The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Health has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found probable cause to suspect that the licensee has committed one or more disciplinable offenses. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 10658. Background On February 3, 2012, T.S., a 26-year-old single mother, presented to Respondent's medical office as a new obstetrical patient. At that time, T.S. was carrying her third child. For the next five months, T.S. and Respondent enjoyed what was, by all appearances, a productive and appropriate physician-patient relationship. However, as discussed below, Respondent would transgress the bounds of that relationship during an office visit on the evening of July 11, 2012. First, though, it is necessary to sketch the relevant background. On the morning of July 11, 2012, T.S.——who was then nine months pregnant——appeared at Respondent's office for a routine examination. During the visit, T.S. advised Respondent that she was experiencing substantial cramping and discomfort. In response to these complaints, Respondent performed a pelvic examination and a sonogram, both of which yielded normal results. Later that day, at approximately 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., T.S. telephoned Respondent's office and informed his staff of a new symptom: namely, that significant pain was making it difficult to lift her right arm. Although a member of the staff advised T.S. that she could be seen immediately, logistical constraints made it impossible for her to report to Respondent's office prior to the close of business. Over the course of the next several hours, T.S. communicated with Respondent by phone and text (his cell number was available to all patients) concerning the new symptom and her preference to be seen that evening. Ultimately, Respondent informed T.S., via a text message sent at approximately 6:15 p.m., that she could meet him at his office for an examination. The Misconduct T.S. arrived at the office at 6:30 p.m., whereupon Respondent unlocked the front door and invited T.S. inside. Upon entering the lobby area, which was only partially illuminated, T.S. saw no sign of Respondent's office staff. At that point, Respondent asked T.S. to sign a form that read as follows: I give consent to be seen at Dr. Miller's office, by Dr. Miller, without an assistant present, at my request, in order to have a medically urgent need addressed. The foregoing document, although signed by T.S., is of dubious propriety, as obstetrical treatment without a chaperone present is rarely, if ever, appropriate.3/ This issue is of no moment, however, for most of what occurred next——as established by the credible testimony of T.S. and Petitioner's expert witness——was not a legitimate medical examination but, rather, nonconsensual sexual contact perpetrated under the guise of an examination. Upon the execution of the "consent" document, Respondent directed T.S. to an examination room and informed her that the likely cause of her arm pain was either a clogged milk duct or the positioning of the fetus. Respondent then requested that T.S. disrobe her upper body, at which point he left the room for a few moments. Upon his return, Respondent asked T.S. to recline on the examination table, purportedly so he could examine her right breast to rule out the possibility of a clogged duct. T.S. complied and, for the next 30 to 45 seconds, Respondent squeezed her breast in a manner quite dissimilar to examinations she had undergone in the past. In particular, T.S. thought it peculiar that Respondent "cupped" her entire breast with his hand——as opposed to examining the breast from the outside in with the pads of his fingers.4/ Even more troublingly, Respondent asked T.S., while his hand was still in contact with her breast, whether "it felt good."5/ After removing his hand from T.S.'s breast, Respondent remarked to T.S. that her arm pain was not the result of a clogged milk duct. Respondent further stated that her symptoms would be assuaged upon the baby's delivery, an event which, according to him, could be facilitated by sexual activity. Before proceeding further, it is important to note that T.S.'s symptoms of arm pain arguably warranted, at most, a legitimate breast examination. In other words, there were no symptoms or aspects of T.S.'s history that justified a pelvic examination at that time,6/ particularly since Respondent had performed such a procedure (along with a sonogram) earlier in the day. Nevertheless, Respondent informed T.S. that he "needed" to measure the dilation of her cervix; then, in a disturbing and conspicuous departure from accepted obstetrical practice,7/ Respondent applied lubricant to one of his ungloved hands. Moments later, Respondent inserted two fingers into T.S.'s vagina and, for the next 30 seconds or so, positioned his penetrating hand in such a manner that his thumb was in continuous contact with T.S.'s clitoris——something that would never occur during a proper examination.8/ Tellingly, this was not the only physical contact incongruous with a legitimate pelvic examination, for at one point Respondent used his free hand to pull on one of T.S.'s nipples.9/ By now suspicious of Respondent's conduct, T.S. attempted to maneuver her body toward the head of the examination table. As she did so, Respondent began to remove his fingers from T.S.'s vagina while stating that she "needed to have sex" in order to induce labor. This could be accomplished, Respondent further suggested, by having sex with him, an invitation T.S. sensibly declined.10/ On the heels of this rejection, Respondent told T.S. that the only other means of inducing labor would be to "strip her membranes." Owing perhaps to an urgent desire to give birth——the reader should recall that she was nine months pregnant and in significant discomfort——T.S. acceded to Respondent's suggestion. Respondent then penetrated T.S.'s vagina with his (ungloved) hand for a second time and, prior to the removal of his fingers, repeatedly implored T.S. to engage in sexual intercourse with him.11/ When T.S. refused and tried to move to the other end of the table, Respondent grabbed her by the hips and pulled his midsection into her exposed vaginal area. By virtue of this aggression, T.S. could feel that Respondent's penis, albeit clothed, was erect.12/ Wishing to extricate herself from this situation, T.S. pushed Respondent away, at which point he attempted to "laugh off" his abhorrent behavior. T.S. dressed herself and, a short time later, drove to the home of an acquaintance to seek advice. Later that evening, T.S. made a report of the incident to the appropriate authorities,13/ which ultimately resulted in the filing of the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of violating section 459.015(1)(l), as charged in Count I of the Complaint. It is further determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of violating section 456.072(1)(v) and, in turn, section 459.015(1)(pp), as alleged in Count II of the complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Osteopathic Medicine finding Respondent guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; revoking Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine; and imposing a fine of $10,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was constructively terminated from her employment with Respondent because of her national origin.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female of German and Turkish descent and has a somewhat heavy German accent. In 1995, Petitioner was employed with Bay Medical Center, a hospital in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner was employed as a unit secretary for one of the hospital units. She voluntarily resigned that position in 1997. In March of 1998, Petitioner was again employed by Bay Medical Center as a unit secretary. She was a member of a secretarial float pool and floated from one unit of the hospital to another as needed. Later, due to a hospital reorganization, the unit secretarial position was reclassified to a Clerical Support Associate (CSA) position. The CSA position included more duties than the unit secretary position and had a higher wage. As a CSA, Petitioner was responsible for providing essential clerical support as required by patient’s and clinical staff. Her duties included entering physician orders into the hospital’s computer system, scheduling tests and procedures for patients, charging and crediting patient bills, greeting patients and visitors, chart maintenance, and otherwise assisting as needed. Petitioner eventually, was assigned as a full-time CSA in the Critical Care Unit (CCU). The CCU was a very small unit with only eight open beds and was the least active unit in the hospital at that time relative to the duties of a CSA. The lower activity resulted in less work and less stress for the CSAs assigned to the CCU. Because of the light workload and low- stress environment for CSA’s, P.J. Dotson, Petitioner's supervisor in the CCU, used the CCU to train new CSAs. Because Petitioner had experience with the work, she occasionally helped train new CSAs. At some point, Ms. Dotson determined that the CSAs in the CCU were only performing two and a half to three hours of clerical work during an eight-hour period. The small amount of productivity by the CSAs was unacceptable. In order to increase the CSAs’ productivity, Respondent changed the job role of the CSAs in the CCU, including Petitioner's, and added basic patient care tasks. Some of the new tasks included feeding patients and helping patients on and off bedpans. Additionally, the CSAs' hours changed to require them to come in earlier. On December 12, 2000, Petitioner was disciplined by Ms. Dotson for complaining to a physician about Respondent's decision to change the job requirements of the CSAs in the CCU. The physician was Respondent's "customer," not Petitioner's supervisor and Ms. Dotson felt that it was inappropriate for Petitioner to discuss her employment situation with a "customer." Ms. Dotson’s position was a reasonable position by an employer. After the disciplinary action, Petitioner declined the upgraded CSA position because she did not want to change her working hours and did not want to do hands-on patient care. Rather than terminating Petitioner's employment, Respondent allowed Petitioner to transfer to the EKG department to work as an EKG technician which position also included some clerical tasks. Petitioner served as an EKG technician for two months. During those two months, Petitioner experienced numerous performance problems and was disciplined several times by Ms. Dotson. Petitioner admits she simply was not very good at direct patient care and performed poorly as an EKG technician. On February 20, 2001, Ms Dotson issued Petitioner a Notice of Corrective Action based on a number of issues that had arisen beginning around January 15, 2001. The Notice states, "During week two, we started experiencing several problems with the paper work [Petitioner] was doing. Files were not in correct order (alphabetical), Cardiology Associates were complaining about paperwork, [and] the unsigned copies of Echo reports were not getting to M.D.s for their signature.” These problems were detrimental to efficient and timely patient care in an area of health care, cardiology, where efficiency and timeliness of care are very important. Due to these concerns, Ms. Dotson changed Petitioner's orientation schedule and established specific times to achieve performance goals. However, the changed schedule did not help resolve Petitioner's performance problems. After Petitioner was fully trained to perform an EKG procedure, Petitioner "developed the inability to perform this task" within a few weeks. Petitioner also improperly double-billed a large number of Respondent's patients. The double billing was a major oversight on Petitioner's part that could have been seriously detrimental to Respondent's ability to serve Medicare and Medicaid patients if the problem had not been discovered and resolved by Ms. Dotson. On March 8, 2001, Petitioner received a final written warning because her work-related problems persisted. At that time, Ms. Dotson informed Petitioner that she needed to find a different position within Bay Medical Center, resign, or be terminated. Ms. Dotson also took this opportunity to coach Petitioner on how to sell herself to other managers, so Petitioner could acquire another position. One of the areas Ms. Dotson discussed with Petitioner was her communication skills. Ms. Dotson explained that she needed to communicate better because she has an accent, does not articulate well and often speaks with her hands in front of her mouth thereby making it difficult for others to understand her. In addition, Ms. Dotson explained to Petitioner that she demonstrated a somewhat negative attitude and failed to take responsibility for her mistakes. These traits were concerns for managers in the various departments throughout the hospital. These traits were also demonstrated at the hearing. There was no evidence that any action taken by Ms. Dotson was done for discriminatory purposes or that the reasons given for such action were pretextual. Indeed, Petitioner admitted that Ms. Dotson did not discriminate against her. However, because of these traits, Petitioner had a difficult time finding another position within Bay Medical Center, even though there was a high turnover rate among CSAs throughout the hospital. Eventually, Petitioner was accepted by Ms. Pat Owens to serve as a CSA on Three South, a medical/surgery unit at Bay Medical Center. Indeed, Petitioner’s transfer to Three South was against hospital policy since Petitioner was slated for termination from her earlier position and had received her final warning. However, in order to help Petitioner, the transfer was allowed. Although Petitioner had served as a CSA in CCU previously, the working atmosphere of Three South was very different. Three South was, as Petitioner described it, a "very, very busy floor." Three South had 39 beds and over 200 physicians on staff. However, during Ms. Owen’s time as manager of Three South, Ms. Owens did not formally discipline Petitioner regarding her job performance. Ms. Owens did not testify at the hearing. Petitioner admits that she made mistakes while Ms. Owens was her supervisor. She testified that there were "minor things" that Ms. Owens would make her redo. However, under these facts, the fact that Ms. Owens chose not to discipline Petitioner formally is not evidence of discrimination. The hospital was not satisfied with the way Three South was being managed by Ms. Owens. The unit staff were not following various hospital protocols impacting patient care. Numerous complaints were made by both patients and doctors regarding the quality of care being delivered by the unit staff. Therefore, in April, 2002, Ms. Andi Bush was hired as the manager of Three South. She was hired in order “to get Three South into shape.” Ms. Bush also became Petitioner's supervisor and demanded considerably more performance and compliance with protocols of all the employees on Three South. After Ms. Bush became manager, Petitioner claims that Ms. Bush commented on Petitioner's accent and that "[Ms. Bush's] hearing would be perfect if anybody else would talk to her. But whenever I said something to her or tried to quote her [sic] about something, all of a sudden she had this major problem." This alleged evidence is not convincing. Ms. Bush wears a hearing aid and relies on "lip-reading" because she has a significant amount of hearing loss due to nerve damage. She often has difficulty hearing others' words and asks others to repeat themselves. This difficulty was demonstrated at the hearing. In addition, Petitioner did not provide any details about the times Ms. Bush allegedly commented on her accent. There is no evidence in the record about how often or in what context any such comment allegedly happened. Given the facts that Ms. Bush is hearing impaired and reads lips and that Petitioner often speaks with her hands in front of her mouth, has an accent and does not enunciate her words, comments by Ms. Bush regarding Petitioner’s accent do not support a finding of discrimination. Ms. Bush, unlike her predecessor, enforced the hospital protocol’s and demanded that her staff comply with those protocols. It was clear that Ms. Bush's job, as the new manager of Three South, was to impose accountability and discipline on that unit. Indeed, Petitioner testified that, during Ms. Bush's initial meeting with the employees on Three South, Ms. Bush made it clear that she believed Three South was a "mess" and that "she was going to straighten it out." Petitioner failed to provide any evidence that Ms. Bush applied the rules or issued discipline inconsistently among the employees or that employees of other nationalities were treated better than her. There is no comparator evidence in the record to demonstrate that Ms. Bush's discipline of Petitioner was for discriminatory purposes. Under Ms. Bush's administration, Petitioner was disciplined on several occasions for various performance issues. On May 23, 2002, Petitioner was issued a written warning for failing to enter a physician's order. The order requested a consultation with a cardiologist to determine what treatment the patient needed. Because Petitioner did not enter the order, the consultation was delayed for over 24 hours. When the consultation was eventually performed, the cardiologist determined that the patient needed a pacemaker. Petitioner's mistake could have had dire consequences for the patient involved. Petitioner does not deny that she failed to enter the order but claims that she was told by her co-workers that she did not need to enter the order because the patient was going to be transferred to a different floor. However, Petitioner knew that other co-workers could not instruct her not to follow the hospital’s protocol for entering a physician’s order in a timely manner. The discipline she received was clearly not pretextual and was appropriate for her failure to enter the physician’s order. On June 5, 2002, Petitioner received a written warning for excessive absenteeism. Again, Petitioner does not deny that she was excessively absent. Instead, Petitioner alleges that her absences "weren't really more extensive than anybody else's." Petitioner later admits, however, that these other employees were also punished for their tardiness and absenteeism. Petitioner provided no other evidence that Respondent applied its attendance policy inconsistently among the employees. Given these facts, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Petitioner’s disciplinary action was discriminatory or pretextual. On July 3, 2002, Petitioner was suspended following two different incidents. First, Petitioner placed several documents in the wrong patient's chart. Second, Petitioner failed to properly consult a physician regarding a patient care issue. Both of these incidents could have had detrimental impact on the health and safety of Respondent's patients. Petitioner offered no evidence to dispute the accuracy of the report of these incidents. On August 7, 2002, Ms. Bush held a corrective action meeting with Petitioner to discuss the following incidents: (1) Petitioner's repeated failure to enter consultations into the computer; (2) Petitioner's repeated failure to consult physicians in a timely manner; (3) a patient complaint that her call light was not being answered during Petitioner's shift; and (4) Petitioner’s failure to file a stack of documents as she was assigned to do, but instead twice sent them to medical records to file. Petitioner denies making these mistakes, but her denial is based on her lack of memory for the events. Indeed, Ms. Bush based the disciplinary action on complaints and witness statements she received form a variety of sources. Again there was no evidence that the Ms. Bush’s actions were discriminatory or pretextual. Finally, on August 14, 2002, Petitioner was given her annual performance appraisal. Petitioner was rated as "unsatisfactory" based on her record of discipline and the real potential of her performance failures to adversely impact patient care. Based on her previous performance problems and the performance appraisal, Petitioner was told that she could no longer work as a CSA at Bay Medical Center. Indeed, Ms. Dotson who was consulted regarding Ms. Bush’s decision, concurred that Petitioner should not be transferred to any CSA position or position involving patient care due to past mistakes which were potentially detrimental to a patient’s health. Respondent gave her two weeks to find a different position within the hospital, resign, or be terminated. Respondent, through its personnel department, tried to assist Petitioner to find a position within the facility. After reviewing the printout of available positions with Petitioner the only positions that were open, and for which Petitioner was qualified, were in Dietary, Housekeeping, and Laundry. Petitioner did not offer any evidence of any other positions outside those areas that were available and for which she was qualified. Petitioner refused to apply to any of these positions and, instead, resigned on August 28, 2002. The evidence did not demonstrate that her resignation was forced or caused by any discriminatory actions by Respondent. Again, Petitioner failed to provide any evidence that Respondent discriminated against her and the Petition For Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Margie Beach-Gutierrez 5807 Butler Drive, Apartment 4 Callaway, Florida 32404 L. Taywick Duffie, Esquire Price H. Carroll, Esquire Hunton & Williams, LLP 600 Peachtree Street, Suite 4100 Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
