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JAMES E. GONZALES vs PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP, 06-000677 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 20, 2006 Number: 06-000677 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2006

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment in the form of a sexually hostile work environment and was retaliated against for complaining about the alleged harassment in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, James E. Gonzales, is a male person who was hired by the Respondent, Pepsi Bottling Group, on March 13, 1995. He was hired as a route sales trainee in the Central Florida marketing unit of that employer. The Pepsi Bottling Group (Pepsi) is responsible for the manufacture sale and delivery of Pepsi products to its vendors. Over the last three years the Central Florida unit has been the foremost marketing unit in the United States. The management of the Central Florida Marketing Unit has been rated by its employees as being the top management team in the country for Pepsi. The Petitioner applied for a Pre-sale Customer Representative (CR) position on March 27, 2003. On April 21, 2003, the Petitioner was assigned to a Pre-Sell (CR) position. As a Pre-Sell CR, the Petitioner was responsible for serving his own accounts; creating and maintaining good will with all customers; ordering customer's products in advance; and developing all assigned accounts relative to sales volume, market share, product distribution, space allocation and customer service. He was responsible for solicitation of new business; selling and executing promotions; soliciting placement of equipment; selling sufficient inventory; and utilizing point of purchase materials to stimulate sales. He was also charged with maintaining "shelf facings" cleaning and shelving and rotating product and merchandising product sections and building displays to stimulate sales. Additionally, he was required to complete and submit all related paperwork regarding sales and promotional operations in an accurate and timely manner. The Petitioner's direct supervisor initially was David Lopez. He was replaced by Wanzell Underwood in approximately August 2003. On December 5, 2002, the Petitioner received the Respondent's employee handbook. The handbook contains the Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and Sexual Harassment Policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, age, disability, etc. including sexual orientation. It encourages employees to immediately report any complaint, without fear of retaliation, to the Human Resources Manager or Human Resources Director. The Respondent's policy has a zero tolerance for retaliation and forbids any retaliatory action to be taken against an individual who in good faith reports a perceived violation of that policy. Employees who feel they have been retaliated against are required to report such retaliation to the Human Resources Manager or Director. The sexual harassment policy of the Respondent prohibits all forms of harassment and clearly sets out complaint procedures for employees to follow in the event they have experienced harassment. They are directed to report any complaint immediately to the Human Resources Manager or Director. Throughout his employment the Respondent received numerous customer complaints regarding the Petitioner's poor performance. The Petitioner received five disciplinary actions against him from the period 2003 through 2005. These "write- ups" were for failing to service customers according to the Respondent's standards and were dated August 2003, April 2004, September 2004, October 2004, and May 2005. On August 1, 2003, the Petitioner received a documented verbal warning after the Respondent received a complaint from a customer regarding the amount of out-of-date product in his store and the poor level of service he was receiving from the Petitioner. On April 9, 2004, the Petitioner received a documented verbal warning for his failure to prepare his three Circle K stores for a "customer tour," although he had assured his direct supervisor, Mr. Underwood, and the Key Account Manager, Eric Matson, that the store would be ready. The Petitioner's failure to prepare his Circle K stores for the customer's tour embarrassed both his supervisor and the Key Account Manager. On June 23, 2004, the assistant manager at ABC Liquor, a store Gonzales was responsible for, sent an e-mail to Eric Matson complaining about the lack of service provided by Gonzales and requested a new CR to service his store. The customer stated that Gonzales had given nothing but "crappy" service, bad attitude, and sometimes no service. On September 21, 2004, Eric Matson received an e-mail regarding the Petitioner's failure to order product for the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. The Petitioner's supervisor, Wanzell Underwood, visited the Mt. Dora Sunoco store and confirmed the manager's complaints. The Petitioner received a written warning for not properly servicing the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. In the Petitioner's contemporaneous written comments in opposition to the written warning he failed to note that the manager of the Mt. Dora Sunoco was purportedly sexually harassing him. On October 11, 2004, the Petitioner received a final written warning and one-day suspension after his direct supervisor re-visited the same Mt. Dora Sunoco store that complained previously. The Petitioner was warned that a similar problem in the future would lead to his termination. Again, in the Petitioner's written comments in opposition to his written warning, he made no mention that the manager of the Mt. Dora Sunoco store was sexually harassing him. On October 11, 2004, after the Petitioner was suspended for one day, he requested that the Human Resources Manager, Christopher Buhl, hold a meeting. During the meeting he complained for the first time to the Unit Sales Manager, Howard Corbett, the Sales Operations Manager, Tom Hopkins, and Mr. Buhl, that three years previously, in 2001, one person had told the Petitioner that everyone thought he was "gay" (meaning co-employees). One person asked him if he was gay, according to the Petitioner's story, and one person said, "We all know you're gay," before he became a Pre-Sell CR. The Petitioner, however, refused to cooperate with Mr. Buhl in obtaining information regarding his complaints. At no time during the meeting did the Petitioner complain about being sexually harassed by the manager of the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. During the October 11, 2004, meeting the Petitioner claimed his supervisor, Wanzell Underwood, threatened him. However, the Petitioner conceded during the meeting that the alleged statement made by Mr. Underwood was made to a group of Customer Representatives, to the effect that he would "kill you guys if you do not make the sales numbers." Mr. Underwood denied ever threatening to kill the Petitioner. During the meeting the Petitioner also complained that his route was too large and he requested that it be reduced. At no time during that October 11, 2004, meeting did the Petitioner complain that he was sexually harassed by Alice Marsh, the Mt. Dora Sunoco manager. His extensive notes and comments on his Disciplinary Action Reports did not document any such complaint. In November 2004, the Petitioner was asked to go to K- Mart and place an order, but the Petitioner failed to follow instructions and visit the store. Instead, the Petitioner placed the order over the phone. The manager of the store called the Respondent three times to complain about the poor service provided by Mr. Gonzales. Each year the Respondent changes its delivery routes. During the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005, the Respondent re-routed all of its Pre-sell CR routes. The Respondent reduced the Petitioner's route as he had requested and in conformity with its route standards. Despite the Petitioner's allegation to the contrary, in fact the Petitioner's route was not reduced by as much as 50 percent. In May 2005, Key Account Manager, Mike Lewis, visited the Petitioner's K-Mart store to conduct a "Look at the Leader" audit. The Petitioner had been trained and was responsible for preparing the K-Mart for the audit. When Mr. Lewis arrived at the store, the store did not meet the Respondent's standards. Additionally, required product was missing from the displays. Mr. Lewis called Howard Corbett to inform him of the problems. Mr. Corbett called the Petitioner to ask about the missing product. The Petitioner assured him that the product was in the store and on display. The missing product was not displayed, however, and was later found in the back room of the K-Mart store. On May 18, 2005, the Respondent received another e- mail from Charles Pippen, District Manager for Sunoco, complaining of the Petitioner's poor service at the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. He claimed that the Petitioner did not reply to phone calls and rarely ordered enough product. On May 19, 2005, the Territory Sales Manager, John York, followed up on that complaint by visiting the Mt. Dora Sunoco store and meeting with the Manager, Alice Marsh. Mr. York was substituting for Mr. Underwood who was out on medical leave. During the meeting, Ms. Marsh complained that the Petitioner did not order the quantity of product she requested, failed to provide adequate signage, and refused to place product where she requested. While at the Mt. Dora Sunoco store, Mr. York observed the problems about which Ms. Marsh had complained. After meeting Ms. Marsh, Mr. York spoke with the Petitioner to inform him of Ms. Marsh's complaints. During his conversation with Mr. York, the Petitioner admitted to failing to service the account by not placing the product by the gas pumps as requested, not ordering the amount of product requested, and not hanging certain signs. Later in this conversation with Mr. York, the Petitioner informed Mr. York that he believed that the Sunoco Manager's reason for complaining about his service was that he had refused her sexual advances. The Petitioner did not tell Mr. York what the alleged advances consisted of or when they might have occurred. Mr. York, however, in fact was never the Petitioner's supervisor. The Petitioner was responsible for two CVS stores in Mt. Dora. On Friday, May 20, 2005, the Petitioner made an unusual request of his temporary Manager, Dan Manor, for a Saturday delivery to his CVS stores. The Respondent does not normally schedule Saturday deliveries for such "small format" stores like CVS. When Mr. Manor approved the Saturday delivery, he specifically instructed the Petitioner that must meet the bulk delivery driver at the stores to "merchandise" the product, because bulk delivery drivers do not merchandise the product delivered and Mr. Manor did not have a merchandiser assigned to the Mt. Dora stores. The Petitioner agreed to meet the bulk delivery driver at the CVS stores on Saturday. The Petitioner did not advise his supervisor that he had made arrangements with the CVS store manager or a merchandiser regarding alternate arrangements for the Saturday delivery. The supervisor would have expected the Petitioner to do so. On Saturday, May 21, 2005, the Petitioner failed to meet the bulk driver to assist in merchandising the orders at the two CVS stores as instructed. The customer refused to take delivery of the product until a merchandiser was present to merchandise the product. Mr. Manor was unable to reach the Petitioner by telephone because the Petitioner was at Sea World with his family. Mr. Manor had to send a merchandiser from Longwood in order to merchandise the product that the Petitioner had ordered for the CVS stores. On May 23, 2005, the Petitioner failed to attend a weekly mandatory 5:00 a.m. meeting. He did not call his supervisor advising of his unavailability. The Petitioner did call Mr. Manor at about 6:15 a.m. and told him that he had overslept. When Mr. Manor questioned the Petitioner about why he did not meet the bulk driver on Saturday, he said that "he did not get a chance to make it out on Saturday." On May 23, 2005, Mr. Corbett decided to terminate the Petitioner based on his very poor performance. That decision to terminate him was approved by the Respondent's Human Resources Department. On May 26, 2005, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner for failing to service the CVS stores at a critical time, for the services issues at the Sunoco and the K-Mart, and for failing to attend the Monday morning meeting. At the time of his termination the Petitioner was on a final warning and had been advised that he could be terminated. The Petitioner never alleged during his termination meeting that he was being sexually harassed. Howard Corbett provided the Petitioner with documents to file an internal appeal on the day he was terminated. The Petitioner, however, did not appeal his termination as permitted by the Respondent's policy. The Petitioner claims he was the victim of sexual harassment by being subjected to (1) homosexual related comments made in 2001, and (2) alleged sexual overtures by the Sunoco Manager, Alice Marsh, in 2003. According to Ms. Marsh, she was never interested in the Petitioner sexually. She did not socialize with the Petitioner, and did not want a relationship with him. She did not touch him and did not state that she wanted the Petitioner fired. She also testified that she never stated that she wanted a sexual relationship with the Petitioner. The Petitioner's allegations regarding sexual harassment by Ms. Marsh related the following behaviors: She touched his back and arm; She was too close to him when he was around; She was nice to him until informed that he was married; She suggested sexual interest by her body language and eyes; and She wore provocative clothing. David Lopez supervised the Petitioner for approximately two years in the 2001 to 2003 time period. During this time period the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Lopez that he had been sexually harassed. Mr. Lopez did not witness the Petitioner being harassed while working with the Respondent either. Wanzell Underwood supervised the Petitioner for approximately two years in the 2003 to 2005 time period. During this time, the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Underwood that he had been sexually harassed. Mr. Underwood did not witness the Petitioner being harassed while he worked for the Respondent. The Petitioner never made a compliant regarding the alleged sexual harassment by the Sunoco Manager, Alice Marsh, to the Human Resources Department, in accordance with the Respondent's policy. He did not explain the nature of any sexual harassment, even when he finally claimed that he was being harassed. The Respondent would have terminated the Petitioner for his poor performance regardless of whether he engaged in the purported protected activity by complaining of sexual harassment. The Petitioner alleges he was terminated for reasons other than complaining about sexual harassment, including his alleged knowledge of theft in Lake County. In any event, on July 15, 2005, the Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination with the Commission and the resulting dispute and formal proceeding ensued.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James E. Gonzales 26437 Troon Avenue Sorrento, Florida 32757 Nicole Alexandra Sbert, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP 390 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32802

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000E Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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MARLANA M. HULTS vs SUPERIOR BEDROOMS, INC., 04-002710 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Aug. 04, 2004 Number: 04-002710 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination or sexual harassment against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payroll, accounts-payable clerk for Respondent's furniture store from May 23, 2001 until May 20, 2002. Respondent operates a furniture store located at 6886 North 9th Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32504-7358. Five months after commencing her employment with Respondent, Petitioner began to look for a new job. Petitioner believes that Mr. Alan Reese, Respondent's office manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor, began to follow her home in August 2001. Petitioner believes that, after ceasing to follow her when she confronted him about it, Mr. Reese began to follow her home again two months later. Petitioner accused Mr. Reese of following her home on numerous occasions, peeking into her windows, and sitting in his car and watching her while she tended to her garden. Petitioner was permitted to come to work late during October 2001, on occasion, when she was looking for a new place to live. Petitioner did not get along with Serita Coefield, her fellow accounting clerk at the furniture store. They often had disputes over the handling of invoices. In May of 2002, Petitioner met with Barbara Hoard, the Escambia County/Pensacola Human Resource Coordinator, to discuss the alleged harassment by Mr. Reese. Ms. Hoard told her to inform her employer in writing of her concerns and explained the availability of filing a complaint with the FCHR or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On May 15, 2002, Petitioner delivered a memo to Mr. Reese in which she accused him of following her home, touching her improperly in the workplace, and asking her questions about her personal life. She also sent, by certified mail, a copy of the memo to Elmer Githens, Respondent's president. After receiving the memo, Mr. Githens conferred with Mr. Reese, then issued a memo to Petitioner on May 17, 2002, in which he set forth her work schedule for the dates of April 29 through May 16, 2002. Petitioner's regular work hours were supposed to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with an hour for lunch. The May 17 memo, which was based upon Petitioner's actual time cards, showed that her start time at work ranged from 8:18 a.m. to 11:38 a.m. and her end time ranged from 4:01 p.m. to 6:12 p.m. Petitioner clocked in for a full eight- hour workday on only four of fourteen days during the time period reflected in the memo. Later in the day on May 17, 2002, Mr. Githens issued a second memo to Petitioner in which he noted that Petitioner had yelled at him when he gave her the first memo, and accused Serita Coefield of "being out to get her." The memo further stated that Petitioner "has alienated every one [she] works with due to [her] attitude." The memo continued with a discussion of Petitioner's work hours which were to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with at least a 30-minute lunch break every day. Petitioner was informed that this was her final warning about her tardiness and her inability to get along with her co-workers. The memo concluded with the words "[t]he next time you will be dismissed." On Monday, May 20, 2002, Petitioner's next workday, Petitioner clocked in at 10:37 a.m. She was given a memo that day dismissing her for "willful misconduct after receiving ample warnings that termination of your employment was imminent if you continued present behavior of coming to work late, not putting lunch on your time card, clocking out after 5pm without permission and causing disturbances with fellow employees for no reason." Petitioner claims that, on the day she was fired, she arrived at Respondent's parking lot at 8:00 a.m., but sat in her car because she was having a "panic attack" due to her belief that Mr. Reese was continuing to stalk her. Both Petitioner and Mr. Reese live east of Respondent and travel, at least part of the way, in the same direction and on the same roads to go home after work. Mr. Reese denies knowing the location of Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese has never been to Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese admits he drove home in the same direction as Petitioner on numerous occasions since she drove along one of the routes he routinely took home. No one witnessed the alleged stalking of Petitioner by Mr. Reese. Petitioner claims to have contacted the police by telephone, but never filed a police report concerning the alleged stalking by Mr. Reese.

Recommendation is, Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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MICHELE PRICE vs FLAGLER COUNTY SCHOOLS, 07-005677 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bunnell, Florida Dec. 14, 2007 Number: 07-005677 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 2009

The Issue Whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006), and if so, what remedy should be ordered?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female formerly employed by the School District. From February 2006 to April 18, 2007, she was employed as a paraprofessional in the special education unit at Flagler Palm Coast High School. Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 760.02(6) and (10), Florida Statutes, in that Petitioner is female and filed a complaint of gender discrimination and retaliation with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. From the inception of her employment and until March 13, 2007, Ms. Price was assigned as a paraprofessional (parapro) in Mr. Robert Rinker's classroom. Ms. Price had not been in the work force for several years before taking the job at Flagler Palm Coast High School and was taking classes at night to obtain her teaching degree. Mr. Rinker teaches in what was described as a self- contained classroom for students who are classified as emotionally handicapped in the exceptional education program. At Flagler Palm Coast High School, at least some of the students in the program would attend classes in the 300 building of the campus, and would have fewer classes and teachers compared to a traditional schedule. However, students would not necessarily be limited to one classroom all day. They could, for example, have classes with other special education teachers in the 300 building. Parapros are evaluated by the assistant principal. While teachers with whom the parapro worked might be asked to provide input for evaluations, the teachers are not considered to be their supervisors. Ms. Price was in the classroom with Mr. Rinker during first and second periods, between classes, and during lunch. During third and fourth period, Mr. Rinker supervised students in the gym while Ms. Price remained in the classroom with students who did not go to the gym. Stan Hall also teaches special education in the 300 building of Flagler Palm Coast High School. During Ms. Price’s employment, he was assisted by a parapro named Kathy Picano. Ms. Picano sometimes visited Ms. Price in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She is significantly younger than both Ms. Price and Mr. Rinker. Mr. Rinker is a jovial man and a veteran teacher. He coaches soccer and has coached basketball. He is well liked by his peers and by the students he teaches. Mr. Rinker often tells jokes and stories, and sometimes his jokes are “off color” or of a sexual nature. The jokes and stories are told to both male and female colleagues and not in the presence of students. No other staff member had ever told Mr. Rinker that his jokes were offensive and no one had ever complained to supervisory personnel that they were offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior. Mr. Rinker sometimes used the phrase, “a good lovin’ is the universal cure.” He testified that he had heard this phrase since his childhood from his older relatives, and simply meant that when someone is having a bad day, a hug or other encouragement helps make things better. The remark could be addressed to students and staff alike. He did not mean anything sexual by the phrase, and others hearing the phrase did not interpret it as a sexual remark. Mr. Rinker’s testimony is credited. Ms. Price, however, was offended by Mr. Rinker’s jokes. She testified that nearly every conversation with Mr. Rinker became focused on sex. According to Ms. Price, the first week she worked with Mr. Rinker, they were discussing mailboxes in the classroom, and he stated, “let’s talk about the box you are sitting on.” She understood that he was referring to her vagina. Ms. Price stated that she was shocked by this statement, but did not say so because it was her first week on the job. Mr. Rinker does not remember ever making such a statement. Whether or not this incident actually happened, it occurred over a year prior to Ms. Price's complaint to either the School District or the Commission. Also that first week, Ms. Price mentioned in the classroom that she had a headache, and in response Mr. Rinker rubbed her shoulders or neck. Ms. Price was offended but did not tell Mr. Rinker his touch was unwelcome. Ms. Price claims that while things were not too bad the first semester she worked with Mr. Rinker, eventually it got to the point where she was unable to have a conversation with Mr. Rinker without it focusing on sex. She claimed that he sometimes purposefully rubbed up against her in the classroom.1/ In order to avoid talking to him or being physically close to him, she moved her desk to another part of the room. While she claimed the situation was intolerable, she did not report Mr. Rinker’s behavior to any supervisor and did not tell him she was offended by his conduct. Kathy Picano and Ms. Price sometimes spent time together in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. Mr. Rinker sometimes told jokes in Ms. Picano's presence and sometimes “invaded her personal space.” He acknowledged that he might have patted her on the back in passing as part of a greeting, but Ms. Picano described the touch as no different from what she might have received from her grandmother. Although Ms. Picano did not particularly care for Mr. Rinker’s jokes, she attributed them to being “just his personality.” She was not offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior and, before being questioned with respect to Ms. Price's complaint in this case, never complained about it to him or anyone else in authority at the school. She acknowledged hearing Mr. Rinker make the “good lovin” comment, but found it endearing, as opposed to harassing. Ms. Price, however, was deeply offended by what she viewed as Mr. Rinker’s behavior toward Ms. Picano. The things with which she took offense did not stop with Mr. Rinker’s jokes or the attention she perceived that he gave to Ms. Picano. She did not think that Mr. Rinker or Mr. Hall did an adequate job of teaching, and was upset that Mr. Hall’s students were allowed, on occasion, to come to Mr. Rinker’s classroom to finish assignments because they were disruptive. She did not appreciate the way Mr. Peacock, the assistant principal, performed his job and believed there was an unwritten code where coaches and athletes did not have to follow the same rules as others on campus. Perhaps most of all, she was offended because students in Mr. Rinker’s classroom talked about sex too much and she did not believe that he did enough to stop it. In her view, this was exacerbated when Mr. Hall’s students were allowed to come over and finish work. Further, she believed that the students were using the computers in the classroom to access inappropriate videos and music that were offensive. Computers were in the classroom for students to complete assignments and to do research for school projects. When they were finished with their work, students sometimes played games on the computers and checked sports sites. Sites such as “myspace,” however, were blocked in accordance with school policy. While Ms. Price claimed the students were using the computers for inappropriate purposes, she admitted that she could not see what was on the computer screens from where she sat in the classroom. The testimony of the students did not corroborate her claim. All stated computers were used for school work and when school work was finished, to play games as stated above. Only one student indicated that he watched music videos. All the others denied doing so. There is no question that the students in Mr. Rinker’s class sometimes talked about sex and used profanity in the classroom.2/ One of the classes was a health class. The students were teenagers, many of whom had significant emotional problems with little or no support at home. Some of their individual education plans addressed the problem of too much use of profanity, with a goal of reducing its use in the classroom setting. Staff who testified all stated that trying to eliminate the use of profanity entirely was probably not a realistic goal, but modifying behavior to reduce it was. Their testimony is credited. Ms. Price was not the only one who complained about students talking about sex in the classroom. Barbara Ryan was another parapro who sometimes worked in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She agreed that the students sometimes talked about sex and remembered a particular incident where she thought the discussion was particularly explicit and she said something to Mr. Rinker. He told the students involved to “knock it off.” In December 2006, an anonymous call came in to Ms. Myra Middleton at the District office complaining about inappropriate language used by students in the 300 building. Ms. Middleton referred the person to Mr. Peacock in accordance with School District policy. She spoke to Mr. Peacock, who said he would take care of it. After the phone call, Mr. Peacock went to each of the classrooms in the 300 building and spoke to the students about the inappropriateness of using profanity and talking about sex in the classroom. There was no evidence, however, that the anonymous call was placed because of conduct occurring in Mr. Rinker's classroom. The talk by students did not necessarily stop after Mr. Peacock spoke to the students. However, the more credible evidence is that these conversations did not involve the entire class, but rather small groups of students. Several students testified they never heard talk about sex in the classroom. The conversations that did occur took place while other conversations were also taking place. When Mr. Rinker heard the conversations, he told students to stop. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Rinker heard each conversation that Ms. Price heard or that he deliberately chose not to address the students’ behavior. Nor is there any evidence that the students’ discussions regarding sex were in any way directed toward her. Mr. Rinker was not particularly computer literate. As a consequence, Ms. Price entered all of the students' grades in the computer. She had access to Mr. Rinker’s password and would print out his e-mail. In early March, 2007, Mr. Rinker received an e-mail from Mr. Peacock’s secretary directing that he see Mr. Peacock regarding his evaluation. Ms. Price did not believe that Mr. Peacock intended to complete the required observation for Mr. Rinker's evaluation, and this offended her. Ms. Price answered the e-mail as if she were Mr. Rinker, noting that no observation had yet taken place. This conduct violated the written standards applicable to parapros. Mr. Peacock discovered that Ms. Price, and not Mr. Rinker, had responded to his secretary's e-mail. On March 9, 2007, Mr. Peacock called Ms. Price into his office and told her that it was improper for her to send e-mails under Mr. Rinker’s name. During the meeting, Ms. Price explained that she was inputting grades, attendance and all other computer data. Mr. Peacock advised that additional training would be made available for Mr. Rinker, but that she was not to perform his duties. Ms. Price was under the impression that she was receiving a reprimand. She also felt that Mr. Rinker, who was also counseled by Mr. Peacock, did not defend her as vigorously as he should, and that he was the one who should be in trouble. In fact, Mr. Rinker told Mr. Peacock that Ms. Price had his permission to use his password for the computer and that she was very helpful. Ms. Price’s reaction to this incident was well out of proportion to the incident itself. Moreover, she did not appear to recognize that what she did in signing Mr. Rinker’s name to the e-mail was wrong. She was crying, both after the meeting and into the next week. The meeting with Mr. Peacock took place on a Friday. On Monday, Ms. Price was on a previously-scheduled day off. On Tuesday, she was still upset to the point of tears, and went to see Sue Marier, the ESE Department head. Although she was told repeatedly, both by Ms. Marier and by Mr. Peacock, that she was not being formally reprimanded for the incident, she continued to believe she was being treated unfairly. She told Mr. Rinker, Ms. Marier and Mr. Peacock that if she was going down, then so was Mr. Rinker. The following day, March 14, 2007, Ms. Price went to the principal, Nancy Willis, and complained that Mr. Rinker had been sexually harassing her since the beginning of her employment. Ms. Willis advised Ms. Price to put her complaint in writing, which she did. The complaint was forwarded immediately to the district office for investigation. During the investigation, Mr. Rinker was suspended with pay. Mrs. Willis also asked Ms. Price if she wanted to be moved to a different classroom, and Ms. Price indicated she did not want to be around Mr. Rinker. Mrs. Willis went to Sue Marier, the ESE Department Head, and asked where there was a need for a parapro so that Ms. Price could be transferred. At the time of the request, Ms. Marier did not know that Ms. Price had filed the complaint regarding sexual harassment and thought Ms. Price was still upset over the computer e-mail incident. She told Mrs. Willis that the greatest need was in the class for autistic children, and Ms. Price was transferred to that class. A decision had been made to add more staff, including another teacher, for that area, but positions had not yet been advertised. Parapros do not generally have the right to choose their assignments. They are placed in the classroom with the greatest need. At the time of Ms. Price's transfer, the autistic classroom was the classroom with the greatest need. This transfer did not result in a change in pay or status. There were significantly fewer students in the autistic class than in Mr. Rinker's class, and at least one of the students had a one-on-one aide in the classroom. While there was a slight change in schedule, it was not significant, and she remained a parapro at the same rate of pay. Both Sue Marier and Nancy Willis went by at different times to check on Ms. Price in her new placement. The more credible evidence indicates that Ms. Price did not complain about being in this classroom. The School District has two policies that deal with sexual harassment: Policy number 662, entitled Prohibition of Sexual Harassment - Employees, and Policy number 217, entitled Prohibiting Discrimination, Including Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment. It is unclear why the School District has both at the same time. The definitions regarding sexual harassment in both policies are similar, with Policy number 217 being slightly more detailed. The complaint procedure outlined in Policy number 217 is clearly more detailed, and it cannot be said that it was followed to the letter in this case. However, Policy number 217 was amended after the investigation took place in this case. No testimony was presented to show whether the more detailed procedures presently listed in Policy number 217 were in place at the time of the investigation. Further, the documents related to the investigation reference Policy number 662, as opposed to Policy number 217. It is found that the investigation was conducted in accordance with Policy number 662, and that to do so was appropriate. Ms. Price’s complaint of sexual harassment was investigated by April Dixon and Harriet Holiday. Over the course of the next several days, both Mr. Rinker and Ms. Price were interviewed (separately) as well as several other staff members. Those staff members included Sue Marier, Kathy Picano, Donna Dopp, Stan Hall, Pat Barile (Sue Marier's assistant), Mr. Tietema (another teacher), and Barbara Ryan. The investigation conducted was reasonable, given the allegations by Ms. Price. Ms. Price's written complaint stated that Mr. Rinker made inappropriate sexual comments; that he rubbed up against her on numerous occasions; that Mr. Rinker allowed the students to talk in the classroom using sexually explicit language and had made no effort to stop it; and that he had made inappropriate sexual comments to Ms. Picano. Policy number 662 provides in pertinent part: Sexual harassment consists of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is made, either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of employment (or of an individual's education). submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for an employment or employment decisions affecting that individual; or such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance, or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment, as defined above, may include but is not limited to the following: verbal harassment or abuse; pressure for sexual activity; repeated remarks to a person with sexual or demeaning implications; unwelcome or inappropriate touching; suggesting or demanding sexual involvement accompanied by implied or explicit threats concerning one's employment. * * * Procedures. -- Any employee who alleges sexual harassment by any staff member must report the incident directly to the building principal or the employee's immediate supervisor. Alternatively, the employee may make the report to the Assistant Superintendent of Instructional Accountability. Filing a complaint or otherwise reporting sexual harassment will not affect the individual's status, future employment or work assignments. The right of confidentiality, both of the complaint and of the accused will be respected, consistent with the Board's legal obligations, and with the necessity to investigate allegations of misconduct and take corrective action when this conduct has occurred. In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the totality of circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged conduct occurred will be investigated. The Superintendent or designee has the responsibility of investigating and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. A substantiated charge against a Board employee shall subject such employee to disciplinary action, including but not limited to warning, suspension or termination, subject to applicable procedural requirements. After investigation of Ms. Price's complaints, April Dixon discussed her findings with Mr. Delbrugge, the School District Superintendent. She also turned over to him all of the transcripts of taped interviews and her conclusions regarding the investigation. She concluded, and he agreed, that the investigation showed Mr. Rinker told inappropriate jokes in the workplace but that in all other respects Ms. Price's complaints were not substantiated. The investigation also revealed that Ms. Price also used profanity and occasionally told sexually- related jokes in the workplace. The Superintendent decided that the appropriate penalty (in addition to the suspension with pay already imposed) was to reprimand Mr. Rinker with a letter in his file; to require him to receive additional training on sexual harassment; to warn him that further complaints would result in termination; and to place him on probation for the remainder of the school year. This discipline was consistent with the School District's collective bargaining agreement concerning discipline of instructional staff. Mr. Rinker was informed of this result March 19, 2007, and completed the sexual harassment training as required. Ms. Price was notified informally of the results of the investigation that same day. She received official notification by letter dated May 3, 2007. Ms. Price was very dissatisfied with the results of the investigation and the action taken by the School District. She felt that Mr. Rinker should be fired. It is clear, after hearing, that nothing less then Mr. Rinker's termination would appease her. Ms. Price was also unhappy with her new placement. She did not like being in the classroom with the autistic students and felt they were dangerous. She felt that she should have been allowed to remain in her original classroom and Mr. Rinker should have been removed. After less than three weeks, she tendered her resignation. This three-week period included one week off for Spring Break and some personal leave days taken due to Ms. Price's husband having a stroke. Her resignation is dated April 18, 2007, but her last day working in the classroom was approximately April 6, 2007. Ms. Price's resignation was voluntary. While there was some belief that she left because of her husband's stroke, Ms. Price disputes that assertion and insists that it was because of the conditions in the new classroom to which she was assigned. Her resignation letter, however, references neither reason. It states: Dear Ms. Willis: It is with sincere regret that I am writing this letter of resignation as an ESE Para Professional for Flagler Palm Coast High School. Please accept this as such. I do apologize for the short notice. I would also like to take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation of your handling of my complaint. You are the only one who has validated me as a person and as a worthy employee. I only had a brief encounter with you but it was enough for me to know that working directly under you would have been a pleasure as well as a great learning experience as I respect your leadership abilities. I recognize that this is a trying situation for all involved and that you have done your very best to rectify the matter under the circumstances. It is important for me to let you know that whatever happens in the future in regards to my claim, this is no way a reflection on you. I truly hope that you can appreciate my position and the importance of making positive changes for the future. Based upon the evidence presented, it is found that Ms. Price resigned for a variety of reasons, including her husband's stroke and her unhappiness with the new placement. However, her dissatisfaction with the handling of the complaint regarding Mr. Rinker and his continued employment was at least a part of her decision. Ms. Price was not subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of her complaint. To the contrary, school officials transferred her to another classroom at her request. The conditions in the new classroom setting were not onerous.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Human Relations Commission dismissing Petitioner’s complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2008.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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PHILLIP M. WHISLER vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 96-002614RU (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 30, 1996 Number: 96-002614RU Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1997

The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.

Florida Laws (6) 110.105110.227110.233120.52120.56120.68
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CYNTHIA STEBBINS vs APPLIANCE DIRECT, 08-000394 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Jan. 24, 2008 Number: 08-000394 Latest Update: Apr. 10, 2009

The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to race and gender discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, and retaliation, as alleged in her Petition for Relief.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, a 36-year-old Caucasian female, was employed by Respondent as a sales associate. She first worked for Respondent at its Sebastian, Florida, store where she started in June 2006. She voluntarily resigned from the Sebastian store in October 2006 and was hired by Respondent's Merritt Island, Florida, store one week later. Respondent owns and operates an appliance retail store in Central Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 people. At some time during Petitioner's employment, John Barnaba, an operations manager who rotated among several stores, said things to her that she found "unacceptable." For example, "You would look good on my Harley," "You look like a biker chick," and "You must be anorexic." He also clapped his hands behind her and said, "hurry, hurry, hurry." She reported Mr. Barnaba's conduct to Phil Roundy, her manager and manager of the Merritt Island store, who said "That's just the way he is," or words to that effect. She was unaware of any other action undertaken by Mr. Roundy regarding her complaint. In January 2007, Petitioner began a voluntary sexual relationship with Mr. Roundy, which involved at some point, Petitioner and Mr. Roundy living together. This relationship lasted until April 29, 2007, when the parties separated. She and Mr. Roundy "got back together in May, about a week after her termination." Mr. Roundy did not sexually harass Petitioner based on the voluntary nature of their relationship, nor did he sexually harass Petitioner between April 29 and May 18, 2007. After Petitioner and Mr. Roundy separated, he started treating her "differently." She reports that he became critical of her and would not assist her. Respondent has published an "information resource for common questions and concerns" titled, "Associate Handbook" that addresses sexual harassment and presents a grievance procedure for employees who believe they have been subjected to unfair treatment. It contemplates reporting the unfair treatment to (1) "your immediate manager"; (2) the store manager; or (3) "[s]hould the problem, however, be of a nature which you do not feel free to discuss with your manager, you are encouraged to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources." Petitioner requested a transfer to another store on May 1, 2007. She requested the transfer before Mr. Roundy started treating her "differently." She called Human Resources on May 9 and 15, 2007; it is unclear as to whether she called to check on the requested transfer or to report the alleged sexual harassment. She did not timely pursue any recourse suggested in the Associate Handbook. On May 9, 2007, Mr. Barnaba, the operations manager mentioned above, authored an email that characterized several of Petitioner's activities of that work day as "completely unprofessional and insubordinate." The following day, Mr. Roundy emailed his supervisor that Petitioner had gone through his private, business-related emails and discovered Mr. Barnaba's May 9, 2007, email. He also related several incidents that he thought unprofessional and that reflected bad customer service. He advised that Petitioner accused Barnaba and himself of conspiring to try to terminate her. Petitioner was scheduled to work on May 16 and 17, 2007, but did not report to work. She was scheduled to work on May 18, 2007; as a result, Kevin Draco, a risk manager for Respondent, went to the Merritt Island store to interview her. When Petitioner did not appear, management made the decision to terminate Petitioner for "absenteeism."

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maurice Arcadier, Esquire 2815 West New Haven Avenue, Suite 303 Melbourne, Florida 32904 Christopher J. Coleman, Esquire Schillinger & Coleman, P.A. 1311 Bedford Drive, Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida 32940

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY vs DAVID FAUSTINO GRABAU, 97-003644 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 1997 Number: 97-003644 Latest Update: May 21, 2004

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a psychologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Psychology was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and professional discipline of psychologists in Florida. Respondent is and has been licensed as a psychologist in Florida and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Psychology. During the period April 11, 1995, through August 7, 1995, Respondent was employed as a psychologist at the University of South Florida Counseling Center for Human Development. In that capacity, Respondent saw the Complainant, K.R., on several occasions and established a psychologist-client relationship with her. At the initial visit of K.R. to his office, Respondent conducted an initial intake evaluation of her and, in his client notes, defined the goal of his continued treatment of her as being to assist Ms. K.R. in stabilizing her depression; and to clarify her needs and patterns with regard to her career and relationships. Upon completing the intake evaluation of K.R., Respondent referred her to himself as treating therapist, and between the initial meeting and the end of August 1995, met with her approximately thirteen times. Review of Respondent’s notes regarding his sessions with K.R. reveals that they discussed her relationship with her parents; her relationships with men; her ability to deal with her emotions, her anxiety, and depression. K.R. relates that during many of their sessions, Respondent told her she had nice legs and was very sexy. He also told her of his personal life, including his dissatisfaction with his marriage, and it appears that he met with her outside his professional office on a purely social basis. K.R. claims Respondent told her not to tell anyone about their friendship outside the clinic. The relationship between Respondent and K.R. culminated in their engaging in sexual intercourse which resulted in her becoming pregnant. The pregnancy was subsequently aborted. As a result of their relationship, K.R. filed a complaint against Respondent with the Board of Psychology relating the sexual nature of their relationship. Subsequent to the filing of K.R.’s complaint against Respondent, and the Agency For Health Care Administration’s (Agency) filing of an Administrative Complaint against him, the Agency deposed Dr. George J. Rockwell, Jr., a retired psychologist with a specialty in school psychology. Dr. Rockwell did not meet with Respondent or speak with him in any capacity. He examined the file collected in this case regarding the allegations against Respondent, and from his review of all the material, concluded that Respondent had established a psychologist/patient relationship with K.R. This relationship involves trust and the generation in the patient of a basic belief that the psychologist has the skills and knowledge that would assist the patient in dealing with whatever problems he or she has. The patient develops the ability to talk to a non- critical, non-judgmental person in an effort to help him or her deal with their problems or concerns. The psychologist has the responsibility to create an emotionally safe environment for the patient. In this process the patient is often made vulnerable. The patient must be open with the psychologist and feel comfortable in sharing emotions and incidents which he or she would most likely not be able to share with others. It is without question a special relationship, and in Dr. Rockwell’s opinion, it is unlikely that a patient will work with a psychologist and not form that special relationship. This special relationship places upon the psychologist special responsibilities toward the patient. These include abiding by the laws and rules relating to the practice of psychology; having respect for the patient; and keeping all matters confided by the patient confidential. In addition, the psychologist has the responsibility to comport himself or herself in a manner so as to maintain a professional relationship and distance with the patient. Specifically, sexual relationships between a psychologist and his or her patient are normally prohibited as being beyond boundaries that should not be crossed. It is the psychologist’s responsibility to set the limits on behavior so as to prevent an inappropriate relationship from developing. This applies even if the patient initiates sexual advances. These advances would not excuse the psychologist from professional responsibility toward the patient. In the event the psychologist detects what appear to be inappropriate sexual advances from the patient, the psychologist had a duty to discuss this with the patient; talk about the nature of the psychologist/patient relationship; and explain that such a relationship would not be appropriate. The constrictors on the professional are even more specific in the event the psychologist finds himself or herself sexually attracted to the patient. Under no circumstances should the professional act on those feelings, but should evaluate the situation to ensure that those feelings are in no way interfering with the therapeutic relationship. There is absolutely no situation which Dr. Rockwell can think of in which it would be appropriate for a therapist to engage in sexual relations with a patient, either during or after termination of a therapy session. Inappropriate sexual contact between a therapist and a patient can have severe and deleterious effects on a patient. These might include feelings of guilt and depression, based on the patient’s belief that the inappropriate behavior was his or her fault. The patient might also feel embarrassment and be reluctant to undergo further treatment. Further, the patient would most likely lose trust in the involved therapist and potential other therapists. Dr. Rockwell concluded that notwithstanding Respondent’s contention that he saw K.R. solely for the purpose of career counseling, and at no time entered a psychologist/patient relationship with her, Respondent’s clinical notes regarding K.R. clearly indicate a professional psychologist/patient relationship was formed. An independent review of the records supports that conclusion, and it is so found. Even were the counseling limited solely to career counseling, it would still constitute counseling, the conduct of which is covered by the standards of the profession. Here, however, Dr. Rockwell is convinced that Respondent’s conduct toward K.R., as alleged, constituted sexual misconduct in the practice of psychological counseling which fell below the minimum standards of performance and professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. It is so found.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Psychology enter a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of all Counts in the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his license to practice psychology in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen L. Holz, Esquire Williams & Holz, P.A. 211 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 O. C. Allen, Qualified Representative 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Kaye Howerton, Executive Director Board of Psychology 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57490.009490.011190.80290.80390.804 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B19-17.002
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ELIZABETH MOORE vs. HEAVENLY BODIES II, 88-002595 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002595 Latest Update: Sep. 06, 1988

Findings Of Fact On or about March 8, 1988, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination based upon sexual harassment with the City of Clearwater, Office of Community Relations, involving Respondent. Petitioner had been employed at Respondent from approximately April, 1987 until she resigned in November, 1987. This case was duly noticed for hearing on August 24, 1988, by Notice of Hearing dated June 6, 1988. Petitioner received this Notice of Hearing, and did appear at the hearing. Petitioner testified, under oath, at the hearing that she did not want to pursue her claim of sexual harassment, and would offer no evidence in support of her claim. In fact, she did not offer any evidence in support of her claim.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's claim of discrimination based upon sexual harassment against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 1988 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Moore 1411 Illinois Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34663 Scott McGregor, Owner Heavenly Bodies II 3323 U.S. 19 North Clearwater, Florida 34619 Ronald M. McElrath Office of Community Relations Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Miles Lance, Esquire Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEFFREY R ALSHIN, 86-000959 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000959 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1986

The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57490.009490.0111
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY, AND MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING vs ISMAEL LOPEZ, 00-004526PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Nov. 02, 2000 Number: 00-004526PL Latest Update: Aug. 10, 2001

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 491.009(2)(k), and 491.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent held a license as a Mental Health Counselor in the State of Florida. Petitioner, through the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling, is the state agency that licenses and has regulatory jurisdiction of Clinical Social Workers. Respondent was employed as a counselor by the ACT Corporation (ACT) at the time of the incident that is the basis for this case. ACT operates a residential psychiatric treatment facility at which Respondent was employed. T.J. was a patient in the ACT facility from December 26, 1996 until mid-February, 1997. While at ACT, T.J. was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. T.J. had both group sessions and private sessions with Respondent while she was an in-patient at ACT. The private sessions took place in Respondent's office. Respondent and T.J. talked on the telephone, and he brought her small items, like lip-gloss and gum, that she was not allowed to have. T.J. alleges that the sessions became sexual on or about the second private therapy session. She alleges sexual contact during the in-patient sessions involved kissing and touching, that was consensual. T.J. states that she trusted Respondent and was in love with him. T.J. alleges this sexual relationship with Respondent continued after T.J. left ACT in February. There was never a therapeutic relationship between Respondent and T.J. after T.J. left the hospital. There was never any discussion of a fee arrangement, and no fees were ever paid for counseling sessions. Two days after T.J. left ACT, Respondent picked her up from her home and took her to Sapporo's for dinner and drinks. Following dinner, they went to a bar called the Barracks. T.J. alleges that when Respondent brought T.J. home that night they engaged in oral sex and intercourse. A few days later, T.J. and Respondent met for dinner at the Olive Garden. At the Olive Garden they had dinner and drinks. T.J. alleges that following dinner, Respondent walked T.J. to the van she was driving, they kissed and then had sexual intercourse in the van. On Valentine's Day Respondent came to T.J.'s house for dinner. T.J. lived with her parents. He brought her flowers and a bottle of wine for her parents. A card accompanied the flowers that said: "Sorry! No candy. Hope this will do instead." The envelope said "Traci." Following dinner, they went out to the Flagler Tavern. T.J. alleges that when they returned to T.J.'s house Respondent stayed until early morning and they had oral sex and intercourse. Respondent denies any sexual intimacy with T.J., and asserts that their relationship was one of patient-therapist even after she left ACT. T.J.’s testimony was presented by deposition. There was no opportunity to observe her. She was diagnosed contemporaneously with the events to which she testified with a condition that makes her credibility difficult to assess. Respondent testified at hearing denying the sexual relationship with T.J. I do not find the deposition testimony of T.J. credible regarding the allegations of sexual relations with Respondent. I find that there was a relationship between Respondent and T.J. because Respondent verifies the social contacts T.J. reported. Respondent did not perform any counseling with T.J. on the various occasions when they went to the bars and restaurants. This relationship was inconsistent with existing standards of professional conduct, as testified to by experts at hearing and exemplified in the code of ethics which ACT had. T.J. continued therapy as an outpatient with another ACT therapist for a short time after she was released from the hospital. During one of these sessions, T.J. told the outpatient therapist about her social/personal relationship with Respondent. Shortly thereafter, ACT fired Respondent for violation of ACT's code of ethics. This code prohibited personal relationships between patients and employees of the facility. Respondent had his Florida Teaching Certificate permanently revoked when he worked as a counselor at Deland Senior High School. He was charged with sexual misconduct with a student, and did not contest the charges formally. Psychotherapy is dependent upon a personal relationship between the patient and the therapist. Patients often develop emotional relationships or attachments to counselors or therapists because of the creation of an environment of trust. It is important that therapist recognize that this relationship is an outgrowth of treatment, and not to take advantage of the patient. Respondent had a relationship with T.J. that is contrary to the professional standards of practice, notwithstanding the allegations of sexual misconduct. His professional relationship should have been confined to the clinical setting, and the social activities in which he engaged with T.J. were inappropriate.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling, enter a final order adopting this order and revoking Respondent’s license and assessing a fine of $1,000 against him pursuant to Rule 64B4- 10.002 formerly 59P-5.001, Florida Administrative Code, the Board's penalty guidelines. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ismael Lopez 13691 Gavina Avenue, No. 447 Sylmar, California 91342 Mary Denise O'Brien, Esquire Department of Health 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.81491.009491.011190.801 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B4-10.002
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GLORIA D. GARCIA vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, N/K/A DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 96-002868 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 17, 1996 Number: 96-002868 Latest Update: Apr. 01, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination is what should be the award to Petitioner as to back pay, interest on the amount awarded, retirement system contributions, attorney's fees, and costs.

Findings Of Fact Had Petitioner retained her employment with Respondent, she would have earned $161,014.11. However, she actually earned $125,865.87. As a result of Petitioner's being terminated by Respondent, she lost income in the amount of $35,148.24. As a result of Petitioner's being terminated by Respondent, she lost pension contributions in the amount of $7,110.16. Consequently, Petitioner incurred a total monetary loss in the amount of $42,258.41. As to whether Petitioner incurred a break in service, no one from the Division of Retirement was called to testify. Consequently, no evidence was presented as to that issue. Petitioner suggests that she should receive credit for retirement from October 8, 1993, the date of her termination when she was a career service employee, to January 1995, the date that she again became a career service employee. Petitioner's suggestion is a reasonable resolution to the issue of break in service and should be implemented if there exists a break in service. No argument was presented to contradict that the statutory interest rate is ten percent per annum. Petitioner's counsel testified that she expended 437.80 hours on this matter and Petitioner's expert opined that such hours are reasonable. Respondent's expert opined that 241.30 hours are reasonable. Petitioner's expert did not review the index of the official file of this matter, which was maintained by the Division of Administrative Hearings. Respondent's expert reviewed the index online. Further, Respondent's counsel reviewed the Verified Motion, but did not review the file of Petitioner's counsel. Respondent's expert questioned whether Petitioner's counsel personally performed the tasks in certain entries in the Verified Motion or whether a secretary performed the tasks, not whether the tasks were performed. However, Respondent's expert did not question, and did not indicate that he was required to question, Petitioner's counsel on such entries prior to hearing. Regarding such entries, Petitioner's counsel testified that she, not her secretary, performed the tasks in the entries. The testimony of Petitioner's counsel is found credible. Respondent's expert also questioned whether some entries contained adequate detail and specificity to support them, not whether the tasks were performed. The expert's testimony is found to be credible. The detail and specificity are inadequate in the entries identified by Respondent's expert. The lack of detail and specificity dictate a reduction in the number of hours requested by 98.30 hours. Consequently, the number of hours reasonably expended by Petitioner's counsel in this matter is 339.50. Petitioner and her counsel entered into a mixed agreement (Agreement) for representation at $250.00 per hour and for contingent fees. The Agreement provided in pertinent part as follows: agree to pay my attorneys from the proceeds of the gross recovery including costs and fees awarded attorney's fees, if applicable the following fee: * * * b. 40% of any recovery up to $1 million after the filing of an answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator through the trial of the case; 40% becomes immediately applicable as soon as the matter is set for trial; * * * My attorneys shall be entitled to choose the fee at the hourly rate [$250.00 per hour] if I am entitled to an award of attorneys fees from the client or the contingency, whichever is greater. In the event there is a court-awarded fee which is more than the contingency fee, the attorneys shall keep the court-awarded fee in lieu of the contingency fee provided it is greater than the contingency fee and provided the court-awarded fee is actually collected. The hourly rate of $250.00 by Petitioner's counsel is within the range of rates for this matter. The hourly rate of $250.00 is reasonable. Therefore, the amount of reasonable attorney's fees in this matter is $84,875. Petitioner requests an enhancement of attorney's fees by one-third because of the uniqueness or unusualness of this matter. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that this matter is a unique or unusual case involving employment discrimination. Petitioner's counsel requests costs in the amount of $3,094.49. The Verified Motion contains taxable and non-taxable costs.2 Costs identified as fax or facsimile, postage, cab fare, and transportation to and from the courthouse should be excluded as inappropriate. As a result, the reasonable amount of costs is $2,844.48. Petitioner's Verified Supplemental Motion indicates additional attorney's fees associated with this hearing in the amount of $11,200.00, representing 44.80 hours (out of a total of 65.30 hours indicated) at a rate of $250.00 an hour; and additional costs associated with this hearing in the amount of $12,100.91. Regarding the supplemental attorney's fees, no explanation was submitted as to why the entries from June 6, 2003 to August 20, 2003 were not available at hearing. Notwithstanding, the supplemental documentation is sufficiently detailed and specific. As a result, the number of supplemental hours reasonably expended by Petitioner's counsel is 44.80, and the reasonable amount of supplemental attorney's fees is $11,200.00. Regarding the supplemental costs, the cost for the services rendered by Petitioner's experts are included in the $12,100.91. Petitioner obtained the services of an expert on attorney's fees and an expert on lost wages and benefits. For the services rendered by the expert on attorney's fees, the cost was in the amount of $1,775.00. For the services rendered by the expert on lost wages and benefits, the cost was in the amount of $9,006.25. The total cost for the services rendered by the experts is in the amount of $10,781.25. Again, costs identified as fax or facsimile, postage, cab fare, and transportation to and from the courthouse should be excluded as inappropriate. Additionally, regarding costs, Petitioner represents that the parties agreed to equally share in the expense of the court reporter for the hearing, which is shown on the Verified Supplemental Motion as $663.00. Respondent did not refute the representation. Consequently, the reasonable amount of supplemental costs is $12,054.91.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order as to back pay, interest on the amount awarded, retirement system contributions, attorney's fees, and costs: Ordering the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services n/k/a Department of Children and Family Services (Department) to pay Gloria Garcia (Garcia) back pay in the amount of $35,148.24. Ordering the Department to make contributions to the Florida Retirement System on behalf of Garcia in the amount of $7,110.16. Ordering the re-evaluation of Garcia's break in service by the Division of Retirement. Further, ordering that, if it is in compliance with and satisfies applicable statutes and rules of the Division of Retirement, Garcia receive credit in time for retirement from October 8, 1993, the date of her termination, to January 1995, the date that she again became a career service employee. Ordering the Department to pay to Garcia's counsel attorney's fees in the amount of $96,075.00 and costs in the amount of $14,899.39, totaling $110,974.39. Ordering the statutory interest rate of ten percent per annum be applied to the amounts awarded. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2003.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57258.41760.10760.11768.28768.72768.73
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