The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner’s request to renew a lien against alcoholic beverage license number 62- 08383 on or about July 8, 2011, should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at hearing, and upon the entire record of this proceeding, the following facts are found: Respondent is the state agency charged with the licensing, regulation, and enforcement of Florida’s alcoholic beverage laws pursuant to section 20.165(2)(b) and chapters 561- 568, Florida Statutes, including recordation of liens against alcoholic beverage licenses and provision of notice to lienholders pursuant to section 561.65. Petitioner is the holder of a recorded lien against alcoholic beverage license number 62-08383, a 4COP spirituous alcoholic beverage license, commonly referred to as a quota license, which was issued pursuant to sections 561.20(1) and 565.02(1)(a)-(f) for use in Pinellas County. Liens and Security Interests in Alcoholic Beverage Licenses Section 561.65 governs mortgages, liens, and security interests against spirituous alcoholic beverage licenses. DABT has a lien section within its Bureau of Licensing that is responsible for the oversight of lien recordings and lien searches. To perfect a lien or security interest in a spirituous alcoholic beverage license that may be enforceable against the license, the entity holding the security interest or lien must record it with DABT within 90 days of the date of creation of the lien or security interest, using forms authorized by DABT. The forms adopted by DABT require the names of the parties and the terms of the obligation being recorded. § 561.65(4), Fla. Stat. Form DBPR ABT-6022, Application for Mortgagee’s Interest in Spirituous Alcoholic Beverage License, is used to record a new lien, a lien assignment or assumption, or a lien renewal or extension. The form is adopted by rule. Fla. Admin. Code R. 61A-5.0012. Upon receipt of a request to record a lien or the renewal of an existing lien, DABT will review the provided documentation and, if the documentation is in order on approved forms and accompanied by the security agreement and statutorily- required payment, will record the lien or lien renewal. If there is a deficiency noted during review of the lien documentation submitted, DABT will issue a 14-day deficiency notice to the requesting entity to provide any missing information. If timely corrected, DABT will record the lien or lien renewal. Section 561.65(4) provides that any lien or security interest filed with DABT on or after July 1, 1995, expires five years after recordation by DABT unless renewed by the lienholder within six months prior to its expiration date. Statutory Notice Requirements to Lienholders Recording a lien not only makes it enforceable, but provides assurance to the lienholder that it will receive notice of pending actions by DABT against the license that may compromise the lien’s vitality. Section 561.65 also sets forth requirements for DABT to provide notice to lienholders of both pending actions against encumbered licenses and any suspension or revocation of a license subject to a lien. Specifically, section 561.65(3) provides that “such lienholder shall be notified in writing of the filing of an order to show cause as to why the license should not be suspended or revoked; and also the lienholder shall be furnished a copy of any order of suspension or revocation.” (Emphasis added). In other words, two separate notices are required: one when the agency institutes proceedings against the licensee and a second if the agency action against the licensee results in a suspension or revocation of the license. Respondent does not assert and no evidence was presented to demonstrate that Petitioner had knowledge of or participated in the cause for revocation of the license at issue in this proceeding, or that Petitioner would not otherwise be entitled to notice of the revocation proceeding. The holder of a recorded lien is entitled to notice because the lienholder has the right to enforce the lien against the licensee within 180 days after the entry of any order of revocation or suspension of the license. Section 561.65(3) specifies that “the 180 days within which to file for enforcement of the lien by the lienholder shall commence running from the date of the mailing of the copy of the order of revocation or suspension.” Thus, the 180-day period runs from when notice is sent to the lienholder, not from the entry of the final order of suspension or revocation. Once notice is provided to the lienholder, any enforcement of the lien is through foreclosure proceedings in circuit court. The process for foreclosure proceedings is outlined in section 561.65(5). Most importantly, both section 561.19(2) and section 561.65(1) provide that no revoked quota beverage license encumbered by a lien or security interest perfected in accordance with section 561.65 shall be issued until the 180-day period (from mailing of the suspension or revocation order) has elapsed or until such enforcement proceeding is final. Re-issuance Through Double Random Drawings Quota licenses may become available three ways: 1) when a dry county goes wet (i.e., a county that previously prohibited the sale of alcohol decides to allow it), three initial quota licenses are issued for the county; 2) when there are population increases in a county, an additional quota license is issued for every population increase of 7,500; and 3) when a quota license in a county has been revoked. When any of those instances occur, pursuant to the directive in section 561.19(2), quota licenses are issued through the use of a double random public drawing. While a revoked quota license may be reissued in a double random quota drawing, if a revoked quota license is encumbered by a perfected and recorded lien or security interest, as discussed previously, it may not be reissued until the 180-day period has elapsed or until enforcement/foreclosure proceedings are final. Damon Larry is currently the assistant bureau chief of licensing, and oversees the annual quota drawing. Each year, he runs a report of all revoked quota licenses and, if the revocation is final, determines whether the 180-day period has elapsed. Before a revoked quota license is placed in the double random drawing, there is communication between staff in different sections within the Department to determine if a license is eligible for inclusion in the quota drawing. The communications involve the quota drawing section, the licensing section, the administrative case unit, the Office of the General Counsel, and the lien section. During this process, DABT staff will determine whether there is a lien attached to the license and, if so, whether there was notice to the lienholder, and whether the 180 days has elapsed or foreclosure proceedings no longer remain pending. If all of these conditions have been met, the revoked license is placed in the quota drawing for reissuance under a new license number. The revoked license number is then deleted from the Department’s database. Petitioner’s Lien Against Alcoholic Beverage License No. 62-08383 Turning to the facts of this case, Daniel A. King, as debtor, executed and delivered a Demand Promissory Note in favor of Rebco on or about April 18, 1997, in the principal amount of $61,000, and simultaneously executed a security agreement in favor of Rebco, as the secured party, pledging license number 62-08383 (the License) as collateral for repayment of the sums due and owing under the Promissory Note. Rebco submitted the promissory note and security agreement to DABT for initial recordation as a lien against the License on or about May 1, 1997, within 90 days of the date of the creation of the lien, on forms approved by the Division. The forms clearly identified the parties and the obligation. DABT recorded the lien against the License effective May 8, 1997. If not timely renewed, the lien would expire on May 8, 2002. Rebco submitted a request to renew its existing lien against the License for recordation on or about November 7, 2001, within six months of expiration of the lien, on forms approved by the Division. The request for renewal was accompanied by the promissory note and security agreement, and the forms clearly identified the parties and the obligation. DABT recorded the lien renewal against the License effective November 7, 2001. If not timely renewed, the lien would expire on November 7, 2006. Rebco submitted a second request to renew its existing lien against the License for recordation on or about July 26, 2006, within six months of expiration of the lien, on forms approved by the Division. The request for renewal was accompanied by the promissory note and security agreement and the forms clearly identified the parties and the obligation. DABT recorded the lien renewal against the License effective August 1, 2006. If not timely renewed, the lien would expire on August 1, 2011. The License Revocation Proceedings On or about November 16, 2006, at a time when the lien was recorded in the records of DABT, DABT filed administrative charges against Daniel J. King, holder of the License, in Case number 2006-049240, alleging that the licensee failed to operate the License in accordance with section 561.29(1)(f). DABT was unable to achieve personal service on Mr. King, so it published notice of the administrative action in the St. Petersburg Times on May 2, 9, 16, and 23, 2007. The published notice did not identify Petitioner, and no evidence was presented to indicate that DABT sent a copy of the notice to Rebco. Rebco clearly had a recorded lien against the License when the disciplinary action was filed against the License. DABT did not notify Petitioner of the pending action. On or about June 22, 2007, after receiving no written defense in the disciplinary proceeding, DABT issued a Final Order revoking the License effective July 31, 2007. The Final Order of Revocation was not served on Rebco, the owner of the security interest in the License. Petitioner had a recorded lien against the License on file with DABT both when proceedings were instituted against the License and on the date of the entry of the Final Order of Revocation. Stephanie Coxwell works in the administrative case unit of DABT and has done so for at least the last 14 years. The administrative case unit is responsible for determining whether an alcoholic beverage license that is pending revocation or suspension is encumbered by a lien and for notifying any lienholder of the revocation or suspension of an encumbered license. DABT’s practice was to mail any lienholder notice of the license suspension or revocation, along with a copy of the final order, soon after entry of the final order. It is this mailing of the notice and final order that commences the 180 days referenced in section 561.65. For at least the last 14 years, DABT has used a form “notice to lienholder” to notify lienholders of the revocation or suspension of an alcoholic beverage license, accompanied by a copy of the final order revoking or suspending the license. The notification form is a public record maintained by DABT. It is this notification, and not the publication of the pending action, that provides notice to the lienholder. Internal correspondence from Ms. Coxwell within the licensure file for the License indicates that in December 2006, she requested a lien search with respect to the License. Ms. Coxwell was advised by return e-mail that Rebco had a recorded lien against the license. On or about March 21, 2007, Ms. Coxwell requested research for any bankruptcy proceedings affecting the License. She was again informed by intra-agency e-mail that Rebco had a recorded lien against the License. Ms. Coxwell replied by e-mail that she was aware that there was a lien, but that they would notify the lienholder of the administrative action “in the usual way.” However, Ms. Coxwell’s March 27 e-mail was sent three months before the final order revoking the license, not simultaneous to the Order. There is no record that notification was sent to Rebco, either at the time of the administrative action, or after issuance of the final order. Beverly Peebles works in Rebco’s corporate office located at 701 Tennessee River Drive, Muscle Shoals, Alabama 35661, and has done so since 1990. She is responsible for receiving, retaining, and disbursing any mail received by Rebco. Ms. Peebles testified regarding the process used to copy, scan into the company’s electronic database, and distribute any mail received by Rebco. Rebco did not receive any notice concerning the administrative action or the revocation of the License until Rebco received the letter denying the recordation of its lien renewal against the license in 2011. Rebco’s address was at all times on file with the DABT since the inception of the lien against the license in 1997. It is found that the DABT did not notify Rebco that there was an administrative action filed against the License, and did not notify Rebco of the Final Order of Revocation against the License. The licensure file contains all other expected documents from the first recordation of the lien in 1997 to the present. It does not include a copy of notice to Rebco of either the pending action or the Final Order of revocation. Moreover, both a letter dated August 19, 2011, to counsel for Rebco, as well as an e-mail dated March 21, 2007, from Ms. Coxwell, contain handwritten notes regarding the failure to send proper notification. The notes, which are clearly hearsay, are part of public records maintained in the normal course of business, and corroborate Ms. Peebles’ testimony that no notification was received. They also corroborate evidence of the absence of any record of notification to Rebco in DABT’s records of regularly-conducted activity. The August 19, 2011, letter contains a handwritten note at the top stating, “$61K lien no lien ltr sent,” and the e-mail dated March 21, 2007, referenced in paragraph 32, contains the following note: “are we the only group/people who check for current liens recorded before deleting the license? It was deleted on 5/4/2011. Lien was still recorded at that time.”2/ Respondent has presented no credible evidence to indicate that the notice was somehow sent despite the lack of any documentation to that effect contained in the DABT’s records. While the handwritten notes standing alone do not establish that no notice was sent, they do indicate that a question was raised internally regarding whether adequate notice was provided. Despite the failure to notify Rebco of the revocation of the License, the License was placed in the 2010 double random drawing held on March 10, 2011, at a time when a valid lien against the License was duly recorded. Only one license for Pinellas County was included in the drawing for that year, and no licenses for Pinellas County have been issued in a double random quota drawing since then. Shortly after the random drawing, the license number assigned to the License was removed from the Department’s system and a new number assigned to the license issued as a result of the drawing. While there is no direct testimony on the issue, it can be inferred that the purchaser of the new license received the license with no notice that there was any outstanding lien on the right to engage in the sale of alcoholic beverages in Pinellas County under the new license. While it is DABT’s practice to delete a revoked license number from its database, no evidence or statutory reference was presented to support the premise that there is a legal impediment to renewing an existing lien for a revoked license when no notice of the revocation was provided. Given the Department’s failure to notify Rebco of the revocation of the License, the 180-day period identified in section 560.65 never began to run. On or about July 6, 2011, Rebco timely submitted a third request to DABT to renew its existing lien against the License for recordation, within six months of expiration of the lien, on forms approved by the Division, which request was accompanied by the promissory note and security agreement. DABT notified Rebco by letter dated July 19, 2011, that it was unable to record the lien renewal because it was not submitted for recordation within 90 days of its creation. The July 19, 2011, notice of denial was issued based upon a review of the lien renewal request submitted to DABT, because the executed ABT6022 lien-recording form submitted with Rebco’s third renewal request mistakenly identified the effective date of the lien renewal as April 18, 1997, the date of the creation of the original lien. On or about July 25, 2011, Rebco submitted an amended form ABT6022 correcting the effective date for renewal of the lien as August 1, 2011. On August 3, 2011, DABT notified Rebco that it was unable to record the renewal of the lien against the License because “the alcoholic beverage license being pledged as collateral was revoked by the Division on July 31, 2007,” following service of a Notice of Action through publication in the St. Petersburg Times on May 2, 9, 16, and 23, 2007. No action taken by Rebco compromised the vitality of its recorded lien against the License. To the contrary, Rebco faithfully adhered to the recording requirements outlined by statute to record and renew its lien. DABT, however, failed to take the action required by section 561.65 to provide notice to Rebco of the pending action and subsequent revocation of the License. As a result, the 180- day period required by section 561.65 did not run before the License was placed in the quota drawing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order approving the renewal of Rebco’s lien in the License at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2015.
Findings Of Fact The first paragraph of charges in the Amended Notice to Show Cause reads as follows: That you, P & D SOUTH OF MARTIN COUNTY, INC. d/b/a STAGE EAST, licensed under the beverage laws of the State of Florida as a licensed vendor holding a SRX series license, did in the year of 1982, violate the beverage laws, to wit: you failed to maintain as 51 percent of your gross revenue the sale of food and non- alcoholic beverages, based upon the average monthly gross revenue for the period 12/81 to 12/82, contrary to F.S. 561.20(2)(a)(3), Rules 7A-3.14 and 7A-3.15(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code. In the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation and again at the commencement of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent admitted the violation alleged in that paragraph. Also at the commencement of the formal hearing, Petitioner dismissed with prejudice the charges contained within paragraphs numbered too and three of the Amended Notice to Show Cause. The case therefore proceeded forward for the presentation of evidence in aggravation or in mitigation of any penalty to be imposed against Respondent. Respondent corporation, P & D South of Martin County, Inc., does business as Stage East and is the holder of alcoholic beverage license No. 53- 352, Series 6-COP SRX. Stage East opened for business on November 25, 1981, at 200 South Dixie Highway, Stuart, Martin County, Florida. When Richard Pouser, Respondent's president, applied for an alcoholic beverage license, he spoke with Beverage Officer Richard White. White explained to Pouser that an SRX license is a special license, carrying with it a requirement that the restaurant derive at least 51 percent of its gross revenue from the sale of food and nonalcoholic beverages. Pouser advised White that Respondent intended to obtain an unrestricted quota license as soon as one became available in Martin County. When Respondent prepared to open Stage East, it leased a building containing two separate portions of space. It was Respondent's intention from the initial creation of its new business to open the first section of the restaurant as an area also geared to entertaining persons under the age of 50. In that section, Respondent has electronic games, televisions, pool tables, a dance and bandstand area, and two bars. There are approximately 25 tables in the "back bar" area and approximately 40 tables in the front or bandstand area. Full food service is available in both areas. In this section, Respondent also provides either recorded or live musical entertainment every day, ranging from local musical talent to "mini-concerts" by groups or individuals with national or international recognition. The second section of Stage East, which comprises an additional 4,000 square feet, is to be a family-type food service area, analogous to a "Bennigan's" style of restaurant. Only the first section of Stage East was opened on November 25, 1981, and Respondent continued its preparations to open the second section also. Respondent filed its plans for the proposed second section and application for a building permit and zoning approval with the City of Stuart on January 4, 1982. The City denied Respondent's application the same day, citing as its reason "inadequate parking." After Respondent expended substantial monies for legal fees and engineering studies, zoning approval was finally obtained in June 1983. The evidence is uncontroverted that the City had no legal basis for its denial of Respondent's application; rather, certain members of the City Commission personally did not approve of an establishment like Stage East. In February 1982, Beverage Officer White received an anonymous complaint that Respondent was not meeting its 51 percent requirement. He visited the premises and, upon examining the cash register receipts and food tickets, ascertained that only approximately 25 to 30 percent of Respondent's business had been from the sale of food and nonalcoholic beverages. On February 9, 1982, White served on Pouser an Official Notice with a compliance deadline of August 9, 1982. On September 15, 1982, White returned to Stage East to make a compliance inspection. After speaking with Pouser and ascertaining that the 51 percent requirement was still not being met, White issued a second Official Notice. Although that Notice contained a compliance deadline of January 1, 1983, White returned to Stage East on December 23, 1982, met with Pouser, and reviewed Respondent's records. A cursory examination revealed that Respondent still had not met the 51 percent requirement. Between the time that White first advised Pouser of the 51 percent requirement and the date of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent attempted to obtain a quota license, which carries no requirements as to food consumption on the premises. For a year, Respondent advertised daily in the Stuart newspaper that it wished to purchase a quota license. Respondent contacted Beverage Officer White, liquor distributors, and owners of quota licenses in Martin County to ascertain if they had a quota license for sale or if they knew someone who did. During this time, the quota license for Harper's became available. The license holder asked $250,000 cash, Respondent offered $200,000 cash, and Walgreen's purchased Harper's license for $215,000. By the time of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent had entered into favorable negotiations for the SR license at Boston's. Although Respondent had inquired whether Petitioner would permit the transfer of Boston's license to Respondent, Petitioner had not answered Respondent's inquiry at the time this cause was heard. In addition to taking steps to expand its restaurant area and to obtain an alternate license throughout the time period in question, Respondent did all it could to encourage its customers to purchase food so that Respondent could meet the 51 percent requirement to which its license was subject. Respondent hired an experienced chef and additional kitchen staff in order to offer a larger variety of food at lower prices. Respondent changed its menu to add "quicker" foods and advertised its menu in the Stuart News. Respondent opened for lunch and advertised its daily luncheon specials; advertised its food service when advertising its new "happy hours" and those prices; opened for breakfast after 2:00 a.m.; advertised its dinner programs; hired male dancers to perform during certain hours on Monday nights "for ladies only;" offered discount Prices for women on Tuesdays for "ladies night;" and attempted to attract an older crowd on Sundays by providing a buffet and a Dixieland band or "the big band sound." Respondent increased its radio advertising to six to eight ads a week, sometimes advertising as a restaurant with a nightclub and sometimes only as a restaurant. Although Respondent had on its premises during 1982 sufficient foods, utensils, and personnel to serve everything on its menus, Respondent started a nightly buffet which was either self-service or could be served by a waitress. The cost of the buffet depended upon the day of the week, with ladies paying a small price on Tuesdays, ladies' night, for example. Sometimes the cost of the buffet (which is collected as the customer enters the premises) included the customer's alcoholic beverages on an "all you care to consume" basis, and sometimes the customer paid for his alcoholic beverages in addition to paying for the buffet. On the evening before the formal hearing, the buffet cost $10, and the price of drinks was not included. Since Respondent opened Stage East, it has made continuing good faith efforts to encourage the purchase of food at its premises, to add the "Bennigan's" family-style restaurant, and to obtain an alternate license without the 51 percent requirement. During the three-month period immediately before the formal hearing, Respondent approached, just exceeded, and then just missed the 51-percent mark.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the charge in paragraph numbered one of the Amended Notice to Show Cause, dismissing with prejudice the charges in paragraphs numbered two and three of the Amended Notice to Show Cause, and imposing a civil penalty in the amount of $1,000 to be paid by Respondent within 30 days of the entry of the Final Order in this cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: John A. Boggs, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles L. Curtis, Esquire 1177 Northeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Victor Ingargiola is the sole shareholder, director and officer of Petitioner, I & H Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Basin Street East (Petitioner), a Florida corporation. The State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is the Respondent. Both Mr. Victor Ingargiola and his wife, Mrs. Barbara Ingargiola, entered the Division's double random selection drawing for eligibility to apply for a new quota alcoholic beverage license. Mr. Ingargiola was selected in the drawing, and Mrs. Ingargiola was not. After receiving notice of his selection in the drawing, Mr. Ingargiola formed the Petitioner and applied for licensure on or about November 1, 1984. In his application, Mr. Ingargiola did not identify his wife as a person having an interest in Petitioner or its business, either directly or indirectly. The application also represented that Petitioner had a right to occupancy of the premises to be licensed at 4513 Causeway Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner's application carries with it an application fee of $6,750. Mr. Ingargiola obtained a portion of the funds necessary to pay the application fee from funds held jointly by him and his wife and by loans to him and his wife secured by property jointly held by him and his wife. Virtually all money and property of the Ingargiolas is held in their joint names. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ingargiola conferred with the Division's Investigator Miller concerning the application. Miller initially requested that Mrs. Ingargiola be finger printed as a person having an interest in the license to be issued. Mrs. Ingargiola understood that she was not permitted to have an interest since she herself had entered the double random selection drawing. She therefore declined to be fingerprinted or to be made to appear on the application as a party having an interest in the license to be issued. Investigator Miller also discussed with the Ingargiolas the question of Mrs. Ingargiola's involvement and the financing of Petitioner. Investigator Miller led the Ingargiolas to believe that the only possible legal financing arrangement would be for Mrs. Ingargiola to give the funds to her husband outright. He led them to believe that this could be done by affidavit, and Mrs. Ingargiola signed and filed an affidavit which Investigator Miller approved as to form. The affidavit listed the financing in question and stated: "I swear that the following funds obtained are to be used by Victor A. Ingargiola and I will have no interest or control over these funds." Barbara Ingargiola also testified at final hearing that she claims no interest whatsoever in Petitioner, any license to be issued to it, or the funds she gave outright to her husband to finance Petitioner. Essentially, Mrs. Ingargiola gave her half of the joint funds and proceeds of joint loans used by Victor Ingargiola to finance Petitioner's application fee. If necessary, she was prepared to do the same with the proceeds from the sale of joint real property or loans secured by the Ingargiolas' joint real property. However, no mention was made or consideration given to Mrs. Ingargiola's liability for her husband's share of the joint borrowing in addition to hers. Mrs. Ingargiola did have an interest in the successful operation of Petitioner so as to enable her husband to pay at least half, if not all, of the joint borrowing used in part to finance Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1984, Mr. Ingargiola obtained a written lease to the premises to be licensed. However, the lease does not contain a commencement date. At the time the application was filed, the premises were occupied by another tenant, and, as of December 20, 1984, this tenant had a legal right to occupy the premises and had not been notified of the pending liquor license application or the lease. In addition, the purported lease contains a provision requiring Petitioner to secure its duties and obligations under the lease by depositing with the landlord the sum of $60,000 in cash or irrevocable letter of credit. There was no evidence that Petitioner had complied with or could comply with this requirement of the lease. Although Mr. Ingargiola testified to his understanding of his right to occupancy of the premises under the lease upon granting of Petitioner's application and issuance of the license, there was no testimony from the landlord on the ambiguities surrounding the lease and the rights of the tenant in possession. As a result, the evidence as a whole was insufficient to prove Petitioner's right to occupancy of the premises to be licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, deny the application of Petitioner, I & H Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Basin Street East, for a quota alcoholic beverage license RECOMMENDED this 17th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Diaz, Esquire 2522 W. Kennedy Blvd. Tampa, FL 33609 Thomas A. Klein, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1927 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301
The Issue This case concerns the application of William E. Morey, who does business as Morey's Restaurant, to acquire a new series 2-COP beverage license from the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, in which the Respondent has denied the license application on the grounds that the granting of such a license would be contrary to provisions of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code deal with the prohibition of a financial interest directly or indirectly between distributors of alcoholic beverages and vendors of alcoholic beverages.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Willian E. Morey, applied to the State of Florida, Departent of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, for the issuance of series 2-COP alcoholic beverage license. By letter dated, January 23, 1979, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco denied the application based upon the belief that such issuance wood violate the provisions of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code. The pertinent provision of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, states: 561.42 Tied house evil; financial aid and assistance to vendor by manufacturer or distributor prohibited; procedure for en- forcement; exception.-- (1) No licensed manufacturer or distributor of any of the beverages herein referred to shall have any financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or business of any vendor licensed under the Beverage Law, nor shall such licensed manu- facturer or distributor assist any vendor by any gifts or loans of money or property of any description or by the giving of rebates of any kind whatsoever. * * * In keeping with the general principle announced in Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has enacted Rule 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code, which states: 7A-4.18 Rental between vendor and distri- butor prohibited. It shall be considered a violation of Section 561.42, Florida Sta- tutes, for any distributor to rent any property to a licensed vendor or from a licensed vendor if said property is used, in whole or part as part of the licensed premises of said vendor or if said property is used in any manner in connection with said vendor's place of business. The facts in this case reveal that William E. Morey leases the premises, for which he has applied for a license, from Anthony Distributors, Inc., of 1710 West Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. Anthony Distributors, Inc., is the holder of a J-DBW license to distribute alcoholic beverages in the State of Florida. This license is held with the permission of the State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Consequently, the issuance of a series 2-COP license to William E. Morey at a time when he is leasing the licensed premises from a distributor of alcoholic beverages, namely, Anthony Distributors, Inc., would be in violation of Section 561.42, Florida Statutes, and Role 7A-4.18, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, William E. Morey's application for a series 2-COP beverage license be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Willian E. Morey d/b/a Morey's Restaurant 4101 North 66th Street St. Petersburg, Florida 33709 Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Ida Bartlett is the sole shareholder, officer and director of the Applicant corporation. She pursued the lottery drawing for Pasco County for a quota liquor license in order to embark on her own business venture involving the sale of alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption in a lounge-type situation, as well as possibly to sell alcoholic beverages in a package store for off-premises consumption. On September 18, 1984, the Division informed Ms. Bartlett by letter that she had been selected in the lottery drawing for an available quota liquor license in Pasco County. The letter advised her that she had 45 days from the date of the letter to file her application with the Tampa field office of the Division, which she did. In preparing her application, she sought the advice and counsel of her son, Charles Bartlett, an attorney who has extensive experience in commercial and real estate matters, including commercial litigation, contract litigation, landlord tenant litigation and zoning matters, as well as experience representing other quota liquor license applicants as clients. Mr. Bartlett was tendered and accepted without objection as an expert in these areas of law, and in the interpretation of contracts, leases and other documents related to these fields of law. In particular, Mr. Bartlett currently represents establishments holding liquor licenses, has recently been actively involved in leasing and licensing matters for them and was counsel for a 4-COP quota liquor license applicant in Sarasota County with regard to the same lottery drawing as the instant application. After she was advised of her successful lottery drawing and of the right to file her application within the 45 days, Mr. Bartlett and Ms. Bartlett began the preparation process for the application by attempting to locate suitable premises in Pasco County at which to locate the license and operate the related business. Mr. Bartlett contacted several real estate brokers in this connection and eventually met Mr. Harry Sasser, who had an existing lounge establishment in Hudson, Florida, Pasco County. Mr. Sasser's premises were then used for only on premises consumption of alcoholic beverages in a lounge-type situation. Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Sasser negotiated an agreement, reduced to writing and executed by the Applicant and Mr. Sasser, whereby his premises would be used for the liquor license sought by Ms. Bartlett. That agreement was entered into on November 1, 1984. It provided that upon the issuance of a license to Ms. Bartlett, Mr. Sasser would place his liquor license in escrow so that the only license applicable and used at the Sasser premises would be the license to be awarded Ms. Bartlett. Ms. Bartlett entered into this agreement in good faith and with the bona fide intent to be bound by it and to actually operate the premises under the license she sought (Applicant's Exhibit 2, in evidence). Mr. Bartlett drafted the agreement which required Mr. Sasser to lease the premises to the Applicant upon the occurrence of the condition precedent which is the granting of the liquor license. The agreement does not specify a rental amount, but rather provides that the rent shall be the prevailing market rate upon the execution of the related lease, which the parties agreed to enter into upon the granting of the license. The agreement does not specify a date certain for execution of the lease, but rather provides that the leasing of the subject premises will take effect upon the issuance of the liquor license. Mr. Bartlett established that this agreement is a legally binding document and affords the Applicant a legal right of occupancy to Mr. Sasser's premises upon the occurrence of that condition precedent. Such provisions for rental payment at market rates are common in lease agreements of that nature, and such a provision as to rental amount does not mitigate the binding effect and enforceability of such an agreement. Agreements contingent on the occurrence of a specific event which would trigger the execution of a lease to which the agreement refers, are common. Otherwise there would be no purpose to be served in leasing the premises for either party, until it is clear that the Applicant can use the premises for the purposes for which the agreement and contemplated lease are intended. Charles Bartlett and the Applicant prepared and completed the remainder of the license application and related documents to be filed with it. Mr. Sasser was actively involved in the completion and submission of the application, and indeed took it himself to the Pasco County zoning Authority to secure that body's approval of the purpose to which the premises involved would be devoted. The Pasco County Zoning Authority indicated no objection to issuance of the liquor license for the Sasser premises and it is noted in three letters, (in evidence) from the Pasco County Attorney regarding the zoning question, that the property was correctly zoned for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages, which is what the premises were currently used for and would be used for under the sought license, at least in part. The letters from the County Attorney regarding zoning do indicate that if off-premises package store sales were engaged in under the sought liquor license, that further certification from the zoning authority concerning the question of whether that would be a substantial departure from the existing use of the premises might be necessary and that rezoning to commercial zoning might be necessary before the premises could be used for package sales for off-premises consumption. Mr. Bartlett opined, based upon his experience in similar liquor license application matters that the premises were appropriately zoned for the issuance of the subject liquor license. Mr. Sasser took the application to the appropriate health department official and secured his approval as to the suitability of the Sasser premises for the use of the liquor license. The zoning authority approval and health department approval were asserted on the face of the application when filed. On about November 1, 1984, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Bartlett, and Ms. Bartlett met at the Tampa field office of the Respondent to assemble the liquor license application, submit it, and sign the agreement concerning the use of Sasser premises. The Division's filing clerk thereupon reviewed the materials submitted with the application and the application to make certain that all information had been provided in the spaces and blanks on the application, and that it was duly executed and signed. Those parties then met with Mr. Espinola who identified himself to them as the "licensing officer" to review the completeness of the application. Mr. Espinola met with the parties for about 15 minutes to review the application and the related agreement with Mr. Sasser. After reviewing the Sasser agreement, Mr. Espinola suggested that Sasser enter into an escrow agreement for his existing liquor license for those premises, so that the Applicant's license, if issued, could be located at the Sasser premises without occurrence of the situation of two licenses being issued for the same premises. Mr. Sasser agreed and entered into and signed an escrow agreement to that effect in the presence of Mr. Espinola, Charles Bartlett and Ms. Bartlett, the principal of the applicant corporation. Mr. Espinola, on behalf of the Division, accepted the application as complete upon submission. Mr. Bartlett was advised that the acceptance of the application as complete would stand so long as he submitted an affidavit from his father concerning the source of financing for the proposed business. Mr. Bartlett had the affidavit executed the same day and sent it by Federal Express the same day to Mr. Espinola. He then called Mr. Espinola the following day to verify the receipt of the financial affidavit by Federal Express, and Mr. Espinola indicated that all was in order. Thereafter the Applicant, being advised that the application was complete and in order, waited to hear from the Division as to its decision regarding the application. Neither the Applicant nor her attorney, Mr. Bartlett, was contacted further by the Division or by anyone from its headquarters in Tallahassee concerning any questions regarding the review of the application. In the meantime, Ms. Bartlett and her attorney, Mr. Bartlett, remained in contact with Mr. Sasser to make certain that everything was still in order regarding their arrangement. Mr. Sasser gave them no indication that anything was amiss or that he had changed his position regarding escrow of his license and the lease of his premises to the applicant corporation. Since a binding agreement between the Applicant and Mr. Sasser had been entered into, and since the execution of the contemplated lease only required occurrence of the condition precedent, that is the issuance of the license, there was no reason to enter into other agreements by the parties until the license was issued. Thus, the Applicant and Mr. Sasser awaited the Division's decision before taking any further action regarding the application or the inauguration of the new business. On March 6, 1985, by letter, the Applicant was advised that its application was denied by the Division. This was the first indication the Applicant had that the application was not in order and would not be routinely approved following Mr. Espinola's assurance that the application was complete and in order. The Division indicated in its letter of denial that the bases for denial were a lack of establishment of a right of occupancy of the subject premises, and lack of sufficient zoning for the subject premises. Upon learning of the Division's denial of the application, Mr. Bartlett contacted the Tampa and Tallahassee offices of the Division seeking further explanation for the denial. He offered to file an amendment to the application to cure the alleged defects, but was informed by a staff member of Mr. Schoenfeld, the Bureau Chief's office, that amendments would not be accepted. Thereupon, the Applicant instituted this-administrative challenge to the denial of the application. During the interim period of time prior to the subject hearing, the Applicant took further steps to secure approval of the application. Thus, at Mr. Bartlett's behest, the Chief Assistant County Attorney for Pasco County provided Attorney Sandra Stockwell of the Division a letter setting forth further and clarifying the zoning authority's position regarding the Sasser premises. This letter (in evidence) makes clear that the County has no objection to the issuance of a 4-COP liquor license for the Sasser premises, although it points out that should the holder of the license desire to expand the alcoholic beverage use to include the sale of liquor for on-premises consumption then a determination would have to be obtained from the zoning administrator of the County whether or not the expansion constituted a substantial expansion of use. If the administrator determined that the expansion of use was substantial in nature, then the Board of County Commissioners would have to approve the actual sale of liquor on the premises. Correspondingly, if the holder of the license were to seek to expand the alcoholic beverage use for the Sasser premises to include the sale of alcoholic beverages for off-premise consumption (package sales) the same action would be necessary prior to actual sale of the alcoholic beverages for off-premise consumption. Additionally, rezoning of property to the appropriate commercial district would be required prior to sale of alcohol for off-premise consumption. The Applicant also secured alternate premises to locate the applied-for liquor license in the event the Sasser arrangement fails to consummate or is otherwise deemed undesirable. The Applicant thus entered into a three-year lease agreement with two 5-year options for premises on U.S. 19 in the City of Port Richey. These premises had been recently used as a lounge establishment and are equipped with all required lounge and bar equipment and fixtures. The lease depicted in Applicant's Exhibit 8, in evidence, gives the Applicant a legal right to occupy the premises identified in that lease for the purposes of this license application. Those premises, additionally, are zoned for commercial use, which according to the City of Port Richey Zoning Code is appropriate for the on premises consumption of alcoholic beverages. In this connection, it was established by Mr. Bartlett, based on his personal experience in representing liquor license applicants, that the Division has approved the issuance of 4-COP liquor licenses to a number of applicants he has represented for premises zoned for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages only without them being zoned at the time of issuance for off-premises package sales. DIVISION POLICY Mr. Barry Sehoenfeld is the Bureau Chief of Licensing and Records for the Division. He has been delegated the authority to process and finalize all quota liquor license applications and is in charge of the state-wide system for the review and issuance of alcoholic beverage licenses. He is the final decision maker on quota liquor license applications. Quota liquor licenses authorize license holders to sell alcoholic beverages for on-premise consumption and/or package sales. A quota liquor license enables the holder to sell alcoholic beverages for on-premise consumption, to sell such beverages in a package store capacity or both, according to Mr. Schoenfeld. Quota liquor licenses are issued on a county basis. Only a certain number of such licenses are issued in a county, depending on the population of the county. When the Division determines that it is appropriate for additional quota liquor licenses to be issued for a county, the Division holds a drawing and all interested persons may apply to get in the pool for the lottery drawing. When such a person is drawn, that person can then file an application with the Division for issuance of a liquor license. A "4-COP quota liquor license" refers to a county which has more than 100,000 population. When a party is selected from the lottery drawing to file an application for a quota liquor license, that person has 45 days from notice of the drawing to do so. The application is filed in the local field office of the Division in which the applicant seeks a license. The field office involved in this proceeding is the Tampa office. The application and all related documents must be filed with the licensing clerk of that field office, who then determines whether all documents are in order and whether the application can be accepted by the field office for review. Another staff member in the field office then meets with the applicant to determine whether all necessary forms and documents are complete. In the instant situation, that person was Mr. Espinola. According to Division policy, the field office will not accept an application if not complete. According to policy the applicant does not receive a letter regarding completeness from the field office, but simply a verbal understanding from the personnel of the field office that the application is complete upon submission and acceptance by that office. Here the Applicant was so informed. Once an application is submitted and deemed complete, the field office may ask the applicant for additional information. Requesting additional information is common practice and is often done after the 45-day submission deadline. In fact, if an application is missing the field office will contact an applicant to request that he provide the missing documents. According to Division policy, as explicated by Mr. Schoenfeld, review of an application should be performed with the applicant present so that additional information or explanation required may be done at that time. The intent of this policy is to keep the applicant advised of Division requirements and to communicate freely with an applicant to ensure that all necessary data is gathered for review. Further investigation of an application will be pursued if the field office supervisor deems that necessary and it is within the discretion of that supervisor as to whether an investigation is necessary, and if so, the scope of that investigation. If an investigation is deemed necessary, the supervisor should provide specific instructions to an investigator as to the scope of his investigation. There is no set time during which an investigation should be completed, and the scope depends on the particular circumstances of the application. It is common for an investigation to require one to to three months. The purpose of the investigation is to discover as much information as necessary to fairly make a recommendation on the application. After review by the field office, and any investigation by that office if it is deemed necessary, the field office makes a recommendation to the Division headquarters and Mr. Schoenfeld in Tallahassee regarding disposition of the license application. It is at this point that Mr. Schoenfeld becomes involved with any license application. Thereafter Mr. Schoenfeld makes a final determination on the application and the applicant is sent either a liquor license or a letter of denial. The letter of denial sets forth all bases for the Division's denial of such an application. According to statute, the application process must be completed and the Division must make its decision within 180 days. This time frame can be waived by an applicant however, if it appears for any reason that the statutory time requirement cannot be met, as for instance in situations where the premises to be used are not yet constructed or other delays have been encountered by the applicant or the Division, when both are acting in good faith. In such situations, the Division's decision on the application is placed in abeyance for an indefinite period until the premises are constructed or the other basis for delay by either the Division or the applicant in the review process have been alleviated. Mr. Schoenfeld also explained Division policy to allow for a liquor license holder to move his license to another premises by submitting an application to the Division for a transfer. Additionally, Division policy allows an applicant to propose to locate his license in a premise already holding a liquor license, if the existing license holder places his license in escrow. It is a routine matter for such previous license holders to place their licenses in escrow under these circumstances. Pursuant to the below-cited statutory authority, an applicant must have "suitable premises" in which to house or locate the liquor license for which it has applied. The Division interprets this to mean that an applicant must demonstrate a legal right of occupancy for the premises identified in an application. Mr. Schoenfeld acknowledged that the phrase "legal right of occupancy" is not defined by statute or agency rule, but that the intent is to make certain that an applicant has a lawful right to occupy the identified premises. The Division determines on a case by case basis whether an applicant has secured a lawful right of occupancy. Typically, this determination process does not employ the use of Division attorneys to review and determine from a legal standpoint whether a right of occupancy has been demonstrated. There is no statutory provision or Division rule which requires that written documentation be submitted with an application in establishing a legal right of occupancy. The Division's policy and procedures manual does not specifically require a right of occupancy document to be filed with the application. The Division's application form furthermore, does not require written documentation by the applicant to prove its legal right of occupancy. Although Mr. Schoenfeld indicated that the Division requires written documentation of an applicant's lawful right of occupancy to the identified premises, no specific type of agreement is required. Rather, any document reflecting a binding, lawful right of occupancy is sufficient, nor is it necessary that the written document be a lease agreement. In the instant case, as Mr. Bartlett established, a binding, written contract calling for the occupancy of the Sasser premises was timely executed by the parties to the application and filed with the application, which binds the parties to enter into a written lease upon the occurrence of the condition precedent, that is the issuance of the liquor license. The Division requires an applicant to show sufficient, appropriate zoning for the premises identified to be used in an application. On the second page of the application there is a section requiring indication whether the appropriate zoning authority has determined whether the identified premises are in compliance with existing zoning regulations. Additional information in the form of letters from the appropriate governing authority is commonly submitted with an application to demonstrate that the premises have sufficient zoning. A 4-COP quota liquor license authorizes on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and/or package store sales. In some situations, existing zoning regulations permit only the on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and not package store sales for off-premise consumption. That is the case with the Sasser premises involved herein and as to the alternate premises, depicted in Applicant's Exhibit 8, in evidence, although that property is commercially zoned. Commercial zoning also encompasses on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages only. Division policy, however, provides that conditional zoning approvals are acceptable in the process of reviewing and granting liquor licenses. The Division has approved applications where the zoning only allowed on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and, as discussed above, in Mr. Bartlett's experience with his own clients such approval has been given where zoning only permitted on-premises consumption for quota liquor licenses on more than one occasion. In these situations, the Division's policy is that it is not responsible for enforcing the terms of the conditional zoning approval' that is a matter to be negotiated or enforced between the local zoning authority and the ultimate holder of the liquor license involved. Conditional zoning approval does not bar the issuance of a quota liquor license. Additionally, Mr. Schoenfeld corroborated Mr. Bartlett's testimony showing that it is often reasonable to waive the 180-day statutory time period to accommodate situations where an applicant must change the premises originally applied for in such instances where a landlord or owner of the premises originally identified in an application breaches the right of occupancy agreement after the application is submitted for review by the Division. In those instances, it has often been determined to be reasonable to allow an applicant to amend his application after the 45-day time period has elapsed to allow for such a change of premises. Licenses have indeed been issued frequently for alternate or changed premises from those originally identified in an application so long as an applicant has acted in good faith throughout the application process. Also, according to Division policy, if an applicant is making a good faith effort to arrange for a suitable, appropriately zoned premises from which to operate his license, the Division will permit the applicant to locate alternate premises in instances where zoning approval is denied subsequent to the 45-day period or has not yet been obtained at the end of the 45-day period. It should be noted that Mr. Bartlett described two instances where this policy was followed where the Division permitted a change of premises after submission of an application. In one case an application was submitted for premises in a shopping center not yet built. After it was filed and prior to issuance of the license, the applicant elected to change the location and to amend the application. The license was granted for the second location. In another situation an amendment to the application was effected after the 45-day period, proposing a change of premises. The amended application was approved by the Division and the zoning on the changed location allowed only on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and not package store sales. Even so the Division approved issuance of that license. DIVISION REVIEW Mr. William Fisher is a law enforcement investigator for the Tampa field office of the Division. Mr. Fisher's immediate supervisor is Reuben Espinola. Mr. Fisher's duties involve investigation of liquor license applicants and related premises to ascertain whether the application should be recommended for approval or not. He does not investigate applications independently, but rather acts on Mr. Espinola's instructions. Mr. Espinola normally does not instruct him as to the scope of his investigation (contrary to policy as stated by their superior, Mr. Schoenfeld). In any event, Mr. Espinola ordered Mr. Fisher to investigate the Ida Know, Inc. application without giving him specific instructions. Mr. Fisher was not present at the meetings between the applicant and Mr. Espinola and other members of the staff in the Tampa field office when the application was first submitted and accepted as complete. Mr. Fisher traveled to Mr. Sasser's establishment to investigate the application, and conferred with Mr. Sasser for approximately 75 minutes on January 29, 1985, which meeting constituted the entirety of his investigation of this application, although he had acknowledged that such application investigations normally require one to three months so as to discover as many facts as possible to completely and fairly conduct the review. The next day, however, Mr. Fisher recommended to his superiors that the application be denied after his single conversation with Mr. Sasser. No further investigation by the Tampa field office was performed. Mr. Fisher never conversed with the applicant nor Mr. Bartlett during the investigation or at any other time, nor did he communicate in writing with them, although he acknowledged that conversing with applicants concerning matters involved in investigation of an application is common practice. Mr. Fisher had not read the Division's policy and procedures manual in its entirety. He exhibited some unfamiliarity with Division policy, as for example, his belief that Division policy does not allow issuance of a liquor license for premises where the zoning does not authorize both on-premises consumption and package store sales for off-premises consumption. Mr. Schoenfeld acknowledged that Mr. Fisher misunderstood the pertinent Division policies regarding this liquor license application and the review of it, and yet Mr. Schoenfeld's denial of the application was based entirely on the investigation performed by the Tampa field office and specifically Mr. Fisher. Mr. Schoenfeld did not conduct any independent investigation of his own and never conferred with either Mr. Sasser, the Applicant, Ms. Bartlett, or Mr. Bartlett. His conclusion, and Mr. Fisher's conclusion that no right of occupancy of the Sasser premises existed was evidently based on the Division's Exhibit No. 3, which was not admitted into evidence. In any event, if indeed Mr. Sasser was seeking to recant his agreements with the Applicant and that fact was within the knowledge of Mr. Fisher or someone else in the Tampa field office or the Tallahassee office of the Division, no Division staff member ever contacted the Applicant to advise them of that purported situation, nor to seek additional information from the Applicant concerning it. Even if Mr. Sasser could successfully repudiate his agreement to escrow his liquor license and his agreement to allow the Applicant to use his premises, the Applicant has successfully established its right of occupancy and use of the alternative premises depicted and described in Applicant's Exhibit 8, however, which is zoned commercially such that on-premises consumption of any alcoholic beverage is permitted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the application of Ida Know, Inc. d/b/a The Anchorage, be approved and that the subject 4-COP quota liquor license be issued to that applicant in a manner consistent with the conditions and alternatives posited in the paragraph last above. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1986.
The Issue This case arises out of a Notice to Show Cause dated January 13, 1982, served by the Petitioner upon the Respondent requiring that the Respondent show cause as to why his Beverage License No. 26-02065 should not be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined for having committed violations of the laws of Florida, and thus, a violation of Florida Statutes 561.29(1)(b). On January 28, 1982, the Respondent, by and through his attorney, Lacy Mahon, Jr., requested, in writing, a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On March 30, 1983, a Notice of Hearing scheduling the formal hearing in this matter for April 28 and 29, 1983, was served upon Mr. Lacy Mahon, Esquire, attorney for the Respondent. Prior to the formal hearing, Mr. Mahon contacted Mr. Watson, counsel for the Petitioner, and informed him that his client, Mr. Billy Freeman, had requested that he not appear at the hearing on behalf of Mr. Freeman and that Mr. Freeman also would not appear. The undersigned Hearing Officer also received an ex parte communication from the Respondent, Mr. Billy Freeman, inquiring as to the purpose of the formal hearing, and I explained to him that a Notice to Show Cause had been filed against his beverage license and that if he had any further questions, he should contact either his attorney or Mr. James Watson of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The Respondent nor his attorney appeared at the formal hearing in this matter. The petitioner presented as its evidence three exhibits. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is an indictment charging the Respondent with burglary and arson dated June 4, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit 2 is a certified copy of a judgment convicting the Respondent of arson in violation of Florida Statute 806.01(2). And Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a late filed exhibit reflecting the license status and license number of the Respondent's beverage license. The Respondent did not appear, and, therefore, did not present any evidence.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Billy Freeman d/b/a The Mug, holds Beverage License No. 26-02065, Series 2-COP. On August 10, 1982, the Respondent, Billy Freeman, was convicted of arson, a second degree felony, in violation of Florida Statute 806.01(2). The Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 18 months. The conviction occurred in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, Case No. 81-11038CF.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Beverage License No. 26-02065, 2-COP be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lacy Mahon, Esquire 350 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mr. Howard M. Rasmussen Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Gary Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner originally held alcoholic beverage license no. 26-532, Series 4-COP, as an individual. He transferred this license to M & S, Inc., a Florida corporation, about one year ago. Petitioner is a 50 percent shareholder in this corporation. Jimmy G. Maddox holds the other 50 percent stock interest. Petitioner and Maddox are currently engaged in civil litigation involving the corporate licensee. Respondent referred to this civil suit in its notice disapproving the transfer application, citing the pending litigation as a basis for disapproval. Petitioner has not purchased the license from the corporation or entered into any agreement in contemplation of license transfer. Rather, he believes he is entitled to the return of the license because he received no consideration for the prior transfer from either the corporation or Maddox. Alternatively, Petitioner asks that the prior transfer to the corporation be set aside due to this lack of consideration.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for transfer of alcoholic beverage license no. 26-532, Series 4-COP. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Fischette, Esquire Suite 1916 Gulf Life Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32207 James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Herbert T. Sussman, Esquire 3030 Independent Life Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mr. Charles A. Nuzum, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact 10. The Division hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Finding of Fact in foto, as set forth in the Recommended Order.
Conclusions The Director, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter’Division’), after consideration of the complete record of this case on file with the Division, hereby enters this Final Order.
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for transfer of an alcoholic beverage license should be granted, or denied on the ground that the license has been revoked.
Findings Of Fact On January 25, 1977, Armando Calo, through counsel, filed a Notice of Lien with DABT stating that he was a bona fide mortgagee on an alcoholic beverage license (4-COP, lic. no. 23-1901) held by the Intimo Lounge, Inc., 1601 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Citing Section 561.65, Florida Statutes, he enclosed a copy of his chattel mortgage and a check payable to DABT in the amount of $5.00. (P-1) By return letter dated February 4, 1977, C. L. Ivey, Jr., DABT's Licensing Supervisor, acknowledged receipt of Mr. Calo's Notice of Lien and stated that it would be made part of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license file. At that time, administrative license revocation proceedings were pending against Intimo Lounge, Inc. So Mr. Ivey sent a copy of his February 4, 1977 acknowledgment letter to DABT's Miami Office, and included this notation: P.S. John: You need to immediately notify Attorney Solomon's [Calo's attorney's] office if and when an order to revoke is issued. He will then go to court to seek a judicial transfer. (P-2) On March 22, 1977, Charles A. Nuzum, DABT's Director, executed an order revoking Intimo Lounge, Inc.`s alcoholic beverage license. (R-1) Eight days later, on March 30, 1977, Armando Calo sued Intimo Lounge, Inc., seeking to foreclose his chattel mortgage on its alcoholic beverage license. By letter of the same date, counsel for Mr. Calo, citing Section 561.65, Florida Statutes, notified DABT of the filing of the foreclosure action; he also asserted that Mr. Calo had no knowledge of or participation in the causes for which the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license was revoked. Copies of subsequent pleadings filed in the action were sent to DABT's legal department. DABT thus knew the suit was filed and was aware of its continued progress. (Testimony of Barone; P-3, P-4, P-11) The Circuit Court of Dade County ultimately entered a final judgment of foreclosure in Mr. Calo's favor. On August 17, 1979, pursuant to such judgment, the Clerk of the Court sold the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license, at public sale, to intervenor Rene Valdes, 1710 N.W. 7th Street, Suite 7201, Miami, Florida for $25,000. Notice of the sale was published in the Miami Review, a newspaper circulated in Dade County. On August 28, 1979, the Clerk issued a Certificate of Title pursuant to Chapter 45, Florida Statutes. This Certificate certified that Intimo Lounge, Inc.`s alcoholic beverage license (4-COP, license no. 23-1901) had been sold to Rene Valdes on August 17, 1979, and that "no objections to the sale have been filed within the time allowed for filing objections." (Testimony of Valdes; P-5, P-6) Although DABT was aware of the protracted mortgage foreclosure litigation involving the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license --which it had earlier revoked -- it never protested or sought to block the foreclosure action. It was not a party to the action; neither did it attempt to become one. (Testimony of Barone, Valdes) In September, 1979, a month after the judicial foreclosure sale, Nathaniel Barone, counsel for Intimo Lounge, Inc., wrote R. B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Business Regulation, asking what steps were necessary to keep the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license viable. An internal memorandum suggests that DABT was, at first, unprepared to answer that question and preferred, instead, to delay answering until an application for the license was filed. But, on October 4, 1979, Harold F. X. Purnell, the Department's General Counsel replied on behalf of Secretary Burroughs: It is the Division's position that the . . . license has been and presently is revoked pursuant to the actions pre- viously taken by [DABT]. Further, that in the absence of an order of appropriate jurisdiction entered in a proceeding to which the Division is a party we are powerless to transfer such license. (Testimony of Barone; P-7, P-10) Meanwhile, Rene Valdes, notified DABT of his purchase of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license and asked that it be held in escrow while he found a suitable purchaser and location. When DABT refused, Mr. Valdes petitioned the court, which had rendered the foreclosure judgment, to require DABT to process and transfer the license. The court denied his petition, at least in part, because DABT was not a party to the proceeding. After the court hearing, Mr. Valdes, together with his attorney, Charles Kelly, and DABT's counsel, Mr. Purnell, met outside the chambers and discussed their next step. Mr. Kelly discussed seeking a mandamus ordering DABT to issue the license. Mr. Purnell suggested, instead, that Mr. Valdes find a location and purchaser for the license, then submit an application to DABT -- something which Mr. Valdes had not yet done. Although Mr. Purnell did not assure them that the application would be approved, both Mr. Valdes and Mr. Barone gained an impression that it would be. 2/ Mr. Valdes, following Mr. Purnell's suggestion, found a location and buyer, then applied for a transfer of the license. DABT's denial resulted in this proceeding. (Testimony of Barone, Valdes) Under Section 561.65(1), Florida Statutes (1977), a lender licensed by the state holding a lien on an alcoholic beverage license had the right to enforcement of his lien against the license within 12 days after any order of revocation, provided it was revoked for causes which the lienholder had no knowledge and did not participate. If the lienholder purchased the license at foreclosure sale, he could operate under it or transfer it to a qualified person. Until August 17, 1980, it was DABT's long-standing practice and policy to make no distinction between licensed and unlicensed lenders (lien-holders). It allowed both licensed and unlicensed lienholders to file notice of liens against beverage licenses and honored the subsequent transfer of the license if the lien was enforced within 12 days of revocation. This practice was abruptly changed on the basis of an agency legal opinion. On August 17, 1980, one month before Gui-Dom filed its application, DABT's General Counsel rendered a legal opinion limiting Section 561.65 relief to lenders licensed by the state. After that date, until 1981, when the legislature removed the "licensed lender" language of Section 561.65, DABT applied Section 561.65 literally and only accepted liens filed by licensed lenders. (Testimony of LaRosa; P-13) But in October, 1980, DABT did not deny Gui-Dom's application for transfer of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license because Armando Calo, the lienholder, lacked a lender's license. Instead, the application was denied because the license had been earlier revoked. As later explained by Barry Schoenfeld, DABT's Chief of Licensing: 2 [DABT] felt at the time that . . . there really was no license, that the license had already been revoked, and that there was no license for the court to sell [to Valdes]. (P-13, p. 25). But Section 561.65 specifically permits liens, under specified conditions, to survive license revocation. When asked to explain DABT's position in light of Section 561.65, Mr. Schoenfeld replied, "I don't know that I can explain it." (P-13, p. 16) Neither could Mr. Schoenfeld adequately explain why, in cases similar to this, DABT has approved license transfers while, here, they have not. (P-13, p. 23) It was not until after the denial of Gui-Dom's application that DABT contended that Section 561.65, Florida Statutes (1977), provides no relief because Armando Calo was not a licensed lender. (P- 9, P-13). Rene Valdes, a beverage license broker, operates a business known as "Beverage License, Inc." He specializes in obtaining and transferring alcoholic beverage licenses for clients and has a working knowledge of the Beverage Law, including DABT rules and practice. When he purchased the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license at the judicial sale, he did not know that it had been revoked by DABT. He did, however, know that there was license revocation litigation between Intimo Lounge, Inc. and DABT. He also knew that DABT had issued an emergency order suspending Intimo Lounge, Inc.'s license; and he knew that there were circuit court foreclosure proceedings involving the license. Yet he failed to ascertain the status of the license -- either by checking the files of DABT or the circuit court. But even if he had discovered that the license had been revoked, under DABT's long-standing practice and interpretation of Section 561.65, it would have made no difference. The license would have "survived" revocation because Armando Calo had timely enforced his lien. And it could have been sold at a judicial sale and transferred to a new qualified purchaser. (Testimony of Valdes, Harris; P-13) DABT has provided no record foundation for its abrupt discontinuance of prior agency practice and policy in August, 1980, a policy which allowed both licensed and unlicensed lien holders to file and timely enforce liens against beverage licenses. This policy enabled a lien to survive license revocation; and the license, which had been revoked earlier could then be transferred by judicial sale. The only explanation given for the change in policy, a change which DABT now relies on as cause for denying Gui-Dom's application, is that the agency changed its legal interpretation of Section 561.65 (1977). (Testimony of LaRosa; P-13)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Gui-Dom's application for transfer of alcoholic beverage license no. 23-1901, series 4-COP, be granted. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to the crime of possession of a controlled substance (for which adjudication was withheld) is sufficient to support the imposition of discipline with regard to his alcoholic beverage license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility and duty to issue beverage licenses pursuant to Chapter 561, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules. Prior to September 11, 2000, Respondent, doing business as Smiley's, was the owner and holder of a beverage license, DBPR License No. 74-05336, Series 2-COP, which permits him to sell beer and wine for consumption on premises. On October 9, 1998, Respondent was charged by information with sale and delivery of cocaine. He was acquitted of that charge on May 12, 2000. Subsequently in a separate incident, Respondent was charged with possession of cocaine and on September 11, 2000, pleaded no contest to that charge. Pursuant to Respondent's timely request for formal proceedings, Petitioner's counsel initiated discovery in the course of this administrative proceeding through a Request for Admissions to which Respondent failed to respond. Respondent failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this circumstance and, upon motion of Petitioner, the Request for Admissions was deemed admitted. Those admissions establish that Respondent entered a no contest plea on September 11, 2000, to the charge of possession of cocaine and that the plea bargain negotiated at that time also included two days' incarceration. Additionally, the admissions establish that Respondent is aware that possession of cocaine is a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years. Respondent's own testimony is uncorroborated by other direct evidence and fails to establish that he possesses good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent's alcoholic beverage license, DBPR License No. 74-05336, Series 2-COP. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Kwilecki, Jr., Esquire 629 North Peninsula Drive Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Michael Martinez, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Lt. John P. Szabo Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Room 709 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Turner, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
