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DAN L. MOODY vs DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 92-005778 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Sep. 29, 1992 Number: 92-005778 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 1993

Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns a single family residence on a lot (Lot 2) abutting Lake Buffum in Polk County, Florida. This property has a 60 foot frontage on the lake. Petitioner subsequently purchased and now owns an adjacent lot (Lot 3) with a lake front frontage of approximately 73 feet. Petitioner has placed a dock on the westerly edge of Lot 2 from which he suspends and lowers a power boat to the surface of Lake Buffum. Lot 3 is westerly of Lot 2. Lake Buffum is a class III water body which classification provides for management for recreation; and propagation and maintenance of a healthy, well- balanced population of fish and wildlife. Petitioner was cited for violation of Section 369.20, Florida Statutes, by spraying herbicide on aquatic plants without a permit. He subsequently applied for a permit to control aquatic plants in front of his property and was issued a permit allowing him to control an access corridor to his property 50 feet wide. Petitioner here seeks an access corridor 60 feet wide. When Petitioner was issued his permit, the plat showing his dock in the center of the 50 foot access corridor was attached. Petitioner desired to clear aquatic plants on the western side of his dock as there is deeper water on that side of the dock to permit access to the dock with his boat. This is due to the angle of the shore line. The plat showing the dock in the middle of the 50 foot corridor obviously caused some confusion on the part of the Petitioner as the approach to his hoist on the dock is parallel to the shoreline. Accordingly, clear water to approach the dock from the west is what Petitioner needs to dock his boat. The permit granted is for a 50 foot corridor without specifying where at right angles to the coast line the corridor should be placed. Accordingly, if desired, Petitioner could clear a corridor starting at the western side of his dock and extending 50 feet to the west. In coordination with the Florida Game, Freshwater Fish and Wildlife Service, the Respondent has adopted a general policy of granting a permit to clear aquatic plants on waterfront property with a corridor of one-half width of the lot fronting the lake but limited to 50 feet for lots of 100 feet width and greater. Since Petitioner has approximately 133 feet of shoreline, he was granted a permit to control aquatic plants in a 50 foot corridor. This general policy is not absolute, but varies with the quantity of aquatic plants on a particular lake and whether the permit is desired for the use of the general public, such as a public boat ramp provided by a county or municipality. The amount of aquatic plants most beneficial to the propagation of fish and wildlife on lakes is between 40% and 70% coverage of the lakes. On the lakes with more than 70% coverage, Respondent may grant a 100 foot corridor in which the upland property owner is issued a permit to control aquatic plants. Lake Buffum is a sparsely vegetated lake with a coverage varying between 1.8% and 4%. Although the property around the lake is sparsely developed, an extra 10 feet of aquatic plant control would have some adverse effect in this lake which is far below the average coverage. More importantly, however, is the cumulative impact of granting Petitioner a 60 foot corridor which would require the granting of similar corridors to all other applicants on Lake Buffum.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Dan L. Moody's petition to be granted a permit to clear a 60 foot corridor of aquatic plants below the high water line at his property on Lake Buffum be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dan D. Moody, Esquire 945 East Broadway Fort Meade, Florida 33841 Nancy L. Harvey, Esquire Nona Schaffner, Esquire 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard MS #35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Donald Duden, Acting Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard MS #10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard MS #10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (2) 120.57369.20
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ISLES OF CAPRI CIVIC ASSOCIATION vs. WILLIAMS CAPRI MARINE, INC., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 79-002415 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002415 Latest Update: Apr. 15, 1980

Findings Of Fact By application (Exhibit 1) dated September 15, 1978, WCMI requested a permit to dredge approximately 740 cubic yards of sovereign bottom lands in Snook Bay adjacent to upland property owned by applicant. At the same time applicant requested a lease of some 0.98 acres of submerged sovereign land, containing the area to be dredged, for the purpose of constructing a marina with docking facilities over the leased property. Following receipt of all requested information from applicant, plus objections from adjacent land owners, DNR, as the state agency acting on behalf of the Trustees Internal Improvement Trust Fund (TIITF) , held a public hearing in Naples, Florida on April 25, 1979. The Hearing Officer submitted a report following this hearing in which he recommended the lease be granted (Exhibit 4). After review DNR staff recommended granting the lease and before the Trustees took action, Petitioner requested this hearing. In the interim DER reviewed the application for a dredge and fill permit and, following a preliminary investigation, advised WCMI of its intent to deny the permit (Exhibit 8). At informal conferences with DER, WCMI revised its application to commence the dredging 25 feet from the existing seawall, reduce the amount of material to be dredged to 349 cubic yards and to move the floating dock sections further from the seawall. This revised application (Exhibit 10) was submitted to DER and, after review, DER on November 13, 1979 (Exhibit 11) issued its notice of intent to grant the requested permit. Petitioner then requested this hearing to contest the granting of this permit. The Isles of Capri was developed into a waterfront homesite project by bulkheading, dredging and filling a pristine mangrove area to provide the homesites now occupied by members of Petitioner. This project destroyed the ecosystem as it existed before the development. The area which is here proposed for lease and for a permit to dredge some 349 cubic yards therefrom is located in the originally disturbed area. Most of the homes on the Isles of Capri are built on waterfront lots and most homeowners have docks and boats. Fishing is generally considered good off the docks and in surrounding waters. The proposed marina is located in Snook Bay, a relatively small cul-de-sac-like area. On the dead end of Snook Bay, which is adjacent to the proposed marina, mangroves have been planted and the area designated as a park. Since these mangroves are rat infested, the park concept has not received general acceptance. However, the proposed marina will not adversely affect this park. Apart from the ecological problems that will allegedly be created by the leasing of the property and the dredging thereon, petitioner alleges the project will interfere with other "rights" of the homeowners of the Isles of Capri. Although this Hearing Officer has considerable doubts as to the validity of these alleged rights, the facts presented relating thereto will be first considered. WCMI owns the uplands adjacent to this submerged land and this land is zoned General Retail Commercial, which includes use as a proposed marina. Use as a marina would create less additional vehicular traffic than would any of the other 12 uses considered most likely for this land. (Testimony of Barr) The proposed marina will provide wet dock space for 32 boats and dry storage for 116 boats in sheds with the boats stacked three-high. No ramps will be provided and boats will be launched and picked up by use of a forklift at the concrete seawall. Parking space for 54 vehicles will be provided. This parking space complies with local requirements, as does WCMI's proposed construction. Collier County and the area of Collier County in the vicinity of Isles of Capri is an area of rapidly increasing population. A need for some six additional marinas has been recognized by Collier County authorities. Numerous witnesses opposed the use of WCMI property as a marina because: They do not think the site is suitable for a marina, and a much smaller marina would be preferred. Installation of a marina would increase boat traffic, thereby increasing the risk of boat collisions, increase wake action which might damage seawalls, disrupt the peace and quiet now enjoyed by these residents, and increase the possibility of boats striking manatees. Property values in the vicinity of the proposed marina and elsewhere in the Isles of Capri might decline. Operation of a marina would increase the noise level, thereby disturbing occupants of residences closest to the proposed marina. Vehicular traffic would be greatly increased on the Isles of Capri once the marina commences operation. Most of these objections are beyond the jurisdiction of this tribunal. This property has been zoned for the use proposed and if this use is inappropriate, the proper recourse is with the local zoning authorities. The credible evidence submitted is that the operation of the marina would increase boat traffic in and out of Snook Bay some 20 round-trips per day and this increase will create and insignificant additional risk of collision with other boats or with the occasional manatee that is sighted. While most of this traffic will use the deeper channel that follows the seawalls and boat docks of residents, an alternate channel is available for use by boaters with local knowledge of its characteristics. Even if all traffic used the deeper channel, no serious hazard to navigation would thereby result. No credible evidence was presented that the increased boat traffic caused by the marina would increase the damage to a properly constructed seawall. Navigation of these waters is a right to be jealously guarded. If wave damage results, local authorities have jurisdiction to establish speed or wake restrictions. Furthermore, the more credible evidence presented was that at the Isles of Capri more subsidence of soil behind the seawalls is caused by tidal action than by wake action. No credible evidence was presented that the operation of the proposed marina would decrease property values. Even if this could be shown, such a use would be consistent with the usage for which this property is zoned. There are two marinas across the street from WCMI's proposed marina and no evidence was presented that the operation of ties smaller marinas affected property values. The uncontradicted evidence that was submitted was that property values on the Isles of Capri have increased at a rate as great as, if not greater than, land values elsewhere in Collier County. The roads on Isles of Capri are presently operating far below capacity and the additional traffic expected to be generated by the proposed marina will have no significant impact on these roads, nor will the construction of the marina create any vehicular safety problems. Petitioner's contention that the construction and operation of the marina will create additional pollution because of septic tank, oils and greases, and water runoff from impervious surfaces is not well-placed. It is not well-placed in the first instance because this is not the proper forum in which to air these complaints. Local health and safety ordinances regulate the installation of septic tanks, installation of fueling facilities and retention of water falling on the property. Secondly, the evidence presented here is that WCMI will comply with all regulations regarding septic tanks, no live-aboard boats will be moored at the marina other than temporarily for fuel or supplies, fuel tanks will be underground on the upland area, provided with proper protection and insulation, and the fuel will be dispensed by hose from the fueling dock by experienced personnel. WCMI will provide containment booms and retrieving material to take care of the accidental spill that might occur. Collier County Ordinance requires the first 1-inch of rainfall be retained on the property and WCMI will comply with this requirement. From the testimony of the numerous residents who testified, the primary concern of most of those who object to the proposed installation is that "their" waters will become more available to people living elsewhere and this will somehow detract from the use and enjoyment of those waters by these residents. If access to the Isles of Capri is facilitated for people living elsewhere by the installation of this marina, these waters will become more crowded, resulting in less fish per resident, and this aquatic preserve will become less private and more available to the general public. These residents purchased their homesites because of the waterfront characteristics and the quietness and solitude of the area. Facilitating access by nonresidents will necessitate sharing these waters with these nonresidents, thereby detracting from the enjoyment residents hoped to retain undiminished forever. The allegations of Petitioner that merit the most serious consideration in both of these applications of WCMI involves those relating to the ecosystem. Petitioner contends that the proposed dredging will adversely affect the ecosystem and this requires denial of the dredge-and-fill permit. Without the permit the lease would be useless. Petitioner also contends the granting of the lease would be contrary to the public interest. WCMI's original application was to dredge from the seawall seaward some 60 feet until the desired depth contour was reached. Also, floating concrete docks would be adjacent to the seawall for berthing sites. When an inspection of the area disclosed the bottom grasses were heaviest from the seawall out to about 30 feet, the applicant was issued the Notice of Intent to Deny by DER because of these bottom grasses and the shading that would be caused by the floating docks. WCMI then proposed to do no dredging for the first 25 feet from the seawall, except for two areas 30 feet and 36 feet wide needed to launch boats, and also to move the floating docks 25 feet from the seawall so as not to shade the grassy areas. As noted above, the site under consideration was severely disturbed by the initial dredging which destroyed the original grassbeds at this site. Some of these grasses have now returned but the coverage is sparse and patchy. From the seawall out to about 30 feet the grass is Cuban shoalweed and manatee grass. Respondent's investigations and studies revealed only these two grasses. Petitioner's biologist who performed studies similar to those done by Respondent found halophila in the deeper waters (up to five feet) extending out as far as 60 feet from the seawall. Halophila is a more ephemeral grass that grows in deeper depths than Cuban shoalweed and manatee grass and is often found in previously dredged areas. The area proposed for dredging comprises some 1200 square meters, and seagrasses cover about one-fourth of the dredge area. Sample cores taken by Petitioner's expert in October while the more luxuriant summer growth predominated showed some 1600 blades of grass per square meter, while the winter sample taken by WCMI expert showed 467 blades per meter. In the 320 square meters of seagrasses in the area a total biomass of invertebrates was found to be 17 pounds. Using generally accepted conversion rates and invertebrate reproduction cycles to convert this biomass to fish, this weight of invertebrate biomass could be converted into between 2 and 10 pounds of fish annually. Removal of the seagrasses will remove feeding grounds and hiding areas for some types of aquatic animals and also take away the type of fish that inhabit such areas. On the other hand, the piling and other docking structures that will be installed will attract sessile organisms such as oysters, barnacles, etc. which currently attach themselves to rocks and mangrove roots in the vicinity. The biomass or weight of these organisms is likely to equal or exceed those to be lost by dredging away the seagrasses. The different types of fish will be attracted to the area where the shellfish and other attaching animals congregate than will be attracted to grassy bottoms, the change is not significant from a quality or quantity of fish point of view. The area to be dredged is an area that has partially recovered from its earlier destruction and there is no reason to believe a similar recovery will not recur after the dredging here proposed is completed. No evidence was presented that a collision between a boat and a manatee has ever occurred in the waters in the vicinity of the Isles of Capri. Any conclusion that such an incident is likely to occur because of increased boat traffic when the proposed marina is in operation would be sheer speculation. Furthermore, Collier County does not contain any of those designated waters wherein special manatee protection rules are to be set up. Nor is Snook Bay one of those areas where a concentration of manatees is likely to occur.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JAMES WAYDE CAMPBELL vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 95-005066 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Oct. 16, 1995 Number: 95-005066 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1997

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional compensation for fishing nets that he sold to the State of Florida under the Net Buy-Back Program.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a commercial fishers who is an affected person under the Florida Net Ban, which is set forth in the Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 16. Section 370.0805(5), Florida Statutes, which became effective on July 1, 1995, establishes the Net Buy-Back Program. The program enables eligible persons previously engaged in the commercial fishing industry to sell fishing nets to the State of Florida. The Legislature appropriated $20 million to the Seafood Workers Economic Assistance Account (the Account) to fund the payments authorized in Section 370.0805, as well as agency expenses in administering the program. Section 370.0805(3)(b) directs Respondent to purchase nets "according to the availability of funds on a first-come, first-served basis determined by the date of receipt of each completed application." By Net Buy-Back Application signed on July 5, 1995, and filed with Respondent on the same day, Petitioner applied to sell nets to the State of Florida. His application form is completely filled out and shows two saltwater-product license numbers, one for an individual and one for a vessel. The application form calls for the applicant to list the "TOTAL NUMBER OF YARDS OF EACH NET TYPE THAT YOU INTEND TO SELL." The form lists five categories of nets: gill (49 meshes or less); gill (50 meshes or more); beach, purse, seine; trawl; and trammel. The former gill net is a shallow-water gill net. The latter gill net is a deepwater gill net. Petitioner listed on his application 800 yards of shallow-water gill nets, 4600 yards of deepwater gill nets, two trawls, and 600 yards of trammel nets. After checking a data base maintained by the Department of Environmental Protection, Respondent found only one of Petitioner's two listed saltwater-product licenses. Respondent thus processed Petitioner's application as though he had only one license. By letter dated August 8, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was eligible "to receive compensation for 8 nets" and set an appointment for him to turn in the nets on September 6, 1995. On September 6, 1995, Petitioner appeared at the appointed site with nets to sell to the State of Florida. He delivered 4800 yards of seine nets, for which he received a voucher for $27,998.40. Prior to paying the voucher, Respondent discovered that the Account might be exhausted before Respondent had paid for all of the nets that fishers might lawfully seek to sell to the State. Respondent thus dishonored Petitioner's voucher, as well as the vouchers held by numerous other fishers, while Respondent considered changes in its administration of the program. The purpose of the Net Buy-Back Program, as provided by Section 370.0805(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was to allow, "[a]ll commercial saltwater products licensees and persons holding a resident commercial fishing license" to apply to Respondent "to receive economic assistance to compensate them for nets rendered illegal or useless by the constitutional limitation on marine net fishing." The emphasis was on economic assistance. Section 370.0805(5)(a) authorizes Respondent to make payments only "in nonnegotiable amounts not intended to reflect the actual value of the nets." Section 370.0805(5)(a) assigns payment amounts of $3500 for beach, purse, or seine nets of at least 600 yards in length; $500 for trawls and shallow-water gill nets of at least 600 yards in length; and $1000 for trammel nets of at least 600 yards in length and deepwater gill nets of at least 600 yards in length. Section 370.0805(5)(a) states that, except for trawls, nets of less than 600 yards in length shall be "valued proportionately." Section 370.0805(5)(c) limits the number of nets that a commercial fishers could sell, based on his annual earnings from the sale of eligible saltwater products. The limits range from four nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average from $2500 to $4999 in earnings, to ten nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average more than $30,000. Respondent relied on another data base from the Department of Environmental Protection to determine the average yearly earnings of applicants. The Department of Environmental Protection maintains records of each licensee's trip tickets, which disclose earnings. The only other limit in the statute as to the type and number of nets to be purchased is that, under Section 370.0805(5)(d), "[n]o licensee may be paid for more than two. . . trawls." Respondent reviewed the applications that it received from the initial 951 fishers who filed applications. This was a large majority of the 1104 fishers who would eventually sell their nets to the State under the Net Buy-Back Program. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the funds in the Account would be sufficient to cover the nets that the State was to be purchasing. Respondent found from the applications that seine nets represented only about five percent of the nets that fishers intended to sell to the State. Relying on this information, Respondent calculated the potential encumbrance of $6.5 million on the Account, based on an average payment of $1000 per net. Applications contained few seine nets because commercial fishers initially resisted selling their best nets to the State of Florida. The Net Buy-Back Program provided for payment of only $3500 per seine net, even though many seine nets were worth $10,000. And commercial fishers were optimistic at first that their legal challenges to the constitutional amendment would succeed. Applying liberal eligibility criteria, such as calculating the number of nets that each applicant could sell based on the number of licenses that he held, Respondent raised its estimate of the potential encumbrance to $8.775 million. But in recalculating the potential encumbrance on the Account, Respondent still assumed that the average payment per net would be $1000. Respondent began receiving nets on August 3, 1995. Through the first three weeks of August, Respondent purchased seine nets in roughly the same five-percent mix that it had used in calculating the potential encumbrances on the Account. After this point, however, fishers started turning in much larger numbers of seine nets than they had listed in their applications. During this first phase of the program, Respondent paid fishers for whatever types of nets they presented at their net buy-back appointment. Respondent would pay a fishers entitled to sell eight nets for seine nets if he turned in seine nets, even though he had listed only gill nets on his application. This policy jeopardized the solvency of the Account because the payments to fishers turning in all seine nets were 3.5 times greater than the figures that Respondent had used in calculating the potential encumbrance on the Account. From the fishers's perspective, the program acquired an element of chance, as applicants with earlier appointment times-which did not necessarily correspond with earlier-filed applications-netted fine catches of economic assistance at the expense of their counterparts, upon whom destiny had bestowed later appointment times. By late August, the applicants, less sanguine about their litigation prospects (as the fishers suggest) and more inventive in recasting old gill nets as seine nets (as Respondent suggests), began turning in seine nets in large numbers, so that Respondent was purchasing nearly all seine nets. Eventually, the cumulative effect of this trend raised the total mix of seines purchased from five percent, during the first three weeks, to sixty percent. After a brief period of trying to stay the course, Respondent decided on September 6, 1995, that it had to take action or else the Account would be exhausted before the State had purchased all of the nets listed on the applications. Respondent immediately suspended further payments on issued vouchers and applied new criteria to persons holding unpaid vouchers, as well as to applicants who had not yet received vouchers. This action stopped payment on all vouchers issued from around August 28 through September 6. At the time that it stopped payment on outstanding vouchers, Respondent had approved the purchase of nets from about 750 fishers. About 450 of these applicants received their money prior to the suspension of payments, leaving about 300 applicants, including Petitioner, holding worthless vouchers. However, a large number of the 450 applicants who were actually paid for their nets prior to September 6 sold a relatively large percentage of gill nets rather than seine nets. As of September 6 (retroactive to August 28), Respondent began the second phase of the Net Buy-Back Program. In this phase, Respondent paid for seine nets, but only up to the greater of the number of seines shown on the application or the number of seines based on past use of seines. Respondent determined the latter figure from the trip tickets, which also contained information as to types of catch, from which Respondent could infer the type of net used. As in the first phase, Respondent continued to insist the fishers turn in seines if they were being paid for seines. The 300 fishers holding dishonored vouchers filed a class action suit. Petitioner's voucher for his first eight nets was covered in this legal action and is not the subject of this case. Petitioner received slightly more than $10,000 on his claim for about $28,000. In the meantime, Respondent discovered that Petitioner in fact held two licenses, as he had represented on his application. By letter dated October 5, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had reconsidered his application and determined that he had the right to sell 16 nets, not eight nets, but none could be a seine net. Respondent issued Petitioner a new voucher for these additional eight nets. This voucher is in the amount of $7996.80 for 4800 yards of deepwater gill net. On October 13, 1995, Petitioner turned in eight nets and received his money. Petitioner's application lists no seine nets. His application, as noted above, lists one and one-third shallow- water gill nets (i.e., 800 yards), eight deepwater gill nets, two trawls, and one trammel net. Petitioner claimed that he turned in seine nets. If turned in during the first or second phase of the program, Respondent would have treated these nets as seine nets. But it is Petitioner's unique fortune to have been intimately involved with all three phases of the Net Buy-Back Program. Evidently dissatisfied with the effects of the restrictions introduced by the second phase of the program, Respondent added a third phase by promulgating an emergency rule defining "seine nets," effective October 2, 1995. This third phase, which did not change Respondent's policy of paying for the greater number of seines as shown on the application or the trip tickets, restricted the kinds of nets that fishers could turn in as seine nets. Rule 38BER95-1 provides that, for the purpose of "the implementation of the Net Buy-Back Program" described in Section 370.0805(5): "Gill net" means a wall of netting suspended vertically in the water, with floats across the upper margin and weights along the bottom margin which captures fish by entangling them in the meshes, usually by the gills. Any net offered for the net buy- back program that consists of at least fifty- one percent (51 percent) gill net, shall be considered a gill net. "Seine" means a small-meshed net suspended vertically in the water, with floats along the top margin and weights along the bottom margin, which encloses and concentrates fish, and does not entangle them in the meshes. No net offered for the net buy-back program shall be considered a seine if the wings are composed of entangling mesh. * * * THIS RULE SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Effective Date: October 2, 1995 Under the emergency rule, Respondent's nets were not seines, but were gill nets because they were at least 51 percent, by area, gill net. At the time of the final hearing, Respondent estimates that the Account balance is about $300,000 with about 160 contested claims remaining to be resolved.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order dismissing the petition for additional payment from the Account. ENTERED on October 3rd, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this October 3rd, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Secretary Douglas L. Jamerson Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 John Wayde Campbell 1103 67th Street Northwest Bradenton, Florida 34209 Louise T. Sadler Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Suite 307, Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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LEE LIGHTSEY vs FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 19-005210F (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Sep. 30, 2019 Number: 19-005210F Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2020

The Issue Is an Agency that settles a challenge to its denial of a license by agreeing to issue the license a "non-prevailing adverse party," as defined by section 120.595(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes (2019)? 1

Findings Of Fact The Commission denied an application by Mr. Lightsey for issuance of a Hunt Preserve License. A letter titled "Amended Notice of Denial" (Amended Notice), signed by Major Rob Beaton, Division of Law Enforcement, advised Mr. Lightsey that the Commission intended to deny his application. The Amended Notice included this dispositive paragraph: "Due to the facts stated above, pursuant to 68-1.010, F.A.C, your application for a HPL has been denied. We are processing your application fee for a refund, and you should receive it within 21 days." The Amended Notice also advised Mr. Lightsey of his right to request a hearing to challenge the intended decision. Mr. Lightsey challenged the proposed denial and requested a formal administrative hearing. Mr. Lightsey brought his challenge under section 120.57(1), which creates a right to a formal hearing to dispute a proposed agency action. The Commission referred the matter to the Division for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge and conduct of the hearing. The parties settled the licensing dispute before the hearing. Their settlement agreement provided for the Commission issuing each of the denied licenses. The parties' agreement also provided for severing the attorney's fees and costs claim, leaving it pending for the Division to resolve if the parties could not agree. The order closing the file in this case severed the fees and costs claim and reserved jurisdiction over it. The parties could not agree. The division re-opened the fees case as DOAH Case No. 19-5210F. This proceeding followed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter its Final Order denying Petitioner's Motion for Fees and Costs under section 120.595, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Bert J. Harris, Esquire Swaine, Harris & Wohl, P.A. 401 Dal Hall Boulevard Lake Placid, Florida 33852 (eServed) Bridget Kelly McDonnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Joseph Yauger Whealdon, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Sharmin Royette Hibbert, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.595120.6857.111 Florida Administrative Code (3) 28-106.10128-106.10268-1.010 DOAH Case (4) 05-4644F16-576618-542819-5210F
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GEORGE W. ROBERTS vs. DIXIE COUNTY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 86-001448 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001448 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1987

Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts admitted by all parties The water quality standards contained in Rule 17-3.111, Florida Administrative Code will not be violated by this project. There are no aquatic macrophytes located in the area of the proposed project. The proposed project is located within 500 feet of the incorporated municipality of Horseshoe Beach, Florida. The proposed project is located within Class II waters of the State not approved for shellfish harvesting. The project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The proposed project will be of a permanent nature. The project will not adversely affect or will not enhance significant historical or acheological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061, Florida Statutes. The rest of the findings The Applicant, Dixie County, applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock which would expand the existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach. In accordance with the revised plans dated October 23, 1986, the proposed facility would consist of a pier 6 feet wide and 120 feet long designed to accommodate six boat slips, each 30 feet wide and 40 feet long. The boundaries of the boat slips will be demarcated by pilings set 10 feet apart. Four of the boat slips would be primarily for the use of commercial fishing boats and commercial shrimping boats. The other two boat slips (the two slips closest to the land) would be reserved for the exclusive use of recreational and other small vessels. By adding a catwalk 3 or 4 feet wide down the middle of the two slips reserved for recreational vessels, the usefulness of those slips to recreational vessels would be greatly enhanced and the narrowness of the resulting slips would preclude their use by large vessels. Adding the two catwalks would be a minor addition to the proposed project which would greatly enhance the usefulness of the project and at the same time avoid the possibility that large vessels in the two slips closest to the land would impede ingress and egress at the nearby boat lift, boat fueling facility, and boat ramp. Adding a reasonable number of permanent trash or garbage containers would also enhance the usefulness of the proposed project and minimize the possibility of improper disposal of trash and garbage which is generated by the normal use of a dock by fishermen and boaters. The proposed project site is located in the Gulf of Mexico at Horseshoe Beach, Florida, and would extend into the waters of the Gulf, which is a tidally influenced water body adjacent to Dixie County, Florida. The water along the shoreline of the area is shallow for a considerable distance waterward, except where basins and channels have been dredged. The Horseshoe Beach area is relatively unpolluted. The existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach is used primarily by recreational vessels, but there is also extensive commercial fishing and Shrimping boat activity in the area. The project is located at the mouth of a canal with direct access to the Gulf. Several commercial fishhouses operate from the canal bank, which generates extensive commercial boat traffic past the proposed project site. Large numbers of commercial shrimp boats presently dock along the canal that ends near the proposed project site. The proposed project requires no dredging. The only filling required by the proposed project is the placement of pilings into the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Even though the plans do not specify whether concrete or wooden pilings will be used, this lack of specificity in the plans is irrelevant. Regardless of what types of pilings are used on this project, the filling activity will not violate the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17- 3.051(1), Florida Administrative Code. The placement of the pilings will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Further, the proposed project will not adversely affect any property interests of the Petitioners within the scope of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Gulf bottom in the area of the proposed project has already been disturbed. The presently existing suspension of particulate material in the water column, a natural occurrence in the area of the project, results in low visibility which means that seagrass beds and other marine vegetation, which provide shelter and detrital deposits for fish and other marine resources, will not grow. Coast Guard regulations prohibit commercial fishing vessels from depositing materials into the water within three miles of the coast line. Commercial fishing vessels must prominently display a sticker reciting that regulation and it is the practice of commercial fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of Horseshoe Beach to comply with this Coast Guard no discharge requirement by cleaning nets and scrubbing decks outside the three mile limit. It is not the practice of Commercial fishing vessels to deliberately discharge diesel fuel, fish parts or other material into the water while docked. Further, the limited number of commercial fishing vessels which could dock at the proposed facility at the same time cannot reasonably be expected to create discharges in amounts creating a nuisance, posing any danger to the public health safety or welfare, or violating the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17-3.051(1), Florida Statutes. Although small amounts of diesel fuel can become mixed with bilge water and be discharged by automatic bilge pumps while commercial fishing vessels are docked, there is no evidence that this would be in amounts Sufficient to create a nuisance or violate water quality criteria. To the contrary, notwithstanding a large amount of commercial boat traffic past the proposed site and notwithstanding the fact that large numbers of shrimp boats dock up the canal from the proposed site, the water in the area of the proposed site has remained relatively unpolluted. The proposed project will not affect the normal wind and wave action in the area of the proposed project. Such wind and wave action presently results in free exchange between the waters of the open Gulf and the waters near the shore. This free exchange of waters means that any pollutant discharges in the area of the proposed project will be diluted and rapidly dispersed into the Gulf of Mexico. There will be no measurable difference in the wind and wave action, or in the water exchange, after the proposed project is built. No harmful shoaling or erosion is expected to result from construction of the proposed project. Any docking structure extending out into the Gulf of Mexico will obviously have some effect on navigation in the area of the dock, but there is no evidence that the proposed dock will present a hazard to navigation or any significant interference with customary navigation patterns. The distance between the nearest channel marker and the waterward end of the proposed project is more than 200 feet. The angle of the proposed dock and its Spatial relation to the main Horseshoe Beach turning basin cause no impediment to navigation. The placement of Coast Guard Safety lights on the dock would minimize any potential for impeding navigation or posing a danger to the public health or safety during hours of darkness.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a Final Order in this case granting the permit applied for by Dixie County. It is also recommended that the permit be made subject to the following additional conditions: That one or more Coast Guard safety lights be placed on the proposed expansion to the dock; That catwalks be added down the middle of the two most landward of the proposed boat slips; and That a reasonable number of trash or garbage receptacles be permanently located on the proposed expansion to the dock to minimize the possibility of trash and garbage being thrown overboard. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1448 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. The paragraph numbers referred to below are references to the paragraph numbers in the parties' respective proposed recommended orders. Ruling on findings proposed by the Petitioners: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First sentence is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than a proposed finding of fact. Second and third sentences are rejected as repetitious Paragraph 5: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 6: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 8: Entire paragraph is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; construction of the dock may be expected to bring about some changes in the nature of the boat traffic in the immediate area, but nothing of the nature or magnitude suggested by these proposed findings. Paragraph 10: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is accepted in part and rejected in part. Rejected portion is irrelevant. Third sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Fourth Sentence is accepted. Fifth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as repetitious Sixth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rulings on findings Proposed by the Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary recitation of opposing party's contentions and not proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence accepted in part and rejected in part; rejected portion concerns riparian rights, which are irrelevant to whether this permit should be issued. Paragraph 14: Entire paragraph rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick M. Bryant, Esquire Moore, Williams & Bryant, P.A. Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Doyle Thomas, Esquire County Attorney Post Office Box 339 Cross City, Florida 32628 Ann Cowles-Fewox, Legal Intern Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Karen Brodeen, Esquire 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Florida Laws (3) 120.5726.012267.061
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. W. D. HARRELL FISH BAIT AND TACKLE, ET AL., 77-002040 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002040 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1978

The Issue Whether Respondent's beverage license should be suspended or revoked, or a civil penalty assessed, for an alleged violation of Section 562.12, Florida Statutes, pursuant to Section 561.29(1) Florida Statutes, as set forth in Notice to Show Cause issued by Petitioner. The hearing was originally scheduled for December 8, 1977, but respondent filed a motion for continuance which was granted by the Hearing Officer and the hearing was rescheduled for January 18, 1978. At the hearing, respondent moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the Notice of Hearing issued on November 21, 1977, by the Hearing Officer was defective in that it did not adequately describe the petitioner's Notice to Show Cause or attach it to the Notice of Hearing. The motion was denied upon a determination that respondent had adequately been placed on notice as to the nature of the offense charged and due to the fact that the Notice to Show Cause had been sent by certified mail to respondent and that the receipt thereof on August 13, 1977, by an authorized agent of respondent was not contested. Further, respondent's motion for continuance indicates that her counsel was aware of the subject matter of the charges. Additionally, if such had not been the case, respondent had sufficient opportunity during the period in which the case had been continued to seek amplification or clarification of the issues involved in the case as set forth in the Notice of Hearing.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Jennie E. Harrell, d/b/a W. D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle, 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida, holds license Number 30-82, Series 1 COP, issued by petitioner which permits the sale of beer for consumption on the premises. The license was in effect during August, 1976. (Petitioner's Exhibit l) An occupational license for 1975-76 issued by the City of Quincy, Florida, Number 394, was issued to the Lake Talquin Fish Market, 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida, on October 15, 1975, to engage in the occupation of merchant. A similar license in the same name at the same address, Number 395, and issued on the same date, authorized the licensee to engage in the occupation or business of retail sale of gasoline. City occupational license 1976-77, Number 298 ,issued by the City of Quincy to Lake Talquin Fish Market at 517 South Roberts Street, to engage in the business or occupation of merchant, was issued on September 30, 1976. The Lake Talquin Fish Market is located at 517 South Roberts Street. The official records show that the license was issued to Jenny Harrell of 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida, and that the 1975-76 license Number 394 was issued in the same name. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 10, supplemented by Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3) On August 15, 1976, at approximately 10:55 a.m., State Beverage Officers Gary Sams and Fred Miller met with a reliable informant, one Guy Williams, in the vicinity of respondent's licensed premises at 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida. After searching Williams for any money or alcoholic beverages on his person, Sams gave him $7.20 and instructed him to attempt to purchase whiskey at respondent's place of business, W. D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle. The officers observed Williams drive to the building in question, but could not see his subsequent actions. He returned approximately fifteen to twenty minutes later with a partially filled one-half pint bottle of Seagram's Seven Crown whiskey. Williams had entered respondent's premises and asked a woman behind the counter if he could purchase a half-pint of whiskey. She told him he would have to go next door. He thereupon entered the adjacent premises, Lake Talquin Fish Market, and ordered a half-hint of Seagram's Seven Crown whiskey from a man there. The man went in the back of the store and returned with a sealed one-half pint bottle labeled Seagram's Seven Crown. Williams paid $2.50 for the bottle, took a drink from it, and found that it was, indeed, whiskey. The bottle was thereafter labeled for identification by the beverage officers and placed in the evidence room of petitioner's Tallahassee office. However, it was destroyed by petitioner prior to the hearing. (Testimony of Sams, Miller, Williams) On August 22, 1976, the two beverage agents again met with Williams at the same location at approximately 9:30 a.m. Following the same procedures as before, Sams gave Williams $4.00 and instructed him to go to respondent's state- licensed premises to attempt to purchase liquor. The same sequence of events as on August 15th occurred, involving a woman at W. D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle, and a man at the Lake Talquin Fish Market. This time the purchase was for a one-half pint sealed bottle of Seagram's Golden Dry Gin for which Williams paid $2.50. Again, he drank out of the bottle and verified that it was gin. This bottle was turned over to the beverage agents who verified that it was gin by its smell, and it was tagged and placed in petitioner's evidence room in Tallahassee. It, too, was destroyed by petitioner prior to the hearing. (Testimony of Sams, Miller, Williams) On August 23, 1976, criminal complaints were filed by petitioner's representatives against respondent and others, and, on August 24, a search warrant was issued authorizing a search of the premises of the Lake Talquin Fish Market at 517 South Roberts Street, and warrants were issued for the arrest of respondent and the individuals who had allegedly sold the alcoholic beverages to Williams. At approximately 5:15 p.m. on August 28, Agent Miller, together with local police officers, served the search warrant on one Isaac Ford at the Lake Talquin Fish Market. A search of the premises failed to reveal the presence of alcoholic beverages. The agents observed a well-worn path leading approximately 15 or 20 feet to an adjacent condemned frame house, and also an electric wire running from the store to the house. Further, they discovered a light switch in the store which controlled a light in the northeast room of the house. They observed a quantity of liquor and wine bottles on the floor of that room. It was noted that the house was secured by a padlock. Upon Inquiry, Ford stated that he did not have the key to the lock. The agents then asked respondent, who was at her place of business, if she had the key. She answered in the negative. When asked if the whiskey that had been observed in the house belonged to her, she said that it did not, but that she owned the house and wanted the whiskey off the premises. The agents thereupon forced entry into the house and seized 265 bottles of alcoholic beverages found inside. The bottles were sealed and strips indicating that tax had been paid were on the bottles. Sixteen of the bottles were assorted brands of wine; the remainder were liquor. (Testimony of Sams, Miller, Fader, Petitioner's Exhibits 5-13)

Recommendation That a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00 be imposed against Jennie E. Harrell, d/b/a D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle, License Number 30-82, pursuant to Section 561.29(1)(h) and (4),F.S., for violation of Section 562.12(1), F.S. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Bayley,. Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Jack A. Harnett, Esquire Post Office Box 706 Quincy, Florida 32351 Charles A. Nuzum, Director Division of Beverage Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (3) 561.29562.12775.082
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SOUTHEASTERN FISHERIES ASSOCIATION, INC.; OSCAR THOMPSON; RICHARD RITTENHOUSE; RON BALL; AND FABIAN BOTHWELL vs MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, 97-004418RP (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 15, 1997 Number: 97-004418RP Latest Update: May 08, 1998

The Issue Whether proposed rules promulgated by the Florida Marine Fisheries Commission are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Marine Fisheries Commission (MFC) has proposed rules requiring use of bycatch reduction devices (BRD.) The proposed rules are applicable where trawling for shrimp is permitted in specified Florida waters within the Gulf of Mexico. The notice of proposed rulemaking was published in Volume 23, Number 30, Florida Administrative Weekly, July 25, 1997. The Petitioners have challenged the proposed rules, specifically the provisions prohibiting possession of an otter trawl (a type of trawling net) that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel without having a required BRD installed. All parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. The federal government requires BRDs in the Florida waters not impacted by the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding. The federal rules are intended to protect red snapper in the Gulf and weakfish and Spanish mackerel in the Atlantic Ocean. The MFC rules are intended to offer broader protection than federal rules, and are intended to protect the Gulf ecosystem rather than specific species of organisms. Shrimp trawls operating in the Gulf of Mexico harvest approximately 2.4 pounds of non-shrimp species for every pound of shrimp harvested. The MFC goal is to reduce the level of bycatch harvested by 50 percent. The proposed rules do not cover the “Big Bend grass beds” where trawling for shrimp is already prohibited. The proposed rules do not cover Florida’s northeast coast where other BRD rules are in effect. The Petitioners challenge the same provision in three separate rules. Proposed Rule 46-31.010(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In the Northwest Region, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 46-31.012(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In the Southwest Region, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 46-31.013(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In all waters of the Southeast Region outside nearshore and inshore Florida waters, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) On a shrimping boat, “otter trawl” nets are suspended from the ends of “outriggers” attached to the sides of the boat. When in use, the nets are dropped from the outriggers into the water. Once in the water, the nets are dragged along behind the boat, collecting shrimp and other marine species. The non-shrimp marine species collected are referred to as the “bycatch.” The phrase “rigged for fishing” means that the nets are shackled to the outriggers and are in a condition ready to fish, but are not yet in the water or being dragged along the bottom of the water. Nets attached to the outriggers of a shrimping boat and ready to be dropped into the water are rigged for fishing. Nets lying on the deck of the boat which are not attached to the outriggers are not rigged for fishing. It takes no more than a few minutes to attach the nets to the outriggers. The phrase being challenged in the proposed rules essentially prohibits a shrimp boat operator from suspending the nets above the water prior to dropping the nets into the water without having the BRD installed in the nets. Although there is no credible evidence indicating the reason shrimp boats leave the docks with nets in a position rigged for fishing, many apparently do so. There is no credible evidence suggesting any reason nets would be suspended from the outriggers other than in anticipation of initiation of shrimp harvest activity. There is no credible evidence that any impact would result from requiring that non-BRD equipped nets remain unrigged for fishing until outside of waters affected by the proposed rule. Use of the BRDs results in a substantial reduction of bycatch. There is no evidence that use of the BRDs results in any reduction in shrimp harvest. The evidence establishes that the reduction in bycatch will contribute towards the preservation of renewable marine fishery resources and will benefit the continuing health of the resources. There is no evidence that the proposed rules are unfair or inequitable to any persons including shrimp boat operators. The Petitioners assert that because the penalty for violations of the rules may eventually result in incarceration, the cited phrase creates a criminal presumption that a shrimp boat operator with non-BRD equipped nets is presumed to be fishing without a BRD. The evidence fails to support the assertion. There is no presumption being created by the proposed rule. The challenged rules are gear specifications for shrimp trawls, and are clearly within the realm of the MFC's rulemaking authority. The cited phrase does not prohibit the mere possession of a net without a BRD installed. The cited phrase prohibits suspension of a net from an outrigger without having a BRD installed in the net. There is no reason, other than in anticipation of immediately dropping the net into the water, that a trawl net must be suspended from an outrigger. The Petitioners assert that the rule would impact shrimp boat operators who are passing through Florida waters traveling to waters outside the areas impacted by the proposed rules. There is no evidence that the proposed rules would interfere with fishing operations. In the example of boat operators fishing outside Florida waters and using non-BRD equipped nets, compliance with the rule requires only that the nets remain unrigged for fishing while passing through Florida waters. The Petitioners assert that there are instances due to emergency, weather or otherwise, that may result in a shrimp boat operator working waters outside those covered by the proposed rules, raising non-BRD equipped nets and moving through into Florida jurisdictional waters. In such an event, the Petitioners assert that an operator could be subject to application of the rule even though the non-BRD equipped nets, still rigged for fishing, were not used in Florida waters. The Florida Marine Patrol will be responsible for enforcement of the proposed rules. Obviously, a Marine Patrol officer’s judgment will be required to determine the existence of an emergency and whether any official action is appropriate. A shrimp boat officer cited for violation of the proposed rules is entitled to challenge the application of the rule.

Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.56120.68
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STEPHEN E. ENGLISH vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 95-005781 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Stuart, Florida Nov. 29, 1995 Number: 95-005781 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 1999

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, had the sole authority to administer the Net Ban Assistant Program enacted in Section 370.0805, Florida Statutes. For purposes of this record, this program has been called the net buy-back program (or the program). The Petitioner, Stephen E. English, is a fisher who filed an application for assistance under the buy-back program on July 5, 1995. The Department received applications from many fishers who sought to participate in this program. Those fishers who were deemed eligible to receive assistance from the program were notified of a time and date certain to present their nets for buy-back. The Department advised all fishers that their claims would be processed on a first come, first served basis. The initial estimate of the total buy-back expense to the Department (and the assumption that the fund was sufficient to cover same) was based upon the types of nets listed on the buy-back applications which had been filed. For example, Petitioner listed that he would be selling 5,000 yards of gill net (49 meshes or less); 5,000 yards of gill net (50 meshes or more); 1,000 yards of beach, purse or seine net; and 4,000 yards of trammel net. Based upon the foregoing information, when the Department reviewed the Petitioner's application and the amounts applicable to each type of net was computed, it was presumed Petitioner would receive approximately $25,000.00 for his nets. This process was repeated for all applications filed and led the Department to believe that, based upon what the fishers had described in their applications, there would be sufficient funds to pay all fishers who were deemed eligible for all nets listed in their applications. When the Department made the decision to set appointments for the buy- back program it erroneously presumed the fishers would turn nets in as described in the applications. Therefore, although the appointments were to be on a first come, first served basis (based upon the date and time of the filing of the applications), the appointments were scheduled at various sites around the state on the basis of when applications were turned in, what nets were expected to be received, and total volume of work a location could be expected to do on a given day. Several buy-back sites were selected in an effort to accommodate the fishers hauling their nets in for sale. Had the Department used only one buy- back site, and set the appointments by time only, fishers traveling long distances to turn in their nets would have been inconvenienced. Delays inherent in the process of waiting for identification of nets and receiving them by the Department would have been greater than those incurred at the multiple sites. Since the Department did not expect any site to be able to handle more than 80 nets per day, the numbers of nets expected to be turned in also affected the scheduling of the appointments. None of these minor deviations from the first come, first served policy would have effected the buy-back program had the fishers, in fact, turned in nets according to their applications. That did not happen. Instead, when fishers presented nets for buy-back on the first days of the program in August, 1995, they turned in huge volumes of seine nets. The buy-back amount for a seine net was much greater than the other types of nets. As a result, the claims to the buy-back fund greatly exceeded the amounts initially computed by the Department. In fact, it became apparent that the fund could not repay fishers for all seines expected to be turned in. This impacted Petitioner because the first appointments for the buy- back program at Petitioner's buy-back site (Stuart or Salerno) began on September 5, 1995. Petitioner's appointment was for September 7, 1995 at 8:00 a.m. By September 5, 1995, the Department was in the process of evaluating claims and stopping the buy-back program. On September 6, 1995, at 5:00 p.m. the Department called a halt to the buy-back at all sites. On September 6, 1995, before the buy-back program was stopped, Petitioner attempted to sell his nets. He was advised by the Department's agents at the buy-back site that he would not be allowed to turn in his nets until his appointment time. Petitioner observed others, who had appointment times after his, being allowed to turn in their nets on September 6, 1995. The Department refused to purchase Petitioner's nets on September 6, 1995. The net purchase process can be described as follows: a fisher presented the net for purchase, it was identified by type, measured over a roller, and a voucher receipt issued. This procedure was repeated for each type of net turned in until all nets from a fisher were processed. Although unexpected by the Department some buy-back locations were able to process more than 80 nets per day using the described procedure. After the buy-back program was resumed, Petitioner was permitted to sell his nets but was advised he would only be paid for 1,200 yards of seine nets (the amount shown on his application). Petitioner was advised that the remainder of his nets would be acceptable in any other type other than seine net. Consequently, Petitioner was paid as follows: $11,608.68 for trammel nets, $6,999.60 for seine nets, and $10,382.51 for gill nets (50 meshes or more). Thus, the total Petitioner received for his nets was $28,990.79. The underlying problem with the buy-back program was caused when fishers who turned in nets ahead of Petitioner altered their nets to claim reimbursement as seine nets. Since the appointment letters did not advise fishers that they would only be able to sell the nets described on their applications, the fishers took advantage of the definition of "seine" net as then in effect and presented "seine" nets at the buy-back locations. In response to this definition issue, the Department enacted an emergency rule, 38BER95-1, to define the types of seine nets more particularly so that the integrity of the buy-back program was assured. Persons who were given vouchers for their "seine" nets who were later disallowed have filed a class action lawsuit against the Department. Petitioner did not receive a voucher for his nets on September 6, 1995, so he is not a member of the class action suit. Petitioner maintains he should have received a voucher for his nets on September 6, 1995; that he was treated differently than others whose nets were purchased at his site on September 5 and 6, 1995; and that he has been damaged and should receive a voucher from the net buy-back program in the amount of $55,000.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order denying Petitioner's claim for additional compensation based upon the nets returned under the buy-back program, and dismissing Petitioner's request for a voucher or to make him a member of the class action lawsuit. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5781 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 6, and 14 through 17 are accepted. Paragraphs 7 through 13, 18 and 19 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence, argument, or irrelevant. Further, it is concluded that Petitioner had no vested right to sell his nets before 8:00 a.m. September 7, 1995. Since the program had been suspended by that time, he was compensated according to the rules and his application at the next appointment date and time. Thus, he was paid all monies contemplated under his original application. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 18, and 22 through 38 are hereby accepted and adopted by reference. With regard to paragraph 19, it is rejected as repetitive. With regard to paragraph 20, it is rejected as irrelevant. With the correction to September 6, 1995 at 5:00 p.m., paragraph 21 is accepted. The Department bought no nets on September 7, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Louise T. Sadler, Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Stephen E. English, pro se Post Office Box 814 Port Salerno, Florida 34992 Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152

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ROBERT L. BANNERMAN AND GRACE B. BANNERMAN vs. DAVID HALFEN AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 83-001249 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001249 Latest Update: Apr. 04, 1985

Findings Of Fact Respondent David Halfen applied for a permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation authorizing construction of a footbridge across Little Red Fish Lake in Section 7, Township 3 South, Range 19 West in Walton County, Florida. The footbridge would be 490 feet long and four feet wide with a raised area five feet high in the middle permitting small boat traffic underneath. The bridge would be constructed from treated pilings, timbers and planks and the pilings would be jetted down into the sub-strate or bottom of Little Red Fish Lake. Mr. Cliff Rohlke was accepted as an expert witness in water quality. He is employed by the Department as an Environmental Specialist with the specific duties of dredge and fill inspector. In this capacity he conducts field appraisals, reviews and makes reports of biological impacts of dredge and fill projects in conjunction with applications filed with the Department for dredge and fill permits. In this regard, Mr. Rohlke went to the site of the project and made an assessment of both the long and short-term impacts of the project on water quality in Little Red Fish Lake. Mr. Rohlke made a biological appraisal of the subject project in evidence in this proceeding as Exhibit 1. It was thus established that the short-term impacts of the project would be limited to minor turbidity and sub-strate disturbance related to the placement of the pilings. Long-term impacts will be insignificant. Based upon his long experience as a dredge and fill inspector and biologist, Mr. Rohlke established that no significant problems or impairment of water quality are associated with the construction of such a pier or footbridge by using treated pilings and timbers. Mr. Richard Fancher was accepted as an expert witness in water quality. He is the Environmental Supervisor of the Department's northwest district, supervising the Department's permitting and enforcement program in the area of dredge and fill permitting. In his years of experience with the Department, he has reviewed some 3,000 dredge and fill applications. He evaluated Mr. Halfen's application for the proposed footbridge. His review of the proposed project was conducted with a view toward whether it complied with the standards of Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes and Chapter 17-3 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. He established that the water quality standards that the Department is charged with enforcing by these legal provisions would be complied with, with construction of the proposed project, in that the pilings for the pier or footbridge would be jetted into the sub-strate of the lake and turbidity curtains would be used to minimize the short-term deleterious effects of turbidity or sediment disturbance on the lake as a whole by confining such turbidity to the immediate area of the project. The project will not significantly affect fish and wildlife in the water body involved, nor impair water flow so as to be contrary to the public interest. Neither will any significant loss of fish or wildlife or fish or wildlife habitat be occasioned by installation of the subject bridge. Mr. Fancher was of the opinion that the bridge would impede and interfere with navigation to some extent, but not, in his opinion, so as to be contrary to public interest. Mr. Fancher, however, has not visited the site himself and has no direct knowledge as to how the lake is used in terms of navigation, fishing, water skiing and the like. Mr. Rohlke opined that navigation in terms of "normal boat traffic" would not be interfered with since on his brief inspection he saw no boats using the lake, and the bridge would have a single span raised to a five-foot elevation over the lake's surface for the purpose of permitting boats to pass under the bridge. Mr. Rohlke, however, spent only a period of less than an hour visiting the lake site and did not confer with any adjacent landowners to ascertain what uses they made of the lake. He did not measure the lake bottom depth but did acknowledge that it was of sufficient size to be used for both sailing and water skiing. He admitted that a portion of the lake would be cut off by the bridge, consisting of approximately two acres on the western side. The Petitioners, the Bannermans, as well as witnesses Klep and Hughes own property and homes on the western side of the lake and their access to the remainder of the approximately 50-acres of the lake would be partially cut off by the bridge. They would be denied some use and enjoyment of the majority of the lake. Mr. and Mrs. Bannerman have a home which fronts on the western edge of the lake. Mr. Bannerman has measured the lake and established that it is five to seven feet deep near the water's edge and approximately 12 to 15 feel deep in the center of the lake. He has a dock and a small boat on the lake and uses the boat for fishing and navigation of the lake. Fishermen frequently utilize the lake from a public access point. The lake is large enough to be used for normal recreational pursuits such as water skiing, sailing, and fishing. Mr. John Klep owns property bordering on the western edge of the lake. Access to the lake was an important consideration in his purchase of the property, and in his continuing use of it. The lake is in excess of six feet deep at his property and physically navigable. He does not wish his access to the entire lake to be restricted. Mr. Lyle Hughes has legal access to the lake conveyed to him by deed although his own property does not actually border the lake. Sailing has been his lifetime recreational pursuit and he desires to use the lake for sailing for himself and members of his family, especially the children in his family. The small sailboats for which the lake is suited generally have a mast of approximately 14 feet in height. Such a boat could not pass under the bridge if constructed as proposed, since the five-foot raised center span would only barely permit small power boats and their occupants to safely pass under it. In short, the subject bridge, while it permits small fishing and pleasure boats to pass under with their occupants, would preclude the adjacent landowners in the western end of the lake cut off by the bridge, from sailing beneath the bridge or water skiing on the lake, since their point of access for water skiing and other purposes is at their own property and it would be impossible to water ski in the lake since the bridge would not be navigable for water skiing boats and skiers. The only way sail boats could navigate under the bridge would be to use a motor, oars or paddles until the sailboat negotiates the bridge span, with attendant stepping and unstepping of the mast every time the boat passes under the bridge. This arrangement is totally impractical for those adjacent landowners to do in order to use the lake for sailing. Water skiers could not pass under a five-foot span for obvious reasons of safety. In short, it has been established that the proposed project comports with Department permitting requirements in terms of water quality impacts and impacts on fish and wildlife and fish and wildlife habitats. The project, however, has not been established to be in the public interest and not contrary to the public interest in terms of its impact on the rights of adjacent landowners to navigate the entire 52-acre lake which they presently have access to for the above-mentioned reasons. Any approval of the permit applied for must be in conjunction with a condition that the bridge be so constructed that sailboats can pass through without having to unstep their masts and water ski boats and skiers can pass through it, possibly through use of a movable span. An additional and more basic problem exists in approving this project as proposed. Department's Rule 17-1.203, Florida Administrative Code requires that a permit applicant execute and submit, with his application, an affidavit of ownership of the property involved in a dredge and fill project. The affidavit and rule requires that a permittee be either the record owner, lessee, record easement holder or an applicant to the record owner of the property for an easement to the property described in the application, and in the affidavit. Mr. Halfen submitted this affidavit with his application certifying that he was the record owner, lessee, or record easement holder of the property upon which the bridge was to be constructed and of the property landward of the construction site, and either had or would have the permission of all other persons with a legal interest in the property prior to undertaking the project. It is the policy of the Department to require the applicant to be the record owner of the submerged land, his lessee or easement holder and to submit the necessary affidavit of ownership or control. The rationale for this policy is so that the Department "will not knowingly issue a permit for dredging and filling or other activities which would constitute a trespass." 1/ The property involved at the project site is subject to an active title dispute being litigated in the Circuit Court. In dispute is the question of whether the title to the lake bottom is held by the Petitioners, the Bannermans or FDIC, Mr. Halfen or the State of Florida. The property was initially conveyed into private ownership by the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, in 1918 as shown by stipulated Exhibit 2 in evidence. The federal government thus conveyed the pertinent property, Lots 1 and 2 of Section 7 in Township 3 South of Range 19 West together with other unrelated land to one Carl Froholm. That conveyance transferred all of the land in Lots 1 and 2 without making reference to Little Red Fish Lake. It does not indicate any reservations of public rights in and to the waters located on that property. It does not indicate any reservation of title to the bottom of the lake to be held by the State or Federal governments. Thus, the legitimate title question now being litigated in the court, is whether the Petitioners, Mr. Halfen or the State of Florida own the lake bottom upon which the bridge will be constructed and not simply whether DNR approval for its use has been obtained. Resolution of that quiet title action is still pending and argument and legal authority has been extensively briefed and provided to the Hearing Officer in the form of the various parties' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and memoranda. 2/

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the application by David Halfen for a dredge and fill permit, as described above, be granted, provided the plans and construction of the proposed bridge are sufficiently altered so as to permit water skiers and sailboats to safely and simply navigate and pass under or through the area of the proposed bridge and provided that Mr. Halfen, at the conclusion of the pending quiet title action, can establish that he has ownership or other right of control of the property on which the project will be built. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57253.77
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