The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be granted a consumer’s certificate of exemption pursuant to Subsection 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Revenue (Respondent) is the state agency charged with enforcement of Chapter 212, Florida Statues, and the issuance of certificates of exemption. Unto Others, Inc. (Petitioner) is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a non-profit corporation. Petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation, Article II, states Petitioner’s purpose as follows: The purposes for which the Corporation [Petitioner] is organized are exclusively religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue law. Petitioner made application to the Respondent for a certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Subsection 212.08(7)(o)2.b, Florida Statutes. Petitioner did not make application for an exemption as a scientific, religious, or educational institution, but it may in the future apply under these criteria. By Notice of Intent to Deny (Notice) dated January 30, 1998, the Respondent notified Petitioner that its application was being denied. The grounds stated in the Notice for the denial were the following: (1) "Your organization does not provide, nor does it raise funds for charitable institutions which provide one or more of the charitable services listed in the statute [Subsection 212.08(7)(o)2.b, Florida Statutes]."; and (2) "Your organization fails to meet the qualification for exemption from sales and use taxation, as set forth in Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes." Currently, Petitioner’s sole function is the raising of funds to enable Petitioner to rehabilitate people and dwellings. All of Petitioner’s activities are conducted by non-paid volunteers. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner rehabilitates any person or dwelling, or holds religious services. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner governs or administers any office within any hierarchy of a larger organization. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner participates with or controls another organization. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner expends more than 50 percent of its expenditures toward any charitable service. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner disburses more than 50 percent of its expenditures directly for a charitable service or to any entity that directly provides or performs any charitable service. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner directly provides or performs any charitable service for any entity or person; or that Petitioner provides any goods or services as a charitable service. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner directly provides a reasonable percentage of any charitable service free or at a substantially reduced cost to persons, animals, or organizations that are unable to pay for such services. No evidence was presented to show that any charitable service was provided free or at a substantially reduced cost. No evidence was presented to show that persons, animals, or organizations actually received any charitable service and that those persons, animals, or organizations were unable to pay for such service(s). Petitioner does not currently provide any of the services listed in Subsection 212.08(7)(o).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying a consumer's certificate of exemption to Unto Others, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1998.
The Issue Whether Gary Savage committed the statutory violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty is authorized for such violations.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Principle Allegations The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing of insurance agents in Florida, pursuant to authority granted in chapter 626, parts I and IX, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69B-231. Mr. Savage is a 75-year-old registered investment advisor and financial planner who also is licensed to sell life insurance in Florida. The Department’s Complaint seeks to revoke Mr. Savage’s license as an insurance agent. Counts I through III and V through VIII concern eight clients, whereby Mr. Savage earned commissions for selling them annuities and, based on agreements they signed, charged them annual one-percent financial planning service fees tied to the value of their portfolios, including the annuities. Each of these counts alleged the following statutory violations: Engaging in unfair insurance trade practices for knowingly collecting an excessive premium or charge. § 626.9541(1)(o)2., Fla. Stat.; Demonstrating a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to conduct insurance business. § 626.611(1)(g), Fla. Stat.; Demonstrating a lack of reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in insurance transactions. § 626.611(1)(h), Fla. Stat.; Engaging in fraudulent or dishonest insurance practices. § 626.611(1)(i), Fla. Stat.; and Misappropriating, converting, or unlawfully withholding moneys belonging to others in conducting insurance transactions. § 626.611(1)(j), Fla. Stat. Count IX charged Mr. Savage with two violations concerning adverse administrative action taken by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) against his securities license: Failing to timely report final administrative action taken by FINRA against his securities license. § 626.536, Fla. Stat.; and Being suspended and fined for violating FINRA’s rules. § 626.621(12), Fla. Stat. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Savage was not working in the financial services industry because FINRA suspended him for several months. During his suspension, Mr. Savage continued to meet with his insurance clients, though he currently has no appointments with life insurers to sell their products. Wearing Two Hats - An Investment Advisor and Insurance Agent Mr. Savage has worked in the investment industry for over 50 years, initially focusing on securities but evolving into financial advising and estate planning work. He has taken numerous courses and examinations relevant to securities law, financial planning, and tax law. Mr. Savage owns two investment advisor businesses: Wall Street Strategies, Inc. (“Wall Street”), is a stock brokerage firm that handles securities transactions; and Advanced Strategies, Inc. (“Advanced Strategies”), is a registered investment advisor firm, offering clients financial planning, tax management, and estate planning advice. In order to provide a wide variety of products to his financial planning clients, Mr. Savage also is licensed as a nonresident agent in Florida to sell life insurance, including annuities.2/ Annuities provide a guaranteed income stream over a term of years, but also come with substantial penalties if they are surrendered or cancelled before the term expires. Fixed index annuities, like those Mr. Savage sold to the clients at issue here, offer portfolios of funds tracking stock market indexes. Owners choose from around six portfolios and can then reallocate by choosing different portfolios each year. Mr. Savage considers himself an investment advisor who is licensed to sell insurance, which is what he tells new clients. Indeed, his businesses are securities and investment advisor firms, not insurance agencies. Mr. Savage’s client base is diverse. Many have portfolios with annuities and other investment products. Some have portfolios with no annuities. Others have portfolios with only annuities, like most of the clients at issue. In order to procure new clients, Mr. Savage held financial planning seminars where diverse speakers discussed financial and estate planning, and tax management. Mr. Savage discussed the types of insurance products he preferred, including fixed index annuities. Other speakers discussed real estate, oil, and investment trusts, which were beneficial from a tax perspective. Most of the clients at issue attended such a seminar and later met with Mr. Savage to discuss their financial plans. When Mr. Savage first met with the clients at issue, he asked them to bring tax returns, investment statements, wills and/or trusts, and other documents relevant for a financial planning discussion. They completed a new client form with information about their assets, investments, and objectives. He often met several times with new clients to develop a plan for them to reach their financial, estate, and tax management goals. To provide financial planning services, Mr. Savage—— like most investment advisors——charged an annual one-percent fee based on the total value of the portfolio. He has reduced or waived his fee if the clients’ situation warranted it or if they continued to purchase products for which he received commissions to compensate him for providing financial planning services. Before that are charged an annual fee, Mr. Savage’s clients signed a “Service Fee Agreement” (“Fee Agreement”), which was on “Advanced Strategies, Inc., Registered Investment Advisor” letterhead and provided as follows: Advanced Strategies charges a 1% (one percent) financial planning retention fee annually. This fee is based upon the total combined value of accounts including annuities, indexed life, mutual funds, income products and brokerage accounts that we manage or provide service for. This amount is tax deductible as a professional fee. The Fee Agreement offered to provide several financial planning services3/: Address, ownership, and beneficiary changes; Duplicate statements and tax returns; Required minimum distribution and withdrawal requests, and deposits; General account questions; One printed analysis per year; Annual review; Asset rebalancing when applicable; Informing client of new tax laws, changes in estate planning, and new exciting products and concepts. The Fee Agreement noted that the non-refundable fee was due on the service anniversary date and that non-payment would result in discontinuation of the planning services until paid in full. Mr. Savage confirmed that the Fee Agreement was voluntary. If clients wanted to purchase a product, but did not want him to manage their portfolio or provide the outlined services, they did not have to sign the agreement. In that event, Mr. Savage would procure the product and not provide financial planning services. All of the clients at issue here purchased annuities from Mr. Savage. He helped them complete the applications with the insurance companies and, if necessary, assisted them with transferring or closing out other investments used to pay the premiums. He ensured that the insurers received the paperwork and the premiums. Once the annuities were procured, he received commissions from the insurers. The Complaint did not allege that he acted unlawfully in recommending annuities to the clients or receiving commissions from the insurers. All of the clients at issue also signed the Fee Agreement and Mr. Savage provided them with services every year.4/ Some of the services were things an insurance agent technically could handle, such as answering client calls, making address and beneficiary changes, providing duplicate statements, assisting with the paperwork for required minimum distributions, withdrawals, and deposits, and asset reallocation. Other services were things that an agent could not provide, such as tax management/credits, duplicate tax forms, assistance with estates, trusts, and wills, and financial planning advice. But, even as to the services an agent technically could provide, Mr. Savage used his financial planning expertise to advise these clients as to a number of decisions relating to their annuities. For instance, although agents can assist with reallocation, required minimum distributions, and withdrawals, Mr. Savage’s securities and financial planning expertise allowed him to make recommendations that took into account an analysis of the stock market, the economy, and the clients’ financial circumstances and overall goals. An agent is not required to have that expertise, which is one reason he charged the clients an annual service fee. Many of these clients did not recall Mr. Savage providing most of the services listed in the Fee Agreement, but the weight of the credible evidence reflects otherwise. He analyzed asset reallocations for these clients every year and, when he believed reallocation was appropriate, he undisputedly made it happen. He provided annual account analyses consolidating the clients’ investment statements. He met with some of them every year to conduct an annual review and, for those he did not meet, he offered to do so in their annual invoice letter. Whenever the clients asked for assistance with questions, address, beneficiary, or ownership changes, withdrawals or required minimum distributions, or deposits, among others, he performed the task. And, as he confirmed and some of the clients acknowledged, the Fee Agreement made it clear that the services were available, even if they did not need all of them in a particular year or did not think to ask. Although some of the clients testified that Mr. Savage failed to tell them that his fee was optional, all of them had a chance to review the Fee Agreement before voluntarily signing it. The agreement noted that the fee was a “financial planning retention fee” based on the value of the accounts “that we manage or provide service for,” and that non-payment “will result in the discontinuation of my/our planning services.” These clients believed they hired Mr. Savage as an investment advisor and many understood that such advisors do charge fees for providing services. More importantly, no client testified that Mr. Savage said his annual fee was required to procure the annuities or was a charge for insurance. Nothing in the Fee Agreement gave that indication either. Mr. Savage credibly confirmed that he did not charge a fee for insurance; rather, the client paid the fees for financial planning services. And, if they decided they no longer wanted Mr. Savage’s services and stopped paying his fee, they took over management of their annuities without losing access to them or the money in them. The Department concedes that Mr. Savage may wear two hats, as both the agent selling an annuity and the financial advisor managing his client’s portfolio. It contends, however, that Mr. Savage violated the insurance code by selling annuities to these clients and thereafter charging them annual fees——tied to the value of the annuities——to provide services that he should have provided for free after earning commissions on the sale of those annuities. The Department’s investigator, Ms. Midgett, testified about annuities, commissions, and insurance agent services based on her experience in the industry as both a former agent and certified chartered life underwriter.5/ Ms. Midgett confirmed that the Department approves both the premiums and commissions applicable to annuities. Once the premium or deposit is paid, the commission is earned; if an additional deposit is made into the annuity, the agent would earn another commission. Ms. Midgett testified that it is improper for an agent to receive a commission and knowingly charge a client any fees with respect to that annuity under section 626.9541(1)(o). However, she admitted that a financial advisor may charge service fees on annuities if they did not receive a commission on the sale. And, if the annuity is ever rolled into a non- insurance product, that agent could charge service fees on that asset because they are no longer tied to the annuity. Ms. Midgett also testified about the services agents are expected to provide. Once an agent sells a product, he or she becomes the agent of record and does “things such as answer questions, beneficiary changes, address changes, yearly reviews, anything to keep that client and to help them in any way they can.” According to her, “it’s basic 101 insurance that an agent services their clients,” which is “extremely important if you want to build your book of business and to keep a client happy.” Importantly, however, Ms. Midgett conceded that no statute or rule specified what services agents were required to provide once they sold an annuity. “It’s just understood when you’re an insurance agent that you’re going to service your clients. It’s part of the sale of the product.” She believed agents learned this in the course study to obtain a license. Although Ms. Midgett testified that Mr. Savage should have provided most of the services listed in the Fee Agreement for free once he earned commissions on the sale of the annuities, she conceded that at least two of them——duplicate tax forms and informing the client of new tax laws——were not services agents would do. She also agreed that agents could not advise clients as to taking money from an annuity and investing in stocks, mutual funds, real estate trusts, or other investment-related options as “those are all investment advisor functions.” Ms. Midgett initially admitted having no knowledge of whether insurance agents were trained in asset reallocation, though she “would assume so” because “[i]f you have a license to sell the product, then obviously you have to have the knowledge of how to be able to service that product and make the allocations.” When she testified several months later in the Department’s rebuttal case, she stated that the manual used to obtain a license in Florida had a chapter on annuities that “touched on” reallocation. But, she admitted she was not an expert on reallocation or analyzing market conditions, and she had only previously worked with one agent who sold annuities, though he did advise his annuity clients on reallocation. In sum, the Department conceded that no statute or rule articulated the services an agent is required to provide upon receiving a commission. The appointment contracts between the agents and the insurance companies, two of which are in the record, apparently do not specify the services agents are expected to provide. At best, the evidence established what a good agent should do to build a book of business; the evidence did not establish what services an agent, like Mr. Savage, was legally required to provide for receiving a commission. Count I – Kathy Butler Ms. Butler met Mr. Savage while working at a yacht club. In February 2011, they met at his office and she filled out a new client form with financial information. In March 2011, Mr. Savage assisted Ms. Butler with the application for a fixed index annuity for $50,000. On that same day, she signed the Fee Agreement, which she understood to be paying for his services as an investment advisor to manage the annuity and ensure it was being invested correctly; she believed he received income from the insurance company. In January 2012, she purchased another fixed index annuity for $8,000. Mr. Savage procured both annuities. Between 2012 and 2015, Ms. Butler received annual invoices from Mr. Savage and paid about $3,265 in service fees. At this point, Ms. Butler deals directly with the insurance companies, though Mr. Savage is still listed as her agent. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered general account questions, made a beneficiary change, conducted annual reviews when requested, sent annual account statements, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2014 and 2015, he handled the paperwork. Ms. Butler knew she could avail herself of the services in the Fee Agreement, even though she chose not to request many of them. Count II – Beverly Wilcox Ms. Wilcox met Mr. Savage at a seminar in early 2009. In February 2009, they met at his office, she completed a new client form, and she signed the Fee Agreement. She believed he was a financial advisor and that she would owe him money, but she did not read the Fee Agreement before signing it. In March 2009, Mr. Savage assisted Ms. Wilcox with the application to purchase a fixed index annuity for $120,000. He procured the annuity, as requested. Between 2010 and 2016, Ms. Wilcox received yearly invoices from Mr. Savage and paid about $6,500 in fees, after which she decided to deal with the annuity company directly. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered questions when asked, offered to conduct annual reviews each year, sent annual account statements, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2012, he handled the paperwork. Count III – Joseph Cerny Mr. Cerny met Mr. Savage while working at a yacht club and knew he was a financial advisor. Mr. Cerny purchased several fixed index annuities and other investments from Mr. Savage, who helped him complete the paperwork and procured the policies. Between 2003 and 2004, he bought two annuities for $100,000 each and two mutual funds for about $30,000 each. In 2008, he bought an annuity for $10,000. In 2010, he bought another annuity for $119,400. Mr. Savage did not charge fees for the first few years. Mr. Cerny believed he received compensation from the companies. However, in March 2010, Mr. Cerny signed the Fee Agreement. Between 2011 and 2012, he received two invoices, paying the first for $1,266.84 but refusing to pay the second. Mr. Cerny and Mr. Savage ended their relationship at that point. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered questions, provided annual statements, assisted with making withdrawals when requested, met with Mr. Cerny yearly, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he handled the paperwork. Count V – Marion Albano Ms. Albano met Mr. Savage at a retirement seminar in early 2007. In February 2007, they met at his office to go over her investments, including several annuities. Based on his recommendation, she surrendered her old annuities and purchased a fixed index annuity for about $1.6 million. He assisted her with the application and procured the annuity. In February 2007, Ms. Albano also signed the Fee Agreement. Mr. Savage told her there was a service charge to manage the annuity and she agreed because her brother pays the same rate on his managed brokerage account. She was never worried about losing the annuity if she failed to pay the fee. Ms. Albano received invoices from Mr. Savage every year from 2008 through 2015 and testified that she had paid between $110,000 and $120,000 in fees during that time. She had to pay some of the fees out of her distributions. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered account questions, corresponded with her daughter about his recommendations, provided her with an account analysis each year, met with her annually to review her account, and assisted her with required minimum distributions and withdrawals. He analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he handled the paperwork. Count VI – Jane D’Angelo Ms. D’Angelo and her late husband, whose son-in-law was an insurance agent, met Mr. Savage at an estate planning seminar in early 2003; they believed he was an investment advisor. In March 2003, he came to their home and they completed a new client form, indicating they had several types of investments, including annuities. Between 2003 and 2016, the D’Angelos invested with Mr. Savage. In 2003, they purchased a tax credit investment for $10,000. In 2005, they purchased a similar investment for $19,000, which resulted in tax credits totaling $17,174. Between 2005 and 2011, they purchased eight fixed index annuities from Mr. Savage. He assisted them with the applications, informing them that the companies paid him directly. He procured the following annuities, some of which were purchased by transferring money from their existing annuities: In April 2005, they bought an annuity for $250,000; in May 2007, they bought an annuity for $32,789.78; in May 2008, they bought an annuity for $29,510; in March 2009, they bought three annuities for $337,554, $550,000, and $6,000; in May 2011, they bought two annuities, one for $40,715 and another for $150,889; and, in June 2011, they bought an annuity for $24,667. Prior to 2010, they paid no service fees. However, in April 2010, they signed the Fee Agreement. Although they were surprised and felt like they had to sign, Ms. D’Angelo agreed they were not coerced or told the annuities would lapse if they failed to do so. Indeed, she never lost access to the annuities even after she stopped paying Mr. Savage’s fees in 2015. Mr. Savage sent them annual invoices from 2010 through 2015, totaling $54,000 in fees. Mr. Savage agreed to waive the 2010 fee and, ultimately, they only paid about $14,511 total. In 2016, Ms. D’Angelo informed Mr. Savage that she no longer needed his services. She had been dealing directly with the insurance companies herself, though they have provided her with names of individuals if she wanted someone to advise her. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to the D’Angelos on the investments he managed for them.6/ He had discussions with them, sent them annual statements, and assisted them with deposits and transfers between annuities, required minimum distributions and withdrawals, income riders, and beneficiary and ownership changes. He analyzed reallocation every year and handled the paperwork when he felt it was appropriate. He also offered to meet annually and held those meetings in years in which they were requested. Count VII – Ernest Blougouras Rev. Ernest Blougouras, a Greek Orthodox priest, attended several financial planning seminars with Mr. Savage. They met privately in February 2005, at which he completed a new client form listing his investments, which included fixed annuities, CDs, mutual funds, bonds, and stocks. Rev. Blougouras purchased fixed index annuities and other investments from Mr. Savage. He told Rev. Blougouras that he received commissions for selling the annuities. Mr. Savage assisted with the applications and procured the policies. Over the last 14 years, Rev. Blougouras purchased nine fixed index annuities. In March 2005, he bought an annuity for $347,003; in April 2005, he bought an annuity for $229,458; in August 2005, he bought an annuity for $102,227; in June 2006, he bought an annuity for $8,300; in May 2007, he bought an annuity for $41,143; in June 2009, he bought an annuity for $50,000; in July 2009, he bought an annuity for $14,308; and, though the record is unclear as to the date, he bought another annuity that was worth $40,572 in 2010. Since 2011, he bought an additional annuity and several non-insurance investments, such as real estate trusts and energy funds. Prior to 2010, Mr. Savage did not charge Rev. Blougouras service fees because he continued to purchase annuities. However, in 2010, Mr. Savage decided to start charging an annual service fee and sent Rev. Blougouras the Fee Agreement. Rev. Blougouras believed that Mr. Savage’s services would be cancelled if he failed to pay the fee and he would have to hire another advisor. He signed the Fee Agreement and continues to use Mr. Savage’s services. Mr. Savage has sent annual invoices to Rev. Blougouras every year since 2010. The record only contains the 2010 invoice for $9,883 and Rev. Blougouras could not recall how much he paid overall. However, he confirmed that he has paid every invoice he has received either himself or with distribution checks he received from the annuities. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to Rev. Blougouras. He prepared paperwork and documents for required minimum distributions and withdrawals, held meetings to review and organize his tax paperwork, copied documents requested, and made address changes when requested. He analyzed asset reallocation every year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he completed the necessary paperwork. Count VIII – George Flate Mr. Flate and his wife met Mr. Savage at a financial planning seminar in 2010. In February 2010, they met Mr. Savage and completed their new client form listing their investments, including fixed annuities, CDs, mutual funds, and stocks. They also signed the Fee Agreement, which Mr. Flate believed was a standard service agreement. They thought they hired Mr. Savage as an investment advisor and never believed they would lose access to the annuities if they stopped paying his fees. Based on Mr. Savage’s recommendation, the Flates purchased two fixed index annuities: one annuity was issued in April 2010 for approximately $22,000, and the other annuity was issued in May 2010 for approximately $22,500. Mr. Savage assisted them with filling out the applications and handled the paperwork to ensure the annuities were issued. Between 2012 and 2015, Mr. Savage sent the Flates invoices for his annual service fees every year. In total, they paid approximately $1,506 in service fees. In 2015, the Flates terminated their relationship with Mr. Savage. They have worked with two financial advisors since then, neither of whom charged them service fees relating to the annuities. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to the Flates. Each year, he met with them to go over their account, provided them with account analyses, analyzed reallocation and, the two to three times they agreed with his recommendations, he handled the paperwork. He handled withdrawals and address changes for them when requested, and he provided them with information as to changes in tax law and estate planning, though they did not believe that was necessary since they had tax and estate lawyers. The Flates understood that Mr. Savage was available to answer their questions and provide the services if they asked. Count IX – FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding On July 14, 2016, two former clients of Mr. Savage’s filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA alleging that he had recommended investments that were not suitable for them. Over Mr. Savage’s objections to proceeding with the hearing as scheduled, the arbitration panel awarded the clients over $725,000 in damages, fees, and costs. The clients filed a petition in Florida circuit court to approve the arbitration award. Mr. Savage responded in opposition and moved to vacate the arbitration award on grounds that it violated his due process rights. On November 9, 2017, the circuit court issued a final judgment awarding over $769,000. On December 4, 2017, Mr. Savage appealed the circuit court’s order to the Second District Court of Appeal. On June 12, 2018, while the appeal was pending, Mr. Savage signed a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”) with FINRA. The AWC stated that Mr. Savage accepted and consented, without admitting or denying, the following findings: Wall Street failed to apply for a material change in its business operations, i.e., to sell oil and gas interests, private placements, and non-traded real estate investment trusts, before engaging in more than 50 such transactions, many of which were consummated by Mr. Savage; Mr. Savage failed to timely update his FINRA Form U4 within 30 days of the Statement of Claim being filed against him in July 2016; Mr. Savage failed to timely respond to FINRA’s requests for information relating to an upcoming examination of Wall Street; and Wall Street failed to maintain the minimum net capital requirements of $5,000 while engaging in securities transactions. Mr. Savage agreed to three sanctions: (1) a five- month suspension from associating with any FINRA registered firm; (2) a three-month suspension from association with any FINRA registered firm in a principal capacity, to be served following the five-month suspension; and (3) a $30,000 fine. The AWC confirmed that Mr. Savage waived his procedural rights relating to these alleged violations and made clear that it would become part of his permanent disciplinary record that could be considered in future actions brought by FINRA or other regulators. He was precluded from taking positions inconsistent with the AWC in proceedings in which FINRA was a party, but was not precluded from taking inconsistent positions in litigation if FINRA was not a party. The five-month suspension began on June 13, 2018, and ended on November 17, 2018. The three-month suspension began on November 18, 2018, and ended on February 17, 2019. In the interim, on August 16, 2018, FINRA notified Mr. Savage by letter that it was suspending his securities license indefinitely for his “failure to comply with an arbitration award or settlement agreement or to satisfactorily respond to a FINRA request to provide information concerning the status of compliance.” This letter is not in the record and, as such, it is unclear whether Mr. Savage had an avenue to challenge that suspension directly. Mr. Savage had challenged the underlying arbitration award, which remained pending on appeal in the Second District Court of Appeal. On November 7, 2018, the Second District affirmed the circuit court’s arbitration order. On November 20, 2018, Mr. Savage put the Department on notice of the FINRA disciplinary actions, including the AWC from June 2018 and the decision of the Second District affirming the arbitration award.
Conclusions For Petitioner: David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Financial Services Room 612, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 For Respondent: Michael Buchholtz, Esquire The Law Office of Michael Buchholtz Post Office Box 13015 St. Petersburg, Florida 33777
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order suspending Mr. Savage’s license as an insurance agent for twelve months. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2019.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent held a class "H" certificate of registration numbered GH-8500083 issued by Petitioner pursuant to Chapter 496, F.S. According to Respondent's application for registration which was submitted on or about January 23, 1984, Respondent is the President of an organization known as, "Citizens Benevolent Association - Displaced Inmate Dependent Mission." The purpose of that organization is to give housing, employment, food, clothing and toys to the dependents of inmates in central Florida. It was further indicated that the organization would raise less than $4000 each year, and contributions it received would be used to carry out the purpose of the organization. In February, 1986, Willie Rister, regional office supervisor and investigator for Petitioner, attempted to meet with Respondent concerning his charitable organization, and particularly its financial records. After two unsuccessful attempts to meet with Respondent, Rister contacted Respondent on March 12, 1986, and was told that all financial records of the organization had already been turned over to him. Respondent's financial records fail to reveal or inaccurately reveal the income and expenses of the organization. Specifically, they fail to account for all contributed funds and in-kind contributions, as well as disbursements. It appears that the organization's funds and Respondent's personal funds have been comingled, and no distinct records have been kept. It is not possible to determine which expenditures are personal and which are to carry out the purpose of the organization. The financial records are simply a listing of receipts without any explanation of the source or method of raising these funds, which appear to total approximately $9000 for 1985. Rister testified that he was unable to find any people who had been helped by Respondent or his organization. Contributed funds were used primarily for the personal expenses of Respondent or his family, or here not fully accounted for and were not used for any charitable purpose associated with the organization. Respondent advertised his organization in the Sebring News, indicating that his organization finds jobs and housing for the dependents of inmates. There is no evidence that his organization ever performed these services, and in fact the evidence presented indicates it did not.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner issue a Final Order revoking Respondents certificate of registration numbered GH-8500083. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James V. Antista, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 John Joseph Heinrich 109 North Self Avenue Avon Park, Florida 33825
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be denied on the ground that he is not qualified for licensure for the reasons set forth in the Florida Real Estate Commission's October 19, 1999, Order preliminarily denying his application.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a disbarred attorney. He began practicing law in approximately 1972, and was licensed to practice in Florida and New York. In or about March of 1991, Petitioner was involved in a transaction involving the sale of an aircraft. The purchaser of the aircraft was Joseph Towne. Mr. Towne paid for the aircraft by giving Petitioner, who was conducting the closing, a cashier's check issued by Citizen's United Bank, N.A., in the amount of $150,000.00 (Cashier's Check). Petitioner deposited the Cashier's Check in his trust account at a Miami, Florida branch of Sun Bank (Petitioner's Bank). He subsequently made payments (by check) from his trust account. On or about March 25, 1991, New Jersey National Bank, which had purchased Citizen's United Bank, N.A., refused to honor and make payment on the Cashier's Check and returned it (with the notation "refer to maker") to Petitioner's Bank. Upon receiving the returned Cashier's Check, Petitioner's Bank made the necessary adjustments to Petitioner's trust account to reflect that the Cashier's Check was not honored. As a result, there were not sufficient funds in Petitioner's trust account to cover all of the checks drawn on the account. When he learned what had happened, Petitioner contacted New Jersey National Bank and was told that it appeared that the Cashier's Check had been stolen some time ago. Petitioner then wrote a letter to Gail Alston, a consumer affairs specialist employed by the Comptroller of Currency in New York, asking her to "look[] into the matter." He received back from Ms. Alston the following written response to his letter: This is in response to your letter concerning New Jersey National Bank, Ewing Township, New Jersey. As a result of our inquiry, the bank has advised that this matter was previously investigated by the bank's Loss Prevention and Security Division. The review revealed that the subject check was stolen approximately ten years ago, prior to New Jersey National Bank's purchase of Citizens United Bank (CUB). The check was presented for payment in March of 1991 and returned to Sun Bank- Miami for the above reason. You were advised that CUB was no longer a bank, that the subject check had been stolen to the best of their knowledge and New Jersey National Bank had no way of determining that the check itself is not counterfeit. The question of who should bear liability, if any exists, in this matter is not governed by administratively enforceable banking statutes. Any restitution you seek in this matter would have to be decided by the courts through private legal action. Petitioner determined not to pursue such "private legal action." In October of 1991, Petitioner was disbarred (effective nunc pro tunc June 6, 1991) by the Florida Supreme Court for misuse of client trust funds resulting in trust fund shortages amounting to approximately $208,000.001 and for failure to keep proper trust fund records. The Florida Supreme Court also ordered Petitioner to pay $4,348.27 in costs. Petitioner was thereafter disbarred in New York based upon the same misconduct that led to his disbarment in Florida. In 1993, Petitioner was arrested and charged in Broward County Circuit Court with grand theft in the first degree for the same misconduct (relating to his handling of trust fund monies) for which he was disbarred in Florida and New York. Petitioner pled no contest and was adjudicated guilty as charged in this criminal proceeding. Petitioner was sentenced to community control, followed by a period of probation, and ordered to pay $208,290.04 in restitution. In August of 1997, Petitioner's probation was terminated and a Judgment was entered which effectively "converted the previously issued Order of Restitution to a civil judgement." The Judgment directed Petitioner to pay the full amount of restitution he owed ($208,290.04) "immediately." There is no indication in the evidentiary record that Petitioner has made any restitution payments. Furthermore, the evidentiary record lacks persuasive competent substantial evidence demonstrating that, since engaging in the unethical and criminal conduct that resulted in his disbarments and criminal conviction, Petitioner has transformed himself into a trustworthy and responsible person with a good reputation for fair dealing who, if allowed to become a licensed real estate salesperson, would conduct himself in a manner that would not endanger the public.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2000.
The Issue Whether Petitioners are liable for the payment of amounts set forth in Respondent's Notice of Assessment for fiscal fund years 1977-78, 1979-80, 1980- 81, and 1981-82, dated November 9, 1984, pursuant to Chapter 768, Florida Statutes. This proceeding arose as a result of petitions filed by two groups of hospitals contesting Notice of Assessment issued by the Department of Insurance on November 9, 1984, based upon the certification by the Board of Governors of the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund to the Insurance Commissioner of a deficiency in the amount of money available to pay claims for the 1977-78, 1979- 80, 1980-81, and 1981-82 fiscal Fund Years. The proposed assessment seeks payment of the alleged deficiency in the total amount of some 57 million dollars from health care providers who were members of the Fund during the fund years in question, pursuant to Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. Two groups of hospitals subsequently filed petitions contesting the proposed assessment. They consist of Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center and 42 other hospitals (Case No. 34-4398), and Southeast Volusia Hospital District and 64 other hospitals (Case No. 85-4399). A third petition was filed by Miami General Hospital, Inc. shortly before the final hearing herein (Case No. 85-0992). The three cases were consolidated for hearing. An additional petition filed by Harborside Hospital was merged with the petition of Tallahassee Memorial Regional Hospital, et al. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Greater Miami, Inc., one of the petitioners in Case No. 84-4398, filed a "Supplemental Petition" raising additional disputed issues, including the question of whether the Department of Insurance was required to consider the impact of the loss of Medicare reimbursement on individual member hospitals in allocating the proposed assessment to such hospitals. Intervention as a party respondent was granted to the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund. By prehearing orders, it was determined that questions involving Medicare reimbursement, the setting of fees for various classes of health care providers, and the repeal of the "statutory cap" by Chapter 83-206, Laws of Florida, amending Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, were not properly in issue in this proceeding. The parties entered into a prehearing stipulation that set forth certain agreed facts. However, Respondents reserved the right to object to their relevance or materiality. Such of the agreed facts as are deemed relevant are included hereinafter. The following issues of law remain for determination: Whether the Fund and the Department properly applied Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, in certifying and approving a deficit and assessment for each of the subject Fund years based on the reserving practices and procedures employed by the Fund; particularly: (a) in failing to adjust or write down reserves to reflect the amounts of known settlements and verdicts, plus accrued interest as of the certification date. (b) by the manner in which claims supervisors and the claims committee for the Fund posted or set reserves on individual cases. (c) in that the reserves set by the Fund on known cases are redundant. Whether the Fund and the Department properly applied the $15 million maintenance cap with respect to the actual assessment for each Fund Year. At the hearing, Petitioners presented the testimony of Lee M. Smith, who was accepted as an expert in actuarial science, and Catherine M. Sims, Administrative Manager of the Florida patient's Compensation Fund. Additionally, petitioners submitted deposition testimony of Michael Rinehart, Administrator for Automobile and General Liability Claims for the Division of Risk Management, Department of Insurance, and excerpts of prior testimony of John W. Odem. Petitioners submitted 16 exhibits in evidence which are numbered according to the exhibit list contained in the Prehearing Stipulation. Respondents presented the testimony of Ms. Sims, Charles Portero, Claims Manager of the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, who was accepted as an expert in claims handling and reserving practices, and Jerome Vogel, an actuary with the Department of Insurance who was accepted as an expert in that field. Respondents also submitted the deposition testimony of Ward Johnson, Vice President of Claims for Alexsis Risk Management, and James O. Wood, a Consultant Actuary employed by Tillinghast, Nelson and Warren, Inc. Respondents submitted 18 exhibits, including supplemental excerpts of the prior testimony of John W. Odem and Michael Rinehart. Respondents' exhibits also follow the numbers set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, except for exhibits which were not listed therein. At the conclusion of the hearing, certain of Respondents' answers to Petitioners' request for admissions were received in evidence. Certain other answers were proffered, as were a number of Petitioners' exhibits, as reflected on the record. The parties have submitted proposed recommended orders that have been fully considered. All matters therein have been ruled on directly or indirectly herein, except for proposed findings of fact that have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Patient's Compensation Fund (Fund) is established under Chapter 768, Florida Statutes, for the purpose of paying claims against member health care providers, including hospitals, in amounts exceeding statutory limits which must be maintained by the health care provider as primary coverage. The Fund is operated subject to the supervision and approval of a Board of Governors which consists of members representing the insurance industry, the legal and medical professions, hospitals and the general public. Annually, each health care provider electing to become a member of the Fund pays certain fees established by statute for deposit into the Fund. Each fiscal year of the Fund operates independently of preceding fiscal years and participants are only liable for assessments for claims from years during which they were members of the Fund. If the Fund determines that the amount of money in an account for a given fiscal year is insufficient to satisfy claims, it certifies the amount of projected excess or insufficiency to the Insurance Commissioner with a request that he levy an assessment against Fund participants for that fiscal year. Subsection 768.54(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), which was the statutory language applicable during all fund years in question, provides that the Insurance Commissioner shall levy such assessment against the participants in amounts that "fairly reflect the classifications prescribed above and are sufficient to obtain the money necessary to meet all claims for said fiscal year." For all years at issue in this proceeding, a statutory limitation was in effect on the amount physician members of the Fund could be assessed. Petitioner hospitals were members of the Fund during one or more of Fund Years 1977-78, 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82 (Stipulation). Each month, the Administrative Manager of the Fund follows a prescribed procedure to determine if an assessment is required for a particular Fund Year, utilizing what is termed a "retrospective rating plan." The plan provides that assessments will not be levied in any year until the cash available for paying claims in that membership year is down to 33 percent of the loss and expense reserves for all known losses. It further provides that the amount should be sufficient to create enough cash flow to pay known reserved claims for the year showing such deficit. In reviewing the Fund's monthly financial report of March 31, 1984, it was determined that a sufficient deficit existed to warrant the levy of an assessment. Thereafter, an outside audit of the Fund accounts was conducted and presented to the Fund Board for certification. At a meeting of the Fund Board of Governors on May 12, 1984, the Board approved the verifications that assessments had been triggered for the 1978, 1980, 1981, and 1982 fiscal years and voted to submit the deficit certification to the Insurance Commissioner for assessment. Thereafter, by letter of May 23, 1984, the proposed assessment was certified to the Insurance Commissioner. (Respondents' Exhibits 2 a, b, c, 4-5, 7, 9, 17; Testimony of Sims.) Prior to the issuance by the Department of an assessment order, the 1982 Fund Year triggered an additional deficit in excess of nine million dollars. The Fund's Board of Governors, at their October 25, 1984 meeting, accepted the audit substantiating the need for the additional amount to be added to the 1982 Fund Year assessment. On November 9, 1984, the Department issued a Notice of Assessment for Fund Years 1977-78, 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82. The Notice of Assessment announced that the Insurance Commissioner intended to levy and authorized the Fund to collect an assessment in accordance with the Fund's certification of deficits as follows: 1977-78 Membership Year $ 7,467,603.00 1979-80 Membership Year 3,952,812.00 1980-81 Membership Year 18,448,460.00 1981-82 Membership Year 16,154,699.00 (amount certified May 23, 1984) 1981-82 9,047,785.00 (amount certified October 29, 1984) The Notice of Assessment of November 9, 1984, further provided that the assessment shall be divided among the various classes of health care providers for each year as follows: CLASS OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AMOUNT OF ASSESSMENT Class 1977-78 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 Physicians & Surgeons (a) Class 1 0 0 0 $ 1,370,677 (b) Class 2 0 0 0 1,974,946 (c) Class 3 0 0 0 6,476,422 2. Hospitals 7,467,603 3,924,941 18,309,420 14,668,665 3. HMO 0 9,764 44,203 97,207 4. Ambulatory Surg. Center 0 18,107 94,837 38,555 5. Professional Assoc. 0 0 0 576,012 The notice further provided that each health care provider that was a member of the Fund during one or more of the specified Fund Years shall pay a pro rata portion (based on premium paid) of the total amount assessed against the class of health care providers for each year of which the health care provider was a member. It further stated that each health care provider failing to pay its share of the assessment within 21 days of date of receipt of the order or its publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly, whichever date is earlier, shall pay an additional amount in interest of 12 percent per year. (Respondents' Exhibits 3 a-d, 6, 11-12, Stipulation, Testimony of Sims.) The Fund used the same procedure in preparation of Certification to the Department in this fifth assessment since the inception of the Fund as it used in the first four assessments. The Department used the same procedure and methodology (indicated rate method), in allocating the assessment among the various classes as it used in the first four assessments. The Fund levies assessments based on the amount needed to pay known claims. Usually, the Fund becomes aware of a claim by service of process incident to a civil action. The Fund's reserves are estimates of the amount needed to pay known claims. The Fund follows standard industry reserving practices, as modified in several respects by its particular needs and procedures. Each claim is assigned to a claims supervisor who obtains information concerning the claims incident from the primary insurance carrier. The initial reserve on a claim is based on a variety of factors, including the type of injury, potential damages, liability considerations, geographic location, and the particular attorney for the claimant. After a determination that a reserve is needed on the file, the claims supervisor makes an initial determination of the amount which is referred to the claims manager for approval. Final approval of the posted reserve lies in the hands of the Claims Committee of the Fund. The figure is usually fixed at a sum for which it is believed that the claim could be settled and the potential liability arising from a jury verdict. The necessity of obtaining approval of the Claims Committee for the initial reserve and any subsequent changes creates a certain amount of delay in obtaining such decisions. Changes may be effected in the reserve when injuries are found to be greater than anticipated, or because of the discovery of additional facts affecting potential liability. It is not unusual for a particular claim to be submitted three or four times to the Claims Committee before it is settled. In recent years, the Fund has not had sufficient cash available to pay all the required settlements or verdicts due to the lack of ability to collect prior assessments which have been in litigation. The Fund has found that such delays have increased the settlement value of claims, and plaintiffs unwilling to wait for payment of a settlement amount have gone on to trial and obtained verdicts in excess of what the case could have been settled for if the funds had been available. The reserve for a particular case is normally adjusted following settlement or verdict within a period of approximately 90 days. Although such an adjustment includes anticipated interest, interest is not taken into consideration in setting initial reserves. Past experience has shown that a lag time of about two years will elapse before funds are available to pay settled claims and, accordingly, interest is projected for a substantial period when reserves are adjusted. (Testimony of Portero.) Although individual claims have been found to be "over-reserved" at a particular point in time, it is also true that other claims are sometimes "under-reserved." The setting of reserves is based upon past experience and is necessarily subjective to a certain extent. As indicated above, changes in the status of a claim may require an increase or decrease in the amount of reserve. Additionally, a number of claims settled shortly before certification of the deficit for the assessment herein reflected that the Fund did not reduce the reserves to the amount of settlement prior to the certification dates. Several such instances were brought to the attention of the Fund in a claims audit made by an independent firm in March 1984. However, the audit report also noted that although the claims staff recognized the potential of large exposure claims, the Claims Committee was not allowing them to set a sufficient reserve on the "million dollar plus exposure claims." The auditor found that overall, the file reserves were in line by the time a case went to trial, but that the reserves could probably have been established more promptly if traditional claims handling procedures had been employed. The report found that there were many cases of reserve requests being made by the claims personnel which were turned dawn or drastically cut by the Claims Committee, and recommended that the claims staff should be allowed to set the reserves to properly reflect the exposure that the claim had at the time the file is examined. It was the opinion of the individual who conducted the claims audit, Ward W. Johnson, Vice President Of Claims, Alexsis Risk Management Services, Inc., that the number of cases that were under-reserved exceeded the cases that had potential of being over- reserved. He was of the further opinion that generally the Fund did a "good job of reserving." (Respondents' Exhibits 13, 23, (Deposition of Ward Johnson); Petitioners' Exhibits 23, 58.) Conflicting expert testimony and statistical data concerning the reasonableness of the Fund's reserving practices in general and for the Fund Years in question were presented by the parties at the hearing. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, it is found that the Fund's procedures conform generally to standard insurance industry practices. Although there is evidence as indicated heretofore that individual cases have been both "over- reserved" and "under-reserved," and that required adjustments to reserves have not always been made in a timely manner, the evidence does not show that the reserves as a whole or as to the instant assessment are unreasonable. (Petitioners' Exhibits 10-13, 62-63; Respondents' Exhibits 13, 18, 20-24; Testimony of Wood (deposition), Johnson (deposition), Vogel, Smith, Portero, Rinehart (deposition), Odem (prior testimony).) It is further found that the present assessment was prepared in accordance with standard procedures, that the amounts proposed to be levied as an assessment for each Fund Year in question represent a deficiency in the Fund Account for such years, and that the proposed allocations of such amounts among the specified health care providers are appropriate. (Respondents' Exhibits 2- 3, 5-7, 9, 11-12, 17, 29; Joint Exhibit 1 (Stipulation) testimony of Sims, Vogel.) 12. During Fund Years 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82, Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, provided that the Fund shall be "maintained" at no more than $15 million per fiscal year. There was a $25 million maintenance cap applicable to Fund Years prior to 1979-1980. The limitation was removed by statutory amendment in 1982 (Chapter 82-236, Laws of Florida). Petitioners contend that the present assessment exceeds the $15 million "can" for Fund Years 1980-81 and 1981-82, but failed to submit competent substantial evidence to support such contention. The Fund apparently used the limitation as applicable to membership fees and not to assessments. The letter of the Fund to the Department, dated May 23, 1984, certifying the assessment, stated in part as follows: During the 1981-82 membership year the Fund's membership fees exceeded the $15 million cap and, by your Order, the excess was returned to those members. We are requesting that your Order of Assessment for the 1982 membership year include an Order for the overage refunds to be repaid to the Fund. In any other respects, the Fund did not take the monetary limitation into consideration with regard to the present assessment. (Petitioners' Exhibit 24; Respondents' Exhibit 2b; Testimony of Sims, Vogel.)
Recommendation In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that a final order be entered by the Department of Insurance levying assessments in accordance with the Notice of Assessment, dated November 9, 1984, for the Fund Years specified therein. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable William Gunter Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Legal Division Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William C. Owen and Doug Hall, Esquires Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith and Cutler Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Cathi C. O'Halloran, Esquire Pennington, Wilkinson and Dunlap Box 3985 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-0985 James Wing, Esquire Myers, Kenin, Levingson, Frank and Richards 1428 Brickel Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Louis F. Robinson, III, Esquire Barnett and Alagia 250 South County Road Suite 201 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 David A. Yon and Dennis S. Silverman, Esquires Department of Insurance Legal Division Room 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 E. Clay McGonagill, Jr., Esquire 241 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Both Ryder and Disney World are self-insurers as defined by Section 440.38, Florida Statutes (1979). If the proposed rules were adopted both parties would be liable for assessments required by the rules.
The Issue As stated by the parties in the joint stipulation to limit issues: whether the costs of $70,455.00 associated with the Moore Haven office of Petitioner are eligible costs under the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) administered by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the issues of this matter, the Petitioner was the grantee of a community services block grant. Generally, the Department enters into CSBGs for a defined period of time for defined work to be performed by the grantee. The work normally entails defined services to low income people. In this case, the COFFO was to provide personnel, materials, services, and facilities as set forth by their agreements to low income persons in Collier, Dade, Glades, Okeechobee, Polk, Hardee, Indian River, DeSoto, Highlands, Hendry, Lee, and Palm Beach Counties. At all times material to this matter, COFFO acknowledged that it is governed by applicable laws and rules related to CSBGs, including, but not limited to: The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35, as amended), 45 C.F.R. Part 96, and Chapter 9B-22, Florida Administrative Code. Rules governing CSBGs require written documentation both as to the person served and the activity or service provided to such individual. On September 14, 1995, the Department notified COFFO that an audit had determined a lack of justification for funds to continue operation of the COFFO Moore Haven field office Such notice claimed that the field work performed by an independent audit firm found "no documentation to support the expensing of CSBG funds at the Moore Haven field office." The Department invited COFFO to provide the needed documentation to support its claim for reimbursement. For the three year period at issue, COFFO was unable to provide documentation for the individuals served at the Moore Haven office. While COFFO claimed twenty-seven persons appeared at that office for service, it also maintained that such persons would have been routed to the COFFO office at Immokalee for services. Regardless, neither office produced records to verify that eligible individuals received eligible services. COFFO maintains that since it met the overall terms of its agreements, whether at the Moore Haven office or elsewhere, it should be entitled to all funds claimed. Additionally, COFFO claims that since the Department did not cite inadequate records at Moore Haven to them at an earlier time, they were unable to correct any deficiencies timely and thus avoid the issue inherent in this case. Normally, exit interviews conducted by Department staff incidental to a monitoring visit alert grantees of any deficiencies noted during the visit. In this case, Department staff attempted a monitoring visit at Moore Haven, but an exit interview was not conducted. COFFO did not have staff or anyone at the location at the time of the visit. At all times material to this case, the major programs for COFFO were implemented at its main office in Homestead and a field office at Immokalee. The office at Moore Haven did not have equipment or other resources to provide services. In the past, although not documented as to time, the Moore Haven office had been used to distribute emergency food, for job and budget counseling, and for recreation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining the costs associated with the Moore Haven office of Petitioner to be ineligible under the community services block grant program. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5694 and 95-5695 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 2, 3, 5, and 9 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 1, with the clarification that it is accepted that COFFO provided services to migrant and seasonal farmworkers but could have provided services to any eligible recipient; the paragraph is otherwise accepted. The first three sentences of paragraph 4 are accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or argument of law. With the clarification that forms were not maintained at the Moore Haven office demonstrating eligible services were rendered to eligible recipients, paragraph 6 is accepted. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are rejected as irrelevant or immaterial to the issue of this case, or not supported by reference to the record. The first two sentences of paragraph 10 are accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or irrelevant as stated. With regard to paragraph 11, the first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence as stated. Paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Arturo Lopez Coalition of Florida Farmworker Organizations, Inc. Post Office Box 388 Homestead, Florida 33090 Pedro Narezo Coalition of Florida Farmworker Organizations, Inc. Post Office Box 388 Homestead, Florida 33090 Barbara Jo Finer Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Carol Soliz, Board Chairperson Coalition of Florida Farmworker Organizations, Inc. P.O. Box 1987 Sebring, Florida 33871-1987 James F. Murley Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Stephanie M. Gehres General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is perhaps the first cemetery in Florida to sell "opening and closing" of graves on a "pre-need basis." Joseph M. Erlich, deputy director of respondent's division of finance, learned that petitioner was making such sales in the spring of 1978. At that time, as head of the section in respondent's office regulating cemeteries, Mr. Ehrlich instructed field personnel in respondent's Tampa, Miami and Pensacola offices to find out how much it cost cemeteries in their areas to open and close graves. Intentionally excluded from this survey were cemeteries in the Jacksonville and Tallahassee areas, where soil conditions make digging graves more difficult than in most other areas of the state. This inquiry yielded oral advice from persons connected with twelve of the 171 cemeteries regulated by respondent; of the twelve cost figures, which ranged from $35.00 to $125.00, the two highest were discarded. The ten remaining figures were averaged. Petitioner's cost was not among those averaged. This computation yielded a number between 70 and 75, which was rounded down to $70.00. The parties stipulated that the figures reported by these twelve cemeteries accurately reflected their individual costs for opening and closing graves, with one exception. Donald Farr, executive vice president of Hillsborough Memorial Gardens, originally reported a cost of $75.00, whereas the true cost, as subsequently determined by more rigorous cost accounting, amounted to $59.57. Using the lower figure for Hillsborough Memorial Gardens, the average of the ten lowest figures is still between 70 and 75. On July 1 of every year petitioner has been in operation, respondent has published a "Merchandise Trust Fund Departmental Cost List." Each such list provided that "[a]ll items not listed but sold on a pre-need basis will be assessed at the invoice price plus 10%." Joint exhibit No.1. On the 1978 and 1979 lists appeared the item "pre-need opening and closing $77.00." Joint exhibit No. 1. On no previous list was there any mention of "pre-need opening and closing." Every list contained cost figures for, inter alia, a great variety of bronze grave markers. Opening and closing graves on petitioner's grounds does not differ significantly from opening and closing graves at other cemeteries. The process ordinarily begins with a telephone call from a funeral home. In addition to answering the call, a secretary spends time filling out forms, checking records and notifying the supervisor where the grave is to be dug. Men use a backhoe to dig the grave. A truck brings a vault to the site where a lowering device deposits it in the grave. A tent, artificial grass and chairs are set up. Afterwards these things are removed and the grave is closed. Petitioner's cost for opening and closing a grave, including labor, insurance, gas, maintenance and depreciation of machinery and equipment comes to $37.72. Petitioner charges $125.00 for the opening and closing of a grave on a "pre-need" basis, which is substantially less than what petitioner and other cemeteries charge for the same service on an "at need" basis. Petitioner has put no money in its merchandise trust fund on account of its sales of grave openings and closings on a "pre-need" basis.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's use of $77.00 for each contract for the future opening and closing of a grave, in calculating the deficit in petitioner's merchandise trust fund, be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Forst, Esquire 3201 Griffin Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Franklyn J. Wollett, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF FINANCE SHARON GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 79-918 OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible for services under the Home Care for Disabled Adults Program.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Parties Petitioner is a 41-year-old retired State of Florida employee. She retired on disability in August 2002 as a result of "extreme" and "terminal" medical problems, the precise nature of which is not reflected in the record. At the time of her retirement, Petitioner was working for the Department. She had worked for the Department and its predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, for slightly more than ten years and she was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the Home Care for Disabled Adults Program ("HC/DA Program"). HC/DA Program The HC/DA Program is a state-funded program related to the federal supplemental security income (SSI) program. As such, the HC/DA Program is referred to as an "SSI-related program." The HC/DA Program is intended to provide an alternative to institutional or nursing home care for disabled adults. It does so by providing monthly support and maintenance payments for the care of eligible disabled adults in family-type living arrangements in private homes. The income threshold for the HC/DA Program is 300 percent of the SSI federal benefit rate, which is currently $552.00 per month. Accordingly, the income threshold for the HC/DA Program is $1,656.00 per month. An individual who has income in excess of $1,656.00 per month is ineligible for services under the HC/DA Program, no matter how significant his or her needs are. It is undisputed that Petitioner meets all of the other eligibility requirements for the HC/DA Program except the income threshold. Petitioner's Income and the Health Insurance Subsidy Petitioner does not receive SSI benefits. Her only sources of income are a disability benefit she receives from the federal Social Security Administration (SSA) and a pension benefit she receives from the FRS. Petitioner's SSA disability benefit is $983.00 per month. Petitioner's gross FRS pension benefit is $701.00 per month. Her net benefit is only $410.00 per month as a result of health insurance premiums which are paid to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (BC/BS) by Petitioner through "payroll deductions." Included in Petitioner's gross FRS pension benefit is a health insurance subsidy of $50.40 per month. The subsidy amount is based upon the number of years of creditable service that Petitioner had with the State. It is calculated at a rate of $5.00 for each year of service. The subsidy may only be used by Petitioner to purchase health insurance. The subsidy does not cover the entire cost of Petitioner's health insurance. Even with the subsidy, Petitioner pays approximately $240.00 per month to BC/BS for health insurance. The subsidy is "optional" in the sense that Petitioner was required to separately apply for it under the FRS. However, upon application, the subsidy is legally owed to Petitioner as a result of her ten years of service to the State. The subsidy is paid directly to Petitioner, although Petitioner never actually receives the money since she has chosen to have it (and the remainder of her insurance premium) transferred to BC/BS through a “payroll deduction” from her monthly FRS check. Petitioner's total income is $1,684.00 per month if the health insurance subsidy is included, and it is $1,633.60 per month if the subsidy is excluded. Department's Review of Petitioner's HC/DA Application and Determination of Ineligibility On March 5, 2003, Petitioner met with Tracy Seymour, an adult services counselor with the Department, to determine whether she might be eligible for services under the HC/DA Program. Ms. Seymour helped Petitioner complete the application for the HC/DA Program, and gathered general income information from Petitioner. Petitioner's application was then forwarded to the Department's economic self-sufficiency unit for review. That unit is responsible for determining income eligibility where, as here, the applicant is not receiving SSI benefits. To determine income eligibility, the economic self- sufficiency caseworker verifies the income and resource information provided by the applicant on the application. Pamela Bolen was the caseworker responsible for reviewing Petitioner's application. Ms. Bolen contacted the SSA and obtained a print-out detailing Petitioner's disability benefit. That print-out confirmed that Petitioner received an SSA benefit in the amount of $983.00 per month. Ms. Bolen next called the Division of Retirement (DOR) to obtain information related to Petitioner's FRS pension benefit. Ms. Bolen was told that Petitioner's benefit was $650.60 per month with an additional $50.40 per month being paid towards Petitioner’s health insurance by the State. Later, Ms. Bolen received a print-out from DOR which reflected Petitioner's gross FRS pension benefit as being $701.00. That figure is the sum of $650.60 and $50.40. Because Ms. Bolen had not previously done an income eligibility determination for the HC/DA Program, she was unsure as to whether the $50.40 insurance subsidy was to be included or excluded when determining Petitioner's income. As a result, she contacted the economic self-sufficiency "help desk" for guidance. Roger Menotti, an administrator with 18 years of experience in the economic self-sufficiency unit, responded to Ms Bolen's inquiry. Mr. Menotti researched those portions of the Department's policy manual that relate to the HC/DA Program. The policy manual is not adopted by rule, nor is it incorporated by reference in any Department rule. However, the policy manual is consistent with the Department rules governing the HC/DA Program as well as the federal SSI rules. Section 2640.0115.02 of the policy manual provides that "gross income is used to determine eligibility" for the HC/DA Program. Section 1840.0102 of the policy manual provides that "[s]ome deductions withheld from gross income must be included as income" and that section specifically lists health insurance premiums as an example of such a deduction. Section 1840.0118 of the policy manual provides: A vendor payment is a money payment made for SFU [sic] expenses by an individual or organization outside of the SFU [sic] from funds not legally owed to the SFU [sic]. Vendor payments are excluded as income. . . . * * * Direct payments to a creditor or vendor on behalf of an individual are vendor payments and are excluded as available income to the individual with exception. When a vendor payment results in the individual directly receiving income, the income is included. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Section 1440.1400 of the policy manual provides that: Individuals must apply for and diligently pursue to conclusion an application for all other benefits for which they may be eligible as a condition of eligibility [for the HC/DA Program]. Need cannot be established nor eligibility determined upon failure to do so. Section 1440.1400 specifically identifies retirement benefits and health insurance payments as examples of the other benefits for which the applicant must apply. Based upon his review of the policy manual, and particularly the sections quoted above, Mr. Menotti concluded that the health insurance subsidy is not a "vendor payment" and that it must be included in Petitioner’s gross income. Mr. Menotti conveyed this conclusion to Ms. Bolen. Thereafter, Ms. Bolen updated her calculations to reflect Petitioner's total monthly income as $1,684.00, which exceeds the income threshold for the HC/DA Program. Ms. Bolen then returned the application to Ms. Seymour. Based upon the economic self-sufficiency unit's determination that Petitioner's income exceeded the threshold for the HC/DA Program, Ms. Seymour notified Petitioner in writing on March 20, 2003, that she was "financially ineligible" to receive home care services. Ms. Bolen knew Petitioner when she was a Department employee. She and Ms. Seymour are continuing to work with Petitioner to identify Department programs for which Petitioner may be eligible. As of the date of the hearing, those efforts had resulted in Petitioner being found eligible for the Department's Medical Needy Program. Upon learning that her income exceeded the threshold for the HC/DA Program, Petitioner considered giving up the health insurance subsidy in order to reduce her income below the threshold. Ms. Bolen advised her not to do so. Ms. Bolen's advice was based upon Section 1440.1400 of the policy manual which does not allow an applicant for services under the HC/DA program to turn down other benefits or assistance that they may be eligible for. Had Ms. Bolen not given Petitioner this advice, Petitioner would have given up the health insurance subsidy for no reason. In a final effort to determine whether there was any means by which Petitioner could be found eligible for services under the HC/DA Program, Petitioner’s case was referred to Lynn Raichelson, an adult services policy specialist with the Department's Tallahassee office, for review. Ms. Raichelson contacted DOR to obtain information regarding the operation of the health insurance subsidy. She also contacted the Atlanta office of the SSA, which is the federal agency responsible for administration of the SSI program. Based upon information that she received from those sources, Mr. Raichelson concluded that the subsidy must be included as income in determining eligibility for services under the HC/DA Program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order denying Petitioner's application for services under the Home Care for Disabled Adults Program because her income level exceeds the threshold for the program. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2003.
