Findings Of Fact By application dated March 3, 1983, Respondent ITT Community Development Corporation (ITT) requested a permit from Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) to dredge 815 cubic yards of material from the Intracoastal Waterway In Flagler County, Florida, as part of the construction of a high-level concrete highway bridge over the intracoastal Waterway. The proposed bridge project will extend Palm Coast Parkway from the end of existing pavement to State Road A1A east of the Intracoastal Waterway, and thus complete the Interstate 95 connector link with coastal State Road A1A. At the present tine, there are two drawbridges across the Intracoastal Waterway some ten miles south at Flagler Beach. and approximately 15 miles north at Crescent Beach. Existing high bridges across the Intracoastal Waterway are further north and south of the proposed bridge project. (Testimony of Smith, ITT Exhibits 1, 9- 12) The proposed bridge is a fixed concrete bridge approximately 2,598 feet long and 52 feet, 7 inches in width. The bridge will have a minimum vertical clearance of 65 feet above mean high water and 66.4 feet above mean low water, with a horizontal clearance of 90 feet between fenders. It will involve a cast- in-place concrete deck set upon prestressed concrete columns. The bridge will be supported by sets of concrete beams and placed on top of pilings, which will be driven into the surface to a depth of approximately 80 feet. The center two support piers, which are the subject of the requested permit, will be set upon concrete seals constructed inside of cofferdams, which will be located within the right-of-way of the Intracoastal Waterway. It is the construction of these two piers within the limits of the cofferdam that involves the removal of material which is considered dredging pursuant to DER rules. (Stipulation) The cofferdams will be made of steel and will be driven into place to encompass the pier foundations, with the 815 cubic yards of material excavated from inside the cofferdams being placed on a barge and transported to the adjacent uplands as part of the bridge approach construction. During construction of each support pier, a turbidity curtain will be placed around the cofferdams and the barge. Bridge deck drains will be omitted over the Intracoastal Waterway, and first flush storm water runoff will be retained in a stormwater management system which meets the requirements of Chapter 17-25, Florida Administrative Code. Piles used in the construction of the two fenders shall be made of concrete rather than treated timber. Treated timber may be used for the horizontal wales, the catwalks, and other components of the fender system which do not extend below M.S.L. Reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the release of preserving chemicals by the timber components of the fender system will not adversely affect the waters of the Intracoastal Waterway in violation of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. Turbidity controls will be used during the the construction of the two piers in the Intracoastal Waterway if the level of turbidity produced exceeds 29 NTUs. (Stipulation, Greene) The bridge will connect two parcels of land under the ownership of ITT, and will facilitate access between Palm Coast Parkway and the State Road A1A. (Stipulation, ITT Exhibits 1, 9-12) After receiving the ITT application, DER solicited comments from adjoining landowners, the Flagler County Board of Commissioners, and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, but none were received. By letter dated April 13, 1983, the Department of Natural Resources gave its authority for the project under Section 253.77, Florida Statutes. An onsite inspection of the proposed site was made by DER in June 1982 and March 1983, who found that the project site was devoid of literal vegetation and that minimal impact could be expected from the project provided that turbidity is contained during construction. They further determined that the bridge pilings would not eliminate valuable habitat or alter the natural flow of the Intracoastal Waterway, a Class III body of water. Further, in view of the fact that the dredging activities would be isolated by the cofferdams, no turbidity problems re expected. On May 18, 1983, the DER District Manager issued a notice of its intent to issue the requested permit for the reason that reasonable assurance had been provided that the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed activity would not result in violation of water quality criteria under Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Cede, and that the proposed activity would not interfere with the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interests, or create an navigational hazard or impediment, or alter or impede the natural flow of navigable waters so as to be contrary to the public interests. The intent to issue provided that the permit would be subject to the condition that turbidity controls would be used during construction if the level of turbidity produced exceeds 50 JTU above background. (Testimony of Tyler, ITT Exhibits 2-5, 7) By Resolution No. 83-13, dated August 18, 1983, the Flagler County Board of County Commissioners expressed its support of the concept of the proposed project as long as the cost of construction is funded through ITT funds or bridge tolls. (ITT Exhibit 13) In their prehearing and posthearing stipulations, the parties agreed to the following: That reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the short-and long-term effects of the bridge construction will not adversely affect the surficial aquifer to such an extent that it will cause harm to its use by Petitioners as a potable water supply. That the construction and operation of the proposed bridge will not interfere with the conservation of the Florida Scrub Jay, the Gopher Tortoise, or the Indigo Snake. Reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the release of preserving chemicals by the timber components of the fender system will not adversely affect the waters of the Intracoastal Waterway in violation of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. Reasonable assurance has been provided by ITT that the short-term effects of turbidity will not adversely affect the waters of the Intracoastal Waterway in violation of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed bridge will not create a navigational hazard or a serious impediment to navigation, or substantially alter or impede the natural flow of navigable waters so as to be contrary to the public interests, and the proposed bridge will not result in the destruc- tion of oyster beds, clam beds, or marine productivity, including but not limited to destruction of natural marine habitats, grass- flats suitable as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life, and establish[ed] marine soil(s] suitable for producing plant growth of the type useful as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life or natural shoreline processes to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interests. If the permit is issued, it shall be issued with the following conditions: Turbidity controls will be used during construction of the two piers in the Intracoastal Waterway if the level of turbidity produced exceeds 29 NTUs above background. Piles used in the construction of the two fenders shall be made of concrete rather than treated timber. Treated timber may be used for the horizontal wales, the catwalks, and other components of the fender system which do not extend below M.S.L. In view of the above stipulations by the parties, the only remaining disputed issues of material fact are whether the proposed project will interfere with the conservation of the Florida panther and Florida black bear to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interests. The black bear is considered to be a "threatened" species of wildlife by the State of Florida. A wildlife survey of some 2,000 acres of land surrounding and including the project area during the period 1979-82 by an expert in the field of wildlife ecology revealed traces indicating the presence of the black bear on two occasions in a location east of the proposed project area. On those occasions, bear tracks were found east of State Highway A1A in a hammock area north of the bridge corridor in 1979. However, the signs were insufficient to indicate that there was a resident bear population in the area. Signs of the black bear are fairly common on the west side of the Intracoastal Waterway in swampy wilderness areas, such as Long's Creek area and Graham's Swamp. It is possible that, on occasion, a black bear may wander into or cross the bridge area; however, construction and operation of the bridge should have little or no adverse impact on any black bear population which is located either several miles south or north of the proposed bridge area. (Testimony of Brown) The Florida panther is classified as an "endangered" species by the State of Florida. The four-year survey of wildlife undertaken by ITT during the period 1979-82 failed to disclose any traces of the panther in the area surrounding the proposed project site. There are only approximately 20 to 30 Florida panthers in the state, and all are located to the south and west of Lake Okeechobee in the Everglades. The Florida panther requires a vast area of undisturbed habitat. Approximately 400 square miles are necessary for males and some 50 to 100 square miles for a female. They avoid populate areas. Several state personnel saw a tan catlike animal near the entrance to Washington Oaks State Gardens which is located a number of miles north of the proposed bridge site, on May 13, 1983. They reported to the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission that the animal was a Florida panther, and plaster casts of the animal's tracks were submitted to that agency for verification. However, the casts were insufficient upon which to base an identification of the animal as a Florida panther, and the park personnel admittedly lacked sufficient qualifications to determine if the animal was, in fact, a Florida panther. There have been other purported sightings of panthers in the general area during past and recent years by Petitioner Gerald D. Schatz and others who reported such sightings to him for investigation. However, it has never been confirmed that the said sightings were of the Florida panther. Although a suitable habitat for the panther is the Graham Swamp, that area is not large enough to be sustain the Florida panther, and It is unlikely that any of that species are present in the area of the proposed bridge. It is accordingly found that construction of the bridge would have no impact on the Florida panther. (Testimony of Brown, Wood, Ganson, Nichols, Schatz; Petitioner's Exhibits 3-5)
Recommendation That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the requested permit pursuant to Chapter 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, and Public Law 92-580, subject to standard conditions, and the special conditions set forth in paragraph 6 above of the Conclusions of Law herein. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1983.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Diane Hashil, has been a toll booth attendant for the Harbormaster of the City of Clearwater since July, 1992. On or about April 2, 1993, she was given a Letter of Reprimand for speaking in a discourteous tone of voice to a customer passing through her toll booth on March 20, 1993, a Level 2 offense under paragraph 2, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action: "Discourtesy to persons with whom an employee comes into contact while in the performance of duties " On December 17, 1993, the City gave the Respondent written notice that she was being suspended for two days, effective December 21 through 22, 1993, on charges that she violated Rule 14, Section 1, paragraph (e), of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater: "Has been offensive in his conduct or language toward his fellow employees, City officers, or the public." The specifications of the charge were: On November 11, 1993, Mr. Joe Lain, Water Safety Supervisor, in a memo to Mr. Held [the Harbormaster] and Mr. Hancock, related Ms. Hashil's continued unfriendly treatment of himself and other beachguards who pass through the toll plaza on a daily basis supervising Sand Key Park and Clearwater Beach. On November 17, 1993, Mr. Lee Achterhof, Lead Marine Facility Operator, wrote a memo concerning Diane Hashil's treatment of a customer. The customer lost quarters Ms. Hashil had given them and asked for more change. Ms. Hashil told them she had already given them change, turned her back on them and ignored them as traffic started backing up. This also is a Level 2 offense under paragraph 2, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action: "Discourtesy to persons with whom an employee comes into contact while in the performance of duties . . .." The guidelines provide for a letter of reprimand for the first such offense and a one- to four-day suspension for the second such offense. On the afternoon of Christmas day, December 25, 1993, a woman from Wesley Chapel named Sharon Kressl was driving her mother, Evelyn Campbell, and at least one friend sight-seeing on the Clearwater beaches. They became disoriented on Sand Key and found themselves approaching the Clearwater Pass Toll Bridge without money to pay the 75 toll. The Respondent was the attendant at the toll booth at the time. When Kressl tried to explain their predicament to the Respondent and ask to be allowed to turn around, the Respondent answered, in a manner considered by Kressl and Campbell to be curt and rude: "No. You have to pay and go through." She did not fully explain the City's policy that, after paying the one-way 75 toll and going over the bridge, they would be allowed to turn around and return across the bridge free of charge. She initially also did not explain the City's policy that someone without money to pay the 75 toll could agree to pay at a later date. When Kressl and Campbell asked if they could mail in the 75 , the Respondent got them an envelope and promise to pay that was pre-printed for that purpose. The Respondent got the car's license tag number to fill out the form and read them the part of it that said: "With my signature below, I do hereby agree that I was passed through the above mentioned toll facility without payment. I promise to pay $.75 within 72 hours or this slip will be turned over to the Marine Department for further action." Kressl, as driver, started to sign the form but saw that it was written for the signature of her mother, as owner of the vehicle, and signed her mother's name instead. After crossing the bridge onto Clearwater Beach, Kressl and Campbell realized that they could get home from Clearwater Beach without returning to Sand Key and that they did not have to turn around and return across the bridge. They drove across the bridge from Clearwater Beach to Clearwater and drove home along Alternate U.S. Highway 19. Both women were upset by what they considered to be the rudeness of the Respondent's curt manner. When they got back to their home in Wesley Chapel, Sharon Kressl decided to telephone a complaint. Kressl made at least two telephone calls that day, one to the police to get an address and telephone number for the supervisor of the toll booth attendants and one that by chance was answered by the Respondent, unbeknownst to Kressl. The Respondent told Kressl to call back the next morning to speak to a supervisor. The Respondent inquired as to the nature of the complaint. When Kressl explained it to her, the Respondent realized who Kressl was and that Kressl was complaining about the Respondent. After Kressl hung up, the Respondent wrote a memo denying any misconduct. Kressl made several telephone calls in the next several days trying to contact the Respondent's supervisor. Again, one of the calls was answered by the Respondent. This time, an argument ensued. The two women, in their testimony, gave diametrically opposed versions of the telephone call. The Respondent testified that she gave Kressl the telephone number of her supervisor, that the telephone call was conducted in a calm fashion and that, as soon as the Respondent identified herself to Kressl, Kressl hung up. Kressl, on the other hand, testified that, after the Respondent identified herself, a nasty argument ensued, during which Kressl threatened to have the Respondent fired, and the Respondent called Kressl a "bitch." It certainly would be a clear injustice if Kressl were lying about the telephone conversation. But, taking all of the relevant evidence into consideration, it is found that the two women did have an argument and that the Respondent did use the term "bitch" to describe either Kressl or her conduct. As for the incident on December 25, 1993, Kressl and Campbell assert that the Respondent was "discourteous" or "offensive"; the Respondent maintains that she was not. Those concepts are inherently difficult to define precisely. Gross discourtesy and grossly offensive conduct might be easy to recognize, but it is difficult to describe the precise borderline between acceptable manners versus manners that are discourteous and offensive. In addition, different people's perceptions of behavior may not be entirely objective. People can be overly sensitive and perceive as discourteous and offensive behavior that objectively is not; on the other hand, some people cannot recognize their own discourteous and offensive behavior and are oblivious to the effect it has on others. Bearing in mind these difficulties, it is found that, taking all of the relevant evidence into consideration, the Respondent's behavior towards Kressl and Campbell on December 25, 1993, was discourteous and offensive. It is found that she was curt and that she was not forthcoming in helping Kressl and Campbell resolve their dual predicament of not wanting to cross the Clearwater Pass Toll Bridge and not having the 75 to pay for the toll. She should have been more helpful and more polite.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the City of Clearwater Civil Service Board enter a final order suspending the Respondent without pay for three days. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1363 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5.-6. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. First sentence, accepted but subordinate and not necessary. The rest is argument or subordinate and not necessary. Argument or subordinate and not necessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2 Accepted and incorporated. 3.-4. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that her "priors" "consisted mainly of" those things. Accepted that she was warned about those things, too, but subordinate and not necessary. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Rejected. (Her motivation was not established by the evidence.) Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found that they asked to "back up" or that she explained the "U-turn" policy. (She said they could not turn around or back up and that they had to pay the toll.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 11.-15. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The Respondent thought it was Evelyn Campbell because that was the name she had on her paperwork and she thought the driver was Campbell.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Other City employees also assumed that Campbell was telephoning because her name was on the paperwork.) Accepted and incorporated (although Campbell did speak to City personnel at some point in the process.) 19.-21. Rejected that they were lying. They may have been confused. It is believed, as found, that Kressl began to sign her own name, saw that the form required her mother's signature, and signed her mother's name (contributing to the Respondent's confusion who was who), but it is possible that she passed the form to her mother to sign, unbeknownst to the Respondent (likewise contributing to the Respondent's confusion who was who.) 22. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. 23.-24. Accepted and incorporated. (After crossing the Clearwater Pass Bridge from Sand Key to Clearwater Beach, they went over the bridge from Clearwater Beach to Clearwater.) In part rejected as contrary to facts found (that they asked to back up); otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found and to the evidence. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 J. Robert McCormack, Esquire Wiggins & McCormack 3040 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard Suite 100 Clearwater, Florida 34619 Michael Laursen Secretary City of Clearwater Civil Service Board P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748
The Issue The issue in this administrative proceeding is whether the Florida Department of Transportation’s ("DOT" or "the Department") denial of Petitioner’s, Network Engineering Services, Inc. d/b/a Bolton Perez & Associates ("BPA"), 2019 application for qualification pursuant to section 337.105, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-75, was for good cause due to Petitioner’s participation in the construction of the Florida International University ("FIU") City Prosperity Project ("FIU Bridge project").
Findings Of Fact DOT is the state agency responsible for coordinating the planning, construction, and maintenance of a safe, viable, and balanced state transportation system. DOT relies on qualified contractors and professional consultants to provide services for Florida’s transportation needs. Section 287.055(3), Florida Statues, requires that any firm or individual desiring to provide professional services to a governmental agency must first be certified by the agency as qualified, pursuant to law and the regulations of the agency. The agency must find that the firm or individual to be employed is fully qualified to render the required service. Among the factors to be considered in making this finding are the capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, and experience of the firm or individual. Each agency is also required to evaluate professional services, including capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, and experience of the firm or individual. Section 337.105 and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-75 also governs the qualifications of professional consultants and other contractual services providers to DOT. Section 337.105 authorizes DOT to deny or suspend an application for qualification based upon a determination of "good cause," which includes, but is not limited to, nine illustrative examples specified in section 337.105(1)(a)–(i). DOT may, for good cause, deny or suspend for a specified period of time a person or firm from consideration for award of a professional service contract for a particular type of work. BPA is a multidiscipline engineering firm specializing primarily in transportation related engineering services, including bridge design, roadway design, civil works, construction engineering inspection ("CEI"), and program and construction management. At the time of the hearing, BPA had approximately 38 employees. BPA was formed by Joaquin "Jake" Perez, P.E., and John Bolton, P.E., in 1997 to provide transportation-related engineering services. BPA’s CEI qualifications are independent from, and do not necessarily mirror, BPA’s design qualifications. In some instances, BPA was qualified to serve as a CEI for categories of structures that the firm was not qualified to design. This is because BPA was internally divided into two core groups: design and CEI. Since inception, BPA’s design group was and continues to be headed by Mr. Perez, and the CEI group headed by Mr. Bolton. The operations of BPA’s CEI and design groups were completely segregated within the firm. CEI personnel did not work on design projects, and design personnel did not work on CEI projects. As President, Mr. Perez was involved in pursuing contracts for CEI services, but CEI services were provided only by CEI personnel. In or about 1999 or 2000, BPA first became qualified to respond to DOT’s request for qualifications to provide professional services to DOT. Mr. Bolton qualified the firm to provide CEI services, and Mr. Perez qualified it to provide design services. BPA remained qualified with the Department on an annual basis for both CEI and design work for nearly 20 years until July 2019. At that time, DOT issued a NOID removing BPA from consideration for award of professional service contracts with DOT for 2019- 2020. DOT issued the NOID based solely upon a report issued by OSHA and the investigation of NTSB regarding the collapse of the FIU Bridge project on March 15, 2018. THE FIU PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE PROJECT In 2014, DOT entered into a Local Agency Program ("LAP") Agreement with FIU for its pedestrian bridge project, a Category II, complex bridge, that would be constructed along Southwest 109th Avenue and Southwest 8th Street in the City of Sweetwater, Florida (the "project"). As the supervising agency of the LAP program, DOT was responsible for supervising and authorizing work by the local agency. The design of a Category II structure required an independent peer review by a firm with no other involvement in the project, which was prequalified with DOT. In September 2016, FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc. ("FIGG"), the Engineer of Record ("EOR") for the project, hired Louis Berger to review FIGG’s plans for bridge foundation, substructure (end bents and center tower), and superstructure. Those plans included construction sequencing (including construction sequence drawings), the covered main span pre-casting, transport of main span, and placement of the main span between end bent 1 (south pier) and the pylon pier. The plans also included the post-tensioning stressing and destressing sequences. As the Local Agency, FIU was in responsible charge of the day-to-day activities, including project safety issues. Alfredo Reyna, P.E., was the Department’s LAP Coordinator for the project. Mr. Reyna is a licensed professional engineer, although he is not a structural engineer. In January 2016, FIU entered into a design-build contract1 with Munilla Construction Management, LLC ("MCM"), to design the bridge and to perform all work and furnish all materials, equipment, supplies, and labor necessary to construct the project. The bridge was designed by FIGG, a member of the MCM design-build team and the EOR. FIGG is a reputable designer who has been recognized internationally for its work. FIGG has experience in designing complex bridges, such as the Sunshine Skyway Bridge near Tampa, Florida. On September 23, 2016, FIU entered into a Standard Professional Services Agreement with BPA for CEI services (the "CEI Contract"). At the 1 The interaction of the local agency, contractor, designer, EOR, DOT, and the CEI is different between a "conventional" and a "design build" bridge project. In a conventional project, the designer is hired by DOT or owner to create a new bridge. The design goes through a review process at DOT and a final set of plans goes to bid for a contractor. By the time the contractor is selected, the EOR has completed the plans. The EOR is essentially "on call" for the construction phase of the project because the design work is complete. The CEI begins its work when the contractor begins construction. If there is a question in the field, the CEI makes a request for information from the EOR. DOT supplies design and construction managers throughout the process. In contrast, for a "design build" project, the owner has a conceptual plan for the project. The designer and contractor bid for the job based on the preliminary conceptual plan. The Designer/EOR and contractor work hand in hand from the beginning of the project and are in constant communication. The CEI begins work when the contractor starts work on the project. The CEI facilitates the resolution of any issues between the EOR/designer and the contractor who continue to plan throughout the duration of the project. Like a conventional build project, DOT has construction managers and design project managers involved from the beginning of the project. If concrete cracking occurs, it is the CEI's obligation to document the cracking and speak to people in the process who can assess and address the cracking. For a conventional build bridge, if cracking is observed, the CEI documents it, copies DOT, and sends it to the EOR for assessment. The EOR provides an assessment by conducting a site visit. The EOR then prepares an Engineering Assessment Report (EAR) for the project team. In a design build bridge job, if cracks are observed, they are documented by the CEI who notifies the EOR. The EOR, who is already on the job site, assesses the cracks and works with the contractor to devise a solution. time, John Bolton was the CEI qualifier for BPA. As CEI, BPA was to act as the liaison between the project owner (FIU) and the contractor (MCM). The CEI handles quality control, materials, schedules, payments, documents the entire process, and monitors the project. Jose Morales, P.E., worked under John Bolton as the Senior Project Engineer for the project. Mr. Morales first obtained his professional engineer’s license in 2006. He had approximately 12 years of CEI experience at the time of the collapse. Although he was the Senior Project Engineer for the project, Mr. Morales had little-to-no design experience. Mr. Morales was first involved in the early stages of pursuing the CEI Contract for the project. After the project was awarded, BPA was not involved in the design phase, but was later brought back into the fold beginning in October 2016, when BPA received the Notice to Procced and fully staffed its CEI scope of services when construction was scheduled to begin in or about March of 2017. The "Scope of Services" section (Exhibit B) to the CEI Contract required BPA to be prequalified with the Department in the following work categories: Work Type 10.1--Roadway CEI; Work Type 10.4--Minor Bridge and Miscellaneous Structures CEI; and Work Type 10.5.1--Major Bridge CEI- -Concrete. For the FIU bridge project, Categories 10.1 and 10.4 were considered to be the "major" type of work while 10.5.1 was considered to be the "minor" type of work. As expressly permitted by the Standard Professional Services Agreement, BPA satisfied the 10.5.1 prequalification requirement through its sub-consultant, The Corradino Group, Inc. ("Corradino"). BPA’s scope of services for the project did not include any design responsibilities. BPA performed constructability review of the plans as part of its CEI scope of work, but it did not review the plans or drawings on a technical level. The FIU bridge was a Complex Category II structure as defined by the Department’s Design Manual. The structure had a unique, complex design that was meant to be a signature, architectural feature for the area. The relevant construction sequence for the main span (Span 1) of the FIU bridge consisted of: casting the main span superstructure in the casting yard; installing post-tension bars in the diagonal and vertical members of the structure; stressing of the main-span post-tensioning while the main span is in the casting yard; removing the temporary formwork and supports; transporting the main span from the casting yard using a self- propelled modular transporter and placing the structure in a "simply supported" condition on the south pier and pylon pier; and de-tensioning truss members 2 and 11. Generally, cracks in concrete are common and are not, in and of themselves, a cause for concern. On a design-build job, when cracks manifest themselves in a concrete element, the CEI must document the cracking and report it to the design-build team, which includes the EOR. Depending on the nature of the cracks, the CEI may request an EAR from the EOR. This process is set out in section 400, subsection 400-21, of DOT’s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (the "Standard Specifications"). DOT's Construction Project Administration Manual ("CPAM") includes the procedures to be followed by a CEI in addressing cracks in concrete. The CPAM requires that the CEI identify and document its observations and convey the information to the EOR for a final disposition as to the potential danger of the crack or the need for further evaluation. The FIU Bridge Cracking and Inspections by BPA On or about February 6, 2018, while Span 1 of the bridge was still in the casting yard, BPA became aware of certain cracks that had developed in the structure. Mr. Morales personally inspected the structure after the tendons on truss members 2 and 11 were stressed, and he noted that cracks had developed in other locations on the bridge. The cracks observed were very small, approximately 0.004 of an inch wide. On February 13, 2018, BPA submitted Crack Report #1 to MCM, FIU, and Corradino, documenting the cracks that had developed in the concrete truss members after completing the post-tensioning operations in the casting yard. Despite the small size of the cracks, BPA requested that the EOR provide an assessment of the cracks. FIGG, the EOR, responded to BPA’s request by stating that the current condition observed was temporary in nature and that the cracks were not an issue. BPA exercised independent professional judgment when it exceeded the requirements of section 400 of the Standard Specifications and the CPAM by documenting and reporting these initial cracks. In late February 2018, before the placement of the main bridge span on the permanent pylon and south pier supports, cracks were observed in certain truss members. BPA prepared and submitted Crack Report #2 to FIU and MCM on February 28, 2018, documenting the size and location of these cracks and requested that FIGG evaluate the cracks and provide a disposition. In its report, BPA called attention to certain cracks that were significant in size. As CEI, BPA was not qualified to determine whether these larger cracks posed an imminent danger of collapse. Further, BPA’s design team was not involved in the design of the bridge and was not qualified to evaluate these cracks from a design engineering perspective due to the category and complexity of the bridge. At this point, the cracks were not "structural" as defined by Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. Cracks more than one-half inch in depth are deemed "structural" and trigger the obligation of the CEI to notify the EOR. Nevertheless, BPA, again, exercised its independent professional judgment above and beyond the requirements of the Standard Specifications and CPAM by requesting that the report be forwarded to the EOR and requesting that the EOR provide a response and disposition of the cracks. On March 7, 2018, FIGG replied to Crack Report #2, stating, in part, that the cracks appeared small, that they were not concerned about these types of cracks in the particular region shown in the report, and that MCM would need to seal the cracks in accordance with the Department’s specifications. As the EOR, FIGG did not have any structural concerns regarding the cracks in Crack Report #2. On March 7, 2018, FIGG representatives were on site and observed the cracks referenced in Crack Report #2. After observing the cracks, FIGG did not delay the bridge movement that was scheduled to take place three days later on March 10th. As of March 8, 2018, BPA had no concerns regarding the integrity of the structure or public safety because the EOR had looked at the cracks in- person and assured the project team that the cracks were not a safety issue or structurally significant. These assurances came two to three days prior to the bridge being moved over Southwest 8th Street and placed on the permanent pylon and pier supports. The bridge movement was not delayed due to the cracks observed by the EOR. On March 10, 2018, Span 1 was moved from the casting yard and placed on the permanent pylon and south pier supports. After the placement and de-tensioning of diagonal members 2 and 11, cracks began to appear at the construction joint of diagonal 11, the deck, and at the top of diaphragm II. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 13, 2018, two days before the collapse, BPA circulated a draft of Crack Report #3 to MCM, recommending further monitoring and documenting of the cracks to determine whether they were active or dormant, and requesting that BPA be informed of the outcome of the EOR’s EAR and course of action. At 5:18 p.m. on March 13, 2018, the EOR responded to MCM with additional recommendations and stated "[a]gain, we have evaluated this further and confirmed that this is not a safety issue." Because BPA’s design team was not involved in the project, no BPA design personnel were aware of the documented cracking on the structure until sometime after Crack Report #3 was generated. At that time, Mr. Morales provided Mr. Perez with a copy of a draft of Crack Report #3. Mr. Perez briefly reviewed the draft report and confirmed with Mr. Morales that the CEI team had elevated the issue to the EOR. At all times in the documented communication relating to the cracks, the EOR and members of the FIGG design team represented to BPA that the cracks were not a safety concern, without reservation. Starting on March 13, 2018, FIGG directed MCM to implement an initial, temporary measure to address observed cracking in the member 11/12 nodal region. At that time, BPA was not aware of this communication between the EOR and the contractor. To restore the temporary support conditions when the structure was in the casting yard, MCM placed shims between diaphragm II and the pylon on March 13, 2018. FIGG also directed re-tensioning the post-tensioning rods in truss member 11 to begin on March 15, 2018. The re-tensioning operation was made as a "rushed request" to the post-tensioning subcontractor by MCM on March 14, 2018. "FIGG recommends to stress these PT bars as soon as possible but again, this is not a safety concern." MARCH 15, 2018, AND THE BRIDGE COLLAPSE Rather than waiting for the EAR, BPA once again exercised its independent, professional judgment and went above and beyond the requirements of the Standard Specifications, CPAM, and Contract Documents when it further escalated the issue of the cracks by calling for a meeting with the EOR. On the morning of March 15, 2018, a meeting requested by BPA and coordinated by MCM, was held in Miami, Florida. Representatives of FIGG, MCM, DOT, FIU, and BPA were present. At the March 15th meeting, BPA first became aware of the EOR’s instruction to MCM to proceed with a second temporary measure. This subsequent temporary measure was to reinstate the post-tensioning compression force back in member 11 as per the previous construction phase. As explained by the EOR, both temporary measures (shims and re- tensioning) were intended to restore the temporary support conditions when the structure was in the casting yard. Prior to the start of the meeting, the EOR, other FIGG engineers, and DOT’s LAP Coordinator inspected the bridge and the cracks in the nodal region of members 11/12. Only FIGG had structural engineers at the meeting. No other engineers present at the meeting had a background in structural engineering, including those in attendance on behalf of BPA. The meeting was called for purposes of discussing the concrete cracking on Span 1, and specifically the concrete cracking in nodal connection between truss members 11 and 12 and the bridge deck. At this meeting, BPA informed FIGG that the cracks in the bridge were lengthening and growing daily. Though not formally invited, Mr. Reyna attended this meeting in his capacity as DOT’s consultant/Assistant LAP Coordinator. At the March 15th meeting, the EOR presented FIGG's assessment of the cracking after having reviewed the three BPA crack reports and having personally inspected the cracks on at least the following two occasions: (1) prior to the bridge being moved from the casting yard over Southwest 8th Street; and (2) on the morning of the March 15th meeting. The EOR’s presentation consisted of a lengthy and comprehensive PowerPoint slide presentation on the conditions of the bridge, structural analysis by calculations and 3D modeling of the loads and forces the area of member 11/12 nodal region cracks, and an evaluation of the safety of the span over Southwest 8th Street for workers and the public. Throughout the March 15th meeting, BPA exercised its independent professional judgment by actively participating in the EOR’s presentation, questioning and challenging the EOR. For example, BPA: inquired as to whether temporary shoring was needed; sought clarification regarding the mechanism being used to capture the load from the node and whether it would have to be integrated with the pylon diaphragm; requested clarification on the amount of transferred post- tensioning assumed for the nodal shear stability analysis; inquired as to whether there were any restrictions on load; inquired as to whether there would be a crack monitoring plan; requested a copy of the EOR’s presentation; inquired as to whether it had been peer reviewed and commented that it wanted more eyes on the presentation calculations; and BPA requested a copy of the stressing procedure that was being recommended by the EOR. Throughout the presentation, and during the question and answer phase of the meeting, the EOR assured BPA and the other attendees that the structure was safe. These assurances were based on statements made by the EOR as well as its calculations and modeling, which were part of its slide presentation at the meeting. In the presentation on the slide entitled "Safety," FIGG stated that "…[it] had conducted sufficient supplemental/independent computations to conclude that there is not any concern with safety of the span suspended over the road." At the end of the presentation, the EOR concluded the meeting with "[b]ased on conservative calculations, it is concluded that the design meets LRFD strength requirements for this temporary condition and therefore there is no safety concern relative to the observed cracks and minor spalls." During the meeting, the EOR stated that some cracking similar to the ones on the structure, were expected. The EOR further stated during the meeting that the top deck spalls could not be replicated, but that the spalled areas were minor and they should be repaired during the next phase of work when the pylon concrete was to be placed. No engineer at the meeting, including DOT's representative, Mr. Reyna, requested or recommended a complete road closure to protect the public safety or that the bridge be shut down. BPA had no reason to request a full road closure of Southwest 8th Street. There was no preplanned complete road closure, there was no maintenance of traffic ("MOT") deficiency, and, based on the EOR’s presentation, BPA was reasonably satisfied that no safety issues required a road closure. Towards the end of the meeting on March 15th, MCM informed BPA that a specialty contractor, Structural Technologies ("VSL"), was already onsite to conduct the re-tensioning operation. Without BPA’s knowledge, VSL had already mobilized on site to perform the remedial re-tensioning. BPA was not involved in pre-coordination for the re-tensioning operation. Therefore, BPA’s sub-consultant, Corradino, was not onsite to participate in monitoring of the re-tensioning procedure. Corradino’s role, as BPA's sub-contractor, was that of a 10.5.1 CEI (Major Bridge CEI--Concrete). Corradino was responsible for monitoring and documenting the post-tensioning operations. The post-tensioning operation after placement of the span had already occurred and therefore, Corradino was not on-site on March 15, 2018. Based on the safety assurances and conservative calculations presented by the FIGG EOR that the structure was safe, BPA, and the other professional engineers present at the meeting, including those representing FIU and DOT, followed the recommendations of the FIGG EOR to bring the main span condition back to its pre-existing state when the span was in the casting yard. BPA did not have the expertise or the contractual duty to perform its own analysis of the cracking on this complex bridge and override, or even call into question, FIGG’s unequivocal assessment that the bridge was safe. During the restressing operation of member 11, the roadway below the bridge had two westbound lanes closed as per the blanket, two-lane, closure permit issued by DOT. This blanket, two-lane, closure permit was obtained by MCM to provide workspace underneath the bridge to conduct the remedial action. MCM obtained the blanket, two-lane, closure permit from the Department the morning of March 15, 2018, before conducting the remedial action. A CEI’s authority to request a partial or complete road closure is defined by the contract plans and roadway closure permits, which is implemented using the procedures outlined by the CPAM and the CEI Scope of Services of the CEI Contract. A CEI is authorized to request the contractor to either partially or fully close a road if there is an MOT deficiency, as contemplated by CPAM Section 9.1.8--"Recommended Action to Shut Down a Project Due to MOT Deficiencies." Lastly, a CEI has authority to request a partial or full road closure if it is aware of a safety issue. None of these conditions existed on the project in the days leading up to the collapse in light of the EOR’s comprehensive presentation regarding the cracking conditions of the bridge, strength in the area of member 11/12 nodal region, safety of the span over Southwest 8th Street, and repeated, unequivocal reassurances that the structure did not pose a safety concern. Ultimately, BPA’s authority to request a partial or complete road closure on the project was a collective effort with the Department and FIU. BPA did not have the authority or ability to act on its own to close the road. The FIU Pedestrian Bridge collapsed during the re-tensioning of the truss member 11 post-tensioning rods on the afternoon of March 15, 2018. Six people died as a result of the FIU bridge collapse, including one bridge worker and five vehicle occupants. Ten people were critically injured as a result of the FIU bridge collapse, including two BPA employees, Mr. Morales and Carlos Chapman. Mr. Chapman was on the canopy of the bridge during the re- tensioning operation, observing the work being performed by VSL and communicating the progress to Mr. Morales who was on the deck of the bridge. Because of the representations made by the EOR, neither Mr. Chapman nor Mr. Morales was concerned for his own safety or well-being when they went on the bridge on the day it collapsed. BPA’s role, responsibilities, and scope of work on the FIU Bridge project as the CEI was that of a contract administrator, not as a structural engineer with the capability to analyze the structural behavior of the bridge sufficient to determine if the cracks posed any danger of collapse. BPA had no basis, ability, or contractual obligation, to perform its own analysis of this complex structure sufficient to override the FIGG EOR’s unequivocal safety assessment and recommendations. BPA performed its CEI duties and utilized its independent professional judgement when it documented and monitored the cracks and requested an immediate structural evaluation by the FIGG EOR. Ultimately, the bridge collapse was caused by a fundamental design error. THE OSHA AND NTSB INVESTIGATIONS Shortly after the collapse, both OSHA and NTSB began investigating the causes of the collapse. OHSA completed its investigation and released a written report of its findings in June 2019.2 The June 2019 OSHA report was 2 DOT failed to enter into evidence the OSHA report on which it relies. However, prior to the final hearing, DOT filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of Reports Issued by Federal Agencies Concerning the FIU Bridge Collapse ("Motion"). The Motion was opposed by BPA on the basis that the first OSHA report was not final because a second report was issued, and is hearsay. By Order dated January 24, 2020, the undersigned officially recognized both the issued without prior review or comments from all party members who willingly cooperated with and were involved in the investigation, including NTSB and BPA. OSHA released an amended report on the collapse of the FIU Bridge project in July 2019; however, none of the amendments in the report pertained to the actions of BPA on the FIU Bridge project. NTSB completed its investigation and issued its report in October 2019. Significantly, no evidence was presented at the final hearing regarding from whom either agency conducted the investigations or drafted the reports, the qualifications or expertise of the investigators, the methodology used in the investigations, or the ability of any of the participants in the investigation to rebut the findings or conclusions. BPA willingly participated in both the OSHA and NTSB investigations, working with investigators and providing them with information, photographs, and details on the FIU Bridge project. Both OSHA and NTSB also conducted interviews of BPA personnel involved with the FIU Bridge project as part of their investigations. In its report, OSHA found that BPA failed to classify the concrete cracks, which were structural in nature, in accordance with DOT requirements. OSHA determined that BPA, as CEI, was expected to exercise its own independent professional judgment in accordance with their contract with FIU and DOT requirements. With intimate knowledge of extensive initial OSHA report and the NTSB report. Accordingly, references to the report in this Recommended Order are based upon the official recognition. As noted in the Order on the Motion, official recognition of the OSHA and NTSB reports, however, does not make the statements contained therein automatically admissible. "The distinction between noticing the contents of a record and noticing the truth of the contents resembles the distinction in the hearsay doctrine between offering an out-of-court statement simply to show it was said, and offering it for the truth of the matter asserted." C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 201.1 (2011 Edition)(quoting Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6337). Although the existence of the report and its findings were officially recognized, the greater weight of the evidence supports that the contents were not accurate as to the exercise of independent judgment of BPA. cracking on the bridge, BPA failed to recognize the bridge was in danger of collapsing, and did not recommend to FIU, MCM, or others to close the street and shore the bridge, regardless of the opinion held by the EOR. As a result, OSHA imposed a monetary fine on BPA for its conduct and failure to take appropriate action in the days leading up to the collapse of the main bridge span. In its October 2019 report (issued after the NOID to BPA in this case), NTSB found that beginning with the cracking identified on February 24, 2018, the distress in the main bridge span was active, continued to grow, and was well documented by all parties involved in the design, construction, and oversight of the bridge. Neither FIU, MCM, FIGG, nor BPA took responsibility for declaring that the cracks were beyond any level of acceptability and did not meet DOT standards. Further, NTSB concluded that under the terms and conditions of the CEI Contract, BPA had the authority to direct or authorize partial or complete road closures as necessary, acting in concert with DOT and FIU; however, none acted to close the road under the bridge, contributing to the severity of the impact of the bridge collapse. BPA POST-COLLAPSE ACTIVITIES AND 2018 APPLICATION FOR QUALIFICATION On May 3, 2018, BPA submitted its Request for Qualification for the July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019, fiscal year ("2018 Application"). BPA’s 2018 Application was for the same Work Groups that would eventually be included in the 2019 Request for Qualification. Each work category is tied to a distinct job function. There is no relationship or similarity between CEI services (Work Group 10) and the other work groups. On June 27, 2018, DOT accepted BPA’s Request for Qualification in all work categories. In processing the application, the Department did not ask BPA any questions regarding its involvement in the project, offer any criticisms of BPA in response to the application, request to interview any BPA employees, or raise any concerns at all regarding BPA’s participation in the project. From the date of the collapse on March 15, 2018, to December 2018, DOT awarded two contracts to BPA directly for CEI and design services, respectively. During the same period, DOT allowed BPA to participate as a qualified sub-consultant on one CEI contract, three design contracts, and one traffic task work order contract. During the 2018-2019 fiscal year, before DOT attempted to suspend BPA’s qualifications, BPA was able to win several jobs in both the prime and sub-consultant role, including projects in which BPA would be providing CEI services. In October 2018, approximately seven months after the collapse, BPA applied to change its CEI qualifier from John Bolton to Jose Morales because John Bolton wanted to retire. DOT approved the request and did not object or raise any concerns with respect to Jose Morales serving as BPA’s qualifier for CEI services. On December 19, 2018, nine months after the collapse, DOT expressed concern for the first time about BPA’s role in the bridge project, staffing of current DOT projects, quality assurance/quality control ("QA/QC") plans, and professional liability insurance. DOT sent BPA a "Qualifications Letter of Concern," stating that it had "serious concerns regarding [BPA]’s involvement as the Construction Engineering Inspection consultant on the Florida International University (FIU) pedestrian bridge project[.]" DOT requested in its letter, among other things, "a detailed explanation of the firm’s actions on the FIU pedestrian bridge project and… any controls or changes in personnel, policies or practices that [BPA] has implemented subsequent to the collapse." On December 21, 2018, BPA responded to the Letter of Concern addressing each concern raised by the Department, in detail, including providing a copy of its Certificate of Liability Insurance demonstrating that there was no lapse in professional liability insurance coverage. On February 12, 2019, DOT responded to BPA’s correspondence dated December 21, 2018, requesting additional detail from BPA relative to its revised QA/QC plan and punctuated the correspondence by stating that DOT would refuse to process any further qualification requests from BPA, including ministerial prequalification name changes, until the matter was addressed to the Department’s satisfaction. Around this time, BPA submitted a request to change its name with DOT to reflect its business name with the Division of Corporations. BPA requested that DOT update this information on its website, but DOT refused to process the request due to its concerns with BPA’s qualifications. On February 20, 2019, BPA provided further detail regarding the specific policies and procedures that have been implemented to its CEI services. Specifically, BPA provided extensive detail regarding its revised QA/QC plan, which included a section dedicated to Category II type bridge structures and included a copy of the revised QA/QC program for DOT review. DOT never responded or requested any additional information in this regard. On March 15, 2019, one year to the day after the collapse, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Suspend BPA’s existing certificate of qualifications. DOT attempted to suspend BPA’s qualifications in all Work Groups and declare BPA non-responsible for a period of one year for good cause. DOT further claimed that BPA "failed to adequately address the Department’s concerns regarding the firm’s performance of the contract, and the [BPA] staff directly involved with the FIU project who continue to work on other Department structural contracts." No further explanation was provided as to how BPA failed to address these concerns. BPA timely responded to the Notice of Intent to Suspend by way of a Notice of Contest, requesting an administrative hearing on the issues raised therein. Despite the Notice of Contest, DOT suspended BPA’s qualification, and sent written notice to its various offices stating, among other things, that BPA had been removed from DOT’s prequalification list. Ultimately, DOT reinstated BPA’s qualifications, but never formally withdrew the Notice of Intent to Suspend. However, in reinstating BPA’s qualifications, DOT neglected to reinstate BPA’s Small Business Enterprise ("SBE") designation, which negatively affected BPA’s ability to obtain points for SBE participation. The points add value in scoring competing responses to Requests for Proposals for DOT contracts. BPA repeatedly requested that this be corrected. BPA’s requests went largely ignored for nearly two months. On April 2, 2019, after BPA had an in-person meeting with Courtney Drummond, DOT's Assistant Secretary of Engineering and Operations, BPA submitted a qualifications modifications package to replace Jose Morales, P.E., with John Bolton, P.E., as the qualifier for the CEI Work Group to address Mr. Drummond's and DOT’s concerns about BPA staff involved on the FIU project working on other DOT contracts. On April 5, 2019, in response to the Notice of Intent to Suspend, BPA provided specific facts in support of BPA’s proper performance of the CEI Contract. As an accommodation to DOT, BPA further proposed a solution to DOT's concern about the staff involved in the FIU project. BPA stated that it was "willing to immediately remove the BPA staff directly involved in the FIU Bridge project from working on any Department contracts or qualifying the company for CEI services" and resubmitted its qualifications application with those changes. 2019 BPA REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATION REJECTION On May 7, 2019, BPA submitted its 2019 Request for Qualification to the Department early due to the lack of response from DOT on BPA's April 5, 2019, correspondence. BPA sought qualifications for design work and CEI services in the same work categories it was qualified in for the prior fiscal year. On June 10, 2019, BPA’s counsel met with DOT representatives in Tallahassee to discuss several outstanding issues relative to BPA’s current qualification, the upcoming renewal, and DOT’s failure to reinstate BPA’s SBE designation. DOT responded by promising to correct the "mistake" that same day. Inexplicably, it took another two weeks and several reminders from BPA for DOT to finally correct the SBE designation. BPA’s 2018-2019 qualifications expired on June 30, 2019. The next day, on July 1, 2019, DOT untimely responded to BPA’s Request for Qualification with a letter titled "Incomplete Renewal Applications for Pre- Qualification." DOT's letter raised the same concerns regarding BPA’s involvement in the bridge project and, again, requested "a detailed explanation of BPA’s actions on the FIU pedestrian bridge project and…any controls or changes in personnel, policies or practices that BPA has implemented subsequent to the collapse." This is the same request that had been previously made by DOT in its December 19, 2018, Qualifications Letter of Concern, February 12, 2019, Qualifications Letter of Concern, March 15, 2019, Notice of Intent to Suspend, and April 26, 2019, denial of BPA’s Submittal for Modification. BPA had already provided the information requested several months prior to DOT's July 1, 2019, correspondence. On July 11, 2019, DOT issued its Notice of Intent to Deny Request for Qualification directed to BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification. In issuing its denial of BPA’s Request for Qualification, DOT relied solely on the findings and conclusions of the June 2019 OSHA Report as they relate to the CEI services provided by BPA on the project and referenced the pending NTSB investigation. The Department’s Notice of Intent to Deny was executed by William Watts, the Department’s Chief Engineer. Mr. Watts admitted at final hearing that he does not have the training or experience necessary to evaluate a CEI’s performance on a CEI contract. Moreover, neither Mr. Watts nor DOT retained or consulted with any individuals with CEI expertise prior to issuing the Notice of Intent to Deny. When he issued the Notice of Intent to Deny, Mr. Watts was completely unfamiliar with the following: the terms of BPA’s CEI Contract; BPA’s Request for Qualification; BPA’s past performance on CEI or any other Department contract; and BPA’s professional reputation. Mr. Watts did not evaluate BPA under the criteria required by Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code prior to denying BPA’s Request for Qualification for good cause. Mr. Watts did not receive any analysis from the Department’s prequalification staff regarding their evaluation of BPA’s application under the statutory criteria. Mr. Watts admitted that he was aware that BPA documented the cracking on the bridge, reported the cracking to the design-build firm, and requested an EAR from the EOR--actions which were all in accordance with BPA's obligations as CEI pursuant to the CPAM and its contractual obligations with FIU. Mr. Watts’ only reason for issuing the Notice of Intent to Deny, as Chief Engineer for DOT, was because BPA was under investigation by OSHA and the NTSB, and OSHA’s release of its June 2019 Report. However, Mr. Watts did not know the author of the June 2019 OSHA Report, whether the author of the report was qualified to evaluate the performance of a CEI under Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, or whether the author of the OSHA report did anything to evaluate BPA’s performance relative to any other CEI, at the same time, and/or in the same community. DOT did not investigate the structure or organization of BPA to determine whether the issues raised in the OSHA report, regarding BPA’s performance of the CEI Contract, would reflect negatively on other groups or divisions within BPA that provided services exclusively under other non-CEI work categories (design services). Prior to issuance of the NOID, Mr. Watts did not undertake a review of BPA’s past performance or professional reputation--both of which were beyond reproach. DOT evaluates its consultants’ performance on all projects approximately every six to eight months. These evaluations produce a score that ranges from one to five, five being the highest possible score. A perfect score of five is uncommon and a score of four is outstanding. In the five years prior to the final hearing, DOT evaluated BPA’s performance on projects involving both design and CEI services. Specifically, DOT scored BPA’s performance in Work Groups 3.1, 3.2 (Highway Design), 4.12 (Bridge Design), 5.1 (Bridge Inspection), 7.2 (Traffic Operations Design), and 10.1 and 10.3 (CEI). During that period, BPA averaged a score of outstanding to nearly- outstanding on all projects, including outstanding and nearly-outstanding scores for inspection services on bridge rehabilitation projects, which involved cracking concrete elements. In May of 2019, prior to denying BPA’s request for qualifications for the fiscal year July 1, 2019, through June 20, 2020, Mr. Drummond personally presented BPA with an award from the American Council of Engineering Companies ("ACEC"), for excellence in major urban reconstruction. Specifically, the award was for CEI services on the State Road 7 project, and the ACEC recognized two-and-a-half-years of excellence in CEI services from late-2016/early-2017 through 2019. DOT's District Construction Engineer, District 6 Secretary, and Headquarters were intimately involved in the selection and vetting process that, ultimately, resulted in BPA receiving the award. In September 2019, after denying its request and three months after the release of the June 2019 OSHA Report, DOT voted that BPA receive another award for excellence in CEI services. As a member of the selection committee, DOT chose BPA to receive an award from the Florida Transportation Builders Association ("FTBA"), for excellence on the Baker’s Haulover Bridge rehabilitation project. By this award, FTBA and DOT recognized BPA’s excellence in CEI services, which spanned from one year before the collapse to one year after the collapse. The Experts 3 Gustavo Quesada, P.E. At the Final Hearing, BPA presented the expert testimony of Gustavo Quesada, P.E., a CEI with over 30 years of experience. The ALJ finds that Mr. Quesada is a qualified expert on the standard of care for a CEI and his opinions in that regard are based on competent substantial evidence. As explained by Mr. Quesada, the role of a CEI with respect to cracks in concrete is to identify the cracks and make sure they do not go unseen or undetected and that an EOR is engaged for purposes of addressing the cracking. Pursuant to the CPAM, when a CEI encounters cracks in concrete, a CEI is required to document the observation and make a disposition on the cracks based on Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. Moving forward, the CEI is also required to monitor any changes in the cracks. A CEI is not responsible for making a determination as to whether a crack is potentially dangerous. This is a determination for the EOR, who has an understanding of the structure, its design, and how the structure is expected to behave. A CEI is not charged with making judgment calls on the design of a structure or whether its integrity has been jeopardized. BPA documented, monitored, and reported the cracks on the project in compliance with the industry standards for CEIs working on Complex Category II Bridges, as well as the relevant sections of the CPAM and Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. BPA’s Senior Project Engineer, Mr. Morales, exercised his independent professional judgment in elevating 3 DOT intended to offer Mr. Watts at hearing as an expert to testify to the "good cause" DOT had when issuing the NOID to BPA. BPA filed a Motion in Limine to exclude or limit the testimony of both Mr. Watts and Mr. Robertson. The motion was argued at the outset of the final hearing. The undersigned precluded Mr. Watts from testifying as an expert in the field of CEI. Mr. Watts was allowed to testify as to DOT's qualification process and did so as a fact witness, rather than an expert. the issue of the cracks to the EOR even before he was required to do so under the CPAM and Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. At the meeting called by BPA on the morning of March 15, 2018, BPA exercised its independent professional judgment and complied with the applicable standard of care when Mr. Morales asked the EOR a series of questions in response to the EOR’s presentation and evaluation of the cracks on the bridge. According to Mr. Quesada, professional engineers are expected to rely on other engineers with superior or specialized knowledge when exercising their independent professional judgment. BPA’s role, responsibilities, and scope of work on the project as the CEI was largely that of a contract administrator, and a liaison between FIU and MCM--not as a structural engineer with the capability to analyze the structural behavior of the bridge sufficient to determine if the cracks posed any danger of collapse. Robert V. Robertson, P.E. DOT presented the testimony of Robert V. Roberson as an expert on the standard of care for CEIs. Mr. Robertson has served as DOT's State Structure’s Design Engineer for 13 years. Mr. Robertson has been a professional engineer for 35 years. Although preliminarily accepted by the undersigned as an expert in this field, it became apparent through cross-examination that Mr. Robertson has no significant CEI experience. Mr. Robertson has not worked in the CEI industry in the last 26 years, nor has he ever graded a CEI’s performance. Mr. Robertson was not involved in the Department’s evaluation of BPA’s performance of the CEI Contract. Accordingly, Mr. Robertson's testimony was of limited value. Mr. Robertson acknowledged that the FIU bridge was a complex concrete bridge structure that required a separate design qualification and that BPA did have such qualification. Mr. Robertson admitted that BPA’s contract with FIU did not require BPA to be qualified to inspect complex concrete bridges because BPA was allowed to satisfy that particular qualification requirement of the contract through a sub-consultant (Corradino). Mr. Robertson testified that any licensed engineer with a college degree in engineering should have known, based on the photographs in Crack Report #3, that the cracks were dangerous and should have acted to stop work on the project and close the road. However, DOT's LAP representative at the March 15, 2018, meeting held prior to the bridge collapse, Mr. Reyna, a licensed professional engineer with a college degree in engineering, failed to raise any concerns at the March 15th meeting or act to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, or close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge. Mr. Robertson opined that the re-tensioning operation of the bridge should have been peer reviewed. In his opinion, BPA failed to use sufficient independent judgment. BPA, as the CEI, should have recognized the bridge was in danger and known to stop traffic and shut down the road. However, Mr. Roberston admitted that he did only a cursory review of the PowerPoint presentation provided on the morning of March 15, 2018, in which FIGG, as the EOR, stated it had no safety concerns. Mr. Robertson stated that he performed no analysis on anything other than BPA's CEI work relative to the FIU bridge. He had no information about BPA's design group or its qualification in any work category. However, he suggested the denial of BPA's application for qualification across the board, in all work categories because he questioned "the culture at BPA." Significantly, concerns regarding "the culture" of BPA was not cited by DOT as a basis for the NOID. Most significantly, Mr. Robertson testified that six months prior to the issuance of the NOID, he had a conversation with Mr. Drummond during which Mr. Drummond recommended that the qualification of all parties involved with the FIU Pedestrian Bridge project should be suspended. Importantly, this was prior to the issuance of either the OSHA or NTSB reports and seemingly with no analysis of the role of any party to the possible prevention of the bridge collapse, injuries, or loss of life. Ultimate Findings of Fact DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise its independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, or close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge in light of the documented cracking on the structure in the days leading up to the collapse. The evidence shows that BPA documented, monitored, and reported the cracks pursuant to the CPAM, Section 400 of the Standard Specifications, and industry standards. BPA involved the EOR in evaluating the cracks even before it was required by the CPAM, Section 400 of the Standard Specifications, and industry standards. BPA was assured time and again by the EOR that the bridge did not pose a danger to the travelling public and that the structure was safe. At the meeting on the morning of March 15, 2018, BPA inquired as to whether temporary shoring was needed, and the suggestion was rejected by the EOR who had inspected the cracks on the structure just moments before the meeting. There is no evidence that BPA deviated from the standard of care for CEIs on design-build projects or that BPA failed to exercise its independent professional judgment. To the contrary, BPA met all of its obligations pursuant to contract and state regulation. DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, and close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge pending a peer review of the re-tensioning plan proposed by the EOR at the March 15th meeting. At the March 15th meeting, BPA was reasonably convinced by the EOR that the structure was safe and that the re-tensioning plan was a temporary measure that should be implemented as soon as possible. BPA had already engaged the EOR to prepare an EAR to address the cracking observed on the bridge, which would have included signed and sealed calculations and a repair protocol that would have been implemented in a later phase of construction. On March 15, 2018, the cracks were not a safety concern such that BPA should have overridden the EOR’s directive to MCM and required that the re-tensioning operation be postponed pending a peer- review of the re-tensioning plan. There is no evidence in the record that BPA deviated from the standard of care for CEIs on design-build projects or allegedly failed to exercise its independent professional judgment by allowing the re-tensioning procedure to proceed as directed by the EOR. Conversely, the evidence supports a finding that BPA acted appropriately in relying on the recommendations of the EOR who was uniquely qualified to evaluate the safety of the structure and who had specialized knowledge of its design. DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, and close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge until the Corradino Group could arrive on the project site to observe the re-tensioning operation proposed by the EOR during the meeting on March 15, 2018. Corradino’s role on the project was to monitor and document post-tensioning operations. By the time the meeting was over, MCM’s specialty contractor, VSL, was mobilized and prepared to proceed with the re-tensioning operation. BPA was not involved in the pre- coordination of this work. Ultimately, the bridge collapsed due to an inherent design error in the plans and not due to Corradino’s absence from the re- tensioning operations. The findings of the OSHA report and the pendency of the NTSB investigation, standing alone, were insufficient "good cause" for DOT to deny BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Transportation finding that good cause does not exist to deny BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: George Spears Reynolds, IV, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Scott Kirschbaum, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 Anthony Lopez, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 George Richard Truitt, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 (eServed) John Ashley Peacock, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Erik Fenniman, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Kevin J. Thibault, P.E., Secretary Department of Transporation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether All Aboard Florida – Operations, LLC (“the Applicant”); Ram Land Holdings, LLC (“RLH”); and J. Acquisitions Brevard, LLC (“JAB”), are entitled to the Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”) issued by the St. Johns River Water Management District (“SJRWMD”) for construction and operation of certain railway facilities within the portion of the Florida East Coast Railway corridor known as Segment D08 (the “Project”).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is a water control district organized under chapters 189 and 298, Florida Statutes. It owns and maintains the North, Main, and South Canals in Indian River County. The Petitioner manages drainage works for approximately 55,000 acres within Indian River County situated west of the Indian River Lagoon between U.S. 1 and I-95, including portions of the City of Vero Beach. The Applicant, All Aboard Florida – Operations, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in Miami, Florida, formed for the principal purpose of developing and operating express passenger rail service connecting the four largest urban population centers in Southern and Central Florida--Miami, Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, and Orlando. This project is known as the All Aboard Florida Project. Respondents, RAM Land Holdings, LLC, and J. Acquisitions Brevard, LLC, are third-party mitigation providers. The parties stipulated that RLH and JAB are not necessary parties to this proceeding. SJRWMD is an independent special district created by chapter 373, charged with the duty to prevent harm to the water resources of the District and to administer and enforce chapter 373 and the rules promulgated thereunder. The proposed project is within the boundaries of the District. The Proposed Project Most of the Applicant’s passenger service route, including the portion which will pass through Indian River County, will use an existing railroad right-of-way established in the late 1800s by Henry Flagler, the founder of the Florida East Coast Railway (“FECR”). The FECR rail corridor runs along Florida’s east coast from Miami to Jacksonville. It was designed to support passenger and freight operations on shared double mainline tracks and was in use from 1895 to 1968. The passenger service was then terminated and portions of the double track and certain bridge structures were removed. The freight service continued and remains in operation today. The Project would restore the passenger service that once existed on the FECR rail corridor. The passenger service route will utilize the FECR right-of-way from Miami to Cocoa Beach and then continue along a new segment to be constructed along a limited-access highway system which runs inland from Cocoa Beach to Orlando. The Applicant is proposing to upgrade the portion of the FECR right-of-way between Miami and Cocoa Beach by, among other things, replacing existing railroad ties and tracks and reinstalling double tracks. This proceeding involves only Segment D08 of the proposed Project. Segment D08 runs from the southern edge of Indian River County to Cocoa Beach in Brevard County. In Segment DO8, the existing FECR railway includes bridges which cross the North Canal, Main Canal, and South Canal owned and maintained by the Petitioner. The bridges are referred to as the North Canal Bridge, the Main Canal Bridge, and the South Canal Bridge. Each bridge supports a single track. The Project calls for adding new bridges alongside the three existing bridges over the canals so that the crossings will again accommodate two tracks. The Petitioner’s objections to the proposed permit are confined to the proposed bridges at the North Canal and South Canal. The new bridge at the North Canal would be constructed along the west side of the existing bridge. The new bridge at the South Canal would be constructed along the east side of the existing bridge. Obstruction of Water Flow The Petitioner’s main objection to the proposed project is that the proposed new bridges over the North Canal and South Canal are too low to allow clearance during a 100-year storm event, which would cause water flow to be obstructed. The Petitioner believes floating debris is likely to be blocked and accumulate at the bridges, causing water to back up and flood lands upstream of the bridges. The Petitioner’s Superintendent, David Gunter, testified that there were “a couple of events where debris backed up either at a bridge or a culvert.” However, he said none of the Petitioner’s ratepayers ever had a flooding event that was attributable to the FECR bridges. The new bridges would be constructed with the same low chord/beam elevations (lowest part of the bridge) as the existing bridges that would remain. For the existing bridge and the proposed new bridge over the North Canal, the low beam elevation is 13.1 feet NAVD88 (North American Vertical Datum 1988). For the existing bridge and the proposed new bridge at the South Canal, the low beam elevation is 8.5 feet NAVD88. Because the proposed new bridges would be at the same height above the canals as the existing bridges, the potential problem the Petitioner is concerned about--floating debris being trapped by the bridges--is already a potential problem. The Petitioner did not claim or present evidence to show that the new bridges would increase the probability that floating debris would be trapped, over and above the current probability for such an event. The Petitioner argued that “two wrongs don’t make a right,” and the new bridges should not be approved even though they are at the same height as the existing bridges. Obviously, the Petitioner wants the existing bridges raised, too. Based on the FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps used by the Applicant, the 100-year flood elevation at the North Canal bridge is 11.5 feet NAVD88, or 1.6 feet below the low beam elevation of the North Canal Bridge. The 100-year flood elevation at the South Canal Bridge is 9.3 feet NAVD88, or 0.8 feet below the low beam elevation of the North Canal Bridge.1/ The Applicant’s consultants performed hydrologic and hydraulic analyses for the proposed new bridges using a HEC-RAS model which was adapted to local site-specific conditions and incorporated FEMA flood level data. They determined that in a 100-year storm event, the new bridge at the North Canal would cause no more than a 0.04-foot (0.48 inches) increase in water levels immediately upstream (within 500 feet) of the bridge, and the new bridge at the South Canal would result in no more than a 0.07-foot (0.84 inches) increase in water levels immediately upstream. These were considered insignificant impacts that would not cause flooding to upstream properties. The Petitioner disputes the Applicant’s determination that there is a 1.6-foot clearance at the North Canal Bridge and a 0.8-foot clearance at the South Canal Bridge. The Petitioner asserts that the FEMA elevations used by the Applicant are not based on the best available data, and the best available data show the 100-year flood elevations are higher. The Petitioner calculated higher 100-year flood elevations using SJRWMD flood stage gages in the canal near the North bridge and the Petitioner’s own hydrologic model. The Petitioner determined that the low beam at the North Canal bridge is 0.6 feet below the 100-year flood level, and the low beam at the South Canal bridge is 1.5 feet below the 100-year flood level.2/ In other words, the Petitioner contends there is no clearance. The Petitioner’s witness, Simons, testified about why he thought FEMA did not use the Petitioner’s water level data and analysis in determining 100-year flood elevations for the FEMA flood maps, but the testimony was largely hearsay. SJRWMD’s Applicant’s Handbook refers to the use of FEMA flood level data for these kinds of analyses, but it also refers to the use of “detailed information” possessed by SJRWMD. See Section 3.3.4, A.H., Vol II. Information possessed by SJRWMD would likely include data from their own water level gages. The Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to prove their data and modeling was more accurate or reliable than FEMA data and the Applicant’s modeling. FEMA flood insurance rate maps are a standard reference in the industry. The HEC-RAS model is a generally accepted tool used by engineers for this kind of analysis. None of the parties presented evidence to make clear what is the usual or industry protocol for choosing between conflicting data of this kind in the permitting process. The Petitioner has the burden of proof on disputed issues of fact and failed to carry its burden on this disputed issue. It is found, therefore, that the Applicant’s use of FEMA data and the HEC-RAS model was reasonable. The Petitioner admitted that the 100-year flood elevation in the canals has been increasing over time because of the conversion of land uses in the area from agricultural to urban. Because the Petitioner regulates discharges to its canals, it has some responsibility for the rising water levels in its canals. The Petitioner claimed that reduced clearance was due in part to the bridges from “age, use, lack of maintenance, frugality or causes other than design.” However, the Petitioner presented no supporting evidence for this allegation in the record. In its regulatory role, the Petitioner requires a minimum clearance of one foot between a bridge’s lowest horizontal beam and the 100-year flood elevation to avoid obstruction of water flow through the canals. SJRWMD rules do not specify that bridges be designed to have a minimum clearance above the 100-year flood elevation. The applicable design standards for flood protection in the Applicant’s Handbook are set forth in Section 3.3.2(b), A.H., Vol. II, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Floodways and floodplains, and levels of flood flows or velocities of adjacent streams, impoundments or other water courses must not be altered so as to adversely impact the off-site storage and conveyance capabilities of the water resource. It is presumed a system will meet this criterion if the following are met: * * * A system may not cause a net reduction in the flood conveyance capabilities provided by a floodway except for structures elevated on pilings or traversing works. Such works, or other structures shall cause no more than a one-foot increase in the 100-year flood elevation immediately upstream and no more than one tenth of a foot increase in the 100- year flood elevation 500 feet upstream. The bridges would not cause more than a one-foot increase in the 100-year flood elevation immediately upstream or more than one tenth of a foot increase in the 100-year flood elevation 500 feet upstream. Therefore, the Applicant is presumed to have provided reasonable assurance that the Project would not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property, or adversely impact the existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities of the North Canal or South Canal. The Petitioner argues that the SJRWMD criteria fail to account for floating debris. The Petitioner claims that bridge designers are obliged to follow basic design guidelines published by FDOT and other government agencies and provide clearance for floating debris, but Petitioner did not offer into evidence these “basic design standards” or prove their industry- wide acceptance.3/ SJRWMD’s engineer, Fariborz Zanganeh, stated that the potential for floating debris to be blocked by a bridge or any other traversing work is considered by SJRWMD to be an operation and maintenance issue, not a design issue. The Petitioner referred to some road bridges in the area that, upon reconstruction, were raised by county, state, or federal governments to comply with the Petitioner’s clearance requirement. First, it is noted that the Applicant does not propose to reconstruct the existing North Canal Bridge and South Canal Bridge. Second, there is a substantial difference between the effort and cost of raising a road and raising a railroad track. Raising the proposed bridges would require elevating the railroad bed for a considerable distance in each direction so that slopes comply with railway safety criteria. The Petitioner failed to prove the Project does not comply with SJRWMD flood control criteria. The Sand Bar The Petitioner also objects to the proposed bridge at the North Canal because the Petitioner contends the existing bridge pilings have caused a sand bar to form, and shoaling and erosion would likely increase with construction of additional pilings. The Petitioner believes the problem is caused by the fact that the existing and proposed pilings, which would have the same alignment, are not parallel to water flow in the canal. There are sand bars upstream of the bridge which cannot have been caused by the bridge pilings. The North Canal, which runs downstream almost due east makes a turn to the northeast under the North Canal Bridge. The record evidence, as well as generally known facts of which the Administrative Law Judge may take official recognition, establish that a change in the direction of water flow in a channel creates non-uniform flow, which can cause erosion and shoaling. The Petitioner did not present evidence to distinguish between shoaling and erosion that could be caused by the pilings and shoaling and erosion that could be caused by the turn in the canal. The Petitioner did not call a witness for this subject who had special knowledge of the science of hydraulics and no study was done by the Petitioner to confirm its theory of the cause. The Petitioner has the burden of proof on disputed issues of fact and failed to carry its burden on this disputed issue. The Applicant asserts that the conditions of the proposed permit provide for maintenance that would include “the removal of any buildup of siltation that might occur over time and potentially cause the North Canal Bridge structure to cease operating as designed.” However, whether the bridge is operating as designed would not address whether the canal is operating as designed because of shoaling. There is no condition in the proposed permit that imposes on the Applicant the duty to remove built-up sediment beneath the North Canal Bridge. It is unlikely that such a requirement can be imposed on the Applicant because it does not own or control the canal. The Petitioner claims the railroad authority denied the Petitioner access to the right-of-way when it sought permission in the past to remove the sandbar at the North Canal Bridge. Unfortunately, a permit condition that requires the Applicant to cooperate with the Indian River Water Control District in performing canal maintenance at the bridges is probably not enforceable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the St. Johns River Water Management District enter a final order approving the issuance of Environmental Resource Permit No. 135214-2, with the conditions set forth in the Technical Staff Report dated August 26, 2016. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2017.
Findings Of Fact By an application filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation on October 28, 1980, Pinellas County requested a dredge and fill permit to- construct a road and bridge crossing with an associated stormwater treatment system in connection with the improvement of County Road No. 1 across Curlew Creek and its wetland flood plain. The specific location of the project is in Section 12, Township 28 South, Range 15 East, in the City of Dunedin, Pinellas County, Florida. The project will involve the dredging of approximately 2,639 cubic yards of soil and include the placement of approximately 1,605 cubic yards of fill in the creek bottom. After an evaluation of the initial application the Department issued a letter of intent to deny the application on March 17, 1982, but the denial suggested several modifications to the project which were accepted by the County when it filed an amended application on September 30, 1932. It is on the basis of this amended application that the Department issued its notice of intent to grant on November 5, 1982. The County's initial application was complete before February I, 1982, the effective date of Chapter 17-25, Florida Administrative Code, the Department's new stormwater discharge rules. The Petitioners jointly own real property on which they reside immediately to the west and downstream of Curlew Creek. Their property is riparian to the creek. Curlew Creek is a natural water body which runs from near U.S. Highway 19 in a westerly direction to the Gulf of Mexico in Dunedin, Florida. It is an unnavigable Class III water of the state. At times it carries a heavy stormwater runoff load and passes private residences such as Petitioners' which border the creek in many areas. During design storm events there has been flooding when the creek exceeds its historic flood plain. That flooding has come up into Petitioners' back yard. At the project site where the creek now runs under the existing span for County Road No. 1, the creek is approximately 25 feet wide and 2 feet deep. The creek bottom is flat and consists of deep fine sand. The banks are well vegetated with a dense scrub layer and many large trees. This vegetation provides good soil stabilization and prevents erosion of the creek banks. Curlew Creek is presently traversed by County Road No. 1 over a two- lane bridge. Because of increased traffic flow the County proposes adding another bridge span to carry two more lanes of traffic. When the additional two lanes are complete the center line of the entire bridge complex will be moved to the west of its present location and therefore be closer to Petitioners' residence. Petitioners primary concern in opposing the project is their belief that when completed the project will increase the potential of Curlew Creek to flood their land. Curlew Creek, which generally runs in an east-west direction, takes a sharp bend to the south on the downstream side of the existing bridge. It later resumes its course to the west toward St. Joseph's Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. The creek's rapid change of direction underneath the bridge caused some confusion when the Department of Environmental Regulation issued its notice of intent dated November 5, 1982, to grant the requested dredge and fill permit. Condition number one for issuing the permit stated "The existing vegetation in an area more than 50 feet up and downstream from the bridge railing will not be disturbed except in the area of detention pond number 3 on the northeast side of the bridge." The author of the notice had intended that the condition mean vegetation would not be disturbed any further than 50 feet to the east or 50 feet to the west of the planned bridge railing, and not 50 feet upstream or downstream. The project plan is to remove a small sand spit which projects into the creek from the east bank immediately to the south of the bridge. Additional minor dredging is planned to smooth the water flow through the bridge area. Fill will be deposited to also provide a smoother water flow and consequently cut down on the eddies which presently arise under the bridge. The result of improved stream flow will be a reduction in the erosion of the creek banks and a lessening of turbidity in the creek water. Because the construction proposed will result in removal of certain vegetation along the creek bank which now provides soil stabilization, the County plans to use wet sand cement riprap or gabions for slope protection to stabilize the soil. Either method provides adequate erosion protection to ensure that the standards for Class III surface waters of the state will not be violated if the conditions of the proposed permit are followed. The expanded stormwater runoff facilities which are part of the project, as modified and subject to the condition in the Department's letter of intent to grant, will not have a significant impact on the water quality of Curlew Creek. These facilities provide adequate retention and settling capacity to ensure that the stormwater which eventually discharges into the creek will not cause pollution.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order approving the application of Pinellas County for a dredge and fill permit in order to construct the above described project in accordance with the conditions set out in the Department's letter of intent to grant dated November 5, 1982. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners own residential property near South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) Canal C-24. The canal is owned and maintained by SFWMD, an agency of the State of Florida. The State property includes the banks and bottom of Canal C-24 and a 50-foot-wide strip of land which separates Petitioners' property from the canal. However, some of the Petitioners have obtained permits from SFWMD to maintain boat docks in the canal and to cross the 50 feet of intervening property as necessary. Canal C-24 is closed to navigation immediately west of Petitioners' property by a SFWMD dam used to control the water level. However, the canal is open to navigation east of the dam and connects with the St. Lucie River which flows into the Atlantic Ocean. Respondent GDC plans the residential development of property east of that owned by Petitioners. Construction of the proposed bridge will improve access to the GDC property and other portions of southeast Port St. Lucie which are now blocked on the north and east by water and on the west by the Florida Turnpike. On August 28, 1980, Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) issued its Notice of Intent to grant a permit for construction of the bridge with 17 feet clearance. The bridge was originally planned to provide 12 feet clearance which was approved by SFWMD and the City of Port St. Lucie. Based on Petitioner's objections and the recommendation of the US Coast Guard, the clearance was increased to 17 feet. However, Petitioners maintained their opposition, giving rise to these proceedings. At 17 feet the bridge would be approximately six feet below the Florida Turnpike bridge which is situated between the GDC residential development and Petitioners' property. Thus, Petitioners are currently limited to a 23-foot navigation clearance by the Florida Turnpike bridge which was present when they purchased their property. None of the Petitioners operates any boat at his Port St. Lucie residence which would be affected by construction of the proposed bridge. Rather, Petitioners' objections are based on the obstruction of larger boats they might acquire and on the belief that resale value of their property would be diminished. They also content that use of the canal as a hurricane refuge for large boats will be restricted. Finally, Petitioners argue that bridge pilings will cause erosion and thus create a surface hazard in addition to the height impediment. The Petitioners indicated no plans to acquire any power boats of such size as to be restricted by a 17-foot clearance, nor did their plans include the purchase or use of any sailboats which would not already be blocked by the 23- foot turnpike bridge. No studies, appraisals or together evidence was introduced to establish that property values would be affected by construction of the proposed bridge. Conflicting evidence was presented on the use of the canal by third parties as a hurricane refuge. However, the expert testimony given by Respondents' witnesses established that use of the canal during storms was unsafe and impractical due to the narrowness of the canal, the absence of trees to reduce the force of the wind or secure the boats, and the possibility of strong currents caused by operation of the flood control dam. Further, this testimony established that safer moorings are available on the adjacent portion of the St. Lucie River, which has the added advantage of being directly accessible to the ocean. Such moorings are preferable because of the greater maneuverability in the river and the presence of mangroves which provide anchorage and wind protection. The alleged erosion problem was not supported by any studies or expert testimony, but was based on Petitioners' observations of some soil erosion around turnpike bridge pilings. GDC's construction proposal has been considered by DER, and its engineering plans will be reviewed by the City of Port St. Lucie before it authorizes construction. This process should insure that any potential erosion problems are minimized. Furthermore, there was no evidence to indicate that soil erosion, even if it did occur at the site of the proposed bridge, would create any hazard to navigation. The City Manager of Port St. Lucie supports construction of the bridge at its present level. His concern, and that of the City Commission, is centered on the need to deliver police, fire and ambulance service to the area south of the proposed bridge. Additionally, opening of the bridge will result in the improved flow of vehicular traffic in the community. A local contractor who owns lots on both sides of the canal opposes any further elevation of the bridge as it would reduce the view from houses he intends to construct in this area. The GDC evidence established that raising the height of the bridge would also enlarge the property on either side of the canal required for bridge purposes. Finally, the cost of construction of further increasing bridge height would be substantial, amounting to approximately $40,000 per foot.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation grant the permit to General Development Corporation as reflected in the Notice of Intent issued on August 28, 1980. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kenneth J. Thomas 2649 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Ms. Anita R. Cockerham 2549 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Walter J. Konrad Ms. Victoria Konrad 2657 Harem Circle, SW Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Henry Albright Ms. Nancy Albright 2651 Harem Circle, SW Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. William Isaacs 2645 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. and Mrs. Frederick C. Walrath 2647 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Ms. Mary Bruins Kars 2659 Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Norman Zlinkoff 1814 Erwin Road Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Donald M. Homer General Development Corporation 111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Randall E. Denker, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph Z. Fleming, Esquire 620 Ingraham Building 25 SE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation’s (“Department” or DOT”), notice of intent to award a contract to Intervenor, Archer Western De-Moya, Joint Venture (“AWD”), for a transportation project involving the design and reconstruction of federal and state roadways in Miami, Florida (“the Project”), is contrary to governing statutes, DOT’s rules, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the award is contrary to competition, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Project, Parties & Participants Respondent, DOT, is the state agency authorized by section 334.30, Florida Statutes, to issue requests for proposals to solicit competitive bids for private-public (“P3”) partnership projects. The Project was located in District VI of the Department. Greg Schiess is the manager of the Strategic Initiatives Office for DOT. Mr. Schiess oversaw the Project and was the agency representative for DOT at the final hearing. Nadine Chinapoo was DOT’s procurement officer who oversaw the RFP process for the Project. The RFP had strict rules of contact between bidders and any DOT employee or officer. The Department designated Ms. Chinapoo as the “single contact and source of information” for the RFP. The Miami-Dade Expressway Authority (“MDX”) is a state agency created in 1994, authorized by Miami-Dade County, and funded through toll revenues. MDX has regional oversight of five expressways in Miami-Dade County, including State Road 836 (“SR 836”). On February 6, 2017, DOT issued the “Design-Build Request for Proposal for SR 836/I-395 from West of I-95 to MacArthur Causeway Bridge and I-95 Pavement Reconstruction and I-95 Southbound to SR 836 Westbound and SR-836 from West of NW 17th Avenue to Midtown Interchange (SR-836/I-395/I-95)” (“RFP”). The Department developed the RFP pursuant to section 334.30, Florida Statutes, which allows DOT to enter into a P3 to finance, design and build transportation construction and facilities. No one timely filed an objection to any of the RFP specifications. The RFP involves two contracts: (1) the DOT contract for federal interstates 95 (“I-95”) and 395 (“I-395”), and a portion of SR 836 leading to and from MacArthur Causeway Bridge; and (2) the MDX contract which involves another portion of SR 836 from Northwest 17th Avenue to the Midtown Exchange at I-95. A key component of the RFP was the replacement for “Bridge No. 8/9” of I-395, which would run east to west (“Signature Bridge”). According to the RFP, the Signature Bridge would take traffic over a portion of downtown Miami to and from the MacArthur Causeway. Ultimately, the winning bidder or design-build firm (“DB Firm”) would provide preliminary designs, coordinate design services with the Department to finalize the engineering and construction plans, and perform construction of the finalized designs. It would also need to self-finance the design and construction of the Project, because payment would be made by DOT into an escrow account and then disbursed to the selected DB Firm on periodic intervals. This form of payment was referred to as “gap financing.” BCC is a private civil engineering firm based in Florida specializing in roadway projects. The Department engaged BCC to advise and draft concept plans and portions of the RFP related to roadway design, roadway geometrics and temporary traffic control (also known as maintenance of traffic (“MOT”)). Staff from BCC also represented the Department in meetings with bidders as allowed by the RFP.4/ The Project Selection Committee (“PSC”) was made up of three members: Javier Rodriguez, Executive Director of MDX; Gerry O’Reilly, Secretary of DOT for District IV; and Dat Huynh, District Planning and Environmental Administrator of DOT for District VI. The PSC selected the Best Value Proposer (“BVP”) based on scores given for the bidders’ Technical Proposals, contract time, price proposals, and a passing grade for the bidder’s financial health. The PSC also met publicly at various times during the RFP process. The Technical Review Committee (“TRC”) was the group in the RFP process responsible for reviewing and scoring the Technical Proposal. The TRC was made up of four DOT engineers and one MDX engineer. The Technical Proposal was made up two volumes. Volume 1 was worth a total of 60 points and included criteria such as construction methods, MOT plans, and innovation. Volume 2 was worth up to 30 points, and addressed aesthetic criteria such as streetscapes, lighting and enhancements. The Aesthetic Review Committee (“ARC”) was the group assigned to review and pass acceptable Signature Bridge options. The ARC also was responsible for reviewing and scoring Volume 2 of the Technical Proposals from each bidder. There were originally five members: four non-DOT representatives from the local community; and Brian Blanchard, the DOT assistant secretary. Mr. Blanchard withdrew from the ARC prior to the scoring of Volume 2, when his duties at DOT increased after the DOT Secretary resigned. Each bidder could submit three bridge designs or options. The ARC members gave a “pass” or “fail” grade to each Signature Bridge option submitted. These pass/fail grades determined which proposals moved to the next phase of the RFP involving the technical aspects of the entire proposal. Although the ARC members also ranked each of the bidders’ options, these rankings were for “informational purposes only.” Leon Corbett, the Department’s finance manager for the RFP, was responsible for overseeing the final phase of the RFP process of evaluating the financial fitness of the intended DB Firm. Mr. Corbett was experienced in evaluating financial proposals submitted in response to requests for proposals, and specifically had experience in evaluating bidders for proposals involving P3s. Mr. Corbett and DOT staff evaluated the financial proposal of the highest scorer on a pass/fail basis. Petitioner, FAM, is a joint venture organized specifically to submit a response to the RFP. The corporate members of FAM are Fluor Enterprises, Inc. (“FEI”), Astaldi Construction Corporation and Munilla Construction Management, LLC (“MCM”). All three members of FAM are civil construction contractors that were prequalified by DOT to submit bids to the RFP. Hope Grumbles, FEI’s director of sales and infrastructure, served as the corporate representative for FAM at the hearing. AWD was also organized to submit a response to the RFP. AWD is composed of Archer Western Contractors, LLC (“Archer”), and the de Moya Group, Inc. (“de Moya”), both DOT- prequalified contractors. Ultimately, DOT issued a notice of intent that AWD had been chosen as the winning proposer or DB Firm. Kevin McGlinchey, the vice-president over Florida and the Caribbean for Archer, served as the corporate representative for AWD at the hearing. History and Groundwork for Project and RFP Planning for improvements to I-395 and the bridge to the MacArthur Causeway began in the early 1990s, but did not result in any renovations. Research on the project began again in 2004 with the beginning of a project development and environmental study (“PD&E”) and culminated in 2010 with the issuance of a Final Environmental Impact Statement and the Record of Decision.5/ The purpose of the PD&E study was to produce a recommendation for final designs and construction. Separate PD&E studies were done for the I-395 and SR 836 projects. The original PD&E premise was simply to replace the bridge on I-395, but that project did not move forward because of concerns that the bridge and the construction itself may have negative impacts on the area underneath and adjacent to the bridge, including Overtown, a historic black neighborhood located adjacent to I-395. At some point after the release of the PD&E studies, DOT created a Project Advisory Group which met numerous times until 2013. The Project Advisory Group consisted of representatives of numerous stakeholders in the road improvements, including governmental agencies and civic organizations from the local area. Meanwhile in 2010 and early 2011, BCC, on behalf of the Department, began developing the RFP language. Although it was not involved in the original I-395 PD&E, BCC reevaluated the PD&E for factors, such as environmental and socioeconomic impacts, traffic issues, and right-of-way requirements. These changes were incorporated in the concept plans and procurement language for the final advertisement requesting proposals for the Project. In 2013, a lawsuit filed against DOT in Miami-Dade County sought equitable relief relating to any bridge renovations by DOT. As a result, DOT agreed that any renovation or improvements by DOT to the I-395 interchange would include a “Signature Bridge” as part of the Project. In furtherance of this goal and to allow local input regarding the visual impact of the bridge on the area, DOT created an Aesthetic Steering Committee to review alternatives for the “Signature Bridge” and recommend a specific bridge design to DOT. Despite meeting numerous times, however, this committee was unable to reach consensus on any one specific design. The committee disbanded, but the concept of the committee’s role was incorporated in the RFP process in the form of the ARC. During this time, MDX also had plans to reconstruct portions of SR 836. DOT and MDX agreed to conduct the SR 836 renovations and the bridge replacement as part of the same project for convenience and to save resources. As a result, DOT partnered with MDX to conduct a multi-phased and comprehensive reconstruction project that would address the traffic and aesthetic concerns of the local citizens. The project would include three major components: (1) a “Signature Bridge”; (2) SR 836 renovations; and (3) I-395 renovations. Also as a result of the public’s concerns related to the visual impact of the Project to the surrounding areas, the Department developed an Aesthetic Manual (found at Joint Exhibit 3) for the Project. This manual focused on the Signature Bridge and area underneath the bridge. As explained in the Aesthetic Manual: [T]he signature bridge will be the crown jewel of the Project. The purpose of this structure is two-fold: to provide Downtown Miami with a contemporary infrastructure icon, and to improve the quality of the space below 1-395 by relieving it of obstructing piers and columns. . . . Irrespective of the ultimate design, the Signature bridge shall still adhere to [certain] constraints: [The] Signature bridge shall have a constant depth superstructure. The signature bridge shall be two fully independent bridges that are made to look like one form (e.g. twin basket handle bridges void of a visually unifying element will not be allowed). This structural autonomy is necessary because the EB and WB structures will be constructed sequentially, yet the stakeholders have insisted upon the appearance of one aesthetic entity. Concept Plans To provide bidders with an established set of design objectives (i.e., an idea of what it was looking for in the final product), DOT created concept plans that identified the project’s physical boundaries, the scope of the interstate reconstruction and proposed layouts. The RFP concept plans were developed and approved as part of the PD&E studies that were conducted for the I-395 and SR 836 projects prior to the issuance of the RFP. It is clear from the RFP itself and the testimony at the hearing that changes to the concept plans were anticipated and encouraged. A bidder’s improvements to the basic requirements and layouts to the concept plans could garner more points in the final bid score. The RFP described the purpose of concept plans. The Concept Plans have been developed to illustrate the work required for the Total Project. The Design-Build Firm may make use of the design in the Concept Plans as a starting point for the design. However, the Design-Build Firm is not limited to only the work identified in the Concept Plans but must stay within the constraints of the Department Commitments and the requirements of the RFP. Anthony Jorges, a civil engineer and the BCC consultant working with the Department on the roadway design, geometrics and MOT requirements of the RFP, gave clear and convincing testimony. He testified the concept plans were to serve as a launching pad for the proposals. [The concept plans are] essentially a starting point for the design-build teams. [I]t really is a conceptual level, about a 30 percent level design, but it gives the teams a point to start. It by no means is final or unmodifiable. It’s just a starting point . . . a baseline to start off with. No one timely filed any protest of the concept plans. RFP Timing and Process The procurement process took place over a year, from the date of advertisement to the selection of the DB Firm. The RFP process was broken down into four phases. Phase I: Short Listing Phase II: Aesthetic Signature Bridge Submission Pass/Fail Phase III: Technical Proposal Submissions and Scoring Phase IV: Price Proposal and Financial Proposal Submittals Although addressed in detail below, in summary, prequalified bidders were first required to submit a letter of response with specific preliminary information about the bidder. DOT then created a shortlist of bidders based on review of these letters. Each shortlisted entity was then given the opportunity to submit Aesthetic Signature Bridge Proposals. Each bidder that had a passing Aesthetic Bridge submission was permitted to submit a Technical Proposal and Financial Proposal. After the Technical Proposals were scored, the scores were announced along with each bidder’s price proposal and proposed contract time. After getting a pass grade on its financial proposal from the Department, the PSC selected the BVP. Phase I In Phase I, each proposer was to provide DOT a “Letter of Response” with general information, such as the proposer’s past projects and résumés of designated key staff positions. Specific to this protest, bidders were to designate a bridge architect and engineer of record for the Signature Bridge. Each timely Letter of Response submitted to the Department was to be evaluated on specific criteria by the PSC. DOT would then post a shortlist of bidders authorized to submit proposals. Petitioner and Intervenor submitted a Letter of Response and the PSC selected both for the shortlist, thereby advancing both to the second phase of the RFP process. Phase II Each proposer that was shortlisted provided a draft submittal of its Signature Bridge design or design options. These drafts were vetted by DOT through meetings that allowed the proposers and the Department to discuss any questions or concerns either had about the draft proposals. No members of PSC, TRC or ARC attended these “vetting” meetings; the meetings were solely intended to provide feedback and answer questions between DOT staff and the proposers. After the “vetting” meetings, each shortlisted proposer submitted up to three final Signature Bridge options to the ARC. Each ARC member then gave each option a “pass” or “fail” grade. If a proposer submitted more than one option, the ARC members ranked that proposer’s options by preference. These grades and rankings were provided to the PSC for review. To move to the third phase, a proposer must have received at least one “pass” rating. The RFP specifically provided the ARC’s rankings of individual options “are purely for informational purposes only, and will have no direct impact on the Pass/Fail decision or on the evaluation of the Proposer’s Technical Proposal.” On August 19, 2016, DOT issued the “Aesthetic Bridge Proposals Pass/Fail Posting Notice” indicating that the PSC had reviewed the ARC’s rankings. As allowed by the RFP, the PSC determined that the bidders that received three out of five passes would move on. AWD’s Signature Bridge proposal was a fountain-like design with multiple arches sprouting from a unified point. FAM’s Signature Bridge design consisted of two cabled structures that were similar, but inverted. Each had an arm with a rotating disk extending into the air. Ultimately, the PSC approved these submissions from FAM and AWD to proceed to the third phase of the RFP process. Phase III Whereas Phase II focused on the Signature Bridge, Phase III involved the Technical Proposals from the bidders. Each Technical Proposal was made up of a Technical Volume (Volume 1) and Aesthetic Volume (Volume 2). The TRC members reviewed and scored both volumes; the ARC members only scored Volume 2. According to the RFP, the technical scores were based on an “adjectival scoring system” that required each of the TRC and ARC members to review the volume or volumes of the proposals he or she was assigned and give each section an “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” These descriptive ratings were later converted to a numerical value and announced at the public meeting held on April 24, 2017, to open the contract time and price proposals. Ms. Chinapoo provided the Technical Proposals, the individual scores of the evaluators, and a spreadsheet compiling all the scores to the PSC for review prior to the April 24 public meeting. Unlike the other bidder’s proposals, AWD’s Technical Proposal included a viaduct made up of two by-pass lanes in each direction on an elevated freeway along the center of the existing SR 836. The viaduct had construction and safety advantages over traditional “parallel lane” formats and would eliminate interaction between I-95 traffic and special event traffic in downtown Miami. Because this was a novel concept not addressed in the RFP or concept plans, AWD was required to get DOT’s approval before submitting the preliminary designs. After the TRC and ARC members reviewed the Technical Proposals, AWD received a 53.980 out of 60 points on Volume I and 24.389 out of 30 points on Volume II; FAM received 50.180 points for Volume I and 28.656 on Volume II. ATC Process Bidders were allowed to obtain permission to deviate from the concept plans and RFP requirements in certain aspects. The RFP outlined a process for approving requests for an Alternative Technical Concept (“ATC”), which included any deviation from a component of the technical requirements, or any proposed material or technology not addressed in the RFP. The RFP schedule anticipated that bidders would submit their ATC requests after Phase I and, if approved, incorporate them in the Technical Proposals submitted in Phase III. The purpose of the ATC process was to allow “innovation, flexibility, time and cost savings on the design and construction of Design-Build Projects while still meeting the Department Commitments.” The ATC process included one-on-one discussion meetings between the Department (or its representatives from BCC) with bidders “to describe proposed changes to supplied basic configurations, Project scope, design criteria, and/or construction criteria.” The purpose of these one-on-one ATC meetings was to discuss the ATC proposals, answer questions that the Department may have related to the requested deviations, review other relevant information, and establish whether the ATC proposal met the requirements for approval when possible. Representatives from the bidders and/or their engineers or designers, and DOT staff were involved as needed to provide feedback on the ATC. None of the TRC, ARC, and PSC members attended ATC meetings or participated in the ATC process. An ATC was deemed worthy of approval if the concept suggested was equal to or better than the existing requirements of the RFP, as determined by the Departments. ATC requests, which reduced scope, quality, performance or reliability, would be rejected. The Department retained discretion to approve or deny an ATC without a need to state justification. Once approved, an ATC was treated one of two ways: with an addendum to the RFP so all proposers were aware of the deviation; or (2) without an addendum so only the proposer that submitted the ATC would be permitted to utilize the approved ATC in its design. Not all concept plans or RFP requirements were modifiable; some could not be changed through an ATC. Specific to these proceedings, the RFP had “specific ATC restrictions” (or what the parties referred to as “nonmodifiables”) on the following requirements: Minimum basic number of lanes [for I-395 and I-95] as shown in Attachment A-33. All Signature Bridge components shall be part of the structural system that carries bridge Dead Load (DL) and Live Load (LL). Minimum basic number of lanes [for SR 836] as shown in Attachment MDXA-02. Minimum widths of mainline lanes and ramp lanes [for MDX]. Preliminary Plans and Confirmation Letter During Phase III, each remaining bidder was required to submit a technical proposal in which the bidder provided design concepts with preliminary plans. The RFP did not seek proposals of final designs that were ready for construction. Rather, as explicitly stated, the actual preparation of final plans and designs was to be part of the contract work being solicited, and would be performed after contract execution. As was clear from the RFP and testimony at the hearing, the goal of the procurement was not for the award recipient to provide final signed and sealed plans. Instead, it would provide plans as deliverables in the contract, submitted to DOT engineers for review, comment, and approval. More precisely, the RFP and contract required the winning bidder to submit--during contract performance--60- percent plans (plans that are 60-percent complete) for DOT comment and approval, followed by 90-percent plans for further DOT review. Only after the 90-percent plans were finalized, were they to be signed, sealed, and submitted to DOT for construction. In other words, the final design plans were to be developed by the DB Firm’s designers in collaboration with DOT’s (and MDX) staff as part of contract performance and deliverables--not as part of the procurement itself. Because of the unique fluid nature of the proposal drawings, the RFP provided that DOT may waive minor irregularities in proposals as follows: Waiver of Irregularities The Department may waive minor informalities or irregularities in Proposals received where such is merely a matter of form and not substance, and the correction or waiver of which is not prejudicial to other Proposers. Minor irregularities are defined as those that will not have an adverse effect on the Department’s interest and will not affect the price of the Proposals by giving a Proposer an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Proposers. Any design submittals that are part of a Proposal shall be deemed preliminary only. Preliminary design submittals may vary from the requirements of the Design and Construction Criteria. The Department, at their discretion, may elect to consider those variations in awarding points to the Proposal rather than rejecting the entire Proposal. In no event will any such elections by the Department be deemed to be a waiving of the Design and Construction Criteria. Because the proposal plans were merely preliminary, DOT required each bidder to submit a “Written Confirmation Letter” (“Compliance Letter”) stating that regardless of the preliminary plan, if chosen as the DB Firm, it would comply with and be bound by all requirements in the contract documents during contract performance. The winning bidder was required to fully comply with the Design and Construction Criteria and other RFP requirements for the price bid, regardless of the preliminary designs or if the proposal was based on a variation. AWD and FAM each submitted Compliance Letters. Phase IV and Selection of AWD as BVP In Phase IV, FAM, AWD, and two other bidders submitted their price proposal and total project calendar days. During the public meeting on April 24, 2017, price proposals from each proposer were opened. The price proposals also included each proposer’s total estimated contract time. Based on the formula set forth in the RFP, each proposal received a score for its price proposal. The members of the PSC were not involved in evaluating the price proposals or the contract time. Instead, the prices and contract times were evaluated by DOT staff, who were to alert the PSC members to issues with a proposer’s price or contract time. The record established DOT staff were not concerned and did not alert the PSC members to any issues. Both AWD and FAM received a score of 4.99 points for their price proposals. AWD proposed a total contract time of 1,460 days; FAM proposed a total contract time of 1,825 days. The RFP provided the formula for scoring the proposed contract times as: 5 x (a/b), where a = lowest number of calendar days proposed by any bidder; and b = number of calendar days proposed by that bidder. Using this formula, AWD received 5.00 out of 5 points; and FAM received 4.00 points. The total scores were then noticed by the Department. The next step in this phase was for the Department to evaluate the financial fitness of the intended award. The Department’s finance manager for the RFP, Leon Corbett, and DOT staff evaluated the financial proposal of the highest scorer on a pass/fail basis. As noticed in the RFP, the financial review portion for this RFP was to occur after the April 24 public meeting announcing the technical scores and price proposals. The RFP states that the “PSC shall select the BVP for the Total Project.” It also states that “[t]he Proposer with a responsive Proposal will be evaluated by the PSC for award of the I-395 Agreements as the Best Value Proposer as set forth in this RFP.” Finally, the RFP provides as follows: The PSC will review the evaluations of the Technical Proposal and the scores for the Proposed Contract Time and Scored Price Proposal for each Proposer and make a final determination of the highest score. The PSC has the right to correct any errors in the evaluation and selection process that may have been made. The Department is not obligated to award the I-395 Agreements and the PSC may decide to reject all Proposals. If the PSC decides not to reject all Proposals, the I-395 Agreements will be awarded to the Proposer determined by the PSC to be the Best Value Proposer. Before the scheduled PSC meeting on May 12, 2017, Ms. Chinapoo provided each PSC member with the technical proposals submitted by the vendors, the individual scores of the evaluators, and a spreadsheet compiling the scores. On May 12, 2017, the PSC met to consider the scores, as well as DOT staff’s evaluation of the AWD financial proposal. The PSC unanimously determined that AWD was the “Best Value Proposer” based on the highest technical score, the best value proposer and the best contract time. One PSC member, Mr. Rodriguez, testified that before the May 12 meeting he spent about 12 hours reviewing the material before making the final decision as to which bidder would be BVP. He also testified that he considered AWD the BVP because “they had the best score, after they were scored, they had a compliant price, and they had the best time.” Mr. Rodriguez indicated he would have asked any questions at the meeting had he seen anything unusual, untoward, or problematic about the scoring of the proposals. Mr. Rodriguez noted there was one anomaly in the technical scores of one ARC member who preferred the FAM’s proposal. Whereas the other members of the ARC gave AWD scores of 26.2, 24.6, and 17.80 out of 30 points for Volume 2, John Richard gave AWD a score of 7.20 points; while awarding FAM a nearly perfect score of 29.300. Mr. Richard awarded the other two proposals (not FAM or AWD) 9.00 and 2.5 points. Mr. Rodriguez considered, but was not concerned about Mr. Richard’s individual scores because Mr. Rodriguez felt the scores were based on “aesthetics” and just “an opinion” about which proposal Mr. Richard thought offered the prettier bridge. There is no evidence establishing the PSC failed in its responsibilities or did not follow the RFP process in selecting the BVP as described in the RFP. After the PSC determined the intended award, the Federal Highway Administration was required to concur, the DB Firm was required to submit final financial documents, and the parties would then execute the contracts. DOT’s Scoring In the Amended Protest, FAM asserts the bid award should be rejected because the Department used the wrong methodology for assigning the technical scores for Volume 2. DOT took all of the reviewers’ scores, added them together and divided them by the number of reviewers. FAM claims that correct methodology would be to take the ARC members’ individual scores and average them to one score (x); take the TRC members’ individual scores and average them to another score (y); and then average x and y to arrive at a technical score for Volume 2. Although the RFP was specific as to what criteria the ARC and TRC members were to use in grading the technical proposals, and how those grades were converted to numbers, it was silent as to how the individual reviewers’ scores would be combined to come up with one score for Volume 2. As explained previously, all members from the TRC and the ARC used an “adjectival scoring system” that required individual evaluators to rate portions of the proposals as “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” Consistent with the RFP, non-reviewers (Mr. Schiess and a DOT in-house attorney) assigned numerical equivalents to the adjectival scores. These individual numerical conversions were delivered to Ms. Chinapoo, who kept them secure until the scores of all proposers were presented in a spreadsheet during a public meeting on April 24, 2017. As established by the evidence at the hearing, typically in DOT procurements there are technical reviewers scoring the technical part of proposals. In that situation all of the reviewers’ scores are averaged (i.e., added all together and divided by the total number of reviewers). Unlike other procurements that are based only on technical components and price, this RFP involved an additional component relating to aesthetics. Therefore, in this RFP process there were two separate scoring committees, ARC and TRC, each starting out with five members each. Mr. Rodriguez testified the method used by DOT-– calculating the final score by adding up the scores from the individual reviewers and then dividing it by the number of reviewers--was common practice. Theoretically, under this typical method, for the Aesthetic volume of the Technical Proposals, DOT would have added the scores from each of the ten committee members and divided by ten to reach the technical score. During the course of the procurement, however, one of the members, Brian Blanchard (the sole DOT representative on the ARC) resigned from the committee, and was not replaced. The RFP is silent as to how the absence of a committee member should be treated. DOT addressed the reduction in ARC membership by notifying the proposers that Mr. Blanchard was no longer on the ARC; and explaining the “scoring of your Technical Volume 1 will be done by the five-member Technical Review Committee (TRC), who will also score your Aesthetic Volume 2, along with the four remaining members of the ARC.” It did not clarify how the individual scores would be used to arrive at a total score. As reflected in Joint Exhibit 46, DOT converted the adjectival description provided by each ARC and TRC member and then calculated the scores of each of the reviewers to reach a total sum, which was then divided by the number of reviewers for each volume of the technical proposal. The language in DOT’s notice announcing Mr. Blanchard’s departure from the ARC is ambiguous. The fact, however, that the Department did not provide a formula (as it did for scoring the price proposal or contract time scores) and that it mentioned the “members,” and not the committees, supports the use of the typical averaging methodology, averaging scores of all nine evaluators. As Mr. Schiess testified, this is the way an evaluator’s scores would be treated in any other procurement. Q.: Do you know who made the decision on how to average those numbers? A.: The decision to average the scores has been something the Department has been doing. That’s just common practice. Q.: And what is the common practice? A.: To average the scores of the evaluators. Q.: Just take a straight average, add up all the evaluators and divide the scores by the number of evaluators? A.: Correct. Similarly, the testimony of the PSC members established this was common practice. Mr. Rodriquez testified that he has served on numerous DOT project selection committees over the years and that scores of evaluators are typically averaged. Dat Huynh, another PSC member, described the process as “regular averaging” as “just combining the number and dividing by the number of people that were in participation.” The testimony established any contrary method would need to have been clearly spelled out in the RFP. At the May 12 public hearing, FAM’s representatives raised the issue of the scoring and claimed it defeated the public’s role in the process. The evidence, however, established the public did have a key role in the selection of the Signature Bridge. The ARC’s role was to provide public input. In addition to scoring Volume 2, the ARC evaluated the Signature Bridge design proposals on a Pass/Fail basis and served as the “gate-keeper” keeping any designs it did not approve from moving further in the process.6/ John Morris, president of the third-place proposer, also indicated at the May 12 public meeting that based on his experience the process was not unusual: My team came in third in that process. And I’m not really here representing my joint venture team. I’m really more here as someone who has done a great deal of work with the Department of Transportation and bid on a lot of design-build projects over the last 20 years, and as far as I’m concerned, the DOT followed the process that they laid out in the RFP. Additionally, a plain reading of the RFP indicates it was the weight of the individual ARC members, not the ARC as a whole, that was valued. For example under the section titled “Aesthetic Signature Bridge Proposals Pass/Fail,” the RFP stated in relevant part: Each ARC member will independently pass or fail each option submitted. Each ARC member will also rank the options provided by a Proposer against the other options provided by the same Proposer against the other options provided by the same Proposer. * * * Although the ARC members will rank the different options . . . these rankings are purely for information purposes only, and will have no direct impact on Pass/Fail decision or on the evaluation of the Proposer’s Technical Proposal. * * * [T]he PSC will recalculate the options based on “passing” being lowered to three (3) out of five (5) passes from the ARC members. (RFP at 20)(emphasis added). There is also support for using individual scores in the RFP section titled “Final Selection Process,” which provides that at the public meeting where the price proposals are opened, “the Department will announce the adjectival scores for each member of the TRC and ARC, by category, for each Proposer.” (emphasis added). This interpretation makes sense given that the previous form of the ARC, the Aesthetic Steering Committee, could not come up with a consensus regarding a style or appearance for the Signature Bridge. Moreover, given that it was the DOT’s representative and not a public member that resigned, it cannot be said that the method used by DOT undermined the public’s participation in the process. There is no evidence that the method put forth by FAM is supported by the RFP, any rules or by any industry or departmental precedent; nor is there evidence that the ARC and TRC were to contribute to the scoring process equally. There is no evidence that the averaging methodology used by DOT is contrary to any statute or rule. The Department’s deriving the total score for Volume 2 by averaging all the evaluator’s scores was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition or arbitrary and capricious. AWD’s Contract Time As stated previously, the RFP provided the formula for scoring the proposed contract times as: 5 x (a/b), where a = lowest number of calendar days proposed by any bidder; and b = number of calendar days proposed by that bidder. Additionally, the RFP noted: “The Proposed Contract Time should incorporate and set forth an aggressive but realistic time frame for the required completion of the Total Project.” According to the RFP, any time more than 1,825 days would be nonresponsive. AWD’s Proposed Contract Time was 1,460 days; FAM’s Proposed Contract Time was the maximum provided by the RFP-– 1,825 days. This comes out to be a 365-day or a one-year difference. As a result, using the formula in the RFP, AWD achieved a score of 5.0 out of 5 points for its contract time, and FAM achieved a score of 4.0 points. FAM challenges AWD’s contract time, claiming it was not realistic. FAM argues the 1,460 days proposed by AWD was unrealistic and insinuates this number was done solely to manipulate the scoring. AWD counters, not only was it realistic, it was aggressive, as requested by the RFP. There is no evidence of collusion or that AWD knew the individual technical scores before it came up with its proposal or that there was any kind of unethical or improper conduct relating to the contract time. Rather there was competent and convincing evidence that AWD’s shorter time proposal was realistic given its resources and experience. Kevin McGlinchey, who was involved in developing AWD’s contract time, testified the calculation of AWD’s contract time was an on-going process and was not finalized until a short time before the price and time submission was due. The evidence established AWD’s joint members had previous experience with DOT and P3/design-build projects. In addition, AWD was a very large contractor in the state with access to adequate local labor. Archer employs 1,300 workers in the area; de Moya employees up to 300 workers in the area. For example, depending on equipment availability AWD could have five eight-hour shifts, five ten-hour shifts, or six eight-hour shifts; or AWD could increase the number of crews working each shift. This access to labor afforded AWD the ability to increase its crews and shifts, thereby reducing the length of total work time. AWD also reduced its contract time over the procurement process by changes in its construction plan that allowed it to overlap construction phases and work on more than one segment of the Project concurrently, instead of running consecutively as originally anticipated when it submitted preliminary design documents and MOT plans. Mr. Schiess testified that he and a DOT bridge expert reviewed AWD’s Proposed Contract Time to determine whether it was realistic. This review was conducted between the time the scores were publicly released on April 24, 2017, and the PSC meeting on May 12, 2017. Mr. Schiess testified “based on our experience in Florida and other projects [with] these contractors [Archer and de Moya], that [1,460 days] was not an unrealistic time.” Because there was competent evidence AWD had the resources and a plan to complete the Project in the 1,460 days, its contract time proposal was aggressive, realistic, and responsive to the RFP. AWD’s Financial Proposal FAM also challenges the “Pass” grade DOT awarded AWD on its Financial Proposal. It argues (1) DOT failed in not reviewing FAM’s financial proposal; (2) AWD’s original financial proposal was non-responsive; and (3) DOT improperly allowed AWD to supplement information to its original financial proposal. Section VI, M., of the RFP addresses the financial requirements of the RFP and the documentation that must be provided by bidders. The financial evaluation is a two-step process with an initial Financial Proposal to be submitted on the due date for the price proposals. After the PSC chose a BVP, Mr. Corbett and his staff was also responsible for reviewing a final letter of commitment or credit provided by the DB Firm, which was due 15 days following the Department’s posting of its Intent to Award. Mr. Corbett and his staff conducted the initial financial review for this procurement after the public meeting, announcing the technical scores, price proposals and contract times. The Department was to give the highest scoring bidder either a pass/fail grade, which was relayed to the PSC to make its final decision. During this period, the RFP specifically allowed Mr. Corbett to obtain additional financial information. It states: The Department’s evaluation of a Financial Proposal is solely for the benefit of the Department and not for the benefit of the Design-Build Firm, any entity related thereto, the public or any member thereof, nor create for any third party rights. . . . The Departments evaluation of each Financial Proposal will be on a pass/fail basis. Analysis of the Design-Build Firm’s Financial Proposal by the Department will include, but not be limited to the following: * * * d. Review of the Lender Letter(s) of Commitment or Demonstration of Line(s) of Credit to determine if it meets the financing needs established in the Project Financial Plan. * * * The Department reserves the right to request any additional information or pursue other actions required to meet its obligations to complete the financial due diligence. (RFP at 70.) As an initial matter, although Mr. Corbett did not conduct a concurrent pass/fail review of the financial proposal submitted by FAM (or the other bidders who made it to Phase IV), nothing in the RFP required the Department to review and assess the financial proposals of all the bidders. FAM asserts by failing to have its financial proposal evaluated, the PSC was deprived of the option of awarding the contract to FAM. However, if the PSC had opted not to award the contract to AWD despite its status as the highest scoring bidder, nothing in the RFP would have precluded the Department from initiating a pass/fail review of the FAM financial proposal at that point to assess FAM’s financial viability for the contract award. The Department did not err in evaluating only the highest scoring bidder, AWD. Regarding AWD’s responsiveness to the financial requirements of the RFP, AWD timely submitted its financial proposal to DOT on August 24, 2017, which included a preliminary letter of commitment (“PLOC”) from BankUnited. According to the RFP, the PLOC was required to contain the following information at a minimum: The lender was interested in providing financial support for the project; The lender had reviewed the financial requirements of the RFP; The amount of financial support the Lender intended to provide (no minimum amount was required by the RFP); Any special conditions to the PLOC. After AWD was ranked as the highest scoring bidder, Mr. Corbett and his staff conducted DOT’s initial review of AWD’s financial proposal. There is no dispute that DOT had the right to request any additional information or pursue other actions required to meet its duty of due diligence. The evidence established the original financial proposal met the minimum requirements of the RFP, but DOT requested additional assurances and clarification regarding its PLOC, which AWD provided. As Mr. Corbett explained, AWD’s Financial Proposal was responsive to the RFP requirements, but he had questions relating to the PLOC. Q.: And so this determination of responsiveness was made after you had the original financial proposal, Archer Western- de Moya, the first supplemental proposal and a second supplemental proposal that we just went over, correct? A.: So I mean, there is responsiveness and there is pass/fail, and I think that’s where we have to explore a little bit more. The letter states responsive, meaning it meets the minimum requirements. And then there is the pass/fail, which I don’t know why I didn’t address pass/fail, why I didn’t say it’s a pass in the letter. But the pass came at that point, too, yes. * * * So my answer is it wasn’t an additional proposal, it was--the original proposal was what was evaluated for responsiveness. We asked for additional assurances to make sure they were headed towards a path of getting the resources necessary to finance the project. So the determination was made after receiving all that information. It is evident on the face of the BankUnited PLOC that it is responsive, as it complies with the following minimum RFP requirements. BankUnited confirmed “its interest in providing financing” for the project. BankUnited stated it “has taken careful consideration to review and understand the financial elements of the Project.” BankUnited specified it was “prepared to provide a credit facility up to” $125 million; and the $125 million credit facility consists of $75 million from BankUnited and another $50 million from other participating banks. It is this reference to “other participating banks” that triggered Mr. Corbett to request further information. Attached to the PLOC was a term sheet from BankUnited that sets forth the conditions for its $125 million credit facility. Although FAM contends that the BankUnited PLOC is nonresponsive because BankUnited is only committing to provide $75 million of the $125 million credit to AWD, the evidence at the hearing established BankUnited was proposing to provide a single credit facility totaling $125 million, some of which BankUnited may obtain through group or a “pool” of lenders. The financial proposal was that BankUnited would be the lead arranger of multiple banks participating in the “lending pool.” Nothing in the RFP prohibited this type of “pool,” and the testimony at the hearing established DOT has accepted this kind of loan structure in the past. Where a single credit facility in the form of a loan pool is being proposed, there is nothing in the RFP that precluded BankUnited, as the lead arranger, from submitting the PLOC on behalf of all of the lenders that are or would be participating in the credit facility. Regardless, even if BankUnited’s PLOC is treated as offering a credit facility in the amount of $75 million rather than the full $125 million, this does not render the AWD financial proposal nonresponsive since the RFP merely requires that the PLOC state the “amount the Lender intends to lend,” and does not require what amount that should be. The RFP only states that the commitments “should meet the required amount [of gap financing] identified in the Project Financial Plan.” Obviously, the goal was to ensure the winning bidder had the ability to secure preliminary commitments equaling the amount it may have to put forward for completion of the Project because DOT would be making period payments, but not until after the DB Firm had incurred the expenses. Given BankUnited’s PLOC meets the minimum requirements of the RFP, AWD’s financial proposal was responsive. Moreover, the RFP allowed DOT to look beyond the bare minimum requirements of the RFP to obtain a higher level of assurance before finalizing a “passing” grade. Mr. Corbett also wanted the information in anticipation of questions that the PSC members may have. Specifically, the evidence established that on April 25, 2017, Ms. Chinapoo’s requested AWD to provide additional information regarding the proposed pooling loan being offered by BankUnited. In particular, Mr. Corbett sought “additional assurances” that BankUnited would be able to obtain the balance of the “pool” financing from other participating banks. On April 27, 2017, AWD responded to DOT’s request for additional assurances. In this response, AWD reaffirmed that BankUnited was committed to provide the Final Letter of Commitment that was required under DOT’s RFP. Because AWD’s compliance with the request for information was provided prior to the agency’s announcement that it intended to award the contract to AWD, these additional documents did not violate section 120.57(3)(f). On April 28, 2017, AWD also confirmed to DOT that it had taken steps toward finalizing the $125 million pooling credit facility described in the BankUnited PLOC. AWD also provided another PLOC from Private Bank indicating Private Bank also had an interest in participating in the BankUnited credit facility. Private Bank’s PLOC proposed that it would participate in BankUnited’s credit facility (rather than offering its own credit facility) and that its proposed $50 million loan to the $125 million pool would be the same as the conditions set forth in BankUnited’s term sheet. AWD’s April 28 response also advised that it was continuing to explore the possibility of having BankUnited provide a credit facility for the entire $125 million in gap financing needed. The details regarding this alternative credit facility were described in a letter from BankUnited that was attached to AWD’s April 28 response. Mr. Corbett admitted he considered the additional information received from AWD before announcing his final decision to “pass” the AWD financial proposal; and this information solidified his decision to give AWD a passing grade. Although hypothetically it is possible that had AWD provided different information, Mr. Corbett would have not been assured and may have reached a different result, this is not evidence of an error. Rather it is the essence of conducting “due diligence.” It is also true the additional information BankUnited provided included information that was not contained in AWD’s April 24 financial proposal. Based on this, FAM argues that the April 27 and April 28 responses constitute modified or amended financial proposals that were submitted after the RFP’s financial proposal deadline in violation of section 120.57(3)(f). However, FAM’s position must be rejected for several reasons. First, the RFP expressly authorized DOT “to request any additional information or pursue other actions” in furtherance of its financial due diligence. This clearly is broad authority that does not limit DOT’s inquiry to information that merely clarifies the financial proposal. Having failed to challenge this “due diligence” language in the RFP provision within the time permitted by section 120.57(3)(b), FAM has waived any objection to DOT’s use of this provision. Further, in both its April 27 and 28 responses, AWD reaffirmed that it was prepared to move forward with the BankUnited credit facility proposed in AWD’s April 24 financial proposal. Although AWD’s April 28 response included information from Private Bank, this information did not propose a new or different credit structure, it simply provided additional information regarding the pool structure expressed originally by BankUnited. Because the BankUnited credit facility indicates that there would be other lenders participating in its credit facility, the identification of Private Bank is consistent with, rather than amending or modifying, the financing plan presented in AWD’s financial proposal. Again, the purpose of the Financial Proposal and PLOC was not to obtain a final commitment from the DB Firm to a particular financing arrangement with a particular lender. Instead, the RFP only required the proposer to present its “preliminary” or possible financing plans so that DOT could evaluate the likelihood that the final award would go to a proposer that had the financial resources necessary to finish the project on time. Only after the contract was awarded would AWD be required to present DOT with its final financing plan in the form of a final letter of commitment. Nothing in the RFP required that this final financing plan be identical to the preliminary financing plan that was presented in AWD’s initial Financial Proposal. As such, the Department’s request for and consideration of the information from AWD regarding the BankUnited PLOC and the pooling credit structure did not violate section 120.54(3)(f), and was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition or arbitrary and capricious. FAM also argues the Preliminary Term Sheet (“PTS”) attached to the BankUnited PLOC conflicts with the RFP, which specifies the circumstances under which money paid under the proposed contract may be assigned to a lender as security for a loan. The RFP provision at issue, referred to by the parties as the “Assignment Clause,” states in relevant part, as follows: Reimbursement shall be made to the Design- Build Firm by warrant mailed to the Project Specific Escrow Account [“PSEA”] using a unique vendor number sequence. The Design-Build Firm may, with the express written consent of the Surety(ies) and the Lender(s) Financier(s), sell assign or pledge any monies paid into the Project Specific Escrow Account by the Department in favor of third parties and including but not limited to the Design-Build Firm’s Surety(ies) and Lender(s)/Financier(s); however, any such sale, assignment or pledge must only attach to payments made by the Department after such funds have been paid by warrant mailed to the Project Specific Escrow Account, and no sale, assignment or pledge of any receivable from the Department is authorized nor will be permitted by the Department. (RFP at 63)(emphasis added). AWD submitted with its Financial Proposal the BankUnited PLOC, which had an attachment with the following relevant language: Seller [AWD] proposes to sell the right of certain future [DOT] payments . . . to one or more Purchasers in order to finance the Project. As established by Mr. Corbett and Department e-mails, the intent of the Assignment Clause was to make “each [contract] payment payable to the vendor/contractor executing the agreement.” In this regard, the RFP treats the deposit of funds into the PSEA as payment to the contractor. The assignment is permitted under the RFP’s Assignment Clause if AWD’s assignment of a contract payment to a lender does not divert DOT’s payments away from the PSEA to BankUnited. In other words, there is no violation if the funds continue to be deposited into the PSEA. If, however, the assignment gives BankUnited the right to receive payments from DOT before the payments are mailed to the escrow account, it violates the RFP’s Assignment Clause. There is no dispute that the BankUnited PTS purports to assign certain rights held by AWD to the BankUnited as collateral for the proposed credit facility. The terminology used to describe the assignment is non-specific and creates ambiguity as to what the particular right is that is being assigned or sold. For instance, there is language in the PTS indicating that AWD is selling or assigning its “right to payment from DOT” without describing what that right is. In order to know what “right to payment” is being assigned, it has to be determined what right to payment AWD would actually have under its DOT contract since AWD cannot sell or assign contract rights that it does not have. See Cole v. Angora Enters., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). As established by the RFP and testimony at the hearing, AWD will have no right under the DOT contract to receive payments directly from DOT; rather, payments from DOT will first be deposited into the PSEA, which will then be available for disbursement to the DB Firm. Because AWD will have no right to direct payment from DOT (as opposed to indirectly through disbursement from the PSEA), AWD cannot assign or sell a right to direct payments from DOT to any lender, including BankUnited. Stated differently, the only “right to payment” that AWD can assign is its right to payment from the PSEA. Moreover, the plain meaning of the PTS establishes AWD does not intend to assign or sell to BankUnited the right to receive payments from DOT before the payments are deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. The PTS states as follows: The Seller [AWD] shall establish a project specific escrow account (the “Project Specific Escrow Account”) with the Escrow Agent. All payments payable by DOT under the Department Contract will be deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. (emphasis added). Consistent with this directive, the PTS requires the parties, including BankUnited, to execute the “DOT Project Specific Escrow Account Form” as part of their financing transaction. As established by the Department’s exhibits, the purpose of DOT Project Specific Escrow Account Form, which must be signed by both the bidder and lender (or in this case AWD and BankUnited), is to “irrevocably” request, authorize and direct DOT “to process, issue and transmit any and all future payments otherwise payable directly to [the DB Firm] to now be processed, issued and transmitted using DB Firm’s Project Specific Escrow Account . . . in lieu of DB Firm’s regular vendor account. . . .” This irrevocable request to DOT would be made in the name of AWD as the DB Firm contracting with DOT. As the lender, BankUnited’s signature on the form would indicate its consent and agreement “to be so bound by the entirety of the terms of [AWD’s] Request for Specific Escrow Account ” In other words, by signing this form, BankUnited will be agreeing to be bound by AWD’s irrevocable request to have all DOT payments deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. This means that, in accordance with the RFP’s Assignment Clause, BankUnited will be irrevocably agreeing not to receive payments from DOT before payments are deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. The arrangement between AWD and BankUnited does not violate the Assignment Clause and is, therefore, responsive. AWD’s Technical Proposal FAM challenges a number of aspects of AWD’s technical plan as being non-responsive to the RFP. Specifically, it claims AWD’s proposal violates the non-modifiable requirements for the number of lanes on certain portions of the Project and the lane width requirements. Basic/Continuous Lane Requirements for I-395 (Attachment A-33) As described earlier, AWD made substantial changes to the RFP’s concept plans for I-395 and SR 836 by proposing a two- tiered road formation made up of a two-lane viaduct on an upper level and a collector road system on the lower level. In order to pursue this design, AWD submitted an ATC proposal which was eventually approved as “ATC 12C”. The proposed viaduct would have two continuous lanes in each direction between the two major highway systems, SR 836 and I-395, without being impeded by local SR 836 traffic. The local traffic would be carried on a lower roadway or Collector- Distributor (“CD”) road underneath the viaduct. This lower CD road would also have one continuous lane in each direction, for a total of three continuous lanes in each direction. DOT determined that the viaduct concept and changes were an improvement over the RFP concept plan. As explained by Anthony Jorges, a traffic roadway engineer for BCC: First with the viaduct, by separating the traffic, it provides you unimpeded access to and from Miami Beach to the east, so it improves the emergency evacuation and improves access for emergency services. This addresses the event traffic issue that I brought up earlier. While you have events that may cause backups on the lower level for local traffic, we do have a separate level for the mainline that’s going to carry through. So you have those two lanes on top free at all times. So that was a significant advantage that we were looking at. And in addition to that, there is also the additional lane on the westbound to northbound--I am sorry, the eastbound to northbound movement, and that is taking it from the one lane that was in the RFP concept to the two lanes that Archer Western de Moya provided. That provides significant improvements to the operations of the mainline. It also provides safety benefits because now traffic that was queuing up on this ramp back on to the mainline is separated. Whatever traffic queues up here is separate from the mainline, and you won’t have the possibility for the speed differential, which contributes significantly to accidents. FAM contends that DOT erred in approving a technical proposal ATC 12C, because the number of continuous basic lanes on the highway was a non-modifiable requirement of the RFP. According to the testimony at the hearing and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (“AASHTO Manual”), highway lanes can be grouped into two categories: basic lanes and auxiliary lanes.7/ A basic lane is essentially one that is designated and maintained over a significant length of a route, irrespective of changes in traffic volume and lane balance needs. The parties also referred to a “basic lane” as a “continuous” lane-–one that allows traffic to move over a “significant length of route” without having to change lanes. An auxiliary lane is essentially all lanes other than the basic lanes. It is defined as “the portion of the roadway adjoining the through lanes for speed change, turning, storage for turning, weaving, truck climbing and other purposes that supplement through-traffic movement.” As part of the 2010 I-395 PD&E, DOT found that I-395 lacks sufficient capacity “for system linkage” with SR 836 and other roadways due, in part, to the fact that it has only one continuous lane in each direction while the linking roadways have three. One continuous lane on I-395 was inadequate to provide the necessary access or linkage to the other road systems. Initially, the Federal Highway Authority (“FHWA”) approved a plan to address I-395’s deficiencies which added one additional continuous lane in each direction. On June 15, 2015, however, the FHWA approved the Final Re-Evaluation (completed by BCC) for the I-395 PD&E. This version included a design change allowing “three (3) continuous lanes in each direction to match 836 on the west and MacArthur Causeway on the east.” (emphasis added). DOT noted that this design change was supported by AASHTO design principles, including the basic lane concept. A concept plan for the I-395 project, which included the three continuous lanes and later became the RFP concept plan, was attached to the Final Re-Evaluation. Section VI of the Final Re-Evaluation addressed DOT’s commitments for the I-395 project, including commitment number 14: “[m]aintain and enhance continuity between SR 836/I-95 facility on the west and the MacArthur Causeway on the east.” DOT concluded on page 18 of the Final Re-evaluation that the addition of the third continuous lane on I-395 was necessary to support this commitment, stating: STATUS: [ ] Design Changes No. 1 and No. 7 describe the need to add an additional lane in each direction and widen a portion of the westbound MacArthur Causeway Bridge in order to accommodate the changes to the ingress and egress points of the Port of Miami Tunnel. These changes allow the I-395 project to be compatible with both roadways to the east and west and provide system continuity. DOT also noted that the I-395 project would be constructed concurrently with the SR 836 project, which was the subject of a separate PD&E that was completed in 2011. The SR 836 PD&E Study noted on page 6: More specific improvements potentially involve the provision of a minimum of six continuous (i.e., 3 directional) mainline lanes and the provision of parallel collector distributor facilities to separate the system to system traffic from the local to system traffic. This language establishes MDX also intended that there be three continuous lanes in each direction as proposed by DOT for the I-395 project. In short, DOT’s intent was to have three continuous lanes that would extend from the western boundary of SR 836 to the eastern boundary of I-395. This would allow a driver in any of these lanes to travel from one end of the project to the other without having to change lanes. As a result of the re-evaluation of the PD&E, BCC developed the language for the RFP that related to continuous lane requirements also found in Attachment A08. This language states, in relevant part: The Department has prepared a set of Reference Documents, which include Concept Plans. These plans convey an established set of design objectives to which the Design-Build Firm is required to accomplish in [the I-395] component of the project. The Department’s design objectives include: * * * Provide 3 continuous through lanes to the I-395 Mainline in the Eastbound and Westbound direction. The RFP also provided “[t]he Design-Build Firm shall not modify the following requirements with an ATC Proposal . . . Minimum basic number of lanes shown in Attachment A-33.” Mr. Jorge’s testimony was that the purpose of this language was to be consistent with the objective to provide three continuous lanes in each direction on I-395 to and from the Signature Bridge. The reason the word “minimum” was included in there was we wanted to make sure that we were getting at least three lanes in each direction, and that is the intent behind having the word “minimum.” We did understand that there would be a possibility for changes. But we wanted to make sure that we had at least three lanes in each direction. Attachment A-33 is titled, “I-395 Lane Schematic” and includes information relating to the number of “basic lanes,” “auxiliary lanes,” and the “direction of lanes” at various points of entry via connector roads and ramps onto I-395. For the Signature Bridge, Attachment A-33 has a footnote that states, “The Signature Bridge Shall Accommodate a Minimum of Four 12’ Lanes in Each Direction[.]” The plain reading of Attachment A-33 in the context of the RFP is that the three continuous or basic lane requirements applied to the roadways, but that the Signature Bridge was required to have four continuous lanes. On its face, Attachment A-33 is a schematic drawing that shows all of the lanes in the RFP concept plan for I-395. Although four of the lanes depicted in Attachment A-33 are identified as auxiliary lanes, the rest are identified as basic lanes. However, absent is any indication of some “minimum” number of basic lanes that must be maintained and that cannot be altered through the ATC process, except at one location, which is at the Signature Bridge. For that specific location, Attachment A-33 states that there must be a “minimum of four 12’ lanes in each direction.” (emphasis added). The fact that a minimum is specified at one location on Attachment A-33, but not others, is an indication that DOT did not intend to establish a minimum for other locations on the schematic. Indeed, if DOT had intended for all basic lanes depicted at each location to be the minimum number of lanes for that location, then there would have been no point to including a specific note to express that the number of lanes at the Signature Bridge location was a minimum of four lanes. Mr. Jorges confirmed that this language requiring four lanes in each direction in Attachment A-33 applied only to the Signature Bridge. Q.: And what is the minimum number of basic lanes that there need to be at that [the Signature Bridge] location? A.: Four. Q.: And is a minimum number of basic lanes indicated on attachment A-33 at any other location? A.: No, it’s not. Q.: Can you explain how indicating a minimum number of lanes at the signature bridge is consistent with the PD&E? A.: The PD&E called for three lanes in each direction of I-395, so at the signature bridge, you have 16 a situation where you have the three lanes from I-395 plus the one lane from the eastbound connector, and that’s how we arrived at the four. Like I mentioned before, it was beyond the minimum three that we were expecting, and that’s why we felt it was necessary to identify minimum for that specific location. * * * Q.: Do you have a view or an opinion as to whether or not it would make sense to have a minimum basic number of lanes at every location that’s depicted on A-33? A.: Well, if every lane there was designated as a minimum requirement, there would be no room for any sort of modification or changes by the team, so it essentially eliminates any possibility for innovation and really negates the design- build process. Q.: Can you explain whether or not that would be consistent or inconsistent with the objective of the RFP? A.: It’s--the attachment is consistent with the objectives. One of the key objectives was to have three lanes in each direction. And there is other objectives stated, but they are not specific as to the number of lanes. Although Petitioner’s roadway engineer offered its own interpretation of the Attachment A-33 and the RFP language regarding continuous lanes, Mr. Jorges’ testimony was more reliable and convincing. Mr. Jorges was familiar with the history of “continuous lane” requirements and the reasons for including that requirement in the RFP. He and others from BCC were involved in drafting the concept plans and the RFP language that included the “three continuous-lane” requirement in the RFP. In reality, while the RFP stated the proposals were to “adhere to the number of lanes” in the concept plans, each bidder also had the option of pursuing an ATC that would allow it to deviate from this requirement. The purpose of the ATC process was to encourage the proposers to offer innovative solutions or an approach that was equal to or better than the RFP concept plans or other requirements in the RFP. The viaduct design offered by AWD was found to be “equal to or better” to the concept plan and thus meets the standard for issuing an ATC because (1) AWD’s ATC proposal does not preclude DOT from “meeting the Department Commitments,” which are defined to include the ones “listed in the PD&E, FEIS/ORS and any Reevaluations attached” and (2) AWD’s ATC proposal did not violate the Specific ATC Restrictions set forth in the RFP. Attachment A-33 plainly states there must be a minimum number of basic lanes at the Signature Bridge location only. FAM’s argument that every basic lane identified on Attachment A-33 should be treated as a “minimum” continuous lane that cannot be modified is rejected. The Department did not violate the RFP by issuing ATC 12C, and AWD’s proposal with this ATC is responsive to the RFP. Basic Lane Requirements for SR 836 (Attachment MDXA-02) FAM also challenges the number of lanes proposed by AWD for the MDX’s portion of SR 836 of the Project, which are established by attachment MDXA-02. Specifically, FAM argues AWD’s plan is “one basic lane short of the four basic lanes required by the RFP from Northwest 10th Avenue going eastbound through to I-395.” (FAM’s PRO, p. 16 at para. 45) The issue to be determined is whether the RFP and MDXA-02 requires four continuous lanes for this portion of the Project. Unlike Attachment A-33, Attachment MDXA-02 is not a schematic of all the lanes on the SR 836 concept plan. Instead, Attachment MDX-A02 contains only “typical sections” or a view of a cross-section (not a linear) of the roadway at a particular location. It is not possible to determine from only a cross- section view of a segment of the roadway whether any of the lanes are continuous over a significant length of SR 836. Thus, Attachment MDX-A02 does not reveal which lanes on SR 836 are basic or continuous. Although Mike Madison, FAM’s roadway engineer, testified it was “possible” by reference to the typical sections “to determine what the basic lane requirements are for State Road 836 even if they are not identified as basic lanes on those typical sheets,” he did not rely on (or even refer to) Attachment MDX-A02. Instead, he relied on the RFP concept plan and the industry definition of “basic lane.” The RFP’s SR 836 concept plan referenced by Mr. Madison does identify which lanes are continuous. Again, the concept plans were to serve as reference documents for proposers to build off of and improve. The SR 836 concept plan serves as “general information only,” except as “specifically set forth in the body of” the RFP. Regardless, both parties offered evidence that AWD’s SR 836 proposal includes three basic or continuous lanes. Mr. Jorges’ testimony established the SR 836 concept plan has three basic lanes on the mainline and no basic lanes on the adjacent collector ramp. Instead, the fourth lane that FAM claims was necessary and non-modifiable was actually an auxiliary lane, not a basic lane. The evidence established the “fourth lane” in question is a CD road. Although a CD road can be a continuous lane, here it was not. In the concept plan, the CD road merely collects traffic from Northwest 12th Avenue, which it then distributes to I-395 without providing any access to or from SR 836. Because the CD road on the concept plan does not serve traffic that originates from SR 836, the concept plan’s CD road does not serve the function of a continuous or basic lane for SR 836. Further, the alleged “fourth lane” on the RFP concept plan’s CD road is not continuous and, thus, cannot be considered a “basic” lane. Mr. Madison admitted the concept plan’s CD road does not originate at the western boundary of the SR 836 project. Instead, the concept plan’s CD road originates at Northwest 12th Avenue, nearly halfway between the Project’s western and eastern boundaries. Thus, traffic cannot navigate the length of the SR 836 project on this fourth lane without changing lanes as required by the PD&E. Hypothetically, as explained by Mr. Jorges, a driver would not have access to a continuous lane on the concept plan’s CD road; on the concept plan, a driver entering the CD road via the northbound Northwest 12th Avenue entrance cannot reach the interchange and I-395 without shifting to another lane. After the interchange, this same driver would be forced to shift to another lane again to reach the MacArthur Causeway. By contrast, a driver accessing AWD’s CD road at the western boundary of SR 836 would be able to reach the MacArthur Causeway with no lane changes. Finally, as noted above, the Final Re-Evaluation for the I-395 PD&E proposed the addition of a third continuous lane to I-395 so that I-395 would have “three continuous lanes to match 836 on the west.” (emphasis added). The goal of the I-395 project was therefore symmetry in the number of basic lanes to improve linkage between the I-395 and SR 836 systems. The RFP required three basic or continuous lanes for the MDX portion of SR 836. AWD’s proposal was responsive to this basic lane requirement. Minimum Lane Width Requirements FAM next contends AWD’s proposal is non-responsive because it reduces the lane width for the lane and ramps for the SR 836/I-95 interchange. There is no dispute AWD’s lanes were reduced by an ATC from 12 feet to 11 feet at the ramp in question, but at issue is whether the ramp is in the I-95 portion of the Project, which is modifiable (i.e., not subject to the ATC restrictions); or is in the MDX portion of the Project, which is non-modifiable. The RFP states that “services performed by the Design-Build Firm shall be in compliance with” DOT’s Plans Preparation Manual (“PPM”). (RFP at 77.) Included in the PPM is a 12-foot lane-width requirement. For that portion of the roadwork within the scope of the MDX project, the RFP states that the winning bidder “shall not modify” through the ATC process the “[m]inimum widths of mainline lanes and ramp lanes.” (RFP at 84.) However, pursuant to Addendum 11, this ATC restriction was removed from the RFP for roadwork that is part of DOT’s I-395 project. In ATC 12C, AWD indicated it would be reducing the lane width of the SR 836 west-north connector from 12 feet to 11 feet starting at the physical gore. A “gore” is the area where a ramp joins the mainline or where two streams of traffic converge. Although there was testimony about a “theoretical gore” as opposed to a “physical gore,” engineers use the physical gore to mark the point where the ramp ends and the highway begins. In this case, AWD, through ATC 12C, sought to narrow the width of the traffic lanes at the point where the northbound ramp physically joins and transitions onto I-95. According to FAM’s roadway engineer, this reduction in the lane width is necessary because this ramp connects eastbound SR 836, which has 12-foot lanes, with northbound I-95, which has 11-foot lanes. The evidence establishes the portion of the connector road at issue is not part of the MDX project because it is owned and maintained by DOT, not MDX. This is confirmed by the fact that DOT owns the Northwest 17th Street Bridge (Bridge ID 870369), which is on the connector road to the south of the lane-width reduction area. DOT’s ownership of the lane-width reduction area is also consistent with DOT’s I-395/I-95 maintenance map, which shows that DOT (and not MDX) maintains this part of the roadway. FAM does not rely on the jurisdictional or maintenance maps, but rather relies on two documents in AWD’s ATC 12C application in which AWD referred to “836” as the applicable “State Road Number” and “MDX” as the “Approving Agency” for the proposed lane-width reduction. FAM also noted that AWD used station markers referring to SR 836 to identify the lane-width reduction area. However, as confirmed by the attachments to the RFP, including the DOT maintenance maps and DOT’s bridge inspection report, AWD was mistaken that MDX owned this segment of the roadway. This does not make DOT’s granting of the ATC erroneous. Moreover, FAM offered no document prepared by either DOT or MDX, including the RFP itself, which established MDX’s jurisdiction over this portion of the roadway. Here, the lane-width reduction occurs north of the physical gore, which is the point where the lanes originating from the ramp become physically connected to the lanes on the existing highway, I-95, via pavement that lies between the converging lanes. For safety purposes, according to the AASHTO Manual, once a roadway becomes physically connected to the highway, it is good engineering practice to design the roadway to match the criteria for the highway (e.g., 11-foot lanes) rather than to continue using the ramp criteria (e.g., 12-foot lanes). Even FAM’s roadway engineer acknowledged that, at some point before reaching I-95, the lanes joining I-95 from the connector road must transition from 12 feet to 11 feet to match the I-95 lanes, and that good engineering practice requires that this transition be done gradually rather than “suddenly.” He conceded that the lane-width transition proposed by AWD was reasonable, but disagreed whether the ramp ended at the physical or theoretical gore point. Q.: Right. You agree with me that at some point the lanes that are coming in to I-95 have to transition from 12 to 11 to match? A.: They would have to at some point. Q.: You can’t just go from 12 and all of a sudden have an 11-foot lane, right, that’s bad engineering practice? A.: Yes. Q.: As a matter of fact, the PPM won’t let you do it that way and AASHTO, too, you’ve got to have a transition? A.: Correct. Q.: Okay. So we are not questioning the reasonableness of having a transition? A.: Reasonableness, no. Q.: Okay. So I think to figure out the disconnect again, do you think the ramp doesn’t end at the gore? A.: No, it ends north of the gore, the other side of the gore point. Q.: But you just said there are two points. A.: Theoretical gore points. Q.: You believe the ramp ends at the theoretical gore point? A.: Yes. At the same time, FAM offered no evidence to show that it would still be possible to comply with the gradual transition requirement in the PPM and AASHTO if the lane reduction were delayed until after the theoretical gore when there is no longer any pavement separating the 12-foot lanes from the connector road and the existing 11-foot I-95 lanes. Because MDX neither owns nor maintains that part of the roadway where the lane is narrowed to 11 feet, this road segment is not within MDX’s portion of the Project or jurisdiction. Because the portion of AWD’s proposed lane narrowing for the ramp to I-95 was in the Department’s I-95 jurisdiction, it was modifiable. Therefore, AWD’s ATC proposal with the lane-width reduction was responsive and also a reasonably safe way to transition traffic to I-95. FAM’s Proposal Prior to and at the hearing, AWD argued FAM’s proposal was non-responsive to the RFP and to DOT’s regulations in a number of ways: (1) FAM’s engineer of record, FIGG-WGI, was a joint venture and, as such, could not work on the Project; FAM’s bridge architect, Linda Figg, was not qualified to serve in that capacity; (3) FAM’s Financial Proposal lacked the requisite audited financial statements; and (4) FAM’s technical proposal was inconsistent with the RFP requirements. FIGG-WGI, Inc. First, AWD claims FAM’s designation of FIGG-WGI as an engineer of record violates Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 75.003(2), which states as follows: (2) The Department shall not recognize joint ventures for purposes of qualifying consultants to work for the Department. Each individual or firm will be annually qualified based upon individual or firm capability. FAM designated in its Letter of Response both “FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc.,” and “Wantman Group, Inc.” as two subcontractors as part of the FAM team. Later, however, FAM designated FIGG-WGI as FAM’s “Lead Design Firm.” Prior to submitting its Letter of Response, David Wantman asked DOT what information a design joint venture needed to submit to receive DOT approval to participate in this procurement. Carla Perry, a DOT procurement manager, was responsible for the prequalification process for this RFP. She informed FIGG-WGI engineering joint ventures “are not recognized” and that WGI would need to be designated as the engineering firm instead of the joint venture. She suggested the following: The foreign firm could sub to the Construction JV (or to Wantman), but the Engineering JV you referenced below would not be recognized for purposes of fulfilling the technical qualification in the engineering work types, and would be found non-responsive. . . . FAM’s position at final hearing and in its PRO was that FIGG–WGI was not a “legal joint venture.” This position is contrary to the evidence in FAM’s technical proposal noting FIGG–WGI was “organized as a fully integrated, single-purpose entity, which is the engineering firm of record” and the testimony at the hearing establishing FIGG-WGI was formed for legal reasons to insulate its members (Figg Engineering and Wantman) from third-party liability on large construction projects. FIGG-WGI is a joint venture and its participation in the Project, had FAM been chosen, would have violated DOT’s rules regarding what type of business structures can work on DOT projects. The violation, however, was curable. The RFP allows changes in designated key personnel and “teaming arrangements” subject to the Department’s approval. Approval of changes would be based on “whether or not the proposed substitutions in Partner/Teaming Arrangements are comparable to the Partner/Teaming Arrangements identified in the Letter of Response and/or Technical Proposal.” Here, the evidence establishes that the members of the joint venture are both individually prequalified to do work for DOT. In reality, their employees are the same employees of the joint venture which would have been working on the Project had FAM been chosen as the BVP. Moreover, the testimony at the hearing established that if FAM was chosen, both Figg Bridge Engineers, Inc., and Wantman Group, Inc., would have individually contracted with FAM in whatever corporate form would have been required by DOT. The RFP “Waiver or Irregularities” also provides FDOT may waive irregularities in proposals “where such is merely a matter of form and not of substance, and the correction . . . of which is not prejudicial to other Proposers.” Here, AWD failed to sufficiently establish how it suffered (either potentially or actually) from FAM’s designation of FIGG-WGI, LLC. Nor was there any evidence of how AWD would have been prejudiced if FAM was allowed to substitute the individual members of the joint venture, if FAM had been chosen to be the BVP. Any error in designating FIGG-WFI, LLC, as its lead designer and engineer of record was a curable minor irregularity that would not have made FAM’s proposal non-responsive. Linda Figg Second, AWD makes the same arguments regarding Linda Figg’s designation as “Bridge Architect” as it did in its pre- hearing motions as to why FAM’s proposal was non-responsive: the RFP required bidders to designate a bridge architect; and Linda Figg, the person designated by FAM, is not an architect. FAM designated Ms. Figg in its Letter of Response as its “Lead Bridge Architect.” Ms. Figg is not licensed as an architect with the State of Florida under chapter 481, Florida Statutes, (Architecture, Interior Design, and Landscape Architecture) nor is she licensed in any other state. The RFP is silent as to the qualifications of a bridge architect. Nothing in the RFP indicates the designated bridge architect must be registered or licensed; nor does it require the designated bridge architect to meet specific educational or other qualifications. No evidence was provided at the hearing as to how the Department defined “bridge architect.” In fact, FDOT did not join with AWD in this argument. Nor was there evidence at the hearing establishing the industry standard for defining a “bridge architect.” Merriam-Webster defines “architect” as “a person who designs buildings and advises in their construction.” Architect, Merriam-Webster Online (2017), https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/architect (accessed on February 23, 2017). Ms. Figg meets this definition of “architect.” Moreover, Figg Engineering is prequalified by DOT and has available professional staff (other than Ms. Figg) who are licensed architects and/or professional engineers. As such, FAM’s designation of Ms. Figg as its Lead Bridge Engineer did not make its proposal non-responsive. FAM’s Bridge Design – Load AWD also asserts FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal violates the RFP’s non-modifiable requirement that “[a]ll Signature Bridge components shall be part of the structural system that carries bridge Dead Load (DL) and Live Load (LL).” “Dead load” is the actual weight of the bridge structure; “live load” is the added weight of the traffic traveling on the bridge. As explained at the hearing, “components” are the necessary parts of the bridge: superstructure (what cars drive on); substructure (pylons or columns); and foundation (what the pylons and columns are set on). In contrast, railings are safety devices and considered “appurtenances” as opposed to “components.” FAM’s bridge design contained two rotating disks, each on top of an extended arm. Bridge components that do not serve a purpose or carry any weight were not allowed by the RFP, and bidders could not obtain an ATC to change this requirement. FAM’s own bridge engineer, Denny Pate, testified that nonstructural parts of the bridge were prohibited by the RFP. Q.: Can you give the judge an example of a nonstructural bridge component that would be noncompliant under the RFP? A.: The RFP requirement, obviously, is--in my opinion, is saying: We don’t want fake bridge components. For example, there is a project development over here just west of Port St. Joe on the coast there called WindMark. And as part of their entrance to their development, they have a very standard short-span girder bridge, but they have put up steel, fake steel trusses along the sides that basically add interest to the bridge, make it visually more unique, but they don’t do anything. They are not structural. Mr. Pate went on to testify that the rings on the tops of FAM’s proposed bridges do not carry any live load. They were not necessary and could be removed without any effect on the bridge’s structural integrity.8/ This was consistent with the testimony of John Corven, AWD’s bridge engineering expert. Mr. Corven explained the loads in FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal picked up by the cables into the pylon did not find their way into the single arm with a rotating disc and, thus, the arm and disc would not be part of the load-carrying capability of the bridge. The inclusion of non-load bearing components was more than a minor irregularity. One could imagine a scenario where an aesthetic design may compromise safety concerns. More importantly, failure to adhere to the restriction requiring only load-carrying components had the potential of prejudicing other bidders who complied with this requirement from coming up with more eye-pleasing bridge designs. Mr. Corven testified: Q.: As an engineer, what would be the impact if that restriction were lifted in terms of the work you are doing from an engineering standpoint, meaning if you no longer had to worry about dead and live load components, how does that impact how you go about designing a structure? A.: Well, I think it would free the engineer to more artistic and aesthetic expressions for elements that might capture a visual appeal but not be functional structurally. Although the rotating ring may have been aesthetically and architecturally interesting, it was prohibited by the RFP. As such, FAM’s Signature Bridge design with the arm and rings was non-responsive. Twin Structures AWD also asserted FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal violated the RFP’s prohibition against “twin structures” found in the Aesthetic Manual for the RFP which states: The signature bridge shall be two fully independent bridges that are made to look like one form (e.g. twin basket handle bridges void of a visually unifying element will not be allowed). This structural autonomy is necessary because the EB and WB structures will be constructed sequentially, yet the stakeholders have insisted upon the appearance of one aesthetic entity. Elsewhere the RFP notes, the bridge proposals must adhere to the following minimum requirements: “No twin structures.” The common sense meaning of “twin structures” is two bridges that are identical or exact duplicates. Simply looking at the design, FAM’s proposal’s eastbound and westbound structures are not identical, but rather inversely similar. Moreover, as established by Mr. Pate’s unrefuted testimony, there were a number of “non-twinning” aspects of FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal. The westbound bridge runs straight, whereas the eastbound bridge contains a horizontal curve. The towers are mirrored so that the features are not in the same direction. The features on the two structures are staggered. There are a different number of spans in the overall length of the structures. The overall structures are different lengths: Bridge 8 (eastbound) has a signature bridge length of 980 feet and 1,432 feet of overall length between the spans; and Bridge 9 (westbound) has 977 feet for the Signature Bridge and 1,207 feet in overall length. FAM’s proposed Signature Bridge design did not contain twin structures prohibited by the RFP requirements. Constant Girder Depth AWD also challenges FAM’s Signature Bridge as being non-responsive to the Aesthetic Manual’s requirement “the signature bridge shall have a constant depth superstructure.” The language of the RFP does not include this reference, but does require “[g]irder depth on each side of the expansion joints shall be the same, i.e., no steps allowed.” As explained at the hearing “girder depth” is “basically what your eye sees as the distance from the top to the bottom of the roadway surface.” Both AWD’s and FAM’s bridge engineering experts testified the girder depth on each side of the expansion joint was the same in FAM’s Signature Bridge design and complied with the RFP language requiring equal girder depth on each side of the expansion joint. FAM’s Signature Bridge was responsive to the RFP’s girder depth requirement. MOT Plan Next, AWD contends FAM’s MOT plans are non-responsive because (1) the plans do not illustrate pedestrian access; (2) the plans do not have the requisite number of traffic lanes; and (3) the plans contain two reverse curves without a tangent. The RFP requires the following: The Construction Phasing/Sequencing Plan shall provide information regarding Traffic management for Total Project . . . [and] shall include a narrative describing the means by which the Design Build Firm will move vehicular, bicycle and pedestrian traffic along the Project Limits. The evidence established FAM provided a narrative description of pedestrian access in its technical proposal and submitted MOT plans that allow for the same level of pedestrian access as exists in the present condition. As such, FAM met the pedestrian access requirements of the RFP, and its MOT was responsive to the pedestrian access requirements. AWD next contends that the RFP requires that three lanes of traffic be maintained during all MOT phases because that is what exists in the present condition. However, DOT clarified in writing during the Q&A phase that proposers need only provide the same number of lanes shown in the RFP concept plans during MOT. The evidence at the hearing established FAM provides the same number of traffic lanes shown in the Concept Plans, and as such its MOT plans are responsive to this requirement. Finally, AWD contends FAM’s MOT plans are deficient because one of the ramps (Ramp D1) contains two reverse curves without a tangent. A tangent is the straightaway leading a driver in a certain direction when he or she comes around the curve. Although the testimony surrounding the curves in the MOT plan was highly technical, Mr. Madison, FAM’s roadway engineer, convincingly explained that the two reverse curves in FAM’s MOT are not super-elevated or abnormally cross-sloped. A cross-slope is the pitch of the roadway from one side to the other; a normal cross-slope is two percent. The testimony at trial established FAM’s MOT plan contains two curves that are two percent in one direction at all times and meet industry safety standards. Thus, they do not require a tangent. Regardless, even if the curves required a tangent, there was no evidence that failure to include this tangent put other bidders at a disadvantage. Finally, if Ramp D1 required a tangent, the plans AWD complains about are preliminary in nature. During the Q&A phase, DOT notified FAM that its Ramp D1 design needed a tangent between two curves or otherwise needed to be redesigned to meet the standards. FAM agreed to do so. Because this was a “modifiable” aspect of the MOT, had the PSC selected FAM as BVP, adjustments and corrections to Ramp D1 could be achieved per FAM’s commitment to comply with the RFP in its Confirmation Letter. FAM’s MOT plans were responsive to the RFP, and any need for an adjustment to include a tangent could have been provided in the final plans as allowed and anticipated by the RFP. Audited Financial Statements AWD argues FAM’s Financial Proposal was non- responsive because it did not contain audited financial statements from one of the members of its joint venture. The winning bidder was required to self-finance portions of its work as it would not receive full payment from DOT until after it had incurred costs for design and construction. This type of structure is often referred to as “gap financing.” The RFP required each bidder to submit a Financial Proposal “so the Department can be assured that the Design-Build Firm has sufficient financial resources to construct the Department Project within the allotted Contract Time, based on the Cash Availability Schedule.” To satisfy itself that the entity who would ultimately design and build the Project was able to finance the labor and construction costs, the Department required each bidder to provide a financial proposal that contained, among other things, audited financial statements. The RFP required the following in the Financial Proposals: The minimum required documents the Design- Build Firm must submit to the Department as part of the Design-Build Firm’s Financial Proposal shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: . . . Financial Statements of members of the Design-Build Firm or any partners of the joint venture that make-up [sic] the Design-Build Firm that will be responsible for the repayment of financial support related to the Department Project or directly provides financial support related to the Department Project. Lenders that are not members of the Design-Build Firm or partners of the joint venture that make up the Design-Build Firm are not required to provide Financial Statements. Financial Statements shall include: For the most recent two (2) fiscal years in which audited Financial Statements are available, audited Financial Statements prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Required Financial Statements shall include: Opinion Letter (Auditor’s Report); Balance Sheet; Income Statement; Statement of Retained Earnings or Changes in Stockholders Equity; Statement of Cash Flows; and Notes to Financial Statements. * * * If audited Financial Statements are unavailable for the most recently completed fiscal year, unaudited Financial Statements, prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, shall be provided for such fiscal year. An affirmative statement shall be provided indicating that the Financial Statements for the most recently completed fiscal year are still being audited. These unaudited Financial Statements shall be certified as true, correct and complete by the Chief Financial Officer or treasurer of the entity. Requirements for unaudited Financial Statements are the same as for audited Financial Statements, except an Opinion Letter (Auditor’s Report) is not required. (RFP at 67–68.) As described in the RFP, the RFP required a joint- venture bidder to submit the audited financial statements of each of its members in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); if a partner of a joint-venture member would provide financial support for the project, that partner’s audited financial statements were required to be submitted as well. There is no dispute FAM did not and could not include any audited financial statements for one of its members, FEI, because FEI is not audited. There is also no dispute that FEI will be responsible for the repayment of financial support related to the Project or would directly provide financial support related to the Project. FAM did not qualify for the alternative included in the RFP for providing audited financial statements when such statements are unavailable for the most recent fiscal year. Moreover, it was clear from the testimony put on by FAM that such audited statements could not have been provided in a timely matter, even if the Department had allowed FAM to supplement its financial proposal. Brian Smith, the assistant corporate controller for Fluor Corporation, testified if FAM had been selected BVP and the Department had requested the audited financial statements for FEI, it could not have provided them until well after the May 18, 2017, date set forth in the RFP for selecting the BVP. Q.: Had you been asked by DOT for an FEI audited financial statement for 2016 back in April of 2017, what is the soonest that FEI could have provided that information to DOT? A.: An audit of this nature would generally take four to six weeks, on an expedited basis, probably four weeks. FAM counters it provided equivalent information and thus there was no effective harm. The RFP, however, specifically requires audited financial statements, not the information in those statements. This seems especially prudent given the size of the Project and when, as in this case, the bid was awarded as a public–private transportation facility under section 334.30, Florida Statutes, which emphasizes the financial health of bidders. Moreover, the failure to submit audited financial statements has been found to render a proposal non-responsive when such statements are required by an RFP. See Jani-King Gulf Coast Region v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., Case No. 16-2762BID, RO at 23 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 26, 2016) (explaining the importance of audited financial statements, noting they “provide a much higher level of assurance as to the validity of the financial information presented,” than unaudited statements). Nor can FAM satisfy the requirement for audited statements from FEI simply by submitting such statements from FEI parent corporation. See Consultec, Inc., d/b/a Gen. Am. Consultec, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Admin., Case No. 91-5950BID, RO at 29 (Fla. DOAH Nov. 25, 1992) (finding submission of financial information from parent company failed to satisfy RFP requirement to provide audited financial statements and thus proposal was non-responsive). As explained in Consultec, FAM would have had an advantage had it not been required to provide such statements. Succinctly, . . . its failure to comply with the audited financial statement requirement of the RFP gave it an advantage not enjoyed by other bidders since by submitting the balance sheet of its parent company, as opposed to its own financial statements, HCPP effectively precluded any assessment of its own financial soundness. Id. As such, FAM’s failure to include the audited financial statements of FEI renders its Financial Proposal non- responsive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner Fluor-Astaldi-MCM, Joint Venture’s Amended Formal Written Protest, and affirming Respondent Florida Department of Transportation’s Notice of Intent to award to Intervenor Archer Western-de Moya, Joint Venture. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2018.
The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether Respondent's license as a dentist in Florida should be disciplined because of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaints filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations involved in this hearing, relating to both cases, the Respondent, Peter A. Kurachek, was licensed as a dentist in Florida under license number DN 0005429, and the Board of Dentistry was and is the state agency governing the practice of dentistry in Florida. AS TO CASE NUMBER 89-1240 Jill J. Hageman started work at the Respondent's clinics in Port Charlotte and in Venice, Florida in July, 1985 and left his employ in January, 1986. During the period of her employment it was office practice to soak instruments used on patients in a cold soap solution, not a bactericide. Her job included the task of cleaning used instruments and she had been instructed to scrub them and soak them in a soap solution before placing them in a dry heat sterilizer. This unit, not an autoclave or a chemclave, did not have any gauges or lights to indicate appropriate temperature. The instruments were left in the soap solution between 30 minutes and an hour; then rinsed and dried. During the first three months of her employment the heat unit was not there. It was installed only after she had worked there for some time. Her instructions on the use of the soap solution and the procedure to be followed came from the Respondent. Ms. Hageman was concerned with sterilization. She observed that some instruments were rusty and the procedures she was instructed to follow were not consistent with what she had been taught in dental technician's school. Respondent denies this and none of the other doctors who worked for him who testified at the hearing observed any. It is found, therefore, that allegations of rust are not supported. The sterilizer utilized in Respondent's office was not as sophisticated as those seen by Ms. Hageman in other offices or in school. Since it did not have any means to indicate completion of sterilization, it was difficult to tell when the instruments were completely sterilized. This was the only office in which she has ever seen a dry heat sterilizer used. On one occasion, when she was assisting Respondent with a patient, she saw him drop an instrument on the floor, pick it up, and use it in the patient's mouth without sterilizing it. She was upset by this but failed to discuss the situation with Respondent or the patient, or make a notation in the patient's record. This incident allegedly took place shortly after she began work at Respondent's clinic but she, nonetheless, remained there for several months, perhaps mentioning it only to her friend and coworker, Ms. Gillespie. She finally left Respondent's employ of her own volition because she was concerned about the lack of sanitation in the clinic. To the best of her knowledge, she was not about to be fired. Ms. Gillespie worked in Respondent's office in Port Charlotte during 1985 and 1986, primarily as a receptionist, but, when necessary, as a dental assistant. She was licensed as such, holding an expanded certificate. To the best of her recollection, no sterilization was practiced in the facility. Respondent repeatedly used instruments that had been washed with an all purpose soap, and while there was an autoclave on the premises, it was inoperable during the entire period that she worked for him. As she recalls it, instruments were washed in the soap, dried, and placed back into the instrument drawers for subsequent use on patients, and this lack of sterilization concerned her. On one occasion, Respondent needed a post for a device he was inserting into his patient's mouth. When he could not find a dental post, he asked Ms. Gillespie for her hair brush, and when she gave it to him, cut several bristles off and, as she recalls it, without washing or sterilizing them in any way, inserted one into a patient's mouth as a post. The brush had been used and had hair in it. This shocked her but she did not make any official report of it, discussing it only with Ms. Hageman. Though there is some inconsistency between the testimony of Ms. Hageman and that of Ms. Gillespie regarding the type of mechanical device used by Respondent to sterilize his instruments, it is obvious that both are discussing the same piece of equipment and one or the other is in error in her description of it. However, both agree that the equipment on hand did not work in any case, and that Respondent knew it did not work. According to Ms. Gillespie, he advised his employees to falsely state, if asked, that instruments were taken to the other office for sterilization. Respondent denies both Hageman's and Gillespie's allegations. In the area of sanitation, in Dr. Robinson's opinion, the use of soapy water is not appropriate and does not meet minimum standards of sanitary practice. Further, the use of a dropped instrument or the use of a bristle from a hairbrush for a post in a patient's mouth is not an appropriate sanitary procedure. Use of alcohol as a sterilizing agent is inadequate. Respondent's wife claims that on the day the clinic was visited by the investigator, a sterilizer, a cold sterilizer, and a daylight loader were present and operable. The heat sterilizer in question was a small unit different from that in most other offices. It has a temperature gauge and lights to show its operation, but, admittedly is difficult to operate. The cold sterilizer is merely a covered tray utilized to hold instruments while immersed in a sterilizing fluid. At that time in either March or April, 1985, this office in Port Charlotte had been open for about 7 to 8 months. Ms. Hageman had already left Respondent's employment as had Ms. Gillespie. Ms. Kurachek is not a technician but has picked up considerable knowledge of procedures and equipment over the 21 years she has been married to Respondent. Monica Colburn is a certified dental assistant and Respondent's receptionist in the Port Charlotte office. In May, 1986, she worked in the Venice office and has worked for Respondent for over three years. She did not work with either Ms. Hageman or Ms. Gillespie, both of whom preceded her. She has seen Respondent and other dentists drop instruments while working on a patient. It is a common occurrence. When this happens to Respondent, he always leaves the instrument on the floor and asks for a new one. Only when the patient departs is the instrument picked up and it is sterilized before being used again. The chemclave, the autoclave and the cold sterilizer have all been there as long as she has been employed. Both Ms. Hageman and Ms. Gillespie claim that while employed as dental assistants by Respondent, they were instructed to adjust dentures on patients. Ms. Hageman relates that in order to do this, she had been instructed to place an identifying paste inside the pink part of the denture currently in use by the patient to identify raised pressure points and then adjust the denture. She did this, accomplishing the procedure at the Respondent's direction but without his assistance or supervision. She also was given no training in the procedure by the Respondent but had some background in it because the procedure was briefly covered to give students a familiarity with it, not a use capability, during training. In fact, when in either basic technician school or classes for her expanded certificate, she was advised that for her to do this type of work by herself was illegal. She did it, even knowing it was improper, out of fear of Respondent's ill temper and because, as her boss, he had instructed her to do it. Nonetheless, though it bothered her that she was being required to do something illegal, she did not complain to anyone other than Ms. Gillespie even though she was required to perform the procedure for approximately four different patients. Ms. Gillespie, primarily the receptionist in the office, was occasionally called upon by the Respondent to make adjustments to a patient's dentures and when she did this, on at least 12 separate patients, he did not supervise her performance of the procedure nor was he present in the room while it was being done. His sole participation in training her was to show her once or twice how to accomplish the procedure and even after Ms. Gillespie advised Respondent of her concerns regarding this, and that she was not licensed to do this type of work, he nonetheless inferred that if she did not do as he directed, she was likely to lose her job. Since she was a divorcee with two children and needed the employment, she did as she was told. She was also asked to use a cavitron on a patient but refused and even the potential of losing her job would not convince her to do so. The instrument may legally be used only by a licensed dental hygienist or dentist. According to Dr. William F. Robinson, an expert in general dentistry, whose opinion is accepted herein, the task of adjusting dentures is one which cannot be delegated to a dental assistant whether or not the assistant has an expanded certificate because dental adjustment is a delicate procedure which requires special training that assistants do not normally receive. To do so violates community standards as an improper application of the dentist's practice and can result in: destruction of soft tissue and bone, neurological damage, incorrect occlusion resulting in speech and fungus problems, sanitation problems, and an overreactive gag reflex with choking. Ms. Colburn, Respondent's current assistant, has never adjusted an appliance or been asked to do by Respondent. The same can be said for the other assistants. Only a dentist does adjustment though she has taken a paste impression preparatory to an adjustment being made. This has been the policy at Respondent's clinic so long as she has been there. It should be noted, however, that Ms. Colburn has been employed by Respondent only since the initiation of the investigation involved herein and is not aware of any practice previous to that time. At Respondent's request, she contacted prior denture patients to see if any had had their denture adjusted by an assistant. None of the five who responded so indicated. Respondent claims that his clinics now have and had, during the first five months of 1985, an autoclave and a large tub for cold sterilization. To support this claim, Respondent offered three checks and a purchase order which he asserts refer to the autoclave in question. However, the purchase order, upon review, fails to indicate a vendor and is undated, and the checks total an amount larger than that necessary for the purchase of the instrument. Respondent claims that the autoclave he had worked but not properly. It would heat up to the proper temperature for sterilization and would stay at that temperature but had no timer capability and would not complete the cycle to remove and heat and turn itself off. In order to get the instruments out, the operator would have to pull the plug. Ultimately, Dr. Kurachek purchased another heat sterilizer and then a chemical sterilizer, but asserts that at all times he had some kind of sterilization capability in each of the clinic offices. No doubt some type of equipment was present, but it is found that the equipment did not work sufficiently to be reliable for sterilization, and was a problem. Respondent also denies ever having picked up a dropped instrument and using it in a patient's mouth. He claims that when he drops an instrument he leaves it where it is until either the patient leaves or it is convenient for him to retrieve it and sterilize it. He also denies that he used a hairbrush bristle as alleged by Ms. Gillespie. He admits, however, that at times he used hairbrush bristles as posts and still does when a regular post is not available. In the instant case, Respondent claims that the bristle was taken from a brush bought specifically for this purpose and used only after sterilization in a cold sterilization solution. He unequivocally denies using any bristle from Ms. Gillespie's personal hairbrush claiming he has not ever seen that brush until it was shown to him at the hearing. Respondent also claims that instruments were transported from one center to another but only to replace an instrument that was used and was no longer effective, or to fill a need in the center to which taken. Respondent claims that this sterilization process was adequate and meets sterilization standards. The procedure followed consisted of a wash in soapy water and a rinse, followed by cold sterilization, and for those instruments requiring further sterilization, a second rinse was used followed by heat sterilization. Dr. Kurachek did not clarify what was meant by use of the term "cold sterilization". According to Respondent's expert, Dr. Bliss, at one time it was appropriate to use nylon bristles as posts for crowns and a hair brush bristle, if properly sanitized before use, could legitimately be inserted if it was the proper size. Respondent attempted to discredit the testimony of Ms. Gillespie, and to a lesser extent, Ms. Hageman, by implications that they were merely trying to seek revenge by making the allegations here involved because they had been suspected of misconduct with funds while employed. There was no direct evidence to that effect, however, and such inference is rejected. Taken together, the evidence shows, and it is found, that inadequate sterilization equipment was on hand and proper sanitation procedures were generally not followed, but the allegation relating to use of a dropped instrument is rejected. AS TO CASE NO: 89-1241 Ms. Jean D. Spears was treated at the Respondent's clinic during the period 1984 through 1986. During the early part of her treatment, she went there strictly for routine fillings and cleanings. However, as time went on she also needed some crown preparations. At first she saw Dr. Feasley who took the required x-rays and did the fillings required and, did some other things for her. She had no problem with this treatment. However, in 1985 she also needed a bridge installation for which Dr. Feasley did the preparation but, because he left employment with the Respondent before the bridge could be constructed and placed, it was ultimately completed and placed by a Dr. DeVol. The bridge prepared by Dr. Feasley and installed by Dr. DeVol did not fit at first and could not properly be placed. Ultimately the Respondent was called in and recommended something be done which seemed to cure the problem. However, while the Spears were on vacation, the bridge came out and had to be recemented several times. After this, Respondent made a partial bridge for Mrs. Spears for other teeth, but this bridge did not fit either. Because she was dissatisfied with the fit of the original bridge made by Dr. Feasley Ms. Spears went to another dentist, Dr. Currie. She then returned to Respondent who agreed to remake the original Feasley bridge and an appointment was made for her after Respondent did a lot of other work elsewhere in her mouth. However, when the time came for Respondent to correct the original bridge, even though he had promised to do so, Respondent refused to work on it claiming it was not his responsibility since he did not make it. Ms. Spears thereafter complained to state authorities and sometime later, Respondent called and offered to do the necessary repair work. At this time, Ms. Spears refused to allow him to do so because she had made alternative arrangements for correction and she never went back to Respondent's clinic. Instead, she went to see Dr. Feasley, her original dentist, who remade the bridge which now fits properly and which she wears to this day. Ms. Spears considered herself to be a patient of Respondent's clinic regardless of which dentist did the work for her, and though she does not blame Respondent for the poor fit of the original bridge, she considers him ultimately responsible since he is the owner of the clinic. She was upset by Respondent's attitude and even after he originally agreed to fix the bridge he changed his mind and suggested she go back to Dr. Feasley to get the repair work done because it was not his, Respondent's, responsibility. Respondent questions Ms. Spears' recollection of the particulars involved in her complaint against him and though it is obvious that time has dimmed her memory of exact dates and times, it has not adversely affected her recollection of the ultimate facts. At 78 years of age, she appears to have a good command of her faculties and is considered a credible witness. Dr. Feasley worked at Respondent's Venice clinic from 1983 to 1985 as a contract dentist and during that period, treated Ms. Spears for whom he suggested, on April 25, 1984, a root canal. Though he attempted to do the root canal, he was unable to accomplish it. He sealed it up and suggested she have an endodontist pull the tooth in question, number 18. Somewhat later, on August 1, 1984, he took several x-rays and did some fillings, and prepared three teeth for crowns which he set in place. In light of Ms. Spears' age and health, he felt it appropriate to put in crowns even though she had some periodontal disease. In July, 1985, he also did the preparation work for the construction and insertion of a bridge to cover teeth numbers 18 - 21 for Ms. Spears, but because he severed his connection with the clinic before it was finished, he was unable to follow through on it. However, he saw Ms. Spears again at his new office in May, 1986 when she came to him complaining of the bridge on teeth 18 through 21 which had been placed by Respondent's clinic after his departure and with which she had had problems since its insertion. Dr. Feasley took x-rays and found that the bridge in question was defective and based on what she told him, he recommended it be replaced. On July 15, 1986, Dr. Feasley removed the offending bridge, repaired teeth 18 and 22, and put in a new bridge extending between those two teeth. It is noted that an additional tooth was added. When, in 1986, Dr. Feasley examined the bridge constructed at Respondent's clinic, he determined the fit was inappropriate. There was a margin gap on tooth 21 which had been filled with a tooth colored material. This was not as he, Dr. Feasley, had designed the bridge. When Dr. Feasley made the new bridge for teeth 18 through 22, he charged Ms. Spears even though on May 13, 1986, Ms. Spears told him that the Respondent had sent her to him to have him fix the bridge. In the course of their conversation, Ms. Spears advised him that whenever she had gone to the clinic, they would always do most of the work requested but, would never work on the bridge for teeth 18 through 21 which, though made at the clinic, had been prepared and designed by Dr. Feasley. Dr. David R. Smith, an expert in general dentistry called by the Petitioner, reviewed Ms. Spears' records and x-rays and examined her on April 24, 1988. Based on his review, he concluded that for various reasons, Respondent's treatment failed to meet the minimum standards of performance within the community. These reason were: There was no charting of periodontal disease. X-rays clearly showed periodontal disease on tooth 18 resulting in bone loss; that the teeth were tipped; and that teeth numbers 3 and 4 were periodontally involved. The clinical examination showed severe function involvement on tooth 32; tooth 18 had a 5 mm periodontal pocket on two sides and a 4 mm pocket on two others; teeth 6, 8, 22, and 23 showed buckling and bleeding on probing with active periodontal disease; the mobility of the teeth was slight; teeth 4 and 5 had been roughly ground flat on the biting surface; tooth 11 showed decay on the biting edge; and teeth 12 and 13 showed short margins around a bridge. The charts prepared on Ms. Spears show that Dr. Feasley started treatment with preparation for a bridge for teeth 18 through 21. The bridge was placed in the patient's mouth on July 19, 1985 by Dr. DeVol. There were some problems with this bridge and Dr. Curry treated Ms. Spears and did an extraction of an unrelated tooth. Ms. Spears continued to complaint about the 18 to 21 bridge and in December, 1985, a filling material was placed on the edge of the tooth which leads Dr. Cook to believe there was a short margin which required the patch. Work was also done on upper right teeth 3 through 5 and 12 through 14. Some of these are in direct occlusion with teeth 18 through 21. On February 6, 1986, Dr. Kurachek first saw Ms. Spears. He indicated in the record at that time that it was a difficult case, (teeth 3 through 5 had super-erupted and needed adjustment), and he had to grind down some teeth. He also indicated the patient needed a bridge on the upper left from tooth 12 through tooth 14. On February 7, 1986, he delivered a partial bridge and advised Ms. Spears of the need for another different bridge which she refused to have done. At this time, Respondent failed to chart any periodontal disease. On several follow-up visits, Respondent adjusted the partial bridge and on February 20, 1986, he placed some covering material over a gap left by a short margin. On March 13, 1986, he concluded that the teeth 18 through 21 bridge was to be redone at no charge. On April 8, 1986, the bridge still was not corrected and in May, 1986, Respondent entered in the file that he did not want to interfere with Dr. Feasley's work. The records indicate Respondent did the bridgework on teeth 12 through 14 before the patient's periodontal disease was corrected, and in the opinion of Dr. Smith, this is below community standards. In this, Dr. Smith disagrees with Dr. Feasley's position that in light of the patient's age, installation of a bridge prior to correcting periodontal disease is acceptable. Though there is a divergence of opinion on this issue, the better position is that one should treat and cure the periodontal disease before beginning bridge work. In Dr. Smith's opinion, however, the first bridge on teeth 18 through 21, constructed by Drs. Feasley and DeVol, appears inadequate due to the repeated adjustments that were necessary. Given the fact that this bridge was inadequate, it was improper for Respondent to put a bridge on teeth 12 through 14 without regard to the improper condition of the teeth 18 through 21 bridge. It would have been more appropriate for him to fix the 18 - 21 bridge first and then install the 12 - 14 bridge. Dr. Smith is of the opinion that Respondent's installation of the 12 - 14 bridge without first correcting the problem with 18 - 21 does not meet standards because it did not treat the underlying problem and it impacted and abutted a severely impacted tooth, (18). In addition, the placing of the partial denture on the left side, (teeth 28 - 31), was a violation of standards since it was anchored to a faulty tooth, (tooth 18), by a wire that went around the mouth behind the front teeth. Both conclusions are found to be correct. It also appears that Respondent recommended adjustment of the biting surface of teeth 3 through 5 and that teeth 12 through 14 be planed. He recommended extracting teeth 24 and 25 and insertion of a lower bridge. He also indicated the bridge on teeth 18 through 21 should be redone but refused to do it himself, and it was not done at Respondent's clinic. Dr. Paul A. Hounchell, also an expert in general dentistry, also reviewed Ms. Spears' records and her x-rays, and from the records was unable to determine the treatment plan anticipated for this patient. There was no charting of her periodontal problems and a failure to chart pockets is not within standards in this state. Dr. Hounchell agreed with Dr. Smith regarding the impropriety of inserting a new bridge on different teeth in Ms. Spears' mouth without first correcting the improper formulation of the 18 through 21 bridge. He also observed that the margin on tooth 12 was open at least 1 mm and that on tooth 13 by at least 1/2 mm or more and his opinion, this is outside minimum standards. Dr. Rupert Q. Bliss, an expert in general dentistry, has served on the Board of Dental Examiners and has been a consultant for it thereafter. He teaches at the University of Florida Dental School and has, over the years, reviewed thousands of charts and records. He has considerable experience in crown and bridge work and general reconstructive dentistry with the majority of his practice dealing with prosthetic manufacture. His examination of the records kept on Ms. Spears by Dr. Smith, Petitioner's expert, shows they contain little in regard to periodontal pockets. In charting this area, training generally calls for the noting of six items for each tooth. Other than as to teeth 32 and 18, Dr. Smith's records note only four items per tooth. This is not appropriate. However, Dr. Smith's charting is not in issue. Comment is made by Dr. Bliss only for comparison. The clinic notes on Ms. Spears prior to the Respondent's taking over of her treatment in February, 1986, show many problems in her mouth which Respondent recognized and agreed to correct, especially regarding the bridge for teeth 18 through 21. Since Respondent took over treatment of Ms. Spears in mid process, it is not necessarily below standards for him to have failed to rechart prior conditions and to continue with the treatment already begun, especially since she had been seen be another dentist in the same office. Though Dr. Bliss keeps detailed charts on his patients, it is not uncommon to see charts which do not include thorough periodontal pocket charting. While he does not approve of this practice, there is no absolute requirement for it. The Board standards require a complete examination including thorough charting of periodontal pocketing. The chart kept by Respondent appears to be typical. It does not conform to the minimum standards in Florida but is consistent with common practice in the dental community. As to Respondent's grinding down of teeth to make them fit to a bridge, this can legitimately be done, but if it is, it leaves the tooth open to the mouth environment. According to Dr. Bliss, whether to do so is a judgement call, but evaluating Respondent's performance in grinding down teeth 12 through 14 before correcting teeth 18 through 21, in his opinion the process was accomplished in a manner equal to or above minimum standards. If the grinding of teeth 12 through 14 were done to an ideal plane of occlusion, it would reduce pressure on the lower bridge and would improve the periodontal condition of the patient on teeth 18 through 21. Consequently, it would eliminate the potential for traumatic occlusion. Further, the initiation of crown and bridge work before clearing up the periodontal problems was acceptable in this case, Bliss opines, because Respondent was picking the patient up in mid treatment. Had Ms. Spears been a new patient, it would have been more appropriate to clear up the periodontal problems before starting the crown and bridge work. Ms. Kurachek was present in her husband's office when the investigator from the Department came. He was there for approximately 15 minutes during which she heard him indicate it appeared everything was in place and he would so report. There appears to have been a serious misunderstanding on someone's part regarding this, and it is highly unlikely the investigator made such comments.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license to practice dentistry in Florida be suspended for a period of six months and that he be fined $3,000.00, and that when reinstated, he be placed on probation, under such terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe, for a period of three additional years, these actions to run concurrently with the penalty, if any, imposed by the Board in its action, when taken, in its allied case involving the Respondent, heard under DOAH case number 89-5544. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 89-1240 AND 89-1241 The following constitutes my specific ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By the Petitioner: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3(a). Accepted and incorporated herein. 3(b). Rejected. 3(c & d). Accepted and incorporated herein. 4. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. 5.-7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12.-14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. & 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. By the Respondent: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated but not dispositive since there is some issue as to whether either worked properly. 1st sentence accepted. Rejected since sole evidence of this is hearsay testimony. Balance accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a summation of testimony and a comment thereon. 1st sentence accepted. Balance is not a Finding of Fact but a summation of testimony. A restatement or and comment on testimony, not a Finding of Fact. 1st Sentence accepted. Balance merely a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11.-14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15.-19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted. 1st sentence rejected as not supported by evidence of record. Balance accepted. Accepted as accurate description of treatment plan and of Respondent's reasons therefore without accepting appropriateness thereof. & 25. Accepted. Accepted. & 28. Accepted and incorporated herein. 29.-32. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of testimony. Accepted. Accepted but not determinative. Accepted, but it was never done properly. Accepted, but failure to examine eventually is a failure of standard. Rejected as an inaccurate summary of testimony. Dr. Bliss indicated charting is often not done properly and indicated specifically that Respondent's charting was not up to standards. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 730 South Sterling Street, Suite 201 Tampa, Florida 33609 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire One Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Buckhalt Executive Director Board of Dentistry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Both Hewitt Contracting Company, Inc., (Hewitt), and Vogel Brothers Building Company, (Vogel), submitted a bid on Florida Department of Transportation, (FDOT) project number 105003631, for the construction of a minor bridge in Hillsborough County, Florida. Both Hewitt and Vogel had been pre-qualified by FDOT to bid on its projects, The determination of pre-qualification was done for FDOT by Charles Goodman, a registered professional engineer. Pre-qualification is not done on a project by project basis but instead is determined on a particular work category in advance. Vogel was low bidder for the project in issue and Hewitt was second low bidder. Hewitt timely filed a notice of protest and formal protest based on its claim that Vogel was not properly pre-qualified for minor bridge construction. Vogel has no experience building bridges for FDOT or for any other state and the instant project was the first project for FDOT in which Vogel had bid as a prime contractor. However, the company has been in business in Wisconsin since the 1920's and has performed numerous construction projects at various locations throughout the country. Those that have required heavy pouring of concrete have been primarily parking garages, pedestrian walkways, and wastewater treatment plants. Within those types of categories, several construction techniques were used which are similar if not identical to those used in bridge building. Vogel has, however, no pile driving experience which would be used in this project. Vogel does not own all of the equipment that would be necessary to construct this project. Ownership is not required, however, so long as the applicant is willing and able to provide the equipment through other means such as lease or rental. Though Vogel has presented no evidence of specific rental agreements, it has the financial capacity to rent the required equipment and there is little doubt it could do so. By the same token, Vogel does not currently employ any personnel in Florida who have experience in the construction of bridges similar to the project under consideration nor does the company presently employ any professional engineers totally registered as such in Florida. It does, however, employ professional engineers registered elsewhere with experience that would be pertinent to this project and, as it has done in the past, would, if necessary, bring those personnel to Florida to assist in this project. During the time Mr. Goodman was performing as a qualification engineer, he reviewed all 900 contractors doing business with FDOT at least twice and some, three times. In performing the qualification review, he looked only at the applications of the various contractors and did not talk to any of the company representatives. By the same token, he did not discuss the applications with anyone in the department. The decision on approval was his alone. Mr. Goodman was aware of Vogel's prior experience and the fact that it had constructed several pedestrian overpasses and recognized that the company's experience with the classical type bridge such as is involved here is limited. However, he was satisfied that while Vogel does not own all of the equipment necessary for completion of this project, it does own enough equipment to complete part of the work and the remainder of the items on the FDOT equipment list which it does not own, it can procure from outside sources. He is also aware of the fact that Vogel does not have any experience driving piles of the size required for this project. It does, however; do mass pours of concrete and is involved in larger construction projects such as water and sewage treatment plants. Most of its experience is in the construction of commercial buildings in Wisconsin. In his analysis, Mr. Goodman used an evaluation sheet in conjunction with the table contained in Rule 14-22, F.A.C., to come up with an ability factor. This does not, however, have any substantial impact on approval. In the instant case, out of a possibility of 25 points, Vogel was awarded 0 points on bridge construction as it pertained to both completed and ongoing projects. In fact, Vogel was awarded points only in those experience areas not related to bridge projects. As to organization and management, it received 10 points in each out of a possible 15 points for each. These awards related to the company's skills in general. Since Mr. Goodman's consideration was based only on what was contained in the application, he does not know if any personnel have experience in constructing bridges as are called for in this project. His decision was based on his conclusion that Vogel had done similar work on other projects equivalent to the least of the qualifications for bridges, (pedestrian overpasses, parking garages, and water plants), which involved techniques similar to those used in construction of the least complex bridge. This information upon which Mr. Goodman relied came from Vogel's brochure and he is not personally aware of the projects or when and where they were constructed. The FDOT policy was to require an applicant to meet the equipment and experience even for minor bridges, and in this case, in Mr. Goodman's opinion, Vogel, which had built box culverts which are legally defined as a minor bridge at a low level, qualified. In making their analyses, FDOT evaluators are required to look at minimums, not optimums, and Vogel's experience, in the opinion of Mr. Goodman, satisfied the requirements at the lowest level. Even though this project involved procedures it had not previously done, Vogel's qualification was determined on the basis of general requirements and not on the basis of the specific requirements of this project which had not been identified at the time qualification was established. Mr. Goodman did not verify any of the statements made in Vogel's application with Vogel or any other individual, nor did he attempt to contact any reference or other party to inquire regarding Vogel's ability to construct the project. Mr. Goodman's decision to qualify Vogel was reviewed, prior to the hearing, by Mr. Kayser, the current qualification engineer for FDOT. He looked at Vogel's application and based on what he saw, (their ability to procure the required equipment; the types of projects they have completed in the past; and the intricate techniques involved therein), is of the opinion that Vogel is capable of completing this project successfully. If he were doing a qualification evaluation on Vogel today, he might require some verification of certain items, and request evaluations of the quality of the work they have done, but that would be all. The fact that most of the work Vogel has done is out of the state does not bother him, nor does the fact that the contractor is from out of state. Many of the successful contractors with whom FDOT has done business are in the same category. Had Vogel built only buildings, he might have had some concern. However, the diversity of their projects, including many where the work and techniques used are similar to that used in bridge construction, makes him comfortable with them, and he would not attempt to decertify or disqualify Vogel. In support of Petitioner's point of view, Mr. Andrew Clark, executive vice president of a general contracting firm specializing in heavy bridge construction, feels Vogel does not have the experience to construct bridges, major or minor. While it can pour concrete, it does not have the people qualified and necessary to do bridge work. There is more to building a bridge than pouring concrete and Vogel does not appear, to Mr. Clark, to have the experience or equipment sufficient to properly finish the concrete surface. For example, though it might be able to rent a screed, it does not have the people qualified to use it properly. It does not have the experience to drive piles and it does not have the equipment necessary to do that job nor do its proposed suppliers of rental equipment. Mr. Clark, however, is a competitor and was, in fact, a bidder on this project. In the event the award to Vogel is set aside and a re-bid authorized, Mr. Clark's company would be in a position to bid again. Mr. Clark also looked at the equipment listed in Vogel's brochure and determined that most of the equipment on that list is not used in construction of either major or minor bridges. By the same token, the projects listed on Vogel's experience list do not qualify it to do bridge work since they are not similar and the techniques utilized therein are not necessarily the same. Mr. Clark is of the opinion that the project in issue is not the typical minor bridge project. The design is somewhat different and requires the use of different techniques. He feels Vogel's experience would not prepare it to successfully accomplish the project. Though FDOT follows up its award by numerous inspections during the construction phase, in his opinion these inspections are inadequate since they generally relate to the materials being used by the contractor and not to the contractor's workmanship. Mr. Clark's opinions are supported by those of Mr. Barrett, president of another construction company which deals primarily in bridge construction. In Mr. Barrett's opinion, Vogel's experience in construction of water and sewage treatment plants and parking garages does not qualify it to build bridges since the company has no expertise in the techniques need for that type of construction. Petitioner has been qualified to do minor bridge construction since 1962 and has constructed approximately 75 minor bridges within this state. It's personnel include numerous people who have extensive experience in pouring bridge decks and driving bridge pilings. It has the needed equipment, including cranes, pile drivers, welding equipment, and screeds, and more important, the experienced people who know how to use it properly. Having reviewed Vogel's prior projects and equipment owned, Petitioner's owner, Mr. Hewitt, cannot see where Vogel is qualified by experience or equipment to do bridge construction. In his opinion, Vogel is a building contractor, not a bridge builder. He is satisfied that the skills developed in general contracting do not qualify an individual to do bridge work. These skills are different, and the level of subcontracting is different. In addition, construction standards and tolerances are much stricter in bridge projects than in other general contracting projects. Petitioner raises a legitimate question regarding Vogel's ability to do this particular job. However, it's evidence is in the form of testimony of individuals who, though individuals of long experience in their fields, were not offered as experts in the area. Further, all except one, have an interest in the outcome of this case. On the other hand, Vogel has been shown to be a competent and successful builder and there is no evidence to show that the pre- qualification process utilized by FDOT here was either inappropriate or improperly applied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding the contract on State Project No. 105003631 to Vogel Brothers Building Company. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2898BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER 1. & 2. Accepted and Incorporated herein 3. & 4. Accepted and Incorporated herein 5. - 8. Accepted and Incorporated herein Accepted except for the statement that letters from rental companies were not submitted & 11. Accepted and Incorporated herein 12. - 14. Accepted and Incorporated herein Accepted but not probative of any material fact & 17. Accepted but not probative of any material fact Accepted but incomplete Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence Rejected as a comment on the evidence and not a Findings of Fact Accepted but not probative of any material fact Rejected as irrelevant & 25. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence Accepted but not probative of any material fact FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted Accepted and incorporated herein Not established Accepted but not probative of any material fact Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein COPIES FURNISHED: Crit Smith, Esquire 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brant Hargrove, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald E. Cotterill, Esquire 1519 North Dale Mabry, S-100 Lutz, Florida 33544 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Southern Hy Power Corporation (Hy Power) has provided reasonable assurance, based on plans, test results, or other information, that its proposed hydroelectric facility will comply with the Management and Storage of Surface Water (MSSW) statutes and rules of Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) and the Wetland Resource Management permit (WRM)/water quality certification statutes and rules of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).
Findings Of Fact By Joint Prehearing Stipulation the parties agreed to the following description of the parties and the project: PARTIES: The Department of Environmental Protection (the Department) is a government agency in the State of Florida existing by virtue of Section 20.255, Florida Statutes, and operating pursuant to Chapters 253, 373, 376, and 403, Florida Statutes, and Title 62, Florida Administrative Code. Under an interagency agreement with SWFWMD, the Department also implements Title 40D, Florida Administrative Code. The Department is located in Tallahassee, Florida, and it has a district office in Tampa, Florida, which district includes Levy County. Southern Hy Power Corporation is a Florida Corporation whose principal offices are located at 7008 Southwest 30th Way in Gainesville, Florida. Betty Berger is an interested party with a mailing address of Post Office Box 83, Inglis, Florida. The Campbells are an interested party with a mailing address of 245 Palm Street, Inglis, Florida. Hy Power applied on August 31, 1993, to the Department for a WRM permit/water quality certification to construct a hydroelectric facility on the Inglis By-Pass Channel. The project is located in Section 12, Township 17 South, Range 16 East, within the town of Inglis in Levy County. The facility consists of a powerhouse located on the south side of the channel measuring about 28 feet wide by 115 feet long, drawing water from the Inglis By-Pass Channel, passing it through a single-pit type turbine and discharging downstream of the Inglis By-Pass Spillway Dam. Hy Power applied on August 4, 1998, to the Department for a MSSW permit for the same proposed hydroelectric facility on the Inglis By-Pass Channel. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED PROJECT The project involves the construction of an intake structure, powerhouse, and tailrace on a 0.61-acre area located on the south side of the existing Inglis By-Pass Spillway. The facility will take advantage of the existing hydrostatic head that exists on either side of the Spillway Dam, to generate electricity. The powerhouse will be constructed below grade and will contain a single megawatt turbine and generating unit. The intake structure will divert flows from the upstream side of the Spillway Dam through the powerhouse and back into the By-Pass Channel. A small one-story control building and low profile substation will be constructed above grade within the boundaries of the project area. The hydroelectric project is considered to be a "Run of the River" type of facility because it can only use that water which flows down the existing channel. The geometry of the channel restricts flow to a certain amount, therefore the project cannot create or use flows above those that the By-Pass Channel can provide. The overall authority for control of water levels in Lake Rousseau and flow to the lower Withlacoochee River will remain with the DEP. Lake Rousseau was created in 1909 when the Inglis Dam was constructed across the Withlachoochee River for the purposes of hydroelectric generation. The dam impounds over 11 miles of the Withlachoochee River and forms a lake approximately 3,000 to 4,000 acres in size. Prior to construction of the Barge Canal, water released from the Inglis Dam would flow down the lower portion of the Withlachoochee River about 10 miles before entering into the Gulf of Mexico. In the mid to late 1960's the Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) built a portion of the Cross Florida Barge Canal between the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Rousseau. The canal severed the Withlachoochee River downstream of the Inglis Dam causing its flow to be diverted into the Barge Canal and then into the Gulf. In order to maintain the flow of freshwater from Lake Rousseau to the lower segment of the River, the 8,900-foot long Inglis By- Pass Channel and Spillway were constructed. The resulting downstream flow ensures navigation in the lower portion of the River and sustains its freshwater and estuarine environment. The water level in Lake Rousseau is generally maintained at an elevation of 27.5 feet above mean sea level (msl) by a combination of the Inglis Dam, the Inglis Lock, which is located in the Barge Canal, and the By-Pass Channel Spillway. These water control features are known collectively as the Inglis Project Works. The water levels in the lower Withlachoochee River immediately to the west of the By-Pass spillway are close to sea level. The resulting head provides the potential energy needed to drive the proposed generator turbine. Under normal conditions the majority of water released from Lake Rousseau flows over the Spillway Dam into the lower segment of the River. According to the DEP Office of Greenways and Trails (OGT), the maximum capacity of the existing By-Pass Channel Spillway is 1,540 cubic feet per second. The hydroelectric project will divert whatever flow is allowed around the existing spillway through the turbine and back into the channel. When the Cross Florida Barge Canal project was cancelled in the 1990's, the ACOE transferred ownership of the property to the State of Florida Board of Trustees, who in turn has leased the property to the DEP for use as the Cross Florida Greenbelt State Recreation and Conservation Area. Management of this property, the control of river flow and lake levels, and operation of the Inglis Project Works are exercised by the DEP's OGT. The OGT utilizes a document entitled "Water Control Plan for Inglis Project Works," dated September 1994, as a guide to operating the structures. The Water Control Plan is incorporated as part of the MSSW intent to issue. On or about April 25, 1995, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Trustees"), approved a request from Hy Power to sublease 0.61 acres of Greenway property at the project site for the purpose of providing electric power. The request was challenged by Berger and the Campbells, and resulted in an administrative hearing held on November 3, 1995. As a result of the hearing, Administrative Law Judge Larry Sartin entered a Recommended Order on July 12, 1996, that the Board enter an order approving execution by the DEP of the proposed sublease and dismissing the petition of Berger and the Campbells. The Recommended Order was approved by the Trustees in its entirety in a Final Order dated April 12, 1996 ("Final Order"). Berger v. Southern Hy Power Corporation et al., Case No. 95-3589. A copy of the Final Order is listed as an exhibit to this Stipulation, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained therein are adopted herein. As previously ruled by the undersigned, the previous Final Order is res judicata as to Petitioners in this case, who are collaterally estopped from challenging any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law contained in the previous Final Order. Petitioners reserve the right to litigate issues of fact and law not addressed in the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law contained in that Final Order with regard to the permittability of this project under the WRM and MSSW permitting proposals, and to raise objections as to relevance to this proceedings of any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law in the Final Order. On February 21, 1995, Hy Power filed application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for a conduit exemption from the licensing requirements of Part I of the Federal Powers Act (FPA) for the proposed project. Petitioners and various other persons filed protests with FERC in opposition to the project. On April 21, 1997, FERC issued an Order Granting Conduit Exemption, a copy of which is listed as an exhibit to this Stipulation. Petitioners in this case are collaterally estopped from challenging any of the findings or conclusions contained in that Order Granting Conduit Exemption. Petitioners reserve the right to litigate issues of fact and law not addressed in the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law contained in that Order Granting Conduit Exemption with regard to the permittability of this project under the WRM and MSSW permitting proposals, and to raise objections as to relevance to this proceedings of any of the findings or conclusions in the Order Granting Conduit Exemption. FACTS ADDUCED AT HEARING OUTLINE OF PROJECT The proposed project calls for the construction of a water retention structure along the existing By-Pass spillway, the excavation of a large hole in which the powerhouse and turbine would be constructed "in-the-dry" south of the existing dam, and a millrace below the proposed project to return the water back into the existing water course. Conflicting testimony was received regarding the facts surrounding the construction of the project. These included: whether the proposed project will touch the existing wing walls of the existing dam; whether the water retention structure is a coffer dam; whether the proposed water retention structure will safely retain the water; whether the powerhouse and turbine have sufficient negative buoyancy to stay in the ground; whether the proposed excavation will weaken the existing dam; and whether the de-watering of the excavation site will adversely impact ground and surface water. PROJECT DESIGN AND ENGINEERING Engineering for the project was directed by witness Richard A. Volkin, a professional engineer and president and CEO of Engineering Company, Inc., based in Canton, Massachusetts. Mr. Volkin has extensive national and international experience in the design, management, and operation of hydroelectric facilities. Other engineers in Mr. Volkin’s firm worked on the project under Mr. Volkin’s direct supervision, including John May, who became registered as a professional engineer in Florida in order to sign and seal the engineering drawings for the project, which he initially did around 1994. Mr. May became ill and retired in 1998. Because of the length of time the application process has taken and the fact that Mr. May retired, there was a time while the application was pending, when Hy Power's design team was without a registered Florida engineer. When this was brought to the attention of Hy Power, Hy Power substituted Steven Crockett for Mr. May as the Florida-registered professional engineer of record for the project. DEP routinely accepts an applicant’s changing its engineer of record during the course of permit application or construction. Mr. Crockett is a civil and structural engineer who has considerable experience in preparing dam structural designs. Mr. Crockett independently reviewed and evaluated the engineering drawings for the project. Mr. Crockett resealed the drawings by using his drawn seal and signing the plans because his embossed seal was not readily available and time was of the essence. Mr. Crockett has advised DEP that he is now engineer of record for the project, using the appropriate DEP forms. Mr. Volkin’s firm performed all of the studies required by the various agencies, including a geotechnical study of the area, a 50-year analysis of water flow in and out of the Lake Rousseau regime, and water quality evaluations of water in the By-Pass Channel. The ACOE performed deep hole borings of the soils (approximately 36-40 feet below sea level) in the area of the project site to determine soil stabilization conditions at the site when they were constructing the Inglis Project Works. The soil conditions found can reasonably be expected to be similar today. Mr. Volkin’s company also took its own eight-foot deep surface core samples. The purpose of those samples was to verify the ACOE data. The new core samples verified the original core samples. Mr. Volkin also reviewed the ACOE’s engineering drawings developed from construction of the Spillway Dam. These show that the dam is founded on limestone bedding that has been stabilized with concrete. The hydroelectric facility will be constructed adjacent to and south of the dam structure and adjacent to and north of the barge canal. The same type of limestone bedrock is found in the area of the proposed construction. The facility design includes an intake channel on the upstream channel and a tailrace downstream. Those are the only structures that will be constructed next to the By-Pass Channel. The construction of the facility itself will be "in the dry." Hy Power will use coffer dams to seal off the construction site from the By-Pass Channel, so that there will not be water leakage from the Channel into the construction site. Water from the By-Pass Channel will enter the power plant when the coffer dams are lifted and the water is allowed to flow into the facility. The Petitioners presented the testimony of Bill Edwards, an individual with considerable experience in the construction of bridges, cofferdams, and similar concrete structures in aquatic and semi-aquatic conditions. Mr. Edwards is a former hard-hat diver who worked all over the world and worked in Florida for many years prior to his retirement. Based upon his experience and expertise in construction related to projects of this type, his testimony is credible and worthy of consideration. Mr. Edwards pointed out that if the proposed water retention structure did not touch the wing wall of the existing dam, it could not keep the water out and would not have the strength that it needed to retain the water. Hy Power’s witnesses explained that the retention structure would be set close enough to the existing wing wall that waterproofing materials could be placed between the two structures to keep the water out. Further, that the existing plans did not show interior bracing which would be included for structural strength and integrity. In sum, the retention structure will be in contact with existing dam’s wing wall, but will be free standing and not dependent upon the strength of the wing wall for its strength. Mr. Edwards pointed out that a cofferdam by definition has walls on all sides of the structure. The structure proposed by Hy Power did not have walls all the way around the proposed excavation. In rebuttal, Hy Power presented evidence that its plans were conceptual, design drawing and not construction plans. Hy Power represented that in actuality it would put as many walls as were necessary to keep the water out of the hole it intended to excavate. Trash racks will be constructed at the intake structures to protect aquatic life and make sure that trash and vegetation do not enter the intake structure or go down river. The trash rack bars will be two inches on center, which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has determined as the appropriate size for the protection of fish. The turbine blades are "double regulated," and operate generally between 60 and 90 revolutions per minute. The design enables the turbine to operate at a constant speed to generate a consistent flow of electricity, notwithstanding the fact that the flow of the water may vary. The blade speed is not very fast, and the 2.5-meter blades provide a two to three-foot opening. This design acts to prevent fish mortality. There are four ways to shut off the flow of water through the proposed structure: close the pitch of the blades, close the wicket gates, allow the counter balance to the wicket gates to kick in and automatically close the gates, and close off the main gates. This is a fail safe system ("four level redundancy") designed to work upon any failure. Once water goes through the generator, its velocity is reduced to no greater than its intake rate which is a maximum of three feet per second. This prevents the water being discharged from the tailrace from causing erosion. If the head of water in the dam produces a flow exceeding three feet per second, it can be diverted over the other dams which will be functional. The power plant will be encased in concrete, except for a small access way that enables a person to go down a set of stairs to the plant. It will be a sealed, waterproof structure, as required by FERC and the ACOE. This will prevent penetration of groundwater, or flood waters in the event a massive flood overtops the plant. The only water entering the powerhouse will be through the turbine tunnel for power generation purposes. Mr. Edwards pointed out that the powerhouse was a closed structure and as such would have positive buoyancy, that is, it would float. Mr. Edwards pointed out that the proposed site is between the barge canal and By-Pass spillway and there is a great deal of groundwater and potentiometric pressure in the existing water table. In sum, there is a unlimited supply of groundwater at the site, and powerhouse could float out of the ground just like an empty swimming pool. Hy Power presented rebuttal evidence that the weight of the building, the turbine, and the water flowing through the turbine would be close to negative buoyancy, and they would add additional weight to the structure as necessary to keep it in place. The project is designed to generate three megawatts of electric power which is enough electricity to serve between 300 and 3000 homes, depending on usage. The project is designed to be unmanned. This is common for facilities such as this. The plant can be operated by remote control, unlike the existing controls at the By-Pass Dam, which are operated manually. DEP can access, monitor, and control remotely the generator's operation to include shutting the facility down at any time. There will be remote sensors to monitor water elevations. Flood protection will improve because of the ability of DEP to manage water flow from a remote location. If there is any major disruption, the plant will shut itself down. The project is classified as "green power." In other words, it generates natural energy without any disruption to the environment. The project will have minimal to no impact on the environment. There will be no significant changes in water quality compared to existing conditions as a result of either construction or operation of the facility. WRM Permit Criteria Hy Power has provided reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not cause a violation of state water quality standards of Section 403.918(a), Florida Statutes (1991). The parties stipulated that turbidity and dissolved oxygen were the two surface water quality issues of concern in this proceeding. The receiving water body is the Inglis By-Pass Channel. The Inglis By-Pass Channel is a Class III surface water. The project is not located in a OFW. While the lower Withlacoochee River is an OFW, the OFW designation runs up the natural river itself, and does not include the Spillway Dam, tailrace, or the remainder of the By-Pass Channel. There would be no degradation of water quality at the point of contact with the Withlacoochee River OFW. The DEP and FERC looked specifically at potential for turbidity and dissolved oxygen in determining whether the project would violate state water quality standards. The standards for turbidity and dissolved oxygen will not be violated. Because the By-Pass Dam is an under flow structure, a minimum of oxygenation currently occurs as water flows through the existing dam. The proposed project runs the water underground through the generator; however, Hy Power will measure the dissolved oxygen below the dam in the Lower Withlacoochee River. In the event there is any lowering of dissolved oxygen, Hy Power can install a "sparge ring" to reoxygenate the water going through the turbine so that dissolved oxygen remains at current levels. No turbidity will be added to the receiving water as a result of the project, because water velocity is low and the structure is encased in concrete and rip-rap. The only other potential for turbidity would occur when the coffer dams are removed after construction is complete. The coffer dams can be removed with the generator closed to permit any turbidity to settle. The amount of siltation that might occur when the generator is opened would be insignificant. Where a project is not in a OFW, an applicant must provide reasonable assurance that the project will not be contrary to public interest. See Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes (1991). Hy Power has provided such assurances. The project will not directly affect public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. See Section 403.918 (2)(a)1., Florida Statutes. There are concerns relating to the structural integrity of the proposed facility and adjacent structures which are discussed extensively below. The project will have no adverse impact upon the conservation of fish and wildlife, including threatened and endangered species and their habitat. See Section 403.918 (2)(a)2., Florida Statutes. While manatees are not likely to be found at the project site, the installation of the trash racks will eliminate any potential adverse impact on manatees. In fact, the racks will be an improvement over the current unprotected Spillway Dam. DEP procedures require a specific manatee control plan be implemented to deal with site specific concerns. The project will not adversely affect navigation or the flow of the water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. See Section 403.918(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes. The project will not adversely affect fishing or recreation values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project. See Section 403.918(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes. The permanent project and its construction will cause no significant environmental impacts. See Section 403.918(2)(a)5., Florida Statutes. There will be no adverse impacts to significant historical and archeological resources. Section 403.918(2)(a)6., Florida Statutes. With regard to the impact on current conditions and relative value of functions being performed by the areas affected by the proposed activity, there will be no negative impacts. See Section 403.918(2)(a)7., Florida Statutes. Improvement will result from better control of water flow at the project site, installation of trash racks and implementation of green power. THE FORESEEABLE ADVERSE SECONDARY OR CUMULATIVE IMPACTS Potential adverse secondary impacts related to power transmission are addressed through the fact that there is an existing power line corridor that can be used to transmit the electricity. Any need to change the corridor could be addressed by subsequent DEP permitting. Cumulative impacts are not at issue. Mr. Gammon, with Florida Power, acknowledged that the current electric company, presumably Florida Power, would be required by FERC to transport the electricity generated by Hy Power over its existing corridor and poles. No final decision has been made regarding how to access the site with equipment during construction. Several feasible construction options exist, and there are several ways of accessing the site with heavy equipment vehicles and without impacting wetlands. Any final decision would be subject to DEP approval. Since the project meets the public interest criteria of Section 403.918(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and wetland impacts are minimal, the project is permittable without the need for mitigation. See Section 403.918(2)(b), Florida Statutes. The ACOE has issued a permit for the facility. The permit varies slightly from the DEP intent to issue in the use of reinforced concrete rather than rip-rap on the bottom half of the intake channel. This is to comply with ACOE preference, but the variation has only an environmental benefit. Counsel for Petitioners sought to elicit testimony from Linda Sloan, Executive Director of the Withlacoochee Regional Planning Council, with regard to compliance of the proposed project with the Town of Inglis Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code. Such compliance is not relevant to this proceeding. At any rate, Ms. Sloan conceded that any prohibition that might apply in the Land Development Code to construction of the proposed facility could potentially be alleviated by exemption or variance provisions in the Code. MSSW PERMIT CRITERIA The project will provide adequate flood protection and drainage in the conventional sense. See Rule 40D-4.301(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Because the amount of impervious area is minimal, runoff from the project will not in any way contribute to increased flooding or adversely impact drainage patterns. The total amount of impervious area of the facility is less than that of a single-family residence. SWFWMD rules do not even require MSSW permits for single-family residences because the impact is not significant. The only purpose for requiring a MSSW permit for the project is to review the project’s potential downstream impacts to the watershed, not stormwater runoff from the facility itself. The project will not cause adverse water quality or water quantity impacts on adjacent lands in violation of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, or cause a discharge that violates state water quality standards. See Rule 40 D-4.301(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. As indicated by the WRM water quality findings above, the project will not generally violate state surface water quality standards. See Rule 40 D-4.301(1)( c), Florida Administrative Code. The project will not generally cause adverse impact on surface or groundwater levels or flows. See Rule 40 D- 4.301(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code. Since the project is a run-of-the-river, it will not diminish the capability of a lake or other impoundment to fluctuate through the full range established for it under Chapter 40D-8, Florida Administrative Code. The project will not cause adverse environmental impacts, or adverse impacts to wetlands, fish, and wildlife or other natural resources. The project can be effectively operated and maintained. See Rule 40D-4.301(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code. The project is a slow speed, low maintenance facility. The design concept is well established and has been successfully used for many years. Possible adverse affects to public safety are discussed below. The project is consistent with the requirements of other public agencies. See Rule 40D-4.301(1)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Potential harm to water resources within the SWFWMD are discussed below. See Rule 40D-4.301(1)(j), Florida Administrative Code. The proposed project generally will not interfere with the legal rights of others. See Rule 40D-4.301(1)(k), Florida Administrative Code. The proposed project is not against public policy. See Rule 40D-4.301(1)(l), Florida Administrative Code. The project complies with the requirements contained in the Basis of Review. See Rule 40D-4.301(2), Florida Administrative Code. There is a dispute as to whether the project was within or at the edge of the 100-year flood plain. This dispute is related to how one interprets the rule as it relates to the millrace and the location of the facility which is under ground. In the conventional sense, the project is not in the flood plain. Further, the project is designed in such a way, that it is waterproof if it were topped with water. While in the past SWFWMD may have had concerns that the project might cause downstream flooding, SWFWMD currently has no such concerns, given the run-of-the-river status of the proposed project. The operation of the project will not cause downstream flooding. The DEP included in its intent to issue, conditions contained in the sublease between Hy Power and the DEP in order to ensure that the facility would remain run-of-the-river, would comply with the water control plan, and would otherwise comply with the terms of the sublease. The DEP has final control over water flow and can revoke the permit or otherwise take enforcement action against Hy Power if Hy Power fails to comply with the water control plan. GROUNDWATER IMPACTS Operation of the project will not cause groundwater contamination or otherwise have adverse groundwater impacts. Some concerns about groundwater during excavation of the construction site were raised. The conflicting evidence received regarding them is discussed below. An area of concern was the de-watering plan for the project. Everyone agrees there will be some water seepage into the construction site that will have to be pumped out. The parties disagree regarding the amount of water that will have to be removed. Their estimates of amount of water to be removed vary because their estimates of size and over-all depth of the site vary. Petitioners presented credible evidence that a potential exists for the construction site to have a large quantity of water because of its location between two sources of surface water (the By-Pass Channel and Barge Canal), because of the makeup of the subsurface, and because of the depth of the construction. Hy Power credibly represents that if excessive groundwater is found, it can address the adverse impacts through its de-watering plan that would have to be filed with FERC and DEP. The technology exists to address the de-watering of the project. Such plans are routinely considered by DEP after a construction permit is issued and before de-watering occurs. There is very little evidence of sinkhole activity in the project area, and the construction activities are not expected to cause any sinkhole activity. NOISE POLLUTION Mr. Bitter expressed concerns that FERC would require the facility to install a very loud siren that would result in sudden noise adverse to the well-being of neighbors. Mr. Bitter is unfamiliar with FERC siren requirements at run-of the-river hydroelectric facilities. In contrast, Mr. Volkin, who has substantial experience in this area, testified that the only alarm device that would be required would be for the protection of the workers during construction. The purpose of the alarm is to warn persons below a dam spillway of a change in the volume of water being let out of the impoundment. In the case of a run-of-the-river facility, the volume is near constant, changing only gradually. Therefore, even if a warning siren had to be installed its use would be limited to significant changes in flow or testing. This would not constitute a nuisance. Further, the facility is located in the vicinity of the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant which has its own warning sirens. It would be prudent to make any warning devices required for this structure significantly different from those at the nuclear plant and to limit their use. DAM SAFETY AND FERC REVIEW In reviewing whether Hy Power’s applications complied with the relevant permitting criteria, the DEP took into consideration the review of the facility already performed by FERC. FERC will also be responsible for reviewing the project as it is being constructed. Mr. Edwards also raised concerns about the structural stability of the By-Pass Dam itself. This has been a subject of concern by those responsible for the dam, and a survey of the structure was conducted in 1993, referred to as the Greiner Report. The Greiner Report identified specific maintenance problems that have been and are being addressed by the DEP. However, DEP’s maintenance plan does not address specifically the possibility that the weight of the dam over time has caused some shifting in the dam. Hy Power has only a few core borings and only one at the location of the generator. Hy Power is using the ACOE’s original borings, as confirmed by several new ones, to develop its preliminary plans. The DEP considered FERC and the ACOE as responsible agencies for determining the structural integrity of the dam. DEP has taken FERC’s review of this facility into consideration as part of DEP’s own permitting review. It is normal for DEP to rely on outside sources and agencies for assistance in determining compliance with DEP permitting criteria such as public health and safety, and it is reasonable for DEP to do so in this instance. Most states do not have the full capability to evaluate dam safety, and so they rely on FERC and ACOE. On April 21, 1997, the project received a conduit exemption from FERC. The application process is illustrated in Hy Power Exhibit 11. Hy Power submitted to DEP detailed information about the dam, the associated structures and the proposed project which had been reviewed by FERC and the ACOE, the two agencies in the United States who are responsible for dam structure design, control, and administration. Included in the package was the Greiner Report and Hy Power’s review of it. FERC evaluated the project, the Inglis By-Pass Dam structure, and the proximity of the project to the Dam in relation to structural impact, upstream and downstream impacts, water quality, and environmental issues. Mr. Edwards raised concerns regarding the ability of the limestone bedrock to sustain additional construction in the area of proposed construction. This is a material issue in the controversy which impacts several aspects of the proposed construction. Mr. Edwards pointed out that the barge canal channel was constructed with the use of explosives that caused a fracturing of limestone bedrock. He pointed out that the steel panels, which Hy Power proposes to drive into the bedrock to construct the water retention structure necessary to excavate the hole into which the turbine and powerhouse would be placed, will further fracture this bedrock. This creates two potential dangers. It could permit water to move under and around the bottoms of the panels, potentially scouring the loosened material from the base of the panels and making them unstable and subject to failure. It could weaken the entire southern wing of the existing spillway dam. Mr. Edwards opined that this could result in catastrophic failure of the dam or the coffer dam. Such a failure would cause major destruction and loss of life to those persons living and working in and along the lower Withlacoochee River. Hy Power presented rebuttal evidence that it could and would, if necessary, inject concrete into the limestone to stabilize it and avoid the concerns raised by Mr. Edwards. FERC specifically evaluated concerns raised by project opponents over the poor physical condition of the By-Pass Channel Spillway structures, relying particularly on the 1993 Greiner Report. FERC noted that the DEP had entered into a contract to correct any deficiencies listed in the Greiner Report, which "did not conclude that the deficiencies at the By-Pass Spillway threaten downstream life and property." The FERC review concluded that the dam was safe. To ensure safety, FERC is requiring that Hy Power do a complete stability analysis of the dam prior to any construction. Articles 301 and 302 of the FERC exemption ensure that all final drawings and specifications be submitted to FERC prior to construction, along with a supporting design report consistent with FERC’s Engineering Guidelines; that FERC can require changes to assure a safe and adequate project; and that Hy Power must also submit approved coffer dam construction drawings and specifications at least 30 days prior to starting construction. FERC has its own engineering staff who will go to the site and do their own analysis, along with the ACOE, of the dam and structures, prior to any construction commencing. This is a detailed design review evaluation so that the latest information on the dam will be made known immediately prior to construction, and will prevent any catastrophic event from happening. Under FERC procedures, FERC requires the applicant to obtain the DEP permits prior to requiring applicant to submit more detailed construction designs for FERC's consideration. These more detailed designs in turn will be subject to further review by DEP and FERC. It is assumed that Hy Power will comply with the post- permitting procedures and requirements, and will present complete, detailed construction drawings for FREC and DEP approval. Hy Power’s failure to complete the process would result in denial of a construction permit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the DEP enter a Final Order that issues the two permits challenged in this proceedings, WRM Permit No. 38-237096-3.001 and MSSW Permit No. 38-0129249-002, subject to the conditions contained in the Intents to Issue in the respective WRM and MSSW Permits and as described in the Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire Berger Davis & Singerman 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 705 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John S. Clardy, III, Esquire Crider Law Firm Plantation Point 521 West Fort Island Trail, Suite A Crystal River, Florida 34429 Teri Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Bernard M. Campbell Bessie H. Campbell 245 Palm Street Post Office Box 159 Inglis, Florida 34449 Sarah E. Berger Post Office Box 83 Inglis, Florida 34449
