The Issue The amended Administrative complaint, forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 20, 1987, alleges that Respondent is unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of alcohol and substance abuse; that Respondent attempted to treat patients while under the influence of alcohol, constituting gross or repeated malpractice or failure to practice medicine with the level of care recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; and that Respondent failed to fulfill a statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician. After lengthy discovery and negotiations and Respondent's submittal to an inpatient mental and physical examination, the parties filed a stipulation substantially limiting the issue to the conditions under which Respondent should be allowed to return to the practice of medicine and appropriate monitoring once he returns to practice. At the final hearing, DPR presented the testimony of two witnesses: Lynn Hankes, M. D., qualified as expert in addictionology without objection, treated Dr. Pigg for alcoholism in 1985 and examined him as an inpatient in January, 1988. Robert A. Goetz, M. D., qualified without objection as an expert in the field of impaired physicians, has been the director of Florida's Physicians' Recovery Network since February 1988, and has known Dr. Pigg since shortly after that time. Respondent's sole witness was Milton R. Burglass, M.D., qualified without objection as an expert in psychiatry and in addiction treatment. Dr. Burglass reviewed Dr. Pigg's records and files and interviewed him on April 7, 1988, in anticipation of this hearing. After the hearing the transcript was filed and both parties submitted proposed recommended orders. Specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact are found in the attached appendix.
Findings Of Fact William Larry Pigg is, and has been at all time material, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0040625. The parties in their prehearing stipulation filed on February 15, 1988, agree to the following: Peitioner, the Department of Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Since at least the summer of 1984, Respondent has had a problem with alcohol abuse. On or about June 13, 1985, Respondent entered the Impaired Physician's Program. Respondent completed an alcohol treatment program in Miami, Florida. Thereafter, Respondent also completed an extended program in Mississippi. On or about December 17, 1985, Respondent was granted staff privileges at Holmes Regional Medical Center in Melbourne, Florida. In order to obtain staff privileges, Respondent signed a statement agreeing to do the following: to abide by the Aftercare Con- tract of the Mississippi State Medical Association Impaired Physician's Program; and to submit to blood alcohol levels [sic] at any time at the request of any physician on the staff of Holmes Regional Medical Center. In or about April 1986, Respondent began to abuse alcohol again. On or about April 12, 1986, Respondent was attempting to perform a right hip reduction on a patient at Holmes Regional Medical Center. The patient in question was legally intoxicated and a large muscular man. Respondent, in attempting to relax the patient, ordered a large dose of narcotics, including Demerol and Nubain, as well as Phenergan and Valium. On or about the evening of April 12, 1986 or the morning of April 13, 1986, Respondent left the emergency room, took a Phenergan tablet and went home. Phenergan is the brand name for prometnazine Hydrochloride. Phenergan can cause drowsiness or impair the mental and/or physical abilities of the individual taking the drug. Later on the same evening, the Emergency Department Physician, Dr. Wagner, spoke with Dr. Pigg by telephone in reference to two patients with fractures that required orthopedic intervention. Respondent agreed to come and resume care for the patients. However, Respondent never came to the medical center and could not be located by police. On or about April 16, 1986, Respondent's wife contacted the Melbourne Police Department because her husband had come home intoxicated. On or about June 7, 1986, Respondent was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol and reckless driving. On or about June 30, 1986, the Director of the Florida Medical Foundation Committee on Impaired Physicians, Roger A. Goetz, M.D., advised the Petitioner, by letter, that Respondent was not progressing satisfactorily with the program and had not complied with all aspects of his aftercare contract. Respondent is and has been at all times alleged in the above stipulated facts, unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of alcohol abuse. No evidence was presented as to substance abuse, other than alcohol. Nor was there evidence that Dr. Pigg suffers from a mental condition. Although his records reflect some prior diagnosis of a passive/aggressive personality disorder, the prevailing thought in the addictionology community is that psychiatric diagnoses are invalid until an individual has been sober long enough to assure that the problem is not solely the alcohol's effect on the individual. There is no evidence that Dr. Pigg has had this requisite period of sobriety since 1984, and particularly the time that he was examined by Dr. Burglass, the only psychiatrist to testify in this proceeding. Of the experts who testified, Dr. Hankes is most familiar with Dr. Pigg, having been his primary treating physician in the past, and having examined him recently over several days as an inpatient. Dr. Hankes found that Dr. Pigg progressed from the mid stage of alcoholism to the early late stage of this disease between 1985 and 1988. In addition to Dr. Hankes' program at South Miami Hospital, Dr. Pigg has undergone primary treatment at a series of facilities in Georgia, Mississippi and Florida, all of which have an excellent reputation. At this point, in Dr. Hankes' opinion, he is a treatment failure. He has, at various times in his treatment experience also undergone detoxification at a Myers Act facility, attempted Antabuse therapy, and tried and rejected Alcoholics Anonymous. In spite of the past failures, the experts concurred that Dr. Pigg, like other alcoholics, is capable of recovery and that once recovered, Dr. Pigg would be capable of practicing medicine safely. All concurred that the recovery must be verified prior to Dr. Pigg's return to practice, and that thereafter the recovery must be monitored for an unforeseeable period of time. Dr. Hankes' advice, based on his concern as Dr. Pigg's treatment provider and primary therapist, is a six-part program: that addiction therapy continue on an outpatient basis, at least weekly, by a certified alcohol or addiction professional; that Dr. Pigg engage in psychotherapy with a qualified psychiatrist knowledgeable about addictive disease, the frequency to be determined by the psychiatrist; that a primary internist or family general practitioner monitor his physical well-being, especially his liver dysfunction; that Dr. Pigg participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, with a lay individual sponsor, as well as engage in International Doctors in Alcoholics Anonymous with a recovering physician sponsor; that Dr. Pigg be assigned a monitoring physician, knowledgeable in addictive disease, who has the authority to require random, unannounced surprise testing of blood or urine and that personal contact be made every two weeks and telephone contact in the alternate weeks; that the treating and monitoring individuals report on a quarterly basis to Dr. Roger Goetz, the Recovery Network director and that at the end of a two-year period Dr. Pigg be examined again by Dr. Hankes who would make his recommendation to Dr. Goetz. Dr. Pigg would also have the right to go to another AMA approved treatment provider for a second opinion. Dr. Hankes distinguishes between the state of being "dry" or free from alcohol use for a period, and recovery from alcoholism which requires a personal transformation with some undefined indicators. Dr. Hankes is convinced that the latter state is essential for real recovery and that Alcoholics Anonymous is the most effective, though not exclusive, route to that state. Although Dr. Hankes recommends a two year period during which Dr. Pigg would not be permitted to practice, he concedes that recovery could be effective in less time and that he would readily endorse his return to practice if the recovery were completed sooner. He describes Dr. Pigg as a "very competent physician", a "very bright guy", a "multi-talented individual, who flies airplanes and does wonderful things in his life." None can predict the time required for recovery, but each of the three experts recommends a period of one to two years of verified sobriety prior to the return to practice. Dr. Burglass recommends neither Alcoholics Anonymous participation nor the multi-part program outlined by Dr. Hankes. Since Alcoholics Anonymous and the other treatment/recovery models have been unsuccessful, Dr. Burglass suggests that Dr. Pigg be allowed to devise his own method of achieving recovery; he emphasizes that the goal, and not the route to that goal, is the concern here. He recommends that sobriety be verified for a period of one year and thereafter Dr. Pigg be allowed to return to practice with monitoring for approximately three years. The evidence, weighed and considered as a whole, fails to establish that an absolute two-year suspension from medical practice is necessary or that involvement in Alcoholics Anonymous is essential.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That William Larry Pigg, M.D. be suspended from the practice of medicine for an indefinite period, provided that he be given an opportunity to appear before the Board at twelve month intervals to demonstrate that he can resume the competent practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients. That demonstration should include, as a minimum: a ) That he has totally abstained from the use of alcohol for a period of twelve months, as evidenced by frequent unannounced random collection of blood samples by an agent designated by the Board. That he has been under the continuous care and supervision of a physician qualified to provide addiction therapy and that, if recommended by that individual after a necessary period of sobriety, he has also undergone a psychiatric evaluation to determine the existence of mental disease or disorder. If detected, the disease or disorder must be treated. That he has been evaluated successfully participated in Alcoholics Anonymous or other similar peer support group program. Successful participation means frequent regular attendance at meetings and the association with a qualified sponsor from the program. That he has been evaluated and recommended for return to practice by Dr. Hankes or other treatment professional designated by the Board. However, if the recommendation is negative, Dr. Pigg should be permitted to obtain a second opinion independent of the Board's designated evaluator, from an individual other than that described in b), above, who is also qualified in the field of addictionology. The length and type of monitoring necessary once Dr. Pigg returns to practice should be determined at that time, based on recommendations of the professionals responsible for assisting in his recovery. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 4th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0225 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3-13. Adopted in paragraph 2, incorporating the parties pre-hearing stipulation. 14. Adopted in paragraph 7. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-4. Incorporated in Issues and Background statement. 5. Adopted in paragraph 2, incorporating the parties' prehearing stipulation. 6-8. Included in Background Statement. 9-12. Rejected as unnecessary restatement of the witnesses' testimony. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. Included in Background Statement. 15-16. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 9. 19-20. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 9. 23-24. Incorporated in substance in the Background statement. 25-28. Adopted in substance in paragraph 11, otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 29. Adopted by implication in paragraph 12. 30-31. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 12. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Abstinence alone is insufficient. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 3, 11, and 12. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: John Namey, Esquire 22 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Deborah J. Miller, Esquire One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2400 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner has passed the April 1989 Mental Health Counselling examination for licensure by the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counselors.
Findings Of Fact 1. Question 30 of the April 1989 Mental Health Counselling examination required applicants to select one correct and best answer from a multiple-choice selection of four. The question and choices read as follows: 3. Which of the following symptoms or traits is most characteristic of the chronic drug addict? Pleasant hallucinations Intellectual retardation Diminished appetite Aggressive antisocial behavior (Emphasis in original) Petitioner's response to the foregoing question was "4," aggressive antisocial behavior. The agency maintained that "3," diminished appetite, was the correct answer. Both parties are completely in agreement that answers "1" and "2" cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered correct. Drunkenness or alcohol abuse constituted a drug addiction for purposes of answering the question at issue. Petitioner has 22 years of counselling experience, mostly with children and adolescents, but currently within the geriatric community. She testified as to how she applied her education, training, and experience to arrive at her answer. Essentially, Petitioner did not deny that "diminished appetite" is a "symptom" of the chronic drug addict, but she denied that it is a "major concern." She described "diminished appetite" as a "subset" or "side effect" of chronic drug addiction which improves as the addict's attitude improves via counselling. Petitioner maintained that as a "symptom," diminished appetite is a concern of the medical staff and not of the counselling staff. For the foregoing reasons, and because the Diagnostic Standards Manual, 3d Edition (DSM3) and the Diagnostic Standards Manual, 3d Edition [Revised] (DSM3r) connects drunkenness or alcohol abuse with a diagnosis of "antisocial personality," Petitioner opined that the question, "Which of the following symptoms or traits is most characteristic of the chronic drug addict?" was ambiguous and should be thrown out, or alternatively, the only correct answer should be found to be her answer of "aggressive antisocial behavior." Petitioner's answer on the examination and her concern with antisocial behavior was geared primarily to counselling children who are chronic drug addicts as opposed to the multigenerational chronic drug addict population. Both Petitioner herself and Respondent's expert, Dr. Caskie, who was accepted as an expert in mental health counselling, acknowledged that the term "antisocial behavior" can include both aggressive behavior and withdrawal behavior. As described by both witnesses, "antisocial behavior/personality" and, more particularly, "aggressive antisocial behavior" appear to be a diagnosis of psychiatric condition which can result from chronic (not acute) drug addiction, whereas diminished appetite is a symptom by which the diagnostician arrives at a diagnosis of antisocial behavior/personality. Dr. Caskie opined that diminished appetite is the one trait listed in Question 30 which is common to all chronic drug (including alcohol) addictions. Upon her education, training, and experience, Dr. Caskie explained that the only correct answer to the question as posed would have to be "diminished appetite" instead of the answer asserted by Petitioner as correct, that is, "aggressive antisocial behavior," because aggressive antisocial behavior only arises from the use of certain drugs, not all drugs. Dr. Caskie further explained that aggressive antisocial behavior is manifested by only a portion of the chronic drug addict population and that although chronic drug users as a group probably are antisocial, usually only 20% of chronic drug addicts manifest aggressive or outwardly directed antisocial behavior. Her explanation and answer, like the examination question, was geared to symptoms of chronic drug addicts of all ages. In light of the evidence as a whole, Dr. Caskie's answer and explanation, unlike Petitioner's, is persuasive of correctness. The Petitioner introduced into evidence excerpts from the DSM3 and DSM3r. Upon the evidence of both Petitioner and Dr. Caskie, the undersigned finds as fact that these diagnostic manuals are authorized by the American Psychiatric Association and are regularly referred-to by mental health counsellors. However, the fact that the very limited excerpts selected by the Petitioner did not contain the "term "diminished appetite" but did relate antisocial personality to drug addiction is insufficient, in light of all the other evidence, to invalidate the question or the correct answer as described by Dr. Caskie.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner has not passed the April 1989 examination. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted, but not dispositive and unnecessary parts were not adopted. Petitioner did not move into evidence several of her marked exhibits and several were denied admission. This proposal is not a proposed finding of material fact and is covered in the "Preliminary Statement." 3, 4 Rejected as mere rhetoric or legal argument. To the extent that proposals of fact may be included here, they are rejected as not dispositive. See FOF 4, 9 and 10. 5, 6 Irrelevant. Respondent's PFOF: 1 Not stipulated or proven. The parties stipulated that only successful passing of the one question (30) resulting in an increment of 1 point to Petitioner's total score was necessary for her to pass the examination in question. 2, 3 Covered in the "Preliminary Statement." 4 Sentences 1 and 2 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph up to the last sentence is accepted but not adopted as it is mostly mere recitation of testimony. The final sentence constitutes a proposed conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. The facts as found and the conclusions of law as set out in the Recommended Order are supported by the preponderance of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Vytas J. Urba Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Colette Heck, Esquire 1617 Ridgewood Avenue, Suite G-201 Holly Hill, FL 32117 Henry Dover Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counselling Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Courtesy copy to: Karen Ann Carroll 7 Autumnwood Trail Ormond Beach, FL 32174
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Respondent, M. J. Warhola, was a doctor of osteopathic medicine and properly licensed as such by the State of Florida by license number OS 0001256, issued in 1957. He has been practicing osteopathic medicine at his present location in Tampa, Florida, for the past 17 or 18 years. Respondent first started treating Pearl O. Knowles in 1965. Generally, she was suffering from severe diabetes and was overweight. He also, over the years, treated her for arteriosclerosis. Among the drugs he was prescribing for her during the 1979-1989 time period were Placidyl (sleeping pill), Verstran (tranquilizer), Triavil (antidepressant), Dilantin (anticonvulsant) Teldrin (antiallergenic), Donnatal (sedative), Synalgos (painkiller), Talwin (painkiller), various antibiotics, and such other substances as insulin, stool hardeners, vitamins, diuretics, antihistamines, and antiemetics. During the period from January, 1979, through December, 1981, prescriptions written by Respondent for these varying medications for Mrs. Knowles or her husband were filled by area pharmacies in accordance with the following chart: MONTH/YR TOTAL MRS. K MONTH/YR TOTAL MRS. K Jan. 79 11 4 July 80 22 15 Feb. 79 15 7 Aug. 80 15 10 Mar. 79 10 5 Sept.80 26 19 Apr. 79 14 11 Oct. 80 20 10 May 79 13 10 Nov. 80 21 16 June 79 10 8 Dec. 80 22 17 July 79 11 6 Jan. 81 16 11 Aug. 79 15 10 Feb. 81 15 12 Sept.79 13 10 Mar. 81 25 17 Oct. 79 15 6 Apr. 81 26 17 Nov. 79 7 5 May 81 21 10 Dec. 79 17 12 June 81 11 4 Jan. 80 12 8 July 81 23 8 Feb. 80 17 12 Aug. 81 25 23 Mar. 80 21 17 Sept.81 5 5 Apr. 80 17 14 Oct. 81 20 14 May 80 24 22 Nov. 81 4 2 June 80 27 21 Dec. 81 2 2 TOTAL: 588 400 Many of the above instances are refills of the same prescription. According to Respondent, some prescriptions were authorized five refills without contact with him. Some, such as Prescription #27162 for 100 Triavil, initially filled on December 1, 1979, was subsequently refilled at least 11 times, and three other separate prescriptions for the same drug were filled multiple times. From January, 1979, through September, 1980, a period of 20 months, 30 tablets each prescriptions for Placidyl tablets, written by Respondent for Mrs. Knowles, were filled 46 times for a total of 1,380 tablets. During the same period, Triavil prescriptions for 100 capsules each written by Respondent for Mrs. Knowles were filled 22 times for 3,200 tablets, Talwin at 100 tablets 13 times for 1,300 tablets, at least 10 prescriptions for either Tylenol #3 or Fiorinol #3, both with codeine, at 50 tablets each for the Fiorinol at least totalling more than 509 tablets, as well as all the others stated in paragraph 2 above. Mrs. Knowles admits taking too much medication, but claims it is not the fault of Respondent. Whenever Respondent saw her and gave her a prescription for any medicine, he would tell her what dosage to take. She would see the Respondent every two or three weeks and get a new prescription each time and would also give her prescriptions at her request without her going to the office personally. Regardless of what instructions Respondent would give her concerning the dosage of the various painkillers and "nerve medicines" he would give her, she often exceeded the directed dose either by accident or in an effort to relieve the extreme pain she was experiencing in her hands and feet. Not only did she get drug prescriptions from Respondent, but by her own admission, she also saw other doctors during the period from whom she got "pain pills," as well as taking those given to her on her release from the hospitals to which she was admitted. She recognized that she was taking too many drugs at the time, but the pain was severe and she felt it was required. During this same period of time, from mid-1979 on through early 1982, while Mrs. Knowles was seeing Respondent for her diabetes and other chronic ailments, she was admitted to several hospitals in the area. On June 11, 1979, she was admitted to the Brandon Community Hospital (BCH) in Brandon, Florida (Brandon is a small community east of Tampa), in a confused and disoriented state. The admission diagnosis was diabetes with electrolyte imbalance. The attending physician noted at the time that the patient "is somewhat dependent on drugs." Approximately two months later, on August 15, 1979, Mrs. Knowles was again admitted to BCH, this time for uncontrolled diabetes and overdosing her drugs including Placidyl and Fiorinol. Again, the attending physician noted the failure of the patient to take care of her diabetes, her drinking, and her drug dependency. Mrs. Knowles thereafter stayed out of the hospital for about a year until, on September 1, 1981, she was again admitted to BCH, again for her diabetes. Secondary diagnoses on this occasion were hypertension and taxciencephalopathy, a disorder of brain function. At this time, she was seen in the hospital by Dr. Mark Stern. Based on the lab work performed and examination by Dr. Stern and other specialists to whom she was referred, it was concluded that her condition, aside from the diabetes and hypertension, was related to her overuse of drugs such as Talwin, Valium, Triavil, and the like. She was again seen by Dr. Stern at BCH on October 24, 1981, when she was admitted for an unintentional drug overdose. A drug screen done at the time of admission revealed a Placidyl level of 69.4 (normal level is 0.5 to 10, with toxic levels being greater than 20). A repeat test six and a half hours later showed the level of Placidyl at 62.4. Other lab tests showed opiates, benzodiazepan (tranquilizers such as Valium and Librium), and salecylates. When she was admitted on this occasion, she had with her a box containing several medicine bottles. Notwithstanding Petitioner's allegation that "Said labels were not labeled by Respondent," the testimony of Deborah Ann Brown, Director of Pharmacy at BCH, to whom the box of bottles was given for identification, shows that only one of all the bottles did not have the appropriate markings on it. It also appears that some of the medicines in the box had been prescribed for Mrs. Knowles' husband, Ira. Dr. Stern again saw Mrs. Knowles when she was brought to BCH on January 6, 1982, complaining of weakness and difficulty in walking. Again, her history showed she was taking antidepressants and Placidyl for chronic insomnia. Dr. Stern recalls that Mrs. Knowles telephoned him on October 9, 1981, and requested prescriptions for Placidyl, Triavil, and Talwin, but he refused to prescribe them for her. He terminated his relationship with her in August, 1982. During the period she was his patient, however, he did prescribe for her such substances as painkillers, sleeping pills, and antianxiety drugs, the same generic types of drugs as prescribed by Respondent, by written prescriptions, some of which called for multiple refills. Though Mrs. Knowles advised Dr. Stern that she was being treated by Dr. Warhola, Dr. Stern did not discuss her with Dr. Warhola or even contact him. Even when Mrs. Knowles threatened to get drugs from Respondent when Dr. Stern refused to give her prescription over the phone in October, 1981, Dr. Stern still did not contact Dr. Warhola. Between the fourth and fifth BCH hospitalizations, on December 21, 1981, Mrs. Knowles was admitted to Tampa General Hospital (TGH) and was examined by Dr. Jeffrey L. Miller, a rheumatologist internist, at the request of her regular physician, Dr. Sugarman. When Dr. Miller first saw her, Mrs. Knowles was overmedicated. She was confused, and her speech was slurred. She indicated to Dr. Miller that she was taking Triavil and other drugs as well, such as Zomax and Placidyl, but refused to tell him all the drugs she was taking. Those she mentioned are addictive, and it appeared that she was addicted because she had been hospitalized for nonaccidental overmedication and because her condition was consistent with addiction. Mrs. Knowles denied having a drug problem. In Dr. Miller's opinion, however, Mrs. Knowles was not receiving the proper therapy. Her diabetes did not require the drugs she was getting. Her other symptoms, in his opinion, did not justify the apparent liberal prescriptions she was getting and should have been treated with psychotherapy rather than drugs. In his opinion, therapy should be tailored for an individual like Mrs. Knowles so that the medication is limited and regulated to prevent addiction and the buildup of tolerance to a drug, which results in larger and larger doses. The evidence also shows, however, that Mrs. Knowles was a difficult patient. Dr. Sugarman was having difficulty with her and requested the consult by Miller. What must also be considered is that Mrs. Knowles' leg, about which she constantly complained of the pain, was subsequently surgically removed in 1982 as a result of her diabetes. The pain associated with this condition leading up to the amputation was real and required relief to some degree. In any case, Dr. Miller did not ever discuss Mrs. Knowles with Respondent or advise him of her addiction. Mrs. Knowles still receives painkillers and "nerve medicine" from her current physician, Dr. Sugarman, whom she sees every two weeks. She stopped seeing Dr. Warhola when she started seeing Dr. Sugarman, who, she felt, was more current in some of her problem areas than Respondent. She did not leave Respondent because she was dissatisfied with him. In fact, he was the only one who helped her blood clots. According to Respondent, he gave Mrs. Knowles the Placidyl for sleep because she had a lot of pain as a result of her diabetes and needed it to help her sleep. At this same time, Mrs. Knowles' husband was a severe alcoholic and, since she was under a lot of strain because of that, he gave her the drug to help her sleep. The call he got from Dr. Stern on October 26, 1981, when she was in BCH, indicating she was mixing drugs, was the first indication he had that she was abusing drugs. He told Stern she was not to get any more, and he, Respondent, has not prescribed any for her or seen her since. In fact, he was not informed of her hospitalizations in June or August, 1979, or in September, 1981. It is, even by the testimony of Petitioner's expert, Dr. Gladding, not uncommon in Florida for M.D.s to admit a D.O.'s patient to a hospital and not ever notify the D.O. of that fact. Mrs. Clifton M. Wood of Winter Haven, Florida, was first taken to see Respondent for a diet regimen in 1980. On the first visit on February 7, 1980, he gave her a physical examination which included a complete laboratory workup, cardiogram, and weight and pressure check. He gave her some pills which had instructions for use on the bottle, but did not tell her what they were. Each time she came to his office for a visit thereafter, on a monthly basis, either Respondent or his nurse would weigh her and take her blood pressure and adjust her medication as required. During the course of treating Mrs. Wood, Respondent gave her phedymetrazine, an appetite suppressant, methahydrine for high blood pressure, Donnatal, and vitamins and minerals. He gave Mrs. Wood only the drugs he felt she needed in the amount she needed. Mrs. Wood was admitted to Winter Haven Hospital on October 26, 1980, because a neighbor who was concerned about her brought her in. At the time, Mrs. Wood had trouble with dizziness, her balance, and falling. Before this incident, however, Respondent on one or more of his visits, had given her pills for her blood pressure and potassium pills for her to take in water. According to Dr. Gordon Rafool, who had also treated Mrs. Wood since 1979 and who admitted her to the hospital in October, 1989, at the time of admission, she was, among other things, dehydrated and had an electrolyte imbalance (lack of body salt, specifically potassium), the latter possibly being caused by the intemperate use of a diuretic. A diuretic is often used in cases of heart failure, high blood pressure, and, though not recommended, weight reduction, to get rid of body water. Since it was important to know what medicines Mrs. Wood was taking to help determine the reason for her condition, Dr. Rafool and other hospital personnel tried to get an identification of the drugs in Mrs. Wood's possession when she was brought in. The hospital pharmacy could not identify them, and no drug screen was done, but Dr. Rafool obtained a written authorization of Respondent to permit Respondent to release any information regarding drugs dispensed or prescribed to the patient by him. This authorization was forwarded to Respondent's office with a request for Mrs. Wood's medical records, but they were never released. Dr. Warhola's office manager, Mrs. Zacchini, states the request and authorization on Mrs. Wood were received, but were apparently inadvertently filed in the office record without the requested records being sent out. Though Dr. Rafool says that numerous follow-up calls were made to Respondent's office, Mrs. Zacchini denies any were received from either the hospital or Dr. Rafool. In any case, there is no evidence to indicate any calls were made to or received by Respondent directly, and he denies every having received any. Mrs. Wood still considers Respondent to be a good doctor, but she has not gone back to see him since her release from the hospital because Dr. Rafool told her to stay away from him. She has been seeing Dr. Rafool, who has been treating her with pills for her arthritis and high blood pressure. Petitioner presented the deposition of Dr. Lloyd D. Gladding, D.O., over the partial objection of Respondent, whose objection was not to the use of the deposition, but to specific parts thereof based on particular grounds. For example, Respondent objected to Dr. Gladding's testifying as an expert because, he contended, there had been no showing by Petitioner that the witness's experience compares to that of Dr. Warhola. He contends the witness does not practice in the same geographical area nor is there a showing he is a similar health care provider with a similar specialty or a similar type practice. However, Dr. Gladding's curriculum vitae, admitted without objection, shows he is currently co-chairman of a family practice seminar in his area and a clinical preceptor (teacher) at an osteopathic medical school and has been engaged in a family practice in the Fort Myers area since 1978. This area is geographically not far removed from the Tampa Bay area (the distance is not significant) and there is no showing that the patient conditions involved in the two cases at issue would or could be affected significantly by the geographical location of the patient or that treatment of these conditions varies greatly from location to location. In fact, according to this witness, he finds patients from widely differing areas (Pennsylvania, where he was trained, as opposed to Florida, where he practices) to be the same. Accepting the witness as an expert, then, with reference to Mrs. Knowles and her condition, he has had patients with a similar series of health problems where the patient was placed on multiple drug regimens. Sometimes, these patients developed drug dependencies for the different medications he prescribed. In the case of Mrs. Knowles, based on the number of Placidyl prescribed by the Respondent over about a year, she received enough to take two per day, which would constitute 1,500 mg. of the drug per day (two tablets of 759 mg. each). The drug company's recommended daily dose is between 590 and 750 mg. given at bedtime, with an additional 109 to 200 mg. later on, if needed. The fact that Mrs. Knowles was also getting other drugs, including a different type of sleeping pill, makes Dr. Gladding feel the prescriptions by Respondent were excessive. He admits, however, he does not know how much pain the patient was in and this makes it difficult to render an opinion. Because of this, he cannot unequivocally say that the dosage prescribed was excessive. Good practice is to prescribe as few Schedule II drugs as is possible. However, without knowing the patient, her attitude, and her actual condition, an opinion as to the appropriateness of the drugs prescribed, unless clearly inappropriate, would be merely guesswork. As to the patient Mrs. Wood, Dr. Gladding could not read Dr. Warhola's notes of what drugs he gave her. Therefore, in analyzing Respondent's prescriptions, he relied on and referred to a federal drug analysis of the unmarked drugs she got from Respondent as including barbiturates or their derivatives. This analysis was not introduced into evidence, and Dr. Gladding's reference to it is hearsay which cannot, by itself and without other independent evidence of the identity of the drugs, support a finding of fact even though it would appear some were drugs that would not be used in weight control. However, there were drugs identified independently, such as the potassium replacement and the weight reduction drug, which were appropriate and, in addition, the tranquilizer could also be appropriate. In any case, Dr. Gladding does not know what Mrs. Wood told Respondent about the problems she was having sleeping. If she did tell him this, even the barbiturates could be appropriate. Dr. Gladding has also been confronted with a situation where a patient of his has been hospitalized and the hospital calls him for information on the patient on an emergency basis. He knows, he says, everyone in the local hospitals and generally provides the requested information on the spot without a formal release. He is more concerned with the patient's welfare than with technicalities. However, in the case of Mrs. Wood, there was not an emergency situation and there was no showing Respondent was ever personally contacted. In addition, there was evidence of only one written release, not three, as reflected by the witness.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein against Dr. Warhola be dismissed, but that he be officially reminded of the necessity to conservatively prescribe controlled substances in the course of his practice. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32391 Gerald Nelson, Esquire 4950 West Kennedy Boulevard Suite 693 Tampa, Florida 33609 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee. Florida 32301 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Home is licensed as an assisted living facility. It is also licensed to provide extended congregate care, limited nursing services, and limited mental health services. The Home accepted Respondent as a resident. In July 1998, Petitioner had to transport Respondent to the hospital due to an overdose of medication. Upon his return from the hospital, Respondent told Petitioner's staff that he had taken the overdose intentionally. Thereafter, the Home required Respondent to sign a mental health contract dated September 9, 1998. This contract states as follows in relevant part: Qualifications for the Home requires [sic] that a member or applicant must not be mentally ill, habitually inebriated, or addicted to the use of a controlled substance. With these requirements, I understand that to be eligible and maintain my membership in the Home, I must agree to the terms of this contract. * * * If I use alcohol or any non-prescribed drugs I understand I may be dismissed from the Home. I understand that I will allow the Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida to supervise the self-administering of my medications. I will take my medication as it is prescribed by the primary physician. I will only be given my full prescription at the time of my discharge. I understand upon reasonable suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, I consent to testing. The Domiciliary Home staff may take a blood, saliva, or supervised urine sample to test for illegal drugs or alcohol. I authorize members of the Domiciliary staff to perform random searches of my person, vehicle, living quarters, or belongings to determine if I am using drugs or alcohol. If I refuse to allow a blood, saliva, or urine test, or search, or if I interfere in any way with the staff's performance of these duties, I may be dismissed. The Home also required Respondent to sign a Dual Diagnosis/Substance Abuse/Psychiatric (dual diagnosis) contract dated September 14, 1998. In addition to terms and conditions similar to the ones set forth above, the dual diagnosis contract provides as follows in relevant part: 10. In order to assist me in gaining freedom from alcohol and drugs, I will not use alcohol, tranquilizers, sleeping medication, over the counter medications, or any other chemical escapes which have not been prescribed by a physician. If I use alcohol or non-prescribed drugs, I understand I will be dismissed from the Home. In November 1998, one of Respondent's doctors wrote him a prescription for Ritalin. Respondent became very upset when a nurse would not administer the Ritalin to him without first checking with Petitioner's staff physician. Eventually, Respondent's primary care physician approved the administration of Ritalin together with Respondent's other medications. In January 1999, Respondent worked for Petitioner as a receptionist. After working overtime on one occasion, Respondent's speech was slurred, his eyes were dull, and his voice was horse. Petitioner's staff became suspicious that Respondent was taking medication in violation of his contracts. Respondent subsequently tested negatively for all substances except his prescribed medicines. In March 1999, Respondent violated his contracts by having a prescription for methadone filled at a drugstore and removing twenty-four of the pills from the bottle before turning the medicine over to Petitioner's staff as required by his contract. Petitioner's staff advised Respondent that he would be dismissed from the Home by letter dated March 23, 1999. Respondent subsequently requested Petitioner's Executive Director to review the decision to discharge him from the Home. By letter dated August 16, 1999, Petitioner rescinded its decision to dismiss Respondent from the Home but warned him that any further infraction would result in his immediate expulsion. On April 14, 2000, Petitioner conducted a routine facility-wide room inspection at the Home. During the course of the inspection, Petitioner found a bottle of Ephedra 250 in Respondent's room. According to the label on the bottle, Ephedra 250 is a dietary supplement that General Nutrition Corporation (GNC) markets. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that he heard about Ephedra 250 on a television show that discussed its benefits as a diet aid as well as its dangerous side effects. The label states as follows in pertinent part: WARNING: Seek advice from a health care practitioner prior to use if you are pregnant or nursing, or if you have high blood pressure, heart or thyroid disease, diabetes, difficulty in urination due to prostate enlargement, or if taking MAO inhibitor or any other prescription drug. Reduce or discontinue use if nervousness, tremor, sleeplessness, loss of appetite or nausea occur. Not intended for use by person under the age of 18. The maximum recommended dosage of Ephedrine for a healthy adult is no more than 100 mg in a 24 hour period for not more than 12 weeks. Improper use of this product may be hazardous to a person's health. Each capsule of Ephedra 250 contains 250 mg of MA Huang Extract (Ephedra sinica) or ( 15 mg of 6 percent Ephedrine). The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Ephedra 250 is an over-the-counter medication despite being labeled as a diet supplement. Ephedrine is a prescription drug in Florida unless an individual dose is less than a specified quantity. Petitioner's staff properly became concerned about Respondent's possession of Ephedra 250 because he takes numerous prescribed medications, which can have serious side effects, if taken with certain other medications. Ephedrine is one of those drugs. For instance, Respondent takes Cozaar for high blood pressure, Methadose to reduce his dependency on Percoset, and Ritalin. Persuasive evidence indicates that large doses of Ephedra can be used as a recreational drug. Respondent knew or should have known that Ephedra 250 was prohibited by his contracts with the Home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent as a resident of the Robert H. Jenkins Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Sloan, Esquire Department of Veterans' Affairs Post Office Box 21003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-8903 William T. Fisher 1300 Sycamore Lane, Suite 148 Lake City, Florida 32025 Lt. Col. Robin L. Higgins, Executive Director Department of Veterans' Affairs Post Office Box 31003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-8903
Findings Of Fact On June 27, 1991, Petitioner applied for licensure in the State of Florida by endorsement as a physician. He is presently licensed in the states of Alabama, Louisiana and Wisconsin. He is board eligible in dermatology and is currently a house physician for New Orleans General Hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana. On January 5, 1993, Respondent denied Petitioner's Florida application because of Petitioner's previous history of psychiatric problems and psychotherapy which affected his ability to practice medicine with skill and safety; his current psychiatric and psychological evaluations indicating an obsessive-compulsive disorder which could affect his abilities to practice with skill and safety; and the prior denial of his licensure application in 1987 as the result of material misrepresentations in the application. On three separate occasions, Petitioner has applied for licensure in Florida. In addition to the current application, he applied on April 4, 1986 and on August 2, 1990. Following a formal hearing, the 1986 application was denied on December 22, 1987, as the result of misrepresentation in the application. An application for admission filed in 1990 was subsequently not timely completed and became void. All of Petitioner's applications and materials submitted with regard to those applications are maintained by Respondent in one file, a normal practice for Respondent. Documents in that application file have been generated by Respondent or supplied by Petitioner. Diagnosed in 1977 with an obsessive-compulsive disorder, obsessive- compulsive personality and dysthymia, Petitioner has been receiving treatment for his mental illness since 1979. He was hospitalized for a psychotic episode in 1987. From 1988 until the present, Petitioner has been taking Sinequan and Mellaril. The daily dosage of 50 milligrams of Mellaril has not varied during that time period. The daily dosage of Sinequan initially was 150 milligrams per day, tapered to 40 milligrams each night at present. About three months ago, Petitioner began taking about a gram of Valproic acid each night. These medications have a sedating or hangover effect on Petitioner in the morning. At one point in 1992, Petitioner temporarily switched to another drug, Anaframil, for a month to a month and a half. One of the reasons for the switch was that Petitioner was going to be reevaluated by a psychiatric expert, Dr. Dohn, at Respondent's request. Dr. Dohn's previous evaluation had expressed concerns about possible effects on Petitioner's clinical abilities as a result of medication side effects. After Dohn's second evaluation of Petitioner, Dohn was much more confident of Petitioner's abilities in view of the then change to Anaframil for treatment of Petitioner's obsessive-compulsive disorder. Mellaril and Valproic acid are psychotropic medications which have confusion as a side effect. Sinequan can have confusion and sedation as a side effect. Valproic acid also has a sedating effect. The dosage of these medications as taken by Petitioner are sufficient to produce these side effects. The effects of the medications carry over to the following day, although taken the evening before. Psychological evaluations of Petitioner dated October 7, 1991 and August 28, 1992, reflect that Petitioner's cognitive abilities have been affected by his mental condition, inclusive of the medications he takes. The 1991 evaluation documents Petitioner's difficulties with recall of verbal instructions and numbers presented verbally to him; completing eye-hand coordination tasks within the maximum time limit; distinguishing visual details; and a tendency to become stymied with anxiety. Further, the 1992 report indicates that certain symptoms of Petitioner's obsessive-compulsive disorder could conceivably interfere with his ability to perform surgery. The 1992 report was done following testing of Petitioner after his brief change to the drug, Anaframil. Following Petitioner's 1992 evaluation by Dr. Dohn, conducted in close proximity to the August 1992 psychological evaluations, Petitioner quit taking Anaframil and resumed his previous medications of Mellaril and Sinequan. At deposition following a recent psychiatric evaluation of Petitioner by Dr. Edward Foulks, Foulks opined that Petitioner's illness should not be a barrier to the practice of medicine. Foulks opinion is not credited in view of his lack of independent knowledge of Petitioner's medications or mental condition; his lack of knowledge of whether Petitioner's condition had stabilized; how the condition had been resolved; or how much further treatment Petitioner would likely require. Foulks' opinions were based in large part upon Petitioner's representations to him. Petitioner's evaluations from Lazarus S. Gerald of the University of Pennsylvania Department of Dermatology, dated August 21, 1990 and July 8, 1991; from the chief of the Dermatology Department of Lloyd Noland Hospital and Clinic in Fairfield, Alabama, dated August 21, 1990; and from Dr. Derek J. Cripps, Director of the Department of Dermatology of the University Station Clinics, University of Wisconsin, note Petitioner's psychiatric condition as a possible explanation for performance difficulties. In 1986, Petitioner made numerous misrepresentations in his application for licensure. He answered "no" to the application question of whether he had a mental or emotional illness, although he had been ill since 1977 and had been treated from 1979 until 1986 by several psychiatrists. He also answered "no" to whether he had received psychotherapy. He was suspended from seeing patients during the last three months of residency at the University of Wisconsin, but answered "no" to the question of whether he had ever ceased practice for more than a month. He also answered "no" to the question of whether he had ever been denied hospital privileges or had such privileges acted against. In his August 2, 1990 application, Petitioner again answered "no" to whether he had been denied hospital privileges or had his hospital privileges acted against. Later, recognizing that this was not an accurate representation, Petitioner forwarded an affidavit, dated May 16, 1991. In that affidavit, Petitioner changed his answer to "yes". While only receiving partial credit of three months for his residency at the University of Wisconsin, Petitioner listed the dates on the form so that it appeared that he had received one year's credit. In his current application, dated June 27, 1991, Petitioner again failed to show that he only received partial credit for his residency at the University of Wisconsin. An affidavit dated November 21, 1991, was submitted by him regarding the residency program at Tulane University in which he was then participating. The affidavit failed to indicate that his participation in the residency program was conditioned upon his being in the impaired residents program and that the residency lasted 18 months, although he needed only six months to complete residency requirements for the dermatology board examination. Petitioner also failed to tell his supervising physician at Tulane, Dr. Shrum, of Petitioner's previous application for licensure in Florida or denial of that application for licensure, until after Shrum had been deposed regarding Petitioner's reputation for truthfulness.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1671 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Accepted. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Rejected, cumulative. Subordinate to HO findings. Accepted. Subordinate to HO findings. 8.-13. Accepted, but not verbatim. 14. Rejected, credibility. 15.-20. Rejected, unnecessary. 21.-25. Subordinate to HO findings. 26. Rejected, credibility. 27.-38. Rejected, credibility. 39.-45. Rejected, credibility. 46.-51. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 52. Rejected, relevancy. 53.-59. Rejected, credibility. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-13. Accepted, but not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Claire D. Dryfuss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven W. Huss, Esquire 1017-C Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issues presented for resolution in the two consolidated cases are whether Rule 10E-16.004 (27), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and whether Petitioner violated that rule on a specified occasion and is subject to fine or other penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Counselling and Education, Inc., doing business as Substance Abuse Family Education (SAFE), is a Florida corporation doing business in Orange County, Florida. SAFE provides substance abuse treatment to adolescents, mostly within the ages of twelve (12) to eighteen (18) years, with a few young adults who have turned nineteen while in treatment. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency with statutory authority to license and regulate certain treatment programs, including SAFE. At all times material to this proceeding HRS has licensed SAFE to provide substance abuse treatment services in a category titled "non-residential day and night treatment with a host home component." SAFE is not licensed as a secure facility or an addictions receiving facility. SAFE uses a program similar to the Alcoholic Anonymous twelve-step program as a tool for rehabilitating drug abusing juveniles. The program includes five phases through which the clients progress at varying rates. The "first phase" describes clients who are new to the program. As clients progress they enter into stages of increasing responsibility and freedom, until they are able to graduate and return to the everyday world. The program requires that the youths' parents or legal guardians admit them into treatment, even when children are referred by a court, by HRS or another source. The program requires rigorous participation by the parents and any siblings of the client. SAFE's contract for treatment includes a voluntary withdrawal provision which requires that the client request withdrawal through a "chain of command." The purpose of the deliberate, several-step process is to avoid withdrawal on an impulsive or transitory whim of the client. SAFE's rules, including the withdrawal provision, are explained to the client at the beginning of treatment and are reviewed daily with the clients. Clients who are just starting in the program, "first phasers," spend their days at the program and are placed at night with host parents, generally parents with experience in the program through their own children's participation. Staff and host parents are trained in crisis intervention and aggression control techniques through an HRS sanctioned training program. The techniques are progressive; they range from verbal intervention, to putting an arm around a client's shoulder, to physically forcing a client to the floor when the client has threatened to injure himself or others. SAFE contends that when a client attempts to leave treatment without going through the withdrawal process and without involving the parents or guardians in the process, the client is in serious danger of injuring himself or others immediately following departure from the program. SAFE uses physical intervention as a last resort to prevent clients from leaving the program without going through the "chain of command." At night, however, such intervention is used by host parents only to restrain dangerously aggressive behavior. SAFE instructs its host parents to not physically stop a child from leaving the host home. S. B. was a "first phaser" in SAFE's program in August 1993. During dinner one evening he had been staring or glaring at other clients and acting in a provoking and disruptive manner. After dinner, during an organized "rap" session, several clients were called on to confront S. B.'s behavior. He reacted by throwing a chair, across several rows of clients, at the client who was confronting him. Then he bolted, or attempted to bolt, from the room through the exit door. He was restrained by staff, was calmed, and he returned to his seat. Very shortly after he returned to his seat S. B. began staring or glaring at a client by the exit door. He jumped up and ran for the door. Again, he was physically restrained as he kicked, fought and yelled with anger. Staff person Pamela Mardis was one of the persons who participated in the restraint of S. B. on August 27, 1993. She considered the client to be in harm's way if he were permitted to leave the program without the assurance of proper safeguard for his well-being and safety. The January 12, 1994 amended notice of violation provided by HRS to Loretta Parrish, SAFE's owner and executive director, states, in pertinent part: As an amended complaint, the following incidents have been found to be in violation of 10E-16, F.A.C., requirements and are therefore subject to administrative fines: * * * August 27, 1993, 5:20 p.m., (report written August 27, 1993, 6:45 p.m.) in which a client was restrained in an effort to keep the client from leaving treatment, your agency will be fined $100 for non-compliance with 10E-16.004 (27)(a), F.A.C., requirements. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 6) HRS interprets its rule to prohibit restraint when the perceived danger to the client is in leaving and getting back on drugs. SAFE contends that to let one client leave voluntarily without going through the withdrawal procedures would mean that all of the clients, adolescents with poor decision-making skills, would walk out. There is a program in Palm Beach County, Florida, purportedly similar to SAFE, called Growing Together, Inc. On January 22, 1994, HRS and Growing Together, Inc., entered into a stipulated Final Declaratory Judgement in case no. CL93-9599-AO, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, which provided, in pertinent part: In the absence of a Court Order restricting the rights of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may act upon the request of a parent or legal guardian in accepting a minor client for substance abuse treatment regardless of the minor's objections. In the absence of a Court Order limiting the authority of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may reasonably restrict minor clients from terminating their participation in treatment contrary to the express direction of a parent or legal guardian. So long as the minor's rights to challenge the reasonableness of restrictions imposed at the express direction of a parent or legal guardian are protected -- that is, so long as the minor is informed of his or her rights and is provided a practical means by which to exercise those rights -- Growing Together, Inc., may continue to act in loco parent) in declining to release a minor from treatment where such release is against the will of a parent or legal guardian and no court order has been issued to direct otherwise. The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is hereby prohibited from taking any action contrary to the legal principles enunciated herein and is expressly prohibited from enforcing any interpretation of F.S. Section 397.601 which interpretation is contrary to the findings of this Judgement. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 7)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of being convicted or found guilty of a crime directly relating to the ability to practice pharmacy or the practice of pharmacy and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent received his license to practice pharmacy in Pennsylvania in 1962. He has been continuously licensed in Florida since December 31, 1973, through March 28, 1995, when his Florida license was suspended by emergency order of the Board of Pharmacy for the reasons set forth below. His Florida license number was PS0013841. Respondent has not previously been disciplined. Respondent has been employed for many years with a large pharmacy chain. Over the years, he was promoted into positions of increasing managerial responsibility. At one point, he was in charge of the operations of over 25 stores. Sometime prior to the incidents described below, Respondent's responsibilities were reduced, evidently due to corporate restructuring. At the same time, his wife of 15 years had an affair. Respondent suffered other stresses, including a homicide involving someone in a close relationship. Respondent was ill-equipped to deal with these setbacks. He was a hard- working, intense person with no emotional outlets. Two prior marriages had failed in part due to Respondent's lack of emotional insight. Respondent has long defined his role in relationships almost entirely in terms of his income- earning ability. Unable to deal with the stress, Respondent one night picked up a streetwalker in Bradenton and paid her to have sex with him. Respondent identified himself to her. A sexual relationship ensued. The woman had a child, and they lived in squalor. Respondent' initial sexual impulse toward the woman yielded to an impulse by Respondent to rescue the mother and child and serve as their savior or hero. The woman made increasing demands of Respondent. Several times, Respondent tried to end the relationship, but the woman threatened to disclose the relationship to Respondent's wife and employer. Respondent informed her that he had no more money to give her, but she continued her demands. Eventually, Respondent began to steal from the pharmacy store at which he worked. At first, he stole boxes of cigarettes. Later, he stole prescription drugs, including various Schedule III and IV controlled substances. The drugs contained codeine, and Respondent knew that the woman was selling the drugs on the street. At least one of the drugs was popular among drug abusers. About a year after meeting the woman, Respondent was caught in the act of stealing drugs in the early-morning hours at the store. He immediately made a full confession and was prosecuted by federal authorities for the controlled substances and by state authorities for the cigarettes and other miscellaneous merchandise. In Count I of the federal indictment, Respondent was charged with a violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 by knowingly and intentionally combining, conspiring, confederating, and agreeing with the woman and other persons to possess with intent to distribute acetaminophen with codeine and hydrocodone bitartrate, which are Schedule III controlled substances, and diazepam and alprazolam, which are Schedule IV controlled substances. A Schedule III controlled substance has a potential for abuse less than substances contained in Schedules I and II and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule III controlled substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. A Schedule IV controlled substance has a potential for abuse less than substances contained in Schedules I, II, and III and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule IV controlled substance may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence. Respondent pleaded guilty to Count I, which carried a maximum sentence of five years, fine of $250,000, and probation of three years, as well as restitution. The United States noted Respondent's acceptance of responsibility as a factor in mitigation. In the plea agreement, Respondent acknowledged that he began diverting controlled substances, once or twice a week, in September 1993. He had been caught and arrested in April 1994. On February 24, 1995, The United States District Court entered a judgment adjudicating Respondent guilty of Count I, placing him on six months' house arrest, placing him on five years' probation, and ordering restitution to the pharmacy chain of $10,574.84 for the diverted controlled substances. The judge stated her desire that Respondent continue to work as a pharmacist in order to pay for what he had stolen. Respondent's conviction directly relates to his ability to practice pharmacy or to the practice of pharmacy. At the time of Respondent's arrest, the pharmacy chain had fired him. Following the arrest but before the conviction, Respondent worked as a pharmacist for a corporation that supplies licensed replacement pharmacists on a short-term or indefinite basis. Primarily assigned to one client working with terminally ill patients, Respondent was valued as a pharmacist by the clients and his employer for the six months that he was so employed. Respondent's employment as a licensed pharmacist ended when the Board of Pharmacy issued an emergency order suspending his license on March 28, 1995. Respondent has since attempted to find employment, but he has found none. His ability to make restitution has been impeded, although he has made some payments. Respondent has received private psychological counselling since October 1994. The psychologist's diagnosis was that Respondent was suffering from an adjustment reaction with depressed mood. Helping Respondent to analyze his past mistakes and equip himself to deal with stress, the psychologist opines that it is very unlikely that Respondent would repeat this behavior and would not represent a threat to the public safety, health, or welfare if he were to continue practicing pharmacy. Respondent has participated in the PRN since August 1994. The impaired practitioner program typically serves licensees who are unable to practice due to mental illness, substance abuse, or physical disability. The program has determined that Respondent suffers from no chemical dependency, sexual disorder, or psychiatric illness. Rather, at the time of the criminal behaviors, Respondent was under extreme stress. However, the director of the program testified that Respondent is progressing very well, free of all illness, and gaining insight into his difficulties so that he can now express his feelings and handle his stresses. The director also opines that Respondent would not pose a threat to public safety, health, or welfare if he were to continue practicing pharmacy. Respondent has entered into a five-year contract with the PRN. The program monitors Respondent for a lifetime. If at anytime the director were to determine that Respondent is not progressing, such as by failing to renew a contract when asked to do so by the program, the director would file a complaint with Petitioner. It has been almost two years since Respondent began diverting controlled substances to the prostitute and almost a year and one-half since he was caught. This relatively recent behavior was not isolated, but lasted six months. Respondent was caught and did not turn himself in. Respondent's behavior harmed himself, his family and friends, and his employer, which spends considerable resources to develop public trust and employee morale, both of which were damaged by Respondent's actions. Respondent's behavior also harmed the woman, whose squalid circumstances were worsened by Respondent's "generosity." And his criminal behavior threatened the safety, health, and welfare of numerous persons who purchased the controlled substances that Respondent had stolen and given to the woman. On the other hand, Respondent poses no risk to the public. This is the opinion of two mental-health professionals working closely with Respondent. Also, Respondent did not steal controlled substances while working for six months as a temporary pharmacist and while under considerable stress from the criminal prosecutions. Although Respondent did not turn himself in, he did confess immediately and completely. As a practical matter, his ability to make restitution is dependent on his ability to practice pharmacy. Respondent and Petitioner each present numerous final orders of the Board of Pharmacy evidencing past penalties. Petitioner's final orders include Newman, Case No. 94- 20465 (five years' suspension and $2000 fine for state conviction for sale, purchase, or delivery of Schedule IV controlled substance; and Dunayer, Case No. 07300 (revocation for shortage of over 500,000 dosage units of many of the same codeine- containing drugs). Respondent's final orders include Feldman, Case No. 92- 07313 (three years' suspension, retroactive 14 months to when licensee was ordered by court to surrender license, three years' probation, and $3000 fine for federal conviction for distributing and dispensing outside course of professional practice of pharmacy--although some of the same codeine-containing drugs were involved, it appears that considerably greater quantities may have been involved); Swoy, Case No. 93-11716 (two years' suspension, of which 22 months were stayed and several years' probation for state conviction of delivery of one of the same codeine-containing drugs--quantity unclear); and Levine, Case No. 92-04729 (two years' suspension that was stayed and four years' probation for state conviction of impaired practitioner for theft from pharmacy of relatively small quantities of Schedule II controlled substances).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Pharmacy enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 465.016(1)(f), suspending his license for one year from the date of the emergency suspension, imposing a $3000 fine to be paid within 90 days after the end of the suspension, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of five years. ENTERED on August 8, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 8, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: John Taylor, Executive Director Board of Pharmacy 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Nancy M. Snurkowski Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Salvatore A. Carpino 8001 North Dale Mabry Hwy. Suite 301-A Tampa, FL 33614
The Issue Did Respondent, Tonya Shrader, R.N. (Ms. Shrader), violate section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2015),1/ by being unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or chemicals or any other type of material, or as a result of any mental or physical condition? If Ms. Shrader violated section 464.018(1)(j), what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 464, Florida Statutes, charge the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, with the licensing and regulation of nurses. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Ms. Shrader was a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida. She holds license RN 9180605. Ms. Shrader has a complicated history of psychiatric and medical problems that affect her ability to practice nursing with the level of skill and safety to patients required in the State of Florida. Ms. Shrader has suffered from depression since childhood. Ms. Shrader treated her depression with a variety of medications, including: Lithium, Depakote, Pamelor, Elavil, Topamax, Lamictal, and Prozac. In the past five years, Ms. Shrader has not received treatment for her depression. Ms. Shrader also suffers from anxiety. Ms. Shrader is not receiving treatment for her anxiety. In addition to depression and anxiety, Ms. Shrader suffers from chronic severe migraines. The cause has not been determined despite extensive neurological evaluations. Ms. Shrader has been prescribed Tramadol, Fiorcet, and Clonazepam to treat her migraines. At all times material to the Department's complaint, Ms. Shrader was prescribed Fiorcet for her migraine symptoms. Between March 24, 2012, and July 22, 2013, Ms. Shrader complained of multiple neurological symptoms, including double vision, balance and gait instability, and tingling and numbness in her hands. Ms. Shrader elected to undergo extensive neurological testing to rule out demyelinating disease, multiple sclerosis, and palsy. The tests provided no indication that Ms. Shrader's symptoms resulted from a neurological disorder. At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Shrader worked as a registered nurse in the Neurological and Psychiatric Unit at Gulf Coast Medical Center (Gulf Coast). On December 20, 2013, Ms. Shrader took an excessive dose of four Fiorcet pills. She told her family that she "plans to keep overdosing until she dies," and that she "predicts that [she] will be dead by the end of the year." Ms. Shrader's family contacted the Emergency Medical Services. Ms. Shrader was transported to Lehigh Regional Medical Center, where she was treated for an overdose. Ms. Shrader was involuntarily admitted to SalusCare, Inc. (SalusCare), for inpatient psychiatric observation and treatment. On December 20, 2013, the Crisis Stabilization Unit (CSU) at SalusCare conducted an in-patient psychiatric evaluation of Ms. Shrader. During the evaluation, Ms. Shrader denied past psychiatric treatments or psychiatric medication. Ms. Shrader also denied that her Fiorcet overdose was an attempted suicide. Her statements during her SalusCare evaluation contradict her medical charting and statements she has made, which indicate that she has an extensive history of psychiatric illnesses. SalusCare discharged Ms. Shrader on December 23, 2013. The director of nursing at Gulf Coast contacted the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) about Ms. Shrader. IPN is an impaired practitioner consultant to the Department's Board of Nursing. IPN works with nurses and monitors them for safety to practice issues. IPN contacted Ms. Shrader on January 2, 2014, to discuss her entering the program. Ms. Shrader denied that she was impaired or abused any substances. She admitted that she was depressed. But she said that she stopped her depression treatment approximately five years earlier. IPN asked Ms. Shrader to undergo an evaluation to determine her fitness to practice nursing. Ms. Shrader scheduled an evaluation with Theodore Treese, M.D., an expert in the psychiatric treatment, monitoring, and care of health care practitioners. He conducted the evaluation on January 28, 2014. Dr. Treese diagnosed Ms. Shrader with severe major depressive disorder; alcohol abuse; opioid abuse; sedative, anxiolytic abuse; relational problems, not otherwise specified; and rule-out polysubstance abuse. During the evaluation, Ms. Shrader attempted to hide her in-patient psychiatric treatment at SalusCare. Based on Ms. Shrader's diagnoses, Dr. Treese determined that Ms. Shrader was not capable of practicing as a registered nurse with reasonable skill and safety to patients. Dr. Treese recommended that Ms. Shrader seek treatment at a substance abuse treatment center at a level of at least partial hospitalization. Ms. Shrader did not agree with Dr. Treese's recommendation. IPN gave Ms. Shrader the opportunity to seek a second opinion from another IPN-approved evaluator. IPN informed Ms. Shrader that she needed to either obtain a second opinion or enter the recommended treatment before April 14, 2014; otherwise, IPN would close her intake case file. Ms. Shrader refused to obtain a second opinion or enter into the recommended treatment. IPN closed Ms. Shrader's file on April 14, 2014. On December 2, 2014, Mark Sylvester, M.D., a physician specializing in psychiatry and addiction medicine, evaluated Ms. Shrader pursuant to Department Order. Dr. Sylvester reviewed Ms. Shrader's medical records, the IPN intake case file, and the Department's investigative report. Dr. Sylvester also asked Ms. Shrader to undergo a urine and hair drug screen. Ms. Shrader did not participate in the screens. Dr. Sylvester diagnosed Ms. Shrader with recurrent major depressive disorder, opioid abuse, alcohol abuse, benzodiazepine abuse, nicotine dependence, factitious disorder versus malingering, rule-out hypochondriasis, and rule-out conversion disorder. During the evaluation, Ms. Shrader attempted to conceal her psychiatric history, substance abuse, and symptoms of depression. Ms. Shrader's unwillingness to be forthcoming during her evaluation demonstrated denial of her symptoms and presented a significant barrier to her treatment and recovery. Dr. Sylvester concluded that Ms. Shrader's poor judgment and decision-making detrimentally affected her ability to practice nursing. Specifically, Ms. Shrader's judgment in attempting to practice nursing while impaired, her lack of insight into her illnesses, her inability to follow treatment recommendations, and her disagreement with medical professionals showed poor judgment. Poor judgment can affect decision-making while practicing nursing, especially in a crisis situation. Dr. Sylvester concluded that Ms. Shrader was unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety by reason of her depression, use of alcohol, opioids, and benzodiazepines, lack of insight into her symptoms, and poor judgment. In order for Ms. Shrader to be able to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients, she must: undergo treatment at a residential treatment center; enter into an IPN monitoring agreement; and submit to a hair analysis drug screening test. These steps are essential to Ms. Shrader's recovery and to regaining the ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients. There is no evidence that Ms. Shrader has taken any of these steps. Ms. Shrader is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Nursing, enter a final order: finding that Respondent, Tonya L. Shrader, R.N., violated section 464.018(1)(j); requiring her to undergo an IPN evaluation; imposing a suspension of her license until such time as she undergoes an IPN evaluation; requiring compliance with IPN recommendations, if any; requiring the payment of an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00; and awarding costs for the investigation and prosecution of this case, as provided in section 456.072(4) to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2015.
