two year period for perfecting claims was triggered in January 1987. On January 20, 1989, Burguet sent a letter to the Division with a copy of the complaint and final judgment against Stackhouse. In the letter, he requested the Division to "please advise as to what further requirements you may have to file this claim." On January 23, 1989 a Division employee acknowledged by letter that the Division had received the complaint and judgment. The letter contained copies of the relevant portions of the Florida Statutes and advice that "claims for recovery against Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation are currently being forwarded to our Legal Department for the drafting of a Notice of Intent to either grant or deny payment from the Fund." There is no evidence that the Division made any positive representations to Burguet that either mislead him or caused him to delay in filing his claim. Similarly, the Division responded on August 2, 1988 to the initial filing of the Motes and Chesser notices with advice that the time period for complying with the statutory criteria was "two years after the first claim." Although there were subsequent telephone conversations (but no written communications) between their attorney and the Division, there was no evidence that the Division made any positive representations that would mislead petitioners or otherwise cause them to delay processing their claims. Petitioners Motes and Chesser contend that the first valid and complete notice was not received by the Division until May 20, 1987 when intervenor Carman filed a complaint against Stackhouse in circuit court and also filed her claim and copy of the complaint with the Division the same date. Under this theory, the two year period would not expire until May 19, 1989. This contention is based on the fact that the Rucki complaint was filed in circuit court on January 9, 1987 but the claim and copy of the complaint were not filed with the Division until January 20, 1987. Petitioners contend that subsection 494.043(1)(e) requires both acts to be accomplished the same date. However, this construction of the statute is contrary to the manner in which it has been construed by the Division. According to the stipulated testimony of an employee of the Brevard County sheriff's office, if the property to be levied on is not listed on the instructions to levy, the sheriff's office requires a court order prior to filing a return nulla bona. In this case seven claimants obtained such a court order directing the sheriff to furnish a return nulla bona as to the writ of execution. However, petitioners Motes and Chesser did not do so until after the two year time period had expired. The records received in evidence reflect that the initial inquiry made by Robert and Virginia R. Enteen was never pursued and therefore their claim should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order distributing the moneys from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund in a manner consistent with its proposed agency action entered on June 21, 1989. The requests of petitioners to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact By invitation to bid for Architect's Project No. 9129-A, the Board solicited bids for "construction of one new single story building at Lecanto School Complex in Lecanto, Florida." Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 01010.1. Specifications (Re)stated The invitation to bid gave notice of a mandatory pre-bid conference at two o'clock on the afternoon of June 10, 1993, at Lecanto Vocational Center at the project site. Joint Exhibit No. 1, A-1. ("BIDDERS MUST ATTEND . . . TO BE ABLE TO BID") The invitation to bid consisted of a project manual, amended seriatim in a series of four addenda. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The project manual required substantial completion of the project within 250 days of written notice to proceed, Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00700.8, but on another page the same document required substantial completion by July 13, 1993. Id. at 00100.8. Later Addendum No. 1 put the date for substantial completion at "250 days after Notice to Proceed is given," but superseding Addendum No. 2 reverted to July 13, 1993. Addendum No. 3 directed prospective bidders to "[d]elete all previously issued Proposal Forms and replace with the Proposal Form attached." The attached form states: The undersigned agrees that if this bid is accepted, construction of this project will begin after receipt of "Notice to Proceed" and shall be substantially completed within 250 calendar days and finally completed within thirty (30) calendar days from substantial completion. Directions concerning the form specify that it is to "be copied on Contractor's business letterhead." Addendum No. 3, p. 5. Among the specifications were bond requirements, including minimum ratings for companies writing the bonds: To be acceptable to the owner as surety for Bid Bonds, Performance Bond, and Payment Bonds, a surety company shall comply with the following provisions: 3. The surety shall have at least the following ratings: . . . 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 A Class XI Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00600.1. Addendum No. 2 "delete[d] the Class ratings" but not Best's Policyholder's Ratings. Although the copy of the invitation to bid that came in evidence as Joint Exhibit No. 1 lacked pages 00400.1 and 00400.2, the table of contents indicates that these pages contain a bid bond requirement. The proposal form also calls for a bid bond. In its proposed recommended order, moreover, petitioner states that the Board "set forth in its project manual a provision that bidders should submit a bid bond from a company with an 'A 11' rating." The Project Manual states, at page 00100.3, that a contract "will be awarded only to a responsible Bidder, qualified by experience . . . . " Joint Exhibit No. 1. Bidders were required to submit forms along with their bids which called for, among other things, lists of major construction projects in process and major projects completed in the last five years. Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00110.3. Compliance Attempted When, on the afternoon of June 10, 1993, Greg Cecil, Grubbs' general manager, arrived for the pre-bid conference, he was erroneously "instructed that Lakeview was at another site in Hernando." T.70. When he arrived there, "somebody on site . . . said . . . Lakeview Relocation is going to be moved to the site that you were previously at." Id. By the time he again reached his original, correct destination, he "ended up being late for the meeting." Id. It was about quarter of three and only Tom Williford, who is the Board's Director for General Services, and an electrical subcontractor remained. T.78. Mr. Williford recounted what had occurred before the other contractors had dispersed, and told Mr. Cecil "that there would be an addendum issue[d] reflecting any items that occurred that day." T.211. The Board's Addendum No. 2 lists Mr. Cecil as having been "in attendance at the Mandatory Pre-Bid Conference." Bids Submitted Grubbs, Caldwell and others submitted bids for Architect's Project No. 9129A. Grubbs' bid was low, at one million one hundred five thousand dollars ($1,105,000.00). Dated June 17, 1993, Grubbs' proposal offered to bring construction to substantial completion by July 13, 1993. In a blank for "Bond Rating," "A- 11" was inserted. Joint Exhibits No. 2 and 3.11. The bid documents contained no other rating information. A form bid bond executed by Grubbs' president and by Sandra McCullough, as attorney in fact both for Reliance Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation, and for Employees Reinsurance Corporation, a Missouri corporation, accompanied Grubbs' bid. Best rates the former company A- and the latter A++, evidence at hearing showed. The body of the bond begins: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we JOHN G. GRUBBS, INC. P.O. BOX 10262, BROOKSVILLE, FLORIDA 34601 as Principal, hereinafter called the Principal, and RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY AND EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION, P.O. BOX 945090 MAITLAND, FLORIDA 32751 a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of PENNSYLVANIA as Surety, hereinafter called the Surety, are held and firmly bound unto SCHOOL BOARD OF CITRUS COUNTY . . . . Joint Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. Attached to the bid is a power of attorney appointing Ms. McCullough attorney in fact for Reliance Insurance Company and another limited power of attorney appointing her attorney in fact for Employees Reinsurance Company, which authorizes her to execute "any bond . . . in co- suretyship with RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY." Id. Grubbs' bid included a list of five "open contracts" for amounts ranging from $98,749 to $1,362,252 for projects ranging from a water storage system to sanitary sewer installation to road construction; and a list of some 95 completed projects including roads, sewers, clearing, earthwork, a $53,387 reroofing job, and a $116,772 job installing a canopy and sidewalks for a middle school in Hernando County. Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3. After the bids had been opened, John G. Grubbs told the Board's architect of still other projects Grubbs had completed. On July 1, 1993, a principal of the architectural firm the Board had engaged wrote Mr. Williford, as follows: Dear Tom: We have reviewed the bids received and would recommend that the low bid from John G. Grubbs, Inc. be rejected for being in non- conformance with the Bid Documents for the following reasons: The bid by John G. Grubbs, Inc. was submitted on a proposal form that contained an error in the completion date. Their form indicated construction to be completed by July 13, 1993; rather than 250 days as required by the Bid Documents, per addendum #3. Bid Bond received was written by a bonding company having a Best rating of "A minus" (A-). The Documents require an "A" rating. (Section 00600, Page 00600.1, Third Paragraph) The Contractor's Qualification form indicates that John G. Grubbs, Inc. has been in the Site and Drainage business for ten (10) years but has not constructed any School Facilities. It also shows having completed construction of only two buildings and one under construction. These 3 buildings are small fire stations in the $300,000 range each. Due to the above outlined concerns we would recommend the contract be awarded to Caldwell Construction Company, the next low bidder. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. The Board met on July 8, 1993. During the meeting, one Board member opined, "the critical thing here is probably the bond rating." Id., p. 26. The Board voted to reject Grubbs' bid and, separately, to accept Caldwell's.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Board dismiss Grubbs' petition and award the contract for Architectural Project No. 9129-A to Caldwell. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-4325BID Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are not separately numbered. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-11 and 14-19 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, respondent's Mr. Williford concluded at the time that Grubbs had complied. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13 pertains to a subordinate matter. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Grubbs built a canopy and sidewalks at a school. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 21, both the bid rating and the completion date were deviations. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-22, 25, 26, 27 and 28 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Intervenor's proposed findings Nos. 23 and 24 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to intervenor's proposed finding of fact No. 29, the completion date and bond rating were both deviations. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl E. Austin, Superintendent Citrus County School Board 1007 W. Main Street Inverness, Florida 34450-4698 Thomas S. Hogan, Jr. 20 South Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34605 Richard S. Fitzpatrick 213 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4239 Clark S. Stillwell Post Office Box 250 Inverness, Florida 34451-0250
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover against the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund and, if so, the priority of payment to be applied to their claim. A secondary issue is whether claimants who gave notice prior to Petitioners are entitled to payment or whether they have waived or abandoned their claims.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations filed by the parties and the documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (the "fund") was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is charged to disburse the fund according to Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, (Supp.1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property of other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to s. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a),(b),(c),(d), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankruptcy; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Pertinent to this case, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) Provides: Any Person who meets all of the conditions Prescribed in s 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recovery from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. The first notice received by the Department alleging a claim against Barry Koltun or Oakland Mortgage Company was filed on August 13, 1984. This notice was filed on behalf of John and Mary Ahern. The Department utilized this notice in computing the two-year period addressed in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes. For purposes of recovery from the fund, the individual mortgage broker (Koltun) and the company qualified by the broker (Oakland) are treated as one. Petitioners filed an initial notice of their claim against the fund on October 16, 1985. This claim was asserted against Oakland Mortgage Company, Barry Koltun and Robert Tamarro. On January 23, 1987, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Grant or Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund Re Oakland Mortgage Company." This notice outlined the status of some thirteen claims which had given notice of their civil actions against the licensee within the two year period. Two claimants, Kusich and Szafran, had provided all documentation required by Section 494.043, Florida Statutes; consequently, they were approved for payment. The Petitioner's claim was denied because they had allegedly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes and had failed to do so prior to August 12, 1986 (the end of the two year period). The Petitioners timely filed a petition for formal Chapter 120 proceedings challenging the Department's denial of their claim for payment. Subsequent to January 23, 1987, Petitioners completed the conditions precedent for recovery and submitted all documentation required to satisfy the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. On July 6, 1987, the Department received notice and a claim from the Intervenors. This claim satisfied the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. Of the thirteen original claims filed, only two claimants (Kusich and Szafran) completed all conditions of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, on or before August 12, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order finding the claims of Rusich and Szafran eligible for payment, and that the claim of Petitioners be evaluated as part of the second class established in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes, DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Zeigler, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. Suite 1010, Monroe Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joseph Degance, Esquire 1995 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Jack F. Weins, Esquire Boca Bank Building Suite 200 855 South Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morey Udine, Esquire 3111 University Drive Suite 425 Coral Springs, Florida 32065-6930 Hon. Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1976, the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, through its president, Ervin Freeman, and its Secretary, Joan Dimon, executed a warranty deed conveying all right, title and interest, in and to certain property located at Northeast 135th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, North Miami, Florida, to Petitioner, Biscayne South, Inc. (hereafter Biscayne South), a Florida corporation. The warranty deed was recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on November 16, 1976. On November 22, 1976, Biscayne South executed a mortgage deed in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, as a second mortgage on the same parcel of land to secure the payment of a promissory note in the principal sum of $1,500,000.00 which note was made by Outrigger Club, Inc., on the same date in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors. On November 22, 1976, Outrigger Club, Inc., as the "borrower" executed a future advance agreement with Fidelity Mortgage Investors as "lendor". The future advance agreement provides for the advancement of the sum of $1,500,000.00 to be secured by a prior mortgage dated October 27, 1972, executed by Outrigger Club, Inc., in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, which mortgage provided for future advances. On November 22, 1976, a construction loan and disbursement agreement was executed by the parties thereto which provided that the $1,500,000.00 advance be paid to Miami National Bank as disbursement agent for the benefit of Biscayne South. On November 23, 1976, the mortgage deed and the future advance agreement were recorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida, and on that same date, the warranty deed was rerecorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida. Because the 1.5 million dollars was paid to Miami National Bank to be disbursed for future construction work on a draw-down basis, Outrigger Club, Inc., the grantor, never received the 1.5 million dollars. The warranty deed provides in paragraph 9 thereof that the conveyance is subject to: a second mortgage wherein the Outrigger Club Inc., is mortgagor and the trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, is mortgagee, dated the day of November, 1976, which said mortgage is given as additional collateral for payment of certain sums as provided under a settlement and release agreement between the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Lawrence F. Lee, Jr., and others as trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust dated the 16th day of January, 1976. Neither the Department of Revenue nor Biscayne South have introduced evidence to establish that such a mortgage in fact exists or if it did, the value of such mortgage. The only mortgage in evidence is Respondent, Department of Revenue's Exhibit 2, which shows Biscayne South as mortgagor rather than the Outrigger Club, Inc., as recited in the warranty deed. However, the future advance agreement introduced as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, establishes the existence of a mortgage encumbering the subject property in which the Outrigger Club, Inc., is mortgagor and Fidelity Mortgage Investors is mortgagee. Such mortgage is dated October 27, 1972, and not dated with the month of November, 1976, as recited in paragraph 9 of the warranty deed. As recited in the future advance agreement, the mortgage of October 27, 1972, secured an indebtedness of $7,214,000.00. The mortgage provided that future advances could be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., not to exceed in the aggregate $16,500,000.00. The future advance agreement provides that an additional advance of $1,500,000.00 is to be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., thereby increasing the indebtedness represented by the October 27, 1972, mortgage to the aggregate sum of $8,715,000.00. In other words, the buyer of the property sought to borrow an additional 1.5 million dollars. The lender, in order to achieve priority of lien to secure its loan, treated the funding as an advance against a preexisting mortgage originally binding the seller, but then delivered the 1.5 million dollars directly to Miami National Bank for the benefit of the buyer. Accordingly, the seller never received the proceeds of the loan but rather participated in a "book transaction" for the benefit of the buyer and the lender.
The Issue The issue is whether Mr. Cavallo is subject to administrative sanctions for violation of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act for conduct while he was employed with three Florida firms which dealt in securities, Bond Management Corporation, Bond Administration Service Corporation and Bond Services International Corporation.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, administers the provision of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. The Department had investigated the activities of the several respondents named in the Cease and Desist Order filed in this case, including Bond Management Corporation, Bond Administration Services Corporation, Bond Services International Corporation, Bond Premium Corporation and Mr. Cavallo. The business plan of Bond Management Corporation. Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation were principally operated by Thomas Whalen, who was assisted by Mr. Cavallo. These corporations had been founded by Robert DiStefano, who had sold them to Mr. Whalen in 1985. Mr. Cavallo began working for Mr. Whalen in approximately March of 1986. The offices of these corporations were first located on State Road 7 in Plantation, Florida, but later were moved to Hollywood, Florida. The business of Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation consisted of issuing, selling and administering the registration and redemption of Certificates of Beneficial Interest in pools of bonds. The two companies actually operated as an integrated entity. Bond Management was to be the trustee for the bonds which comprised the trust corpus and issue the Certificates of Beneficial Interest. These were sold to telephone marketing companies and to time-share companies. These companies then used the certificates as premiums or incentives to attract people to travel to their developments or to listen to sales presentations. Bond Administration Services Corporation handled the sales and the registration of the certificates by the ultimate purchasers. The certificates were sold from offices in Broward County, Florida, to corporations in Florida and throughout the United States. Bond Management Corporation represented in its private placement memorandum that 68% of the funds it received from the time-share developers and telemarketing companies or others who bought the Certificates of Beneficial Interest would form the trust corpus, and this money would be used to buy zero-coupon government securities. Most of the certificates had face values of $1,000; a few were sold with face values of $500. The certificates would attain these values only if kept until the maturity of the underlying government bonds, which would be from 20-45 years. The actual value of the $1,000 certificates at the time delivered as premiums to those who attended sale presentations was between $17 to $18; the $500 certificates were worth between $8.50 to $9.00. The clients of Bond Administration Services Corporation, the time-share developers or other entities which bought the certificates as premiums for consumers attending their sales presentations, would pay about $30 per $14000 certificate. Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation assisted the time-share developers and telemarketing companies which purchased the Certificates of Beneficial Interest in the redistribution of those certificates to consumers. Bond Administration Service Corporation sent letters to the purchasing companies to be given as handouts to the sales prospects (members of the public) who ultimately received the certificates instructing the recipient about how to register the Certificates of Beneficial Interest with Bond Administration Services Corporation. Regulation of the Certificates of Beneficial Interest The Certificates of Beneficial Interest issued by Bond Management Corporation constitute securities under Federal law and Florida law. Bond Management Corporation made filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States under regulation D, which indicated that the securities were exempt from registration under the Federal Act. The Certificates of Beneficial Interest were not registered with the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities. Neither Bond Management Corporation, which issued the Certificates of Beneficial Interest, or the individuals in the corporation who offered them for sale or actually sold them (including Mr. Whalen and Mr. Cavallo), were registered with the State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities. In May of 1986, the owner of Bond Management Corporation, Mr. Whalen, was visited by representatives of the Florida Division of Securities. Mr. Cavallo attended that meeting. The Division's representative told Mr. Whalen and Mr. Cavallo that the enterprise being operated would require the registration of the issuer of the securities, Bond Management, that the staff members at Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation who sold the securities to their customers (the time-share developers and telemarketing companies) would have to be registered, and that the persons at the time-share developer or other entrepreneurs who were "giving" the certificates to prospective clients would have to be registered. Prospective clients of the time-share developers and telemarketing companies were required to attend sales presentations in order to receive a Certificate of Beneficial Interest; consequently, the Division of Securities maintained that the consumers were providing consideration for the receipt of the certificates, and were purchasing them from the clients of Bond Management Corporation. Mr. Cava1lo's role at Bond Management Corporation Mr. Cavallo had a business card which represented that he was the Vice President of Marketing and Sales for Bond Management Corporation. In his capacity as Vice President of Sales and Marketing, Mr. Cavallo managed the day- to-day operation of Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Corporation. He offered to sell or actually sold Certificates of Beneficial Interest to many companies throughout the United States, at least five of which were located in Florida. Mr. Cavallo sent packages to time-share companies and other potential purchasers of blocks of Certificates of Beneficial Interest, which contained sample Certificates of Beneficial Interest, a private offering memorandum describing the securities, and instruction letters which would accompany the Certificates of Beneficial Interest when delivered to the purchasing corporation's prospective clients. The clients were told how to register those certificates with Bond Administration Services Corporation. When Mr. Cavallo first came to work at Bond Management Corporation, the registration coupons sent to the company by many consumers had not been processed, and Mr. Cavallo spent a good deal of his time in the first two months processing those registrations. The private offering memorandum which Mr. Cavallo distributed as part of the business plan of Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation contained false representations about the securities, including the amount of the compensation which the trustee, Bond Management Corporation, was to receive; the use of 68% of the proceeds of the sale of the certificates to purchase the bonds which were to be the trust estate; the promise to deposit the bonds comprising the trust estate with the Federal bank or similar financial institution, and the underlying value of the certificates. No government bonds were ever purchased, so the Certificates of Beneficial Interest which Bond Management Corporation issued were worthless. Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation, dealt with the money paid for the Certificates of Beneficial Interest as their own. In addition, the private offering memorandum Mr. Cavallo distributed did not disclose important facts, including the participation of Mr. Cavallo in the management of the issuer, and the identity of the founder of the company, John DiStefano, who had previously been convicted of securities violations. Shortly after Mr. Cavallo went to work for Bond Management and Bond Administration Services Corporation, he came to doubt that Thomas Whalen was competent to act as a trustee to run the business, due to Mr. Whalen's apparent addiction to cocaine. Mr. Cavallo consulted with an attorney because of his concerns, who advised him that he should say nothing unless he could actually prove that Mr. Whalen was engaged in wrongdoing. Otherwise, Mr. Cavallo would expose himself to potential liability for slander or libel. Although Mr. Cavallo was aware that bonds were not being purchased to create the trust estate that the Certificates of Beneficial Interest represented, he continued to engage in sales of the Certificates of Beneficial Interest until he left the companies in July of 1986. Bond Services Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation sold at least 10,000 Certificates of Beneficial Interest, which produced approximately $320,000 in revenue. By May 1986 approximately 3,500 of those worthless certificates had been distributed to individuals, approximately 1,100 of whom were Florida residents. Bond Services International Corporation After Mr. Cavallo resigned from working with Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation, he went to work for Bond Service International Corporation (Bond International). Bond International had the same business plan as Bond Management Corporation and Bond Administration Services Corporation, and even did business at what had been the location of Bond Management Corporation. The owner of Bond International was John Wallace. He invited Mr. Cavallo to work for him because he knew Cavallo was unhappy at Bond Management Corporation because of the improper business practices of Mr. Whalen. Mr. Whalen had been involved in a previous business enterprise with Mr. Wallace. When Mr. Cavallo came to work at Bond International, Bond International had few clients. Many of Mr. Cavallo's clients from Bond Management Corporation followed him to Bond International. Sales were carried out by Bond International in a manner essentially identical to that used at Bond Management Corporation and Bond Services Administration Corporation. The Certificates of Beneficial Interest issued by Bon Services were essentially identical to that Bond Management Corporation. As with Bond Management Corporation, Mr. Whalen also failed to purchase the bonds which were to make up the trust estate represented by the Certificates of Beneficial Interest. The operation was a little better than at Bond Management Corporation because Bond International bought $225,000 worth of bonds, but that was only about 2-1/2% of the amount required to give the stated face value to the Certificates of Beneficial Interest. Ultimately, when Mr. Wallace was arrested for violation of Florida securities laws, those bonds were surrendered to Wallace's bail bondsman rather than maintained in trust. As with the program at Bond Management Corporation, neither the Certificates of Beneficial Interest issued by Bond International, nor the individuals selling the certificates, including Mr. Cavallo, were registered with the State of Florida, Division of Securities. Sales of Bond International's certificates were made to at least 40 companies. Offers of sale were made to additional businesses. Mr. Cavallo, himself, sent Certificates of Beneficial Interest in conjunction with sales or offers to sell those securities at least 54 times to 41 separate companies, four of which were located in Florida. Bond International received at least $270,000 in revenue from the sale of approximately 10,000 Certificates of Interest. When Mr. Cavallo left the company in December of 1986 about 2,800 consumers had received the Certificates of Beneficial Interest. The private offering memorandum of Bond International was essentially identical to that of Bond Management Corporation. It contained essentially the same false statements regarding the use of proceeds from the sale of certificates to purchase bonds which were to be held in trust by a financial institution, and the compensation of the trustee. The persons actually described as the company's managers, Mitchell Rymar and Janet Himmelheber did not manage the company, John Wallace and Mr. Cavallo did. The private placement memorandum also failed to disclose ongoing state and federal prosecutions of Mr. Wallace for securities fraud and credit card fraud. Mr. Cavallo drafted and mailed letters to be used by the companies purchasing the Certificates of Beneficial Interest when distributing them to consumers. These letters from Bond International to the certificate holders misrepresented that the certificates were guaranteed by the United States Government, when they were not, and that bonds were held in escrow to support the Certificates of Beneficial Interest when they were not. Mr. Cavallo represented himself as the person in charge of Bond International, represented himself as a vice president, was a signatory on Bond International's bank accounts and established a securities account as the vice president of Bond International. He ran the day-to-day affairs of the company and had access to the books and records of the company from the time he began working there. Mr. Wallace considered Mr. Cavallo as a partner in the business. In connection with his duties at Bond International, Mr. Cavallo offered and made sales of Certificates of Beneficial Interest issued by Bond International, by Federal Express delivery, by telephone, and by hand delivery of certificates to, local companies in Broward County. When Mr. Wallace was jailed in November of 1986, Mr. Cavallo continued to operate Bond Services throughout that month. Mr. Cavallo knew that bonds were not being purchased as stated on the Certificates of Beneficial Interest and in the private placement memorandum, and that John Wallace was irresponsible and wasted funds of the company from the time Mr. Cavallo began working there. Nonetheless, Mr. Cavallo continued with the company and continued to sell Certificates of Beneficial Interest. Mr. Cavallo signed numerous checks drawn on the accounts of Bond International, which included $2,500 to pay the criminal defense attorney Mr. Wallace retained to handle the Federal credit card fraud charges filed against him in Chicago, $349 for Wallace to travel to Chicago in connection with those charges, $1,000 to Robert Trachman, the local lawyer retained by Mr. Wallace to defend him with respect to securities fraud charges in Broward County, and $8,500 paid to John Gilbert Bailbonds, Inc., for Mr. Wallace's bail in connection with the Florida securities charges. Mr. Cavallo also wrote a large number of checks to "cash" on accounts of Bond International beginning in August 1986, and ending in November 1986. These checks aggregated $34,093.66. It is by no means clear what the checks to "cash" were used for, but there is no proof that they were ever used to purchase the securities which Bond International should have purchased to back, the Certificates of Beneficial Interest. Mr. Cavallo received direct payments by check made to him of at least $3,155. Mr. Cavallo is sophisticated in financial matters. He holds a bachelors and masters degree from the University of Miami in Coral Gables, as well as a masters of foreign trade from the American Institute of Foreign Trade in Glendale, Arizona. After Mr. Cavallo severed his connection with Bond International, he took steps to establish Bond Premium Corporation, which would have followed a business plan similar to those of Bond Management Corporation and Bond International, although Mr. Cavallo maintains he would have purchased bonds to support his Certificates of Beneficial Interest. That company never did any business.
Recommendation It is recommended that a final order be entered by the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, finding Mr. Cavallo guilty of: The sale of unregistered securities in violation of Section 517.07, Florida Statutes, and that he be fined $5,000; The sale of unregistered securities by an unregistered person, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, and that he be fined $5,000; and Employing schemes to defraud and making false or fraudulent statements or representations in connection with the sale of the securities of Bond Management Corporation and Bond International in violation of Sections 51- 7.301(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, and that for these acts he be fined $15,000, so that a total fine of $25,000 be imposed, and requiring him to cease and desist from further participation in the sale of securities. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of January, 1989. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th of January, 1989. APPENDIX The following are my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioners pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Rulings on Petitioner's Findings of Fact Covered in finding of fact 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in findings of fact 2 and 15. Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in findings of fact 11 and 12. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 13. Covered in finding of fact 15. Rejected as cumulative. Covered in finding of fact 14. To the extent appropriate, covered in finding of fact 15. 26 To the extent appropriate, covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 16. Covered in finding of fact 18. Covered in finding of fact 18. Covered in finding of fact 19. Covered in finding of fact 19. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 20. Covered in finding of fact 21. Covered in finding of fact 22. Covered in findings of fact 17, 18 and 24. Covered in finding of fact 23. Covered in finding of fact 23. Covered in finding of fact 23. Covered in finding of fact 23. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent appropriate, covered in finding of fact 25. Rejected as cumulative. Covered in finding of fact 26. Covered in finding of fact 17. Covered in finding of fact 5. It is not clear that Mr. Cavallo actually shared the profits equally with Mr. Wallace, however. Covered in finding of fact 23. Covered in finding of fact 26. Covered in finding of fact 27. Covered in finding of fact 28. Covered in finding of fact 29. Although my calculations of the amounts involved are somewhat different. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 29. Covered in finding of fact 31. Covered in finding of fact 31. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Krieger, Esquire 111 Georgia Avenue Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Vincent R. Cavallo, pro se 405 S, Pine Island Road Plantation, Florida The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
