Findings Of Fact By Receipt for Deposit Offer to Purchase and Contract for Sale dated April 26, 1971 Michael J. and Mary Martha Solomon deposited with David J. Watson, Respondent herein, a $5,000 earnest money deposit on a house and tract of land in Polk County. This receipt for deposit became a contract for sale when executed by the seller and contained two special clauses that were disputed at the hearing. The first is "This contract is subject to a change in county zoning. The change is from residential to rural conservation for the purpose of keeping horses." The second special clause which purportedly led to the rescission of the contract is "Seller to convey all pumps, air conditioners, and septic tank in good condition." Michael Solomon (hereafter referred to as Solomon) apparently in response to an advertisement, entered Respondent's office to inquire about the property herein involved. Solomon was interested in purchasing the house which was advertised (Exhibit #6) provided he could buy additional land which he intended to develop as lakefront lots. His father, Dr. Solomon, expected to retire soon and move to Florida, and Solomon thought the house would be suitable for his parents who would provide a substantial part of the purchase money at the time of closing. Since his father raised Arabian horses as a hobby he wanted to be sure that he would be able to keep horses on the property. Respondent Watson, being a somewhat inexperienced broker, suggested the zoning change to rural conservation, and the special clause relating to zoning change was put in the contract. Prior to executing the contract Solomon and his wife inspected the premises and, on one occasion prior to the week in which one day was set for closing, Dr. Solomon flew down from Pennsylvania to look over the property. The testimony of the buyers and others involved in this transaction is in irreconcilable conflict with respect to the details leading to rescission of the contract by the buyers. Well prior to the date set for closing Respondent, while Solomon was in his office, called the County Zoning Department to inquire about the zoning on the property involved in the contract. He then learned that the zoning of the property was R-1 (Residential) and that horses could be kept on the property for personal use so long as the stables for feeding and housing were located not less than 100-feet from the residence. This was communicated to the buyer and he accepted this explanation. An official of the County Zoning Department confirmed at the hearing that the property was so zoned and that horses could be maintained on the premises for personal use. He also stated that an administrative determination could permit horses to be raised on the premises as a business venture; however, this issue was not raised at any time by any of the parties to the contract. Although the buyers testified that they requested the Respondent (or his salesman) to obtain in writing from the county zoning officials confirmation that horses could be kept on the property, neither the broker nor the salesman recall any issue being made of the zoning provision prior to the rescission of the contract. In view of the fact that the sale price of the entire parcel would amount to some $250,000 resulting in a commission to the brokers office of approximately $20,000 it is not conceivable that he would have risked losing such a commission by failure to ask the zoning officials for written confirmation that horses could be kept on the property if the buyers had so requested. Shortly before the day set for the closing Solomon's parents arrived and inspected the house. Apparently Mrs. Solomon was not satisfied with the house so Solomon requested a formal inspection the following day. Conditions found at this inspection rest in the eye of the beholder. The buyers all testified the house had been vandalized, paint was thrown in the garage, screens had been ripped off, windows broken, the basement was flooded, the sprinkler system and the air conditioner were inoperative. Others who visited the premises acknowledged that paint had been spilled on the concrete floor of the garage when a paint can had been turned over, but none had ever seen water in the basement, there was no evidence of vandalism, and all equipment was operable. Respondent produced a bill for repairs to the air conditioner, dated prior to the preclosing inspection, which showed charges only for installing new filters. Neither the Respondent nor anyone other than the buyers recall any complaint by the buyers during this inspection. They did recall that the elder Mrs. Solomon did not like the house. The salesman could not point out the location of the septic tank but there was no evidence that it was not functioning properly. At a preclosing conference held in the office of the attorney representing both parties to this transaction the elder Solomons became quite upset regarding the cost of title insurance on the property and indicated then that they would not close as scheduled. Apparently there are only two law offices in Auburndale and one of the lawyers in Auburndale is one of the four sellers of the property. The buyers accepted the attorney in the other office as their attorney with knowledge that he was representing both parties. The evening before the date set for closing Michael Solomon called Respondent Watson to tell him that his mother hated tide house and that he would be unable, to close. Watson advised him that he would forfeit his deposit if he didn't go through with the contract as the sellers were not the type to refund any of the deposit. Clause 11 of the contract provides that the seller may elect to retain the deposit as liquidated damages if he does not choose to sue for specific performance. At the termite inspection conducted prior to closing, termite infestation was noted and treated at the expense of the seller. N indication was raised by any witness that this issue affected the of the contract. After the date set for the closing had passed, Michael Solomon never requested return of his earnest money deposit from Respondent. Approximately one year later mesdames Solomon requested Respondent Watson to return the deposit and he advised them he was unable to do so. Some six weeks after the July 15, 1971 closing date the attorney- seller demanded that Respondent disburse funds due sellers pursuant to Clause 11 of the contract and offered to file suit against ham unless he did so. Respondent contacted the attorney representing sellers and buyers in this transaction for legal advice regarding his responsibilities. He was advised to disburse the funds. He obtained authorization: from the sellers to pay for the air conditioner repairs and for some work done in the yard at the request of Solomon. By checks dated September 7, 1971 Respondent disbursed $502.45 to each of the four sellers. This represented their share of the deposit less expenses.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Martha M. Bustillo is a real estate broker licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0401092. At all times material hereto, she has been the qualifying broker for Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc. Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc., is a real estate brokerage corporation licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0237551. At no time material hereto has Respondent Olga Venedicto been licensed in the State of Florida as either a real estate broker or as a real estate salesperson. In July of 1992 Thomas F. Sevilla contacted Virmar Investments, looking for a house to buy. Olga Venedicto took his phone call and told him that she would help him. Sevilla went to Venedicto's "office" at Virmar Investment and began working with her. Venedicto gave Sevilla her business card which represented that she is the vice president of Virmar Investments, Inc., and carries the notation "registered real estate brokers." In addition to giving him her card which carried her name, Virmar's name, and the word "brokers" in the plural form rather than the singular form, Venedicto specifically told Sevilla that she was a broker. Venedicto and Bustillo took Sevilla to see a house which he decided to buy. He gave Venedicto his check for $2,000 as a deposit and instructed her and Bustillo to make an offer on that house. Venedicto told him she would put the money in Virmar's escrow account. Instead, the money was deposited in Virmar's operating account. Sevilla did not buy that house, and Venedicto and Bustillo took him to see a second house. Sevilla decided not to make an offer on that house and asked Venedicto to refund his money. It took a month before Sevilla received a check from Venedicto. Although the check was marked "deposit return," the check was not written from Virmar's account but rather was a check from a Mega Group Corp. for only $1,675. When Sevilla attempted to cash that check, it was dishonored three times, with the notation "N. S. F." Finally, the check was honored by the bank. Sevilla had expected to receive his entire $2,000 deposit. Neither Venedicto nor Bustillo had ever told him in advance that they would keep part of his money. Although Respondents' attorney during the final hearing implied that his clients may have kept part of Sevilla's money to pay for a survey and credit report, Sevilla had not agreed in advance to pay for a credit report, and no evidence was offered as to what house Sevilla might have purchased a survey on or for what reason. Further, neither Venedicto nor Bustillo gave him a copy of any survey or credit report nor was he ever shown one or advised that either would be obtained. When Sevilla inquired as to why he was reimbursed the lesser amount, only then did Venedicto tell him that Respondents were keeping part of his money for a credit report. Respondents Bustillo and Virmar authorized and assisted Venedicto in her performance of acts and services requiring licensure as a salesperson relative to the transaction with Sevilla. Rita and Carlos Benitez listed their house for sale with Pedro Realty. Gladys Diaz was the listing agent at Pedro Realty. Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto brought Carlos Martinez and his wife to look at the Benitez house. Gladys Diaz was present at the time. Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto subsequently came to Diaz' office and presented to Diaz and Carlos Benitez an offer on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Martinez. Respondent Venedicto represented herself to be a realtor and Respondent Bustillo to be Venedicto's partner and broker. Respondent Venedicto discussed the contract and price with Diaz and Benitez while Respondent Bustillo observed Venedicto's presentation. The offer had previously been signed on behalf of Respondent Virmar by Respondent Venedicto who represented to Diaz that the signature on the offer was that of Respondent Venedicto. Mr. Benitez signed the document, and Diaz then took the offer to Mrs. Benitez to obtain her signature. Mrs. Benitez also signed the offer, thereby completing the contract. Thereafter, delays ensued because Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were not in a financial position to be able to purchase the home. Respondent Venedicto contacted Mrs. Benitez and attempted to re-negotiate the contract. During those negotiations which were not successful, Respondent Venedicto represented herself to Mrs. Benitez as being a licensed real estate agent. In response to Mrs. Benitez' inquiries, Respondent Venedicto gave Benitez her business card carrying the names of Venedicto and Virmar and the notation "registered real estate brokers." As to the portion of the transaction involving Mrs. Benitez, all of her contact with the three Respondents in this cause was with Respondent Venedicto. Venedicto gave Benitez advice regarding proceeding with the sale and handled the negotiations. Prior to September 24, 1992, Hector F. Sehweret, an investigator for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, requested that Respondents Bustillo and Virmar produce certain records for inspection by him. He spoke with Respondent Bustillo on a number of occasions to no avail. He offered to give her time to gather the records if necessary, but she never did. On September 24, 1992, he served Respondent Bustillo with a subpoena for those records. She still failed to produce them. Thereafter, she would not return his phone calls, and when he came to the office of Virmar Investments, Respondent Bustillo would hide from him. Neither Respondent Bustillo nor Respondent Virmar have ever produced the records subpoenaed. Further, no explanation has been given for the failure of Respondents Bustillo and Virmar to produce their records. Although the attorney for Respondents implied during the final hearing that the records may have been destroyed by Hurricane Andrew, there is no evidence to support that implication; rather, the evidence is uncontroverted that the building housing the real estate office of Respondents Virmar and Bustillo was not damaged by Hurricane Andrew. Ileana Hernandez is a realtor and a mortgage broker licensed in the State of Florida. She met Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto during a real estate transaction. In November of 1991 Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto contacted Hernandez regarding obtaining money in exchange for a second mortgage on certain real property. At the time, Respondents did not tell Hernandez the identity of the owner of the property, but Hernandez was given the address of the property and was advised that the market value of the property was approximately $79,000. Hernandez was subsequently advised that Respondent Venedicto (a/k/a Olga Bichara) was the owner of the property. It was agreed that Respondent Venedicto would execute and record the promissory note and mortgage in the amount of $15,500. Hernandez, who knew that Respondent Bustillo was the president of Terra Title, gave her a personal check payable to Terra Title in the amount of $15,000 on November 26, 1991. Respondent Venedicto, who had promised Hernandez that the promissory note and second mortgage would be recorded, never recorded those documents. Further, Respondents never delivered the original copy of the promissory note and mortgage to Hernandez despite her repeated demands. Hernandez later discovered that Respondent Venedicto was not the sole owner of the property which she had attempted to mortgage but jointly owned the property with her son. Accordingly, Respondent Venedicto's signature would not be sufficient to perfect a mortgage on the property. Hernandez also discovered that the mortgage, represented by Bustillo and Venedicto to be a second mortgage, was not. There were already two mortgages on the property. Had Hernandez known the true ownership and the true encumbrances on the property, she would not have loaned Venedicto the $15,000 because that raised the total amount of mortgages on the property to be in excess of the value of the property. Three checks which were subsequently written by Respondent Bustillo from the operating accounts of Respondent Virmar and of Mega Group Corp. were dishonored by the bank with the notation "N. S. F." As a result of those checks, Hernandez obtained default final judgments against Respondent Virmar and against Mega Group Corp., which final judgments are still unsatisfied. Prior to that time, however, Respondents Venedicto and Bustillo approached Hernandez regarding their need to borrow $35,000 to be re-paid in 30 days in conjunction with some real estate development in which Respondents Venedicto and Bustillo were involved. Respondent Venedicto and Respondent Bustillo each individually represented that Hernandez would have her money back in 30 days. Respondent Bustillo told Hernandez that Respondent Venedicto was in business with Bustillo and was selling real estate in Mexico. Bustillo asked Hernandez to make the check payable to Bustillo's company Terra Title. Hernandez went to the offices of Respondent Virmar and handed her personal check made payable to Terra Title to Respondent Venedicto. When the 30 days had passed with no payments to Hernandez, she went to Virmar Investments and made Respondent Venedicto sign a promissory note for $35,000. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, Hernandez had recovered only $15,000 of the $35,000 loan made to Respondent Venedicto and had recovered only the principal amount of the money supposed to have been secured by a second mortgage on real property. Hernandez is still owed $20,000 in principal alone.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking the license of Respondent Martha M. Bustillo, revoking the license of Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc., and requiring Respondent Olga Venedicto to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $5,000 within 30 days from the entry of the Final Order. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-3328, 93-3329, and 93-3330 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-18, 20-29, and 31-33 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 18, 25, 26, 28, 37, 42, 49-52, 55, 57, 62, 63, 69, 71, and 73 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 6, 11-17, 19-22, 30- 36, 43, 46-48, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 67 and 68 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 10, 23, 29, 61, 64, 65, 70, 72, and 75 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 24, 27, 38-41, 44, and 45 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 59, 66, 74, and 76-78 are rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308A Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ofer M. Amir, Esquire Amir & Associates, P.A. 8751 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 500 Plantation, Florida 33324 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Richard L. Faircloth has held a real estate salesman's license, No. SL 0407933, issued by petitioner Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, authorizing him to work, since July 16, 1990, as a salesman for Discount Realty-Fla., Inc., a corporate broker in Alachua, Florida, whose "qualifying broker" is respondent's wife, Lise H. Faircloth. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On December 1, 1990, Alvin and Betty J. Wilson came to Mr. Faircloth's office in Alachua to sign a form deposit receipt and purchase and sale agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, by which they offered to purchase a house on Northwest 18th Terrace in Gainesville; and they gave Mr. Faircloth five hundred dollars in cash, as earnest money. Mr. Faircloth did not recall at hearing whether he put the money in his pocket at that point, but the money was never deposited in an escrow or trust account. After Mr. and Mrs. Wilson left, Mr. Faircloth communicated their offer by telephone to a representative of the house's owner. The offer was declined. When he telephoned the Wilsons with the news, he asked them to come back to his office. With their return later that day, a conversation lasting about an hour and a half began, at the end of which the Wilsons authorized respondent and his broker to retain the earnest money deposit for use in the event respondent located another house they decided to make an offer to purchase. For the same purpose, Mrs. Wilson later wrote respondent a check in the amount of $1,500, which was duly deposited in the broker's escrow account. Shortly thereafter, respondent drew a check on the escrow account in Mr. Wilson's favor in the amount of $200 (so he could pay an electric bill), but the bank refused to cash it. Funds in the escrow account were insufficient, because the Wilsons' $1,500 check had bounced. Mr. Faircloth also wrote a check the Wilsons used as a deposit when they rented a truck to move into a duplex they rented from him. The deposit check was ultimately returned to respondent, without being cashed. (When the Wilsons moved, respondent regained possession of the dog he had earlier given the Wilsons' son. He was never reimbursed $78 he expended for the care and feeding of this dog, after it had become the Wilsons' property.) The Wilsons paid $450 a month, in advance, while they rented the duplex, and nobody ever asked for a security deposit. When Mrs. Wilson received a check from Beneficial National Bank (who lent money against an anticipated tax refund) in the amount of $1,466, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, she endorsed it in favor of respondent or the broker and, as far as the evidence showed, this money was put in escrow (although $200 might have been deducted beforehand.) In any event, respondent transferred $200 to the Wilsons more or less contemporaneously. Altogether, the Wilsons entrusted respondent with $1,776 ($500 + $1466 - $200 = $1,766) for possible use as earnest money. After Mr. and Mrs. Wilson bought a house respondent had shown them in December of 1990, but through another broker's office, without availing themselves of Mr. Faircloth's assistance in closing the transaction, they asked him to return the money they had given him. He gave them a check signed by his wife, drawn on a Discount Realty-Fla., Inc. account in the amount of $1,316, on which was written "return of deposit less 450 00/100 security." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The check was dated April 17, 1991. At hearing, Mr. Faircloth testified that the $1,316 check to the Wilsons represented a $50 overpayment. He conceded that $450 had been improperly deducted from the moneys the Wilsons paid, as a claimed security deposit. But he contended that he and the Wilsons had agreed to a non- refundable, $500 "finder's fee" during their second visit on December 1, 1990. In fact, the Wilsons never agreed to any finder's fee, non-refundable or otherwise. At the time it was received, respondent and his wife gave two receipts for the Wilsons' $500. Each reflected that it was to be deposited as earnest money, and no subsequent writing indicated any different agreement between the parties. As late as April of 1991, respondent's conduct, notably delivery of the $1,316 check to the Wilsons, was inconsistent with the putative agreement about a finder's fee he testified to at hearing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 14 day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. Copies furnished to: Janine Myrick, Esquire P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 33802 Richard L. Faircloth Post Office Box 1859 Alachua, FL 32615 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of August, 1992. Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact In early July, 1972, Donald R. and Pamela S. Leininger (buyer) entered into a contract to purchase a residence through Sun Up Realty with its salesman, Bernard Zapel. The real property involved and Sun Up Realty were owned by Defendant, Norman N. Zipkin either as sole proprietor or as sole shareholder of the corporation in whose name the property was held. Disclosure of the role of Defendant as owner-seller was not an issue in these proceedings. Buyer executed two contracts for the purchase of the property both dated July 9, 1972. The first contract acknowledged receipt of $100 as a deposit with a down payment to be made of $1750 with the buyer obtaining a mortgage of $33,250. Noted on this contract are two additional payments of $650 and $1,000. All of these deposits were payable to and deposited in Sun Up Realty's Escrow Account. The second deposit receipt contract was also dated July 9, 1972 and receipt of $1750 was thereon acknowledged by seller. The sale price of $35,000 applied to both contracts. The second contract provided as terms and conditions of sale that the buyer would make an additional deposit of $1700 before closing and that buyer was to apply for, qualify, and obtain a mortgage insured by FHA. Papers to so qualify were sent to the bank but buyer never qualified for the loan. The Administrative Complaint indicates that the first document executed by the buyer provided for an FHA insured mortgage; the evidence presented was as noted above. Apparently to allow buyer additional time to qualify for the loan Defendant leased the premises to buyer pursuant to lease agreement (Exhibit 5). Although Defendant testified buyer paid him nothing while he occupied the house pursuant to this lease agreement, in his deposition (Exhibit 1) buyer presented a receipt for one month's rent paid to the seller for the premises. Buyer never qualified for the mortgage because the lending agency was never satisfied from whence the additional $1700 down payment was to come. Although no evidence was presented on this point it appears that this additional deposit was required for buyer to reach a 10 percent down payment on the price of the residence. The July 9, 1972 deposit receipt contract that was in effect with respect to this transaction provides in pertinent part: "2. An additional sum of seventeen hundred dollars ($1700) shall be deposited with Escrow Agent before closing. In the event such sum is not so deposited, Seller at his option may cancel and terminate this agreement." "3. Buyer to apply for, qualify for, and obtain a Mortgage insured by the FHA Section in an amount not less than $31,550. In the event the Buyer fails to qualify for said mortgage, all said deposit shall be returned immediately, less the cost of the credit report. "14. It is mutually agreed that the trans action shall be closed and the Buyer shall pay the balance of the first payment and execute any and all papers necessary to be executed by him for the completion of this purchase within days from the aforementioned abstract of title, or such time as shall reasonably be required by seller to make such title good, otherwise the herein named Escrow Agent is hereby directed by both Seller and Buyer to divide the monies being held by said Escrow Agent, under the terms under this Contract between the Seller and Broker herein named as hereinafter provided." "It is further agreed that in case of default by the Buyers, the Seller may at his option take legal action at law and/or in equity to enforce this Contract, in which event, the Buyer shall pay reasonable attorney fees and court costs; or else the Seller may at his option retain one half of the deposit herein paid as considera tion for the release of the Buyer by the Seller from any and all further obligations under this Contract to the Seller, which release shall be implied from such act of retention by the Seller." Buyer quit the premises in October, 1972 and thereafter demanded return of his deposit from seller. By letter from buyer's attorney (Exhibit 6) dated March 19, 1973 demand was made for return of the deposit. By letter dated March 23, 1973 (Exhibit 7) Seller denied the refund of the deposit on grounds that the buyer had breached the contract as the Buyer had qualified for and been approved for a mortgage by the Collateral Mortgage Co. The money was withdrawn from the escrow account and paid to the seller. Defendant is an attorney, mortgage broker, general contractor, developer and real estate broker. For the past decade he has devoted most of his energies toward real estate development. This is the first time charges have been preferred against him by the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Findings Of Fact Respondent met Sibley Dennis Carpenter, Jr. (Carpenter) in 1974 or 1975, in connection with a land sale that is not otherwise relevant to this matter. In the summer of 1975, Carpenter asked respondent for assistance in obtaining financing for another, separate land transaction. On that occasion, Carpenter furnished respondent an unaudited, personal financial statement, prepared by an accounting firm, which put the net worth of Carpenter and his wife at slightly less than a half million dollars. On November 19, 1975, respondent became affiliated with Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., as a real estate salesman. Because he had other irons in the fire, he only appeared at the office of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., once every month or two. Not until the spring of the following year, after he had been licensed as a real estate broker, did respondent have access to the company's books. In November of 1975, respondent met one Charles W. Van Cura, a hog farmer from Minnesota who expressed an interest in buying land in Florida, and referred Mr. Van Cura to Carpenter. Carpenter, possibly in the company of respondent, showed Mr. Van Cura certain real property belonging to Harvey H. Westphal and Margaret Westphal. Mr. Van Cura made an offer of one hundred fifteen thousand dollars ($115,000.00) for the property and deposited seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter towards the purchase price, as evidenced by a binder receipt and deposit, dated December 31, 1975, and signed by Carpenter. Respondent's exhibit No. 1. Carpenter presented the offer to the Westphals, who refused Mr. Van Cura's offer but made a counteroffer of one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00), by crossing out Mr. Van Cura's figures, substituting their own and signing their names. Both the offer and the counteroffer were "subject to receiving Federal Land Bank Loan of 70 percent of purchase price . . ." Van Cura told Carpenter he was unwilling to accept the Westphals' counteroffer. Carpenter persuaded respondent to buy the property himself, and, on January 6, 1976, Carpenter, respondent and Van Cura met in respondent's office. After some discussion, respondent drew two checks aggregating seventy- five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) to Van Cura's order. Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 6. Van Cura executed a receipt, respondent's exhibit No. 2, reciting that he had received seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) from respondent. At the time of this transaction, Carpenter could not have refunded Van Cura's deposit from the escrow account of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., because there were insufficient funds in the account. Unbeknownst to respondent, Carpenter had never deposited Van Cura's money in the escrow account. On January 30, 1976, Carpenter drew up a written offer on behalf of respondent to purchase the Westphal property for one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00). Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. The binder receipt and deposit recited that respondent "and or assigns" had deposited seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter in earnest money. Although the Westphals accepted this offer, the transaction never closed, for reasons which were not developed in the evidence. The Westphals never made demand for the seventy-five hundred dollar ($7,500.00) deposit, and respondent never got the money back from Carpenter. Respondent has since decided to "treat it . . . as a loan, or write it off." (R119) At no time did respondent relate to the Westphals the history of the earnest money deposit. In May of 1976, respondent was licensed as a real estate broker, and became secretary-treasurer of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc. Respondent and Carpenter agreed between themselves that the corporation should open an escrow account on which each could draw individually. This is reflected by a corporate resolution, dated May 4, 1976. Respondent's exhibit No. 7. Such an account was opened. When the first bank statement revealed to respondent that Carpenter had drawn improper checks against the escrow account, however, a second corporate resolution was drafted, dated July 23, 1976, respondent's exhibit No. 9, which authorized respondent, but not Carpenter, to draw against the escrow account.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. W. O. Birchfield, Esquire 3000 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether petitioners are entitled to payment from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund, and if so, in what amounts. A further issue is in what order of priority the claims should be paid. Based upon all of the evidence, including the pleadings filed in this cause, the following findings of fact are deter- mined:
Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1978, the Respondents, C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation (hereafter Respondents or Chapman) through a registered real estate salesman in the employ of the Respondents, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Gerry and Ada Ball, as buyers or purchasers and Joseph Winston, as seller, for the sale of property located at 305 Ben Avon Drive, Tampa, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, the Respondents' salesman received a $1,000.00 deposit from the purchasers which was placed in the Respondents' trust account on May 5, 1978. Prior to the date of the scheduled closing, the purchasers inspected the property and requested the seller to make certain repairs and/or replacements to rectify defects which included wood borer damage, structural roof problems and an inoperable pool heater. The seller refused to make the repairs and/or replacements demanded and the offer was formally withdrawn by the purchasers on July 28, 1978, via letter to Chapman Realty requesting return of their $1,000.00 earnest money deposit. Prior to formal withdrawal of the offer, verbal demands were made by Mr. Hall upon Chapman Realty for the return of his deposit. The demand for repairs and/or replacements and withdrawal of the offer was predicated on a provision of the sales contract which provided: Buyers themselves, or at their expense may have property inspected to ensure that there are no structural, electrical or plumbing defects. If any are found, buyers have the right to withdraw their offer and have all of their earnest deposit refunded to them. Thereafter, Respondent Chapman disbursed the $1,000.00 as follows: $350.00 via check dated September 6, 1978, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell, an attorney-at-law in Florida. $500.00 via check dated January 9, 1979, made payable to purchasers Hall. $150.00 via check dated January 10, 1979, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell. Prior to any disbursal the Respondent Chapman discussed with Mr. Hall the possibility of placing the escrowed funds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Respondent Chapman contacted his attorney, Robert Carbonell, regarding the conflicting demands of the parties. Mr. Carbonell was introduced to Mr. Hall by the Respondent over the telephone. The Respondent met with Mr. Carbonell on a regular basis since Mr. Carbonell was employed by the Respondent to handle real estate transactions involving Chapman Realty. Respondent was never authorized by the purchasers to pay a fee to Mr. Carbonell directly from the $1,000.00 deposit held in trust. The $500.00 was paid directly by the Respondent to Attorney Carbonell from the Chapman Realty escrow account without oral or written authorization of the seller or the purchasers and in the absence of a settlement agreement between the Hall's and Mr. Winston. Although Mr. Carbonell and the Respondent Chapman believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing Mr. Hall, neither Mr. Hall nor the seller, Mr. Winston, were under the same impression. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Winston believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing the Respondents rather than Mr. Hall. Such an impression was reasonable in light of Mr. Carbonell's regular employment by the Respondent, the absence of a written agreement between Mr. Hall and Mr. Carbonell coupled with the lack of discussion or agreement concerning fees and the potential conflicting positions which existed between the parties and the Respondents. If any fee were due to Attorney Carbonell for his efforts in securing the return of the $1,000.00 deposit, this was a matter between Mr. Carbonell and Mr. Hall. Neither Mr. Carbonell nor the Respondent Chapman discussed the amount of the fee with the Halls. Mr. Carbonell arrived at the amount he thought was reasonable, $500.00, and Respondent Chapman diverted such amount to Mr. Carbonell from the Respondent's escrow account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents', C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation licenses to practice real estate be suspended until restitution is made to Gerry and Ada A. Hall, as follows: $500.00 plus interest at 12 percent accrued since July 28, 1978, and Interest on $500.00 accrued at 12 percent for the period from July 28, 1973 until January 9, 1979. Respondents' licenses to be reinstated upon submission and acceptance by the Board of Real Estate of satisfactory evidence of payment. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Staff Attorney 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale W. Vash, Esquire DIXON, LAWSON & BROWN 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue Whether the Respondent's real estate license in Florida should be disciplined because the Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined because the Respondent failed to account and deliver funds in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Joyce A. Wolford is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0313643 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, t/a Blue Ribbon Realty, 1400 N. Semoran Boulevard, Orlando, Florida 32807. As To Counts I and II Diane Ortiz was employed by Respondent Joyce Wolford to perform various duties, including operating the computer and taking messages. During her employment with Respondent, Diane Ortiz completed a contract for sale and purchase of certain real property which was signed by Jane Evers as buyer. In conjunction with the Evers contract, Ortiz did receive an earnest money deposit in the form of a cashier's check for the sum of $1000 and made payable to Blue Ribbon Realty. The earnest money deposit check given by Evers was turned over to Respondent by Ortiz. The endorsement on the Evers deposit check was Blue Ribbon Realty. The sale was contingent on Evers' assumption of the existing mortgage. The mortgagee did not approve Evers, and the transaction did not close. Evers contacted Ortiz and Respondent on several occasions and demanded return of her $1,000 deposit. Evers met personally with Respondent and demanded return of the $1,000 deposit. Evers sent a written demand for the return of the deposit by certified mail to Respondent on August 9, 1989. Despite Evers repeated demands for return of the $1000 deposit, Respondent has not returned any money to Evers. Jane Evers filed a lawsuit against Respondent Joyce Wolford in the County Court for Orange County, Florida, for the sum of $1,000 and court costs. A Final Judgment in the civil lawsuit was rendered for Jane Evers against Joyce Wolford for $1,000 principal plus $73 in court costs on March 15, 1990. Respondent has not satisfied the Final Judgment awarded to Evers or any portion thereof. As To Counts III and IV Anthony Pellegrino did enter a contract to purchase certain real property known as Lakefront Motel near Clermont, Florida. Respondent Joyce Wolford did negotiate the contract. Pellegrino did give Respondent a $5,000 earnest money deposit in the form of a cashier's check to secure the contract for purchase of Lakefront Motel. The cashier's check given as a deposit by Pellegrino was endorsed to Blue Ribbon Realty account #0880510063. The Lakefront transaction did not close, and Pellegrino demanded that Respondent return the $5,000 earnest money deposit on several occasions. Respondent has not returned the $5,000 deposit or any portion thereof to Pellegrino. The $5,000 earnest money deposit for the Lakefront contract was transferred to a mortgage company for a transaction involving a condominium that Pellegrino sought to purchase. Said condominium transaction did not close. In neither case did Respondent request the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue an escrow disbursement order. On July 2, 1990, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order in the case of Department of Professional Regulation v. Joyce Wolford, finding Respondent guilty of failure to account and deliver a commission to a salesman and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine of $1000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of having violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1989), as charged in Counts I, II, III and IV of the Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that Respondent's real estate license be suspended for two years, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000 and, upon completion of the suspension period, placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years with such conditions as the Commission may find just and reasonable. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,1,7,18,19,20,21,22,24 (in part), 25 Rejected as cumulative or irrelevant: 7,8,23,24 (in part) Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraph 1 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence: Paragraph 2,3 COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Raymond Bodiford, Esquire 47 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner on May 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Mercedes M. Powers and Patricia A. Fleck, were both licensed as real estate brokers, having been issued license numbers 0151412 and 0027277, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Fleck served as qualifying broker for Patricia A. Fleck Real Estate, 5466 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida, while Powers was employed as a broker-salesperson at the same firm. Douglas K. Rogers, a Spring Hill resident, was interested in purchasing a lot in a Spring Hill subdivision and observed a "for sale" sign on Lot 7 at 12287 Elmore Drive. The lot was owned by Wayne and Faith Ryden, who resided in North Hero, Vermont. Rogers contacted the Rydens by telephone in mid or late March 1997 to ascertain the price of the lot. Rogers had also seen a nearby lot for sale carrying a sign from Respondents' firm. On March 23, 1997, he telephoned Powers and inquired about another lot in the same subdivision. Powers contacted the owners but learned that they did not want to sell. After relaying this advice to Rogers, she told him that she had a listing on Lot 6; however, Rogers was not interested in Lot 6 and merely indicated he would "get back" to her later. On April 3, 1997, Rogers again telephoned Powers and told her he was interested in purchasing Lot 7, which was owned by the Rydens. Powers invited Rogers to come to her office where she would call the sellers. Powers then "ran the public record" and learned that the Rydens owned the lot. On Friday, April 4, 1997, in the presence of Rogers, Powers telephoned Mrs. Ryden and spoke with her for three or four minutes. In response to an inquiry from Mrs. Ryden, Powers indicated that if the Rydens listed the property with her, she would represent the sellers; otherwise, she would represent the buyer in the transaction. Based on Mrs. Ryden's response, Powers was led to believe that the Rydens wanted Powers to represent them in the transaction. Accordingly, she explained the arrangement to Rogers, and he voluntarily signed an Agency Disclosure form which acknowledged that he understood, and agreed with, that arrangement. With Powers' assistance, that same day Rogers executed a contract for the sale and purchase of Lot 7 for a price of $8,500.00. The contract called for the sellers to accept the offer no later than April 7, 1997, or three days later, and that the contract would close by May 15, 1997, unless extended by the parties. The contract further called for Rogers to provide a $200.00 cash deposit, which was "to be placed in escrow by 4-7-97." The contract, listing agreement, and expense report were all sent by overnight mail to the Rydens the same day. Because Rogers did not have sufficient cash for a deposit with him, he advised Powers that he would return with a check the following Monday, or April 7. Notwithstanding the language in the contract, he gave Powers specific instructions that when he delivered a check, she was to hold it until the Rydens signed the contract, and then deposit the money. This is confirmed by a contemporaneous note made by Powers which read: "Mr. Rogers will bring check Monday. Then to hold until Rydens sign contract, then deposit it." Rogers testified that he delivered check no. 3497 in the amount of $200.00 to a receptionist in Respondents' office approximately two hours after he executed the contract. He also says he got the receptionist to make a copy of the face of the check, which has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. If in fact a check was actually delivered to a receptionist that day, that person lost the check and never advised Powers or Fleck (or anyone else) that one had been delivered. Indeed, until June 6, 1997, Respondents were not aware that one was purportedly delivered, and they never saw a copy of the face of the check until they received the Administrative Complaint, with attached exhibits, in May 1998. The original check has never surfaced, and it was never presented for payment to the bank. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Respondents to deposit the check in the firm's escrow account, as required by rule and statute. According to a Division investigator, there have been other instances where a realtor denies receiving a deposit from the buyer. It can be fairly inferred from his testimony that when this occurs, if the realtor's denial is accepted as being true, the realtor will not be held accountable. At no time did Respondents ever intend to violate any rule or statute governing the deposit of escrow funds; had they known that a check had been delivered to the firm, it would have been handled in an appropriate manner. The contract technically expired on April 7, 1997, when the Rydens had not yet accepted the offer. However, on April 8, 1997, Powers again contacted Mrs. Ryden by telephone since Powers had not received a reply. Based on that conversation, which led Powers to believe that the Rydens may not have received the first set of documents, Powers re-sent by overnight mail copies of the contract, agency disclosure, and expense sheet to the Rydens with a request that they either accept or refuse the contract, but in either event, to return the contract and let her know their decision. The Rydens, however, never extended her the courtesy of a reply. It is fair to infer from the evidence that by now, Rogers had again contacted the Rydens by telephone about purchasing the lot in a separate transaction so that the parties would not have to pay a realtor's commission. Rogers telephoned Powers once or twice in April or May 1997 to ask if the contract had ever been returned by the Rydens. He made no mention of his check. Those inquiries are somewhat puzzling since Rogers was well aware of the fact that the parties intended to negotiate a separate agreement. In any event, on the reasonable belief that the contract had never been accepted, and no deposit had ever been made by Rogers, Powers did nothing more about the transaction until June 6, 1997, when Rogers telephoned her at home that evening asking for "his check." By then, he had a separate binding contract with the Rydens for the sale of the lot; he had already stopped payment on the check a week earlier; and he knew that it had never been deposited. Powers advised Rogers that if in fact his check was at the office, he could drop by the next day at 10:30 a.m. and get it from the broker. Rogers came to the office the next morning, but he arrived at around 8:45 a.m., or well before Powers expected him. In Powers' absence, the on-duty receptionist was unsuccessful in locating his file (which was in Powers' office) and the check. On June 14, 1997, Rogers sent a complaint to the Division. That complaint triggered this proceeding. It is fair to infer that Rogers filed the complaint to gain leverage in the event Respondents ever brought an action against him to recover their lost real estate commission. Unknown to Respondents, on June 10, 1997, the sale was completed, and the Rydens executed and delivered a warranty deed to Rogers and his wife conveying the property in question. For all their efforts in attempting to accommodate Rogers, Respondents were deprived of a real estate commission through the covert acts of the buyer and seller, and they were saddled with the legal costs of defending this action. In terms of mitigating and aggravating factors, it is noted that Fleck was never involved with this transaction until the demand for the check was made in June 1997. There is no evidence that Powers has ever been disciplined by the Real Estate Commission on any prior occasion. On an undisclosed date, however, Fleck received a fine and was required to complete a 30-hour broker management course for failing to adequately supervise a "former rental manager" and failing to "timely notify FREC of deposit dispute." Neither Rogers or the Rydens suffered any harm by virtue of the deposit check being lost, and the parties completed the transaction on their own without paying a commission. During the course of the investigation, Respondents fully cooperated with the Division's investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ghunise Coaxum, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Charlie Luckie, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 907 Brooksville, Florida 34605-0907 William M. Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Defendant was registered with Plaintiff as an active broker, holding certificate NO. 0182756. On or about October 4, 1976, a Contract for Sale of Real Estate ("the contract") was entered into between Merit Properties Corporation as seller, Frances G. Williams ("the buyer") as buyer, and Defendant as "agent." The contract was for purchase and sale of certain real property and improvements located in Tampa, Florida. The contract provided that purchase of the property was contingent upon the buyer qualifying for and obtaining an FHA mortgage in the amount of $20,850. At the time the contract was signed, the Defendant obtained a $300.00 deposit from the buyer, and at some later date, accepted an additional deposit of $550.00, making a total deposit of $850.00 toward the purchase price of the property. The contract provides that the deposit shall apply as part of the purchase price of the property "...and shall be held by said Agent in escrow pending closing of [the] transaction..." In addition, the contract provides that upon closing of the transaction "[t]he Seller agrees to pay said Agent a sum equal to 7 percent of the purchase price as commission...." Finally, the contract contained a provision indicating that "[n]o agreements, unless incorporated in this contract shall be binding upon the Agent, Buyer, or, Seller." Sometime in late 1976, the buyer applied to Mortgage Associates, Inc. for an FHA mortgage. On or about November 5, 1976, this application was rejected. On or about November 29, 1976, the buyer again applied for an FHA mortgage, this time through Charles F. Curry and Company. This mortgage application was rejected on December 10, 1976. Defendant was aware that the buyer had applied for an FHA mortgage through Charles F. Curry and Company. Written notification of rejection of the buyer's application through this company was sent to the buyer, but a copy was not forwarded by Charles F. Curry and Company to Defendant. The record establishes, however, that Charles F. Curry and Company's general practice was to notify real estate brokers involved in financing transactions of the disposition of mortgage loan applications. Defendant denies receiving any such notification from Charles F. Curry and Company. On several occasions, after the aforesaid rejections of the buyer's mortgage loan applications, the buyer attempted to contact Defendant by telephone, but was unsuccessful in these attempts. Subsequently, on February 21, 1977, the buyer orally advised Defendant that her mortgage loan application had been rejected, and requested return of her $850.00 deposit. When Defendant did not return the deposit, the buyer retained an attorney to assist her in recovering her deposit. Finally, pursuant to a Compromise and Settlement Agreement dated September 5, 1978, Defendant returned the buyer's deposit of $850.00, together with an additional $100.00 as accrued interest. However, of this $950.00 total, the buyer received only $650.00. The remaining $300.00 constituted a fee which the buyer had to pay to her attorney for services rendered in recovering the deposit. Defendant was a substantial owner of Merit Properties Corporation, the purported seller of the real property here involved. Evidence of record in this proceeding clearly establishes that Defendant did not deposit the $850.00 earnest money deposit received from the buyer in an escrow account maintained either in his own name or in the name of Merit Properties Corporation. In fact, Defendant admits that the $850.00 deposit was used to make improvements to the real property which was the subject matter of the contract. Defendant contends that he received the earnest money deposit from the buyer as an officer of Merit Properties Corporation, and that he had an oral understanding with the buyer entered into prior to the execution of the contract that the money so received would note be held in escrow, but would be used to make improvements on the property. These contentions are not supported by the evidence and are specifically rejected. The record clearly establishes that during negotiations leading to the signing of the contract, Defendant informed the buyer that he was a real estate broker. In addition, the record also establishes that Defendant prepared the contract, and was therefore responsible for the wording of that document. The contract clearly provides that Defendant acted as "agent" for Merit Properties Corporation, and that as such, he was to receive a 7 percent commission on the purchase price at the closing of the transaction. By the very terms of the contract, therefore, Defendant was acting in the capacity of a real estate broker in this transaction. In addition, the contention that there existed an oral agreement between Defendant and the buyer prior to the signing of the contract to use the deposit money for construction purposes is not supported by the evidence of record in this proceeding, and, in fact, is directly contrary to the language contained in the contract document prepared by Defendant. Finally, Defendant contends that he never refused to return the buyer's deposit, but informed her that the deposit would be returned upon the buyer furnishing to Defendant both a copy of correspondence rejecting the buyer's mortgage loan application, and a "release." There is no provision in the contract involved in this transaction which would require the buyer to furnish Defendant any sort of "release", or to furnish notice of inability to obtain the necessary financing in any specific form. Thus, oral demand for return of the deposit was clearly permissible under the terms of the contract. Further, Defendant was aware of the fact that the buyer had applied for mortgage financing through Charles F. Curry and Company, and therefore could either have obtained a copy of the rejection of the buyer's mortgage loan application himself had he chosen to do so, or could at the least have inquired of that company as to the disposition of the buyer's application. Both Plaintiff and Defendant have submitted Proposed Findings of Fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in this Recommended Order, they have been rejected as either not having been supported by the evidence, or as having been irrelevant to the issues in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Board of Real Estate, suspending Defendant's real estate broker's license No. 0182756 for a period of sixty (60) days from the date of final agency action in this proceeding. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gwynne A. Young, Esquire Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601 ================================================================= AGENCY MEMORANDUM ================================================================= DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone 904-488-6692 MEMORANDUM TO: C. B. Stafford, Executive Director, Board of Real Estate E. B. Ashley, Administrator on Investigations FROM: John Huskins, Assistant General Counsel SUBJECT: FINAL ACTION - Suspension PD 3402 (DOAH 79-744) James E. Black, Broker 182756-1 DATE: February 6, 1981 This is to advise you that by FINAL ORDER dated September 15, 1980 (copy attached) the license of James E. Black was suspended for six (6) months, effective October 16, 1980, provided no appeal was taken. Black did appeal. January 21, 1991 the Appellate Court entered its ORDER dismissal of appeal (copy attached), therefore, suspension became effective immediately. Broker Black, through his lawyer, delivered to me Black's Certificate Number: 182756, as individual broker Certificate Number: 182755, as corporate-Best Opportunity Realty Corporation. both of which are attached to this memo to C. B. Stafford. It is suggested that revocation records be updated to reflect suspension and the effective date. It is further suggested that investigation be made as necessary to determine if James E. Black is in fact refraining from real estate activities, in compliance with his suspension. JH/pkr Enclosures* cc: Mr. Michael Schwartz, General Counsel Susan Penquite, Central Files Mr. Fred Wilson, Assistant General Counsel Ms. Renata Hendrick, Supervisor of Records * NOTE: Enclosures noted are not available at the Division and therefore not a part of this ACCESS document.
