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FLORIDIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 07-005636BID (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 10, 2007 Number: 07-005636BID Latest Update: Apr. 22, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether the proposed disqualification of Petitioner’s bid is contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules, or policies or contrary to the bid solicitation specifications within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2007).1

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a closely held Florida corporation licensed in the state as a general contractor. Mr. Milton “Mitt” Fulmer is the owner, sole director, and only stockholder. Respondent is a state agency. Respondent regularly solicits bids for construction services to build and maintain its facilities. On August 3, 2007, Respondent issued an invitation to bid identified in the record as Bid No. 03-07/08 (the ITB). The ITB solicited bids to construct a new headquarters for the Apalachicola National Estuarine Research Reserve, commonly referred to in the record as ANERR. Four companies responded to the ITB. Petitioner submitted the lowest bid. Intervenor submitted the next lowest bid. Intervenor is a Florida corporation licensed in the state as a general contractor. The ITB required bidders to submit a bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the amount of the bid, plus alternates. A bid bond is not a performance bond. A bid bond is customarily provided for gratis or a nominal charge, and variations in bid bonds do not result in a competitive advantage among bidders. A bid bond merely insures the successful bidder will enter into the contract and provide whatever payment and performance bonds (performance bond) the ITB requires. The Instructions to Bidders for the ITB required all bonds to be issued by a surety company that “shall have at least the following minimum rating in the latest issue of Best’s Key Rating Guide (Best's): 'A'” (the bond rating requirement). The bond rating requirement was a bid solicitation specification required for a bond to be acceptable to Respondent. Petitioner submitted a bid bond issued by a surety identified in the record as International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC). IFIC has Best's rating of "A-." Respondent proposes to reject Petitioner's bid for failure to satisfy the bond rating requirement and to award the bid to Intervenor as the second lowest bidder. The bond rating for the surety company that issued the bid bond for Intervenor is not in evidence. For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner has the burden of proof. The parties provided the trier of fact with a wealth of evidence during the final hearing. However, judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law confine the purpose of this proceeding to a review of the proposed disqualification of Petitioner's bid at the time Respondent exercised that agency discretion. This proceeding is not conducted to formulate final agency action that determines which bidder should receive the contract or whether all of the bids should be rejected. The review of proposed agency action is limited to a determination of whether the proposed action violates a statute, rule, or specification. If a violation occurred, the review must then determine whether the violation occurred because Respondent exercised agency discretion that was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or an abuse of discretion. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the proposed agency action violates a statute, rule, or specification. That finding ends the statutorily authorized inquiry. In the interest of completeness and judicial economy, however, the trier of fact also finds that the exercise of agency discretion that led to the proposed agency action is not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or an abuse of discretion. It is undisputed that the proposed agency action does not violate a statute or rule. Petitioner implicitly argues that the proposed agency action violates the bond rating requirement in the bid specifications because an "A-" rating is equivalent to an "A" rating. The Best's ratings of surety companies are not equivalent. Before discussing the differences, however, it is important to note that Respondent did not base its proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid on an independent evaluation of the data used to distinguish the two ratings. The failure to conduct an independent evaluation of the differences in Best's ratings criteria was neither clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, nor an abuse of discretion. The differences in Best's ratings criteria are complex and proprietary. Respondent lacks sufficient staff and expertise to evaluate the data underlying the Best's ratings or the quality of surety companies. Respondent relied on its own experience, custom and practice in the surety industry, and advice of counsel. Respondent also took into account the unusual size and complexity of the ANERR project, time constraints, and the added risk aversion to any delay in starting the project. The proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid is consistent with Respondent's past practice. Respondent has consistently required compliance with bond rating requirements for bid bonds in previous projects. In the course of bidding 500 to 600 projects over approximately an eight-year period, only one of the apparent low bidders offered Respondent a bid bond from an "A-" rated surety when an "A" was required by the bid specifications. Respondent disqualified that bid, which was for a project of approximately four million dollars; the only previous project that approaches the $5-$6 million cost of the ANERR project. All other low bidders complied with the specification as written. Respondent reasonably inferred that the surety company for the bid bond would be the same for the performance bond. Respondent's experience with industry practice in the 500 to 600 previous projects suggests the surety company that writes the bid bond will also write the performance bond. It is also customary for a surety company to provide the bid bond for gratis or for a nominal charge because the surety company collects its premium upon writing the subsequent payment and performance bonds. Respondent's experience also shows that contractors must qualify for their surety bonds, and not all contractors succeed in qualifying for surety bonds. Moreover, not all contractors can succeed in procuring surety bonds from an A-rated company. The temporal exigencies between the award of the bid and the provision of a performance bond also supported Respondent's inference that the surety company for the bid bond would be the surety company for the performance bond. The General Conditions of the contract required Petitioner to submit evidence of its ability to provide the requisite performance bond within two working days of being notified of a successful bid. Petitioner had ten days to actually furnish the bond. Establishing a surety is not perfunctory but entails a prequalification process. Petitioner had to supply its bonding agent with information including project history, credit references, reviewed financial statements, personal financials, and details on its assets. Any delay in the ANERR project, in contrast to its previous projects, for reasons of contractor default or otherwise, would expose Respondent to greater risk and greater expense. Respondent reasonably experienced a heightened risk aversion for the ANERR project than the risk aversion Respondent experienced during previous projects. The $5 or $6 million price tag for the ANERR project is about 400 percent greater than all but one previous project in Respondent's experience. Unusual aspects of the project, including its design elements and its environmentally sensitive location, could be irreparably harmed in the event of default or delay. The nature of the project's funding, part of which is a federal construction grant that expires on a date certain and part of which involved taxes paid by Floridians, contributes to the unique qualities of the project that support Respondent's greater risk aversion in connection with the ANERR project. At the time Respondent had to make a decision to reject or accept Petitioner's bid, Respondent believed in good faith a distinction existed between Best's "A" and "A-" ratings. The Best's ratings publication is a summary based on data, much of which is proprietary. It would be pointless for Respondent to "cross examine" a summary before rejecting Petitioner's bid if significant portions of the data underlying the summary are proprietary and unavailable to the cross-examiner. If Respondent were to have sufficient staff and expertise to independently evaluate the data underlying the Best's ratings, if some of the data were not proprietary, and if such an evaluation were the basis for the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid, the outcome would not alter the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid. The Best's ratings are based, in relevant part, on Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio, commonly referred to in the record as BCAR. The BCAR score estimates the ability of a surety company to pay claims. The minimum BCAR score for an "A" rating is 145, meaning the value of a surety company's assets exceed its estimated claims by a minimum of 45 percent. The minimum BCAR score for a surety with an "A-" rating is 130, meaning the value of its assets exceed its estimated claims by 35 percent. Although a 15-percent differential may appear small, Best's states the differentials by reference to a range of scores. The actual differential between individual sureties with an "A" rating and an "A-" rating may be as little as one percent or as great as 29 percent. An independent evaluation by Respondent would have revealed a margin of error as large as 29 percent in the standard used to evaluate a surety company's ability to pay claims. If the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid were based on an independent evaluation of the data underlying the Best's rating summaries, it would have been reasonable for Respondent to reject Petitioner's bid. It would have been reasonable for Respondent to reject a 29-percent margin of error for a surety company in a project that is 400 percent larger than the typical project and for which Respondent reasonably has a greater risk aversion due to the temporal limit on the availability of funds, the complexity of the project, and its environmental sensitivity. Much of the data underlying Best’s published ratings is proprietary information. However, the available evidence shows that Best's adjusts BCAR values based on qualitative factors such as: business plan, management quality, liquidity of assets, liabilities, and other operational aspects of the surety company. A qualitative analysis shows that ratings of "A" and "A-" are not the “functional equivalent” of each other. Petitioner submitted evidence that Best's "bands" surety companies with ratings of "A" and "A-" together in the Best's rating guide. However, the relevant specification in the ITB did not express the bond rating requirement in terms of a band or category. Rather, Respondent requested an "A" or better rating according to Best’s Key Rating Guide. An independent evaluation by Respondent would have provided a reasonable basis for an inference that the surety company for the bid bond and performance bond would be the same company. Petitioner has used IFIC for more than one year. During that time, IFIC has issued all of Petitioner’s bid bonds. IFIC issued Petitioner two payment and performance bonds. Petitioner was unable to identify any other surety company that had issued its payment and performance bonds within the time period during which Petitioner has used IFIC. Petitioner did not ask its insurance broker to obtain a bid bond from a company other than IFIC. When Petitioner sent a bid bond order form to its broker, Petitioner provided information to the broker about the project and the amount of the bid and Respondent’s surety requirements. The Bid Bond Order Form does not indicate the minimum bond rating requirement specified in the ITB. Mr. Fulmer had a conversation with his broker about Respondent’s bid security requirements, but it is unclear whether the relevant specifications were faxed to the broker or whether Mr. Fulmer saw the Bid Bond Order Form before it was provided to the broker. In response to the Bid Bond Order Form, the broker generated a bid bond and sent the bond to Petitioner for signature. At the time Petitioner received the bid bond, Petitioner did not consult Best’s Key Rating Guide to confirm that its surety met the minimum bond rating requirement in the ITB. It is unnecessary to determine whether the bond rating requirement was a material or immaterial requirement. If it were material, Respondent had no discretion to waive it. If it were non-material, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60D-5.002(9)(Rule), evidence discussed in previous Findings in this Order shows that the exercise of agency discretion underlying the refusal to waive the bond rating requirement was reasonable and was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Petitioner's bid protest is not, in substance, a challenge to the bid solicitation specification identified in this Order as the bond rating requirement. If the substance of the bid protest were deemed to be a challenge to a bid specification requirement, the challenge is untimely. On October 30, 2007, Respondent opened the bids, identified Petitioner as the apparent low bidder, consulted Best's for information on the "A-" rating, consulted with counsel, and disqualified Petitioner's bid. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest on November 8, 2007, and a Petition to Protest on November 13, 2007. A deemed challenge to the specification for the minimum bond rating requirement was untimely within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(b).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order dismissing the protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2008.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60D-5.002
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DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE vs ALL STATES MORTGAGE AND INVESTMENT CORP., 89-004985 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 12, 1989 Number: 89-004985 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1990

The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondents' mortgage brokerage licenses for the reasons set forth in the Order to Cease and Desist, Administrative Complaint and Notice of Rights filed by Petitioner on January 18, 1989 (the "Administrative Complaint".) The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondents violated the following statutory and rule provisions: Section 494.055(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by charging borrowers closing costs that were in excess of the actual amount incurred by the mortgagor; Section 494.08(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3D- 40.008(9), Florida Administrative Code, by charging excess brokerage fees; Section 494.055(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by engaging in deceit, misrepresentation, negligence or incompetence in mortgage financing transactions and for breach of the fiduciary duty of a broker as a result of the manner in which escrow accounts were handled; Section 494.055(1)(h), Florida Statutes, due to the misuse, misapplication or misappropriation of funds, mortgage documents or other property entrusted to Respondents as a result of the excess charges assessed to borrowers and the misuse of monies in the escrow accounts; Rule 3D- 40.006(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, for failing to maintain trust, servicing and escrow account records in accordance with good accounting practices; and Section 494.0393(2), Florida Statutes by failing to operate the company under the full charge, control and supervision of a principle who is a licensed mortgage broker.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent All States Mortgage and Investment Corporation ("All States Mortgage") was licensed by the Department as a mortgage brokerage company having been issued License Number HB-592582215. All States Mortgage had its principle place of business in Davie, Florida. All States Mortgage did not typically engage in traditional "mortgage broker functions." Instead, it generally worked with other mortgage brokers in providing funds for loans brought to All States Mortgage by other brokers. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent, Lynn F. Smith ("Smith") was a licensed mortgage broker having been issued License Number HA-265-72-0045. Smith was the principle mortgage broker for All States Mortgage. Smith has been the principle mortgage broker for All States Mortgage since its inception and has been registered with the Department as a licensed mortgage broker since before a license was issued to All States Mortgage. In addition to being the principle broker for All States Mortgage, Smith was an officer and director of the company and had responsibility for the direction, control, operations and management of the company. In May of 1988, Respondents were affiliated with a licensed consumer finance company known as All States Finance Company. Currently, both All States Mortgage and All States Finance are inactive and an application has been filed to transfer the license of All States Mortgage to a new company known as All States Financial Services. As a result of an audit and examination conducted by the Department in May, 1988, it was determined that one client of All States Mortgage, Donald Salvog, was charged a brokerage fee in excess of the maximum allowable fee under Chapter 494. After notification by the Department, Respondents admitted that they inadvertently charged an excess fee to Mr. Salvog and Respondents immediately proceeded to refund the excess of $82.63 to the customer. There is no evidence that Respondents charged any other customers with a brokerage fee in excess of the maximum allowed under Chapter 494. In a number of the individual mortgage transactions in which it was involved, Respondents charged a standard credit report fee of $25.00 to the borrowers. The following chart reflects the individual loan files where such a fee was charged and the total amount of the invoices in the respective loan file to support the charges. Borrower's Name Cost per Closing Stmt. Cost per Invoices Roland Sagraves $25.00 $3.25 John Murphy $25.00 $3.25 Donald Salvog $25.00 $2.95 Harry Walley $25.00 $2.57 Raymond Parker $25.00 $5.14 Shateen/Lawrence $25.00 $5.75 James Arnold $25.00 $3.94 Richard Pope $25.00 $5.04 James Smith $25.00 $6.50 9. In four of the nine customer files listed in Findings of Fact 8 above, a "standard factual" credit report was included in the file. The typical cost for a "standard factual" is $45.00. No invoices were included in those files to reflect this cost. In obtaining credit reports for an individual mortgage transaction, Respondents did not generally order a credit report from an existing service. Instead, All States Mortgage had an on-line computer terminal with a direct phone modem linked to the individual credit reporting agency's computer data base. An employee of All States Mortgage, usually Burton Horowitz, used this computer link-up to conduct a credit report on the borrower. "Standard Factual" reports were ordered from existing services as necessary to supplement the computer search. The standard $25.00 fee charged by All States Mortgage was based upon an estimate of the overhead and indirect costs associated with producing credit reports in this manner. The overhead and indirect costs involved in obtaining credit reports as described in Findings of Fact 10 include the cost of leasing the equipment, the labor involved in obtaining the computer report (it typically takes an operator 30 minutes to obtain the credit reports) and the cost of the materials involved in producing a copy of the report. The standard $25.00 fee charged by All States Mortgage was not based on a specific allocation of the indirect costs associated with producing a particular report, but, instead, was simply based upon an estimate of the costs involved. During the course of its operations, All States Mortgage would periodically receive funds that were to be held in escrow. These escrow funds were kept in an interest-bearing account that was used by All States Mortgage and All States Finance. (This account is hereinafter referred to as the "Commingled Account.") The escrow funds in this Commingled Account were mixed with other funds of All States Mortgage as well as money belonging to All States Finance. Respondents contend that the escrow funds were commingled with the other funds because the companies had only one interest bearing account and that account had limited check writing ability. Respondents transferred money between the interest bearing Commingled Account and their other operating accounts on a continuous basis. At the end of each month, Respondents attempted to perform a reconciliation as to the escrow balances in the Commingled Account. On several occasions during the period from July 1987 through May 1988, the balance in the Commingled Account was less than the total funds that Respondents were supposed to be holding in escrow. No evidence was introduced to indicate that Respondents' handling of the escrow funds and/or the Commingled Account ever resulted in a loss to any of their borrowers or customers. Thus, while the evidence does indicate that, on occasion, the balance of the Commingled Account was less than the funds that should have been in escrow, the difference on each occasion was ultimately corrected in the reconciliation process. Respondents failed to use good accounting principles in the handling of the escrow funds. The Department has not adopted any rules requiring a mortgage broker to handle escrow funds in a separate account. Prior to the initiation of this Administrative Complaint, Respondents were never informed that they were required to do so. The Department's examiners prepared a schedule indicating that Respondents had diverted some of the escrow funds to their own use. However, that schedule includes several loans that had already been sold to another company on the date listed. Thus, the schedule does not accurately reflect the funds that should have been in escrow on any particular day. Although Respondent Lynn Smith was only in the office approximately fifteen percent (15%) of the time while the Department's examiners were conducting their audit in May of 1988, insufficient evidence was introduced to establish the charge that Smith was not fully supervising or controlling the actions of the employees of All States Mortgage. The unrefuted testimony of Smith indicates that she often worked non-regular hours, that she reviewed all the documents for every transaction in which All States Mortgage was involved and she supervised the work of all of the employees of the company. Extenuating circumstances in May of 1988 caused her to be out of the office more than usual during regular business hours. However, this fact alone is insufficient to establish the charge that she was not fully supervising or controlling the actions of the company.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law it is, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order finding the Respondents guilty of violating Sections 494.055(1)(b), (d), (f), (h) and (k) and issue a reprimand to the Respondents and impose a fine of one thousand five dollars ($1,500.00). DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6828.222
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY SINGH, 08-005625PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 10, 2008 Number: 08-005625PL Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2025
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JAMES ANTHONY MCFADDEN, SR., 07-005096PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Port Richey, Florida Nov. 06, 2007 Number: 07-005096PL Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2025
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HARVEY AND BARBARA JACOBSEN vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 87-001237 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001237 Latest Update: Dec. 01, 1987

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover against the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund and, if so, the priority of payment to be applied to their claim. A secondary issue is whether claimants who gave notice prior to Petitioners are entitled to payment or whether they have waived or abandoned their claims.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations filed by the parties and the documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (the "fund") was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is charged to disburse the fund according to Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, (Supp.1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property of other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to s. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a),(b),(c),(d), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankruptcy; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Pertinent to this case, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) Provides: Any Person who meets all of the conditions Prescribed in s 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recovery from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. The first notice received by the Department alleging a claim against Barry Koltun or Oakland Mortgage Company was filed on August 13, 1984. This notice was filed on behalf of John and Mary Ahern. The Department utilized this notice in computing the two-year period addressed in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes. For purposes of recovery from the fund, the individual mortgage broker (Koltun) and the company qualified by the broker (Oakland) are treated as one. Petitioners filed an initial notice of their claim against the fund on October 16, 1985. This claim was asserted against Oakland Mortgage Company, Barry Koltun and Robert Tamarro. On January 23, 1987, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Grant or Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund Re Oakland Mortgage Company." This notice outlined the status of some thirteen claims which had given notice of their civil actions against the licensee within the two year period. Two claimants, Kusich and Szafran, had provided all documentation required by Section 494.043, Florida Statutes; consequently, they were approved for payment. The Petitioner's claim was denied because they had allegedly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes and had failed to do so prior to August 12, 1986 (the end of the two year period). The Petitioners timely filed a petition for formal Chapter 120 proceedings challenging the Department's denial of their claim for payment. Subsequent to January 23, 1987, Petitioners completed the conditions precedent for recovery and submitted all documentation required to satisfy the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. On July 6, 1987, the Department received notice and a claim from the Intervenors. This claim satisfied the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. Of the thirteen original claims filed, only two claimants (Kusich and Szafran) completed all conditions of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, on or before August 12, 1986.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order finding the claims of Rusich and Szafran eligible for payment, and that the claim of Petitioners be evaluated as part of the second class established in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes, DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Zeigler, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. Suite 1010, Monroe Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joseph Degance, Esquire 1995 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Jack F. Weins, Esquire Boca Bank Building Suite 200 855 South Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morey Udine, Esquire 3111 University Drive Suite 425 Coral Springs, Florida 32065-6930 Hon. Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JUANITA WILLIAMS, 07-005664PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida Dec. 12, 2007 Number: 07-005664PL Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2025
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs SERGIO ROQUE, JR., 92-004378 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 21, 1992 Number: 92-004378 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1993

The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with violations of several provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. All of the violations charged relate to allegations that the Respondent failed to return certain personal property received by the Respondent as collateral security on a surety bond.

Findings Of Fact Facts admitted by all parties The Respondent, Sergio Roque, Jr., is currently licensed in this state as a limited surety agent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Administrative Complaint in this matter, the Respondent was licensed in this state as a limited surety agency. On or about July 19, 1990, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent, did, as agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company, post a $100,000 general surety appearance bond, power number X00-0-00000331, to obtain the release of defendant Domingo Arrechea from the Dade County Jail. In conjunction with the posting of the aforementioned surety bond, Respondent did on or about July 19, 1990, receive $10,000, which represented the premium payment for said surety bond. Respondent did in conjunction with the posting of said bond receive from indemnitor Lorraine DeVico a diamond engagement ring, a Rolex watch, and the title to a 1979 Mercedes automobile (ID#11602412149348) as partial collateral security for the aforementioned surety bond. On or about April 3, 1991, Respondent did cause to be surrendered back into custody the defendant Domingo Arrechea, thus terminating all liability for said surety bond. Respondent has failed to return to indemnitor Lorraine DeVico the collateral security described above; namely, the diamond engagement ring, the Rolex watch, and the title to the 1979 Mercedes automobile. Additional facts proved at hearing In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from the defendant Arrechea, and from the defendant's wife, a conditional mortgage on a condominium. In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from "Mike Farina" a conditional mortgage on real estate owned by Mike Farina. Mike Farina was a friend of the defendant Arrechea. "Mike Farina" later turned out to be a fictitious name. Lorraine DeVico was a very close friend of the defendant Arrechea. The Rolex watch Ms. DeVico put up as part of the collateral for Arrechea's bond was a watch that had been given to her by her father. Shortly after Ms. DeVico put the watch up for collateral, her father began to inquire as to the whereabouts of the watch. Because she felt that her father would disapprove of what she had done, and because her father was the source of most of her wealth, Ms. DeVico told several lies to her father about the whereabouts of the watch. As a result of continuing inquiries by her father, Ms. DeVico wanted her watch back and no longer wanted to be responsible under the indemnity agreement she had signed. Towards the beginning of February 1991, Ms. DeVico began to call the Respondent to advise that she was frightened that the defendant Arrechea was considering jumping bond. The Respondent received numerous calls from Ms. DeVico requesting return of her collateral and requesting to be off the indemnity agreement. Consequently, the Respondent hired MV Investigations on February 16, 1991, to locate the defendant Arrechea. On March 27, 1991, Ms. DeVico advised the Respondent that the defendant Arrechea was not answering his digital pager and that his telephone had been disconnected. She advised the Respondent that she sent her employee to look for Arrechea but could not find him. She asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and get her off the bond, agreeing to pay all the expenses. On April 1, 1991, Ms. DeVico again asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and again agreed that she would pay the costs associated with the pick-up. On April 3, 1991, the investigators hired by the Respondent located and picked up defendant Arrechea and surrendered him back to the Dade County Jail. The Respondent returned the collateral deposited by Mr. Farina and by the defendant Arrechea and his wife. After having the defendant Arrechea picked up and surrendered, the Respondent called Ms. DeVico to give her the information and advise her of the pick-up costs. Ms. DeVico verbally refused to pay any pick-up costs. On April 14, 1991, the Respondent sent by certified mail to Ms. DeVico a notice under Section 648.442, Florida Statutes, notifying her that he would be selling her collateral in ten days against his pick-up expenses. The Respondent sold the Rolex watch and diamond ring pledged as collateral by Ms. DeVico after expiration of the ten days. The indemnity agreement signed by Ms. DeVico in conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea included the following language: 2. The indemnitor(s) will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the Company and save harmless the Company from and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities, costs, charges, legal fees, disbursements and expenses of every kind and nature, which the Company shall at any time sustain or incur, and as well from all orders, decrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by reason or in consequence of having executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the indemnitor(s) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good to the Company, its successors and assigns, all sums and amounts of money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, costs, expense, suit, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason of the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitor(s) and before the Company shall be required to pay thereunder. The liability for legal fees and disbursements includes all legal fees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assert or defend its right to collect or to charge for any legal fees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings. * * * 7. The Indemnitor(s) agree(s) that the Company may at any time take such steps as it may deem necessary to obtain its release from any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings, and it shall not be necessary for the Company to give the Indemnitor(s) notice of any fact or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any such bond or undertaking, notice of all such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and further indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such bond or undertaking in any manner it may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses which the Company may sustain or incur or be put to in obtaining such release or in further securing itself against loss, shall be borne and paid by the Indemnitor(s). In conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea, Ms. DeVico also signed a Bail Bond Information Sheet which advised her in bold print that: When all agreements have been fulfilled and bond is discharged, in writing or by the court, and without loss expense on the bond, your full collateral will be returned to you.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4378 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected for two reasons; first, the proposed finding is irrelevant because it is not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, second, the proposed finding was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: First sentence accepted. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 6 through 13: Accepted in substance with some details clarified. Paragraph 14: First sentence accepted. Remainder rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting procedural details or conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: Rejected as constituting statement of position or legal argument, rather than proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 17: First sentence accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting conclusions of law or legal argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20: Accepted COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Martin L. Roth, Esquire Haber & Roth 1370 Northwest 16th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 120.57120.68648.442648.45648.49648.52648.571775.082903.29
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs GEORGE G. WALSH, T/A G G JERRY WALSH REAL ESTATE, 90-004267 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Jul. 09, 1990 Number: 90-004267 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 1991

Findings Of Fact Respondent, George G. Walsh, is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0117943. Mr. Walsh is the owner of and the qualifying broker for G. G. Jerry Walsh Real Estate, located in Panama city, Florida. In May 1989, Respondent was the acting broker for Howard Bilford of Miami, Florida. Mr. Bilford owned a five acre parcel of property located in Bay County, Florida. Around May 15, 1989, Tama and Paul Russ, through Mr. Walsh's office, entered into a contract for the purchase of Mr. Bilford's property. The purchase price of the property was $15,000. The Russ' gave Mr. Walsh a $500 binder for deposit in his escrow account. The $500 was placed in Respondent's escrow account. Simultaneous with the signing of the sales contract and deposit receipt agreement, Mr. Walsh also prepared an estimated closing cost statement. On that closing cost statement, Mr. Walsh estimated that a survey of the property would cost the Russ' $450. During this meeting, Mr. Walsh explained to the Russ' that, especially if a financial institution was involved in the financing of the property, there would be certain costs which they would probably have to pay up front. Part of those costs included a survey of the property. At about the same time, the Russ' made application for a loan to a credit union located in Panama City, Florida. At the time of the loan application, the loan officers Mrs. Stokes, prepared a closing cost statement estimating the loan closing costs which the Russ' would encounter. On the credit union's closing cost statement, the cost of a survey was estimated to be $150 to $200. Since it was the credit union that required the survey, the Russ' believed that that estimate was the more accurate. The Russ' simply could not afford a $500 survey. As part of the loan application, an appraisal of the property was required. The appraisal was ordered by the credit union on May 16, 1989, and was completed on May 31, 1989. Unfortunately, the property had been vandalized by unknown persons, and the mobile home which was on the property had suffered severe and substantial damage. The appraisal indicated that the real estate was worth $10,500. With such a low appraisal, the credit union would not lend the amount necessary to purchase the property at the negotiated price. In an effort to renegotiate the property's price, Tama Russ inspected the property and prepared a list of the items which would have to be repaired to make the mobile home liveable. At the same time, the Russ' placed no trespassing signs and pulled logs across the entry to the property. The Russ' also placed padlocks on the doors to the mobile home and removed the accumulated garbage inside the mobile home in an effort to secure the property. They made no other repairs to the property. On June 1, 1990, the Russ' told the loan officer to hold the loan application. At some point during this process, both Mr. Walsh and the Russ' became aware that the survey would cost a considerable amount more than had been expected. By using a favor with Mr. Walsingham of County Wide Surveying, Mr. Walsh obtained a survey price of $500 for the Russ'. In an effort to help the Russ' close on the property, Mr. Walsh contacted Mr. Bilford to see if he would agree to pay the $500 survey cost. Mr. Bilford so agreed, contingent on the closure of the transaction, and sent Mr. Walsh a check made out to County Wide Surveying in the amount of $500. At that point, the Russ' believed that they were no longer obligated to pay for the survey since Mr. Walsh told them that Mr. Bilford was to pay for the survey. On June 3, 1989, Mr. Bilford agreed to a renegotiated price of $10,500.00 on the property. Additionally the Russ' agreed to sign a ten year promissory note for $2,000 bearing 11% interest per annum. Since there were changes in the terms of the contract, the Russ' entered into a net contract with Mr. Bilford on June 3, 1989. The new contract expired on June 30, 1989. Around June 5, 1989, the Russ' learned that their credit had been preliminarily approved. However, such preliminary approval only indicated that the Russ' had sufficient income to proceed with the more costly loan underwriting requirements of the credit union. Such preliminary approval did not indicate that the loan would be finally approved by the financial institution. The preliminary approval was communicated to Mr. Walsh by Tama Russ. Ms. Russ intended the communication to mean that they had been preliminarily approved by the financial institution. Mr. Walsh in an abundance caution contacted Mrs. Stokes, the loan officer. Mrs. Stokes advised him that the Russ' credit had been preliminarily approved. She did not tell him that the loan had been finally approved. Through a misunderstanding of what Mrs. Stokes communicated to him, Mr. Walsh ordered the survey from County Wide Realty on June 7, 1989. There was no reliable evidence presented that the credit union had authorized him to order the survey. The credit union at no time during this process ordered the survey. Mr. Walsh testified that Ms. Russ told him to order the survey. Ms. Russ denies that she gave Mr. Walsh permission to order the survey. At best this evidence goes only to demonstrate Respondent's intent with regards to the actions he undertook in this case and removes this case from a Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, violation. At some point Ms. Stokes left the employ of the credit union. On June 16, 1989, as part of her leaving, she unilaterally closed the Russ' loan application file and cancelled the loan application. Neither the Russ' nor Mr. Walsh were notified of the closure or the cancellation. The credit union's file fell into the void created between a change of employees. Because Mr. Walsh was unaware of Ms. Stokes' actions, Mr. Walsh, on July 13, 1989, after the expiration of the Russ' sales contract, contacted the credit union in order to obtain the loan closing package from the institution. The credit union had to hunt for the Russ' file. The credit union president called the Russ' about the loan and he was advised that they did not want the loan. The credit union's president then reviewed the loan file and noted that the Russ' had insufficient income to come up with the amount of the promissory note. He also thought the real estate constituted insufficient collateral for the loan. The loan application was officially denied on July 15, 1989. The Russ' were notified of the credit union's denial credit. The real estate transaction never closed. However, sometime after July 15, 1989, Mr. Walsh received the survey from County Wide. The survey indicates that the field work for the survey was completed on July 17, 1989, and that it was drawn on July 18, 1989. 1/ There was no reliable evidence which indicated any attempt had been made to cancel the survey. Sometime, after July 15, 1989, Tama Russ contacted Mr. Walsh in order to obtain the return of their $500 deposit. After many failed attempts to get the Russ' to voluntarily agree to pay for the cost of the survey, Mr. Walsh, around October, 1989, unilaterally paid the Russ' deposit to County Wide Realty. Mr. Walsh followed this course of action after speaking with some local FREC members who advised him that since FREC was swamped with deposit disputes that nothing would happen as long as he used his best judgment. The payment of the deposit to the surveyor, without prior authorization from the Ruse' violates Section 475.25(1)(d) and (k) Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(d) and 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes, issuing a letter of reprimand to Respondent with instructions to immediately replace the Russ' trust deposit and forthwith submit the matter to the commission for an escrow disbursement order and levying a $250 fine. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the portions of the Administrative Complaint alleging violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1991.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.60475.25
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