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FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLIER COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLIER SUPPORT PERSONNEL - NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION vs. COLLIER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 89-000320RX (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000320RX Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1989

The Issue Whether the Petitioners have standing to institute a rule challenge proceeding under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Whether a school board may delegate the authority to suspend an employee without pay to the superintendent in specific instances for a limited period of time.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, COLLIER COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter CCEA) is the instructional bargaining unit for teachers in the Collier County School District. The Petitioner, COLLIER SUPPORT PERSONNEL-NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter CSP-NEA) is the certified bargaining agent for the non-instructional employees of the Collier County School District. The above mentioned Petitioners are affiliates of the Petitioner, FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (hereinafter FTPNEA). As a result of collective bargaining agreements which allow the Petitioners CCEA and CSP-NEA to represent specific categories of employees of the school district, sixty five to seventy per cent of these employees are represented by these associations.. The Respondent SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, (hereinafter SCHOOL BOARD) has a rule that delegates the authority to suspend employees wholly or partially without pay to the superintendent. Under Rule No. R-18/81, such a suspension cannot exceed a period of three days, and the superintendent's authority is limited to five situations which have been specifically set forth in the body of the rule. A suspension is authorized only if the superintendent finds that the employee has: a) been absent without leave, b) been insubordinate, c) endangered the health or well-being of a fellow employee or of a student or students, d) willfully neglected duty, e) been intoxicated, consumed an alcoholic beverage, or used a controlled substance (unless prescribed by a physician,) while working. The rule cites Sections 230.23 and 230.33, Florida Statutes, as the authority for the implementation of this delegation process. The rule was adopted can December 17, 1981. Rule No. R-18/81 requires that any employee suspended by the superintendent under this rule be given all due process rights under the Florida Statutes, including those authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act. Pursuant to Rule No. R-18/81, the superintendent has suspended at least two employees in 1988. One of these employees is Mr. Robert Koy, who is represented by the Petitioner, CSP-NEA, in a proceeding currently before the Division of Administrative Hearings in which the employee's substantial interests are being determined. The process and procedures utilized by the Respondent SCHOOL BOARD in its suspension of employees without pay falls within the general scope of interests and activities of all of the Petitioners in this case. A substantial number of the members of the Petitioners CCEA and CSP- NEA are substantially affected by the challenged rule as it involves the disciplinary procedures used by the Respondent SCHOOL BOARD to manage its employees. Such procedures are included in the agreement between the Collier County Public Schools and the Petitioner CSP-NEA, which is in effect from October 1, 1987 through June 30, 1990. This agreement has been admitted into evidence in this proceeding. The relief sought by all of the Petitioners in this proceeding is that Rule No. R-18/81 be declared invalid. This relief is an appropriate remedy for each of the Petitioners to seek on behalf of its members in a rule challenge proceeding.

Florida Laws (4) 120.52120.54120.56120.68
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RICHARD CORCORAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ACADEMY OF EDUCATION SCHOOL (6979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 31, 2020 Number: 20-003936SP Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024

The Issue Whether grounds exist to deny the application of Respondent, Academy of Education School (6979), to participate in the Florida state scholarship programs under chapter 1002, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Commissioner is the chief educational officer for the State of Florida. The Commissioner is responsible for assisting the State Board of Education in enforcing compliance with the mission and goals of the K-20 education system. See § 1001.10(1), Fla. Stat. The Academy is a private school formed in Orlando, Florida. The Academy registered as a private school with the Florida Department of Education (the “Department”) in March 2020. On March 25, 2020, the Academy submitted a request to participate in the state educational scholarship programs established under chapter 1002. These programs include the John M. McKay Scholarship for Students with Disabilities Program, the Florida Tax Credits Scholarship Program, the Gardiner Scholarship Program, the Hope Scholarship Program, the Reading 3 The Academy’s motion for extension was filed after the expiration of the ten-day deadline it sought to extend, which is contrary to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.204(4). However, the Commissioner did not oppose the undersigned’s consideration of Academy’s Proposed Recommended Order. Scholarship Program, and the Family Empowerment Scholarship Program (collectively referred to as the “Scholarship Programs”).4 The Scholarship Programs distribute state funds to pay tuition for students who come from low-income families or have disabilities. The scholarships help children attend their (private) school of choice. For a school to be eligible to receive money from one or more of the Scholarship Programs, it must comply with the requirements set forth in section 1002.421. The Commissioner's is the state government entity charged with administering and overseeing the Scholarship Programs. Pertinent to this matter, section 1002.421(3) authorizes the Commissioner to deny a private school’s eligibility to participate in the Scholarship Programs if it is determined that the owner or operator of the school has exhibited a previous pattern of failure to comply with section 1002.421. After reviewing the Academy’s application, on May 21, 2020, the Commissioner issued a letter denying the Academy’s request. The Commissioner explained that its decision was based on the (alleged) inappropriate relationship between the Academy and another private school named Agape Christian Academy (“Agape”). Agape was the subject of prior discipline from the Commissioner regarding its improper activity involving the Scholarship Programs. As background information, Agape was founded as a private school in 2002, and remained operational until 2018. Agape was housed in a building located at 2425 N. Hiawassee Road, Orlando, Florida. From 2015 through 2018, Ingrid Bishop served as president of Agape’s corporate entity. Also during this time, Cassandra Cook was an employee of Agape, and served on Agape’s board of directors. After its formation, Agape requested, and was granted, eligibility to participate in the Scholarship Programs. 4 See §§ 1002.385, 1002.39, 1002.394, 1002.395, 1002.40, and 1002.411, Fla. Stat. In March 2016, however, the Commissioner initiated an action to revoke Agape’s eligibility. The revocation was based on the Commissioner’s findings that Agape was operating from an unapproved location and had filed a fraudulent annual fire inspection report with the Department. Thereafter, in August 2016, Agape and the Commissioner entered into a Settlement Agreement wherein the Commissioner allowed Agape to remain eligible for the Scholarship Programs on a probationary status, if Agape agreed to reimburse the Commissioner for past scholarship funds received while not in compliance with state law. Soon thereafter, however, Agape breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Consequently, on May 11, 2018, the Department issued a Final Order terminating Agape’s authority to participate in the Scholarship Programs. The Commissioner further ordered that: Agape’s … officers, directors, principal, or controlling persons [are] ineligible to participate in the Gardiner, McKay or Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Programs for a period of ten years from the date of the Final Order. Regarding the action against the Academy, as articulated in its May 21, 2020, letter, the Commissioner bases its decision to deny the Academy’s application on the following reasons: The Academy’s relationship with Cassandra Cook: Ms. Cook was employed as an officer, director, principal, or controlling person of Agape. Pursuant to the Agape Final Order, Ms. Cook is ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs for ten years. The Commissioner asserts that the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Academy indicate that the Academy is “operating as a proxy or surrogate for Agape and/or Cassandra Cook.” Consequently, the Academy’s association with Ms. Cook renders the Academy ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs. The Academy’s relationship with Ingrid Bishop: Ingrid Bishop was employed as an officer, director, principal, or controlling person of Agape. Pursuant to the Agape Final Order, Ingrid Bishop is ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs for ten years. The Commisioner asserts that the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Academy indicate that the Academy is “operating as a proxy or surrogate for Agape and/or … Ingrid Bishop.” Consequently, the Academy’s association with Ingrid Bishop renders the Academy ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs. The relationship between Academy officers or employees and Ingrid Bishop: The Academy intends to employ Blaire Bishop, Braelyn Bishop, and Brooke Bishop in some capacity. All three women are related to Ingrid Bishop (her daughters). The Commissioner's position is that the relationship between these Academy personnel and Ingrid Bishop renders the Academy ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs. The Academy’s relationship with Northwestern Learning Center, Inc. (“Northwestern”): In addition to Agape, the Commissioner previously denied Northwestern’s eligibility to participate in the state scholarship programs. Northwestern’s denial was based on its relationship with Ms. Cook. The Academy intends to set up its school on property owned by Northwestern. The business relationship between the Academy and Northwestern (and Ms. Cook) renders the Academy ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs. In short, the Commissioner believes that the same parties who owned and operated Agape (Ingrid Bishop and Ms. Cook) are behind the formation of the Academy. This time, however, Ingrid Bishop’s children (Blaire, Braelyn, and Brooke Bishop) are the named officers, directors, principals, or controlling persons. The Commissioner alleges that Blaire Bishop is not the legitimate owner/operator of the Academy, and the Academy’s “true” founders (Ingrid Bishop and Ms. Cook) are fraudulently conducting a shell game in “an effort to circumvent the Department’s Final Order.” To support its position, the Commissioner first called Phylea Daugherty to testify regarding the Commissioner’s investigation into the connection between Agape and the Academy. As a “site visit specialist” for the Department’s Office of Independent Education and Parental Choice (“IEPC”), Ms. Daugherty is tasked with visiting private schools that apply to participate in the Scholarship Programs. She explained that a school must pass her inspection prior to becoming eligible to receive scholarship funds for its students. Ms. Daugherty expressed that the Academy’s application raised concerns when her office noticed that the Academy’s facilities were located close by a school (Agape) whose eligibility to receive scholarship funds had been revoked. Her office also noted that the last name of the person who signed the Academy’s application (“Bishop”) matched the name of an individual who the Commissioner had deemed ineligible to participate in the Scholarship Programs. That being said, Ms. Daugherty divulged that, aside from the possible issues regarding the relationship between the Academy and Agape (the schools’ locations and biologically related officers or employees), the Academy’s application was complete. Therefore, nothing else on the face of the application explicitly indicated that the Commissioner should deny it. Whitney Blake, a Compliance Specialist for IEPC, also testified regarding the Commissioner’s decision to deny the Academy’s application. As part of her responsibilities, Ms. Blake reviews applications from Florida private schools that request to take part in the Scholarship Programs. Echoing Ms. Daugherty’s testimony, Ms. Blake expressed that the Academy’s application raised two concerns: 1) the Academy’s intended location suggested a close association with a sanctioned entity (Agape), and 2) the fact that the Academy’s officers and employees might be related to the officers or employees of another school (Agape) whose authority to participate in the Scholarship Programs was revoked. Ms. Blake explained that the Commissioner’s Final Order from May 11, 2018, banned Ingrid Bishop and Ms. Cook from participating in the Scholarship Programs for a period of ten years. Consequently, neither Ingrid Bishop nor Ms. Cook may personally serve as officers, directors, principals, or controlling parties at any other private school that is authorized to accept scholarship funds. In June 2018, however, Ms. Cook5 became involved in a new school that registered with the Department called Orlando Christian Academy (“Orlando Christian”). Soon thereafter, Orlando Christian applied to participate in the Scholarship Programs. In November 2019, after discovering its association with Ms. Cook, the Commissioner denied Orlando Christian’s application. Moreover, Ms. Blake testified that Orlando Christian’s listed address, 2425B N. Hiawassee Drive, Orlando, Florida, is situated very near the Academy’s intended address of 2332 N. Hiawassee Drive, Orlando, Florida. This address is also close to Agape’s former location at 2425 N. Hiawassee Road, Orlando, Florida. In addition, based on Orange County, Florida, property records, the current owner of 2332 N. Hiawassee Drive is Northwestern. Ms. Cook served on Northwestern’s board of directors from 2017 through 2019. (Ms. Cook is not listed as an officer or director on Northwestern’s annual corporate report for 2020.) Northwestern acquired the property in 2012 from Agape via a quitclaim deed executed by Ingrid Bishop. Ms. Blake expressed that the facts and circumstances surrounding the Academy’s formation insinuate a similar attempt by Ms. Cook to start another private school to unlawfully take advantage of the state scholarship funds. Ms. Blake testified that based on all the circumstantial evidence connecting the Academy to Agape, Northwestern, Ms. Cook, and Ingrid 5 Ms. Cook has used several names over the past twenty years including Cassandra Cook Wood, C. D. Wood, and Sandra Wood. When Orlando Christian applied for scholarship eligibility in 2019, Ms. Cook identified herself as "Sandra Wood." Bishop, the Commissioner had serious cause for concern that Ms. Cook and/or Ingrid Bishop were also involved in the administration, management, and operation of the Academy. According to Ms. Blake, such “undue participation” by prohibited persons in the Academy’s attempt to obtain scholarship funds is grounds to deny the Academy’s application. Despite these facts, Ms. Blake acknowledged that no former officer, director, principal, or controlling party from Agape is included or referenced in any corporate document related to the Academy’s formation or application. In particular, neither Ingrid Bishop nor Ms. Cook are listed on any Academy corporate records. Further, Ms. Blake repeated Ms. Daugherty’s statement that, other than the Academy’s proposed location and the fact that Ingrid Bishop is related to the Academy’s officers and employees, the Academy’s application does not contain information that would cause the Commissioner to automatically deny it. At the final hearing, the Academy argued that the Commissioner’s decision to deny its application is based on false and unsupported assumptions regarding the relationship between the Academy’s founders and officers (Blaire, Braelyn, and Brooke Bishop) and Agape’s founders and officers (Ingrid Bishop and Ms. Cook). The Academy charges that the Commissioner unfairly ties Ms. Bishop to the sins of her mother, with no proof that Ingrid Bishop is connected to the Academy in any way. Blaire Bishop testified on behalf of the Academy. Ms. Bishop founded the Academy and serves as president of its board of directors. She also intends to fill the role of the Academy’s first principal. Ms. Bishop described herself as a product of her community. She attended Agape from kindergarten through high school. Upon graduation from college at Florida A&M University (“FAMU”) in 2018, she returned to Orlando and is pursuing a master’s degree in educational leadership from the University of Central Florida. Ms. Bishop expressed that she now finds herself in a position to give back to the community in which she grew up. She has dreamed of opening a school for some time. Ms. Bishop voiced that she created the Academy as a way to provide educational opportunities for underprivileged children who live in northwest Orlando. Ms. Bishop explained that, currently, the Academy is still in the development and planning stage. She envisions opening her school with about 100 students. She would like to offer classes from kindergarten through high school. At this time, however, she has not hired any employees. Neither has she enrolled any students. She anticipates, however, that her two sisters, Braelyn and Brooke Bishop, who have agreed to serve as officers of the Academy’s corporate entity, will also have a role with the school. Ms. Bishop conveyed that, from an administrative standpoint, she is ready to open the Academy. However, to effectively operate as a private institution, her school will be dependent upon money from the Scholarship Programs. The vast majority of the low-income children she hopes to attract cannot afford private school tuition. Consequently, scholarship money is essential to help fund their enrollment. Ms. Bishop estimates that each student who qualifies for a scholarship will receive approximately $4,500 - $5,000 a year, which will be forwarded to the Academy if its application is approved. Ms. Bishop disclosed that she cannot feasibly run her school unless the Commissioner allows it to participate in the Scholarship Programs. Ms. Bishop expounded that, with the financial assistance awarded through the Scholarship Programs, the Academy will offer free, private school education to low-income students living nearby. Consequently, the Commissioner’s decision to disallow the Academy from accepting scholarship funds only serves to negatively impact needy children in the Orlando area. Ms. Bishop urges that she independently founded the Academy, and her school has no connection with the now-defunct Agape or any of its previous officers, directors, or employees. Ms. Bishop insists that the Academy is not a strawman or surrogate for Agape. She has not allowed anyone associated with Agape to help her incorporate or organize her school. Specifically, Ms. Bishop testified that neither her mother nor Ms. Cook have played any role in creating the Academy. They have not provided any financial assistance to the Academy. Neither will they receive any benefits or compensation from Academy income or resources. In addition, Ms. Bishop asserted that she was not involved in, nor did she have any connection with, the administration, creation, or management of Agape. Ms. Bishop further testified that she was not personally bound by, named, identified, or referenced in the Settlement Agreement between Agape and the Commissioner. Accordingly, she argues it is fundamentally unfair to deny the Academy the ability to participate in the Scholarship Programs based on the breach of an agreement to which she was not a party. Regarding the Academy’s location, Ms. Bishop explained that she is interested in leasing the building located at 2332 N. Hiawassee Drive, which is currently owned by Northwestern. Ms. Bishop explained that the property would provide a great location for the Academy. It is located within her community and was previously used as a school. Further, while the building the Academy may use is situated across the street from the former Agape site (2425 N. Hiawassee Drive), Ms. Bishop proclaimed that, other than being located in close proximity with each other, there is no connection between the two schools. Further, while setting up in the 2332 N. Hiawassee Drive location will require her to rent property from Northwestern, no one associated with Northwestern helped her create the Academy. Neither does she plan on conferring with or employing anyone who currently works for Northwestern, or who previously worked for Agape. Ms. Bishop’s testimony describing the relationship between the Academy and Agape, Northwestern, Ingrid Bishop, and Ms. Cook was credible and is credited. Ms. Bishop spoke with conviction, and no documents or other witness testimony refute her representation that she was not involved in the administration or management of Agape. Neither does the competent, substantial evidence prove that any individual associated with Agape or Northwestern will be involved in the administration or management of the Academy. Ingrid Bishop testified at the final hearing to support the Academy’s application. Ingrid Bishop is Ms. Bishop’s mother. Ingrid Bishop and her husband, Richard (Ms. Bishop’s father), founded Agape. Ingrid and Richard Bishop also lead the Agape Assembly Baptist Church (“Agape Church”). Agape Church is located at 2425 N. Hiawassee Drive, which was the same location as the Agape school. Ingrid Bishop expressed that Agape served as an outreach ministry for the Agape Church. According to Ingrid Bishop, Agape was founded in 2002 as an independent non-profit corporation. The school’s initial board members included Ingrid Bishop, Richard Bishop, and Cassandra Cook. These three individuals remained Agape’s corporate officers through the school’s dissolution in 2018, and are subject to the Commissioner’s 2018 Final Order. Mirroring her daughter’s intentions for the Academy, Ingrid Bishop explained that Agape’s goal was to provide a private school option for low- income children and children with disabilities from the local community. Ingrid Bishop relayed that 98 percent of the students who matriculated at Agape were from underprivileged families. Based on that population, Agape’s ability to operate relied heavily on the funds its students received through the Scholarship Programs. Ingrid Bishop further stated that Agape elected not to charge tuition to any student. Instead, the school relied on the scholarship funds as its sole source of revenue. At its peak, Agape averaged about 300 students on scholarships during a school year. Ingrid Bishop freely recounted that Agape ran into trouble with the Commissioner in 2016 based on a fire inspection report that one of her employees had allegedly forged. Agape and the Commissioner subsequently entered into the Settlement Agreement. Ingrid Bishop signed the Settlement Agreement on behalf of Agape. Regarding her daughter’s involvement in Agape, Ingrid Bishop credibly testified that Ms. Bishop never served as an employee, administrator, agent, or director of Agape. Ms. Bishop’s only interaction with Agape was when she attended the school as a student from kindergarten through high school. Ingrid Bishop further asserted that her daughter had no involvement in the underlying issues between Agape and the Commissioner. She conveyed that Ms. Bishop graduated from Agape high school in 2014 and was a student at FAMU in Tallahassee when the Commissioner began its investigation into Agape. Neither did Ms. Bishop play any part in Agape’s decision to settle with the Commissioner or negotiating the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Ingrid Bishop acknowledged that Agape has not been an active school since 2018. After the Commissioner revoked Agape’s authority to receive funds from the Scholarship Programs in 2017, Agape could only effectively operate for one more year. Agape’s corporate entity was administratively dissolved in September 2018. Finally, Ingrid Bishop convincingly represented that Ms. Bishop is acting completely independently in creating the Academy, as well as drafting the Academy’s application to participate in the Scholarship Programs. Ingrid Bishop asserted that she has not been included in her daughter’s designs and plans for the Academy. She denied that she will work for the Academy in any capacity. Neither will she have any financial interest in the school. Similarly, Ingrid Bishop commented that the location the Academy selected to use, 2332 N. Hiawassee Road, is not the same location as Agape. It is across the street. Ingrid Bishop disclosed that Agape, at one point, leased this site to use as a separate facility for its high school, but it currently does not own or use this property. As a final declaration, Ingrid Bishop readily recognized that her involvement in the Academy’s affairs would jeopardize her daughter’s efforts to run her own school. Therefore, she has deliberately avoided any participation in the Academy’s formation. Ingrid Bishop expressed that she understands that she must keep Agape’s past dispute with the Commissioner completely separate from her daughter’s application for scholarship funds. Ms. Cook also testified to support Ms. Bishop’s representation that the Academy is not connected to either Agape or herself. Ms. Cook declared that she has no involvement or relationship with the Academy. She was not consulted when Ms. Bishop formed the school. Neither has Ms. Bishop asked Ms. Cook to work there. Regarding her relationship with Ms. Bishop, Ms. Cook relayed that she has known Ms. Bishop since she was a student at Agape. Addressing her time with Agape, Ms. Cook admitted that she worked for the school in a number of roles between 2003 and 2018. Her responsibilities included administrator and dean of students. However, she declared that Ms. Bishop was not involved in the administration or management of Agape. Ms. Cook never saw Ms. Bishop in the Agape administrative offices when she was in school there. Regarding Orlando Christian, Ms. Cook stated that this school was to be located at 2425B N. Hiawassee Road in a building just next to the Agape Church. However, neither Orlando Christian nor the Agape school occupied the same proposed site as the Academy (2332 N. Hiawassee Road). Finally, Ms. Cook confirmed that Northwestern owns the property located at 2332 N. Hiawassee Drive, where the Academy may be located. However, Ms. Cook offered that she no longer serves on Northwestern’s board of directors. She represented that in 2019, she was dismissed from the board due to lack of participation. During the final hearing, Ms. Cook’s testimony came across as self- serving and lacking in details. However, no evidence or testimony directly refutes her representation that she is not involved, and will not be involved, in the Academy’s formation, administration, management, or operation. Accordingly, Ms. Cook’s testimony is credited to the extent that it was corroborated by Ms. Bishop and Ingrid Bishop. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the greater weight of the facts do not establish that the Academy is inappropriately associated with Agape, Ingrid Bishop, Ms. Cook, or Northwestern, or that the Academy is “operating as a proxy or surrogate for Agape and/or Cassandra Cook and/or Ingrid Bishop.” Neither do the facts in the record show that the Academy is attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the Commissioner in order to qualify for scholarship eligibility by concealing or misrepresenting its relationship with Agape, Ingrid Bishop, Ms. Cook, or Northwestern. Consequently, the Academy demonstrated that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision to deny the Academy’s application based on the reasons cited in the Commissioner’s letter, dated May 21, 2020. Accordingly, the Commissioner should continue to process the Academy’s application under section 1002.421, and, if appropriate, grant the Academy eligibility to participate in the Scholarship Programs.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner withdraw its letter, dated May 21, 2020, indicating its intent to deny the Academy’s application and continue to review the Academy’s eligibility to participate in the Scholarship Programs under chapter 1002. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2020. 6 This Recommended Order should not be interpreted to mean that the Commissioner should automatically approve the Academy’s application. As the Commissioner emphasized in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Academy must still complete several additional steps in order to gain eligibility to participate in the Scholarship Programs under chapter 1002. The focus of this administrative proceeding is restricted to the allegations and issues specifically raised in the Commissioner’s letter, dated May 21, 2020, which notified the Academy of the Commissioner’s intended action to deny the application. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Leroy Ehrhardt, Esquire Department of Education Suite 1544 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) James Sweeting, III, Esquire James Sweeting, III, LLC Post Office Box 215 Churchville, Maryland 21028 (eServed) Jason Douglas Borntreger, Esquire Department of Education Suite 1544 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 (eServed) Chris Emerson, Agency Clerk Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1520 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)

Florida Laws (5) 1001.101002.3851002.421120.569120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.204 DOAH Case (1) 20-3936SP
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BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs AVA E. WILLIAMS, 19-003379TTS (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 20, 2019 Number: 19-003379TTS Latest Update: Jan. 14, 2020

The Issue The issue is whether, as the district school board alleges, an elementary school teacher choked one of her students in class——an allegation which, if proved, would give the district just cause to dismiss the teacher from her position.

Findings Of Fact The Broward County School Board ("School Board" or the "district"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Broward County Public School System. At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent Ava E. Williams ("Williams"), who holds an active Florida Educator Certificate, was employed as a third-grade teacher at Watkins Elementary School. She had taught at that school for the preceding 13 years and been an employee of the district since 1998. During the 2018-2019 school year, one of the students in Williams's class was a boy named P.P. After school on Friday, September 14, 2018, P.P. told his mother that, earlier during the day, Williams had choked him in class. P.P.'s mother and sister accompanied P.P. to school later that day, or the following Monday, to report this allegation to Assistant Principal Shereen Reynolds. P.P. claims that when he returned to class after the meeting with Ms. Reynolds, Williams called P.P. a "lying, fat pig" for turning her in. The undersigned rejects this allegation, which is uncorroborated, as not credible. Sometime later, on September 17, 2018, Ms. Reynolds told Williams about P.P.'s allegation that she (Williams) had choked P.P. the Friday before. The next day, Tuesday, Williams encountered her colleague, Shawony Russell, in the hallway. Williams——who was acquainted with, but not close to, Ms. Russell——knew that Ms. Russell had been P.P.'s teacher the previous school year, when P.P. was in the second grade. There is no dispute that Williams spoke briefly to Ms. Russell at this time. Ms. Russell asserts, however, that Williams admitted to her that she had choked P.P., whereas Williams adamantly denies having made such a confession. For reasons that will be discussed, the undersigned deems Williams's account of this conversation to be the more credible and thus rejects Ms. Russell's testimony to the contrary. After conducting an investigation, the district determined that Williams was guilty of having choked P.P. while screaming at him, "Do you hear me?"——or words to that effect. On this basis, the district seeks to terminate Williams's employment. Although the district advances several theories in support of its intended decision, Williams concedes that the allegations against her, if proved, would afford the district just cause for dismissal. Her defense is that the allegations are untrue. At hearing, only two witnesses to the alleged incident testified, namely Williams and P.P. Their respective accounts differ in material respects. Williams was by far the more credible witness, and her testimony is accepted over P.P.'s. Although, as the fact-finder, the undersigned is not obligated to explain why he has found one witness to be more believable than another, in this instance a few comments are in order, given that the School Board largely grounded its case on P.P.'s testimony. To begin——and this is undisputed——P.P. is a liar. That is a harsh word, "liar," one that the undersigned does not use lightly, especially with reference to a child witness. But here it is an accurate description. P.P. admitted under oath that he tells lies quite often, including to teachers. He has lied to get other students in trouble, among other things. This, alone, was enough to make the undersigned hesitate to take P.P.'s word about a charge that, if true, would cost a person her job——and might even end that person's professional career. Beyond that, P.P.'s description of the incident makes little sense and is difficult to imagine. P.P. claims that on the morning in question, Williams lined up the students in her class to walk with them to the cafeteria for lunch, except for P.P., who stayed behind because Williams, who thought P.P. had thrown a chair, was walking quickly towards him, after telling the other students to go. According to P.P., after everyone else had left, Williams stood in front of him and touched his throat with her open hand for one second, never squeezing, pushing, or making any movement at all——nor causing any pain—— before withdrawing. The undersigned does not believe that this is likely what happened. Williams's account, in contrast, is easy both to follow and to picture occurring. She recalls telling the children to clean up for lunch that morning, which all of them proceeded to do, except for P.P., who just sat at his desk and refused to move. Another student said something to P.P. that made P.P. mad, and he pushed a chair at the student. At this, Williams walked over to P.P. and asked him to get in line for lunch, but P.P. would not budge. Without touching P.P., Williams raised her voice and said to him loudly, "Do you hear me now?" She instructed the other students to leave for lunch and began walking towards the door herself. P.P. followed Williams and then exited the classroom ahead of his teacher, who had waited at the door for him. At this point, the incident was over. The undersigned credits Williams's testimony and finds that the incident likely took place as described in this paragraph. Apart from the eyewitness testimony, the only other significant evidence that the district offered was Williams's alleged admission. As mentioned above, P.P.'s second-grade teacher, Ms. Russell, testified that, during a conversation in the hallway on September 18, 2019, Williams confided to Ms. Russell that she had "choked" P.P. The undersigned does not believe that Ms. Russell's testimony is historically accurate in this regard. Credibility determinations such as this are the undersigned's prerogative to make without elaboration, but, as promised, a brief explanation will be given. There are three main reasons why the undersigned has found it unlikely that Williams said to Ms. Russell, "I choked him." First, Ms. Russell was not a confidant of Williams. Ms. Russell acknowledged this, saying she was surprised that Williams would tell her such a thing and agreeing that it "[m]ade no sense." Indeed, it makes so little sense that Ms. Russell's description of the confession strains credulity. Why on earth would Williams tell someone whom she had no particular reason to trust that she had choked a student——a gratuitous confession that could have ruinous consequences, including potentially a criminal prosecution? Stranger things happen, of course, but the odds are against an unsolicited, unexpected admission of this nature. Second, Ms. Russell claims that Williams said she had "choked" P.P. This is the word P.P. used in making his allegation against Williams, and it is the term that the district has used in charging and prosecuting Williams. Yet, if P.P.'s testimony were true (which it probably isn't), the contact that Williams made with P.P.'s throat could not reasonably be described as "choking." The term "choke" in this context obviously denotes the application of pressure around the victim's neck or throat to impede breathing and blood flow. What P.P. described, in contrast, was a brief (one second), painless touch without any constriction about his neck whatsoever. Thus, if Williams had touched P.P. (she probably didn't), and if, further, she had confessed as much to Ms. Russell (which is unlikely), it is highly improbable that Williams would have admitted doing something far worse than that which P.P. claims happened——which was, again, that Williams merely brushed the boy's neck with the palm of her hand.1/ Finally, Ms. Russell did not act like Williams had admitted having attacked a student. Imagine that you are an elementary school teacher and that one day, out of the blue, a colleague of yours, someone whom you do not know well, tells you that she has choked a third-grade student. Wouldn't you want to know what had happened? Ms. Russell didn't. More important, wouldn't you feel the need to report this potential child abuse to appropriate authorities for investigation, right away? Ms. Russell didn't. Ms. Russell did not take any immediate action because "[w]e were heading out to recess. I like to go outside and get my sun and just relax." Therefore, Ms. Russell testified, "I didn't call anyone. I didn't do anything. I was going back outside to relax." In fact, Ms. Russell never reported Williams's alleged admission to the school administration or the Department of Children and Families, even though she knew that, as a teacher, she had a legal duty to report child abuse upon becoming aware of reasonable cause to suspect that such has occurred. See § 39.201, Fla. Stat. Promptly going outside to relax in the sun and forget the matter is not the response one reasonably would expect from a teacher whose co-worker has just confessed to choking a student. Williams's description of the hallway encounter between her and Ms. Russell rings true. As stated, Williams knew that Ms. Russell had taught P.P., and she wanted to find out what Ms. Russell's experience with P.P. had been like. Seeing Ms. Russell in the hallway, Williams took the opportunity to inquire. There is no dispute that Ms. Russell told Williams that P.P. performed below grade level academically, had behavioral issues, and lied a lot.2/ Williams recalls telling Ms. Russell that, indeed, P.P. is a liar "because he said I choked him." The undersigned finds that the alleged "admission" is nothing but a truncated version of this statement, in which Williams described P.P.'s charge, not her own conduct. Determinations of Ultimate Fact The district has failed to prove its allegations against Williams by a preponderance of the evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Broward County School Board enter a final order exonerating Ava E. Williams of all charges brought against her in this proceeding, reinstating Williams to her pre-dismissal position, and awarding Williams back salary as required under section 1012.33(6)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2020.

Florida Laws (5) 1012.33120.569120.57120.6839.201 DOAH Case (1) 19-3379TTS
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BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs RACHEL VON HAGEN, 11-000567TTS (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Feb. 03, 2011 Number: 11-000567TTS Latest Update: Sep. 13, 2011

Conclusions This cause coming on to be heard before THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, at its meeting conducted on August 16, 2011, to consider the Recommended Order, entered on June 21, 2011 by the Honorable Claude B. Arrington, Administrative Law Judge of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, having considered the Recommended Order, to which neither party filed exceptions, and being fully advised in the Premises: IT IS THEREUPON ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, that: 1. The Recommended Order is adopted in its entirety and incorporated herein by reference; and 2. RACHEL VON HAGEN’S professional service contract with The School Board of Broward County, Florida is terminated. Filed September 13, 2011 8:54 AM Division of Administrative Hearings Broward County School Board vs. Rachel Von Hagen DOAH Case Number: 11-0567 SBBC AGENDA 081611H02-Final Order aa AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this \ ( aay of hag » 2011. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD Za Aa By: ia iW. Williams, Chair COPIES FURNISHED: CHARLES T. WHITELOCK, ESQ. Charles T. Whitelock, P.A. 300 Southeast 13" Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 MARK HERDMAN, ESQ. Herdman and Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater Florida 33761 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Broward County Schoo! Board vs. Rachel von Hagen DOAH Case Number: 11-0567 SBBC AGENDA 081611H02-Final Order APPEAL OF FINAL ORDER Pursuant to Section 120.68, Fla. Sta., a party to this proceeding may seek judicial review of this Final Order in the appropriate district court of appeal by filing a notice of appeal with Noemi Gutierrez, Agency Clerk, Official School Board Records, The School Board of Broward County, Florida, 600 Southeast Third Avenue — 2"! Floor, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this Final Order. A copy of the notice and a copy of this Final Order, together with the appropriate filing fee, must also be filed with the Clerk, Fourth District Court of Appeal, 1525 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-2399. If you fail to file your notice of appeal within the time prescribed by laws and the rules of court, you will lose your right to appeal this Final Order. fritz/allwork/doah/employment/vonhagen Rachel final order-final

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POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs BRENDA BOHLINGER, 16-002612TTS (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida May 13, 2016 Number: 16-002612TTS Latest Update: Dec. 19, 2017

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Brenda Bohlinger’s conduct constitutes just cause for her dismissal from employment with Petitioner Polk County School Board (School Board).

Findings Of Fact The School Board is duly constituted and charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within Polk County, Florida, pursuant to article IX, section 4, subsection (b) of the Florida Constitution and section 1001.32, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the School Board has the authority to discipline employees. § 1012.22(1)(f), Fla. Stat. Ms. Bohlinger was employed by the School Board as a teacher pursuant to a professional services contract. She has been employed with the School Board for approximately 13 years. During the 2015-2016 school year, Ms. Bohlinger was an itinerant physical education (PE) teacher for the Reaching Every Adolescent Learner Academy (the REAL Academy). Ms. Bohlinger began her responsibilities as the itinerant PE teacher on October 16, 2015, and was relieved of her duties on March 7, 2016. The REAL Academy is a dropout prevention program created for students in fourth through 12th grades who are two or more years behind academically. The REAL Academy was started in and for the 2015-2016 school year and uses a modified educational curriculum which allows students to catch up academically and graduate on time. There are four separate locations in Polk County that house components of the REAL Academy: Auburndale High School (Auburndale), which is located in Auburndale, Florida; the Dwight Smith Center (Smith Center), which is located in Lakeland; the Gause Academy, which is located in Lakeland; and Boone Middle School (Boone), which is located in Haines City. Ms. Bohlinger’s school duty day began at Auburndale where she would teach two separate PE classes. Her first class started at 7:55 a.m. and her second class ended at 9:42 a.m. Ms. Bohlinger then left Auburndale and drove to the Smith Center where she taught two more PE classes. It took approximately 28 to 33 minutes to travel from Auburndale to the Smith Center. Ms. Bohlinger’s first class at the Smith Center started at 10:20 a.m. and her second class ended at 12:37 p.m. After the second class ended at the Smith Center, Ms. Bohlinger would drive to Boone where she taught two more PE classes. Ms. Bohlinger’s first class at Boone started at 1:53 p.m. and her last class of the day ended at 3:40 p.m. When Ms. Bohlinger had the Boone students at PE class, the Boone teachers would have their allocated planning period. In the event Ms. Bohlinger did not provide a PE class, the Boone teachers did not have a daily planning period. School employees who travel from one teaching location to another teaching location are compensated for their mileage at a specified rate.2/ Each traveling employee is responsible for completing a mileage reimbursement form (form). The completed form is submitted to the employee’s immediate supervisor, who reviews and approves it, and then submits it to the district for processing. When she was first hired for the REAL Academy, Ms. Bohlinger asked Robert Hartley, the initial REAL Academy principal/director for instructions on how to complete the form. Mr. Hartley was unable to provide that instruction and Ms. Bohlinger obtained the instructions on how to complete the form from School Board personnel. At the end of each calendar month, Ms. Bohlinger completed the mileage reimbursement form for her trips between Auburndale, the Smith Center, and Boone. The distance claimed between the three learning centers is 32 miles, which was not contested. It took approximately 30 minutes to travel from Auburndale to the Smith Center, and approximately 40 minutes for Ms. Bohlinger to travel from the Smith Center to Boone. The School Board’s reimbursement rate is $.575 per mile. During the 2015-2016 school year, Principal Wilson was a “resource teacher,” working mainly at Auburndale and Boone. He oversaw the REAL Academy programs at those locations, and reported to Mr. Hartley. At some time after the middle of the 2015-2016 school year, Principal Wilson researched information as to any dates that Ms. Bohlinger missed PE classes for all or part of a school day. Principal Wilson identified seven3/ dates that Ms. Bohlinger was not at Boone. They are: November 3, 2015 The first quarter grades were past due. Ms. Bohlinger had started late in the quarter; however, it was determined that she would assign first quarter PE grades to the REAL Academy PE students. Ms. Bohlinger was told she had to enter the grades for her students that day. Principal Wilson’s “understanding” was that Ms. Bohlinger’s grading “would be done in Lakeland at the Dwight Smith Center.” Principal Wilson did not see Ms. Bohlinger at the Smith Center, and did not know when or where she entered the grades. Principal Wilson maintained that Ms. Bohlinger did not go to Boone on November 3, because he had to calm Boone teachers that it was not Ms. Bohlinger’s choice to miss PE, but that she was required to enter grades.4/ Ms. Bohlinger was at the Smith Center (her second school), when she was told she had to assign PE grades to the students. Ms. Bohlinger had to wait for Gwen Porter, a guidance counselor, to assist her because Ms. Bohlinger did not have access to a computer. The two women started working on the grades after 1:00 p.m. and she completed entering the grades prior to 3:00 p.m. Ms. Bohlinger testified she traveled to Boone after she finished with the grading. However, with the allocated time to make the trip, approximately 40 minutes, there was not sufficient time to arrive at Boone to conduct the last PE class of that day. There was no testimony that Ms. Bohlinger actually conducted a PE class at Boone on that day. Ms. Bohlinger’s testimony is not credible. December 2, 2015 A district level/REAL Academy meeting (district meeting) was scheduled for two locations (Boone before school started and the Smith Center in the afternoon) in an effort to have as many participants as possible. Ms. Bohlinger learned of the district meeting either the Friday or Monday before the Wednesday district meeting. Ms. Bohlinger was to attend the meeting at the Smith Center in Lakeland. Ms. Bohlinger “forgot” about the district meeting and “out of habit,” she went from Auburndale to the Smith Center and then on to Boone. Only after she got to Boone did she “realize” there was a district meeting, and she then returned to the Smith Center. Ms. Bohlinger claimed she made a “mistake” in traveling to Boone on December 2, 2015. Ms. Bohlinger’s mileage claim was inappropriate because she did not fulfill any PE teaching responsibilities at Boone. January 4, 2016 Following the winter holiday, the first school day for students was January 4, 2016. Ms. Bohlinger worked at Auburndale, the Smith Center, and then traveled to Boone. After resting in her car at the Boone location, Ms. Bohlinger called Principal Wilson, told him she was ill, and would be going home. Principal Wilson recalled that Ms. Bohlinger called him, said she was ill and would not finish out the school day. Principal Wilson thought Ms. Bohlinger was calling from her car, but he was uncertain of where she was at the time. Ms. Bohlinger’s explanation is credible. January 5, 2016 Ms. Bohlinger was out sick. Ms. Bohlinger failed to accurately record that she did not travel to any of her assigned schools on January 5, 2016. January 6, 2016 Ms. Bohlinger was out sick. Ms. Bohlinger failed to accurately record that she did not travel to any of her assigned schools on January 6, 2016. February 1, 2016 Ms. Bohlinger traveled to her three assigned schools. However, she drove to Boone, the check engine light came on in her car. After she arrived at Boone, she contacted Principal Wilson and asked if he was on the Boone campus. Upon understanding that Principal Wilson was not on the Boone campus, Ms. Bohlinger proceeded to inform him of her car issue, and that she was leaving to attend to her car. Ms. Bohlinger may have driven to Boone, but she did not teach her classes on the Boon campus. Ms. Bohlinger should not have claimed mileage for February 1, 2016. Respondent’s Prior Discipline On May 3, 2013, Ms. Bohlinger had a conference with Faye Wilson, the principal at Jesse Keen Elementary School. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Bohlinger was issued a verbal warning with a written confirmation regarding several instances when Ms. Bohlinger left the school campus before the end of her contractual day. On October 12, 2015, Ms. Bohlinger was suspended without pay for two days (Friday, October 9, 2015, and Monday, October 12, 2015). This suspension was the result of an investigation, to which Ms. Bohlinger “admitted that [she] had ‘peeked in on and listened to’ mental health counseling sessions with students, in which a student’s private information was discussed.”5/ Following the discipline listed in paragraph 15 above, Ms. Bohlinger was assigned to be the physical education teacher for the REAL Academy effective October 13, 2015. The testimony and exhibits establish that on five days Ms. Bohlinger submitted requests for mileage reimbursements to which she was not entitled. Ms. Bohlinger’s explanation that she felt ill and had to leave after arriving at Boone on January 4, 2016, is found to be credible.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Polk County School Board, enter a final order terminating Ms. Bohlinger’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2016.

Florida Laws (13) 1001.301001.321001.331001.421012.011012.221012.231012.331012.3351012.34120.569120.57120.65
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs CHARLES HANKERSON, 15-000210PL (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 13, 2015 Number: 15-000210PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024
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MARK C. ARNOLD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 92-002855BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida May 08, 1992 Number: 92-002855BID Latest Update: Aug. 03, 1992

The Issue This proceeding concerns the Respondent's rejection of all bids for construction of its new middle school "FF". Petitioner has challenged that intended action, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the law. The parties disagree as to the basis for the intended action. Initially the School Board considered rejecting all bids for failure to meet MBE/WBE goals, and Petitioner protested. Later, the Respondent determined that significant revisions to the construction documents were required, and the bids were all rejected on that basis. Petitioner protested again, but contends that the original basis for intended action is still at issue. For reasons set forth in the following recommended order, the MBE/WBE goal issue is moot. The central issue for determination, therefore, is whether Respondent properly rejected all bids based on its determination that substantial changes are required, and Petitioner's motion to consolidate its two protests is DENIED.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mark C. Arnold Construction Co., (Arnold), is a commercial general contracting firm located in Orange County, Florida, but well-experienced in building public facilities throughout the state. Arnold currently is engaged in constructing school "EE" for Respondent, Orange County School Board (School Board, or Board). In January 1992, the school board promulgated an advertisement for bid soliciting bids for the construction of a new school project known as Middle School "FF". The advertisement for bid was published five (5) times in the Orlando Sentinel on January 7, 14 and 28 and on February 4 and 1, 1992. The board also compiled a project manual which among other things contained a copy of the advertisement for bid and instructions to bidders which governed the bidding process. The advertisement for bid reserved the school board's "right to reject any or all bids and to waive any informality or irregularity in any bid received". (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2) The instructions to bidders also reserved the school board's "right to reject any and all bids when such rejection is in the interest of the school board of Orange County, Florida...". (Joint Exhibit 5) The project manual also contained a bid form to be used by bidders. In it the bidder agrees "that the Owner reserves the right to reject this bid, or to waive informalities in any bid,...". Such language was contained in the bid submitted by Arnold. (Joint Exhibits 7 and 9) By addendum dated February 5, 1992 the school board amended and replaced Section A-12 of its project manual and instructions to bidders. Such amendment, among other things, established goals for minority/womens business enterprise (MBE/WBE) subcontractor and supplier participation in the project, and it required any bidder who failed to attain the goals to demonstrate a good faith effort to do so; otherwise, the bid of such bidder would be rejected. (Joint Exhibit 8) Arnold's bid showed that Arnold had no MBE/WBE subcontractor or supplier participation. (Joint Exhibit 9) Arnold's bid was the lowest of eleven bids received by the school board. Arnold's bid was in the amount of $10,977,000.00. The next lowest bid was in the amount of $11,075,000.00. After bids were opened, Arnold promptly contacted the MBE/WBE manager of the school board, and was advised by her to try to obtain MBE/WBE participation to meet the goals; within several days after bid opening Arnold was able to get a total of about 13.5% MBE/WBE subcontractor/supplier participation. Contrary to the MBE/WBE manager's instruction, the addendum to the project manual and bid instructions proscribed any effort after bid opening to attain the MBE/WBE goals and to thereby make a bid responsive. In spite of Arnold's attempt to demonstrate to the MBE/WBE manager that it had made a good faith effort to attain the goals prior to bid opening, the MBE/WBE Manager determined that no sufficient good faith effort was shown by Arnold. On March 5, 1992 the school board furnished to Arnold a written notice of its intended decision to reject all bids because of the failure of all contractors (bidders) to attain the MBE/WBE goals and/or to show compliance with the good faith effort requirement of the contract documents. (Joint Exhibit 11) On March 10, 1992 Arnold and its attorney attended a meeting of the school board for the purpose of appealing the MBE/WBE manager's decision that Arnold had not demonstrated a good faith effort to meet the goals. Mark C. Arnold spoke at length to the school board itemizing actions which Arnold contended showed its requisite good faith effort to solicit MBE/WBE participation. Arnold's attorney also made a presentation at the meeting. By a 6 to 1 vote, the board initially sustained the findings of the MBE/WBE manager that a good faith effort was not shown by Arnold, and rejected all bids because of the failure of all contractors (bidders) to meet the minority participation goal and/or to show compliance with the good faith effort requirements of the contract documents. (Joint Exhibits 12 and 15) Following a work session after its initial meeting on March 10, the board convened again in regular session on March 10, at which time it unanimously voted to reconsider its earlier action of rejecting all bids, and it voted to postpone action of the award of a contract for the construction of Middle School "FF". The effect of that action was to rescind its earlier action rejecting all bids and determining that Arnold had not shown a good faith effort to solicit MBE/WBE participation; and also to postpone action on the entire matter to a future time. (Joint Exhibit 13). On March 20, Arnold filed Formal Protest directed to the board's March 5th Notice of Intended Decision and directed to the March 10 action rejecting Arnold's bid. During or about the first week in April, engineers for the school board met with the school board's attorney, William M. Rowland, Jr., to inform him that significant revisions needed to be made in the site work and sewer plant plans for the Middle School "FF" project. The engineers recommended that because of the need to make such revisions all bids for the project should be rejected and the project should be rebid after the plans were revised. As a result of the early April meeting with the engineers, the board's attorney prepared and delivered a memorandum dated April 7th advising the school board of its engineers' recommendations. The attorney also submitted a resolution which, if adopted, would serve to reject all bids and require a rebidding of the project. (Joint Exhibit 16) On April 10th the school board furnished to Arnold an amended notice of intended decision, which by its express terms replaced, amended and superseded its prior notice of intended decision dated March 5th, and notified Arnold of its intent to reject all bids on the project because of the need to make significant revisions in the construction documents. (Joint Exhibit 17) Said amended notice rendered moot the March 20 formal protest filed by Arnold. At its meeting held on April 14th, the board considered the April 7th memorandum from its attorney. At that meeting, the board heard from its staff engineer, Chuck Greif, who pointed out the revisions needed to the site plans for the Project. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 59-62, 77-78) Mark Arnold also spoke, contending that the site revisions could be handled by change orders if Arnold's bid were accepted. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 76-77) Bob Gallardo, the school board Director of Facilities and Planning, advised of problems encountered in the site work and of the need to make significant revisions in the site plans. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 87-92) As the geotechnical engineer on the job, Charles Cunningham stressed the significance of the site plan changes. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 96-97) Derek Burke, engineer on the project, confirmed that major redesign needs to be done. (Joint Exhibit 20, page 64) Attorney Rowland advised that the prior intended decision to reject all bids because of failure of all bidders to comply with the MBE/WBE requirements of the bid documents, was moot and no longer before the board for action, and that the only resolution before the board for action was the resolution to reject all bids because of the need to make significant site plan revisions for the project. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 72-76) The school board unanimously adopted that resolution. (Joint Exhibit 20, pages 97-99; Joint Exhibit 18) On April 23rd Arnold timely filed the written formal protest which is the subject of these proceedings. At the time of the meeting held by on April 14th, there was a need to make significant changes in the site work and sewer plant for the Middle School "FF" project. Such changes formed a valid and legitimate reason for the board to reject all bids. Even at the time of this administrative hearing, some details regarding the site work still needed to be worked out. For example, an outfall is needed for the percolation pond underdrain but it was not included in the project design. The site work and sewer plant changes and revisions could have been handled by change orders between Arnold and the school board, had the board accepted Arnold's bid, since any changes in a project can be accomplished by change orders; however, revising the nature and quantity of construction work by change orders involves the potential for excessive cost to the project owner and change orders always require agreement between the parties. Prudence dictates that when it is known that changes must be made, the bid advertisement should include those changes up front to remove the uncertainty of costs and to put all bidders on equal footing. There has been no showing of any illegality, fraud, oppression or misconduct in the actions of the school board in rejecting all bids on the Middle School "FF" Project and in opting to seek new bids for the project. There has been no showing in these proceedings that the school board's rejection of all bids had the purpose or effect of defeating the object and integrity of competitive bidding.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the bid protests by Petitioner. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Evans Davis, Esquire 170 East Washington Street Orlando, FL 32801 MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. William M. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 1786 North Mills Avenue Orlando, FL 32803 Dr. James L. Schott, Superintendent Orange County School Board P.O. Box 271 Orlando, FL 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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IN RE: SENATE BILL 40 (MARIA GOUGH AND JORGE GOUGH) vs *, 07-004286CB (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 17, 2007 Number: 07-004286CB Latest Update: May 02, 2008

Conclusions The failure of the School Board to install metal detectors cannot be a basis for a finding of negligence. The legislative decision of the governmental entity to appropriate funds to build, expand or modernize a facility is immune from liability for negligence. Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985). It was not foreseeable that Michael was dangerous because one teacher saw him viewing a website that she did not like, because one thought he was weird, because he talked too much in class sometimes, and because he once punched a girl. The failure of security personnel to effectively bar all access to the school prior to the official start of the school day, absent a showing of actual or constructive knowledge that the boys were sneaking in and that one of them was dangerous, also fails to constitute negligent supervision. The failure of the security guard to respond before the two boys returned to the bathroom, based on the boy's description of the time frame, also fails to demonstrate negligence. Guns, Violence, and Schools: The Results of School Violence--Litigation Against Educators And Students Shedding More Constitutional Rights at The School House Gate, 46 Loy.L.Rev. 389 (Summer 2000). ATTORNEY’S AND LOBBYIST’S FEES: Attorney's fees are set at 25 percent, in compliance with s. 768.28(8), F.S., or $250,000, for a $1,000,000 award. The lobbyist's fee is an additional 6 percent, or $60,000. Costs are not included in the fees. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: This is the second year that a claim bill has been submitted for Maria Gough and Jorge Gough, as a result of the death of their son, Jaime Gough. RECOMMENDATIONS: For the reasons stated above, I recommend that Senate Bill 40 (2008) be reported UNFAVORABLY. Respectfully submitted, cc: Senator Frederica Wilson Representative Carlos Lopez-Cantera Faye Blanton, Secretary of the Senate Eleanor M. Hunter Senate Special Master House Committee on Constitution and Civil Law Tom Thomas, House Special Master Counsel of Record

Florida Laws (1) 768.28
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs MARC S. MORGAN, 03-001334 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 15, 2003 Number: 03-001334 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated based on the allegations contained in the Notice of Specific Charges.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Section 1001.32. Petitioner has continuously employed Respondent since 1992 as a custodian at Melrose Elementary School, one of the public schools in Miami-Dade County. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Cynthia Gracia was the principal of Melrose Elementary School. Respondent is a non-probationary "educational support employee" within the meaning of Section 1012.40, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: As used in this section: "Educational support employee" means any person employed by a district school system . . . who by virtue of his or her position of employment is not required to be certified by the Department of Education or district school board pursuant to s. 1012.39. . . . "Employee" means any person employed as an educational support employee. (2)(a) Each educational support employee shall be employed on probationary status for a period to be determined through the appropriate collective bargaining agreement or by district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist. (b) Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee's status shall continue from year to year unless the superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in the collective bargaining agreement, or in district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist . . . At the times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a member of the AFSCME collective bargaining unit. AFSCME and Petitioner have entered into a CBA, which provides in Article XI for discipline of covered employees. Article XI, Section 4 provides that covered employees who have been employed by Petitioner for more than five years (such as Respondent) may only be discharged for "just cause." Article XI, Section 4 of the CBA pertains to types of separation from employment. Article XI, Section 4(B) pertains to excessive absenteeism and abandonment of position and provides as follows: (B) An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall be grounds for termination. . . . School Board Rule 6Gx13-4E-1.01 provides as follows: Except for sudden illness or emergency situations, any employee who is absent without prior approval shall be deemed to have been willfully absent without leave. Pursuant to Section 1012.67, a school board is authorized to terminate the employment of an employee who is willfully absent from employment without authorized leave, as follows: Any district school board employee who is willfully absent from duty without leave shall forfeit compensation for the time of such absence, and his or her employment shall be subject to termination by the school board. Petitioner's leave policies do not permit a leave of absence for an incarcerated employee, unless the employee can demonstrate that he or she was wrongfully incarcerated. At the times material to this proceeding, Respondent was not wrongfully incarcerated, and he was not eligible for a leave of absence under Petitioner’s leave polices. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 states in pertinent part that: All persons employed by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. On September 25, 2002, Respondent was charged with assault and battery (domestic violence) involving his then girlfriend. Those charges were pending at the time of the final hearing. On or about November 14, 2002, Respondent appeared at a court hearing. Because he had missed an earlier court date, Respondent was incarcerated in the Miami-Dade County jail. Shortly after he was arrested, Respondent attempted to contact Ms. Gracia at Melrose Elementary School. Respondent testified he tried to call the school five or six times on the day he was arrested, but the call from jail was long distance and the school would not take a collect call. That same day, Respondent called his new girlfriend (Leanne Perez), told her that he was in jail, and asked her to tell Ms. Gracia that he was in jail. On November 14, 2002, Ms. Perez told Ms. Gracia by telephone that Respondent had been detained. When questioned, Ms. Perez explained that Respondent was in jail, but she did not provide any additional information. Respondent returned to his job site on December 16, 2002. Between November 14 and December 16, Respondent was absent from work without authorized leave. Neither Respondent nor anyone on Respondent's behalf contacted or attempted to contact Ms. Gracia between Ms. Perez's telephone call on November 14 and Respondent's reappearance at the job site on December 16. Prior to his incarceration, Respondent had absences from work without authorized leave. From April 11, 2002, to December 16, 2002, Respondent had 29.5 days of unauthorized absences from the worksite. Respondent's unauthorized absences impeded the provision of the custodial services that are necessary to keep a school clean and safe. During Respondent's unauthorized absences, the other members of the custodial staff had to perform their duties and had to perform extra work to cover for Respondent's absence. On December 5, 2002, Ms. Gracia wrote a memorandum to Respondent styled "Employment Intention." After listing the dates Respondent had been absent between October 10, 2002, and December 5, Ms. Gracia wrote as follows: These absences have caused the effective operation of the worksite to be impeded, and/or efficient services to students to be impeded. I am requesting your immediate review and implementation of any of the following options: Notify the worksite of your intended date of return; or Effect leave procedures (request for leave [form] attached); or Implement resignation from Miami-Dade County Public Schools. (Resignation letter attached.) You are directed to notify the worksite within 3 days of the date of this memorandum as to your employment intention. Your absences will be considered unauthorized until you communicate directly with this administrator. Ms. Gracia's memorandum was mailed to the address Respondent had given Petitioner as his residence, and a relative of Respondent, who was not named at the final hearing, signed for the mailing. Respondent testified, credibly, that he did not receive the memorandum until after he got out of jail. Respondent did not respond to the memorandum. Respondent testified, credibly, that he did not intend to abandon his employment. Respondent worked between December 16, 2002, and April 9, 2003, the date Petitioner suspended Respondent's employment without pay and instituted these proceedings to terminate his employment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order, sustains the suspension of Respondent's employment without pay, and terminates that employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2003.

Florida Laws (7) 1.011001.321012.391012.401012.67120.569120.57
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