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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY SINGH, 08-005625PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 10, 2008 Number: 08-005625PL Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2025
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ROBERT R. CLARK vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 87-000033 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-000033 Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1987

Findings Of Fact During 1982 and 1983, Petitioner was licensed as a mortgage broker and real estate broker in the State of Florida. His mortgage broker's license expired in September, 1983. At all times material hereto, Petitioner utilized his mortgage broker's and real estate broker's license to engage in real estate development speculation. He worked closely with Jeffrey Graham, who was also licensed as a mortgage broker and who was a co-owner with Petitioner of Continental Development, Continental Mortgage Company and the Real Estate Spot. They were engaged in buying and selling existing residential properties and constructing new homes for sale. Financing for Petitioner's speculative real estate transactions was provided primarily by The Bank of Florida, located in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Bank provided financing on 80 to 85 percent of his transactions, but at some point in 1982 or 1983, Petitioner and Graham found themselves unable to obtain further construction financing from the Bank. In order to continue receiving financing from the Bank, Petitioner and Graham initiated the use of "stand-in" buyers. A "stand-in" buyer would not have to use any of his own money as a deposit or down payment, even though real estate contracts executed in connection with these transactions would show an earnest money deposit by such buyers. The buyer's role was simply to lend his credit to the transaction and to share in any profits on the eventual sale of the property. On or about March 25, 1983, Petitioner executed, as seller, a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Norman Tanner, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $25,000, with an earnest money deposit of $5,000 which the contract specified was to be held by Petitioner, as seller, until closing. Petitioner also executed a Settlement Statement on March 29, 1983, in connection with a loan obtained by Tanner from The Bank of Florida which indicated that Tanner had paid an earnest money deposit of $5,000. Based upon the testimony of Norman Tanner at hearing, it is found that he did not provide the earnest money deposit indicated on the sales contract or Settlement Statement which Petitioner executed as seller. Petitioner testified that this transaction was carried out in his individual capacity as a personal investment, and not under the authority of his mortgage broker's license. In fact, Petitioner did not deal directly with Tanner in this transaction. Tanner's dealings were with Petitioner's partner, Jeffrey Graham. Nevertheless, the evidence and demeanor of the witnesses establishes that Petitioner was aware of the fact that Tanner had not paid the deposit reflected on the instruments he executed, and that such instruments were used to induce the Bank to make a mortgage loan to Tanner. Petitioner, as seller, received $19,665.56 cash at settlement from this transaction with Tanner. On or about February 24, 1982, Petitioner executed a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Joseph Armendinger, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $48,000, with an earnest money deposit of $6,500 which the contract specified was to be held in escrow by The Real Estate Spot, Inc., until closing. Petitioner and Armendinger also executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor in connection with obtaining financing for this transaction, and said Affidavit also indicated the buyer's purported cash equity of $6,500 in the property. At the time, Petitioner was co-owner of The Real Estate Spot, and Armendinger was an electrician who was doing some work at The Real Estate Spot and became interested in the "stand-in" buyer transactions he observed while doing electrical work at Petitioner's office. On or about October 27, 1982, Petitioner and Armendinger executed another contract for sale and deposit receipt for a second piece of property, which reflects a total price of $85,000 and an earnest money deposit by Armendinger of $5,000. Thereafter, they executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor and Settlement Statement reflecting Armendinger's purported cash equity of $4,250.00. Petitioner used the proceeds from this transaction to pay off an existing mortgage and judgment on the property, and realized $1,607.46 in cash, which was shared with Jeffrey Graham, co-seller. Petitioner knew that the contracts for sale and Affidavits which he executed with Armendinger were to be presented to The Bank of Florida and used for the purpose of Armendinger obtaining financing for the purchase of these properties. Based upon the testimony of Joseph Armendinger at hearing, it is found he did not provide any earnest money deposit or downpayment in connection with these two transactions with Petitioner. Armendinger relied on Petitioner, a licensed mortgage broker and real estate broker, in these transactions, and was told by Petitioner that he would not have to put any money of his own into these transactions. Petitioner knew that Armendinger had not made any deposit or downpayments concerning these transactions at the time he executed the contracts for sale and deposit receipts, Affidavits and Settlement Statement. On December 16, 1982, Petitioner executed two mortgages in favor of Patricia G. Herren on property he had previously sold to Armendinger. These mortgages totalled $21,793.35, and were recorded in Pinellas County, Florida, on December 28, 1982. These mortgages were used by Petitioner, along with a $10,000 mortgage he executed in Herren's favor, to obtain a satisfaction from Herren of a mortgage she held on a piece of property she sold to Petitioner in October 1982 in St. Petersburg Beach. The $10,000 Herren mortgage was also recorded on December 28, 1982. Having obtained the satisfaction, Petitioner then sold the St. Petersburg Beach property to Juanita Murdaugh and Jeffrey Graham on December 17, 1982, prior to recording the $10,000 Herren mortgage. He did not disclose on the Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor which he executed that he had an outstanding $10,000 mortgage in favor of Herren on this St. Petersburg Beach property, although this mortgage should have been disclosed as "secondary financing." In each of the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser executed by Petitioner in connection with sales of property as described herein, there is the following statement in Item VII: The certifications of this affidavit are for the purpose of inducing the Lender named above or its assignees to make or purchase the first mortgage described by this affidavit.... By signing the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser, Petitioner, as the "Property Vendor," made the following certification: The PROPERTY VENDOR hereby certifies that to the extent PROPERTY VENDOR is a party, the Financial Terms, including Total Purchase Price, and the Liens are as set forth in Items III and IV above, [and] hereby acknowledges the inducement purpose of this affidavit as set forth in Item VII above....

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX (DOAH No. 87-0033) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1.(a) Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 4. 2.(a) Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 2.(b) Rejected in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 2.(c) Rejected in Finding of Fact 10. 2.(d) Rejected in Findings of Fact 6-10. 2.(e), (f) Rejected in Finding of Fact 11. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 3. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4. 5-6. Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 10. 10-11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 9, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 9, 10. 14-19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: John Swisher, Esquire Dillinger & Swisher 5511 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Office of Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Honorable Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PHOENIX MOWING AND LANDSCAPING, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 01-000371BID (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 26, 2001 Number: 01-000371BID Latest Update: May 21, 2001

The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Department of Transportation ("Department") erred by considering Willeby Construction, Inc. ("Willeby") a qualified bidder; whether the requirement to submit a bid bond or certified funds check or draft (hereafter "security on the bid") with the bid was a material requirement; whether the Department erred in treating Willeby’s failure to include security on the bid with its bid proposal as a minor, and, thereby, an irregularity which could be waived; and whether said decision of the Department was contrary to the terms of the bid, contrary to law, or arbitrary and capricious.

Findings Of Fact On November 14, 2000, the Department issued a bid solicitation notice for Financial Project No. 40509417201/Contract No. E3A78, a contract for routine mowing of grassed and vegetated roadside areas and litter removal from within the Department’s highway right-of-way in Gadsden and Leon Counties. The invitation to bid stated: In a letter dated November 17, 2000 from Richard Norris of the Department District Contracts Office to all prospective bidders, the Department reiterated the bid bond requirement stating "[i]f your bid is over $150,000, a Bid Bond of 5 percent of the bid amount is required and must be attached to your bid proposal. Failure to submit this with your bid will result in your bid being rejected." (Emphasis is in original.) The invitation to bid further stated: BID OR PROPOSAL BOND (If bid is over $150,000): Must be completely executed if bid is over $150,000. This 5 percent bid bond is required and must be included in your bid package. If bid is less than $150,000 no bid bond shall be necessary, however, the successful bidder shall be required to obtain a performance bond upon execution of the contract. The purpose of the requirement for security on the bid is to compensate the Department for damages in the event the low bidder fails to enter into the contract. The Department received bid proposals from six firms in response to its bid solicitation by the due date of December 7, 2000. The lowest bidder for Contract No. E3A78 was Willeby. Willeby submitted a business check drawn on Willeby’s business account no. 02-140168-01 with Farmers & Merchants Bank. This was an unsecured, personal check. At the time the bids were opened, Willeby’s Account No. 02-140168-01 contained insufficient funds to cover the check Willeby submitted as its bid bond in the amount of $11,996.52 for Contract No. E3A78. Willeby failed to submit the required security on the bid in the form of a cashier’s check, bank money order, bank draft of any national or state bank, or surety bond, payable to the State of Florida, Department of Transportation as required by the solicitation. The Petitioner, Phoenix, was the second lowest bidder. Phoenix submitted a bid bond equal to 5 percent of its total bid with its bid package. Phoenix fully complied with all the requirements of the invitation to bid. Bids for Contract No. E3A78 were opened on Thursday December 7, 2000. At that time, the Department's personnel discovered that Willeby had failed to submit security on bid as required by the terms of the bid solicitation. On December 15, 2000, eight days after the Department discovered that Willeby’s bid submittal was deficient, Starsky Harrell, the contract specialist with the District III office of the Department, telephoned W.J. Willeby, the president of Willeby Construction. Harrell informed Mr. Willeby that Willeby’s bid was non-conforming, and gave Willeby the opportunity to cure its non-responsive bid by submitting a check for certified funds or a bid bond as required by the bid solicitation. Willeby, at this point, had the opportunity to cure the defect or refuse to cure the defect, thereby, negating his bid. This gave Willeby an advantage not enjoyed by the other bidders. Willeby chose to cure its non-responsive bid, and submitted a certified check as its security on the bid. Willeby, thereafter, entered into the contract with the Department on Monday, December 18, 2000, eleven days after the bids were opened. The Department posted its intent to award Contract No. E3A78 on December 21, 2000, indicating its intent to award the contract to Willeby Construction. Phoenix timely filed this formal protest in opposition to the award of Contract No. E3A78 as contrary to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2000). Regarding the requirements for security on the bid required in the solicitation for the bid and accompanying materials, Richard Norris, the contracts administrator, made the decision to emphasize the language by having it in bold-face type and underlined. His purpose for underlining and placing in bold-face type this language was to "put some accent on it, to make it stand out." A basic tenet of competitive procurement is to protect the integrity of the bidding process and ensure open and fair competition. A responsive bid is one which meets all the requirements of the proposal documents. Mr. Willeby has entered bids on Department contracts seventeen times in the past. Willeby is an experienced participant in the bid process. A bidder who has the option of taking a contract or not taking a contract after the bidder knows what the other bids are on a project has a competitive advantage over other bidders. If the bidder has bid too close to the profit margin, the bidder can refuse to cure the bid defect and avoid performance on the unprofitable contract. It is not only less expensive for a person to submit a personal check for security on a bid, but a stop payment order can be issued on a personal check. The bid bond posted by the Petitioner cost $800.00. This amount is not refundable. However, the proposal provides alternatives to a bid bond to establish security on the bid; therefore, paying the cost of the bond is not a competitive disadvantage. It is noted that a personal check is not among the alternatives, and the bid proposal's provisions for bid security specifically provide that checks or drafts for less than 5 percent of the bid amount will invalidate the bid. The only checks or drafts permitted under the terms of the bid proposal are those checks secured by the banking institution's funds and not subject to stop payment orders of the person in whose behalf the check is issued. It is consistent with the stated terms of invalidation, that, in addition to an insufficient amount, that an instrument not meeting the stated terms of the provision would also invalidate the bid. If being a dollar short on the secured amount is disqualifying, being short the entire amount in secured funds would be similarly disqualifying. Evidence was received regarding whether Willeby was a qualified bidder. This information related to the nature and amount of the equipment which Willeby had, and its financial ability to obtain additional equipment. Although Willeby did not have some of the equipment necessary to handle this job and its other contract obligations, he had ordered this equipment and his bank indicated that it would loan him the money. It was not developed whether the bank's willingness was dependent upon the pendency of the challenged contract award, and it is concluded that Willeby is a qualified bidder.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the bid of Willeby Construction on Contract No. E3A78 be rejected, and the contract be awarded to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Julius F. Parker, III, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian A. Crumbaker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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B AND B MORTGAGE EQUITY AND BARRY YANKS vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 90-004722 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 30, 1990 Number: 90-004722 Latest Update: Jul. 25, 1995

The Issue The issue in Case No. 90-4722 was whether B & B Mortgage Equity, Inc. was entitled to licensure as a mortgage broker in the State of Florida. As discussed in more detail below, B & B Mortgage Equity subsequently withdrew its application for licensure and that case is now moot. The issue in Case No. 90- 6577 is whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed in that case, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, B & B Investors was registered with the Department as a mortgage broker pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Until June 15, 1990, the business address for B & B Investors was 1481 N.W. 7th Street #1, Miami, Florida 33125. B & B Investors' registration number is HB 592369518. On or about July 5, 1990, B & B Investors filed a petition for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 9090-14587-SMW. Yanks was the president and principal mortgage broker for B & B Investors until May 10, 1989. Yanks is a licensed mortgage broker in Florida having been issued license number was 262788177. He has been licensed since 1980 or 1981. There is no evidence of any prior disciplinary action against him or B & B Investors. At all times pertinent hereto, Yanks was also the President of B & B Equity. B & B Equity has never been registered pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Until June 15, 1990, the business address for B & B Equity was also 1481 N.W. 7th Street #1, Miami, Florida 33125. At all times pertinent hereto, Hernandez-Yanks was married to Yanks and was the Vice President and Secretary of B & B Equity. Hernandez-Yanks is an attorney, but she has never been licensed pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. On or about March 15, 1990, Hernandez-Yanks filed a Petition for Relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 90-11654-BKC-AJC. On or about January 1, 1990, B & B Equity filed an Application for Registration as a Mortgage Brokerage Business (the "Registration Application"). Paragraph 6 of the Registration Application stated in part: List all officers, directors, partners, joint-ventures, and ultimate equitable owners. Ultimate equitable owner means natural person who owns 10 percent or more of applicant. NAME ADDRESS TITLE Barry Yanks 1481 NW 7 St. Pres. Ana Hernandez-Yanks 1481 NW 7 St. VP/Scty Yanks was designated as the principal mortgage broker on the Registration Application. The Department denied the Registration Application by notice dated June 4, 1990. CALVARY CHAPEL TRANSACTION At the time of the hearing in this matter, Marie Hall was 66 years old. She was last employed in 1988 by the Broward County School System as an adult vocational education instructor teaching students how to operate sewing machines. Her husband, the late Reverend Arthur Hall, died on March 22, 1988, at the age of 75. Because of health problems, he had been unable to work since 1962. The late Reverend Hall had very little education. Prior to the transactions involved in this case, the only other real estate deal in which the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall had been involved was the purchase of their home many years ago. In the summer of 1987, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall sought to purchase Mount Bethel Baptist Church (the "Church"). To assist in their effort to purchase the Church, the Halls contacted Reverend Frank Lloyd. Reverend Frank Lloyd was the pastor of Hope Outreach, Church of God in Christ and the Chairman of the State of Florida Prison Ministry. Reverend Lloyd was also engaged in a consulting business through a company called Professional Proposal and Financial Consultants, Inc. ("PPFC"). In the summer of 1987, the Halls entered into an agreement with PPFC pursuant to which they paid PPFC $800 for PPFC's assistance in securing a loan of $250,000 to purchase the church. The agreement called for an interest rate of approximately 11 3/4 percent. The Halls deposited a total of $15,000 in escrow with Reverend Lloyd and/or PPFC. At the time the first $10,000 was deposited with PPFC, the parties entered into an agreement which provided as follows: ...This money is not to be used for down payment, or services rendered. It is to be escrowed only. At the closing of the loan this entire amount is to be returned to Elder Hall or his designate. If in the event no loan is secure [sic] all funds is [sic] to be returned to Elder Arthur Hall, President Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ or his designate. Reverend Lloyd attempted to obtain a mortgage for the Halls from several companies including Ft. Lauderdale Mortgage and Horizon Development Mortgage ("Horizon"). The Halls decided not to pursue a loan from Horizon because Horizon wanted a non-refundable $3,000 up-front fee. There was also some question whether either company would handle a loan for a church. Reverend Lloyd introduced the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall to Yanks because Reverend Lloyd knew that Yanks had successfully obtained loans for other churches. The Halls met with Yanks on a couple of occasions in late 1987 and early 1988. Other members of the Hall's congregation attended some of these meetings. During those meetings, the need for some of the other church members to sign on the loan and/or pledge additional collateral was discussed. Yanks advised the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall that he might be able to secure a loan for them to purchase the Church, but the amount of the loan would be smaller and the interest rate would be higher than they had anticipated in their agreement with PPFC. Yanks did not require an up-front loan application fee. On January 14, 1988, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall met with Reverend Lloyd and Yanks at the office of B & B Investors in Miami. As noted above, the Halls were initially seeking a loan of $250,000. During the January 14, 1988 meeting, Yanks advised the representatives of Calvary Chapel that he could arrange a loan of $162,000 at 17 percent if additional collateral was provided. At the January 14 meeting, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall executed a mortgage loan application (the "Loan Application") with B & B Investors. The Halls executed the Loan Application on behalf of Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ, Inc. (hereinafter Calvary Chapel). Yanks executed the Loan Application on behalf of B & B Investors. The Loan Application was for a $162,000 loan and stated that the loan origination fee would be $4,860.00 and the loan discount fee would be $4,860.00. The Loan Application did not indicate when those fees would be due or to whom they would be paid. The Loan Application noted that there would be an appraisal fee of $600.00 and attorneys' fees of $750.00. The evidence established that, in the mortgage brokerage business, a loan origination fee is often considered synonymous with a broker's fee. The origination fee is traditionally charged at closing. However, the agreement between a mortgage broker and a client determines when the mortgage broker is entitled to his fee. In certain circumstances, a mortgage broker may be entitled to payment upon obtaining a firm commitment for a loan irrespective of whether the loan closes. Although there was no statutory or rule requirement at the time of this transaction, it was customary in the industry for a mortgage broker to set forth in writing the terms as to when he is to be paid. The Application in this case did not state when the fees were to be considered as earned. The Loan Application also provided in part: If the above commitment or a commitment in an amount and/or upon terms acceptable to the undersigned is obtained and said mortgage loan is not closed because (I)(We) have not fulfilled our part of this agreement. (I)(We) agree to pay $ , the application deposit being a part, for obtaining said commitment. If an acceptable commitment is not obtained, the mortgage application deposit will be refunded, except $ to cover expenses actually incurred. A loan discount fee is the cost to the lender to discount the interest rate on a mortgage loan for sale in the secondary market. The discount fee is owed to the lender or investor and was collected at closing. A broker is not entitled to a loan discount fee. Yanks tries to ignore the terminology used in the Loan Application he prepared and claims that all parties knew that he and/or B & B Investors would receive both the loan origination fee and loan discount fee. He contends that he explained to the late Rev. Hall and Mrs. Hall that the loan origination fee and the loan discount fees were fees that would be paid to him when he arranged a firm commitment for a loan at the agreed upon terms. However, the more persuasive evidence established that the late Rev. Hall and Mrs. Hall did not understand that the loan origination fee and/or discount fee would be paid to Yanks irrespective of whether the loan actually closed. Moreover, Yanks has provided no credible explanation as to why he would ever be entitled to receive the loan discount fee. At the January 14, 1988 meeting, Yanks orally arranged a deal with Alan Greenwald, a private investor with whom Yanks had worked in the past, to fund a $162,000 loan at 17 percent. At the time of this transaction, there was no statutory requirement that loan commitments be made in writing. No written confirmation of the commitment was provided even though it was common in the industry for commitments to be given in writing in order to bind the lender to the transaction and to provide evidence of the terms of the commitment. The only written evidence of the loan commitment is a letter from Yanks to the attorney for Alan Greenwald. That letter states that Mr. Greenwald had asked for additional collateral. During the January 14, 1988 meeting, the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall agreed to put up their house as additional collateral. In addition, two other members of the congregation who were present at the meeting, Effie Davis and Cleveland Foreman, agreed in principal to permit a mortgage to be placed on their houses as additional collateral to secure the loan. Yanks contends that, as a result of his efforts in securing a commitment from Alan Greenwald as noted above, he was entitled to receive the loan origination fee and loan discount fee set forth in the Loan Application. After the January 14, 1988 meeting, Rev. Lloyd released to Yanks $10,000 of the $15,000 that he had been holding in escrow for the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall. The $10,000 check was made payable to B & B Investors. The $10,000 was not placed in an escrow or trust account upon receipt. Yanks apparently arranged for $1,000 of the money to be paid to Debbie Landsberg, the attorney for Alan Greenwald, as an advance on the legal fees and costs that were expected to be incurred in closing the transaction. At the time the $10,000 was transferred to B & B Investors, all of the parties to the transaction expected the loan to close and no one contemplated or anticipated that the loan would not go through. While both Yanks and Rev. Lloyd claim that the late Rev. Hall approved the release of the $10,000 as payment to Yanks for services in securing a commitment from Alan Greenwald, this testimony is rejected as not credible. The more persuasive evidence clearly established that at no time did the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall understand that if the loan did not close Yanks would keep the $10,000. After the January 14, 1988 meeting, the parties initiated the steps necessary to close the deal. These efforts were complicated by the illness of the attorney for the seller, the marriage of the attorney for the lender and the difficulty in locating the abstracts for the properties involved. Moreover, a number of title deficiencies regarding the Church were discovered and had to be corrected. The arrangements for financing the purchase of the Church changed several times. Initially, the Seller had indicated that it would take back a second mortgage for $50,000 in order to facilitate a closing. However, as the parties got closer to closing, the Seller changed its mind regarding the second mortgage. Ultimately, in September of 1988, the Seller agreed to take back a second mortgage of $35,000. Sometime during the summer of 1988, Greenwald reduced to $110,000 the amount he was willing to lend on the deal. That amount was to be secured solely by the Church property. Yanks claims that he arranged for another investor to lend between $40,000 to $45,000 with the residences of certain congregation members, including the Halls, Effie Davis and Cleveland Foreman, serving as collateral. These modifications were never memorialized in writing. As preparations for a closing proceeded, it became apparent that Effie Davis' house could not be used as security for the loan. While there is conflicting evidence as to why Effie Davis' house could not be used for additional collateral, the more persuasive evidence indicates that the presence of one or more existing liens on the property rendered it of minimal value as additional collateral. As a result of the inability to use Ms. Davis' house as part of the collateral for the loan, Yanks advised Calvary Chapel that the amount of the loan would have to be decreased from $162,000 to $150,000. Yanks also advised Calvary Chapel that an additional cash deposit of $14,000 was necessary to demonstrate to the lender that sufficient funds were available to conclude the deal. The additional money was paid in two parts. On or about August 23, 1988, Calvary Chapel paid $10,000 to the Ana-Hernandez-Yanks Trust Account. Shortly thereafter, on or about September 1, 1988, Calvary Chapel paid an additional $4,000 to the Ana Hernandez-Yanks Trust Account. These sums were received by Ana Hernandez-Yanks in trust as the attorney for the B & B Investors. No written escrow agreement was executed. No written amendment to the Loan Application was provided to reflect the new terms for the anticipated loan nor was there any written commitment letter. As noted above, the late Rev. Hall died in March of 1988. Reverend Phillip Hall, the son of the late Rev. Hall, was appointed the pastor of Calvary Chapel in April of 1988. At the time of his appointment, Rev. Phillip Hall was living in Nashville. He commuted between Nashville and Fort Lauderdale for a while before moving to Fort Lauderdale on July 31, 1988. Yanks suggests that the Reverend Philip Hall did not like the deal his parents had entered into and refused to honor it. More specifically, Yanks contends that Calvary Chapel and the seller made alternate arrangements for the sale of the property in order to avoid paying him. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. The Seller was obligated to provide clear title before the sale could close. The evidence established that the Seller was never able to provide all of the documents necessary to clear title. There is no persuasive evidence that Calvary Chapel failed to meet its obligations under the contract to purchase the Church. Instead, it appears that Calvary Chapel did everything in its power to go through with the transaction. Sometime in the fall of 1988, the seller, Mount Bethel Baptist Church, rescinded the contract to sell the Church. At some point thereafter, Calvary Chapel began occupying the Church under a lease/purchase arrangement, the terms of which have not been established in this case. As noted above, there is no persuasive evidence that the Rev. Phillip Hall and/or Calvary Chapel conspired to cheat Yanks out of his fees. In any event, even if Calvary Chapel decided for economic reasons not to go forward with the loan that Yanks was trying to arrange, it is concluded that neither Yanks nor B & B Investors had the contractual right to retain any of the money that had been advanced. After the deal failed to close, Rev. Lloyd returned to Calvary Chapel the remaining $5,000 he had been holding in escrow for the Halls. By letter dated September 19, 1988, Holly Eakin Moody, an attorney for Calvary Chapel, wrote to Yanks demanding the return of all the money that had been advanced. The letter stated: Please be advised that I have been retained by Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ, Inc., to begin the appropriate legal action against you and your wife, Ana Hernandez-Yanks, for return of my clients [sic] escrow funds in the amount of $24,000. On or about December 24, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks tendered a check in the amount of $14,000 to Calvary Chapel. On the back of the check, the following release language was written: Full and Final Settlement of all claims against B & B Mortgage and Barry Yanks or Ana Hernandez- Yanks. Hernandez-Yanks wrote a letter dated February 7, 1989 to Holly Eakin Moody stating in part: Please be advised that as per your client's request, on December 24, 1988 I mailed them my trust account check in the amount of $14,000. I have checked numerous times with the bank and said check has not been presented for payment. I am hereby depositing said monies with the Registry of the Court. If you should have any questions, please contact me. It does not appear that Hernandez-Yanks ever deposited any money in the Registry of the Court in accordance with that February 7 letter. By letter dated March 14, 1989, Holly Eakin Moody returned the check containing the accord and satisfaction language to Hernandez-Yanks and reiterated a demand for a return of the entire $24,000. Ultimately, Hernandez-Yanks paid Calvary Chapel $14,000 by check dated March 6, 1990 on account number 020051156008 at the TransAtlantic Bank. A review of the bank records indicates that the $14,000 advanced by Calvary Chapel to B & B Investors in late August and early September of 1988 was not held in escrow. On or about September 1, 1988, $10,000 was deposited in the trust or escrow account of Hernandez-Yanks at Continental Bank (the "Continental Trust Account"). An additional $4,000 was deposited in the Continental Trust Account on or about September 6, 1988. On or about October 4, 1988, the Continental Trust Account was closed with a closing balance of or about $13,553.06. On or about October 4, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at Ocean Bank (the "Ocean Trust Account"). The beginning balance of the Ocean Trust Account on or about October 4, 1988, was $13,000. On or about December 7, 1988, the balance in the Ocean Trust Account was $2,437. On or about December 15, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at United National Bank (the "United Trust Account"). On or about January 19, 1990, the cash balance in the United Trust Account was $2,236.29. On or about January 5, 1990, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at TransAtlantic Bank (the "TransAtlantic Trust Account"). The beginning balance of the TransAtlantic Trust Account on or about January 5, 1990, was $10,000. By check dated March 6, 1990, Calvary Church was paid $14,000 from the TransAtlantic Trust Account. There is no evidence that Yanks, Hernandez-Yanks and/or B & B Investors had any other escrow accounts. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that Yanks failed to ensure that monies received in trust were properly placed in escrow in a transaction wherein he acted as a mortgage broker. Moreover, Yanks failed to ensure that the $14,000 received by Hernandez-Yanks was returned expeditiously to Calvary Chapel. Yank's explanation that he does not tell his wife, who is an attorney, "how to run her business" does not excuse his failure to ensure that money placed in escrow with his company was promptly returned when the transaction was terminated. Yanks refused to repay any of the remaining $10,000 that was paid to B & B Investors claiming that he was entitled to keep the money as fees earned for processing a mortgage commitment from Allan Greenwald. As set forth above, the contention that the late Rev. Hall authorized payment in full of Yanks' fees is rejected as not credible. The more persuasive evidence established that the principals of Calvary Chapel did not understand that Yanks and/or B & B Investors were to be paid their fee even if the loan did not close. Since there was no agreement specifying when Yanks was to be paid, he had no legal right to retain the $10,000. Arguably, Yanks was entitled to some reimbursement for the expenses he incurred, including perhaps the $1,000 he supposedly paid to the investor's attorney. However, the evidence clearly established that Yanks was not entitled to retain the entire $10,000. 52 After the Department began its investigation of this case, Yanks offered to repay the loan discount fee of $4,860 to Calvary Chapel. As of the date of the hearing, Yanks was still refusing to repay the $4,860 loan origination fee which he claims he has earned. While Yanks' claim to the $10,000 was legally insufficient and should have been recognized as such, the evidence did not establish that Yanks was attempting to defraud the Halls and/or Calvary Chapel. There were clearly some misunderstandings between the parties. Many of these problems could have been avoided if Yanks had properly documented his fee arrangement in writing. Yanks spent a good bit of time trying to put the deal together and felt slighted when the transaction he structured fell apart, especially when Calvary Chapel ended up occupying the Church anyway. Yanks overreacted in his attempts to obtain compensation for his services. The evidence was insufficient to establish that his actions should be characterized as fraudulent. VAZQUEZ-CASTILLO TRANSACTION In approximately mid-December of 1988, Ana Vazquez began working for Yanks. Vazquez was hired by Yanks to assist in the processing of mortgages. Prior to becoming employed by Yanks, she had little experience in real estate transactions. Vazquez was employed by Yanks for only about two or three weeks. Thereafter, she was employed by Hernandez-Yanks as a secretary. Both Yanks and Hernandez-Yanks occupy space in the same building. As noted above, Hernandez- Yanks is an attorney. On or about February 27, 1989, Pura Castillo entered into a contract (the "Sales Contract") with Vazquez for the purchase of a condominium owned by Vazquez and located in Dade County, Florida, at 7440 Harding Avenue, Unit 301, Miami Beach, Florida (the "Condominium"). The sales price was $70,000. Pursuant to the Sales Contract, Vazquez was to convey title free and clear of all encumbrances, by a good and sufficient Warranty Deed. "Free and clear of all encumbrances" meant that the title being transferred from Ana Vazquez to Pura Castillo was not to be encumbered by any mortgages, judgments or other liens. The Sales Contract was not made contingent upon Pura Castillo obtaining new financing. The relationship between Ana Vazquez and Pura Castillo is not entirely clear. They were obviously well acquainted with each other. The evidence suggests that Pura Castillo's common law husband, Joseph Hardisson, was a close friend of the father of Ana Vazquez. While Pura Castillo and Joseph Hardisson were visiting with Vazquez, they began discussing the possible purchase of the Condominium by Pura Castillo. Yanks first learned about the possible sale of the Condominium to Pura Castillo when Vazquez asked Hernandez-Yanks to represent her. Hernandez-Yanks indicated that she would represent Vazquez in the sale. Vazquez also requested Yanks' assistance in obtaining a loan for Pura Castillo. Yanks advised Vazquez that he did not process loan applications for employees. He suggested that she contact one of the mortgage lenders with whom he did business. Vazquez contacted one such company, Inter-Mortgage Corporation, and obtained a loan application package. Shortly thereafter, a loan application was submitted with InterMortgage Corporation in the name of Pura Castillo. The circumstances surrounding the completion and submittal of that loan application are not entirely clear nor are they necessarily pertinent to this proceeding. The evidence did establish that the loan application contained some false information regarding Pura Castillo's residence and employment. InterMortgage contacted Yanks' office and advised that there were some problems with the application. Vazquez went to InterMortgage's office and retrieved the application. The evidence did not establish that Yanks was aware of the filing of the application with InterMortgage and/or that he knew the application contained any false information. It appears that a similar application with false information may also have been filed with another lender, Dixie Mortgage. There is no indication that Yanks was aware of the filing of this application and/or that he knew it contained false information. The Condominium was subject to a $42,000 mortgage from Standard Federal to Vazquez (the "Standard Federal Mortgage"). The Standard Federal Mortgage was a typical Fannie Mae mortgage and included a commonly used due-on- sale clause in Clause 17. That clause provided for a default by the borrower upon sale of the property unless the mortgagee had consented to the assumption of the mortgage by the purchaser. There were no federal or state laws in existence at the time prohibiting the enforceability of Clause 17. Vazquez had a contract to purchase another home which was contingent upon the sale of her Condominium. Thus, she was under some time pressure to close the sale of the Condominium. When it became apparent that a quick loan could not be arranged for Pura Castillo, Ana Vazquez turned to Yanks for advice. While there is conflicting evidence as to the discussions that took place, the more persuasive evidence established that Yanks agreed to structure a deal that would enable Ana Vazquez to sell the Condominium to Pura Castillo. As discussed in more detail below, Yanks structured a complicated and confusing arrangement whereby Pura Castillo was to make her monthly payments to B & B Equity, which was to play the role of a servicing agent and distribute the payments to the first mortgagee, Standard Federal. While Yanks now claims that after the Standard Federal Mortgage payment was made, the remainder of the monthly payments received by B & B Equity were going to be paid to Vazquez, there is no written agreement confirming this arrangement. It is the usual practice in the industry for mortgage brokers to determine whether there are outstanding mortgages on the property to be sold and to see to it that an existing mortgage is paid off or otherwise taken care of at the time of closing. It is the responsibility of the mortgage broker to contact the institution holding the mortgage to find out if it is assumable. If an existing mortgage has a due-on-sale clause, the mortgage broker would characteristically contact the first lien holder and get an estoppel letter to determine the balance of the loan. The mortgage broker might also seek a waiver from the lender so that the sale could be made without paying off the loan. Without such a waiver, a due-on-sale clause would entitle the original lender to declare the entire original loan due upon sale of the property. Yanks never obtained an estoppel letter or a waiver of the due-on-sale clause from Standard Federal. While Yanks claims that he contacted various persons regarding the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, he never contacted Standard Federal about the specific clause in its mortgage to Vazquez. There is conflicting evidence regarding the discussions between Yanks and Vazquez regarding the structuring of the transaction. It is clear that Vazquez was more concerned with concluding the transaction rather than understanding the intricacies of it. As discussed in more detail below, the transaction structured by Yanks included several unexplained and/or inappropriate charges. In addition, the loan documentation was confusing and sometimes conflicting and/or contradictory. Vazquez indicated to Yanks that Pura Castillo was prepared to go forward with the sale and a closing was scheduled for June 16, 1989. In preparation for the closing of the sale of her condominium, Vazquez incurred several expenses. On or about March 31, 1989, she paid $275 to have the condominium appraised. On or about April 5, 1989, Vazquez paid $200 to National Title Abstract Company for an update of the abstract. On or about June 15, 1989, she paid $150 to Ticor Title Co. She also paid for a credit report on Pura Castillo. On June 16, 1989, Pura Castillo arrived at the office of Yanks and B & B Investors at 1481 N.W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, to close on the purchase of the Condominium in accordance with the Sales Contract. Yanks and/or Hernandez- Yanks prepared the closing documents used at the closing. Much of the closing was conducted in Spanish. Yanks is not fluent in Spanish. Hernandez-Yanks, who speaks Spanish, acted as the closing agent and remained throughout the process. Yanks and Vazquez were in and out of the room throughout the closing. During the closing, Pura Castillo was told that B & B Equity was going to be the lender for the transaction. Pura Castillo inquired whether it was necessary for her to have her own attorney. Hernandez-Yanks replied that she could represent all parties and that it was not necessary for Pura Castillo to have her own attorney. At the closing, Pura Castillo presented cashiers checks for $5,800, $7,250 and $5,900 all made payable to the order of Ana Hernandez-Yanks, Trust Account. In addition, either Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks was given a check from Parker Realty in the amount of $2,800 which was the balance of the $7,000 deposit after payment of the $4,200 real estate commission. From the $21,750 brought to the closing, $14,000 was disbursed to Ana Vazquez. As noted above, Vazquez had already paid for the abstract, appraisal and credit report. In addition, as part of her mortgage payment, she had contributed approximately $1,281 to an escrow for taxes and insurance for which she was entitled to be reimbursed. Thus, the net cash that she received from the closing was less than $12,000 from the sale of a $70,000 condominium with a $42,000 mortgage. At the closing, Vazquez executed an "Agreement for Deed" in favor of Pura Castillo. An agreement for deed is a conditional sales contract pursuant to which a seller agrees to sell property to a buyer over a period of time. The seller retains the legal ownership of the property until the full consideration for the purchase is paid. After all the conditions have been met, the seller delivers a deed conveying ownership of the land to the buyer. The Agreement for Deed in this transaction provided as follows: That if said Buyers shall first make the payments and perform the covenants herein mentioned on their part to be performed, the said Sellers hereby covenant and agree to convey and assure to the Buyers or their heirs or assigns, in fee simple, clear of all encumbrances whatever, by good and sufficient Warranty Deed...[the condominium] And the Buyers hereby covenant and agree to pay to the Sellers the sum of $70,000 to be paid as follows: $19,073.12 cash in hand, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and $704.32 or more per month on or before the 16th day of each and every month after the date of this instrument, to be mailed to the Sellers' address given herein, with interest at the rate of 11 percent, per annum on the whole sum remaining from time to time unpaid,... Arguably, the Agreement for Deed required Pura Castillo to make monthly payments to Vazquez of $704.32 plus interest on the outstanding balance. However, at the closing, Yanks provided Pura Castillo with a letter which explained that her monthly payments of $704.32 included $499.97 for principal and interest, $142.35 for real estate taxes and $62 for insurance. At the closing, Pura Castillo executed a mortgage (the "Mortgage") in favor of B & B Equity as mortgagee. The Mortgage stated that it secured an indebtedness of $52,500 and a promissory note for that amount was executed by Pura Castillo to B & B Equity at the closing. The Mortgage was similar in form and content to a Fannie Mae or a Freddie Mac mortgage form, except it included some additional provisions stating that it was a "Wraparound Mortgage." A wraparound mortgage is a financing device that is sometimes used when a seller of a piece of property agrees to take back and finance a portion of the difference between an existing first mortgage which is not being assumed or satisfied and the sales price for the property. Typically, the mortgagor on the first mortgage is the seller of the property and the mortgagee on the wraparound mortgage. The wraparound mortgage becomes a second or other junior mortgage behind the existing mortgage. The mortgagee of the wraparound mortgage agrees to continue making payments on the existing primary mortgage, at least so long as payments are made under the wraparound mortgage. Page 8 of the Mortgage included the following language: This is a Wraparound Mortgage. This wraparound mortgage is a second mortgage. It is inferior to certain mortgage [sic], herein called the first mortgage which covers the above described property at the time of execution of this wraparound mortgage. The wraparound mortgagee shall be excluded from any terms or conditions of the prior mortgagees. The wraparound mortgagee's obligation to pay the prior mortgages is limites [sic] to funds received from the wraparound mortgagor. For a number of reasons, the use of a wraparound mortgage in this transaction was totally inappropriate. The first page of the mortgage included a number of warranties including the following: The mortgagor hereby covenants with and warrants to the Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is indefeasibly seized with the absolute and fee simple title to said property. This warranty is inconsistent with the ownership interest that the Mortgagor, Pura Castillo, had as a result of this transaction. Pura Castillo's only claim to title was via the Agreement for Deed and she was not indefeasibly seized with the fee simple title. As noted above, the Mortgage states that it secures an indebtedness of $52,500 and a promissory note (the "Note") for that amount was executed by Pura Castillo to B & B Equity at the closing. That Note required Pura Castillo to make payments directly to B & B Equity. However, the Agreement for Deed calls for Pura Castillo to make payments to Vazquez. Moreover, Pura Castillo signed the Note obligating herself to make payments on a $52,500 indebtedness to B & B Equity even though the Standard Federal Mortgage was not satisfied and had a remaining balance of $42,000. In other words, the result of this transaction, at least as it appeared on the public records, is that a $70,000 condominium was encumbered by two separate mortgages (the Standard Federal Mortgage and the "Wraparound Mortgage") securing separate promissory notes totalling more than $94,000. At no time prior to or during the closing did Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks explain to Pura Castillo that an Agreement for Deed was being utilized in this transaction and that she would not obtain full legal title until all of the mortgages were paid off. Furthermore, neither Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks explained to Pura Castillo that the mortgage she signed in favor of B & B Equity was a wraparound second mortgage. While Yanks contends that Pura Castillo had plenty of opportunity to review the documents and ask questions regarding them, she was clearly an unsophisticated buyer who was incapable of deciphering the confusing and ambiguous documentation for this clumsily crafted transaction. In sum, the use of an agreement for deed and a wraparound mortgage in the same transaction was redundant, confusing and illogical. Moreover, Yanks' efforts in this transaction clearly violated the due-on-sale clause (Clause 17) in Standard Federal's existing first mortgage. The Department has suggested that the transaction was a calculated fraud with some undefined goal. After considering all the evidence, the transaction can more accurately be described as an awkward attempt at creative financing which included a number of hidden and inappropriate charges for the benefit of Yanks and/or B & B Equity. Yanks contends that Vazquez was desperate to close the sale and authorized him to proceed with whatever financing he could arrange so long as she netted $14,000 from the sale. He claims that she agreed to the wraparound mortgage as the only way to proceed with the deal under the circumstances. Under this arrangement, he contends that B & B was authorized to retain any additional proceeds as compensation for serving as a servicing agent on the wraparound mortgage. Even if this explanation is accepted, there are a number of problems with the actions of Yanks and B & B Equity in this transaction. First of all, there was no written servicing agreement setting forth the obligations of the servicing agent nor is there any delineation of the amount of money to be paid for servicing the wraparound mortgage. Moreover, the Agreement For Deed and the Promissory Note call for Pura Castillo to make payments of slightly more than $700 per month. These payments exceed the monthly payments due under the Standard Federal Mortgage. However, there is no written delineation of how the additional payments received each month were to be disbursed. Finally, the servicing arrangement was never explained to Pura Castillo and the documentation for the transaction was very confusing and often contradictory. There is no closing statement for the transaction that accurately reflects all of the disbursements made from the proceeds of the closing. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 is a closing statement signed by both Vazquez and Pura Castillo and purports to delineate certain expenses paid from the proceeds of the sale. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 is an unsigned closing statement which Yanks contends he prepared for use at the closing of the loan. He claims that, after the closing, he found out that Vazquez substituted Petitioner's Exhibit 23 for the closing statement that he intended to be used because she thought it more accurately depicted the fees as she had discussed them with Pura Castillo. This explanation is rejected as not credible. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 was the only closing statement signed by both the buyer and seller. As noted above, Vazquez was in and out during the closing. Hernandez-Yanks was present throughout the closing. The more credible evidence established that Petitioner's Exhibit 23 was the closing statement presented at the closing and executed by the participants. Neither closing statement accurately explains how all of the funds from the sale were disbursed. Thus, it is impossible to determine conclusively how much money Yanks and/or B & B Equity received from the closing. Both statements include some charges which are inappropriate or questionable. Furthermore, it is clear that Yanks and/or B & B received more than either statement indicated. Both closing statements reflect a payment of $600 for title insurance. However, the evidence established that no title insurance policy was ever issued. Vazquez paid for a title insurance commitment prior to the closing. Such a commitment is typically issued by a title insurance company prior to a real estate transaction and is a contractual agreement by the title insurer to issue a policy of title insurance upon compliance with certain terms and conditions. The actual title insurance policy is not issued until after the transaction has closed. The title insurance policy, not the commitment, insures the main insured against certain defects in title. The $600 charge for title insurance reflected on both closing statements was totally inappropriate in this case since no title policy was ever issued. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 includes a number of charges assessed to the buyer which were wholly inappropriate to this transaction. For example, the closing statement included a $500 charge for FNMA underwriting. This fee is charged by the institution underwriting a mortgage loan for compliance with Fannie Mae guidelines. Since the Mortgage in this case was clearly not intended to be sold to a Fannie Mae pool, the FNMA charge was not appropriate. Similarly, the closing statement included a $250 charge for a warehouse fee. This is a fee paid to institutions to cover the cost of a warehouse line of credit and is totally inapplicable to the transaction involved in this case. The closing statement also included a photo fee of $25, a lender's inspection fee of $150 and a survey fee of $225. There is no indication that any photos were taken, an inspection was conducted or a survey was prepared. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 also included a loan origination fee of $1,375 and brokerage fees of $1,575. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 included a lump sum brokerage fee of $5000, but did not include any of the other charges listed in this paragraph. There is no dispute that Yanks and/or his firm were paid mortgage brokerage fees out of the proceeds of the closing. These fees are reflected on both of the closing statements (Petitioner's Exhibits 7 and 23). A mortgage broker is paid a fee to negotiate a mortgage loan transaction for another party. In other words, he is retained to find a lender for a potential borrower. Under a mortgage servicing agreement, the servicer is paid a fee to handle the collection and disbursement of payments on a mortgage loan. Any fees paid for servicing a loan should be separately itemized and disclosed. It is not appropriate for a person who is to service a loan to receive what has been disclosed as a broker fee. Irrespective of which closing statement is deemed authentic, the evidence established that Yanks and/or B & B Equity received significantly more money from the closing than was reflected on either closing statement. As indicated above, $21,750 cash was presented at the closing, of which $14,000 was paid to Vazquez. According to Petitioner's Exhibit 7, there was $6,123.35 in closing costs (including a $5,000 brokerage fee). Thus, there is at least $1,626.65 in cash that is not reflected on the closing statement. Yanks contends that Vazquez told him to keep this money in return for servicing the loan. This contention is rejected as not credible. Similarly, Petitioner's Exhibit 23 indicates closing costs of $6,379 (including the charges in paragraph 89 above). Thus, there is $1371 unaccounted for. Moreover, it is clear that Yanks and/or B & B received in excess of $6,500 which is not readily discernible from the face of the closing statement. Subsequent to the closing, B & B Equity received at least five monthly payments of $704.32 on the Wraparound Mortgage from Joseph L. Hardisson, the common law husband of Pura Castillo. B & B Equity apparently distributed some of these funds in accordance with its claimed role of "servicing agent." However, on at least one occasion in late 1989, a check issued by B & B Equity to pay the Standard Federal Mortgage was returned for insufficient funds. In addition, a check issued by B & B Equity in the amount of $700 to Ana Vazquez in December of 1989 bounced. At some point in late 1989 or early 1990, Pura Castillo became concerned when she learned that the Standard Federal Mortgage had not been paid off. In January or February 1990, Pura Castillo and her husband came to Florida and attempted to contact Yanks regarding the transaction and the irregularities surrounding it. Ultimately, Pura Castillo filed a complaint with the Department and also filed a civil suit in Circuit Court seeking cancellation of the Mortgage and the issuance of a warranty deed in her favor. On April 17, 1990, Vazquez executed a warranty deed to Pura Castillo. Vazquez states that she felt obligated to convey all of her interest in the property to Pura Castillo in view of the confusing and unfair circumstances surrounding the initial transaction. On October 23, 1990, Yanks and B & B Equity entered into a Settlement Agreement with Pura Castillo pursuant to which they paid Pura Castillo $12,000 and the wraparound mortgage was cancelled of record. The Settlement Agreement also resulted in the dismissal of the civil suit and called for Pura Castillo to withdraw her complaint filed with the Department. Despite this withdrawal, the Department has chosen to proceed with this administrative action.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered finding Respondents B & B Investors, Yanks and Ana Hernandez-Yanks guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finding them not guilty of Count VI and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 which should be payable jointly and severally. Yanks and B & B Investors should also be required to repay $9,000 to Calvary Chapel within 30 days after the rendition of the Final Order. Failure to repay this sum should be a basis for the imposition of additional penalties, including revocation. The mortgage brokerage licenses of Yanks and B & B Investors should be suspended for one (1) year for their actions in connection with the Calvary Chapel transaction. A Cease and Desist Order should also be entered against Ana Hernandez- Yanks prohibiting her from any future violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, from engaging in any act within the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and from being an ultimate equitable owner of a business license pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. The facts surrounding her trust account should be reported to the Florida Bar for investigation. A Final Order should also be entered finding Yanks, Hernandez-Yanks, and B & B Equity guilty of the violations alleged in Counts VIII, IX, and XI, finding Yanks and B & B Equity guilty of the violations alleged in Counts XII and finding Hernandez-Yanks guilty of violations alleged in Count XIII of the Amended Administrative Complaint. The Final Order should find the Respondents not guilty of the violations alleged in Counts X and XIV. Based upon the foregoing, the Department should impose an administrative fine of $5,000. The mortgage brokerage license of Yanks should be suspended for a period of three years to run consecutively with the suspension issued in connection with the Calvary Chapel transaction. Respondents should also be required to repay $6,040.12 to Ana Vazquez for inappropriate and undisclosed charges made at the closing. The collection of all fines and/or assessments against Ana Hernandez- Yanks and/or B & B Investors should be suspended pending approval of the Bankruptcy Court. In view of the Voluntary Dismissal filed on November 9, 1993, the Final Order should formally dismiss the Application Case. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August 1994. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August 1994.

USC (1) 11 U.S.C 362 Florida Laws (3) 120.57494.001490.803
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY LORENZO JONES, 06-000707PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 23, 2006 Number: 06-000707PL Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2007

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57648.442648.45648.49648.52648.571
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ROBERT MOTES, MACHIKO MOTES, AND MADGE CHESSER vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 89-004274 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Titusville, Florida Aug. 08, 1989 Number: 89-004274 Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1989

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund (fund) codified in Sections 494.042 through 494.045, Florida Statutes (1987). Among other things, the Division processes claims for payment from the fund by persons who were parties to a mortgage financing transaction and who have suffered monetary damages as a result of a violation of the law by a licensed mortgage broker. In this case, the perpetrator was Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation (Stackhouse), which held mortgage brokerage license number HB-0006527 from September 19, 1976 through August 31, 1986 and operated at least part of that time in the Brevard County area. In order to perfect a successful claim and be assured of participating in the distribution of moneys from the fund, a person must satisfy a number of statutory criteria within a specified time period after the first notice is filed. This proceeding involves a number of claims by various parties who suffered monetary damages as a result of the illicit acts of Stackhouse. The principal factual issues are whether petitioners, Robert Motes, Machiko Motes, Madge Chesser and Christiane E. Driscoll, all claimants, satisfied the required statutory criteria within the specified time period, and whether the first valid and complete notice of a claim was filed on January 20, 1987 as maintained by the Division, or occurred on a later date as urged by petitioners. These issues are crucial to petitioners' interests since the amount of money to be distributed from the fund for all claimants (on a pro rata basis) is $100,000, and all of that money has been proposed to be distributed to intervenors and other claimants because of the alleged untimeliness of petitioners' claims. The Stackhouse matter first came to the Division's attention on January 20, 1987 when it received by certified mail a letter containing a copy of a complaint filed against Stackhouse by intervenors, Richard S. and Althea M. Rucki, in the circuit court of the eighteenth judicial circuit in and for Brevard County. This filing constituted the first valid and complete notice of the matter. As such, it triggered a two year time period in which other claimants had to file such notice with the Division and then satisfy all statutory criteria in order to share in the first, and in this case the only, distribution of moneys from the fund. Intervenors eventually obtained a summary final judgment against Stackhouse on January 10, 1989 in the amount of $27,200 plus $1,972 in interest, $76 in court costs, and $2,000 in attorney's fees. Copies of the judgment, unsatisfied writ of execution and affidavit of diligent search were filed with the Division on January 19, 1989, or within two years from the date the first notice was filed. After the Rucki notice was filed, a number of claimants, including the other intervenors, filed their notices with the Division within the two year time period and thereafter satisfied all pertinent statutory criteria. Their names, dates of filing their final claims with the Division, and amounts of final judgment, including costs and fees, are listed below in the order in which the claimants filed their first notice with the Division: Claimant Date of Filing Claim Amount of judgment Roberts January 19, 1989 $84,562.30 Rucki January 19, 1989 31,248.00 Gantz January 19, 1989 15,634.28 Carman January 19, 1989 48,767.87 Thomas July 21, 1988 40,103.22 Hahn January 19, 1989 14,165.14 Ulriksson January 18, 1989 14,497.00 Choate January 18, 1989 28,994.00 Anderson December 22, 1988 84,443.20 Resnick December 22, 1988 32,912.22 It is noted that each of the foregoing claimants satisfied all statutory requirements prior to the date of the filing of their respective final claims with the Division. This included the obtaining of a judgment against the debtor, having a writ of execution issued upon the judgment which was later returned unsatisfied, and thereafter having made a reasonable search and inquiry to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possessed any property or other assets to be used in satisfying the judgment. Based upon the judgments obtained by the above claimants, those persons are entitled to distribution from the fund in the following pro rata amounts: Anderson claim - $10,950.00 Resnick claim - 10,950.00 Carman claim - 10,950.00 Thomas claim - 10,950.00 Ulriksson claim - 7,937.83 Choate claim - 10,950.00 Roberts claim - 10,950.00 Gantz claim - 7,697.63 Hahn claim - 7,714.54 Rucki claim - 10,950.00 $100.000.00 On July 27, 1988 petitioners, Robert and Machiko Motes and Madge Chesser, filed their notices with the Division. On August 2, 1988, they were advised by the Division that "the first time period for payment of the Guaranty Fund claims is `two years after the first claim.'" Even so, petitioners did not complete all required statutory steps and file their final claims with the Division until March 1, 1989, or after the two year period had expired. Petitioner, Christiane E. Driscoll, filed her notice, copy of complaint and final judgment on January 23, 1989. Thereafter, she completed all required statutory steps and filed her final claim with the Division on June 6, 1989. As a consequence, none of petitioners are entitled to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. An attorney who once represented Driscoll, Rafael A. Burguet, made inquiry by telephone with a Division employee in either late December 1988 or early January 1989 concerning the steps required to process a claim on behalf of his client. It was his recollection that the Division employee did not advise him that the two year period for perfecting claims was triggered in January 1987. On January 20, 1989, Burguet sent a letter to the Division with a copy of the complaint and final judgment against Stackhouse. In the letter, he requested the Division to "please advise as to what further requirements you may have to file this claim." On January 23, 1989 a Division employee acknowledged by letter that the Division had received the complaint and judgment. The letter contained copies of the relevant portions of the Florida Statutes and advice that "claims for recovery against Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation are currently being forwarded to our Legal Department for the drafting of a Notice of Intent to either grant or deny payment from the Fund." There is no evidence that the Division made any positive representations to Burguet that either mislead him or caused him to delay in filing his claim. Similarly, the Division responded on August 2, 1988 to the initial filing of the Motes and Chesser notices with advice that the time period for complying with the statutory criteria was "two years after the first claim." Although there were subsequent telephone conversations (but no written communications) between their attorney and the Division, there was no evidence that the Division made any positive representations that would mislead petitioners or otherwise cause them to delay processing their claims. Petitioners Motes and Chesser contend that the first valid and complete notice was not received by the Division until May 20, 1987 when intervenor Carman filed a complaint against Stackhouse in circuit court and also filed her claim and copy of the complaint with the Division the same date. Under this theory, the two year period would not expire until May 19, 1989. This contention is based on the fact that the Rucki complaint was filed in circuit court on January 9, 1987 but the claim and copy of the complaint were not filed with the Division until January 20, 1987. Petitioners contend that subsection 494.043(1)(e) requires both acts to be accomplished the same date. However, this construction of the statute is contrary to the manner in which it has been construed by the Division. According to the stipulated testimony of an employee of the Brevard County sheriff's office, if the property to be levied on is not listed on the instructions to levy, the sheriff's office requires a court order prior to filing a return nulla bona. In this case seven claimants obtained such a court order directing the sheriff to furnish a return nulla bona as to the writ of execution. However, petitioners Motes and Chesser did not do so until after the two year time period had expired. The records received in evidence reflect that the initial inquiry made by Robert and Virginia R. Enteen was never pursued and therefore their claim should be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order distributing the moneys from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund in a manner consistent with its proposed agency action entered on June 21, 1989. The requests of petitioners to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57562.30
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JOHN G. GRUBBS, INC. vs SCHOOL BOARD OF CITRUS COUNTY, 93-004325BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Aug. 04, 1993 Number: 93-004325BID Latest Update: Oct. 29, 1993

Findings Of Fact By invitation to bid for Architect's Project No. 9129-A, the Board solicited bids for "construction of one new single story building at Lecanto School Complex in Lecanto, Florida." Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 01010.1. Specifications (Re)stated The invitation to bid gave notice of a mandatory pre-bid conference at two o'clock on the afternoon of June 10, 1993, at Lecanto Vocational Center at the project site. Joint Exhibit No. 1, A-1. ("BIDDERS MUST ATTEND . . . TO BE ABLE TO BID") The invitation to bid consisted of a project manual, amended seriatim in a series of four addenda. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The project manual required substantial completion of the project within 250 days of written notice to proceed, Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00700.8, but on another page the same document required substantial completion by July 13, 1993. Id. at 00100.8. Later Addendum No. 1 put the date for substantial completion at "250 days after Notice to Proceed is given," but superseding Addendum No. 2 reverted to July 13, 1993. Addendum No. 3 directed prospective bidders to "[d]elete all previously issued Proposal Forms and replace with the Proposal Form attached." The attached form states: The undersigned agrees that if this bid is accepted, construction of this project will begin after receipt of "Notice to Proceed" and shall be substantially completed within 250 calendar days and finally completed within thirty (30) calendar days from substantial completion. Directions concerning the form specify that it is to "be copied on Contractor's business letterhead." Addendum No. 3, p. 5. Among the specifications were bond requirements, including minimum ratings for companies writing the bonds: To be acceptable to the owner as surety for Bid Bonds, Performance Bond, and Payment Bonds, a surety company shall comply with the following provisions: 3. The surety shall have at least the following ratings: . . . 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 A Class XI Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00600.1. Addendum No. 2 "delete[d] the Class ratings" but not Best's Policyholder's Ratings. Although the copy of the invitation to bid that came in evidence as Joint Exhibit No. 1 lacked pages 00400.1 and 00400.2, the table of contents indicates that these pages contain a bid bond requirement. The proposal form also calls for a bid bond. In its proposed recommended order, moreover, petitioner states that the Board "set forth in its project manual a provision that bidders should submit a bid bond from a company with an 'A 11' rating." The Project Manual states, at page 00100.3, that a contract "will be awarded only to a responsible Bidder, qualified by experience . . . . " Joint Exhibit No. 1. Bidders were required to submit forms along with their bids which called for, among other things, lists of major construction projects in process and major projects completed in the last five years. Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00110.3. Compliance Attempted When, on the afternoon of June 10, 1993, Greg Cecil, Grubbs' general manager, arrived for the pre-bid conference, he was erroneously "instructed that Lakeview was at another site in Hernando." T.70. When he arrived there, "somebody on site . . . said . . . Lakeview Relocation is going to be moved to the site that you were previously at." Id. By the time he again reached his original, correct destination, he "ended up being late for the meeting." Id. It was about quarter of three and only Tom Williford, who is the Board's Director for General Services, and an electrical subcontractor remained. T.78. Mr. Williford recounted what had occurred before the other contractors had dispersed, and told Mr. Cecil "that there would be an addendum issue[d] reflecting any items that occurred that day." T.211. The Board's Addendum No. 2 lists Mr. Cecil as having been "in attendance at the Mandatory Pre-Bid Conference." Bids Submitted Grubbs, Caldwell and others submitted bids for Architect's Project No. 9129A. Grubbs' bid was low, at one million one hundred five thousand dollars ($1,105,000.00). Dated June 17, 1993, Grubbs' proposal offered to bring construction to substantial completion by July 13, 1993. In a blank for "Bond Rating," "A- 11" was inserted. Joint Exhibits No. 2 and 3.11. The bid documents contained no other rating information. A form bid bond executed by Grubbs' president and by Sandra McCullough, as attorney in fact both for Reliance Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation, and for Employees Reinsurance Corporation, a Missouri corporation, accompanied Grubbs' bid. Best rates the former company A- and the latter A++, evidence at hearing showed. The body of the bond begins: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we JOHN G. GRUBBS, INC. P.O. BOX 10262, BROOKSVILLE, FLORIDA 34601 as Principal, hereinafter called the Principal, and RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY AND EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION, P.O. BOX 945090 MAITLAND, FLORIDA 32751 a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of PENNSYLVANIA as Surety, hereinafter called the Surety, are held and firmly bound unto SCHOOL BOARD OF CITRUS COUNTY . . . . Joint Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. Attached to the bid is a power of attorney appointing Ms. McCullough attorney in fact for Reliance Insurance Company and another limited power of attorney appointing her attorney in fact for Employees Reinsurance Company, which authorizes her to execute "any bond . . . in co- suretyship with RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY." Id. Grubbs' bid included a list of five "open contracts" for amounts ranging from $98,749 to $1,362,252 for projects ranging from a water storage system to sanitary sewer installation to road construction; and a list of some 95 completed projects including roads, sewers, clearing, earthwork, a $53,387 reroofing job, and a $116,772 job installing a canopy and sidewalks for a middle school in Hernando County. Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3. After the bids had been opened, John G. Grubbs told the Board's architect of still other projects Grubbs had completed. On July 1, 1993, a principal of the architectural firm the Board had engaged wrote Mr. Williford, as follows: Dear Tom: We have reviewed the bids received and would recommend that the low bid from John G. Grubbs, Inc. be rejected for being in non- conformance with the Bid Documents for the following reasons: The bid by John G. Grubbs, Inc. was submitted on a proposal form that contained an error in the completion date. Their form indicated construction to be completed by July 13, 1993; rather than 250 days as required by the Bid Documents, per addendum #3. Bid Bond received was written by a bonding company having a Best rating of "A minus" (A-). The Documents require an "A" rating. (Section 00600, Page 00600.1, Third Paragraph) The Contractor's Qualification form indicates that John G. Grubbs, Inc. has been in the Site and Drainage business for ten (10) years but has not constructed any School Facilities. It also shows having completed construction of only two buildings and one under construction. These 3 buildings are small fire stations in the $300,000 range each. Due to the above outlined concerns we would recommend the contract be awarded to Caldwell Construction Company, the next low bidder. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. The Board met on July 8, 1993. During the meeting, one Board member opined, "the critical thing here is probably the bond rating." Id., p. 26. The Board voted to reject Grubbs' bid and, separately, to accept Caldwell's.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Board dismiss Grubbs' petition and award the contract for Architectural Project No. 9129-A to Caldwell. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-4325BID Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are not separately numbered. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-11 and 14-19 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, respondent's Mr. Williford concluded at the time that Grubbs had complied. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13 pertains to a subordinate matter. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Grubbs built a canopy and sidewalks at a school. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 21, both the bid rating and the completion date were deviations. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-22, 25, 26, 27 and 28 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Intervenor's proposed findings Nos. 23 and 24 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to intervenor's proposed finding of fact No. 29, the completion date and bond rating were both deviations. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl E. Austin, Superintendent Citrus County School Board 1007 W. Main Street Inverness, Florida 34450-4698 Thomas S. Hogan, Jr. 20 South Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34605 Richard S. Fitzpatrick 213 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4239 Clark S. Stillwell Post Office Box 250 Inverness, Florida 34451-0250

Florida Laws (1) 120.53
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs. LARRY K. SECHREST, 82-002617 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002617 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1983

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Larry K. Sechrest, was at all times relevant to the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, licensed as limited surety agent in the State of Florida representing Allied Fidelity Insurance Company ("Allied"). In February, 1982, Respondent's accounts with Allied were audited by their representative at which time it was discovered that Respondent executed but did not report 202 powers of attorney. The aforementioned powers represented $11,464.51 in premiums due Allied, and an additional $5,732 due the buildup fund. On March 4, 1982, Allied demanded that the Respondent remit to them these premiums and buildup fund payments and account for and return the missing powers of attorney. Respondent had failed to comply with Allied's demands as of the date this Administrative Complaint was filed by Petitioner (July 20, 1982). Respondent subsequently offered to repay Allied at the rate of $1,000 per month, but this was refused. At the final hearing on February 16, 1983, Respondent offered to repay the total amount due within 30 days. On April 29, 1981, Respondent attempted to post a ne exeat bond in the amount of $25,000 for Douglas R. Valentine of Manatee County, Florida, based on power of attorney number FL2800913 issued by Allied. Respondent had not been given authority by Allied to post ne exeat bonds. Power of attorney number FL2800913 was by its language to be issued for appearance bonds only.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 648.45(1)(d), (h) and (j), Florida Statutes (1981), as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and suspending his limited surety agent's license for one year; provided, however, that such license shall not be reinstated until Respondent has made restitution to the Allied Fidelity Insurance Company. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerry Surfus, Esquire 150 East Avenue, South Sarasota, Florida 33577 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER IN THE MATTER OF LARRY K. SECHREST Revocation of License and Case No. 82-L-162J Eligibility for Licensure DOAH Case No. 82-2617 Limited Surety Agent / ORDER REVOKING RESPONDENT'S LICENSES AND ELIGIBILITY TO HOLD LICENSES THIS MATTER came on to be considered upon the transcript of record of hearing held on February 16, 1983, in Sarasota, Florida, and the Report, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hearing Examiner dated May 20, 1983. Upon consideration thereof and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The Findings of Fact of the Hearing Examiner are adopted. The Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Examiner are adopted. The Recommendation of the Hearing Examiner is rejected for the following reasons: Section 648.49, Florida Statutes prohibits the establishment of a period of suspension in excess of one (1) year. The Department lacks the authority to condition any Order upon financial restitution by a Respondent to any aggrieved party listed in an Administrative Complaint. Revocation of license and eligibility for licensure is an appropriate remedy under the statutory authority cited in the Administrative Complaint, and the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law. All licenses of the Respondent, LARRY K. SECHREST, heretofore issued within the purview of the Florida Department of Insurance and eligibility to hold said licenses be, and the same are hereby revoked. DONE and ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, this 28th day of June , 1983. BILL GUNTER Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer WILLIAM D. RUBIN Assistant Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Surfus, Esquire 150 East Avenue, South Sarasota, Florida 33577 Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 648.25648.44648.45648.49
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CONSOLIDATED CRUISES AND TOURS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 94-005783 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 12, 1994 Number: 94-005783 Latest Update: May 29, 2009

The Issue At issue is whether petitioner's request for a bond waiver under the provisions of Section 559.927(10)(b)5, Florida Statutes, should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Consolidated Cruises and Tours, Inc., is a "seller of travel," as that term is defined by Section 559.927(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and was formed in April 1993 by Steven Wolf, its president, to carry on the travel business he had previously operated through Consolidated Cruises, Inc., since October 1987. Effective October 1, 1988, Chapter 88-363, Laws of Florida, codified at Section 559.927, Florida Statutes (1989), required sellers of travel to register with the Department, and to post an annual performance bond. Failure to register with the Department or to conduct business as a seller of travel without the required bond was a violation of law, and subjected the person or business to civil and criminal penalties. Consolidated Cruises, Inc., the business through which Mr. Wolf was operating at the time, did not register with the Department as a seller of travel until November 1, 1991. Effective October 1, 1993, Chapter 93-107, Section 1, Laws of Florida, amended Section 559.927, Florida Statutes, to provide that: The department may waive the bond requirement in this subsection if the seller of travel has had 5 or more consecutive years of experience as a seller of travel in Florida. . . . On or about May 25, 1994, petitioner filed an application for registration as a seller of travel with respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs (Department), and requested a waiver of the annual performance bond requirement. Pertinent to this case, the request for waiver described the history of Consolidated Cruises, Inc., and Consolidated Cruises and Tours, Inc., as follows: Consolidated Cruises Inc. was established on 10/1/87 as a company that promoted cruises. The sales for the company was minimal for the first 2 years. The principal stock holder was Steven Wolf (100 percent). In March of 1990 Consolidated Cruises added 3 new major stock holders to the company and split the company stock as follows: Steven Wolf - 25 percent Miriam Wolf - 25 percent Yoav Tavory - 25 percent Judy Tavory - 25 percent In April of 1993 Consolidated Cruises ceased to function since the major stock holders had a disagreement as to the dissolution of the company. In the interim, to keep the company going a new corporation was formed by Steven Wolf & Miriam Wolf called, "CONSOLIDATED CRUISES & TOURS INC. For all practical purposes, the company continued to work the same as before but under the auspices of a new company name. In all the years that we have been providing our services, we have never had ONE complaint. On the basis of our past performance, we request that you waive the requested security bond of $10,000. Our previous registration number for CONSOLIDATED CRUISES INC. are as follows: certificate of registration No: 11347 certificate No. 00283 By letter of June 16, 1994, the Department denied petitioner's request for bond waiver. Such denial was premised on the Department's interpretation of Section 559.927, Florida Statutes, as allowing a waiver of the bond requirement only when the "seller of travel has had 5 or more consecutive years of experience as a seller of travel in Florida" that was lawfully obtained, i.e., that such experience occurred while the person or business was duly registered with the Department as required by law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered denying petitioner's request for a performance bond waiver. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of January 1995. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January 1995. APPENDIX Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 4, otherwise not relevant. See, paragraph 9. 3-5. Addressed in paragraph 6, otherwise unnecessary detail. 6. Addressed in paragraph 3, otherwise unnecessary detail. 7 & 8. Addressed in paragraph 5. 9. Addressed in paragraphs 4 and 5. 10 & 11. Addressed in paragraph 6. 12. Rejected as not relevant since the Department did not specify such reason as a basis for denial in its letter of June 16, 1994, did not seek to amend its reasons for denial prior to hearing, and did not raise such issue until after petitioner had presented its case-in-chief. See paragraph 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Wolf, President Consolidated Cruises and Tours, Inc. 8181 Northwest 8th Manor Plantation, Florida 33324 Jay S. Levenstein, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL - 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL - 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68501.201559.927
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