Findings Of Fact John Taylor, III, Petitioner, owns property located at 1200 South Missouri Avenue in the City of Clearwater which is zoned CC (commercial center). The subject property consists of a mall and movie theater. On or about April 17, 1986, Michael Johnson, on behalf of Petitioner, applied for a variance to allow two message signs on the subject property and also to allow total message signage of 256 square feet. Without a variance, the subject property can have only one message sign which cannot exceed 192 square feet. The property presently has one message sign and total message signage of 176 square feet located on its marquee. At a meeting of the Development Code Adjustment Board on May 8, 1986, Petitioner's variance application was denied. The parties stipulated that Fusco Corporation is the manager of the mall located on Petitioner's property and further that Fusco is the owner of all improvements on the property. Further, Cineplex-Odeon has leased the theater located on the subject property and has renovated and expanded it from two to five movie theaters. Finally, Michael Johnson was employed by Cineplex-Odeon to install the changeable message sign which is the subject of this variance. The second message sign which is sought by this variance would be located 350 feet from Missouri Avenue, which runs north and south in front of the subject property. Specifically, it will be located in the front wall of the theaters next to the ticket counter, and will be 16 feet long by 4.4 feet high. The sign would actually be a display case, 6 inches deep, with five individual poster display cases, which would be used to display coming attraction posters. Each display case would have a hinged glass door, through which the poster could be seen. Coming attraction posters are 2 feet long by 3.3 feet high. The 6 inch depth of the display case extends equally into, and protrudes out of, the front wall of the theater. Petitioner has not established that a hardship would exist if this variance is not approved. Coming attraction posters can be, and in fact are, displayed in the theater lobby. During the renovation of the theater, the front wall could have been removed and a window installed to allow viewing of the lobby posters from outside the theater. Finally, the existing sign on the property could be used to advertise coming attractions, as well as movies which are currently playing. The display case for which this variance is sought on behalf of Petitioner is a "changeable message sign," as that term is used in Section 134.011(a), Land Development Code, since it would be a graphic communication or device which would be primarily used to convey information or advertise and would also be prominently visible from outside the theater.
Findings Of Fact Ramchandra Jakhotia and Rashmi Jakhotia, his wife, acquired the King Cole Motel at 401 East Shore Drive, Clearwater, Florida in 1983 and have owned the property since that time. At the time of acquisition and for some time prior thereto the property included a commercial marina with 22 slips. In 1985 the City of Clearwater revised its Development Code effective October 13, 1985 and, incident thereto, effective July 7, 1988, enacted Section 114.05, Live-Aboard Vessels as Ordinance 4597, Clearwater City Code. That enactment provided, in part, that: Prohibited; exceptions: It shall be unlawful for any person to moor any live-aboard vessel at any location within or upon the navigable waters in the City for any period of time in excess of seventy-two (72) hours, except as follows: At a marina facility for which conditional use approval has been obtained, or a marina facility in existence as of October 13, 1985 for which conditional use approval would otherwise be required;... In January 1986 a survey was taken of all marinas within the City of Clearwater to determine the number of live aboard vessels coming within the purview of the revised Development Code. At this survey eight live aboard vessels were occupying berths at the King Cole Motel marina and this was the number determined to be grandfathered for which no conditional use approval would be required. In 1988 King Cole Motel applied for conditional authorization to utilize 14 additional berths for live aboard vessels. This conditional use was approved subject to the applicant installing a pump-out facility and meeting the parking requirements. Although the parking requirements for a commercial marina, i.e., 0.5 parking space per slip, is the same as the parking requirement at marinas for live aboard vessels, the latter generally place a greater demand on parking spaces than does non-live aboard vessels. To change the approved use from commercial marina without live aboards to live aboards is a change in the use and requires conditional use approval. Before conditional use approval can be granted the applicant must comply with all code requirements, such as required parking spaces, at the time of the change in use. At the time Appellant acquired the King Cole Motel the 22 commercial slips were grandfathered as an authorized use without any parking being provided. Accordingly, as a 22-slip commercial marina Appellant did not have to provide parking. When the eight slips used for live aboards were counted in 1986 they too were grandfathered in without the need for parking spaces. However, when Appellant applied in 1988 for authorization to use 14 other slips for live aboard vessels, the code required the applicant to provide seven parking spaces. To his credit Appellant obtained the use of seven parking spaces down the road from the marina but those spaces were not contiguous to Appellants' marina as required by the code. Therefore, Appellants' use of the additional slips for live aboards did not meet the parking requirement in his conditional use approval. In 1992 Appellant applied for a variance of the seven parking spaces required to allow the use of these additional slips by live aboard vessels. This hearing was held before the Development Code Adjustment Board on February 11, 1993 and it is from the denial of this variance that this appeal is taken. The Board denied the variance requested because the Appellant failed to demonstrate that the standards established by Section 45.24 Land Development Code were met. In these proceedings Appellant presented no additional evidence to support the variances requested than was submitted to the Board.
Findings Of Fact Ben A. Posdal is the owner of property commonly known as 166 Brightwater Drive, in the City of Clearwater, Florida. On August 7, 1986, he applied for variances to construct two wooden decks on his property, located at the above address. The property which is the subject of the variance request is a building which contains four apartments, which are rented by Ben A. Posdal to various tenants. On August 28, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board (DCAB) denied the variance requested by Mr. Posdal on the grounds that he had not demonstrated a hardship and that he had not demonstrated that the requested variance would not violate the general spirit and intent of the Clearwater Land Development Code. On September 9, 1986, an appeal was filed by Ben A. Posdal from the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board. The appeal alleges that the DCAB decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable on the following grounds: Other properties allegedly are in violation of the back line setback regulations; The DCAB failed to give enough evidentiary weight to photographs he submitted; and Appellant allegedly is being deprived of the beneficial use of the property in a manner commensurate with the community. There are no physical conditions which are unique to the property. There is no particular physical surroundings, shape or topographical condition that would result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Appellant. Failure to obtain a variance would not impinge upon Appellant's use of the property in any way. The record on appeal contains competent, substantial evidence to support the DCAB decision. Nonconforming uses in the area of the subject property are legal nonconforming uses.
The Issue The issues are whether David Boston should be issued an environmental resource permit and sovereign submerged lands authorization allowing him to construct 96 linear feet of rip rap revetment; construct a private dock of less than 1,000 square feet; and place 3,500 square feet of fill in non-jurisdictional areas; and whether he qualifies for a general permit to place a fill pad in isolated wetlands adjacent to the St. Johns River, a Class III waterbody.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this permitting dispute between neighbors, Petitioner, Vincent R. D'Antoni, Jr., contends generally that Respondent, David Boston (Boston), will cause flooding to Petitioner's property by reason of placing too much fill on an isolated wetland, which lies in the center of Boston's property. The filling is in conjunction with Boston's efforts to construct a single-family residence and private dock on his property, purchased in June 1998, which lies adjacent to the St. Johns River, a Class III waterbody, in Duval County, Florida. In preliminary decisions made on November 5, 1998, and January 21, 1999, Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), "acknowledge[d] receipt" of Boston's intent to use a noticed general permit "to fill less than 4,000 square feet of an isolated wetland to facilitate construction of a single family home" on his lot (Case No. 99-2861), and gave notice of its intent to issue Boston an environmental resource permit and sovereign submerged lands authorization allowing him to construct a rip rap revetment and a dock and to place 3,500 square feet of fill in mainly non-jurisdictional areas (Case No. 99-1916). Although a number of objections were raised by Petitioner in his original filings, as clarified at the final hearing, Petitioner now contends that Boston placed excessive fill on his lot, including an isolated wetland, and that the fill has resulted in flooding, saturated soil, or standing water on Petitioner's property. He also contends that the location of Boston's proposed dock will affect the ability to use his own dock. Because no evidence was presented on the docking issue, and through admissions Petitioner acknowledged that there will be no adverse environmental impacts, no consideration will be given to those objections. Finally, Petitioner does not object to the placement of the rip rap revetment on the shoreline. Accordingly, the request for an environmental resource permit and consent to use sovereign submerged lands in Case No. 99-1916 should be approved. The property in issue lies just south of the Jacksonville University Country Club and a few blocks west of University Boulevard North on Wayland Street, which fronts the eastern side of the St. Johns River in a tract of land known as University Park. Except for the Boston lot, all other waterfront lots are now developed. When facing the river from Wayland Street, Petitioner's lot lies to the right of Boston's lot, while another lot owned by Robert Henderson (Henderson) lies to the left of Boston's lot. The lots are up to 500 feet deep; Boston's lot is around 96 feet wide, while Petitioner's lot has a similar width but narrows to only 20 feet or so near the river. At the river end of the D'Antoni, Boston, and Henderson lots is an area of contiguous wetlands. Until 1995, DEP regulated those wetland areas and this prevented D'Antoni and Henderson from placing any fill in those areas. Under DEP's current wetland delineation rule, however, such areas are non- jurisdictional, and any placement of fill at the river end is outside the purview of DEP's jurisdiction. Before Boston's lot was cleared and filled, it was about a foot lower in elevation than the D'Antoni lot; this was true even though Petitioner has never changed the natural grade of his property since it was purchased and developed. Therefore, water tended to flow naturally from an upland area north or east of the D'Antoni lot, through the D'Antoni lot to Boston's lot, and then through the lower part of the Henderson lot populated by "very mature cypress trees," and eventually into the St. Johns River. According to a 1977 aerial photograph, the Boston lot contained what appears to be a tidal connection from an uplands area through the wetlands on his property to the river. However, construction on property adjacent to the Henderson lot sometime after 1977 severed this connection, and a tidal connection (direct hydrologic connection) to the river no longer exists. Under Rule 62-341.475(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, "a single family residence" is exempt from the Environmental Resource Program permitting and a general permit will be granted "as long as it is not part of a larger plan of common development," and "the total area of dredging or filling in isolated wetlands for the residence and associated residential improvement shall not exceed 4000 square feet." Since there is no longer a direct hydrologic connection between the wetlands on Boston's property and the St. Johns River, the wetlands are isolated within the meaning of this rule. Availing himself of the foregoing provision, on October 19, 1998, Boston gave notice to DEP "of [his] intent to use a noticed general permit to fill less than 4,000 square feet of an isolated wetland" on his property. He also provided certain drawings and other information (prepared by his surveyor) to show that he qualified for the permit. DEP does not "issue" a noticed general permit; rather, it only determines whether the applicant qualifies for a permit and then "acknowledges" this fact. Accordingly, on November 5, 1998, DEP "acknowledge[d] receipt" of Boston's notice. Although DEP encourages the user of such a permit to notify affected or adjoining property owners, there was no legal requirement that Boston do so, and he proceeded to clear the lot and then fill a part of the wetland area with two or three feet of dirt without giving notice to Petitioner or Henderson, his two neighbors. The filling raised the elevation of the Boston property at least two feet above the D'Antoni and Henderson lots and impeded the prior natural flow of water. At the same time, Boston constructed a three to four-foot timber wall (consisting of railroad ties) on the Henderson property line to retain the fill and a similar two-foot wall on Petitioner's line. These changes had the effect of impounding the water which had previously flowed naturally in a north-south direction through the wetlands from the D'Antoni lot to the Boston lot to the Henderson lot. It also generated runoff from the Boston lot to the D'Antoni lot, which had not previously occurred. When Petitioner observed the adjacent lot being cleared and filled, and the resulting erosion of fill onto his property, pooling of water, and damage to his chain link fence after a heavy rain in January 1999, he filed a complaint with DEP. An inspection was made by DEP, and Boston was told to stop work until corrective changes were made to ensure that such flooding would not occur. After a series of changes were made which satisfied DEP's concerns, the stop work order was lifted. Boston also signed a consent order and paid a $100.00 fine. However, pending the outcome of these cases, no further construction work has occurred. Petitioner has contended that Boston has placed more than 7,200 square feet of fill on his property in violation of the rule, which limits the amount of fill to less than 4,000 square feet. While this amount of filling has in fact occurred, approximately 3,500 square feet of fill was placed in non- jurisdictional areas between the shoreline and the isolated wetlands, and the rule only requires that Boston limit his fill to less than 4,000 square feet on the isolated wetland. Thus, contrary to a suggestion by Petitioner's engineer, the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional filling are not totaled together to determine whether the threshold within the rule has been exceeded. Through photographs received in evidence and testimony by Petitioner and his wife, it was established that flooding or standing water has occurred on Petitioner's property during heavy rainfalls since the filling occurred, even as recently as January 2000. The evidence further shows that Petitioner's chain link fence has been damaged through the weight of the fill pressing against the fence. In addition, Petitioner has suffered the loss of "a couple of trees" because of "mucky" and "oversaturated" soil caused by excessive water. Also, a dog house on a raised platform in the back yard which was previously dry now "stays in water." These affected areas lie immediately adjacent to the filled area of the isolated wetland on Boston's property. Finally, there is an erosion problem beyond the isolated wetland consisting of sand and silt flowing from Boston's lot onto Petitioner's lot during heavy rainfalls. Despite these problems, Petitioner does not object to the development of the lot; he only asks that Boston do so in a manner which prevents these conditions from recurring in the future. Petitioner's engineering expert, Ronnie D. Perron (Perron), a professional engineer who visited the site in August 1999, ran a computer model (Interconnected Channel and Pond Routing, Version 2.11) showing runoff both before and after the fill was placed on Boston's lot. He concluded that "there was over one and a half feet of flooding in that wetlands due to filling Mr. Boston's lot" during a "mean annual storm event," which assumes five inches of rain during a 24-hour period. Even when he used more conservative estimates, Perron still arrived at water accumulations ranging from 0.6 feet to 1.5 feet. This excessive runoff is caused by the retaining wall and fill, which "blocks off" the water and causes it to "spread out in [Petitioner's] whole back yard." In response to Perron's model, a DEP professional engineer, David P. Apple (Apple), ran another computer model (PONDS, Version 2.25) received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit No. 14. That model shows that during a three-year, one- hour storm event, the small depressed area on Boston's property (including the isolated wetland) had sufficient storage capacity to absorb up to six inches of runoff from off-site areas and not overflow back onto Petitioner's property. This size of storm event (which produces two and one-half inches of rain in an hour) is typically used by the Department in calculations for single- family residential property when the impervious area site is less than fifty percent. In this case, Apple didn't "feel that the impervious area out there was greater than [fifty] percent." Therefore, Apple concluded that the storm event used by Perron was too large, and that the smaller event used in his model was more appropriate. He also concluded that the Boston property could retain all water in a normal storm event without discharging any stormwater onto the D'Antoni lot. He did not, however, address the issue of the fill and retaining wall on the Boston lot impounding the water on his neighbor's lot. In developing the input perameters for his model, Apple assumed that water falling at the front (Wayward Street) side of the D'Antoni property drained to the front roadway; in fact, much of that water drains to the rear of the lot into the wetland area. A similar incorrect assumption was made regarding runoff on the Boston lot. If modifications were made to account for the proper drainage patterns, the Apple model would show larger amounts of water staging on the Boston property during rainfall events, which would increase the possibility of runoff onto the D'Antoni lot. Apple questioned the accuracy of the Perron model given the fact that Perron had used a larger storm event than he (Apple) believed was appropriate. However, even if Perron had used a three-year, one-hour storm event on his computer model, as advocated by Apple, he established that it would have resulted in flood staging on Petitioner's property between 0.97 and 1.64 feet during a smaller storm event. DEP proposed no solutions to the water problems on the D'Antoni lot, presumably because it concluded that the rule was satisfied; that by filling the Boston lot, it was no longer the "stormwater pond for the neighborhood runoff"; and that DEP had no other regulatory authority to solve this peculiar situation. The record shows clearly, however, that if no changes are made, water will continue to back up on Petitioner's property by virtue of the higher elevation on the Boston lot, and the possibility of runoff from Boston's lot exists during certain storm events. Neither condition existed before the fill was added. To correct the foregoing conditions, Perron proposes two corrective measures. First, Boston should install a yard drain (underground culvert) beginning in the wetlands area of his property and outfalling to the cypress trees on the adjacent Henderson lot. Besides providing an outfall for the excess water, this would also help recharge the mature cypress trees on the Henderson lot. Second, D'Antoni should install a series of "yard drains" using high-density polyethylene pipes to convey the standing water on his lot directly into the St. Johns River. The expert opined that neither activity would require a permit from DEP. These modifications are reasonable and appropriate and should be used by the factioning parties. Accordingly, the installation of a yard drain should be a condition for Boston to use his noticed general permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting the application for a permit and consent in Case No. 99-1916 and confirming that David Boston qualifies for use of a noticed general permit in Case No. 99-2861 provided, however, that such use be conditioned on Boston constructing an underground culvert with a yard drain from the wetland area on his lot to the St. Johns River. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Vincent R. D'Antoni, Jr. 3824 Wayland Street Jacksonville, Florida 32277 David Boston 2262 Orchard Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether to grant the appeal of Valentinos Koumoulidis from the Planning and Zoning Board's denial of his application for variances from the requirement of a minimum lot width of 150 feet at the setback line and from the requirement of a minimum of 20 percent clear space.
Findings Of Fact When the Appellant, Valentinos Koumoulidis, bought the subject property, the building was being used as a six-unit motel--three units on each of two floors. There were approximately 1600 square feet of space on each of the two floors. The property fronts at 606 Bayway Boulevard; the back of the property is waterfront. In 1991, the Appellant applied for and was granted a parking variance and variances to enable him to convert the first floor to retail use and convert the second floor to a residence. Apparently construction was delayed, and in October, 1992, the Appellant reapplied for the variances to enable him to convert the first floor to retail use and convert the second floor to a residence, while withdrawing the application for a parking variance. (He had decided to convert from straight- in/back-out parking to an off-street parking lot.) In 1994, the Appellant again applied for variances, this time to allow him to add approximately 300 square feet of commercial space to the back of the first floor and approximately 900 square feet of residential space to the back of the second floor. The Board denied those variance requests in October, 1994. Rather than appeal, the Appellant decide not to pursue the addition of commercial space to the back of the first floor and, on December 22, 1994, instead applied for variances to allow him just to add approximately 900 square feet of residential space to the back of the second floor. (Of the 900 square feet, approximately 550 would be enclosed, and approximately 350 would be open deck.) The evidence (primarily through the testimony of Noel Woods, one of the Appellant's neighbors) was that the residential property in the immediate vicinity is comparable, in terms of square footage of living space per dwelling unit, to the Appellant's current second floor--i.e., approximately 1600 to 1700 square feet. There was some evidence that residential properties across the intracoastal waterway from the Appellant's property are valued as high as a million dollars. But the evidence (again, the testimony of Noel Woods) also was that condominium units in the immediate vicinity are valued at approximately $175,000. There was no evidence that the use the Appellant is making of his property (retail on the first floor and residential on the second floor) is not a reasonable use.
Findings Of Fact This application is to provide irrigation necessary to develop 11,520 acres zoned agricultural into improved grazing land. The land to be so developed is Sections 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, & 25, Township 47 South, Range 34 East, a portion of Sections 4, 9, 16, 21, 22, 26, 27, 35 & 36, Township 47 South, Range 34 East, a portion of Section 1, Township 48 South, Range 34 East, and a portion of Section 6, Township 48 South, Range 35, East. It is bounded on the west and southwest by the L-3 canal, and on the east by the Rotenberger tract which has been purchased by the State of Florida as a Wildlife Management Area. Details of the proposed water management system are contained in Exhibit 4, C&SFCD Staff Report. The tract here involved is basically flat with the elevation going from +14 feet in the northwest portion to +13 feet in the southeast portion. Although the Addendum to the Staff Report (Exhibit 5) states that the application calls for the conversion of several thousand acres of original sawgrass Everglades into improved pasture, expert witnesses testified without contradiction that the tract involved is more on the edge of the Everglades and only a small portion in the southeastern part thereof is truly swamp and marsh land typical of the Everglades. The western portion of the area is comprised of sandy soil rather than the muck characteristic of Everglades land. Although the Intervenors contended that the development of the tract would be environmentally counterproductive, no evidence was submitted to support this position. Conversion of the land to pasture may prove more useful to wildlife than leaving it in its present state which primarily supports deer. As improved pasture the land would still support a substantial deer population. Wading birds in particular will benefit if the wild land is converted to pasture. The annual water allocation recommended by the C&SFCD staff and concurred in by applicant, should be 15,360 acre-feet (16.0 inches/acre/year) which is the basin yield for the area. Therefore the irrigation use should have no adverse impact on the water resource or affect other users.
The Issue Whether Appellant was wrongfully denied a variance of 21.33 feet to construct a second floor deck at 673 Bay Esplanade, Five Palms Motel Condo, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact John Shaw, a resident of Massachusetts, purchased the condominium for which the variance is here requested in December, 1988 without first visiting the property or inquiring about zoning restrictions. The unit purchased is on the second floor of a two story building earlier converted from a hotel or motel into condominiums. The seller told Shaw he could construct a deck over the existing deck on the ground floor condominium below the unit purchased by Shaw. While the construction of this deck was in progress it was discovered no permit had been pulled for the project and the work was stopped. The subsequent application for a permit was denied because the proposed deck encroached some 21.33 feet into the setback area. The application for a variance was denied by the Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The two buildings comprising this complex were erected many years ago and are non-conforming, i.e., the buildings themselves violate the current Development Code. An existing deck extending into the setback area was constructed on the unit directly below the condominium purchased by Shaw and a similar deck extending to the seawall was constructed on an adjacent building. No permits are on file for those decks. Construction of the proposed deck would improve the livability of the condominium greatly by expanding the area usable for looking seaward. The condominium has been used without this deck for many years. This property is zoned CR-24 and the setback requirement is 25 feet from the water's edge.
The Issue The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether to approve, approve with conditions, or deny the Development Order issued to Appellee Pinellas Education Organization, Inc., d/b/a Enterprise High School (Applicant or School), by the Board on December 3, 2019. Specifically, the following issues must be resolved: Whether Appellants have standing to appeal the Development Order. Whether the issues raised by Appellants at the Oral Argument were properly preserved for appeal. Whether there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support approval of the Development Order.3 Whether the Board's decision departs from the essential requirements of the law. If the Development Order is affirmed, whether any additional conditions are appropriate. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellee School filed an application to renovate an existing building to operate a high school at 2495 Enterprise Road, in Clearwater, Florida.4 The Board held a quasi-judicial public hearing on the application on November 19, 2019 (Board Hearing). The Board approved the School's application with conditions and the City issued the Development Order on December 3, 2019. On December 4, 2019, two separate Appeal Applications were filed regarding the Development Order: (1) by 2521 Countryside Blvd., LLP, Countryside Property Principals, LLC, Bruce Levine, and Joan Levine; and by 2505 Enterprise, LLC, and Greg Willsey, and Sandra Willsey. The Appeal Applications were fairly similar and raised a number of issues: four issues pertaining to traffic and parking requirements; and one issue as to whether a high school is a compatible use with the surrounding area. The City referred the matter to DOAH on December 4, 2019, and it was 3 Section 4-505C states, "The burden shall be upon the appellant to show that the decision of the community development board cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the board, or that the decision of the board departs from the essential requirements of law." 4 The School's application went through a Level Two approval process which requires a quasi-judicial public Board hearing to approve flexibility (i.e. deviation) from the minimum development standards set forth in the Code. See Code at §4-401. Level Two approvals must meet both the general applicability criteria and the flexibility criteria outlined by the Code. See Code at Art. 4, Divisions 1, 3, 4 and 6. assigned to an administrative law judge. On December 13, 2019, a telephonic scheduling conference was held to determine the record on appeal and set the oral argument hearing. During that conference the parties agreed not to submit pre-argument briefs, but rather, chose to file post-hearing proposed final orders. The Oral Argument was held at the Clearwater Library and was open to the general public. Applicant, the City, the Board, and all persons who were granted party status at the Board Hearing were allowed to present arguments at the Oral Argument. See Code at 4-505B. At the Board Hearing the following people were granted party status: Dr. Richard Gottlieb, who was represented by Todd Pressman; Sandra Willsey; Greg Willsey; and Todd Burch. The transcript of the Oral Argument was filed with DOAH on February 19, 2020. Pursuant to section 4-505D, the proposed final orders were due within 20 days after the filing of the transcript, or no later than March 11, 2020. Per the City's request, the parties were granted an extension to submit proposed final orders. The additional time was to allow the parties to collaborate on a master index to the record on appeal (Index), which they intended to cite to in their proposed orders. The Index and the proposed final orders were timely submitted on March 23, 2020.5 5 At the Oral Argument, the parties stipulated that the undersigned could take official recognition of the Code provisions and City of Clearwater Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan) found online. As such, the undersigned takes official recognition of the Code found at https://library.municode.com/fl/clearwater/codes/ community_development_code?nodeId=CODECO (last visited April 14, 2020); and of the Comprehensive Plan found at https://www.myclearwater.com/government/city- departments/planning-development/divisions-/development-review-zoning/comprehensive- plan (last visited April 14, 2020). FACTS IN THE RECORD Pursuant to section 4-505A, the record includes the application file of the Clearwater Planning and Development Department (Planning Department); the agenda packet of the Board Hearing; all exhibits accepted into evidence at the Board Hearing; and the streaming video of the Board Hearing.6 The following findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence found in the record. Parties and Property The School filed an application with the Planning Department to renovate a 16,696 square foot building located on a 1.730 acre site at 2495 Enterprise Road in Clearwater, Florida (proposed development). The proposed development is in a retail/office plaza known as Village at Countryside (Plaza), located on the east side of Enterprise Road, just south of Countryside Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida. The Plaza consists of 11 parcels, including a large vacant building that formerly housed a Toys-R-Us store. The Plaza is located within the US 19 Corridor Redevelopment Plan, and has a designation of "US 19 District, Regional Center sub-district" (US 19-RC). Property within US 19-RC is subject to the special zoning district and development standards found at Appendix B of the Code.7 The School seeks to operate Enterprise High School, a charter high school, at the proposed development site.8 As explained below, relevant to this appeal is the number of students at the School and whether there will be adequate parking for the proposed development as required by the Code. 6 See Video of Board Hearing held November 19, 2019, on Agenda FLD2019-8026 at time marker 9:25 at http://clearwater.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=50&clip_id=3782 (last visited April 1, 2020). 7 See Code at Appendix B – US 19 Zoning District and Development Standards, found at https://library.municode.com/fl/clearwater/codes/community_development_code?nodeId=APX BUS19ZODIDEST (last visited April 14, 2020). 8 Enterprise High School is an existing charter school which intends to move from its current location to the proposed development site. The School is subject to section 1013.33, Florida Statutes. Appellants own and operate property within the Plaza and adjacent to the proposed development site. Specifically, Bruce and Joan Levine own Appellants 2521 Countryside Blvd., LLP,9 and Countryside Property Principals, LLC. The LLP and/or LLC operate the Countryside Foot and Ankle Center.10 The Countryside Foot and Ankle Center's administrator, Todd Burch, was granted party status at the Board Hearing. Greg and Sandra Willsey own Appellant 2505 Enterprise, LLC, which is a property in the Plaza. The Willseys were also granted party status at the Board Hearing. At the conclusion of the Board Hearing, the Board voted to approve the School's application. On December 3, 2019, a Development Order was issued to memorialize the Board's action. Thereafter, Appellants filed the Appeal Applications with a document titled "Notice and Statement" which stated the following grounds for the appeals: The Neighbors assert that the decision of the Community Development Board ("the Board") was not supported by substantial competent evidence and was a departure from essential requirements of law. Specifically: The Board's decision was based upon a high school with two, 200-student shifts. However, the record below established that these student shifts would substantially overlap during the noon hour. In other words, the evaluation of the proposed change of use was based on impacts and site requirements that were substantially less than what would actually occur on the site. 9 The Appeal Application lists this entity as 2521 Countryside Boulevard Land Trust. 10 Although Appellants state that Bruce Levine was granted party status at the Board Hearing, there is no substantial competent evidence in the record supporting this statement. See Appellees' Proposed Final Order at p. 3; compare Tab 30 of the Index, Board Meeting Minutes for November 19, 2019, at p. 3 and 5. The Board's decision was based on a traffic analysis provided by the applicant that used a wrong ITE trip generation code - an elementary school instead of a high school - so it cannot be relied upon as a basis for the underlying decision. The change of use to a high school required that the applicant establish that it had one parking space per three students. There is no substantial competent evidence to establish that this parking requirement was satisfied. To the contrary, the substantial competent evidence establishes that the parking on the property failed to meet this requirement. In fact, granting this change of use would result in a substantial oversubscription of the available parking at the site. The proposed use would create tortured on-site parking and traffic circulation patterns that would substantially impact the existing medical office uses on the property, including a kidney dialysis office that serves a substantial elderly population. There is no substantial competent evidence to support the finding that the change of use would "have no impacts on the adjacent retail plaza." To the contrary, the change of use would have substantial impacts on the current retail and office plaza. The proposed change of use would have substantial negative impacts on the surrounding community and is incompatible with the existing surrounding retail, office and residential uses. At the Oral Argument, Appellants raised for the first time whether the operation of a school is an inconsistent use with: (1) an Amended and Restated Declaration of Establishment of Restrictive Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and Grants of Easements dated December 7, 1983 (the "Parking Easement"); and (2) the Comprehensive Plan. The Studies The first four issues raised in the Appeal Applications are related to the Parking Study and Traffic Study (collectively referred to as the Studies) which were submitted by the School as part of its application. The Parking Study, dated September 2, 2019, consists of overall parking calculations; aerial photographs of the development site and surrounding areas; and the Parking Easement. The purpose of the Traffic Study was to analyze the impact of the development on the traffic intersection at Countryside Boulevard and Enterprise Road, as well as the full access drive at the site. The 50-page Traffic Study, dated October 18, 2019, included numerous charts, maps, and tables with underlying information and data relating to the traffic counts for the proposed development. Jerry Dabkowski, a local traffic engineer who prepared the Studies for the School, testified at the Board Hearing about the traffic and parking calculations. To rebut the Studies, at the Board Hearing Mr. Pressman presented a two-page letter from a professional engineer dated November 15, 2019, titled "Traffic Study Review." Relevant to the appeal, the letter finds fault in the number of students and the "ITE Code" used in the Traffic Study and in the Planning Department's Staff Report and Recommendation (Staff Report), dated November 19, 2019, which was also presented to the Board. These factors would affect the calculations for the number of parking spaces required for and the trip distribution caused by the proposed development. Number of Students Appellants argue the parking calculations should be based on the total number of students enrolled at the School, or 400 students. The Studies and the Staff Report calculated the traffic and number of parking spaces necessary based on two shifts with 200 students per shift. At the Board Hearing, Donna Hulbert, the School's Director, testified that unlike a traditional high school, the School operated in two shifts to allow the students to hold employment while completing their high school education. Although the School intends to enroll a total of 400 students, she explained, each of the two shifts would have a maximum of 200 students. Additionally, the students are eligible for a public transportation bus pass, which some students utilize instead of driving their personal vehicles. The Study establishes that "[t]o reduce the impacts during the AM and PM peak hours, the school intends to split the day into two shifts, each with 200 students attending." Although there was conflicting information between the School's application and Ms. Hulbert's testimony at the Board Hearing about whether the shifts would overlap, the Staff Report recommends approval of the application because, "[t]he applicant has provided the school will operate in two shifts . . . with no more than 200 students present per shift." There is substantial competent evidence that there will be only 200 students at the School at a time, and that this number was correctly used in calculating the required parking spaces and the trip generation for the proposed development. ITE Trip Calculation Appellants argue the Traffic Study utilized the wrong Institute of Transportation Engineers' (ITE) Trip Generation Code, 520, which is the code applicable to an elementary school. The Study, however, states it utilized ITE Code 530 from the Institute of Transportation Engineers' Trip Generation, 10th Edition for Office, to calculate the change in trips attributed to the proposed development. A copy of the ITE Code 530 was attached to the Traffic Study. Additionally, Mr. Dabkowski testified that ITE Code 530 was the correct code for high schools. There is substantial competent evidence that ITE Code 530 was used in calculating the change in trips for the Traffic Study which was relied upon in the Staff Report, and which was accepted by the Board. Parking Requirements Table 2 in section B-303, Permitted uses and parking, provides the following parking requirements relevant to this appeal. Use Regional Use Specific Standards Minimum Off-Street Parking Spaces Retail Plaza BCP[Level 1 Minimum Standard(Building Construction permit)] [Not included] 4/1,000 SF GFA Schools FLD [Level 2 Flexible Development (Board approval required)] 1. All off-street parking is located at least 200 feet from any property designated as residential in the Zoning Atlas 1 per 3 students Based on this criterion, the School would require 67 parking spaces (200 students/3 = 66.6667). The Staff Report and Studies establish the proposed site has 55 parking spaces, but five of these spaces cannot be used because they are within 200 feet from a parcel designated as Residential. Thus, there are 49 available parking spaces "on site," leaving 18 spaces to be designated. As stated earlier, the proposed site is one of 11 parcels in the Plaza. The Parking Study contains a copy of a Parking Easement that allows cross- parking among the parcels. Based on the square footage of the buildings on the parcels (including the proposed development site), the entire Plaza is required to have 975 parking spaces. The Plaza actually has 1,137 parking spaces, an excess of 162 parking spaces. The Code also requires off-street parking spaces be located within 600 feet of the principal and accessory uses they serve. See Code at § 3-1404A. Next to and within 600 feet of the proposed development site is currently a vacant building that formerly housed a Toys-R-Us store. That parcel has 228 parking spaces, but only 177 spaces are required for that building, leaving an extra 51 parking spaces. Based on the excess spaces available through the Parking Easement, there is substantial competent evidence supporting the City's staff finding of adequate parking spaces to satisfy the additional 18 spaces necessary for the proposed development, and the Board's approval of the same. Compatible Use The fifth issue raised in the Appeal Applications is regarding the use of the proposed development site as a charter high school. Whether this site is appropriate for the type of school operated by the Applicant was a topic of discussion among the Board members at the Board Hearing. At the Board Hearing, Planning Department Manager Mark Parry testified as an expert witness. Mr. Parry explained the nature of the US 19- RC standards and gave his opinion that the proposed development complies with all applicable provisions of the Code, including the use requirements. In contrast, Appellants expressed anecdotal fears that the types of students attending the School would disrupt Appellants' medical businesses. For example, at the Board Hearing, Mrs. Willsey expressed concern that the students at the School were known to have "behavioral problems." Mr. Burch spoke about the increased number of pedestrians in the Plaza and cited to a letter in the record from Dr. Levine: "For us to have to monitor and police our properties for trespassing students would be untenable." There was no actual evidence in the record that the School's operations would cause any problems such as increased crime or trespassing in the area. At the Oral Argument and in their proposed final order, however, Appellants' argument shifted away from the potential effects of the students in the area and instead offered the new arguments that the School was inconsistent with the Parking Easement which states the Plaza shall be used "for commercial purposes only, including without limitation the operation of merchandising establishments, restaurants, and professional offices."11 Regardless, as explained below, this argument is not appropriate on appeal because it was not raised at the Board Hearing or in the Appeal Applications. At the Oral Argument, Appellants also argued that the School is an inconsistent use with the Comprehensive Plan. Appellants cited a paragraph from the Staff Report: The proposal includes a new charter school with grades nine through 12 and constitutes a public educational facility as defined by Policy J.2.1.2. The school will be located within the US 19–RC future land use designation. The prior designation was Commercial General (CG). The intent is that all uses permitted in the CG are also permitted in the US 19–RC classification. The City is planning to update the Comprehensive Plan to reflect this. Schools are a listed permitted use in the CG classification. As explained below, this argument is also inappropriate because it was not raised at the Board Hearing or in the Appeal Applications. Appellants also argue the proposed development is an inconsistent use with the existing businesses because the adjacent properties are commercial in nature and the School is not commercial. The Code, however, clearly allows Schools as an allowable use in the US 19-RC zoning district, and in the 11 The Complete section of the Parking Easement titled "Uses" states: 2.1 Uses in General The Property, consisting of both the Building Area and the Common Areas, shall be used for commercial purposes only, including without limitation the operation of merchandising establishments, restaurants, and professional offices. No portion of the Property shall be used or operated as a discotheque, bar or cocktail lounge (except in connection with a restaurant) ... theatre, bowling alley, skating rink, roller disco or catering hall, funeral parlor, or for the sale of pornographic literature or material, or an adult book store or so called "head shop" or for a video or other game arcade, flea market, or for a use which would be noxious or immoral or otherwise constitute moral turpitude or constitute an undignified, disreputable use. previous zoning designation of CG. See Code at § B-303. Moreover, unlike the Parking Easement, the Code does not divide use categories into "Commercial" and "Non-Commercial." Rather, the uses are categorized as "Residential" and "Non-Residential." Id. Based on the Code and the review of the application submissions, the Staff Report concluded the School will be an appropriate use in the area. Based on Staff visits, aerial photographs and material submitted by the applicant it is evident that the proposal will be in harmony and consistent with the scale, bulk, coverage and character of adjacent properties and, generally, with properties in the greater neighborhood. The reuse of the 16,700 square foot building with a school will not result in any adverse visual impacts on adjacent properties. Since the character of the site will not change with the proposal, and it is currently similar in nature vis-a-vis placement of other uses in the area it is not expected to impair the value of those properties. The proposal will likely have no effect, negative or otherwise, on the health or safety of persons residing or working in the neighborhood. The testimony of Mr. Parry, coupled with the Staff Report, constitute substantial competent evidence supporting the Board's finding that the School is a compatible use with the area.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has an option to purchase property located at 301-307 Island Way Boulevard, Island Estate, Clearwater, Florida, on which he proposes to construct ten townhouses. Initially Petitioner asked for two variances. The first variance was for 25.12 feet to allow construction on a lot only 124.88 feet wide. This variance was granted for this nonconforming lot. The second variance, for 13.24 feet to allow construction of the ten townhouse complex 12 feet from the side property line, was denied by the Clearwater Code Adjustment Board. The Board concluded the variance requested did not meet the requirements of Section 45.24 of the Clearwater Land Development Code. Petitioner presented evidence that if the lot had been 150 feet wide they would have had 90 feet to build on without requesting any variance. However, since the lot was nonconforming, in order to have 89 feet on which to place the building, the requested variance would be necessary. Petitioner also presented evidence that the construction of ten townhouses on this lot is necessary for the project to be on a solid economic basis. Subsequent to the denial of this variance by the Development Code Adjustment Board, Petitioner submitted plans, which have been approved by the City of Clearwater, to erect nine townhouses on this property without any variance needed. However, these townhouses would be smaller than would be the ten townhouses initially proposed and would provide a lesser return on the capital invested.
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for a variance is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact On or about May 15, 1989, Branch Sunset Associates (Petitioner), the owner of certain property located at 1856 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 6-29-16), applied for a variance to eliminate a condition previously imposed by the Development Code Adjustment Board on a prior variance. The property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. In March, 1988, the Board granted a variance allowing a tenant in Petitioner's mall, Workplace, to have a building identification sign which is larger than would be allowed under the Code without a variance. In November, 1988, Petitioner was granted a variance for the square footage of a pylon property identification sign with the condition that a Workplace sign not be placed on the pylon property identification sign located at the right of way. Petitioner and this tenant, Workplace, are now seeking removal of this condition in order to allow Workplace to be identified on the existing pylon sign, while leaving Workplace's large building identification sign in place. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variance on June 8, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Workplace is located approximately 800 feet off of U.S. Highway 19, and due to this distance, the prior variance of 97 square feet was granted in March, 1988, to allow a business identification sign of 225 square feet. The Code allows business identification signs up to 128 square feet without a variance. The letters spelling out "Workplace" are from 4 to 6 feet in height. Since opening in May, 1988, Workplace has experienced a steady growth in its business, and now completes approximately 1000 transactions per day. It is an office products store, and is open seven days a week. When the condition was placed on the variance for the pylon identification sign in November, 1988, the property owner agreed to this condition. At this time, it is primarily the tenant, Workplace, which is seeking this variance to eliminate the condition agreed to in November, 1988, by the property owner. Workplace seeks to be allowed to be included on the property identification sign, but is unwilling to immediately conform to Code on its building identification sign, a variance for which was granted in March, 1988, if this currently sought variance is approved. Thus, Workplace seeks to retain its variance for the size of its building identification sign, while also being included on the pylon property identification sign, which is larger than otherwise allowed due to the November, 1988, variance. The reason that the Development Code Adjustment Board approved the variance for Workplace in March, 1988, was that there was no property identification sign on site at that time, and the store was to be located so far off the right of way. This was a newly opening mall, and Workplace was one of the first new tenants to open for business. There are some prior tenants on this property that had business identification signs on their buildings that are in excess of the square footage allowed by the Code, but these are prior nonconforming signs which must be removed or brought into compliance by October, 1992. Section 134.015(c). However, when the property owner sought the variance in square footage limits to erect a pylon property identification sign in November, 1988, the Workplace business identification sign was already in place. Rather than allow Workplace to benefit from two variances, the Board conditioned the November, 1988, variance on precluding Workplace from being shown on the pylon sign. This was a reasonable condition under the circumstances, and was agreed to by the property owner. There was no showing of hardship on behalf of Workplace since business has been very good, and since any concerns about distance from the right of way were fully addressed by the March, 1988, variance.
