The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in its employment decisions in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Oscar Jones (Petitioner), is a black male. He began working for Respondent in July 1997, as a longshoreman working on "chicken boats." In that position, Petitioner loaded boxes of frozen chicken into the holds of refrigerated ships. Respondent, Coastal Maritime Services, LLC (Respondent), is engaged in the business of stevedoring and seaport terminal operations, including loading and unloading ships, and receiving cargo. On May 28, 1998, Respondent injured himself when a very heavy box of frozen chicken fell on his ankle. Other than first aid at the worksite, Petitioner declined further medical treatment that day. He was given a medical form authorizing treatment at the medical clinic which provided medical services to injured employees who might be covered under Respondent's workers' compensation insurance. The next day, on May 29, 1998, Petitioner sought medical treatment for his injury at the medical facility which handled Respondent's workers' compensation injuries. As part of that treatment, Petitioner was asked to take a drug test and Petitioner consented. Although no formal written drug test policy was in effect by Respondent at the time of Petitioner's injury, the general policy and practice was that a work-related injury would subject an employee to a voluntary drug test. Petitioner's drug test came back positive for marijuana. As a result of the positive drug test result, Respondent's insurance carrier controverted Petitioner's workers' compensation claim. There was no evidence that Respondent's management had any responsibility or involvement in the carrier's decision to controvert Petitioner's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. During the 12-month time period of January 1998 through December 1998, Petitioner was not the only employee of Respondent required to take a drug test after a work place injury. In fact, in June 1998 (the same time period as Petitioner's test) seven white employees were required to take a drug test and three black employees were required to take a drug test. For the entire 1998 calendar year, 51 total drug tests were administered, with 31 of those tests administered to non- black employees (for example, white or Hispanic) and only 21 of those tests administered to black employees. Similarly, for the entire 1998 calendar year, a total of 18 employees were not administered drug tests, either because medical attention was refused or because of the severity of the injury. Of those 18 employees, 11 were non-black employees and seven were black employees. Employees who were not required to take a drug test either were those who refused medical attention or who were severely injured and had to seek treatment from hospital emergency rooms where drug tests were not given. Clearly, race played no factor in who was required to take a drug test or who received a drug test. Petitioner did cite the names of two white employees, Jay Chavers and Andy Wiley, who allegedly were treated more favorably than Petitioner, in that those two employees did not take a drug test. However, those two employees were not "similarly situated" to Petitioner. First, the injuries of both Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley were much more serious in nature than the contusion (bruise) that Petitioner had suffered and both were taken to emergency rooms for their injuries where drug tests were not routinely administered. Specifically, Mr. Chavers had fallen from a high distance and suffered numerous broken bones, thus, rendering him incapable of giving consent to a drug test at the hospital. As to Mr. Wiley, his injuries were not subject to workers' compensation coverage, unlike Petitioner's. Thus, given the nature of the injuries of Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley, those two individuals were not sufficiently "similarly situated" to Petitioner to enable him to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Petitioner's positive drug test result had no other impact on his employment with Respondent, apart from the controversion of his workers' compensation benefits. Indeed, Respondent attempted to get Petitioner to return to work. Shortly thereafter, in early June 1998, Petitioner contacted the chief financial officer of Respondent, Kathleen Wiley, who in 1998 was Respondent's office manager. Petitioner expressed concern to Ms. Wiley about his workers' compensation benefits and his employment status with Respondent. Ms. Wiley informed Petitioner that he was still considered to be employed with Respondent and that he needed to contact Ben Brown for a light duty assignment. Petitioner was expressly informed that light duty work was available that would meet his medical restrictions imposed after his injury. Petitioner never followed-up with Mr. Brown about light duty work. Almost immediately thereafter in June 1998, Respondent hired Bud Underwood as its new safety manager. Mr. Underwood's responsibilities were to oversee workers' compensation cases and follow up on accidents and injured employees. Ms. Wiley informed Mr. Underwood to follow up on the situation of Petitioner to get him to return for a light duty assignment. In late June or early July 1998, Mr. Underwood contacted Petitioner as directed and offered him light duty work within his medical restrictions. Petitioner informed Mr. Underwood in very obscene terms that he was not going to accept any light duty assignments. Petitioner never appeared for any light duty assignments after that conversation. Based upon Petitioner's response to that telephonic offer of light duty employment, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter around July 9, 1998, informing him that based upon his refusal of light duty work, he had been deemed to have abandoned his employment, and thus was no longer employed by Respondent due to self-termination. Thereafter, in September 1998, Petitioner contacted Respondent by telephone seeking employment. However, by that time, opportunities for longshoremen, such as Mr. Jones were extremely limited, as the "chicken boat" operation had all but shut down for financial reasons, and no positions were available at the time. Thus, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter dated September 2, 1998, informing him that no positions were available, but encouraging him to reapply. Despite the invitation to Petitioner that he should reapply, Petitioner never submitted any subsequent inquiry for employment. Respondent's "chicken boat" operation had shut down completely by February 1999. Petitioner later applied for unemployment compensation benefits, but those benefits were denied on the ground that Petitioner had abandoned his employment by refusing the light duty work that was offered to him. In fact, in an evidentiary hearing held in his unemployment compensation matter, the Unemployment Appeals Referee found as a fact that Petitioner admitted that he had refused the light duty work offered to him. Petitioner's appeal of that adverse decision was, likewise, denied by the Unemployment Appeals Commission. Petitioner's race played no role in Respondent's determination that Petitioner had abandoned his employment or in Respondent's determination that no position existed for Petitioner in September 1998. Similarly, race played no role in the insurance carrier's decisions regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation benefits. In fact, Petitioner voluntarily settled his workers' compensation claim disputes in a settlement agreement signed by him and his attorney dated March 22, 1999. Petitioner had a family to support and needed the money. Pursuant to that settlement agreement, Petitioner agreed to accept $4,500 in full, final and complete settlement, release and discharge of any and all claims against the employer arising out of Petitioner's alleged accident, injury, and disability in issue, including, but not limited to claims for temporary total, temporary partial, permanent total, and/or permanent partial disability compensation, and past and future medical benefits. Petitioner verified that the settlement was adequate and was not entered into under duress. Rather, Petitioner of his own accord thought that the settlement was in his best interest. The Department of Labor approved the settlement. Petitioner has made no credible showing that there was any relationship between his race and the adverse employment actions of which he has complained.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Reed Corbin, Esquire Richard L. Ruth, Jr., Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 121 West Forsyth Street Suite 1000 Post Office Box 41566 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Oscar Jones 1817 East 27th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, tested positive for marijuana metabolites, indicating the unlawful use of a controlled substance, as Petitioner alleges; if so, whether and what discipline should be imposed against Respondent’s certificate?
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer, having been issued certificate number 240412 on May 17, 2004. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by the Town of Palm Beach Police Department (the Town). On June 24, 2012, at approximately 1:20 a.m., Respondent responded to an alarm call. As he was leaving the scene, Respondent, who was driving a city police vehicle, pulled into a private driveway and failed to see a low hanging metal chain hanging across the driveway attached to two concrete pillars. The chain struck the front end of the vehicle, and, as Respondent continued forward, the chain rode up the front hood and struck the windshield. As a result, the vehicle sustained multiple scratches across the hood, a cracked windshield, a broken side view mirror, and a cracked front lens plate. Watch commander, Captain Curtis Krauel (Krauel), was on the scene at the time the accident occurred. Krauel estimated the damage to the vehicle to be approximately $500.00. However, it was very dark and this was a rough estimate only. In relevant part, the Town’s comprehensive alcohol and drug abuse policy, procedure number 1-06-5(d), provides that the Town may require an employee to submit to tests for the presence of alcohol or illegal drugs: Whenever an employee is involved in an accident while operating a town vehicle or while working for the town, which results in one or more of the following: A citation issued to the employee; Total property damage in excess of $1,000; Filing of a notice of injury under Workers Compensation. Because Krauel was not certain of the amount of damage to the vehicle, he instructed Respondent to report back to the station for drug and alcohol testing. Krauel had no concerns prior to the accident regarding any illicit drug use by Respondent. However, he knew that this accident would require a property damage report and that the Town’s policies mandate testing. This was Respondent’s first accident in seven years, and he was upset. Krauel told Respondent he believed the damage was minor. Respondent disputed that an alcohol or drug test was necessary. Respondent had been studying for the sergeant’s exam and was aware that the policy had a minimum $1,000.00 damage threshold. Krauel contacted his sergeant and both believed the threshold necessary for testing was $500.00 worth of damage. However, as Krauel explained at the final hearing, he is not a property appraiser, and he needed to make a ballpark estimate in the dark. Krauel knew that he could not really tell the damage until the morning; therefore, the most prudent option was for him to send Respondent for drug and alcohol testing. Property Damage Appraisers Fort Pierce examined the vehicle and provided a repair estimate of $1,844.24. Respondent, in compliance with the order issued by his supervisor, reported back to the station on June 24, 2012, at approximately 2:11 a.m., and gave a specimen of his urine, by urinating in a sterile, previously unused specimen cup provided to him by Nancy O’Dette (O’Dette)(formally Nancy Richards) of NMS Management.1/ After Respondent urinated into the specimen cup provided to him, he handed it to O’Dette who put Respondent’s specimen into a tube, immediately sealed the tube, had Respondent initial and date the seal, and then completed the chain of custody form. O’Dette labeled Respondent’s specimen with his Social Security number and also assigned it a unique specimen number, 9263743, making it uniquely identifiable as Respondent’s June 24, 2012, urine sample. The vial containing Respondent’s urine specimen was sealed with a label that would not allow the vial to be opened again without breaking the seal created by the label. O’Dette packaged the vial containing Respondent’s urine specimen in a bag which she also sealed and labeled as Respondent’s June 24, 2012, urine sample. She then placed the bag in a pickup box at NMS Management to await pickup by a courier for delivery to laboratories of Quest Diagnostics (Quest). Specimen number 9263743 was received at the laboratories of Quest in Tucker, Georgia, on June 26, 2012, where it was assigned the unique laboratory accession number 328410K for purposes of drug testing analysis by Quest. Quest maintained chain of custody procedures in handling Respondent’s specimen until it was unsealed by qualified laboratory personnel at the Quest laboratory and subjected to screening and confirmatory analysis for evidence of the presence of controlled substances in the urine. Quest conducts initial testing of urine samples by immunoassay, and confirmation testing by "GC-MS" or gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. It is the regular practice of Quest to make reports of the results of its testing. A marijuana metabolite is produced by the body of a person who consumes marijuana either by ingestion or by smoking it. The marijuana is absorbed into the body and is broken down by the liver, producing the marijuana metabolite, which is excreted through the kidneys. Quest conducted immunoassay and confirmation testing on specimen number 9263743. Quest’s confirmatory laboratory analysis of Respondent’s urine specimen was found by qualified Quest personnel to be positive for the marijuana metabolite in a concentration of over 1500 ng/mL. Any quantitative level of the marijuana metabolite detected above 15 ng/mL using the "GC-MS" methodology is considered a positive test result. Dr. Benjamin Droblas, a medical doctor and the medical review officer for Healthcare Center of Miami, reviewed the report from Quest reflecting the results of the analysis of Respondent’s urine specimen. On June 29, 2012, Dr. Droblas discussed the test result by telephone with Respondent. Dr. Droblas’ purpose for contacting Respondent was to ascertain if he could provide any legitimate explanation for the positive test result. Respondent did not provide Dr. Droblas with any explanation for the positive test result and denied using marijuana. The test results from the analysis of Respondent’s urine specimen are consistent with Respondent’s illicit cannabis use prior to providing his urine specimen. Respondent did not request additional confirmatory testing on a split sample from Quest.2/ No evidence was introduced regarding any prior discipline against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondent’s certification as a corrections officer be suspended for a period of six months, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as contemplated by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2014.
Findings Of Fact In 1955, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) entered into a contract with the federal Social Security Administration under which HRS agreed to evaluate applications for social security disability benefits and to allow or disallow claims, accordingly. At the time of the hearing, respondent employed 343 persons who were involved in adjudicating some 2,500 cases every week. On the average, every claim allowed has a value of ninety thousand dollars ($90,000.00). From 1955 through 1972, every determination was reviewed in a central office in Baltimore, Maryland. Since then, as an economy measure required by federal legislation, review has been limited to more or less random samples and most determinations have gone unreviewed by anybody outside of the office making the determination. The original means of choosing samples for review involved the selection of a one or two digit number, which was changed periodically. When applicants' social security numbers ended in the chosen numerals, their cases were sent to another office for review, after the initial determinations had been made. Under this system, the primary evaluators learned which cases would be reviewed, if they found out what digits were being used. This created possibilities for non-random samples. While the first sampling method was in effect, one of respondent's district supervisors, Robert Melcher, limited his review of determinations that had been made in HRS' Orlando office, which he headed, to the cases of applicants whose social security numbers ended in digits designated as calling for inclusion in samples to be mailed elsewhere for review. If one of these determinations struck him as problematic, he might direct that additional work be done with a view toward the matter's eventually being reconsidered. This sometimes had the incidental effect of delaying final processing in Orlando until a time when different digits had been announced for review samples purposes, so that the case escaped any review outside the Orlando office. Petitioner is one of two unit supervisors who answer directly to Mr. Melcher. The other is Creighton Hoyt. Each unit supervisor supervises a team of medical disability examiners. Detailed statistics are kept with respect to the job performance of each medical disability examiner, each unit and each branch office in Florida. As one result, a definite rivalry between Unit I and Unit II has grown up in the Orlando office. James Drake, who has succeeded to the position vacated by petitioner's demotion, was formerly a medical disability examiner in Unit II, headed by Mr. Hoyt. Ms. Johnnie M. Sherrod worked as a medical disability examiner in Unit I, headed by petitioner. Harry Jackson Speir, Jr., also worked as a medical disability examiner in HRS' Orlando office, starting in June of 1973. From 1975 until the time of the hearing, a second method of selecting samples for review purposes obtained in HRS' Orlando office, in accordance with national guidelines. Becky Bowman, a clerk IV or "coder," divided the files she received from the medical disability examiners and their supervisors into two piles. In one pile were files involving claims arising exclusively under Title II of the Social Security Act and in the other pile were files involving all other claims. Mrs. Bowman, who is technically directly answerable to Leon Simkins, in Tallahassee, was supervised on a day to day basis by petitioner and Mr. Melcher. She was told to pick every tenth, then, in February of 1977, every fourteenth case from the first pile for mailing to Tallahassee for quality assurance review; every thirtieth case in the first pile she was told to mail to Atlanta; and every fortieth case in the second pile Mrs. Bowman was told to mail to Baltimore. Although the procedures have stayed more or less constant since 1975, the intervals at which cases were to be selected changed in February of 1977 and again in December of 1977. Originally, Mrs. Bowman only sorted, while Ms. Margaret Dingfelder prepared the files for mailing. From time to time, Mr. Speir took cases he was working on to Mr. Melcher to ask for advice on difficult points. In three separate instances, Mr. Melcher said to Mr. Speir, referring to the case they were discussing, "This is one we don't want to go to Q.A. [the quality assurance section]," or words to that effect. In each instance, Mr. Speir attached a note to the case file before delivering it to Mrs. Bowman. The notes read something like "Not for Q.A." On one occasion, Mrs. Bowman asked Mr. Speir who had authorized bypassing quality assurance review and Mr. Speir told her that Mr. Melcher had authorized it. Ms. Elaine Keir, who worked as Mr. Melcher's secretary from June of 1973 until October of 1976, remembers occasions when Mr. Melcher told medical disability examiners that more evidence should be gathered for a particular case. She remembers other occasions when Mr. Melcher told medical disability examiners to see that a particular case was not included in the quality assurance review sample. She had the impression that Mr. Melcher, who was concerned that his office's processing time statistics compare favorably with other branch offices' statistics, asked for further evidence in cases that relatively little time had been spent on, while suggesting bypassing review procedures in cases in which considerable time had already been expended but in which problems persisted nonetheless. From time to time, petitioner Lee, who began work with respondent as a medical disability examiner supervisor in May of 1973, received instructions from Mr. Melcher, his immediate supervisor, to see that a particular file was not sent for quality assurance review. Aware of the impropriety of interfering with sampling procedures intended to ensure randomness, petitioner began, on March 18, 1976, to keep a record of Mr. Melcher's requests. He received 22 such requests through September of 1977. Initially, petitioner attached a note to any file designated by Mr. Melcher as one to be diverted. The notes read "No Q.A." and were intended as directives to Mrs. Bowman. Mrs. Bowman, also aware of the impropriety of sabotaging the sampling procedures, suggested to petitioner that he dispense with the notes. At her suggestion, petitioner began laying files sideways in a tray on Mrs. Bowman's desk, whenever he had been told by Mr. Melcher that a file should not be sent elsewhere for review. Petitioner never indicated to Mrs. Bowman in any way that a case should be diverted from a quality assurance review sample, unless Mr. Melcher had first directed him to do so. On three occasions, Ms. Sherrod heard Mr. Melcher tell petitioner to see that Mrs. Bowman did not include cases in quality assurance review samples. In August or September of 1977, James Drake noticed a file turned sideways in a tray on Mrs. Bowman's desk. When he started to move it, she stopped him, saying that petitioner wanted the case routed around quality assurance review. Mr. Drake reported this incident to Mr. Hoyt, upon the latter's return from vacation. Mr. Hoyt, who had earlier heard a similar story from his secretary, summoned Mrs. Bowman to his office and listened to her confirm the reports that had preceded her. On September 21, 1977, Mr. Hoyt wrote Mr. Melcher a memorandum entitled "Inequities existing between Unit I & Unit II, in which he set out, inter alia, what he had been told by Mrs. Bowman. Mr. Hoyt sent a copy of this memorandum to James C. Russ, which resulted in Mr. Russ' investigating the charges. Inasmuch as petitioner admitted what he had done, Mr. Russ' investigation was short and straightforward. Petitioner did not accuse Mr. Melcher when he was originally interrogated on these matters, and Mr. Melcher denied complicity. Petitioner's superiors greeted petitioner's accusation with skepticism when it did come. They nonetheless conducted a somewhat perfunctory second investigation, which apparently failed to uncover sufficient evidence to satisfy them that Mr. Melcher had indeed directed petitioner to divert certain cases, so that they would not be included in quality assurance review samples. Even so, Mr. Melcher's superiors did reprimand Mr. Melcher, orally and in writing, for the part they perceived him to have played in these events.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent rescind petitioner's demotion, and issue a written reprimand to petitioner instead. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Carlton L. Welch, Esquire 331 Laurina Street, No. 547 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Douglas E. Whitney, Esquire 1350 North Orange Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mrs. Dorothy B. Roberts Appeals Coordinator 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER (AGAINST SUSPENSION) ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA CAREER SERVICE COMMISSION IN THE APPEAL OF RICHARD LEE, AGAINST SUSPENSION Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-2211 BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Raymond F. Cay was licensed as a barber in the state of Florida and licensed to operate a barbershop in the state of Florida, holding license numbers BB00014055 and B50007436, respectively. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was owner of the barbershop, Cay's Hairstylist (Cay's), located at 1349 Cassat Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32205. On April 14, 1987, Petitioner conducted a routine annual inspection of Cay's as required by rule and noted certain deficiencies which if proven could have resulted in Respondent's licenses being revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined. However, there was insufficient evidence to show that these allegations of deficiencies were ever proven in a formal proceeding or admitted to by Respondent in an informal proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. In fact, there was insufficient evidence to show that any disposition had been made by the Petitioner on these alleged deficiencies. On March 11, 1988, Petitioner again conducted a routine annual inspection of Cay's and again noted certain deficiencies which were the basis of the Second Amended Complaint. There was insufficient evidence to show that there was excessive hair on floor or that the back of the bars, chairs or furniture were not maintained in a safe and sanitary manner or that the shop and equipment were dirty on March 11, 1988 when the inspector visited Cay's. Although all of the barbering tools were not totally immersed in a disinfectant solution on March 11, 1988 when the inspector visited Cay's, there was insufficient evidence to show that that portion of the barbering tool (including brushes) which comes in contact with the patrons, was not sufficiently immersed in a proper disinfectant solution to allow proper sanitation. Although there were no sanitary towels in the bathroom on March 11, 1988 when the inspector visited Cay's, there was insufficient evidence to show that the bathroom was dirty. Sanitation rules were improperly displayed in Cay's on March 11, 1988 when the inspector visited. The only license not displayed on March 11, 1988 when the inspector visited Cay's was Ms. Delp's, and she was currently on leave and not working even though she was in the shop shampooing her hair on that day. On November 22, 1988, Petitioner conducted a re-inspection of Cay's and the inspector noted certain deficiencies which if proven could result in Respondent's licenses being revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined. However, these alleged deficiencies were neither made a part of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint nor was there any evidence that these alleged deficiencies were ever proven or that they formed the basis for any disciplinary action taken by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order DISMISSING the Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed herein. RESPECTFULLY submitted and entered this 24th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4180 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statute, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner in this case. Respondent did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. Treated as a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. 2.-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 5.-6. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 7. Treated as a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. 8.-0. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Myrtle Aase, Executive Director Barber's Board 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 E. Renee Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 P. W. Cay, Qualified Representative 1349 Cassat Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Raymond F. Cay 1349 Cassat Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the witness, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this case, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license no. ME 0045691. The Respondent was born in the U.S.S.R. in 1926 and graduated with honors from the Moscow Medical Institute in 1951. She also received a PhD degree in medical science and obtained the equivalent of board certification as a surgeon oncologist in that country. While employed in the U.S.S.R., Respondent worked for the state. In 1976, Respondent, who is Jewish, immigrated to Israel where she received that country's board certification in surgery. During her residence in Israel, the Respondent was employed as a surgeon in a state-sponsored clinic. From Israel, the Respondent came to the United States in 1983. Respondent passed the ECFMG and the FLEX examinations in 1984. Subsequently, she became licensed in Florida. Currently, Respondent is neither board certified nor board eligible. Respondent attributes her foreign education and age as the primary reasons she has not achieved certification in this country. Because she is not board certified or eligible for certification, Respondent has sought employment where those criteria are not mandatory. Consequently, since becoming licensed in Florida, she has worked almost exclusively at clinics practicing general medicine. In November, 1987, Respondent began employment with Doctor's Diagnostic and Medical Centers (DDMC). Respondent was one of several doctors employed by DDMC. At all times material to this case, DDMC operated walk-in clinics in New Port Richey and Clearwater, Florida. At the outset of her employment with DDMC, Respondent worked only part-time for approximately 16 to 18 hours per week. Her hours increased over time, and, in July or August of 1988, Respondent went to a full-time schedule. Her initial agreement with DDMC provided that Respondent would be paid based upon the rate of $30.00 per hour worked. At that time, DDMC was involved in a program of providing free Doppler examinations for persons requesting that evaluation. Respondent was aware that DDMC engaged in advertisements to solicit patients. All management or administrative decisions such as advertising, billing, or scheduling employees at DDMC were made by a Dr. Neese, the owner of the facilities, or his designee. Respondent did not participate in management decisions. At some early point in her employment at DDMC, Respondent agreed to provide additional services for the company which had formerly been performed by a technician. More specifically, Respondent agreed to interpret Doppler test results. DDMC provided Doppler testing as part of its preventative medicine program. The purpose of the program was to screen patients for potential further treatment or testing. Doppler, cholesterol, and triglyceride testing are all appropriate preventative medicine approaches to determine a patient's potential need for services. According to Respondent, preventative medicine assists in early detection of potentially harmful illnesses. Doppler tests measure or indicate circulation and cardiac function. In the event a Doppler test evidences some abnormality, further testing such as ultrasound or echocardiogram may be suggested as appropriate follow up. While assigned to the New Port Richey clinic, Respondent provided many Doppler interpretations. For each Doppler test interpreted where the patient returned to DDMC for additional testing, Respondent was to receive $60.00. After reviewing the Doppler, some patients would be examined by Respondent. Respondent would perform a limited examination and take a medical history. If the testing and examination suggested some abnormality, Respondent would advise the patient as to the options available. In the event the Doppler showed no problem, Respondent would not recommend additional testing. Where the patient's Doppler results and additional information suggested a medical basis for additional testing, Respondent advised patients that they could confer with their regular physician, have the testing elsewhere if they would like, or could have the testing done at DDMC. At Dr. Neese's direction Respondent kept a list of the patients for whom she had interpreted the Doppler results and for whom additional testing was to be performed at DDMC. Respondent did not confer with all of the patients on the list. According to Respondent some patients on her list did receive additional testing at DDMC. She had presumed she would be compensated in accordance with her agreement; however, Respondent did not receive compensation for that work. For the period November 11, 1987 to December 31, 1987, Respondent received $5,685.00 in compensation from DDMC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes, placing the Respondent on probation for a period of two years, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2500.00. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-6331 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that an individual known to Respondent as Dr. Neese hired her for work at the DDMC and controlled the administration or management of that facility. Otherwise, rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 6 is accepted as to clinics at New Port Richey and Clearwater which would be the only locations material to this case. With regard to paragraph 7, with the deletion of the words "independent contractor" which are rejected as a conclusion of law, it is accepted. Paragraphs 8 and 9 are accepted. With the deletion of the word "scheme" which is rejected as argumentative, paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With the deletion of the word "scheme" (see comment above), paragraph 12 is accepted. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are rejected as argumentative or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraphs 19 through 21 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 22 and 23 are accepted. Paragraphs 24 through 30 are rejected as irrelevant, speculative, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 31 is accepted. Paragraphs 32 and 33 are rejected as argumentative or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 6 and 7, it is accepted that those paragraphs state Respondent's perception of her situation. This record does not establish, in fact, the basis for her failure to obtain certification, eligibility or hospital privileges. Paragraphs 8 through 10 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 11 is rejected as a conclusion of law or irrelevant. The balance of the paragraph is accepted. Paragraphs 12 through 15 are accepted. With the deletion of the last sentence which is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, paragraph 16 is accepted. Respondent was, in fact, aware that some of the patients for whom she had interpreted the Doppler did return to the clinic for additional testing. The first sentence of paragraph 17 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as comment, argument, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. It is accepted that no patient records were admitted into evidence. COPIES TO: Richard A. Grumberg Sr. Medical Atty. DPR 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Grover C. Freeman 4600 West Cypress, Ste. 500 Tampa, FL 33607 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director DPR 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay General Counsel DPR 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
