The Issue Whether the Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to regulate the practice of real estate, pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Lynton Oliver Thomas, was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0504596 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent Thomas was as a broker-salesperson at Pagliari Realty, Inc., 323 Northeast 167 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, L T Express Realty Corp., was a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker, having been issued license number 0273473 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Thomas was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer of Respondent L T Express Realty Corp. The office for this corporate entity was located at 2124 Northeast 123 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. There was no evidence that Respondent Thomas operated his corporate entity from any other office. On May 7, 1995, Respondent Thomas, a licensed real estate broker, d/b/a L T Express Realty Corp., negotiated a contract for the sale of a house between Bruce and Ann McCormick (as sellers) and Marie S. Saintel and Carita Luc (as buyers). The buyers gave Respondent Thomas an earnest money deposit in the amount of $5,528.00. The transaction failed to close. The sellers, through their agent, attempted to make a demand upon Respondent Thomas for delivery of the earnest money deposit. The sellers' agent was unable to serve the demand on the Respondents because the Respondents had closed their offices and could not be located. Respondents had, or should have had, a good faith doubt as to the proper way to disburse the escrowed funds. Respondent Thomas, without authorization from the sellers, returned $3,000.00 of the original $5,528.00 deposit to the buyers. The balance of the earnest money deposit, in the amount of $2,528.00, has not been recovered from the Respondents. Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides the procedure real estate brokers are required to follow when competing demands are made for funds that have been received in escrow or when a broker has a good faith doubt as to how escrowed funds should be disbursed. At no time did Respondents attempt to invoke those procedures. Kenneth G. Rehm, Petitioner's investigator, visited Respondent L T Express Realty Corp. and discovered that Respondent Thomas had abandoned his registered office. Respondent Thomas failed to notify Petitioner that he closed his real estate office at 2124 Northeast 123 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered that finds Respondents guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I-VIII of the Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for these violations, the Final Order should revoke all licenses issued by Petitioner to Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Mr. Lynton Oliver Thomas L T Express Realty Corp. 10810 Northeast Tenth Place Miami, Florida 33161 CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1997 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent Ronald C. Sutterfield is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0153502 by Petitioner in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, % U.S. Land Brokers Incorporated (U.S. Land Brokers), 1809 Flagler Street, #B-7, West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Sutterfield caused Respondent U.S. Land Incorporated (U.S. Land) to be registered as a corporate real estate broker. U.S. Land was issued license number 0211331 by Petitioner in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at 827 Caroline Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Sutterfield was, at all times pertinent hereto, the qualifying broker for U.S. Land. U.S. Land was involuntarily dissolved by the Florida Secretary of State's office on December 6, 1981. Despite this dissolution, Mr. Sutterfield continued to hold himself out as doing business as U.S. Land and he continued to maintain with Petitioner the registration and licensure of U.S. Land. Mr. Sutterfield misrepresented to Petitioner the status of U.S. Land on the applications he submitted to Petitioner for the continued registration and licensure of U.S. Land between 1981 and 1990. From approximately January 1986 through June 1990, Respondents maintained an office in a residence located at 827 Caroline Avenue in West Palm Beach, Florida. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether there was a sign on or about the entrance. Mr. Sutterfield contends that his office was in a back area of the residence that has a separate entrance and that the sign was posted on that entrance. Petitioner's investigator testified that her inspection revealed that no sign had been posted, but it was not clear that she had looked in the remote area of the premises described by Mr. Sutterfield. This conflict is resolved by finding that the evidence failed to establish that Mr. Sutterfield had failed to post a sign at the separate entrance to his office at 827 Caroline Avenue. 1/ On June 12, 1990, Mr. Sutterfield reported to the Petitioner a change of address as well as a new corporation, U.S. Land Brokers, Inc. On July 19, 1990, Petitioner's investigator conducted an office inspection at Respondents' new address located at 1809 Flagler Drive #B-7, West Palm Beach, Florida. This location is an apartment complex whose rules forbid the operation of a business out of the apartments. The Respondents's homemade entrance sign was hung in such a manner as to be partially obscured to public view and, consequently, the name of the brokerage corporation as registered with the Petitioner was not visible. Respondents had, as of the formal hearing, never applied for an occupational license from the local governing authority for either the location at 827 Caroline Avenue or the location at 1809 Flagler Drive. Mr. Sutterfield's former wife would not forward his mail to him following their divorce in July 1980 and, consequently, he did not receive notification of the dissolution of U.S. Land. After Mr. Sutterfield was told by Petitioner's investigator that he needed an occupational license, he learned that U.S. Land had been dissolved and that he could not reincorporate under that name. Mr. Sutterfield told Petitioner's investigator of the problems he had encountered with the dissolved corporation and that he was attempting to resolve the problem with the Office of the Secretary of State before applying for an occupational license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent Ronald C. Sutterfield violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(e) and (m), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that a letter of reprimand be issued for his violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that any remaining licenses issued to U.S. Land Incorporated be revoked. It is further recommended that for his violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, Respondent Ronald C. Sutterfield be fined the sum of $1,000; that his licensure as a real estate broker be suspended for a period of 60 days; and that his licensure be placed on probation for a period of one year following such suspension. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of July, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents are guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b) and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Galdo has been a licensed real estate broker for eight years and holds license number 0414542. At all material times, he served as president of Respondent Real Estate Support and Development Corporation, which is registered as a real estate broker and holds license number 0243131. All references below to "Respondent" are to Respondent Galdo only. By Contract for Sale and Purchase executed by both parties on December 5, 1989, Respondent, as trustee, agreed to sell to Ruben P. Chalarca a parcel located at 12 Sandalwood Court, Oviedo, Florida. The contract calls for a closing on or before December 28, 1989. The purchase price disclosed on the contract is "approx. 46,300.00 1000.00 cash to Mortgagee." According to the contract, payment was to include the buyer taking subject to and assuming a mortgage held by "Central Fed Mortgage Co." in the approximate principal amount of $45,300. The contract contains no information as to a brokerage commission. Blanks on the form contract concerning a commission are filled in "N/A." The only involvement of Respondent Real Estate Support and Development Corporation appears to be that Respondent provided Mr. Chalarca a business card bearing the name of Respondent, the name of Respondent Real Estate Support and Development Corporation, the company's address, and telephone numbers for Respondent and the company. However, the evidence does not establish that Respondent gave the business card to Mr. Chalarca for any purpose other than giving him the information necessary to contact Respondent. There is no evidence that Respondent held himself out as representing Real Estate Support and Development Corporation in his dealings with Mr. Chalarca. The $1000 earnest money deposit that Mr. Chalarca "paid" to Respondent was by a check that never cleared. Mr. Chalarca gave another check payable to Respondent individually. The second check was dated December 5, 1989, but was only in the amount of $400. There is another check dated December 5 payable to cash and in the amount of $150, but the record does not establish that the Chalarcas gave this sum to Respondent. Except for the $1000 earnest money check, all of the Chalarcas' checks cleared. The closing took place and Respondent Galdo, as trustee, conveyed the property by deed to Mr. Chalarca and possibly his wife. Mr. and Mrs. Chalarca are from Columbia, South America. Neither has had any significant real estate experience prior to the subject transaction with Respondent. Although Mr. Chalarca speaks and understands English reasonably well, his wife does not. Mr. Chalarca did not complete high school. Prior to or at the closing, Respondent told Mr. Chalarca to make the mortgage payments to Respondent, who would make arrangements with the mortgagee, evidently to show that the Chalarcas would be making the mortgage payments. It appear that the mortgage payments may not have been current when the Chalarcas purchased the property. Respondent admitted to Petitioner's investigator that he sent the November and December, 1989, payments to the mortgagee in January, 1990, together with a request that the mortgage be transferred to the Chalarcas. He also admitted that the bank returned the package with a demand for the January, 1990, payment. Upon receipt of the demand from the bank, Respondent told the Chalarcas that they must make the January, 1990, payment at that time. However, the record establishes that the Chalarcas gave Respondent only two checks after the closing. The first is dated April 17, 1990, and in the amount of $1600. The second check is dated May 21, 1990, and in the amount of $1000. The record does not clearly establish whether Respondent ultimately made the November and December, 1990, payments. The record clearly establishes that no one made the January, February, and March payments, although there is no evidence that the Chalarcas ever tendered these payments to Respondent. For reasons not apparent from the record, Mr. Chalarca decided to make the April, 1990, payment directly to the mortgagee. This check is dated April 7, 1990, in the amount of $1220, and payable to Transohio Savings. However, the mortgagee returned the check by letter dated May 29, 1990, because the loan was already in foreclosure. The letter gave Mr. Chalarca an address to contact "in order to stop the action." Most important, the record establishes that Respondent retained the $2600 paid to him by the April and May, 1990, checks, and the record does not establish any justification for the retention of this money by Respondent. There is no indication in the record that Respondent applied this money on behalf of the Chalarcas. To the contrary, there is some indication that no payments were made on the mortgage after late 1989. By Summary Final Judgment of Foreclosure entered November 6, 1990, Transohio Savings Bank, F.S.B. obtained a foreclosure judgment on the subject mortgage against Mr. Chalarca and his wife for the total sum of $52,613.74. The foreclosure judgment shows interest on the principal balance of $5649.24 through September 23, 1990, with an additional $15.78 per day interest from September 24, 1990, through the date of entry of the judgment. The assumed interest rate was not the statutory interest rate, which is expressly imposed upon the total due, starting from the date of the judgment. If the daily interest under the foreclosed mortgage were $15.78 daily, then unpaid interest of $5649.24 represents 358 days' interest, which would suggest that no interest payments were made after September or October, 1989. The foreclosure judgment ordered the clerk to sell the property on December 20, 1990. The Chalarcas remained in the 12 Sandalwood Court parcel until about the time of the sale.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Real Estate Support and Development Corporation, finding Roger Galdo guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), suspending his license for six months, placing him on probation for 18 months following the end of the suspension, and imposing upon him an administrative fine of $1000. ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 91-4449 Treatment of Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-3: adopted. 4: rejected as irrelevant. 5: adopted. 6: adopted except that the $1000 check was dishonored. 7: adopted. 8: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. All of the checks that the Chalarcas gave Respondent have been identified in the recommended order., which also identifies when these checks were delivered to Respondent. The evidence does not establish by the requisite standard that the Chalarcas gave Respondent the mortgage payments each month when they were due, or even that they gave Respondent funds sufficient to make the mortgage payments that fell due following the closing. 9: adopted except as the characterization of Mr. Chalarca as "suspicious." The characterization is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate standard of evidence. 10: adopted. 11: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. The record does not establish Mr. Chalarca's motivation for giving Respondent the two checks totalling $2600. 12: adopted, although a substantial amount of time elapsed between the service of the foreclosure summons and the departure of the Chalarcas from the mortgaged property. 13: adopted. 14: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 15-19: rejected as recitation of evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Attorney Janine B. Myrick Division of Real Estate Legal Section P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Roger Galdo 208 Madeira Avenue Orlando, FL 32825 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Fetters has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, trading as RONTRON Realty and Investment, with offices in Largo, Florida, and Choudhury has been a licensed real estate salesperson at RONTRON Realty. Fetters was Choudhury's broker at all times material hereto. Stanley and Mary K. Jankiewicz listed their home for $189,000 with Harvey Seybold, a licensed real estate broker, and neighbor. On January 28, 1988, Choudhury contacted Seybold and asked to see the Jankiewicz house. Seybold showed the house that same day. On January 30, 1988, Choudhury presented a contract for the sale and purchase of the home to Seybold and Jankiewicz. The purchasers, John and Gail Taylor, offered $185,000, but this offer was unacceptable to Jankiewicz because it called for him to hold a $150,000 purchase money mortgage. Jankiewicz proposed a counteroffer, which still provided for a sales price of $185,000, but only required him to hold a purchase money mortgage of $25,000. It also required the Taylors to obtain a firm financing commitment within 45 days for a first mortgage in the amount of $129,000. The Taylors accepted this counteroffer, and the transaction was scheduled to close on March 30, 1988, as proposed in Jankiewicz' counteroffer. Jankiewicz and Seybold testified that Choudhury told them, on January 30, 1988, that the Taylors had a net worth of from $2 to $3 million, and that he had a copy of their financial statement in his office, which he had reviewed. They claim that he promised to provide them with a copy of this financial statement on February 1, 1988. Jankiewicz testified that Choudhury's representation about the financial condition of the Taylors was a significant inducement for him to propose his counteroffer, and he would not have gone through wish this sale had he known on January 30, 1988, what he subsequently learned about their net worth. Choudhury denies making any representation about the Taylors' net worth. He testified that he had only met the Taylors on one occasion, and had no way of knowing their net worth since he denies having a copy of their financial statement at that time. When the Taylors' financial statement was not provided on February 1, 1988, Jankiewicz and Seybold made repeated attempts to contact Choudhury, most of which were futile. He would not return their calls. Finally, on March 7, 1988, Choudhury did send Seybold a copy of the Taylors' financial statement, and Seybold immediately forwarded it to Jankiewicz. The financial statement is dated January 31, 1988, and indicates a net worth of $238,100. Choudhury testified that he forwarded this financial statement to Seybold as soon as he received it from the Taylors, but that when he looked it over he was "shocked". Choudhury offered no credible explanation of why he would be "shocked" to see the Taylors' financial statement, unless he had expected a far higher net worth. Yet, he testified that he had no knowledge of their net worth. Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the testimony of Choudhury, Seybold and Jankiewicz, as well as Choudhury's unexplained testimony about being "shocked" to see the Taylors' net worth, it is found that Choudhury did represent to Jankiewicz and Seybold on January 30, 1988, that the Taylors had a net worth of from $2 to $3 million. This statement was false, but it was a material inducement which led Jankiewicz to make his counteroffer, accepting a $25,000 purchase money mortgage. The contract for sale did not provide any contingency which addressed Jankiewicz' concerns about the Taylors' net worth. He and Seybold believed Choudhury's representations, and admitted at hearing that it was an oversight on their part not to insist on a contingency in the sales contract. They simply took Choudhury's word that he had seen their financial statement, and it showed a net worth of $2 to $3 million. When he received the Taylors' financial statement in early March, 1988, Jankiewicz tried to back out of the deal, but because there was no contingency in the sales contract, and because the Taylors threatened to sue him for breach of contract if he did not close, he went through with the sale. The sale closed, as scheduled, on March 30, 1988. The Taylors had obtained a first mortgage through bank financing in early March, and have subsequently made payments to Jankiewicz under the purchase money mortgage which he holds, although on occasion they have been late with their payments. At no time did Fetters participate in the discussions which took place with Jankiewicz and Seybold concerning this sale. Choudhury made all contacts with them, presented the sales contract, and attended the closing. The Petitioner's investigator, Leo Huddleston, visited Fetters on June 28, 1988, to examine Fetters' records concerning the Jankiewicz transaction, but Fetters brought no records with him to this meeting. He claimed that Choudhury had all of these records. Subsequently, he did provide Huddleston with escrow records showing a $20,000 deposit in his escrow account, and copies of three checks from the Taylors totaling $20,000, which he claimed he received as their deposit on the Jankiewicz house, and which he stated he then deposited in his escrow account. These checks do indicate on their face that they were for a house deposit. However, Fetters was never able to produce a copy of his deposit slips or bank records which would directly establish that the Taylors' checks were in fact deposited into his escrow account. There was no indication on the face of the checks that they were deposited into his escrow account, or that he had an escrow account established for this purpose. Fetters testified at hearing, that he had lost his bank records, and presumed that a former tenant had taken them when he moved. Fetters failed to keep adequate records of his escrow account that would allow an audit of funds deposited into, and withdrawn from, such account. He could not establish that he had an escrow account on which he was signatory. He was also negligent in failing to safeguard any such records which he may have had, and could not produce complete records of his escrow account which would establish that the Taylors' deposit checks were placed in his escrow account, and remained there until they were withdrawn by a $20,000 cashier's check that was exchanged at closing. Following initial investigation of a complaint filed by Jankiewicz against Fetters and Choudhury, a probable cause panel decided not to issue an Administrative Complaint, and they were informed, in August, 1988, that this complaint file had been closed. Subsequently, however, new evidence was discovered concerning the fact that Seybold had also been present on January 30, 1988, when Choudhury met with Jankiewicz, and Seybold confirmed Jankiewicz' recollection of Choudhury's statements. Thereupon, this complaint was resubmitted to a probable cause panel, and the Administrative Complaint which is at issue in this case was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order suspending Respondent Fetters license for a period of six months, and suspending Respondent Choudhury's license for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The Petitioner did not timely file Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent Choudhury did file a Memorandum of Law which contains unnumbered paragraphs under a section referred to as "Facts". This Memorandum has been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order, but specific rulings cannot be made on the matters contained in the section labeled "Facts" since this consists largely of argument on the evidence without any citation to the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), F.A.C. Rulings on the Respondent Fetters' Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding 1. 3. Adopted in Findings 2, 8. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 4. Rejected in Finding 5, and as argument on the evidence, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings 10, 11. Rejected in Finding 11. Not a proposed finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: ARTHUR R. SHELL, ESQUIRE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE P. O. BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 LESLIE M. CONKLIN, ESQUIRE 2120 U.S. 19, SOUTH SUITE 210 CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 34624 RONALD P. TEEVAN, ESQUIRE 200 NORTH GARDEN AVENUE SUITE A CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 34615 DARLENE F. KELLER DIVISION DIRECTOR P. O. BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 KENNETH EASLEY, GENERAL COUNSEL NORTHWOOD CENTRE 1940 NORTH MONROE STREET SUITE 60 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0792 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters involved herein; Petitioner held Florida real estate salesman's license number 0403224. Her license was listed with Century 21 ACR Equities; Inc., 4222 W. Fairfield Drive, Pensacola; on May 25; 1983. On March 4, 1985, Respondent listed her license with Century 21; Five Flags Properties; Inc., in Pensacola, without terminating her listing with ACR Equities. On March 22, 1985, Five Flags terminated her listing with that firm and on April 30; 1985, ACR Equities terminated her listing with that firm. On May 14; 1985; Respondent applied for a change of status to list her license with Old South Properties; Inc., in Pensacola. That firm terminated the association on July 9, 1985. On March 19; 1985; Emmison Lewis and his wife; Lillie Mae signed a handwritten sales agreement prepared by Respondent for the purchase of a piece of property located in Escambia County; for $33,000.00. The Lewises gave her a deposit of $500.00 by check made payable to Respondent and which bears her endorsement on the back. This check was made payable to Respondent because she asked that it be made that way. Several days later; Respondent came back to the Lewises and asked for an additional $1,500.00 deposit. This was given her, along with a rental payment of $310.00; in a $2,000.00 check on March 29, 1985. Respondent gave the Lewises the balance back in cash along with a receipt reflecting the payment of the $1,500.00. On that same date; Respondent had the Lewises sign a typed copy of the sales agreement which reflected that both the $500.00 deposit and the additional $1,500.00 were due on closing. This typed copy was backdated to March 19; 1985. Both the handwritten and typed copies of the sales agreement bear the signature of the Respondent as a witness. The sale was never closed and the Lewises have never received any of the $2;000.00 deposit back. On about four different occasions, Mr. Lewis contacted Respondent requesting that she refund their money and she promised to do so, but never did. They did, however, receive the $310.00 rent payment back in cash approximately two weeks later. On April 26, 1985, James E. Webster and his wife Pearlie signed a sales agreement as the purchasers of real estate with Respondent. This property had a purchase price of $31,900.00. At the time of signing, Mr. Webster gave Respondent $150.00 in cash and a check drawn by his wife on their joint account for $400.00. Due to Mrs. Webster's change of mind, the Websters did not close on the property. They requested a refund of their deposit and Respondent gave the Websters a check for $400.00 which was subsequently dishonored by the bank because of insufficient funds. The Websters called Respondent at home several times, but she was always out. Calls to the broker with whom her license was placed were unsuccessful. Finally, however, Respondent refunded the $400.00 to the Websters in cash. Respondent had listed her license with ACR Equities in May, 1983. At no time while Respondent had her license with Mr. Bickel's firm did she ever turn over to him as broker either the $2.000.00 she received from the Lewises or the $550.00 she received from the Websters. Mr. Bickel, the broker, was not aware of these contracts and did not question her about them. He terminated the placement of her license with his firm because he found out that in early March 1985, she had placed her license with another firm., Both sales agreements for the Lewises and that for the Websters had the firm name of ACR Equities printed on them as broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law; it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee; Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Esquire p. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ralph Armstead; Esquire P. O. Box 2629 Orlando; Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, the Respondent Joyce A. Chandler, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0348072. Respondent's license was suspended for a period of one year pursuant to a Final Order of the Florida Real Estate Commission on August 4, 1983, which became effective September 3, 1983. To date, the Respondent has failed to take steps necessary to reactivate her license and she remains in a suspended status. Gerald and Mary Anne Jennings were the owners of a home located at 15413 S.W. 105th Avenue, Miami, Florida. There was a first mortgage on the home held by Stockton, Whatley and Davin. In the early part of 1981, the Jennings were experiencing financial difficulties and in an effort to help pay off debts secured a second mortgage in the amount of $15,000.00 from Davide and Associates, Inc. This mortgage from Davide and Associates, Inc., was a wrap-around mortgage making the total obligation (Stockton, Whatley and Davin plus Davide) approximately $44,000.00. In August of 1981, Davide and Associates, Inc. sold the wrap-around mortgage to Mr. and Mrs. Leon Shiff. In January of 1983, the Jennings made a decision to sell their home as they were having difficulty making payments to Shiff. The Jennings contacted Mr. Shiff and informed them of their decision, and Mr. Shiff attempted to secure prospective purchasers for them. On or about January 30, 1983, the Respondent Chandler made an offer to purchase the Jennings home, which offer was rejected by the Jennings. On or about February 2, 1983, the Respondent made a second offer to purchase the Jennings home which offer was accepted. The terms of this February 2, 1983 contract provided that the Respondent was to give sufficient funds to the Jennings to catch up on all mortgage arrearages, tender to the Jennings approximately $4,000.00 in cash, and the Jennings were to take back a third mortgage in the amount of $4,000.00. Respondent, in turn, was to assume the Stockton, Whatley and Davin mortgage and agreed to pay off the Shiff mortgage within 90 days. The Jennings desired to return to West Virginia immediately. Therefore, the Respondent promised and represented to the Jennings that she would secure tenants to occupy the residence while she attempted to obtain the necessary financing and to close the transaction and would use the proceeds from the rental money to make all mortgage payments. On or about February 22, 1983, the Respondent and the Jennings signed yet a third contract. Said contract has not been produced and the location of it is unknown. On this same date, the Respondent had the Jennings sign, in blank, a Warranty Deed. The Respondent represented to the Jennings that the Warranty Deed was nothing more than a Power of Attorney which enabled the Respondent to rent the house and use the rental money to make the mortgage payments while the Respondent sought the financing per the terms of the contract. Based on the Respondent's representations and promises, the Jennings vacated the residence and stopped making mortgage payments. Thereafter, the Respondent secured a Mr. and Mrs. Hill as tenants for the property. Mr. and Mrs. Hill came to the Respondent as tenants from Prudential Life Insurance Company. Mr. and Mrs. Hill had recently experienced damage to their home due to a fire and the Respondent secured rental property for the Hills on behalf of Prudential. In regards to this matter, Prudential paid via a double party check made payable to Robert Hill and Princess International, Inc. $1,950.00. The Respondent goes by the name of P. J. Chandler, Princess Chandler, Princess international and Princess International, Inc. These tenants remained in the Jennings' home for approximately two months. The Respondent made no mortgage payments to either Stockton, Whatley and Davin or to Mr. Shiff for the period of February 1983 to August 1983. Further, the last mortgage payment made was for the January payment delivered to Mr. Shiff by Mrs. Jennings. In order to keep the first mortgage in good standing with Stockton, Whatley and Davin, Mr. Shiff took it upon himself to make these mortgage payments although he was receiving no mortgage payments on the wrap-around from Mr. & Mrs. Jennings or the Respondent. In June of 1983, Mr. Shiff enlisted the aid of Herman Isis, attorney at law, to begin foreclosure proceedings on the residence. In August of 1983, the residence was sold to Shiff at the foreclosure sale. Thereafter, a certificate of title was received by Mr. Shiff in regards to said foreclosure purchase. The Jennings received only $3,248.00 from the Respondent as opposed to the approximate $8,000.00 contract amount. The transaction never closed as promised by the Respondent. Finally, the Respondent failed to make the necessary mortgage payments as represented and promised by her to the Jennings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent Joyce A. Chandler's license as a real estate broker be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Graves, Esquire 315 S.E. Seventh Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, whether Respondent's real estate license should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Jared A. White T/A Jerry White Realty was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0187087 pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker with an address of 231 Skiff Pt. 7, Clearwater, Florida 34630. TITLE TO THE PROPERTY The matters at issue began with Respondent's retention as a real estate broker to bid at a foreclosure auction for a beachfront house and lot at 235 Howard Drive in Belleair Beach, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent was hired to submit the bid on behalf of Dr. Moshe Kedan and/or his wife, Ella Kedan. Prior to the auction on August 17, 1995, Respondent had no contact with the Kedans. Kathy MacKinnon of Viewpoint International Realty in Clearwater was Respondent’s point of contact with the Kedans. It was Ms. MacKinnon who obtained Respondent's services to bid on behalf of the Kedans, and Ms. MacKinnon who negotiated with Dr. Kedan as to the financial arrangements for both the bid and any ensuing commissions for Respondent. Neither Ms. MacKinnon nor Dr. Kedan was called as a witness in this case. Respondent attended the foreclosure auction and tendered the winning bid on the property. Respondent bid in his own name. Respondent testified that he had bid at several similar sales in the past, and his practice was to bid in the name of the person who would hold title to the property. Respondent did not follow his usual practice here because Ms. MacKinnon failed to instruct him as to whether the property would be titled in the name of Dr. Kedan, Mrs. Kedan, or one of their corporations. Ms. MacKinnon told Respondent she would know on August 18 how the property was to be titled. Respondent's testimony regarding the initial titling of the property is supported by a handwritten note faxed by Ms. MacKinnon to Dr. Kedan on August 17, shortly after the auction. Ms. MacKinnon's note provides instructions regarding payment of the purchase price, indicating that the money must be submitted to the Clerk of the Court no later than 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 18. The note specifically asks, "Also, whose name do you want the house in?" Respondent testified that on August 18, he went to Atlanta on business, with the understanding that Ms. MacKinnon would handle the payments to the Clerk of the Court and the titling of the property on that date. This testimony is consistent with the handwritten note in which Ms. MacKinnon indicates that she will take the Kedans' checks to the court. The record evidence shows that the payments were made to the Clerk of the Court and that title insurance on the property was timely issued. However, the title and the title insurance policy listed Respondent as owner of the property. Respondent was unaware the property had been titled in his name until he received the certificate of title in the mail, approximately two weeks after the auction. Upon receiving the incorrect certificate of title, he went to the title company and signed a quitclaim deed, effective August 17, 1995, in favor of Ella Kedan. Respondent testified that he had learned from Ms. MacKinnon that the property would be titled in Ella Kedan’s name at sometime during the two-week period after the auction. The quitclaim deed was not notarized until October 9, 1995, and was not recorded until October 10, 1995. However, the face of the deed states that it was made on August 17, 1995. It is plain that the signature line of the notary statement on the quitclaim deed has been altered from August 17, 1995 to October 9, 1995. Respondent had no knowledge of how the quitclaim deed came to be altered. Respondent also had no clear recollection as to why he dated the quitclaim deed August 17, 1995, in light of his testimony that he signed it approximately two weeks after that date. A reasonable inference is that Respondent so dated the quitclaim deed to clarify that Mrs. Kedan's ownership of the property commenced on August 17, the date on which Respondent submitted the winning bid. Respondent also had no knowledge of why the title company failed to record the quitclaim deed at the time he signed it. He testified that on or about October 9, 1995, he checked the Pinellas County computer tax records and discovered that he was still the owner of record. At that time, he returned to the title company to make sure the quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. Petitioner offered no testimonial evidence regarding the events surrounding the titling of the property. Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is credible, consistent with the documentary evidence, and thus credited as an accurate and truthful statement of the events in question. THE CONTRACT FOR REPAIRS Shortly after the auction, Respondent began discussing with Dr. Kedan the possibility of Respondent’s performing repairs on the just-purchased property. Because Dr. Kedan did not testify in this proceeding, findings as to the substance of the negotiations between Respondent and Dr. Kedan must be based on the testimony of Respondent, to the extent that testimony is credible and consistent with the documentary evidence. Respondent testified that Ms. MacKinnon approached him after the auction and asked him if he would be interested in fixing up the house for the Kedans. Respondent testified that he was agreeable to contracting for the work because his carpenter was between jobs and could use the money. Respondent thus met with Dr. Kedan at the doctor’s office to discuss the repairs. Dr. Kedan explained to Respondent that his ultimate plan was to demolish the existing house on the property and to build a more elaborate residence. Dr. Kedan wanted to rent out the house for five years before tearing it down, and wanted Respondent to affect such repairs as would make the house rentable for that five-year period. Respondent testified that Dr. Kedan expressly told him he did not want to spend a lot of money on the repairs. Respondent quoted Dr. Kedan a price of $20,000.00, which was the price it would take to pay for the repairs, with no profit built in for Respondent. Respondent testified that he sought no profit on this job. He had made a substantial commission on the purchase of the property, and anticipated doing business with Dr. Kedan in the future, and thus agreed to perform this particular job more or less as a “favor” to Dr. Kedan. After this meeting with Dr. Kedan, Respondent walked through the house with Irene Eastwood, the Kedans’ property manager. Ms. Eastwood testified that she and Respondent went from room to room, and she made notes on what should be done, with Respondent either concurring or disagreeing. Ms. Eastwood typed the notes into the form of a contract and presented it to Respondent the next day. On September 21, 1995, Respondent signed the contract as drafted by Ms. Eastwood. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent represented himself as a licensed contractor in the negotiations preceding the contract. Respondent testified that he never told Dr. Kedan that he was a contractor, and that he affirmatively told Ms. Eastwood that he was not a contractor. Ms. Eastwood testified that she assumed Respondent was a licensed contractor because Dr. Kedan would not have hired a nonlicensed person to perform the contracted work. She denied that Respondent ever told her that he was not a licensed contractor. The weight of the evidence supports Respondent to the extent it is accepted that Respondent never expressly represented himself as a licensed contractor to either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood. However, the weight of the evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that he expressly told either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood that he was not a licensed contractor. Respondent’s subcontractors commenced work immediately upon the signing of the contract. Ms. Eastwood was in charge of working with Respondent to remodel the house, and she visited the site every day, often two or three times. She only saw Respondent on the site once during the last week of September, and not at all during the month of October. She did observe painters and a maintenance man regularly at work on the property during this period. Respondent concurred that he was seldom on the property, but testified that this was pursuant to his agreement with Dr. Kedan that he would generally oversee the work on the property. Respondent testified that he was on the property as often as he felt necessary to perform his oversight duties. Ms. Eastwood testified as to her general dissatisfaction with the quality of the work that was being performed on the property and the qualifications of those performing the work. She conveyed those concerns to the Kedans. Respondent testified that he did not initially obtain any permits to perform the work on the house, believing that permits would not be necessary for the job. On or about October 11, 1995, officials from the City of Belleair Beach shut down Respondent’s job on the Kedans’ property for lack of a construction permit. Respondent made inquiries with the City as to how to obtain the needed permit. City officials told Respondent that a permit could be granted to either a licensed contractor, or to the owner of the property if such property is not for sale or lease. Respondent checked the City’s records and discovered that, despite the fact that he had signed a quitclaim deed on August 17, he was still shown as the owner of the property. Respondent then proceeded to sign a permit application as the homeowner, and obtained a construction permit on October 11, 1995. Respondent testified that because the City’s records showed him as the record owner of the property, he committed no fraud in obtaining a construction permit as the homeowner. This testimony cannot be credited. Whatever the City’s records showed on October 11, 1995, Respondent well knew he was not the true owner of this property. Respondent cannot be credited both with having taken good faith steps to correct the mistaken titling of the property and with later obtaining in good faith a construction permit as the record owner of the property. Respondent testified that in obtaining the construction permit under false pretenses, his main concern was to keep the job going and to finish it in a timely fashion. He testified that there was no financial advantage to him in having the property in his name: he was making no profit on the job, and actually lost money because he had to pay for another title policy in the name of the Kedans. While there may have been no immediate financial advantage to Respondent, he was clearly motivated by the prospect of future profits in projects with Dr. Kedan. The City’s closing down this project jeopardized Respondent’s anticipated continuing relationship with Dr. Kedan, and Respondent took the improper step of obtaining a construction permit as the property owner to maintain that relationship. The Kedans ultimately dismissed Respondent from the job. A claim of lien was filed against the property by the painter hired by Respondent, and the cabinet maker sent the Kedans a lawyer’s letter threatening to file a claim of lien. Mrs. Kedan testified that she paid off both the painter and the cabinetmaker in full. Ms. Eastwood estimated that the Kedans ultimately had to pay an additional $20,000 to $50,000 to complete the repairs to the house, some of which included correctional actions for the improper repairs performed by Respondent’s workers. ALLEGED PRIOR DISCIPLINE Respondent has been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In that prior proceeding, the Division of Real Estate's Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(k), Florida Statutes. On September 25, 1995, Respondent and the Division of Real Estate entered into a Stipulation disposing of the Administrative Complaint. Under the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $1,000, and be subject to one year of probation, during which he would complete 30 hours of post-license education for brokers. The Stipulation expressly stated that Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order approving the Stipulation on November 14, 1995. Respondent's broker license was suspended by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 24, 1996. The cause for this suspension was Respondent's failure timely to pay the $1,000 fine imposed by the Stipulation. Respondent paid the fine on February 19, 1996, and late renewed his license on April 24, 1997. In the instant proceeding, Respondent testified that by entering into the Stipulation, he had no intention of pleading guilty to any of the allegations, and that he would never have entered into the Stipulation had he known it would be construed in any way as a guilty plea.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts One and Three of the administrative complaint, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of the administrative complaint, and suspending Respondent’s real estate license for a period of three years and fining Respondent a sum of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 John Bozmoski, Jr., Esquire 600 Bypass Drive, Suite 215 Clearwater, Florida 34624-5075 Jared White White Realty 231 Skiff Point, Suite Seven Clearwater, Florida 34630 Henry M. Solares Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact Respondent Anglickis is a Florida real estate broker holding license number 0001869. Respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0169476. The address of both respondents is 102 East Leland Heights Boulevard, Lehigh Acres, Florida. (P-26.) Respondent Anglickis is president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., and Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. All three companies are located at the same address. (Testimony of Campbell; P-5, P-26.) On March 12, 1979, Louis G. Hofstetter and his wife, Dale I. Hofstetter, both residents of North Carolina, entered into a real estate contract with American Heritage Builders, Inc. Respondent Anglickis signed on behalf of American Hertiage Inc. Under the terms of the contract, the Hofstetters were to Purchase a lot and home to be constructed thereon by American Heritage Builders, Inc. The purchase price included the transfer of a lot owned by the Hofstetters and a cash down payment. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-1, P-3, P-26.) The contract estimated closing costs to be approximately $2,000". It also contained conflicting conditions relative to the time within which any mortgage financing must be obtained. . . . In the event PURCHASER'S application for mortgage financing is not approved within sixty (60) days from date hereof, all monies receipted for, less cost of credit report, will be returned to the PURCHASER and this contract will be null and void. * * * FOR MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS: This contract of Purchase and Sale shall be void unless Purchaser's application for Mortgage has been approved by a bank or financial institution and Purchaser has executed the Mortgage Acceptance Form, within four (3) [sic] months from date of this Contract of Purchase. 2/ (P-1, R-1.) On March 12, 1979, the Hofstetters signed a mortgage loan application and submitted it to Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. (P-26.) On May 5, 1979, 45 days after accepting the application, Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., submitted the Hofstetters' mortgage loan application to First Federal of DeSoto. (Testimony of Archer.) On June 15, 1979 (95 days after receiving the loan application), Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters indicating that the local lender needed additional information on their stock holdings, and enclosing a document titled "Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges". This document estimated that closing costs would be $2,754--$754 more than the estimate contained in the real estate contract. (P-5.) On June 22, 1979, the Hofstetters protested the increased closing cost, requested clarification, and provided the requested information on their stock holdings. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-26.) On July 7, 1979, the Hofstetters notified Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., that the increased closing cost deviated from the contract, that they therefore considered the contract cancelled and wanted the deposit refunded. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-8.) On June 29, 1979, Robert Campbell, vice-president of Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters and explained the meaning of each component of the closing cost. (P-7.) On July 17, 1979, respondent, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote a letter to the Hofstetters expressing his position: * * * Let me try and put the contract in the proper perspective for you. It's our contention that you have reluctantly provided to us the information that would enable us to make a proper and expedient application to the lending institution and that much of this information has been confused, causing further delays. In accordance with the contract, you were to make this application as quickly and as expediently as Possible so that the contract would not expire. However, this is not the case. Thus, my immediate Position is that the contract should be expired and all of the deposits, including the cash and the lot which we gave you $6,995.00 trade for, would be forfeited as agreed upon liquidated damages. He ended by outlining other alternatives and repeating his asserted right to cancel the transaction and retain the Hofstetters' deposit as liquidated damages * * * First, the lending institution must make a quick determination based on the facts that they have that you are either eligible or not eligible for a mortgage loan as outlined in our contract. If they still do not have enough information, we have no other choice then but to ask you to pay the increase which we have experienced at this time (price list enclosed), and in paying that increase we would be willing to take another 90 days to try and secure a loan for you. If your mortgage loan is denied, your deposit less the costs of processing your mortgage application will be returned to you. Of course, the third choice is the choice I hope we do not have to take, and that is cancelling this transaction and retaining your monies as agreed upon liquidated damages. (P-9.) Mr. Hofstetter responded on July 22, 1979. He denied that he was responsible for any delay or confusion in the Processing of their loan application; asserted that 93 days had elapsed from the submission of their loan application and Mr. Campbell's letter of June 15, 1979, asking for additional financial information; and informed respondent Anglickis that the contract had already expired by virtue of the clause allowing 60 days to obtain mortgage financing. He then, again, asked that his deposit be returned. (P-10.) On July 30, 1979, respondent Anglickis, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote to the Hofstetters indicating that the loan had been approved 3/ and he was prepared to build their home at the contract price. He then addressed Mr. Hofstetter's July 22, 1979, denial of any responsibility for delay in obtaining the mortgage loan: I have reviewed your letter of July 22, 1979 and I understand we certainly have a difference of opinion as to whose fault the delay has been caused by. However, I don't think it's time to look at whose fault the delay might be, since it all has worked out to your satisfaction. The mortgage has been approved and we are ready to build. I expect you will now sign the mortgage papers when receipted for so that we may begin construction immediately. (P-11.) On August 6, 1979, the Hofstetters restated to respondent Anglickis that they were not prepared to go ahead with construction, that the contract became null and void by operation of the 60-day mortgage financing clause, and that the deposit should be immediately returned. (P-12.) On August 31, 1979, respondent Anglickis notified the Hofstetters that, pursuant to the contract conditions, he was retaining their full deposit, including cash and the real estate lot for which they received a $6,995 credit toward the purchase price. The full down payment totaled $10,350. (P-1, P-13.) On September 8, 1979, the Hofstetters replied: We cannot understand why you continue to ignore the provisions of the second sentence of Paragraph Two on the reverse side of Contract No. 1997, dated 12 March 1979. You say you intend to invoke the Provisions of the third sentence of this para- graph, but this sentence is Predicated on the assumption that the mortgage would be approved within sixty (60) days. The mortgage was not approved until late July (your letter of 17 July 1979 indicated it was not yet approved, and your letter of 30 July 1979 stated that it had now been approved), more than 120 days past the date of the original contract. Our Position is as Previously stated on several occasions: on 12 May 1979 the contract became null and void, and on that date our deposit should have been refunded. Any action other than this is illegal, according to the terms of the contract. We are due return of our down payment, plus interest, from 12 May 1979. (P-24.) On October 3, 1979, First Federal of DeSoto, which had continued to process the Hofstetter loan application, issued a commitment approving the requested loan. On October 10, 1979, the Hofstetters rejected the mortgage loan. (P-26.) Subsequently, the Hofstetters wrote letters to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the Lehigh Chamber of Commerce complaining of respondent Anglickis' retention of their deposit; they, then, retained an attorney and filed a civil action against respondents in the circuit court of Lee County. That action was settled out-of-court. There is no evidence whatsoever to support respondent Anglickis' assertion to the Hofstetters that they were dilatory or responsible for confusion or delay in obtaining the necessary mortgage financing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., be dismissed; That respondent Richard A. Anglickis be administratively fined $1,000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oaklnd Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1982.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the real estate license of Keith Allen. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Allan M. Parvey, Esquire Goldberg, Rubinstein & Buckley, P.A. Post Office Box 2366 Fort Myers, Florida 33902
The Issue Whether the license of Respondent as a Mortgage Solicitor should be suspended for violation of Sections 494.05 (1) (a) & (b), Florida Statutes, Rule 3-3.07(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 494.05(1)(g), Florida Statutes. At the commencement of the hearing, Respondent's counsel moved to dismiss the proceedings by reason of Petitioner's failure to provide witness statements of Charles R. Burke & Kathryn C. Burke, pursuant to a letter from Respondent's counsel to the Deputy Director, Division of Finance, dated August 26, 1975, requesting copies of any witness statements obtained in the course of Petitioner'S investigation. Respondent not having previously sought to compel discovery in accordance with Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion was denied. At this point, Respondent's counsel announced that he had been instructed by his client, who was not present at the hearing, to leave the hearing room and take no further part in the proceedings if the motion was denied. This being the case, Respondent's counsel departed and the hearing was then conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was licensed as a Mortgage Solicitor with the firm of Hartwell and Associates, Inc., from May 27, 1974 to July 24, 1974, when his license was returned to Petitioner for cancellation by that firm. On September 13, 1974, Respondent was issued a Mortgage Solicitor's License with ABC Investment Corporation. Records of the Office of the Comptroller, State of Florida, Division of Finance, Department of Banking and Finance, failed to reveal any other license as a mortgage broker or mortgage solicitor having been issued to Respondent (Testimony of Ehrlich, Petitioner's Exhibit 1). In the spring of 1974, Mr. and Mrs. Charles R. Burke, Sr. of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, met the Respondent who proposed to double the income that the Burkes were then receiving from interest on securities investments. This was to be done through the purchase of promissory notes secured by first mortgages on property located in Volusia County, ostensibly owned by LTP Properties, Inc., a land developer. Respondent showed them photographic slides of a club house at the development site and stated that there would be a golf course there and painted a bright picture of the receipt of 12 percent interest on the notes if the Burkes would liquidate the stocks that they owned and invest through him. He stated that the amounts that they would invest would represent only 40 per cent of the value of the real estate that secured their investment, and that it was a "sure thing.' Acting upon Respondent's advice, Mr. and Mrs. Burke cashed in some $180,000.00 in stocks and turned it over to the Respondent in June, 1974. In return, they received $180,000.00 in promissory notes in face amounts of $5,000.00 and$8,000.00 issued by LTP Properties, Inc. The promissory notes indicated on their face that the sale was approved by SEI, Inc., sales agent for LTP Properties, Inc., and they were signed by the president of SEI, Inc. The interest payments were to commence July 1st. Such payments were received during the months of July through December, 1974. In the fall of 1974, the Burkes invested another $100,000.00 with the Respondent for similar instruments, and again in January, 1975, they purchased another $20,000.00 in promissory notes and mortgages in face amounts of $5,000.00 each which also were issued by LTP Properties, Inc., but then owned by Respondent. At this time, the January 1st interest payment on the prior investments had not been made and, prior to making the final investment, the Burkes inquired of Respondent as to the reason for nonpayment of interest. He stated to them that LTP Properties was experiencing financial difficulties at the time but that it was endeavoring to get money from a bank overseas and from the Mellon Bank in Pennsylvania. No further interest payments have been made on any of the notes since December, 1974, and the Burkes discovered later that they did not, in fact, hold first mortgages on the real estate described in their mortgage deeds and consequently could not foreclose thereon (Testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Burke, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3). Prior to advising investors to purchase notes of LTP Properties, Inc., Respondent made several trips to the site of the property, checked with the local bank of the developer, was shown a financial statement which indicated that the developer was solvent, and compared values with surrounding real estate developments. He told the Burkes that LTP was obtaining foreign financing based on information he had received from Mr. David Edstrom of SEI, Inc., who in turn had acquired the information from Mr. Frank Carcaise of LTP Properties, Inc. This statement was made to the Burkes sometime between February and June of 1975 according to the Respondent. As far as Respondent knew, LTP Properties, Inc., stopped making interest payments on their notes about February, 1975 (Deposition of Respondent).
