Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Russell Lynn Tull, became licensed in this state as a general lines agent on January 21, 1989. At the time of the events which gave rise to the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was not licensed as an insurance agent. At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was employed by Cecil Powell and Company of Jacksonville, Florida, in its surety bond department. Cecil Powell and Company was authorized to underwrite performance surety bonds on behalf of Transamerica Insurance Company. On or about September 20, 1988, Embry/Burney, Inc. (hereafter E/B) of Fernandina Beach, Florida, entered into a construction contract with C and W Systems of Jacksonville, (hereinafter C and W), pursuant to which C and W agreed to build certain improvements for E/B within a development located in Nassau County, Florida. The construction contract provided that E/B, as owner, would pay C and W, as contractor, the sum of $765,668 upon completion of the project, and further that C and W would provide a performance bond in the amount of the contract. On or about September 20, 1988 and pursuant to contract, E/B provided a check in the amount of $15,232 payable to C and W as full payment on the premium for the performance bond on the construction project. On or about October 20, 1988, E/B received a performance bond from C and W in the amount of $765,668 to ensure completion of the construction contract. The performance bond was received by W. H. Burney, Jr., in behalf of E/B. The performance bond listed William Whiddon, Paul Chauncey, and the Respondent as personal sureties on the performance bond. Whiddon and Chauncey were the principals in C and W Contracting. When W. H. Burney, Jr. received the personal surety bond he asked Chauncey and Whiddon where they had obtained it. Burney was told by Chauncey that it was obtained through Cecil Powell and Company. Chauncey also told Burney that the Respondent was a Vice-President with Cecil Powell and Company. (The preceding is a hearsay statement included in these findings to explain the state of mind of W. H. Burney, Jr. as stated below.) C and W gave the check provided by E/B for the performance bond to the Respondent who deposited the $15,232 to his personal account. C and W presented the personal surety bond to the local government to meet its requirements for participation. W. H. Burney, Jr. knew that the surety bond which he received was a personal surety bond from Whiddon, Chauncey, and the Respondent; however, Burney thought that their personal obligations had been re-insured by Transamerica based upon statements he received from Chauncey. W. H. Burney, Jr., never spoke to the Respondent in person. All of his conversations with the Respondent were by telephone. Burney testified that the Respondent told him that the re-insurance was through Transamerica Insurance Company; however, his testimony on this point was not deemed to be credible. (Not accepted as Finding of Fact.) 1/ Subsequently, W. H. Burney, Jr. received a letter on the stationery of Cecil Powell and Company, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, which reinforced Burney's misconception that Chauncey, Whiddon, and Tull had re-insured the project through Transamerica Premier Insurance Company. Neither Transamerica nor any other company wrote any insurance guarantying the performance of the contract by C and W. On or about April 13, 1988, C and W failed to complete the work as required by the contract, and the contract was declared in default. After the default on the contract, Joel E. Embry contacted the Respondent at Cecil Powell and Company and discussed with him the default, the need to activate the bond, and the need to hire a new contractor to complete the work. Embry suggested two contractors to the Respondent which the Respondent indicated were acceptable. Embry hired a contractor to complete the work, and provided a copy of the new contract to Cecil Powell and Company. When the new contractor submitted a bill for completion of a portion of the work, he submitted these bills to Cecil Powell. When the bills were not paid, Embry made arrangements to meet with the Respondent and with Fitzhugh Powell. Embry met with Fitzhugh Powell at Cecil Powell and Company to discuss the nonpayment of the bills. At that meeting, Embry presented Fitzhugh Powell a copy of the letter from Cecil Powell and Company referencing Transamerica's insurance of the project (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Fitzhugh Powell investigated internally and determined that neither Cecil Powell and Company nor Transamerica had provided any surety on the contract. Fitzhugh Powell's investigation revealed that the Respondent had received the monies paid for the surety bond, and had, with Chauncey and Whiddon, become a personal surety upon the contract. It was the opinion of Fitzhugh Powell, a licensee with over 30 years of experience in the insurance business and principal officer of a major insurance agency, that the Respondent had not insured the contract by agreeing to act as personal surety on the contract. However, Powell discharged the Respondent for acting as personal surety on the C and W contract. When Tull, Whiddon, and Chauncey were unable to cover the losses on the contract, E/B suffered significant financial losses which resulted in a loss of business reputation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department take no action against the Respondent's license. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1992.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondents are guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, is charged with the responsibility of administering the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in this case, Diko Investments, Inc. ("Diko") conducted business as a mortgage broker in Palm Beach County, Florida. At all times material to the allegations in this case, Dieter Kolberg ("Kolberg") was an officer, director, and acted as principal mortgage broker for Diko. Kolberg passed the mortgage broker's examination on May 28, 1985. Diko was issued a license as a mortgage broker with Kolberg as its principal broker on June 26, 1985 (license NO. HB-16568) Prior to May 28, 1985, Diko ran advertisements soliciting investors for mortgage opportunities. These ads included Kolberg's home telephone number. Prior to May 28, 1985, Kolberg/Diko entered into a business relationship with Michael D. Cirullo, a licensed mortgage broker, to "co-broke" mortgage transactions. Pursuant to their agreement, Cirullo represented the borrower/mortgagor while Kolberg obtained and represented the lender/mortgagee. Kolberg and Cirullo solicited and negotiated at least two loans prior to May 28, 1985. Kolberg acted in expectation of being paid as a mortgage broker. Cirullo remitted 50 percent of the commissions earned on these transactions to Diko. Diko stationery included the phrase "Licensed Mortgage Bankers." Neither Diko nor Kolberg has been licensed as a "mortgage banker." In August and September of 1985, investors, Marcel and Ida Barber, responded to a Diko advertisement which offered a 16 percent interest mortgage loan secured by prime residential real estate. The Barbers were interested in a safe, high interest yielding investment and requested more information from Diko. On September 23, 1985, Kolberg wrote to the Barbers to outline the following business policies of Diko: The first objective of the Diko lending program was "The Safety of the Investor's Capital." Any investment was to be secured by a mortgage on prime residential real estate clear of all liens with the exception of a first mortgage where a second mortgage would be given. Investors would be issued mortgagee title insurance to insure against loss due to defects in title to the mortgaged property. Investors would be issued fire and hazard insurance to cover any losses in the event of fire or storm. Subsequent to the receipt of the aforesaid letter, the Barbers decided to invest $25,000 in a mortgage through Diko/Kolberg. This initial transaction proceeded satisfactorily and the objectives addressed in paragraph 10 above were met. In late December, 1985, the Barbers advised Kolberg that they would be willing to invest an additional $50,000 in early January, 1986. The Barbers expected the transaction to be handled in the same manner as their prior investment through Diko. After reviewing two or three loan proposals, the Barbers chose to invest in a loan to Tony Medici/Automatic Concrete, Inc. The loan was to be secured by a second mortgage on property at 713-717 "L" Street, West Palm Beach, Florida. The "L" Street property consisted of a 24-unit apartment complex and an adjacent laundry facility. Kolberg accompanied the Barbers to view the property. During discussions with the Barbers regarding the proposed investment, Kolberg made the following false material representations: That the property had a high occupancy; That rental payments were guaranteed or subsidized by a government program; That the asset-to-debt ratio for the property was acceptable; and That a proposed expansion of the laundry facility would further enhance the security of the loan. Financial statements of the borrower (Medici/Automatic Concrete, Inc.) did not include all obligations against the "L" Street property. Diko/Kolberg did not give the Barbers an accurate or complete statement of the financial condition of the "L" Street investment. Kolberg knew the information on the statement was incomplete. Diko/Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers the high rate of crime in the area which compromised the security of the "L" Street investment. Kolberg knew of the crime problem in the area. Diko/Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against the "L" Street property. Kolberg knew of the foreclosure action as well as the delinquency on other obligations. Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers that he represented, as trustee, a Kolberg family company which would directly benefit from the Barber loan. The Barber loan would satisfy a mortgage held by Kolberg, as trustee, on the subject property, which mortgage was in default and in the process of foreclosure (the Ropet Anlagen foreclosure). Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers that another mortgage held on the "L" Street property (David Marsh loan) was also in default. A subordination agreement was required to be executed by Marsh in order for the Barber/Medici loan to close. Marsh agreed to subordinate his mortgage position for approximately $3,000 in arrear payments. Marsh was owed approximately $125,000 but chose to subordinate because by doing so he was able to recoup a small amount of what he considered a lost investment. Kolberg knew of Marsh's situation and did not advise the Barbers. The Barber loan to Medici/Automatic Concrete, Inc. closed on January 18, 1986. The Barbers delivered a check for $53,000 payable to the title company chosen by Diko. Neither Diko nor Kolberg gave the title company, Manor Title, closing instructions to protect the lenders' interests. Kolberg did, however, instruct the title company to list expenses relating to the Ropet Anlagen foreclosure against the Medici loan. Proceeds from the closing, in the amount of $50,000 were paid to Kolberg, as trustee for "Ropet Anlagen," and deposited to an account by that name. The name "Ropet Anlagen" translates to "Ropet Investments." Kolberg handles all transactions for this Kolberg family company in the United States. (Kolberg has two sons, Robin and Peter, from a former marriage. The name "Ropet" may derive from their names.) Kolberg's former wife, Patricia Kolberg, owns an interest in Ropet Anlagen. Regular monthly payments were made by Kolberg to Patricia Kolberg on a Ropet Anlagen account. Many of the checks drawn on the Ropet Anlagen account were for personal expenses of Kolberg or his business. The first mortgage on the "L" Street property was 45 days overdue on January 13, 1986. Kolberg knew of this delinquency but did not advise the Barbers. To the contrary, Diko gave the Barbers an estoppel notice from a prior closing showing the first mortgage to be current. The first mortgagee ultimately foreclosed its mortgage and the Barbers lost their entire investment. The Barbers did not receive a fire and hazard insurance policy to cover losses in the event of fire or storm for the "L" Street property. The Barbers did not receive a mortgagee title insurance policy until March, 1986, by which time the first mortgage was further in default. Additionally, the mortgagee policy disclosed a financing statement and a collateral assignment of rents recorded prior to the Barbers' mortgage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller, enter a Final Order revoking the mortgage broker license issued to Dieter Kolberg and Diko Investments, Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are accepted. Paragraph 6 is accepted; however, Kolberg's interest when financing with funds he controlled was only on a temporary, interim basis. The activities were conducted with Diko to receive a commission, therefore requiring a license. Paragraphs 7-15 are accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted to the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 12, 13. Paragraphs 17-18 are accepted to the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 14, 18, 22. Paragraphs 19-27 are accepted. Paragraph 28 is rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Paragraphs 29-42 are accepted. The detail of Petitioner's finding is unnecessary to the conclusions reached herein. Paragraphs 43-45 are accepted but unnecessary. Paragraph 46 is accepted. Paragraph 47 is rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Paragraphs 48-52 are accepted. Paragraph 53 is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 54 is accepted. Paragraph 55 is accepted to the extent found in findings of fact paragraphs 20, 21. Paragraphs 56-57 are accepted. Paragraph 58 is accepted to the extent addressed in finding of fact paragraph 21. Paragraphs 59-63 are accepted but unnecessary. Paragraphs 64-65 are accepted. Rulings on proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondents: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Those portions of paragraph 2 which set forth Respondent's dates of testing and licensure are accepted, the balance is rejected as an erroneous conclusions of law. Paragraph 3 is rejected as contrary to the weight ofevidence. Paragraph 4 is accepted but irrelevant to the issue. Paragraph 5 is rejected as the transaction was solicited with Kolberg's company, Diko, participating as a mortgage broker. Paragraph 6 is accepted but irrelevant to the issue. Paragraph 7 is rejected as contrary to the weight of theevidence and law. Paragraph 8 is accepted but does not mitigate, as a matter of law, Respondent's improper useage of the phrase. Paragraphs 9-11 are accepted; however the detail of thefindings is unnecessary and immaterial to the issues of thiscause. Paragraphs 12-14 are accepted to the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 12, 13 the balance is rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Paragraph 15 is rejected as unnecessary, relevant portions having previously been addressed. Paragraph 16 is accepted. Paragraph 17 is accepted but is unnecessary. Paragraph 18 is rejected to the extent it qualifies Barber as a "Sophisticated Investor." The record is clear Mr. Barber was experienced in the laws of France; however, he relied on Kolberg completely as to both transactions which took place in Palm Beach. Moreover, Mr. Barber's useage and understanding of the English language was suspect. He could hardly be considered a "sophisticated investor" in light of the total circumstances. Paragraph 19 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20 is accepted to the extent addressed in finding of fact paragraph 13, the balance is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Moreover, it is found that the only times of capacity occupancy (which were limited) were due to temporary, transient, undesirable tenants who may have directly affected the crime problem. Paragraph 21 is accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Paragraphs 23-24 are rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Paragraph 25 is accepted but is unnecessary. The crime problem was there prior to closing and was undisclosed to Barber. That it worsened after closing only assured the disclosure should have been made. Paragraphs 26-35 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Many of the facts asserted here are based on testimony given by Kolberg. Respondents presume that testimony to be truthful, accurate, and candid. I found the opposite to be true. Paragraph 36 is accepted but does not mitigate Respondents' responsibilities to have completed the items at closing. Paragraph 37 is accepted with same proviso as above paragraph 36, ruling #22). Paragraphs 38-39 are rejected. See ruling #21. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41 is accepted but see findings of fact paragraph 21 as to Kolberg's useage of Ropet funds for personal expenses. Paragraphs 42-43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Krieger, Esquire 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Keith A. Seldin, Esquire 1340 U.S. Highway #1, Suite 106 Jupiter, Florida 33469 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the proposed award of a contract to Ben Withers, Inc., is contrary to the Agency's governing statutes, rules, or policies or contrary to the bid solicitation specification concerning bid bond requirements, within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). It must also be determined whether those bidders who submitted a less than "A+" bid bond rating are compliant with the specification, or should be disqualified for non-responsiveness.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a closely held Florida corporation. It holds a State of Florida license as a General Contractor. Its licensure authorizes it to perform work of the nature and scope involved in this project. Mr. Milton Fulmer is the principal owner and president of the Petitioner. He testified in this proceeding on behalf of the Petitioner. The Respondent is an Agency of the State of Florida charged with managing and administering state-owned lands in the state park system, including the planning and arranging for the construction of facilities, installations and improvements on those lands. The Respondent engages in procurement through competitive bidding on a regular basis, in order to build and maintain its improvements on those lands. The Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) for certain road and additional work to be performed at the Bald Point State Park, in Franklin County. The ITB is designated as “Bid No. 49-08/09” on the Department of Management Services’ Vendor Bid System (VBS). It is undisputed that the ITB was properly advertised and noticed. The ITB project involves the construction of a new entrance roadway, the removal of an existing timber bridge and the installation of a new “free-span" bridge. The project also includes related drainage and utility work. Three addenda to the ITB were issued, which significantly increased the scope of the work, and the estimated budget for the project, from $1,000,000 to $3,000,000. The bids were timely opened on January 12, 2009. Withers was the low bidder. The Petitioner was the sixth low bidder. The bid tabulation, announcing the Respondent’s intent to award to Withers was posted on January 23, 2009. The Petitioner filed a timely protest, pursuant to Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes (2008). The protest notice was filed on January 28, 2009, and the Petition was timely filed on February 6, 2009. Eight vendors submitted timely bid responses. None of the bids were disqualified by the Respondent. The specifications in the ITB required bidders to submit a good faith deposit or bid guaranty, amounting to five percent of the bid. This could be provided in the form of a bid bond. All the bidders submitted bid bonds with their bids. The instructions to bidders in the specifications of the ITB require that, for bids exceeding $2,000,000, “the surety that will provide the Performance Bond and Labor and Materials Payment Bond shall have at least an 'A+' rating in A.M. Best Company’s online rating guide.” The ITB also provides that the rating of a reinsurance company is not applicable and does not meet this requirement. The Petitioner’s expert witness, Paul Ciambriello, acknowledged in his testimony that a Bid Bond, a Labor and Materials Payment Bond (payment bond) and a Performance Bond (payment bond) guarantee different aspects of a procurement or project. A bid bond guarantees that a vendor or contractor will execute the contract and undertake it for the bid price. A payment bond guarantees payment for all equipment, labor, materials and services, in the event the contractor fails to pay for them, as contractually required. The performance bond guarantees full performance of the contract by the surety company, if the contractor defaults on performance of the contract. The surety company would, in that event, be completing the job, or obtaining bids from other contractors for completion, while remaining liable for the difference between the contract price and the actual price of project completion. The Petitioner has taken the position that the specification requiring an "A+" rating for the payment and performance bonds should be applied by the Respondent to the bid bond requirement, as well, because there is no significant or practical difference between the issuance and underwriting efforts involved in the obtaining of the two types of bond for a given project. The Petitioner’s point is that, if an "A+" rated surety is required for the payment bond and the performance bond, then, as a practical matter, that is the same thing as requiring a bid bond of that same rating, because in the vast majority of cases, the surety which underwrites the bid bond and the one issuing the payment and performance bonds is the same surety, and that inclusive would allow for only one underwriting effort. Because of this purported custom or course of dealing in the industry, as also purportedly reflected in past Department practice regarding bond requirements, the Petitioner maintains that its bid was the only responsive bid, and all the other bidders should have been disqualified. The Petitioner provided its insurance and bond broker, Paul Ciambriello, of the Guignard Company with information about the project and its surety requirements. The broker then obtained a bid bond with International Fidelity Insurance Company and Everest Reinsurance Company, as co-sureties. International Fidelity Insurance Company has an “A-“ rating, according to the Best’s rating guide. Everest Reinsurance Company has a rating of “A+”, according to that rating guide. The other seven bidders submitted bids accompanied by bid bonds issued by surety companies with “A” ratings. The bid specification provided no rating requirement for the bid bond. The Petitioner has argued that it is the custom or practice in the surety industry for the surety company which underwrites a bid bond to also underwrite the payment and performance bonds. In addition to the reasons referenced above, this is generally done because the surety will offer a very low premium price for a bid bond and "make its money" on the premium price for the payment and performance bonds, which it would also issue in the normal course of dealing. There is also a very short time period between issuance of the bid bond and the requirement to underwrite the payment and performance bonds, which is another reason why it is the customary practice in the surety industry for the same company to write both types of bond. The Petitioner contends that the bid bond and the payment and performance bonds really have no practical distinction because it is so common that a surety company issuing a bid bond will be the same as the surety company (with its bond rating) which issues the payment and performance bonds. Although the Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Ciambriello, testified that a bid bond, in essence, guarantees the payment and performance bond, that guarantee is not actually true as a matter of law. Rather, the bid bond does not guarantee that the surety company issuing the bid bond will issue the payment and performance bonds, but rather that the principal, i.e. the contractor, shall provide the payment and performance bonds from a good and sufficient surety, according to the obligee's, the Respondent Agency's, requirements (bid specifications). Mr. Ciambriello acknowledged in his testimony, however, that, while it is rare, in his experience representing surety companies, for a contractor to change the surety company it uses between the issuance of the bid bond and the issuance of the payment and performance bonds, a contractor certainly can do so. It can also simply initially select a different surety company, from the bid bond surety, to issue the payment and performance bonds. There are several reasons a contractor might elect to change surety companies between the issuance of the bid bond and the issuance of the payment and performance bonds. The surety company might become insolvent, lose its ratings, or another surety company might offer a better rate on its premium, which might induce a contractor to change surety companies between the issuance of the two types of bonds. In order for a vendor or contractor to establish a surety, a pre-qualification process is necessary. In pre- qualification, contractors must supply information including project history, credit references, reviewed financial statements, personal financial information and details regarding assets. The surety companies assess risk based upon the characteristics of the project, including its size, nature, location, and complexity. A surety may elect not to underwrite the payment and performance bonds for a project for which it has issued the bid bond, which would also require a contractor to seek a different surety for issuance of the later payment and performance bonds. Moreover, contractors must qualify for surety bonds and not all contractors succeed in qualifying; further, not all contractors can succeed in qualifying and procuring surety bonds from an "A+" rated company. The Petitioner, as found above, submitted its bid response with co-sureties proposed to underwrite the bonds. The Respondent accepts the premise that use of the rating of a co- surety is compliant with the ITB solicitation specification. The use of two surety companies listed as co-sureties on a bond is very unusual, in the Respondent's experience. The Respondent had a good faith belief, at the time it posted the notice of intent to award the bid, that it could not disqualify any bidder for submitting a bid bond from a surety rated less than A+, based upon its ITB specification. Indeed it should not, because the bid bond specification contained no rating requirement for the bid bond. Moreover, the Respondent had a good faith belief that the contractors could change surety companies between the issuance of the bid bond and the payment and performance bonds. The Respondent's belief or interpretation as to this last point is correct. In another procurement involving the Respondent, on a project located at Jonathan Dickenson State Park, a bidder, H and J Contracting, Inc. (H and J), changed surety companies between the issuance of the bid bond and the issuance of the payment and performance bonds. That bidder was determined to have successfully provided compliant bonds, which met the specifications in that solicitation. The Respondent had advertised the ITB for the campground renovation project at Jonathan Dickenson State Park, using the same solicitation specification for surety bonds as was used for the Bald Point project at issue in this case. The low bidder in that case, H and J Contracting, Inc., submitted a bid for $2,033,636.32. It was therefore required to comply with the specification for bonds regarding bids which exceeded two million dollars. H and J, therefore submitted a bid bond from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a company which carried an "A" rating according to Best's On-line Ratings Guide. H and J subsequently submitted payment and performance bonds from U.S. Specialty Insurance Company, a company rated "A+" according to that same ratings guide. H and J was deemed to have complied with the specifications concerning bonding, because, by changing surety companies for the payment and performance bonds, it provided such bonds with the required "A+" rating, even though the bid bond submitted in that case only carried an "A" rating. The solicitation specification in that case did not require any particular rating for the bid bond. In the instant situation, the Respondent did not violate its specification by accepting bid bonds of all bidders because the solicitation specification stated that the rating should apply to the surety company issuing the payment and performance bonds, not the bid bond. The Petitioner contends that its interpretation of the solicitation specification, that the rating requirement should be applied to the bid bond also, is the only practical interpretation because of the pre-qualification process and the lack of adequate time between submittal of the bid bond and the requirement for submittal of the payment and performance bonds. Moreover, the Petitioner contends that any other interpretation would be contrary to competition because other bidders may have bid on the project had they known that the Respondent was not applying the rating requirement to the bid bond, as the Respondent had done in past procurements. This argument is somewhat specious, however, because, in fact, the Petitioner's interpretation would negate the fact that the bid bond specification does not require a rating. The Petitioner is the only one of the six top bidders who submitted an "A+" bond rating response concerning, according to its argument, the bid bond requirement. Thus, if its interpretation were followed as to the bid bond rating requirement, then such would be anti-competitive, in relation to the other bidders, because none of them supplied an ”A+" rating surety in response to the bid bond specification. In the face of the fact that the bid bond specification required no rating, to interpret the rating requirement of the payment and performance bonds as being applicable to the bid bond stage of the procurement, would effectively eliminate the other bidders, which were lower in price than the Petitioner, from the competition. The Petitioner also argues that other unknown vendors might have bid on the project had they known that the Respondent was not applying a rating requirement to the bid bond, as the Respondent had done in the past. In fact, however, all bidders or vendors with access to the ITB solicitation knew, or should have known, of the specification of this particular ITB, which differed in its terms from some past solicitations of the Respondent by not requiring a rating for the bid bond. Moreover, there is no evidence that, in the pre- submittal stage of the process, potential bidders could not have asked for clarification of the specification from the Agency had they chosen to do so. There is no showing by persuasive evidence that there is an anti-competitive effect on potential bidders caused by the Respondent's specification concerning the bid bond. In fact, logic would dictate that by removing any rating requirement for the bid bond, the potential universe of bidders might be enlarged and therefore this might have a positive competitive effect. Additionally, the Petitioner's argument that the specification should be interpreted to apply a rating requirement to the bid bond, when the actual specification, in its language, does not contain such a requirement, is rejected also for the additional reason that such an interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the bid specification language. This amounts to, at least, an implicit collateral challenge to the specification, which is untimely and impermissible.1/ There are 19 vendors listed on the "plan holders list" for the Bald Point project. That relatively large number of potential bidders is because the project began as a paving contract, and was later amended to include vertical construction. This changed the licensure requirement as to potential vendors from a situation of no license being required, to a situation where a general contractor or building contractor license would be required. Some of the bidders appearing on the plan holders list are just paving contractors, and therefore, under the amended project, they would no longer qualify to bid on the entire job, although they might be sub-contractors. Not all bidders who bid on the Bald Point Project are listed on the plan holders list. The Petitioner's argument that the Respondent may have had more of the 19 potential bidders actually submit bids, if the other vendors had known that the Respondent would accept bid bonds from a surety rated less than "A+" is not persuasive. It is impossible to determine how many contactors actually reviewed the Bald Point Project plans and for what reasons they decided not to submit a bid. Seven of the eight bidders submitted bid bonds from surety's rated "A" rather than "A+." It certainly seems obvious that those bidders did not interpret the bid bond specification as requiring a bid bond from an "A+" rated surety company or better. Moreover, all potential vendors, whether they bid or not, who reviewed the specifications should have known when they read the specification that there was no rating requirement attendant to the bid bond (as evidenced by the fact that seven of the eight bidders competing in this situation obviously seemed to be so aware and did not submit an "A+" surety for the bid bond). Thus, in this context, the Respondent's interpretation of this specification is not anti- competitive. The Petitioner also contends that the Respondent acted contrary to its policy by accepting bid bonds from all eight bidders and not disqualifying all but the Petitioner's bid, since it alone submitted one carrying an "A+" rating. The Petitioner refers to past practices of the Respondent as being its "policy." In this particular, the Petitioner and Respondent were involved in a prior bid procurement and protest involving the Apalachicola National Estuarine Research Reserve Headquarters project (ANERR). The Petitioner in that situation was the lowest bidder, but had its bid disqualified. The Petitioner uses the prior project specification as evidence of what the Respondent's policy is with regard to situations such as that in the instant case. The solicitation specification regarding bonds for the ANERR project, however, was different from the solicitation specification for the Bald Point Project. The solicitation specification for the ANERR project required that all bonds have at least a minimum rating of "A" in the latest issue of the Best Rating Guide. The Petitioner submitted a bid bond from a surety company rated "A-" with its bid for the ANERR Project. The bid was therefore deemed non-responsive by the Respondent Agency and the bid was disqualified for failing to meet the solicitation specification. The Petitioner's president testified that he read the specification for the Bald Point Project and he conceded that it was different from the specification for the ANERR Project. The Petitioner's argument that, apparently, the Respondent's policy or practice in the ANERR Project situation should be applied to interpretation of the bonding requirement for the Bald Point Project is not persuasive. Clearly the specification concerning the bid bond and bond rating was different between the two projects. The attempted application of the purported past policy or practice of the Department to interpret the Bald Point specification concerning the bid bond, to require an "A+" rating for the bid bond, when the specification term clearly does not provide it (merely because that was the policy or practice in the ANERR project case, involving a different specification) amounts to an untimely collateral attempt to alter the specification of the Bald Point Project. Such would amount to a material deviation from the specifications because it would disqualify seven of the eight bidders (and would likely have resulted in fewer bids had potential bidders been on notice of that policy or interpretation). In like manner, the Petitioner relies on the case of Gum Creek Farms, Inc., v. Department of Environmental Protection, Case No. OGC 07-2623 (FO: June 20, 2008) as evidence of the Respondent's policy with regard to bond rating requirements. In that case, as in the ANERR situation, the solicitation specification was different from the Bald Point specification at issue. Because the two situations referenced above are different from the Bald Point Project as to the specification requirements, they cannot be said to be evidence of a policy or regular practice by the Agency which would be applicable to this case, since the specific requirements of the bid specifications in this solicitation are what drive the necessary bid responses. Over a period of approximately 10 years the Department has engaged in bid procurement with regard to approximately 600 projects. The Respondent has, during that time, consistently required compliance with its surety ratings specifications in its bid solicitations. This is because an adequate surety bonding for payment and performance is an important means for the Respondent to manage its risk as the owner of a project. Thus, whatever the specifications concerning bond ratings are for a particular project, the Respondent has consistently required compliance with them. In the instant situation, the Respondent re-wrote its rating specification for the Bald Point Project so that it was different from the other two projects referenced and discussed above. It has re-written its specifications on other occasions as well, which is within its prerogatives. Timeliness of Payment and Performance Bond Notification The general conditions of the contract require that the contractor submit evidence of its ability to provide acceptable payment and performance bonds within two working days of being notified of a successful bid. The contractor has 10 days to actually furnish the bonds. The testimony of Michael Renard, of the Department, shows, however, that as a practical matter, it is not a material deviation if a contractor does not supply evidence of ability to provide compliant bonds precisely within that time period. The actual payment and performance bonds are usually submitted to the Respondent at the time the contract is actually signed or shortly thereafter. Sometimes it may be a longer period of time before the contractor submits payment and performance bonds. This might occur because authorization to sign a contract is suspended due to budgetary concerns or due to lack of funding availability. The Respondent does not require and contractors do not generally wish to expend their capital for payment of a surety premium until a contract is actually signed and in effect, and the Agency's funding is approved and released, as persuasively shown by the testimony of Michael Renard and Ben Withers. The winning bidder herein, Withers, did not provide evidence of ability to provide compliant payment and performance bonds within two days of being notified of being the lowest bidder. This was because the protest was filed during the intervening time and Withers and the Respondent were of the good faith belief that all responsive efforts to the solicitation were tolled upon notice being provided that a protest had been filed. In fact, because a protest was filed, triggering a formal proceeding to determine which entity might ultimately be the contractor, it could not be determined that there was, as yet, a winning bidder or contract, as a necessary pre-requisite to issuance of payment and performance bonds. In fact, the Respondent has received evidence of Withers' ability to provide compliant payment and performance bonds. This evidence was provided after Withers was informed that a co-surety rating would be acceptable to the Respondent and in compliance with the bid specification. This treatment, of allowing a co-surety rating as being acceptable was also accorded the Petitioner, who submitted a co-surety proposal. There is no persuasive evidence that the fact that Withers may have supplied evidence of a compliant payment and performance bond beyond the above-referenced time limits had anything to do with selection of Withers over the Petitioner or other bidders and thus provided a competitive advantage for Withers. The Petitioner filed its written evidence of ability to provide the payment and performance bonds on February 20, 2009, almost a month after the posting of the Intent to Award. It did not even become incumbent upon Withers to submit such evidence regarding payment and performance bond compliance until after it was notified that it was a successful bidder. As pertinent to the issues in this proceeding, Withers was selected, in essence, because its bid submittal was compliant with the bid bonding requirement, other specifications, and was the lowest bid. The fact that Withers went beyond the time limits for furnishing evidence of compliant payment and performance bonds, occurred after the initial choice by the Agency as to the awarded bidder, here under review. Thus, Withers' excession of the time limit regarding the payment and performance bond evidence submittal, etc., is not a material deviation from specifications, as to the manner in which the award decision was made. It is of no consequence because, with the initiation of a formal proceeding, there was not even a final award and contract as yet. Finally, although argument was made concerning whether the Respondent had waived the requirement of payment and performance bonds from an "A+" down to an "A" rating, the persuasive evidence shows that the Respondent never did waive the rating requirement in order to post the award to Withers. The Respondent has established that there was no need for it to waive the "A+" rating requirement, and it had no intent to do so.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection dismissing the protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Respondent's licenses as a real estate broker should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of misconduct in the Administrative Complaint, the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency charged with the responsibility for the licensing and regulation of the real estate profession in this state. The Respondent, Richard L. Bohner, was licensed as a real estate broker in Florida operating, with his wife, Kirsten, Bohner Real Estate, located at 205 E. Osceola Street in Stuart, Florida. On October 1, 1989, Mr. Bohner as owner/lessor, entered into separate rental agreements with Trudy Dohm and Thelma Reynolds, with Bohner Real Estate identified as agent, for the lease for 12 months each of apartments number 105 and 204, respectively, at 1674 S.E. St. Lucie Blvd. in Stuart, Florida, for a monthly rental of $350.00 each. Each lease provided for the placement of a security deposit and last month's rental in advance; those sums, according to the terms of the lease, to be held by the agent, Bohner Real Estate, in a non- interest bearing escrow account at the Florida National Bank in Stuart. In actuality, the sums above-mentioned were, in each case, deposited into an account at the First National Bank and Trust Company in Stuart. This account, number 8000030400, was held in the name of Richard L. Bohner or Kirsten L. Bohner, Trust account. This account was an interest bearing account and, over the time in question, also received several large deposits of funds by or on behalf of the Respondent, Richard L. Bohner which were his personal funds and not funds received as a part of or in conjunction with his activities as a real estate broker or those of Bohner Real Estate. For the most part, the funds placed in that account were Bohner's personal funds and security deposits and last month's rent on apartments in the building owned as a personal investment by Mr. and Mrs. Bohner. On February 20, 1990, Sharon Thayer, an investigator for the Department, in the normal course of business, went to the Respondent's real estate office, unannounced as was her prerogative, and asked to speak with Mr. Bohner. He was not present at the time and she asked Mrs. Bohner, who was present, to produce the Respondent's books for the brokerage's escrow account, which she did. In the course of their conversation, Mrs. Bohner identified herself as being in partnership with the Respondent and admitted to assisting him in the maintenance of the escrow account. When Ms. Thayer asked for the backup documents for the escrow account, these were produced. Ms. Bohner also provided Ms. Thayer with copies of the bank account she maintained. On inquiry, Mrs. Bohner said the deposits thereon were, in the main, representative of rental and security deposits from tenants on leases which Bohner Real Estate managed. Ms. Thayer asked about the large deposits made on May 3, June 7, and July 7, 1989. These were for $104,542.50, $50,000.00, and $4.600.00 respectively. In response, Mrs. Bohner indicated these were personal monies which came from personal sources and funds which had been put in that account because that's where they would get the most interest. They were not escrow funds related to the real estate brokerage. Ms. Thayer made an appointment to return to the brokerage office on February 23, 1990 to speak with Respondent. When she did so, Mr. Bohner accounted for the trust liability of $6,885.00 which existed on that date. This sum was verified with the bank by phone. The trust account had an overage of somewhat more than $881.00 which Respondent explained as accrued interest not removed from the account. Mr. Bohner admitted at hearing that he earned interest on the security and rental deposits he held in that account and used that earned interest to offset the low rentals he charged his tenants. He asserted, and there was no evidence to rebut this assertion, that the only security and rental deposits placed in that account were from tenants in the apartment building he and his wife owned personally. Neither he nor Bohner Real Estate managed or served as rental agent for any rental properties owned by others. It is so found. Ms. Thayer pointed out, and it is accepted as fact, that a broker is required to reconcile his trust account on a monthly basis and file a monthly reconciliation form which accounts for overages and shortages. Respondent admits he had not completed or filed these reconciliations because neither he nor Bohner Real Estate has a trust or escrow account into which client funds are deposited. He manages no property from which rents would be collected other than his own, and when he takes a deposit on a sale or transfer, a separate trust account is opened for that particular transaction with any interest earned going to the buyer. Petitioner showed, through the testimony of Ms. Casale, the bank records custodian, that the largest deposit in issue, that one in excess of $100,000.00, was the result of the maturity of a certificate of deposit that was transferred to the account in question. Respondent did not endorse the check for deposit or sign any deposit document. He submitted a letter from the bank chairman to support his thesis that he was not a party to the transfer, but the letter, admitted over objection by counsel for Petitioner, indicates the deposit was made by the bank's investment counselor who handled the transaction consistent with telephone instructions given her by the Respondent. This is a collateral matter, however. When Ms. Thayer completed her audit, she prepared and filed a report on which she indicated, inter alia, that the office met inspection standards and that the property management escrow/trust account was satisfactory. She noted an overage of $889.31 in the account and that it was an interest bearing account although the leases state it would be non-interest bearing. No deadline was given for the correction of this item. Mrs. Bohner admits that when she gave the apartment security escrow account to Ms. Thayer at her request and described it as a trust account, she was not thinking. In fact, and it is so found, neither Respondent nor Bohner Real Estate have a trust account for the business and have not had one for several years. She reiterates Mr. Bohner's assertion that the only money usually kept in the account referenced by Ms. Casale and referred to by Ms. Thayer, is money received as security deposits and last month's rental from tenants in their own building. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case dismissing all allegations of misconduct by Respondents as outlined in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 1st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein,. Balance is not Finding of Fact but lore legal conclusion. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENTS: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 401 NW Second Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Richard L. Bohner Bohner Teal Estate 205 East Osceola Street Stuart, Florida 34994 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 - 1900
The Issue The issue is whether the proposed disqualification of Petitioner’s bid is contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules, or policies or contrary to the bid solicitation specifications within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a closely held Florida corporation licensed in the state as a general contractor. Mr. Milton “Mitt” Fulmer is the owner, sole director, and only stockholder. Respondent is a state agency. Respondent regularly solicits bids for construction services to build and maintain its facilities. On August 3, 2007, Respondent issued an invitation to bid identified in the record as Bid No. 03-07/08 (the ITB). The ITB solicited bids to construct a new headquarters for the Apalachicola National Estuarine Research Reserve, commonly referred to in the record as ANERR. Four companies responded to the ITB. Petitioner submitted the lowest bid. Intervenor submitted the next lowest bid. Intervenor is a Florida corporation licensed in the state as a general contractor. The ITB required bidders to submit a bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the amount of the bid, plus alternates. A bid bond is not a performance bond. A bid bond is customarily provided for gratis or a nominal charge, and variations in bid bonds do not result in a competitive advantage among bidders. A bid bond merely insures the successful bidder will enter into the contract and provide whatever payment and performance bonds (performance bond) the ITB requires. The Instructions to Bidders for the ITB required all bonds to be issued by a surety company that “shall have at least the following minimum rating in the latest issue of Best’s Key Rating Guide (Best's): 'A'” (the bond rating requirement). The bond rating requirement was a bid solicitation specification required for a bond to be acceptable to Respondent. Petitioner submitted a bid bond issued by a surety identified in the record as International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC). IFIC has Best's rating of "A-." Respondent proposes to reject Petitioner's bid for failure to satisfy the bond rating requirement and to award the bid to Intervenor as the second lowest bidder. The bond rating for the surety company that issued the bid bond for Intervenor is not in evidence. For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner has the burden of proof. The parties provided the trier of fact with a wealth of evidence during the final hearing. However, judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law confine the purpose of this proceeding to a review of the proposed disqualification of Petitioner's bid at the time Respondent exercised that agency discretion. This proceeding is not conducted to formulate final agency action that determines which bidder should receive the contract or whether all of the bids should be rejected. The review of proposed agency action is limited to a determination of whether the proposed action violates a statute, rule, or specification. If a violation occurred, the review must then determine whether the violation occurred because Respondent exercised agency discretion that was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or an abuse of discretion. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the proposed agency action violates a statute, rule, or specification. That finding ends the statutorily authorized inquiry. In the interest of completeness and judicial economy, however, the trier of fact also finds that the exercise of agency discretion that led to the proposed agency action is not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or an abuse of discretion. It is undisputed that the proposed agency action does not violate a statute or rule. Petitioner implicitly argues that the proposed agency action violates the bond rating requirement in the bid specifications because an "A-" rating is equivalent to an "A" rating. The Best's ratings of surety companies are not equivalent. Before discussing the differences, however, it is important to note that Respondent did not base its proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid on an independent evaluation of the data used to distinguish the two ratings. The failure to conduct an independent evaluation of the differences in Best's ratings criteria was neither clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, nor an abuse of discretion. The differences in Best's ratings criteria are complex and proprietary. Respondent lacks sufficient staff and expertise to evaluate the data underlying the Best's ratings or the quality of surety companies. Respondent relied on its own experience, custom and practice in the surety industry, and advice of counsel. Respondent also took into account the unusual size and complexity of the ANERR project, time constraints, and the added risk aversion to any delay in starting the project. The proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid is consistent with Respondent's past practice. Respondent has consistently required compliance with bond rating requirements for bid bonds in previous projects. In the course of bidding 500 to 600 projects over approximately an eight-year period, only one of the apparent low bidders offered Respondent a bid bond from an "A-" rated surety when an "A" was required by the bid specifications. Respondent disqualified that bid, which was for a project of approximately four million dollars; the only previous project that approaches the $5-$6 million cost of the ANERR project. All other low bidders complied with the specification as written. Respondent reasonably inferred that the surety company for the bid bond would be the same for the performance bond. Respondent's experience with industry practice in the 500 to 600 previous projects suggests the surety company that writes the bid bond will also write the performance bond. It is also customary for a surety company to provide the bid bond for gratis or for a nominal charge because the surety company collects its premium upon writing the subsequent payment and performance bonds. Respondent's experience also shows that contractors must qualify for their surety bonds, and not all contractors succeed in qualifying for surety bonds. Moreover, not all contractors can succeed in procuring surety bonds from an A-rated company. The temporal exigencies between the award of the bid and the provision of a performance bond also supported Respondent's inference that the surety company for the bid bond would be the surety company for the performance bond. The General Conditions of the contract required Petitioner to submit evidence of its ability to provide the requisite performance bond within two working days of being notified of a successful bid. Petitioner had ten days to actually furnish the bond. Establishing a surety is not perfunctory but entails a prequalification process. Petitioner had to supply its bonding agent with information including project history, credit references, reviewed financial statements, personal financials, and details on its assets. Any delay in the ANERR project, in contrast to its previous projects, for reasons of contractor default or otherwise, would expose Respondent to greater risk and greater expense. Respondent reasonably experienced a heightened risk aversion for the ANERR project than the risk aversion Respondent experienced during previous projects. The $5 or $6 million price tag for the ANERR project is about 400 percent greater than all but one previous project in Respondent's experience. Unusual aspects of the project, including its design elements and its environmentally sensitive location, could be irreparably harmed in the event of default or delay. The nature of the project's funding, part of which is a federal construction grant that expires on a date certain and part of which involved taxes paid by Floridians, contributes to the unique qualities of the project that support Respondent's greater risk aversion in connection with the ANERR project. At the time Respondent had to make a decision to reject or accept Petitioner's bid, Respondent believed in good faith a distinction existed between Best's "A" and "A-" ratings. The Best's ratings publication is a summary based on data, much of which is proprietary. It would be pointless for Respondent to "cross examine" a summary before rejecting Petitioner's bid if significant portions of the data underlying the summary are proprietary and unavailable to the cross-examiner. If Respondent were to have sufficient staff and expertise to independently evaluate the data underlying the Best's ratings, if some of the data were not proprietary, and if such an evaluation were the basis for the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid, the outcome would not alter the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid. The Best's ratings are based, in relevant part, on Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio, commonly referred to in the record as BCAR. The BCAR score estimates the ability of a surety company to pay claims. The minimum BCAR score for an "A" rating is 145, meaning the value of a surety company's assets exceed its estimated claims by a minimum of 45 percent. The minimum BCAR score for a surety with an "A-" rating is 130, meaning the value of its assets exceed its estimated claims by 35 percent. Although a 15-percent differential may appear small, Best's states the differentials by reference to a range of scores. The actual differential between individual sureties with an "A" rating and an "A-" rating may be as little as one percent or as great as 29 percent. An independent evaluation by Respondent would have revealed a margin of error as large as 29 percent in the standard used to evaluate a surety company's ability to pay claims. If the proposed rejection of Petitioner's bid were based on an independent evaluation of the data underlying the Best's rating summaries, it would have been reasonable for Respondent to reject Petitioner's bid. It would have been reasonable for Respondent to reject a 29-percent margin of error for a surety company in a project that is 400 percent larger than the typical project and for which Respondent reasonably has a greater risk aversion due to the temporal limit on the availability of funds, the complexity of the project, and its environmental sensitivity. Much of the data underlying Best’s published ratings is proprietary information. However, the available evidence shows that Best's adjusts BCAR values based on qualitative factors such as: business plan, management quality, liquidity of assets, liabilities, and other operational aspects of the surety company. A qualitative analysis shows that ratings of "A" and "A-" are not the “functional equivalent” of each other. Petitioner submitted evidence that Best's "bands" surety companies with ratings of "A" and "A-" together in the Best's rating guide. However, the relevant specification in the ITB did not express the bond rating requirement in terms of a band or category. Rather, Respondent requested an "A" or better rating according to Best’s Key Rating Guide. An independent evaluation by Respondent would have provided a reasonable basis for an inference that the surety company for the bid bond and performance bond would be the same company. Petitioner has used IFIC for more than one year. During that time, IFIC has issued all of Petitioner’s bid bonds. IFIC issued Petitioner two payment and performance bonds. Petitioner was unable to identify any other surety company that had issued its payment and performance bonds within the time period during which Petitioner has used IFIC. Petitioner did not ask its insurance broker to obtain a bid bond from a company other than IFIC. When Petitioner sent a bid bond order form to its broker, Petitioner provided information to the broker about the project and the amount of the bid and Respondent’s surety requirements. The Bid Bond Order Form does not indicate the minimum bond rating requirement specified in the ITB. Mr. Fulmer had a conversation with his broker about Respondent’s bid security requirements, but it is unclear whether the relevant specifications were faxed to the broker or whether Mr. Fulmer saw the Bid Bond Order Form before it was provided to the broker. In response to the Bid Bond Order Form, the broker generated a bid bond and sent the bond to Petitioner for signature. At the time Petitioner received the bid bond, Petitioner did not consult Best’s Key Rating Guide to confirm that its surety met the minimum bond rating requirement in the ITB. It is unnecessary to determine whether the bond rating requirement was a material or immaterial requirement. If it were material, Respondent had no discretion to waive it. If it were non-material, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60D-5.002(9)(Rule), evidence discussed in previous Findings in this Order shows that the exercise of agency discretion underlying the refusal to waive the bond rating requirement was reasonable and was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Petitioner's bid protest is not, in substance, a challenge to the bid solicitation specification identified in this Order as the bond rating requirement. If the substance of the bid protest were deemed to be a challenge to a bid specification requirement, the challenge is untimely. On October 30, 2007, Respondent opened the bids, identified Petitioner as the apparent low bidder, consulted Best's for information on the "A-" rating, consulted with counsel, and disqualified Petitioner's bid. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest on November 8, 2007, and a Petition to Protest on November 13, 2007. A deemed challenge to the specification for the minimum bond rating requirement was untimely within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(3)(b).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order dismissing the protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondents' mortgage brokerage licenses for the reasons set forth in the Order to Cease and Desist, Administrative Complaint and Notice of Rights filed by Petitioner on January 18, 1989 (the "Administrative Complaint".) The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondents violated the following statutory and rule provisions: Section 494.055(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by charging borrowers closing costs that were in excess of the actual amount incurred by the mortgagor; Section 494.08(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3D- 40.008(9), Florida Administrative Code, by charging excess brokerage fees; Section 494.055(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by engaging in deceit, misrepresentation, negligence or incompetence in mortgage financing transactions and for breach of the fiduciary duty of a broker as a result of the manner in which escrow accounts were handled; Section 494.055(1)(h), Florida Statutes, due to the misuse, misapplication or misappropriation of funds, mortgage documents or other property entrusted to Respondents as a result of the excess charges assessed to borrowers and the misuse of monies in the escrow accounts; Rule 3D- 40.006(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, for failing to maintain trust, servicing and escrow account records in accordance with good accounting practices; and Section 494.0393(2), Florida Statutes by failing to operate the company under the full charge, control and supervision of a principle who is a licensed mortgage broker.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent All States Mortgage and Investment Corporation ("All States Mortgage") was licensed by the Department as a mortgage brokerage company having been issued License Number HB-592582215. All States Mortgage had its principle place of business in Davie, Florida. All States Mortgage did not typically engage in traditional "mortgage broker functions." Instead, it generally worked with other mortgage brokers in providing funds for loans brought to All States Mortgage by other brokers. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent, Lynn F. Smith ("Smith") was a licensed mortgage broker having been issued License Number HA-265-72-0045. Smith was the principle mortgage broker for All States Mortgage. Smith has been the principle mortgage broker for All States Mortgage since its inception and has been registered with the Department as a licensed mortgage broker since before a license was issued to All States Mortgage. In addition to being the principle broker for All States Mortgage, Smith was an officer and director of the company and had responsibility for the direction, control, operations and management of the company. In May of 1988, Respondents were affiliated with a licensed consumer finance company known as All States Finance Company. Currently, both All States Mortgage and All States Finance are inactive and an application has been filed to transfer the license of All States Mortgage to a new company known as All States Financial Services. As a result of an audit and examination conducted by the Department in May, 1988, it was determined that one client of All States Mortgage, Donald Salvog, was charged a brokerage fee in excess of the maximum allowable fee under Chapter 494. After notification by the Department, Respondents admitted that they inadvertently charged an excess fee to Mr. Salvog and Respondents immediately proceeded to refund the excess of $82.63 to the customer. There is no evidence that Respondents charged any other customers with a brokerage fee in excess of the maximum allowed under Chapter 494. In a number of the individual mortgage transactions in which it was involved, Respondents charged a standard credit report fee of $25.00 to the borrowers. The following chart reflects the individual loan files where such a fee was charged and the total amount of the invoices in the respective loan file to support the charges. Borrower's Name Cost per Closing Stmt. Cost per Invoices Roland Sagraves $25.00 $3.25 John Murphy $25.00 $3.25 Donald Salvog $25.00 $2.95 Harry Walley $25.00 $2.57 Raymond Parker $25.00 $5.14 Shateen/Lawrence $25.00 $5.75 James Arnold $25.00 $3.94 Richard Pope $25.00 $5.04 James Smith $25.00 $6.50 9. In four of the nine customer files listed in Findings of Fact 8 above, a "standard factual" credit report was included in the file. The typical cost for a "standard factual" is $45.00. No invoices were included in those files to reflect this cost. In obtaining credit reports for an individual mortgage transaction, Respondents did not generally order a credit report from an existing service. Instead, All States Mortgage had an on-line computer terminal with a direct phone modem linked to the individual credit reporting agency's computer data base. An employee of All States Mortgage, usually Burton Horowitz, used this computer link-up to conduct a credit report on the borrower. "Standard Factual" reports were ordered from existing services as necessary to supplement the computer search. The standard $25.00 fee charged by All States Mortgage was based upon an estimate of the overhead and indirect costs associated with producing credit reports in this manner. The overhead and indirect costs involved in obtaining credit reports as described in Findings of Fact 10 include the cost of leasing the equipment, the labor involved in obtaining the computer report (it typically takes an operator 30 minutes to obtain the credit reports) and the cost of the materials involved in producing a copy of the report. The standard $25.00 fee charged by All States Mortgage was not based on a specific allocation of the indirect costs associated with producing a particular report, but, instead, was simply based upon an estimate of the costs involved. During the course of its operations, All States Mortgage would periodically receive funds that were to be held in escrow. These escrow funds were kept in an interest-bearing account that was used by All States Mortgage and All States Finance. (This account is hereinafter referred to as the "Commingled Account.") The escrow funds in this Commingled Account were mixed with other funds of All States Mortgage as well as money belonging to All States Finance. Respondents contend that the escrow funds were commingled with the other funds because the companies had only one interest bearing account and that account had limited check writing ability. Respondents transferred money between the interest bearing Commingled Account and their other operating accounts on a continuous basis. At the end of each month, Respondents attempted to perform a reconciliation as to the escrow balances in the Commingled Account. On several occasions during the period from July 1987 through May 1988, the balance in the Commingled Account was less than the total funds that Respondents were supposed to be holding in escrow. No evidence was introduced to indicate that Respondents' handling of the escrow funds and/or the Commingled Account ever resulted in a loss to any of their borrowers or customers. Thus, while the evidence does indicate that, on occasion, the balance of the Commingled Account was less than the funds that should have been in escrow, the difference on each occasion was ultimately corrected in the reconciliation process. Respondents failed to use good accounting principles in the handling of the escrow funds. The Department has not adopted any rules requiring a mortgage broker to handle escrow funds in a separate account. Prior to the initiation of this Administrative Complaint, Respondents were never informed that they were required to do so. The Department's examiners prepared a schedule indicating that Respondents had diverted some of the escrow funds to their own use. However, that schedule includes several loans that had already been sold to another company on the date listed. Thus, the schedule does not accurately reflect the funds that should have been in escrow on any particular day. Although Respondent Lynn Smith was only in the office approximately fifteen percent (15%) of the time while the Department's examiners were conducting their audit in May of 1988, insufficient evidence was introduced to establish the charge that Smith was not fully supervising or controlling the actions of the employees of All States Mortgage. The unrefuted testimony of Smith indicates that she often worked non-regular hours, that she reviewed all the documents for every transaction in which All States Mortgage was involved and she supervised the work of all of the employees of the company. Extenuating circumstances in May of 1988 caused her to be out of the office more than usual during regular business hours. However, this fact alone is insufficient to establish the charge that she was not fully supervising or controlling the actions of the company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law it is, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order finding the Respondents guilty of violating Sections 494.055(1)(b), (d), (f), (h) and (k) and issue a reprimand to the Respondents and impose a fine of one thousand five dollars ($1,500.00). DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990.
The Issue Whether the Certificate of Authority held by Respondent should be subject to discipline for Respondent's failure to timely return build-up funds to a licensed bail bond agent, Willie David, pursuant to the terms of Section 648.29(3), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Roche Surety holds a Certificate of Authority as a Florida domestic property and casualty insurer authorized to transact insurance business in the State of Florida, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the Department pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code. Roche Surety, Inc. ("Roche-MGA") is a managing general agent licensed by the Department. Armando Roche is an officer and director of Roche Surety and an officer and director of Roche-MGA. He is licensed by the Department as a limited surety (bail bond) agent. Willie David is licensed by the Department as a limited surety (bail bond) agent. On or about April 18, 1995, Mr. David entered into an Agency Agreement with Roche-MGA. "Build-up fund," or "BUF," accounts are held by the insurer in trust for the agent in order to protect the insurer against any liability that the agent does not directly satisfy. The insurer places a portion of the premium due to the agent on each bond into the BUF account. Should there be a forfeiture on the bond, the insurer is allowed to take that amount out of the BUF account. In this case, Roche Surety was the insurer holding Mr. David's BUF account, pursuant to his Agency Agreement with Roche-MGA. Section 648.29(3), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: Build-up funds are maintained as a trust fund created on behalf of a bail bond agent or agency, held by the insurer in a fiduciary capacity to be used to indemnify the insurer for losses and any other agreed- upon costs related to a bail bond executed by the agent. The build-up funds are the sole property of the agent or agency. Upon termination of the bail bond agency or agent's contract and discharge of open bond liabilities on the bonds written, build-up funds are due and payable to the bail bond agent or agency not later than 6 months after final discharge of the open bond liabilities. (Emphasis added) On or about June 23, 2000, the Agency Agreement between Willie David and Roche-MGA was terminated. In July 2001, Mr. David made a complaint to the Department that Roche Surety had not returned funds that it held in his BUF account, as required, pursuant to Section 648.29, Florida Statutes (2003). Mr. David did not provide the Department with documentation sufficient to demonstrate that all of his open bond liabilities had been discharged. The Department provided Mr. David with a list of what was needed to prove discharge of the liabilities. Over a period of months, Mr. David continued to submit letters to the Department. Matters between Mr. David and Roche Surety became increasingly acrimonious. Roche Surety made repeated attempts to schedule an audit of Mr. David's records. Mr. David made allegations against Roche Surety that the company's principal, Armando Roche, considered defamatory. On or about January 7, 2002, Roche Surety filed a civil complaint in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County against Willie David for defamation and civil extortion. The case was styled Roche Surety, Inc. v. Willie David, Case No. 02000151. Mr. David ultimately submitted information sufficient to satisfy the Department that all of his outstanding bond liabilities had been discharged as of August 23, 2002. Thus, the Department's position was that Roche Surety should have returned the BUF account funds to Mr. David on or before February 23, 2003. The Department sent Roche Surety a letter, dated March 3, 2003, advising Roche Surety that all of Mr. David's outstanding liabilities had been discharged as of August 23, 2002, and placing Roche Surety on notice that it was required to return the funds held in the BUF account, pursuant to Section 648.29(3), Florida Statutes (2003). On March 7, 2003, Roche Surety filed a motion in the circuit court case requesting "an order allowing [Roche Surety] to hold funds as security or, in the alternative, for a pre- judgment writ of attachment." The motion asserted Roche Surety's belief that Mr. David was judgment proof and that the BUF account represented the only asset available to satisfy any potential judgment in Roche Surety's favor. Roche Surety requested a court order permitting it to transfer the BUF account funds into the registry of the court or some other secure account or, in the alternative, for a pre-judgment writ of attachment of the BUF account. Paragraph 4 of Roche Surety's motion states, in full: Defendant [Willie David] has satisfied his open bond liabilities and said bonds have been discharged. As such, pursuant to Section 648.29, Florida Statutes, defendant is entitled to a return of the BUF account and defendant has made demand for its return. Also on March 7, 2003, counsel for Roche Surety wrote a letter in response to the Department's letter of March 3, 2003, attaching a copy of Roche Surety's circuit court motion. In the letter, counsel asserted, "By transferring the BUF account pursuant to Court Order, Roche Surety would fully comply with Florida law, including Section 648.29, Florida Statutes." The Department made no effort to intervene in the circuit court case. On August 15, 2003, Circuit Judge James D. Arnold entered an order granting Roche Surety's motion, allowing Roche Surety "to hold the proceeds of defendant's BUF Account in the same account as it now exists until this matter is resolved or until further Order of Court." The judge's order noted that Mr. David did not object to entry of an order "based on the facts stated in plaintiff's Motion and the facts stated in defendant's response to the Motion." Among the facts recited in Roche Surety's motion and repeated in the judge's order, was the statement that Mr. David had satisfied his open bond liabilities and was entitled to return of the BUF account. At the hearing in the instant case, Roche Surety offered testimony and some documentation to demonstrate that Mr. David has, in fact, not satisfied all of his open bond liabilities. This evidence directly contradicted Roche Surety's representation to the circuit court that Mr. David had satisfied all open bond liabilities. In particular, Roche Surety offered testimony that Mr. David had taken cash collateral upon the issuance of several bonds and had failed to document or account for that collateral in such a way as to assure Roche Surety that it had been returned. At most, the evidence established that Roche Surety had suspicions regarding Mr. David's handling of collateral, but no actual proof that he had not returned collateral to any of his clients. Roche Surety also offered testimony that Mr. David has not returned, provided proof of discharge, resolved, or otherwise accounted for two outstanding powers of attorney. Evidence presented by the Department demonstrated that Mr. David had reported the two powers of attorney as lost and, pursuant to the Agency Agreement, had paid the premiums on them. No evidence was presented that the powers of attorney were ever used to write bail bonds. Roche Surety's initial representation to the circuit court that Mr. David had satisfied all open bond liabilities is supported by the facts, as well as by the equitable consideration that Roche Surety should not benefit by taking diametrically opposed positions before different tribunals. The evidence established that the amount of money held in the BUF account is $30,792.08, plus any interest that has accrued since December 2002, the date of the last statement presented at hearing.
Recommendation Based on all the evidence of record, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order holding that the evidence is not clear and convincing that Roche Surety has willfully violated Section 648.29, Florida Statutes (2003), and that the First Amended Notice and Order to Show Cause be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas S. Gregory, Esquire Preston & Cowan, LLP 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 1975 Tampa, Florida 33602 Richard J. Santurri, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Having heard the testimony and considered the evidence presented at the hearing, the undersigned finds as follows: At all relevant times, respondent was a licensed mortgage broker, holding license number 3256. (Exhibit A) On November 26, 1974, Carl Sciacca and George Williams, the general partners of a limited partnership known as University Professional Plaza Ltd., entered into a written contract with respondent to procure a mortgage loan commitment. Mr. Sciacca first went to respondent because respondent had been highly recommended to him. The amount of the mortgage was to be $2,450,000.00 and the commitment was to be procured "on or before 21 days from date all required exhibits are presented...". The agreement further provided that University would pay to respondent a brokerage fee in the amount of $24,500.00 upon funding of the loan. (Exhibit B) On the same date, November 26, 1974, University delivered to respondent a check in the amount of $7,500.00. This check bears the notation "For partial brokerage commission to be held in escrow." (Exhibit C) On November 27, 1975, respondent used said check to purchase a cashier's check and the money was never placed in escrow by respondent. While some correspondence from someone denoting an interest in the loan did transpire, the loan was never consummated. Sometime after the expiration of 21 days from November 26, 1974, Mr. Sciacca requested respondent to refund the deposit. A dispute arose between respondent and University regarding whether or not respondent had received from University all the required documents pertaining to the procurement of the loan. Respondent stated that University had not acted in good faith and thus was not entitled to a refund of the deposit. When attorneys were brought into the picture, it was learned that respondent no longer had all the deposit money. Respondent still has not refunded the $7,500.00 to University, however, respondent and University have now entered into an agreement whereby respondent and his wife executed a mortgage note to University in the amount of $9,000.00 secured by a second mortgage on their condominium apartment. This arrangement is satisfactory to University and represents complete settlement of the $7,500.00 owed to University, along with attorney There is some dispute in the evidence as to the parties' understanding of both the disposition to be made of the $7,500.00 deposit when the check was delivered to respondent and the actual terms of the mortgage loan commitment agreement. It was Sciacca's and William's opinion that all necessary documents for the procurement of the loan had been delivered to respondent and that if a loan were not procured within 21 days, the deposit was to be returned to University. It was respondent's opinion that the 21 days was to run from the date of receipt. of all necessary documents and that respondent had never received from University an accurate financial statement. Respondent further testified that he informed Mr. Sciacca of some problems involved with procuring the loan and that he would need some of the $7,500.00 to straighten out those problems. It was respondent's testimony that, despite the notation on the check "to be held in escrow", Sciacca told respondent to use whatever he needed to procure a loan.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is recommended that: Respondent be found not guilty of violations of F.S. Section 494.05(1)(a) , (b) , or (c) or Section 494.05(2); Respondent be found guilty of violations of F.S. Section 494.05(1)(e) , (f) , and (g) and F.A.C. Rule 3-3.06(7) recognizing that the latter two statutes and the Rule involve the same offense - the failure to place the deposit in a trust fund or escrow account; and The Division of Finance issue, in such manner as it deems appropriate, a public reprimand or censure regarding respondent's violations as set forth above. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of October, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Ehrlich, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Barry Chapnick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Legal Annex Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Attorney for Division of Finance Steve E. Moody, Esquire MOODY & JONES 207 E. Broward Boulevard Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Jack E. London, Esquire 2134 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020 Attorney for Carl Sciacca and George Williams, members of the general public
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Theodore L. Aubuchon, Jr., has been licensed by the Department of Insurance as a general lines agent and limited surety agent for a period of approximately 12 years. Other than the instant Administrative Complaint and its attendant Emergency Order of Suspension, Respondent has never been the subject of an Administrative Complaint or the subject of disciplinary action by the Department of Insurance. Respondent was served with an Emergency Order of Suspension in November of 1985, to which he failed to respond, and as of the date of the hearing in this cause, his licenses as a general lines agent and as a limited surety agent have been suspended since November of 1985. Pioneer Bonding & Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter "Pioneer"), was formed in 1963 by its first president, Respondent's grandfather. Respondent's father took over control of the company in approximately 1965, and Respondent succeeded to the position of president in 1979. Respondent remained as an employee of Pioneer and its president until some time in 1985. Pioneer acted as a general agent for American Druggists' Insurance Company (hereinafter "ADIC") from 1973 until approximately March of 1984, pursuant to an agency agreement. That agreement specifically sets forth the respective responsibilities of ADIC and Pioneer as it pertains to the bail bond business, including but not limited to the processing of claims, reports, disposition of collateral, and the return of collateral. All counts of this Administrative Complaint deal with bonds underwritten by ADIC. By letter dated October 3, 1983, ADIC advised Petitioner that Respondent d/b/a Pioneer had satisfactorily performed all duties as general agent for ADIC, that no claims were outstanding against Respondent, that any claims preceding the date of the letter were forever waived by ADIC, and that all funds collected were being maintained in accordance with the law. Shortly after the letter of October 3, 1983, ADIC advised Respondent that it was exercising its 120-day option for termination of its agency agreement. Upon being so advised, Respondent began negotiating with ADIC in an attempt to enter into a limited agency agreement solely for the purpose of servicing outstanding and continuing bonds beyond March of 1984. No formal limited agency agreement was ever consummated, and by May 29, 1984, ADIC employee Norman Stotts had been sent by ADIC to handle the transition, to audit Pioneer's books and records regarding ADIC bonds, and to essentially take control over all bonds written by Pioneer on behalf of ADIC. Because no limited agency agreement regulating the servicing of outstanding and continuing bonds was entered into between them, both ADIC and Pioneer sought to control the disposition of collateral and to resolve forfeitures. ADIC at no time gave any written directions to Pioneer as to the manner in which collateral was to be disposed of upon the termination of the agency agreement between them. Further, as of June 1984, Norman Stotts was in possession of the books and records of Pioneer on behalf of ADIC. In June of 1984, ADIC filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Pioneer, Respondent, and others. On August 24, 1985, that federal court issued an injunction prohibiting the release of any funds previously received by Pioneer or by Respondent in connection with the issuance of ADIC bonds. ADIC voluntarily dismissed the federal litigation on July 8, 1986. On April 30, 1986, the Court of Common Pleas in Franklin County, Ohio, issued an Order of Liquidation and Injunction against ADIC, which Order had the effect of prohibiting the disbursement of funds or collateral held by any agents or brokers of that company. On the following day, pursuant to a motion filed by Petitioner, the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida, issued an Order Appointing Ancillary Receiver for purposes of liquidation, which Order also contained an injunction directed against ADIC agents. On January 7, 1983, Karla Myers obtained a surety bond in the amount of $5,000 for Robert Myers Painting, Inc. with ADIC as surety. Respondent signed the surety bond as agent for the surety. Similarly, Respondent signed the collateral security receipt as attorney-in-fact for ADIC. By its terms, the surety bond expired February 28, 1985. By an unnotarized letter dated March 5, 1985, the Tri-County Painters and Decorators Joint Trade Board, Inc. released Robert Myers Painting, Inc. from the surety bond, which letter was received by Karla Myers on March 8, 1985. Subsequent to March 8, 1985, Karla Myers made numerous telephone calls to Pioneer to obtain the return of her $5,000 in collateral. She was advised by employees at Pioneer that Respondent was no longer employed at Pioneer, and on one occasion, Myers contacted Respondent at his home. Respondent advised her that he would need to confer with his attorney regarding the matter. By March, 1985, Respondent was no longer in control of the books and records of Pioneer, with those books and records being in the control and custody of Norman Stotts. A notarized release, along with the original copy of the Collateral Security Agreement, was not provided by Karla Myers to Respondent or Pioneer in order to secure the release of the $5,000 in collateral, and Pioneer and Respondent were already engaged in litigation with ADIC, Respondent having been advised by his attorney not to discuss that litigation. On approximately August 20 1986, ADIC authorized Respondent to return the Myers collateral. Respondent then obtained the authorization of Petitioner, and the collateral was returned to Myers in August of 1986. On August 10, 1983, Pioneer accepted from Antonio and Jane Mininni $10,000 as collateral for a beverage wholesaler's bond underwritten by ADIC. A subsequent increase in the bond to $15,000 was required by the Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. On April 9, 1985, ADIC advised Mininni d/b/a Old Bridge, Inc., that its bond was being cancelled effective June 10, 1985, and that there would be a 90-day waiting period before the collateral would be returned. That waiting period would have expired on September 10, 1985, after the entry of the federal injunction. On June 13, 1985, the Old Bridge, Inc. bond was transferred from ADIC to Southland Insurance Company in order that Old Bridge, Inc. would continue to have the state-required coverage. Mininni participated in and approved that transfer. At all times Old Bridge, Inc. had coverage for the total amount of coverage it had purchased. In August of 1986, Mr. and Mrs. Mininni on behalf of their business, Old Bridge, Inc., executed a release releasing Pioneer, ADIC, and Respondent; the federal court litigation had been dismissed; Respondent obtained authorization from ADIC and from Petitioner to return to Old Bridge, Inc. its collateral; and the collateral was returned. On behalf of a client, attorney Sam Pendino needed to make arrangements for collateral on four bail bonds. In a telephone conversation with Respondent, Pendino advised that he wanted an attorney, rather than an insurance company, to hold the collateral under an escrow agreement. Respondent suggested the name of attorney Terence T. O'Malley, Sr. Pendino subsequently satisfied himself that O'Malley was a licensed attorney authorized to practice law in the State of Florida, and on January 13, 1984, an escrow agreement was entered into by and between Pendino and O'Malley under which O'Malley became the escrow agent for the collateral. That escrow agreement was later signed by Respondent on behalf of ADIC. Pendino and O'Malley physically put the collateral, with an approximate value of $100,000 made up of $57,500 in cash and the balance in precious metals, into a safe deposit box which they rented on the same day that the escrow agreement was signed. Respondent was not a signator on the safe deposit box and was not present at the time the actual transfer of the collateral took place. No evidence was offered to indicate that Respondent ever came into possession of any of the collateral. Under the terms of the escrow agreement, O'Malley was responsible for returning the collateral with no further authorization needed upon the discharge of the bonds for which the collateral had been placed. The bonds were discharged on September 3, 1985, after entry of the federal court injunction. Pendino contacted O'Malley, but O'Malley failed to return the collateral. Pendino filed a lawsuit against O'Malley. He included Respondent as a defendant because Respondent had signed the escrow agreement. According to Pendino's attorney who was the only witness to testify on Petitioner's behalf regarding this transaction, at all stages of the litigation Respondent was disassociated from O'Malley's position, had agreed to the return of the collateral, and had requested the Court to enter orders returning the collateral to Pendino. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, O'Malley had already been held in civil contempt of court and there was presently pending an indirect criminal contempt proceeding regarding false testimony given by O'Malley as to the location of the collateral in question. Respondent, on behalf of Pioneer and ADIC, wrote a bail bond in the amount of $250,000 to guarantee the appearance of John Lee Paul, Sr., in the Circuit Court of St. Johns County, Florida. Certain real property in Georgia was placed as collateral for the bond. The bond was subsequently ordered forfeited, and judgment was entered against ADIC on January 16, 1984. The real property which was the collateral for the bail bond was sold, and the proceeds were transferred to the general operating account of Pioneer. On June 20, 1984, the legal representative of ADIC and Pioneer, the Assistant State Attorney, the St. Johns County Attorney, the Clerk of the Circuit Court for St. Johns County, and the attorney for the Clerk of the Circuit Court entered into a stipulation for a payment schedule on that final judgment. The payment schedule set forth in that stipulation was approved by the Court on June 21, 1984. Since that time, the bond has been paid in full. It is a common practice for a surety company, with the approval of the Court, to arrange an extended payment schedule when such a large bond has been estreated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him, dismissing that Administrative Complaint with prejudice, and immediately reinstating Respondent's suspended licenses. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0660 Specific rulings as to Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are as follows: Adopted. Rejected as being immaterial. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as being immaterial. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted. Specific rulings as to Respondent's proposed findings of fact are as follows: Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted as to Respondent's licensure; remainder rejected since marital status and education are irrelevant. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard L. Greitzer, Esquire Post Office Box 1778 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302-1778 Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Should Respondent's license as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida be disciplined for the alleged violation of certain provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority to administer the disciplinary provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Respondent, at all times relevant to this proceeding, was licensed as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida and subject to the provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Respondent, at all times relevant to this proceeding, was employed by Alliance Bail Bonds (Alliance), which was owned by Linda Jones. There was a verbal employment agreement between Alliance and Respondent, which provided for, among other things, Respondent's salary. However, the verbal employment agreement did not require that Respondent write bail bonds exclusively for Alliance. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Alliance's office was located in Respondent's home in Titusville, Brevard County, Florida, which had a separate entrance and separate telephone for Alliance. Alliance's files, both active and inactive, were also housed in this office. On March 30, 2000, a person identifying himself as Johnny Lamb contacted Respondent by telephone concerning a bail bond for an individual known as Bernard J. Dougherty who was being held in the Brevard County, Florida, jail. The bond amount was $8,500.00. Since Dougherty was not a resident of the State of Florida, Respondent wanted Lamb to put up the full amount of the bond as collateral. However, Lamb advised Respondent that he did not have enough cash to put up the full amount of the bond. Therefore, Respondent and Lamb eventually agreed on $7,000.00 cash as collateral. Additionally, Respondent advised Lamb that the premium for writing the bail bond would be $850.00 (10 percent of the bond amount). Later that same day, Lamb came to Respondent's office to complete the paperwork and put up the necessary funds for the collateral and bond premium. Lamb paid Respondent the collateral and bond premium in cash (U.S. currency, 20's, 50's, and 100's). Respondent prepared a Collateral Receipt and Informational Notice (Collateral Receipt), which was signed by Lamb. The Collateral Receipt indicated that Lamb had deposited the $7,000.00 collateral with Respondent and had executed an Indemnity Agreement and Promissory Note. Lamb also executed a Bail Application. Respondent gave Lamb the white copy of the Collateral Receipt for his records. The goldenrod copy of the Collateral Receipt was also given to Lamb to be delivered to Dougherty at the jail. The yellow copy and pink copy of the Collateral Receipt were retained by Respondent for Alliance's record. Lamb also paid Respondent $850.00 in cash (U.S. Currency) for the bail bond premium for which Respondent gave Lamb a receipt (number 20454) indicating that Lamb had paid the bail bond premium in the amount of $850.00. After completing the bond transaction with Lamb, Respondent prepared a file in Dougherty's name, which included the copies of the Collateral Receipt, Promissory Note, Indemnity Agreement, Bail Application, and a copy of the receipt for the bail bond premium. After preparing the file, Respondent prepared two Powers of Attorney (Powers), one in the amount of $5,000.00 and one in the amount of $3,500.00, and proceeded to the Brevard County jail to interview Dougherty. Upon arriving at the Brevard County jail, Respondent was advised that in addition to the Brevard County charges, there was an outstanding warrant for Dougherty from Volusia County and a hold for a parole violation in the State of Pennsylvania. Lamb was not present at the Brevard County jail at this time. Therefore, Respondent advised Dougherty of the Volusia County warrant and the hold from Pennsylvania. Respondent further advised Dougherty that although he could post bond for the Brevard County charges, Dougherty would not be released because of the Volusia County warrant and the hold for parole violation in Pennsylvania. Dougherty advised Respondent that he did not want to post bond. Whereupon, Respondent attempted to contact Lamb using the telephone numbers furnished Respondent by Lamb but was unsuccessful in locating Lamb. On March 31, 2000, Respondent called the Brevard County jail and had Lamb paged. Upon being advised that Lamb was present in the Brevard County jail, Respondent asked that they instruct Lamb to call Respondent at his office. Lamb called Respondent at his office and was advised of the situation concerning Dougherty. Respondent also advised Lamb that he was on his way to the jail and would bring Lamb's money with him. Upon arriving at the Brevard County jail, Respondent explained the circumstances regarding the posting of bail for Dougherty and proceeded to return Lamb's money. Lamb did not have the copies of the Collateral Receipt with him that had been given to Lamb on March 30, 2000. Therefore, Respondent took his copy of the Collateral Receipt and documented the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 premium fee. Lamb signed the documentation on the Collateral Receipt showing the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 premium fee. Respondent then placed all of the documents, including the Collateral Receipt with the documentation showing the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 bond premium, in Dougherty's file with Dougherty's name highlighted in blue for filing. Afterwards, Respondent voided the Powers by writing "Void" across the front of the Powers and had them sent to Linda Jones by UPS. Subsequently, the Powers were forwarded by Linda Jones to Charles A. Parish, Agent for Continental Heritage Insurance Co., on whom the Powers were written. On March 31, 2000, Respondent returned the $7,000.00 collateral plus the $850.00 bond premium fee to Lamb, notwithstanding the testimony of Lamb to the contrary, which lacks credibility. Respondent did not at any time present any of the paperwork for posting Dougherty's bond, including the Powers, to the Brevard County jail personnel. Since Alliance's Brevard County files were being kept at Respondent's office in Titusville, Florida, Respondent did not forward Dougherty's file to Linda Jones. However, as a caution, Respondent advised Linda Jones by telephone of what had occurred in regards to Dougherty, notwithstanding Linda Jones' testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility. Sometime in January 2001, Linda Jones came into Respondent's office in Titusville, Florida, and removed all of Alliance's Brevard County files, both active and inactive, that were in the possession of Respondent. The Alliance files removed by Linda Jones included Dougherty's inactive file with the documentation concerning the return of the $7,000.00 collateral and the $850.00 bail bond premium, notwithstanding Linda Jones' testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility. By letter dated May 10, 2001, after talking to William Travis and Linda Jones, Lamb filed a complaint with the Department alleging that Respondent had failed to return the $7,000.00 collateral and this proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent, Michael Scott Kelly, not guilty of violating Subsections 648.442(1) and (3); and 648.45(2)(d),(e),(g),(h), (j), and (n), and (3)(a),(c),(d), and (e), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Michael Scott Kelly. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Steven G. Casanova, Esquire 100 Rialto Place, Suite 510 Melbourne, Florida 32935
