The Issue These consolidated bid protests, pertaining to Invitation to Bid #595-581 issued by Respondent, present the following issues: as to Case No. 91-5344B1D whether the bid protest filed by National Cleaning Services of Florida, Inc. should be upheld and as to Case No. 91-5345B1D whether the bid protests filed by Royal Services, Inc. should be upheld. The following sub-issues are presented: Whether Respondent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in rejecting the bid of Royal Services, Inc., the apparent low bidder. Whether Respondent should award the bid to either National or Royal. Whether Respondent should convene an evaluation committee to evaluate the bids. Whether Respondent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in rejecting all bids.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) issued Invitation to Bid Number 595-581 (ITB) in the Spring of 1991. 1/ The ITB solicited bids for the provision of specifically identified housekeeping services at South Florida State Hospital (SFSH), a DHRS facility in District X of DHRS. Robert L. Slater is a contract manager employed by DHRS at SFSH. Mr. Slater had, since 1986, the responsibility of preparing the bid solicitation for SFSH housekeeping services. Mr. Slater prepared the ITB that is the subject of this proceeding. The procedure established by District X for the review of ITB solicitations is as follows: v'... all RFP/ITB documents must be reviewed and approved by Grants Management, Budget, District Legal Counsel and the District Administrator prior to their release and advertisement. District X procedure requires that a form accompany the ITB as it is circulated for review. The form provides identifying information about the ITB and a place for the reviewer to indicated his or her approval or disapproval, his or her signature, the date, and any comments. Mr. Slater did not submit the ITB for the appropriate review. Prior to publishing the ITB, Mr. Slater left the ITB in the in-house mail box of David A. Sofferin, the Administrator of SFSH, without the accompanying form. After the ITB was returned to him without any indication as to whether Mr. Sofferin had reviewed it, Mr. Slater published the ITB without it being reviewed as required by District X procedure. There was no evidence as to whether Mr. Sofferin reviewed the ITB before its release. Mr. Slater initially refused to deliver to Royal a copy of the ITB package. He took this action because he did not believe that SFSH wanted Royal as a provider. This was the first and only time Mr. Slater had refused to deliver a bid package to an interested bidder. It was only after Royal complained to DHRS District X legal counsel that Mr. Slater provided a copy of the ITB package to Royal. Royal did not attend the pre-bid meeting because the notification was contained in the bid package, which was received by Royal after the meeting. There was no showing that Royal's inability to attend this meeting prejudiced it in submitting its bid. The ITB contained the following in paragraph 7 of the "General Conditions" portion: AWARDS: As the best interest of the state may require, the right is reserved to ... reject any and all bids ... The "Bidder Qualifications" section of the ITB provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Bidder qualifications must be satisfactory to South Florida State Hospital. The hospital reserves the right to waive informalities in any Bid and to reject any and all Bids or to accept any Bid, any combinations of alternatives that in our judgment will be in the best interest of the State of Florida. Each bidder shall furnish as a part of his/her Bid a written statement in evidence of their ability to accomplish the specified work. This statement must include information as to the immediate availability or ownership of the necessary; (sic) equipment to perform this work, and the financial worth or reputability (sic) of the bidder and experience which the bidder has had in successfully completing projects of a similar size, scope and responsibility. Experience must be evidenced by three (3) references. The following appears in the ITB in a section entitled "Bidder Qualifications Evaluation Criteria": All bidders' qualifications will be evaluated by a selection team using the following criteria: (yes or no response) "Fatal" criteria/any (sic) Bid receiving a "no" response on any items in this category will not be considered any further. /2 Bidders Organizational Capability Does the synopsis of the bidder's corporate qualifications indicate the ability to manage and completely deliver the services required? Do the evaluations and/or recommendations of the bidder indicate an acceptable level of past performance? Budget or Rate Analysis Does the proposed rate meet the "reasonable and necessary" test? Does either a cost or price analysis indicate that the cost or rate is appropriate and reasonable? Under the "Bidders' Qualification Checklist" portion of the ITB, a checklist type form is provided. This checklist provides a line for the name of the bidder, the name of the reviewer, and the date. Part I of the checklist provides "Fatal" Criterion questions with six questions to be answered in a yes or no fashion. There is no contention that either Royal or National failed to meet a "fatal" item. Part II of the checklist is as follows: Is the ability to manage and completely deliver the services apparent? Is satisfactory past performance apparent? (0-10) x WV of 5 Part III of the checklist is as follows: Does the proposed rate meet the reasonable and necessary test? Is the rate appropriate? (0-10) x WV of 5 There is no indication in the ITB as to how the selection team is to be appointed 3/ or as to how the selection team is to apply the criteria contained in the ITB. The items under Parts II and III of the checklist are to be considered using a weighted values for the scores received in response to the questions. There is no indication as to how these weighted responses are to be factored in to the selection process or whether these items are to be considered additional "fatal" items if the bidder receives poor scores in these categories. If it is assumed that these questions should be considered additional "fatal" items, there is no indication as to what score, if any, is necessary for a bidder to "pass" these categories. DHRS never convened a selection team to review the bids. On May 24, 1991, the bids were opened and tabulated by a bid clerk. This bid clerk did not review the bids to determine whether the criteria in the ITB had been met. The Royal bid was tabulated as being $434,704.32 for residential buildings and $101,088.48 for administrative buildings (for a total of $535,792.80.) The National bid was tabulated as being a total of $626,397.36. The decision to reject the Royal bid was made by J. E. Harmon, the Assistant Hospital Administrator, based on a conversation he had with Mr. Slater following the bid opening. Mr. Slater told Mr. Harmon that he believed that Royal had "low balled" its bid and that Royal's performance had been unsatisfactory when it had had the contract. Royal filed a lawsuit against DHRS for breach of contract that involved Mr. Slater and the manner in which Royal was paid. Royal contends that Mr. Slater's bias against it stems not from poor service, but because of this lawsuit. This contention is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and is rejected. On May 31, 1991, a letter signed by Mr. Harmon, but drafted by Mr. Slater, refunded Royal's check that had been posted in lieu of a bid bond and notified Royal as follows: Please be advised that the Bid submitted by your company has been rejected in the best interest of the State of Florida. This action was determined to be necessary because of your company's poor performance at this facility from August 30, 1989 through June 30, 1990. Also on May 31, 1991, Mr. Slater prepared and sent a letter (which he signed) to each bidder, which provides as follows: The selection process has been completed for the above referenced Invitation to Bid. The selection committee's recommendation to the District Administrator is to award the contract to National Cleaning of Florida, Inc. The Department appreciates your time and interest in the Invitation to Bid. We encourage your continued interest in HRS contractual services. You have the right to protest this decision as described here: Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120 and shall not be considered. To comply with this statute, a written notice of intent to protest must be filed with the contact person listed in the Invitation To Bid within 72 hours after receipt of this notice. Within 10 days after the notice of intent is filed, a formal written notice of protest must be filed with the contact person listed in the Invitation to Bid. The formal written protest must be accompanied by a bond payable to the department in the amount of $5,000 or 1% of the department's estimate of the total volume of the proposed contract, whichever is less. Royal thereafter timely protested DHRS' action in rejecting its bid and in announcing that the recommendation would be made to the District Administrator to award the bid to National. No action was taken by DHRS on these protests until DHRS referred Royal's protests stemming from Mr. Harmon's letter of May 31, 1991, and Royal's protest stemming from Ms. Borland's letter of July 12, 1991, 4/ to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal hearing by its "Notice of Referral and Notice to Bidders" dated August 22, 1991, and filed with DOAH on August 23, 1991. 5/ After Royal filed its protests following the two letters dated May 31, 1991, DHRS reviewed the bids and the process that had been followed in issuing those bids. DHRS determined that it preferred to issue a RFP (request for proposals) for these contractual services rather than soliciting these services by an ITB. This decision was based, in large part, on the desire to give greater weight to the ability of the bidders to satisfactorily perform the required services and on the fact that Royal had filed a protest. On July 12, 1991, DHRS notified bidders by letter signed by Maureen D. Borland, Acting District Administrator, that all bids were rejected, that the services will be the subject of an RFP, and that the contact person was Mr. Slater. The letter notified the bidders that they had the right to protest the decision and advised as to the procedure to be followed and the time constraints to be observed in filing a protest. Following the letter of July 12, 1991, both National and Royal perfected protests of the decision to reject all bids. National contends that the Royal bid was properly rejected. National further contends that any defect in the evaluation process can be cured by convening the evaluation committee to review the remaining bids. Royal contends that the ITB completely describes the services desired by SFSH, that an RFP is not appropriate, and that an RFP would only serve as a means for DHRS to discriminate against Royal. Royal further contends that price is the primary factor to be considered, that it was the low bidder, and that it should be awarded the bid. Royal contends in the alternative that DHRS erred in rejecting all bids and that the evaluation committee should be convened to evaluate its bid along with the other bids. Royal had a contract to provide housekeeping services at SFSH from August 30, 1989 through June 30, 1990. This contact was let pursuant to a RFP. Mr. Slater was the contract manager for the housekeeping services when this contract was procured. The contract could not be renewed beyond June 30, 1990, because the RFP failed to include prices for the second and third years of the contract. The following year, the contract was solicited on an ITB basis, and was awarded to Allstate Specialty Services as the lowest and best bidder. Mr. Slater was the contract manager for the procurement of these services. DHRS was not satisfied with the services provided during the time Royal had the contract for housekeeping services. Various deficiencies were discussed with the project manager during weekly meetings. There were no written statements of deficiencies given to Royal by DHRS while Royal had the housekeeping contract, and no deductions were made from any payment to Royal. On May 7, 8, and 9, 1990, an inspection of SFSH was made by DHRS Office of Licensure and Certification. This report which followed the inspection noted several deficiencies in the housekeeping services. The record was not clear, however, whether the deficiencies were the result of Royal's poor performance or whether the deficiencies were the result of DHRS purchasing an insufficient level of services. The record is clear that Mr. Slater had not been pleased with the services performed by Royal when it had the contract. Mr. Slater was pleased with Mr. Martin, Royal's project manager, but he did not feel that Royal had sufficient supervision of its employees and that Royal should have devoted more workers to the project. As compared to the contract entered into for the period August 30, 1990, through June 30, 1990, the subject ITB was described by Mr. Slater as being more stringent, tighter, and improved. The subject ITB was intended to cure the problem of lack of supervision by inserting specific requirements as to the level of supervision the provider would have for its employees. There was insufficient evidence to sustain DHRS contention that Royal was an unqualified bidder. There was insufficient evidence to sustain DHRS contention that Royal's bid was a "low ball" bid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which rejects all bids submitted in response to the subject Invitation to Bid. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of October, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1991.
The Issue Whether the bids of Unisys and NCR were responsive to the Invitation to
Findings Of Fact Overview Invitation to Bid VH-2 (ITB) sought bids for full service hardware maintenance for approximately 3,500 computer terminals, printers, microcomputers and associated components and peripheral devices, located throughout the state. Upon acceptance of the lowest responsive bid, the State would enter into a six- month contract, renewable for two twelve-month periods. HRS officials considered whether to acquire the services through a Request for Proposal process or through an Invitation to Bid. The decision was made to pursue an ITB. The ITB was prepared by Harriet Parker, who, at the time, was the administrator of the HRS Data Center in Jacksonville, Florida. Ms. Parker's employment with HRS ended after the bidder's conference and after she had answered bidder's questions which came in after the bidder's conference. Ms. Parker was not employed by HRS when the bids received in response to the ITB were received. HRS issued the ITB on January 22, 1988. After a bidder's conference was held, HRS, on March 1 and 9, 1988, issued addenda to the ITB, which contained changes to the ITB. Additionally, the addendum issued on March 1, 1988 contained written responses to questions submitted by potential bidders. The ITB and addenda were reviewed by the Information Technology Resource Procurement Advisory Council. Five companies submitted bids: RAM Systems, Inc., Data Access Systems, Inc., Instrument Control Services, Inc., NCR, and Unisys. The bid of RAM Systems, Inc. was rejected as untimely. The remaining four bids were timely filed. Ms. Parker appointed three HRS employees to serve on the bid evaluation committee which reviewed the bids received in response to the ITB. The three employees were: Vincent C. Messina, a Data Communications Specialist III, James R. Hall, a Data Processing Manager II, and Hilda Fowler Moore, an administrative assistant. All three committee members were employees at the HRS Data Center in Jacksonville, Florida. At its first meeting, the committee reviewed the four bids to determine if they were in the format requested in the ITB. This review was solely as to form, instead of content. After the meeting, each committee member prepared cost extension sheets for each bid, in accordance with the method set forth in the ITB, to determine which bidder was the lowest. At the next meeting, the committee members compared the cost extension sheets each had prepared. While there were differences between them, each member had the bids ranked in the same order. The committee determined that Data Access Systems, Inc. was the lowest bidder, NCR the next lowest, then Unisys and, finally, Instrument Control Services, Inc. After further review, the bid of Data Access Systems, Inc. was rejected as nonresponsive. The committee then decided to concentrate their review on the bids of NCR, now the lowest bidder, and Unisys, now the second lowest bidder. The bid of Instrument Control Services, Inc. was laid aside, since it was the high bidder. After reviewing the content of the NCR and Unisys bids, the committee determined that both bids were responsive. Since NCR was the lowest bidder, the committee decided NCR should be awarded the bid. The Notice of Intent to award the bid was posted on April 5, 1988. Unisys timely filed its notice of intent to protest, and its formal written protest and request for a hearing. Review Standards Used by Committee The committee was not given any direction on how to evaluate the bids, and no instructions on how to determine a bid was responsive. The committee members never discussed the meaning of the terms "minor irregularity or "material deviation" and were never told the meaning of these terms. Finally, the committee members neither sought nor received legal advice on how to evaluate certain provisions contained in the bids. Mr. Messina interpreted his role on the committee to be to compare the items in each bid with the ITB. Reviewed his role as determining whether the wording of the bid would be sufficient to supply the State with a viable service agreement. His determination of whether a bid was responsive was not based on a word for word comparison of the bid with the ITB, but on an overall impression of what each bid contained. Mr. Hall reviewed the bids to make sure that each bidder was meeting what the ITB required. His main focus in reviewing each bid was whether the wording of the bid gave that bidder an advantage over another bidder. At the time of reviewing the bids, Ms. Fowler Moore's understanding of what constituted a "material deviation" was that it would be a major change which would affect an issue or an item in some way. She understood a "minor irregularity" to be a lesser difference. The committee as a group believed that there would be further review of their decision and that some differences between the bids and the ITB would be worked out later by others. The committee members did not think that their decision would be the final decision. The ITB, General Provisions The ITB, including attachments and the two addenda consisted of over 150 pages. The ITB contained a number of mandatory requirements. The ITB explained these as follows: MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS Introduction The State has established certain requirements with respect to bids to be submitted by bidders. The use of "shall", "must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in this Invitation To Bid indicates a requirement or condition from which a material deviation may not be waived by the State. A deviation is material if, in the State's sole discretion, the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this (sic) Invitation To Bid requirements, provides an advantage to one bidder over other bidders, has a potential significant effect on the quantity or quality of items bid, or on the cost to the State. Material deviations cannot be waived. The words "should" or "may" in this Invitation To Bid indicate desirable attributes or conditions, but are permissive in nature. Deviation from, or omission of, such a desirable feature, will not in itself cause rejection of a bid. (Emphasis in original) On page 5, the ITB provided that "any Bid which fails to meet the mandatory requirements stated in this Invitation to Bid shall be rejected." On page 1, the ITB provided that "Bids containing terms and conditions conflicting with those contained in the invitation to bid shall be rejected. On page 6, the ITB, in describing the format to be used, provided that "there is no intent to limit the content of the Bid. Additional information deemed appropriate by the bidder should be included." The addendum issued on March 1, 1988, contained the following: Q. Can a bid contain options that HRS will consider, providing all mandatories are met? If all mandatories are met, bidder may submit options for HRS consideration. These need to be clearly identified in a separate section of the bid. The bid price should not be based on HRS acceptance of options. The ITB contained the standard language that "Any questions concerning conditions and specifications shall be directed in writing . . . for receipt no later than ten (10) days prior to the bid opening," and gave bidders the opportunity to dispute the reasonableness, necessity and competitiveness of the terms and conditions of the ITB. On page 3, the ITB provided: Contractual Mandatories A bidder's response to this Invitation To Bid shall be considered as the bidder's formal offer. The signing of the contract by the Department shall constitute the Department's written acceptance of the successful Bid and a copy of the signed contract shall be forwarded to the successful bidder. The contract for services required by this Invitation To Bid is contained herein. The contract included in the -ITB incorporated and made part of the contract both the ITB and the successful bidder's bid. Comparison of the NCR Bid with the ITB The NCR bid contained numerous changes to the provisions of the ITB. These changes are set forth below. Supplemental Bid Sheets Pages 146 and 147 of the ITB consisted of a form which each bidder was to complete and return as part of its bid. The form stated that "each designated paragraph in this Invitation to Bid must be addressed. The bidder must initial the designated item indicating concurrence." The form set forth 47 items. The layout of the form, showing the first two items for illustration purposes, was as follows: TITLE RESPONSE INITIALS Introduction Understood and Agreed Mandatory Requirements Understood and Agreed The NCR bid contained initials in the appropriate place for all items. On thirteen of the items, NCR's bid contained the words "as per Bidder's Proposal" typed under the words "Understood and Agreed" as shown in the following example: TITLE RESPONSE INITIALS Introduction Understood and Agreed as per Bidder's Proposal Mandatory Requirements Understood and Agreed as per Bidder's Proposal The words inserted by NCR related to the items in the line directly above the inserted words. The committee members interpreted the insertion of the words "as per Bidder's Proposal" in different ways. Mr. Messina interpreted it to mean that NCR was agreeing to the terms of the ITB and was offering the State something better and different which the State could accept or reject. He thought the differences would be worked out later; that the differences were more a "legal matter" than something the committee could solve. Mr. Hall interpreted it to mean that NCR agreed to the provisions of the ITB as some of the provisions had been changed by NCR. Ms. Fowler Moore interpreted it to mean that the items for which "as per Bidder's Proposal" was added were qualified and the ones where nothing was added were not qualified. Limitation of Remedies The addendum issued on March 1, 1988 contained two new pages which became part of the contract section of the ITB. These new pages were numbered 23A and 23B. In its bid, NCR changed the wording of page 23A. The relevant portions of page 23A of the NCR response are set forth below: Limitation of Remedies Contractor's entire liability and the State's exclusive remedy shall be as follows: In all situations involving performance or non-performance of machines or programming maintained or serviced [furnished] under this Agreement, the State's remedy is (1) the adjustment or repair of the machine or replacement of its parts by Contractor, or, at Contractor's option, replacement of the machine [or correction of programming] errors, or (b) if, after repeated efforts, Contractor is unable to install the machine or a replacement machine, model upgrade or feature in good working order, or to restore it to good working order, or to make programming operate, [all as warranted,] the State shall be entitled to recover actual damages to the limits set forth in this Section. * * * Contractor's liability for damages to the State for any cause whatsoever, and regardless of the form of action, whether in contractor or in tort including negligence, shall be limited to the greater of $100,000 or the actual amount laid by the State to the Contractor for the services provided under this Agreement [appropriate price stated herein for the specific machines that caused the damages or] that are the subject matter of or are directly related to the cause of action.... Contractor shall hold and save the State harmless for any and all suits and judgements against the State for personal injury or damage to real or personal property up to the value of the Agreement at the time this Agreement is terminated caused by Contractor's tortious conduct in the performance of this Agreement.... (Underlined words were added by NCR, brackets indicate words NCR struck through). The committee members felt that these changes either were necessary, enhanced the language in the ITB, or would not have much of an effect on the contract. From a legal standpoint, however, the committee was not sure what the changes meant. The committee members felt that they were not qualified to determine whether the changes constituted a material deviation and believed that decision would be made by someone else after the committee was finished. The changes made by NCR to the first paragraph help to clarify the document to meet the provisions of the ITB. The ITB was not for the purchase of machines or programming, but for the servicing of hardware. The changes made to the second paragraph enhance HRS's position and help to clarify the language. HRS's position is enhanced because under the ITB language the limitation would have been the greater of $100,000 or $0 since the ITB did not contain prices for specific machines. Again, the stricken language would apply to a purchase agreement and not to a service contract. The change to the third paragraph has the effect of nullifying the hold harmless clause, since "the value of the Agreement at the time this Agreement is terminated" is zero. Bid Bond On page 3, the ITB required bidders to submit a bid bond or bid guarantee in the amount of $10,000. If the successful bidder failed to execute a contract within ten days after notification of award, the bid guarantee was to be forfeited to the State. The bid bond submitted by NCR contained the following language: NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of the obligation is such that, if the said principal shall be awarded the said contracts and shall within (*) days after receiving notice of the award enter into a contract. . . *to be negotiated between said principal and said obligee. Since NCR's bid bond left the period of time within which to enter into a contract to be negotiated, the bid bond was not in compliance with the ITB's requirements. Invoicing On page 21, the ITB set forth certain requirements for invoices. One of the requirements was that "the invoice will include a detail list of costs for parts replaced listed on each malfunction incident report." This information was important to Ms. Parker in order for HRS to know what it was paying for, even though the contract price included both parts and labor. NCR's bid had the quoted language stricken through. On page 12, the ITB required that "Invoices for payment must be submitted to the State monthly, with at least the same level of detail found in Attachment A." Page 13 of NCR's bid, under the caption "Invoices," stated that "NCR agrees to conform with the existing payment plans as established in previous agreements between NCR and the State of Florida Comptroller's Office." The committee members did not think that the requirement that the invoice contain the cost of replacement parts was important. They assumed that they would not receive this information from the winning bidder, since they were not receiving it from the existing contractor. The committee members did not know what the previous agreements were between NCR and the Comptroller's Office. The committee assumed that NCR's response would be sufficient to meet HRS's needs. Configurations The addendum issued on March 1, 1988, contained a new page 26 for the ITB, which contained the following language: Full service maintenance for microcomputers will include the following configuration: Up to 768KB RAM plus up to one memory expansion card, up to two 5 1/4 inch 360KB or up to two 1.2MB floppy disk drives, up to 20MB hard disk, enhanced graphics capability, monochrome or color monitor, and an ICC card if required for network communications. This full service maintenance configuration was developed to include features that are basic to microcomputers connected to the HRS Data Communications Network and are, therefore, the maintenance responsibility of the Data Center. Machine features that are not included in this configuration are not covered by the maintenance contract resulting from this ITB. Enhancements that may be on a microcomputer covered by the maintenance contract but would not themselves be covered include, but are not limited to: local area network (LAN) cards, 40MB hard disk, 3 1/2 inch floppy disk drive and Bernoulli Boxes. Maintenance of these enhanced features are the responsibility of the user. (emphasis added) NCR, in listing its price for servicing certain equipment, assumed configurations that are less than those stated in the ITB. For example, NCR did not include hard disks in its configuration for some equipment. Hard disk drives are some of the more expensive items to repair and replace in computers. The committee members did not compare the configurations in the NCR bid with those in the ITB. Therefore, they did not take into account the differences between the two in determining that the NCR bid was responsive. Termination of the Contract Page 11 of the ITB provided that: The State reserves the right to cancel maintenance coverage for any single piece of equipment or any number of pieces of equipment or the entire contract upon thirty (30) days written notice to the Contractor. NCR in its bid provided that: Withdraw/Termination Neither party shall be deemed to be in default of this agreement, or of any contract entered into pursuant to it unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the other party shall have first given written notice describing with reasonable detail the condition which it perceives to be a default as outlined in Attachment D and the Bidder's Proposal, and within sixty (60) days following receipt thereof, the party receiving such notice shall have failed or refused to correct such condition. Both parties shall make all reasonable efforts to correct any problems which may lead to termination of the agreement. The evaluation committee noticed this difference, and felt that this was an area to be looked at by other persons who would do a final review. Engineering Changes The ITB, on pages 12 and 13 stated that: Cost of maintenance shall include installation of all announced engineering changes applicable to any piece of equipment covered by this contract. All engineering changes which the manufacturer considers mandatory or engineering changes which the manufacturer or the Contractor considers necessary for safety reasons must be installed as soon as possible. Contractor shall notify the State in writing of all mandatory and safety related engineering changes. Engineering changes which the manufacturer recommends but which are neither mandatory nor for safety reasons must be installed within a reasonable period of time after the Contractor has notified the State of such changes and the State has authorized the installation of such changes . . . It is the Contractor's responsibility to determine what engineering changes are available, whether they are mandatory changes, safety changes, or other changes. Furthermore, it is the Contractor's responsibility to initiate the installation of all such changes. (emphasis added) Page 9 of NCR's bid provided that: Engineering Changes should a reliability modification released from an OEM be deemed necessary by NCR, the modification will be performed during the prime shift of maintenance at no additional charge to the State of Florida. The original equipment manufacturers with whom NCR has agreements are responsible for providing notification to NCR on any engineering changes. NCR will make HRS aware of engineering changes when the necessary. information becomes available to NCR. (emphasis added) The committee assumed that if a manufacturer considered an engineering change to be mandatory, NCR would deem it to be necessary and would make this change. Therefore, the committee determined that the NCR language was responsive and would result in the State receiving the service it expected. Malfunction Incident Reports Page 10 of the ITB required that the winning bidder furnish HRS with a written--malfunction incident report upon completion of each maintenance call. The ITB went on to describe ten items which had to be included in the reports. Page 12 of the NCR bid provided the following: Reports NCR has the ability to provide monthly service reports to HRS which summarize the maintenance activity of the account. Such records may include a listing of all equipment covered in the maintenance agreement accompanied by the dates of service calls, number of service calls received per equipment type, description of problem and solution, and the time spent for repair. NCR maintains a comprehensive equipment history file to meet your reporting needs. Reporting procedures will be jointly defined by NCR and HRS. (emphasis added) One member of the evaluation committee did not consider the reports to be an important item. Another member of the committee assumed that HRS would get the information it needed from the reporting procedures to be jointly defined by NCR and HRS once the contract was awarded. Additional Equipment Page 11 of the ITB required that the contractor would be responsible for maintaining all the equipment owned by the State which is of the type set forth in the ITB, regardless of whether the specific piece of equipment is listed in the ITB or subsequently purchased. Equipment of a type not described in the ITB is not part of the agreement. NCR's bid is consistent with this requirement. Also, NCR's bid gives HRS the option of adding equipment of a type not described in the ITB, after NCR evaluates the equipment and agrees to accept it. Principal Period of Maintenance Page 9 of the ITB provided that the "Principal period of maintenance shall be at least from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., local time at each site, Monday to Friday, exclusive of holidays observed by the Department." Also, page 17 of the ITB provided that, "Principal Period of Maintenance (PPM)" shall be defined as at least nine consecutive hours per day (usually between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.; local time at the site) as selected by the State, Monday through Friday, excluding holidays observed at the site." Finally, page 19 of the ITB contained language similar to the language in page 9 of the ITB. In the industry, "principal period of maintenance is that period of time during which a customer is buying services, including parts and labor, at a flat rate under a contract with the service provider. Page 8 of NCR's bid provided that "NCR's Principal Period of Maintenance (PPM) is Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., including a one hour meal period." NCR's bid did not change the language contained in page 19 of the ITB, noted above, which became part of its bid. Finally, in its Attachment to the contract provided in the ITB, NCR's bid stated that "the 'Principal Period of Maintenance' shall be defined as Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., exclusive of a one hour meal period, excluding holidays." The evaluation committee discussed the differences in the language between the NCR bid and the ITB dealing with principal period of maintenance and decided that the NCR bid was responsive. Response Time, Loaner Equipment and Penalties Page 9 of the ITB required the following: 5. Contractor must provide on site response within four (4) hours in metro areas and six (6) hours in all other areas at a 95 percent response level. Metro and non-metro locations are listed in Attachment B. If the response level falls below ninety-five percent (95 percent) overall for the State on a monthly basis, the Contractor will forfeit ten percent (10 percent) of the monthly maintenance cost per unit for each incident in the month of the occurrence. 7. The Contractor will have the equipment repaired and accepted by HRS Data Center staff or the Contractor will install an equivalent substitute device within six (6) hours after the maintenance begins. Maintenance begins when the Contractor arrives at the site and takes control of the equipment. If the equipment is not repaired or the Contractor does not install equivalent working equipment, the Contractor shall forfeit ten percent (10 percent) of the monthly maintenance cost per unit for each incident in the month of the occurrence. The NCR bid, on pages 8-9, provided the following: Response Time A firm commitment to response time and a stringent set of escalation procedures will be an integral part of NCR's service program for HRS. NCR has a commitment to arriving on-site within four (4) business hours of receipt of call during NCR's Principal Period of Maintenance, for equipment located within metropolitan areas. For non- metropolitan equipment sites, the average response commitment is six (6) hours. NCR understands the State of Florida's objectives to make system availability as high as possible, and we have an internal commitment to help the State meet the goal. Should NCR fail to meet its response and escalation standards as outlined herein, NCR will entertain future negotiations relative to credits and penalties. Because of NCR's response time, repair and escalation procedures, NCR generally does not provide loaner equipment. (emphasis added) The NCR bid then continues, on pages 10-12, under the heading "Escalation/Problem Resolution," to explain the procedures NCR personnel will follow when a machine cannot be restored to good operating condition within set periods of time. The evaluation committee interpreted NCR's bid to mean that NCR would respond within six (6) hours in the non-metro areas, even though the NCR bid stated that "the average response commitment is six (6) hours." The evaluation committee believed that the ten percent (10 percent) penalties set forth in the ITB were irrelevant and not necessary, since the penalties were too low. Therefore, the committee felt that NCR's proposal to negotiate a system of penalties and credits made sense. The committee also believed that, under NCR's escalation procedures, coupled with the statement on page 8 of the NCR bid that "Periodically, a whole unit swap philosophy may be utilized to maximize system uptime," the machines would be fixed within six (6) hours or an equivalent working device (loaner) would be installed. Probationary Period Evaluation Page 145 of the ITB set forth the evaluation criteria which HRS would use to evaluate the contractor's performance during the initial 6-month term of the contract. NCR's bid added language to five of the criteria, as follows: Is the response level of ninety-five (95 percent) maintained consistently each month in all major areas of the State? On the average. Are adequate spare parts available for equipment repair within six (6) hours? Spare carts are generally available within six (6) hours; maximum of twenty- four (24) hours. Is an equivalent substitute device installed if parts are not available or if repair is expected to require more than six (6) hours? Compliance in the following manner: NCR's repair and escalation procedures may result in utilizing a substitute device to maximize system uptime. Are the changes in priorities easily accomplished? As stated, not a quantifiable standard; would prefer substitute language. Are malfunction incident reports received on a timely basis? Compliance defined in Reporting section of Bidder's Proposal. (Underlined words were added by NCR) The committee noted that the NCR bid contained changes to the evaluation language. Implementation of Contract The NCR bid, in Appendix C, contained an implementation schedule calling for service to certain equipment to begin five weeks after the contract was awarded and to the remainder of the equipment nine weeks after the contract was awarded. The ITB, while not explicitly stating when the new contractor was to begin services, appears to contemplate that full service would begin immediately, since it provides for HRS to begin paying maintenance charges on the effective date of the contract. Under the terms of the ITB, the effective date of the contract would be no later than ten days after the award was posted. One member of the evaluation committee, Mr. Hall, believed the new contractor would begin service immediately, which to him meant within a month after the award was made. Execution of Contract The ITB contemplated that the successful bidder execute the contract provided in the ITB within ten days of notification of the award. The NCR bid provided that "Upon mutual agreement of the terms and conditions between our organizations, NCR agrees to execute a contract within ten (10) days." Also, the implementation schedule set forth in Appendix C of the NCR bid provided for the contract to be negotiated and executed between the second and fifth week after notification of the award. Assignment of Contract Page 22 of the ITB provided that "This Agreement is not assignable without the prior written consent of the Customer. Any attempt to assign any of the rights, duties or obligation of this Agreement without such consent is void. In its bid, NCR struck through the word "Customer" and inserted the word "parties." Site Rules and Regulations Page 23 of the ITB stated that: The Contractor shall use its best efforts to assure that its employees and agents, while on the State's premises, shall comply with the State's site rules and regulations. The NCR bid in its attachment to the contract, under the heading "The Rules and Regulations," provided that "Execution of a contract by NCR is contingent upon NCR's review of the State's site rule and regulations." REVIEW OF THE UNISYS BID As stated earlier, the Unisys bid was found to be responsive by the evaluation committee. Unisys agreed to all the performance mandatories of the ITB. The Unisys bid did not contain any deviations from the ITB and was consistent with all the terms and conditions of the ITB. Bid?
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that HRS issue a final order finding NCR's bid to be nonresponsive and awarding the contract under the Bid No. VH-2 to Unisys. DONE and ENTERED 26th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-22525Bid The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO " UNISYS' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact Number Ruling and RO Paragraph 1.-14. Accepted. 15.-18. Accepted as set forth in RO34. Accepted. Rejected as a conclusion. But see Conclusions of Law section of this Order. 21.-45. Accepted. 46. Rejected as irrelevant. 47.-52. Accepted. 53. Accepted. See Conclusions of Law section of this Order. 54.-58. Accepted. 59. Accepted except for last two phrases which are rejected. The evidence is inconclusive on whether NCR would have an advantage over other bidders and whether the price of the contract was affected by this provision. 60.-63. Accepted. 64.-65. Rejected. The evidence is inconclusive as to the effect the NOR bid's language would have. See Conclusions of Law section of this Order. 66.-69. Accepted. Rejected. Since, there is no way of knowing the result of the negotiations, one cannot determine if this would result in an unfair advantage or would have an economic impact. Rejected. Delay can occur in any contract. Under the ITB, undue delay would be penalized. 72.-75. Accepted. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The statement may be true, but that is not the situation here. 78.-79. Accepted. 80. First phrase, rejected. NCR did not agree to anything. Second phrase, accepted. 81.-83. Accepted. 84. Rejected as a conclusion and an assumption, since no one knows what the jointly defined procedures would be. 85.-86. Accepted. Accepted as what the committee felt. However, the provisions of the NCR bid dealing with additional equipment are consistent with the ITB. Rejected as contrary to facts found. 89.-90. Accepted. Accepted. See Conclusions of Law section of this Order. Accepted. Accepted. See Conclusions of Law section of this Order. 94.-97. Accepted. 98. First two sentences accepted. Third sentence rejected; the evidence does not show what is included in the payment plans with the Comptroller. 99-102. Accepted. Rejected. The evidence is inconclusive on whether this item affected the price of the bid. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. The NCR bid states that NCR would prefer substitute language. 108.-112. Accepted to the extent they restate the ITB and the NCR bid. However, the implicit conclusion that this is at variance with the ITB is rejected as not supported by competent evidence. 113.-119. Accepted. 120. The introductory paragraph is rejected as a conclusion of law. Subparagraphs A. through are accepted. HRS's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact Number Ruling and RO Paragraph 1.-7 Accepted Accepted. Accepted. True but unnecessary. Accepted generally. Accepted. Accepted generally. Accepted generally. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. First sentence accepted. Second sentence is true as to what the evaluation committee believed. However, the overall service to the State is affected by the NCR bid. True that this is what the evaluation committee determined, believed and concluded. However, the findings of fact made in this RO differ from what the evaluation committee believed. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. While the cost of the services may be the same, less services are provided for in the NCR bid than are called for in the ITB. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. HRS may wish to accept the NCR bid; if it does so, however, it will agree to a different agreement than called for in the ITB. There can be no meeting of the minds when items are left to be negotiated and where the evaluation committee members did cot understand all the provisions of the NCR bid. Rejected. See RO41. Rejected as irrelevant. See also Conclusions of Law. Rejected as irrelevant. Supported by competent evidence, but unnecessary to the decision reached. Also, the fact that this was the first ITB that Ms. Parker ever prepared does not mean that HRS can now disregard its mandatory provisions. Rejected as irrelevant. NCR's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact Number Ruling and RO Paragraph 1-6. Accepted Subparagraphs a) through s) are accurate representations of what the ITB contained. However, the first phrase to the effect that the ITB recognized and incorporated concepts of variability is rejected. The ITB was rigid and precise. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. First sentence, true but irrelevant. Second sentence accepted. RO2. Third sentence, true but irrelevant. Fourth sentence rejected; the ITB is neither ambivalent nor flexible. Fifth sentence rejected as irrelevant and not supported by competent evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Supported by competent evidence but unnecessary to the decision reached. Supported by competent evidence but unnecessary to the decision reached. First two sentences rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Third and fourth sentences rejected as argument and conclusions. First three sentences are accepted as what they are: the evaluation committee's views, beliefs and understandings. Fourth sentence is rejected. The ITB reserved the right "to reject any and all bids or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." It did not reserve the right to waive any proposed additions or changes which are unacceptable, regardless of how material they may be. Also, the ITB did not provide for further negotiations prior to contract finalization. Fourth sentence rejected; the evidence is inconclusive on what the NCR language means. Rest of paragraph accepted. First, second and fourth sentences accepted. Third sentence rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and the words of the ITB. Fifth sentence rejected as irrelevant; while the NCR proposal may be more beneficial to the State it is inconsistent with the ITB. First, second, fourth and seventh sentences accepted. Third sentence rejected as irrelevant. Fourth sentence accepted. Fifth sentence rejected as irrelevant; while NCR's view may be useful, the ITB did not contemplate it. Sixth sentence accepted, but this only refers to controlling and installing the engineering change and not to deciding whether the change should be made. First, and seventh sentences accepted. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant. Third through sixth sentences reflect what NCR proposed, but this is contrary to the requirements of the ITB. Seventh sentence rejected as argument. First three sentences accepted. Fourth sentence rejected as argument. First and second sentences accepted, noting that the four week training period ended eight weeks after the notice of award. Third sentence accepted, but ITB appeared to contemplate immediate service under the contract since it provided for payments to begin upon execution of the contract. Fourth sentence accepted, but the ITB language speaks to ongoing training of the contract and not training specific to this contract. Fifth sentence accepted. Sixth sentence accepted; however, it is unclear whether the ITB contemplated a nine week delay for full implementation of the contract. First, third and sixth sentences accepted. Second, fourth and fifth sentences rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Last sentence rejected as not supported by the evidence. The evaluation team considered the malfunction incident reports unimportant and did not know what the existing payment plans with the Comptroller's office were; therefore, the committee could not know if these plans met HRS's needs. Rest of paragraph accepted, except to note that there is no evidence to show that the payment plans with the Comptroller's office would meet HRS needs, and that, while HRS may now decide that parts costs are not needed, this was a mandatory requirement of the ITB. Rejected as irrelevant. If NCR or any other bidder had a problem with the ITB they could have asked for clarification or could have challenged the ITB for restricting competition. Rejected as irrelevant. 21.c. First and second sentences accepted. Third, fourth and fifth sentences irrelevant; NCR could have asked for clarification or challenged the ITB. Fourth sentence irrelevant. Sixth sentence rejected as irrelevant. Seventh sentence irrelevant and not supported by competent evidence; it is impossible to now determine what NCR would have bid. Accepted. Accepted. The first sentence being the one following the quoted material, which is accepted. First sentence rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence. Second sentence accepted. Third sentence rejected as irrelevant; this is the number of calls made in the past. Fourth and fifth sentences rejected as assumptions. Fifth sentence accepted. First, second and third sentences accepted. Fourth and fifth sentences rejected as irrelevant; while these statements may be true, the NCR bid's provisions conflict with the ITB. First sentence accepted. Rest of paragraph rejected as argument and conclusion. First and second sentences accepted. Third sentence rejected as irrelevant. Fourth sentence rejected; while the addendums issued to the ITB maintained February 8th as the last day for submissions and inquiries, the ITB's general conditions stated that inquiries could be sent in 10 days prior to bid opening. The limitation of remedies form was sent to bidders on March 1, 1988; bids were not due until March 29, 1988. Fifth through ninth sentences accepted. Tenth sentence rejected; the language in the NCR bid is clear and does limit NCR's liability. Eleventh and twelfth sentences rejected as irrelevant. Thirteenth sentence rejected; the NCR language does not refer to the value of the remaining contract but to the value at the time of termination, which is zero at all times. Rejected as not supported by competent evidence. The evidence is insufficient to determine whether the person was licensed at the time the bid bond was countersigned. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. The evidence shows that Unisys agreed to the ITB provisions requiring a Jacksonville office. Rejected as irrelevant. Unisys agreed to the provisions of the ITB and will be penalized for failure to comply with them. Rejected as irrelevant. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected; this is clearly a proper option under the terms of the ITB. Rejected. See ruling on proposed finding of fact 21e. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly 804 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles R. Holman, Jr., Esquire Unisys Corporation 4151 Ashford, Dunwoody Road, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30319 Elaine New, Esquire Assistant General Counsel, HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building I, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gary P. Sams, Esquire Cheryl G. Stuart, Esquire Hopping Boyd Green & Sams Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Robert J. Beggs, Esquire NCR Corporation 1700 South Patterson Blvd. Dayton, Ohio 45479 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and Amended Administrative Complaints and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a certified residential contractor, having been issued license number CR C040917. He has been licensed since March 16, 1987. Respondent was the qualifying agent of KM Homes, Inc. (KMH) from June 10, 1995 through March 13, 1997, more than one year but less than two years. On or about February 3, 1997, KMH filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 97-30498, with an estimate of assets of less than $50,000.00 and an estimate of liabilities of between $1 million and $10 million. The petition was signed by Kenneth H. Maltz, as president of KMH. On or about February 4, 1997, the next day, Kenneth H. Maltz and his wife, Susan Maltz, filed a joint voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. Case No. 01-3827PL On or about April 28, 1996, KMH contracted with Daniel L. Simons and Carol L. Stefanski for the sale of a lot to Simons and Stefanski and for construction of a house on the lot. The contract price for the lot was $45,000.00 and for the construction of the home was $141,000.00, totaling $186,000.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, Simons and Stefanski made the following payments to KMH: on or about April 28, 1996, $5,000.00; on or about August 21, 1996, $40,000.00; and on or about August 30, 1996, $42,229.60 and $747.00, through their lender, First Federal Savings of the Palm Beaches, pursuant to an August 21, 1996, mortgage loan of $128,000.00. The payments totaled $100,976.60. KMH applied for a building permit from Martin County to build the home for Simons and Stefanski. Respondent's license number appeared on the application. The building permit was never obtained. Beginning on or about August 27, 1996, and at various times thereafter, until approximately January 9, 1997, the lot was cleared and fill was delivered to the lot by KMH's subcontractor, Tideway Construction Company, Inc. (Tideway). The work by Tideway was the only work performed by KMH pursuant to the contract with Simons and Stefanski. KHM did not pay Tideway and Tideway recorded a lien on the lot for $4,084.00. KMH failed to remove Tideway's lien. On or about November 23, 1997, Tideway filed suit to foreclose its lien. Sometime in May 1998, Tideway released the lien in exchange for payment from Simons and Stefanski in the amount of 65 percent of the lien amount. Simons and Stefanski's lender paid the 65 percent from additional funds the lender loaned to Simons and Stefanski to enable them to complete their home. Tideway wrote off the remaining 35 percent. KMH never explained to Simons and Stefanski why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. Simons and Stefanski never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. Simons considered KMH to have abandoned the job. Simons and Stefanski filed a proof of claim in KMH's bankruptcy for an unsecured non-priority claim in the amount of $58,000.00. They received nothing from the bankruptcy action. In the latter part of 1998, Simons and Stefanski had their home completed by another contractor, Murex, for $143,270.00. The house that Murex completed for Simons and Stefanski was essentially the same house that KMH was to construct, except that the roof structure was different and the garage and back porch were a little larger. KMH never provided Simons and Stefanski with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Simons and Stefanski never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. They attempted to sue Respondent but were unsuccessful. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3827PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $457.88. Case No. 01-3828PL On or about June 6, 1996, KMH contracted with Carol Morris for construction of a house on a lot owned by Morris. The contract price for the construction of the house was $287,940.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, Morris made the following payments to KMH: on or about February 28, 1996, $1,000.00; on or about June 10, 1996, $27,000.00; and on or about August 2, 1996, $109,240.00. The payments totaled $137,240.00. Morris obtained a mortgage loan in the amount of $150,000.00 from First Bank of Florida to finance part of the contract price. On or about September 17, 1996, KMH applied for a building permit from Palm Beach Gardens to construct the home for Morris. Respondent's license number appeared on the application. On or about September 26, 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number 28644. From approximately September to December 1996, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract and thereafter, did not perform any more work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of Morris' home. KMH never explained to Morris why it did not complete her home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. Morris never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. Morris considered KMH to have abandoned the job. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on Morris' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens were as follows: on December 12, 1996, Tideway for $8,438.00; on January 16, 1997, Buckeye Plumbing, Inc. (Buckeye Plumbing) for $3,676.00; on January 22, 1997, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac) for $6,296.40; on January 23, 1997, Electrical Express, Inc. (Electrical Express) for $450.00; on February 13, 1997, E. M. Brandon, Inc. (Brandon) for $2,164.00; on February 18, 1997, Tom Rawn Masonry, Inc. (TR Masonry) for $16,454.00; and on April 3, 1997, Spacerace Enterprises, Inc. (Spacerace) for $7,850.00. Morris paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. Morris never paid any monies directly to the lien holders to remove any of the liens. However, Morris' lender, First Bank of Florida, assisted her with the resolution of the liens, including allowing its attorney to act as Morris' representative in resolving the liens. In May 1998, Tideway released its lien in exchange for payment by Morris' lender in the amount of 65 percent of the lien amount. Tideway wrote off the remaining 35 percent. The evidence is unclear as to whether Morris was obligated to repay the lender. Buckeye Plumbing, Electrical Express, TR Masonry, Inc., and Spacerace never received any money on their liens and the entire amount of their liens was a complete loss. Tarmac sued to foreclose on its lien, but ultimately dismissed its lawsuit and wrote off the amount of its lien as a bad debt. No testimony was presented regarding the final result of the lien held by Brandon. Morris obtained the services of another contractor, Home Work Group, Inc. (Home Work), to complete the construction of her home. Morris used the original mortgage loan of $150,000.00, a shortfall loan from the same lender in the amount of $45,000.00, and her savings of approximately $43,000.00, to pay Home Work. On or about September 1998, Home Work completed the construction of Morris' house, which was essentially the same as the house which was to be constructed by KMH. Morris received notification of KMH's bankruptcy by mail. She filed a complaint with the bankruptcy court objecting to KMH's discharge. The bankruptcy court eventually dismissed Morris' complaint. Sometime during the year 2000, Morris received $900.00 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided Morris with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. During the transaction between KMH and Morris, she knew Respondent as the construction manager for KMH. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3828PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $478.70. Case No. 01-3829PL On or about February 23, 1996, KMH contracted with Fred W. Connell, Jr., and his wife, Celia M. Connell, for construction of a house on a lot that the Connells would purchase separately, not as a part of the contract. The contract price for the construction of the house was $258,870.00, which included $18,000.00 for a swimming pool. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, the Connells made the following payments to KMH: on or about February 23, 1996, $5,000.00; on or about February 29, 1996, $30,000.00; on or about November 7, 1996, $8,687.00; on or about November 25, 1996, through their lender, First Bank of Florida, pursuant to a mortgage loan, $33,541.00; and on or about December 16, 1996, $24,393.00. The payments totaled $101,621.00. KMH applied for a building permit from the City of North Palm Beach to construct the home for the Connells. Respondent's name and license number appeared on the application. On or about November 5, 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number 96-01386. From approximately November to December 1996, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract and thereafter, did not perform any more work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of the Connells' home. In December 1996, the City of North Palm Beach issued a stop work order due to voids in the concrete walls that made, according to the City of North Palm Beach, the structure of the house unsafe. After the issuance of the stop work order, KMH failed to resume work on the house. KMH never explained to the Connells why it did not complete their home. The Connells fired KMH only after they received notification of KMH's filing for bankruptcy. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Connells considered KMH to have abandoned the job. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Connells' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 16, 1997, Palm Beach Masonry (PB Masonry) for $12,125.00; on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc. (Sasso Air) for $550.00; on January 22, 1997, Tarmac for $4,239.21; on January 28, 1997, CPS Construction, Inc. (CPS Construction) for $2,580.00; on January 31, 1997, Gulf Stream Lumber Company (Gulf Stream Lumber) for $19,461.00; and on March 24, 1997, Waste Management of Florida, Inc. (Waste Management) for $276.50. The Connells paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. The Connells paid its lender, First Bank of Florida, $25,000.00 in exchange for the lender's assistance in resolving the liens. PB Masonry and Waste Management never received any money on their liens and the entire amount of their liens was a complete loss. On or about August 4, 1997, Sasso Air gave a partial release of its lien in return for payment in the amount of $275.00. Tarmac's notice to owner was untimely, so it chose to not pursue foreclosure proceedings and instead wrote the amount of its lien off as a bad debt. On or about November 11, 1997, Gulf Stream Lumber released its lien in return for payment of $5,000.00 from First Bank of Florida. On May 13, 1997, CPS Construction released its lien in exchange for payment from the Connells in the amount of $2,500.00. On or about April 22, 1997, the Connells obtained the services of another contractor, Villafranca Design and Development, L.C. (Villafranca Design), to complete the construction of their home for $221,000.00. The Connells, through their lender, paid Villafranca Design. Their home was completed shortly before Christmas 1997. The house completed by Villafranca Design was essentially the same as the house which was to be constructed by KMH. Because KMH failed to complete the Connells' home, the Connells, their two children and their two dogs were forced to live on the Connells' boat and to store their furniture for almost a year. During that year, the Connells had to pay dockage fees to live on their boat and storage fees for their furniture. The Connells estimate that the difference in the contract price of their home with KMH and what they eventually paid for their home was conservatively $100,000.00. The Connells did not receive any money from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Connells with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. During the transaction between KMH and the Connells, the Connells knew Respondent as someone who worked in the KMH office. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3829PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $519.43. Case No. 01-3830PL On or about September 19, 1996, KMH contracted with William and Iceline Chang for the construction of a house on the lot owned by the Changs. The contract price for the construction of the home was $205,620.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, the Changs made the following payments to KMH: on or about September 16, 1996, $10,000.00; and on or about October 10, 1996, $10,620.00. Pursuant to a change order for additional site preparation and fill, on or about October 7, 1996, the Changs paid KMH $9,400.00. On or about December 16, 1996, KMH applied for a building permit from Palm Beach County to build the Changs' home. Respondent's license number and Respondent's name as the qualifying agent for KMH appeared on the application. The building permit was never obtained due to KMH's failing to submit the construction plans to Palm Beach County's building department. On December 13, 16, and 19, 1996, the Changs' lot was cleared and fill was delivered to the lot by KMH's subcontractor, Tideway. The work by Tideway was the only work performed by KMH pursuant to the contract with the Changs. KHM did not pay Tideway and Tideway recorded a lien on the lot for $10,900.00. KMH failed to remove Tideway's lien. On or about June 6, 1997, Tideway agreed with the Changs to release the lien in exchange for payment from them in the amount of $9,810.00. The Changs paid Tideway in six monthly installments, June through November 1997, of $1,635.00. On or about November 26, 1997, Tideway gave the Changs a release of its lien. KMH never explained to the Changs why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Changs never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Changs considered KMH to have abandoned the job. The Changs had their home completed by another contractor, Villafranca Design, for $203,500.00. Villafranca Design submitted the same construction plans to Palm Beach County's building department that KMH was to use to construct the Changs' home. On or about May 7, 1997, a building permit was issued, bearing permit number B97012080. The house that Villafranca Design completed for the Changs was essentially the same house that KMH was to construct. On or about February 26, 2000, the Changs received $643.29 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Changs with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. The Changs never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3830PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $714.11. Case No. 01-3831PL On or about July 30, 1996, KMH contracted with Harold and Jean Bell to sell them a lot and construct a house on the lot. The contract price for the lot was $53,000.00 and the construction of the home was $186,000.00, totaling $239,000.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, on or about August 1, 1996, the Bells paid a deposit of $5,000.00 to KMH. On September 19, 1996, the Bells paid, as closing costs, $67,147.63 to Universal Land Title, Inc., which included the cost for the lot and an additional deposit toward construction in the amount of $13,600.00. Subsequently, the Bells received a deed to the lot. KMH never obtained a building permit to construct the house. On or about December 11, 1996, the Bells' lot was cleared and fill was delivered to the lot by KMH's subcontractor, Tideway. The work by Tideway was the only work performed by KMH pursuant to the contract with the Bells. KHM did not pay Tideway, and Tideway recorded a lien on the lot for $3,688.00. KMH failed to remove Tideway's lien. Tideway never received any money on its lien and the entire amount of its lien was a complete loss. KMH never explained to the Bells why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Bells never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Bells considered KMH to have abandoned the job. The Bells had their home, with extras, completed by another contractor, Villafranca Design, for approximately $208,000.00. On or about August 2, 2000, the Bells received $996.95 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Bells with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. On October 1, 2002, Mr. Bell obtained a civil judgment against KMH in the amount of $24,199.64, plus costs of $264.75; prejudgment interest of $21,664.88; and attorney's fees of $2,395.00, totaling $48,524.27. The Bells never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3831PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $305.84. Case No. 01-3832PL On or about May 26, 1996, KMH contracted, in a revised contract, with Erol and Yildiz Aksoy for the sale of a lot and construction of a house on a lot. The contract price for the lot was $58,000.00 and construction of the house was $242,000.00, totaling $300,000.00. The revised contract entered into evidence at hearing was incomplete. No determination could be made as to whether Respondent's license appeared in the revised contract. In accordance with the contract, the Aksoys made the following payments to KMH: on or about October 28, 1994, $1,000.003; on or about June 5, 1996, $23,000.00; on or about August 14, 1996, $12,545.00; on or about October 4, 1996, $21,800.00; on or about October 17, 1996, $1,323.00; on or about November 2, 1996, $21,800.00; on or about November 20, 1996, $7,123.00 and $21,800.00; on or about November 22, 1996, $21,800.00; on or about December 13, 1996, $21,800.00; and on or about January 2, 1997, $21,800.00 and $5,000.00. The payments totaled $180,791.00. On or about July 26, 1996, KMH executed and delivered a deed to the Aksoys for the lot. KMH performed work pursuant to the contract, but only performed 55 percent to 60 percent of the construction contracted for. After January 1997, KMH failed to perform any further work on the Aksoys' home. KMH failed to complete the construction of Aksoys' home. KMH never explained to the Aksoys why it did not complete their home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Aksoys never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Aksoys considered KMH to have abandoned the job. The Aksoys filed a proof of claim in KMH's bankruptcy for an unsecured non-priority claim in the amount of $85,000.00. Sometime in the years 2000 or 2001, they received $918.00 from the bankruptcy action. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Aksoys' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 8, 1997, Buckeye Plumbing for $2,570.00; on January 14, 1997, J. W. Hodges Drywall Textures, Inc. (Hodges Drywall) for $3,500.00; on January 15, 1997, Griffin & Wilson Stucco, Inc. (GW Stucco) for $6,040.00; on January 16, 1997, Gallina Electric, Inc. (Gallina Electric) for $3,732.00; on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air for $2,925.00; on January 21, 1997, K. D. Installation, Inc. (KD Installation) for $2,789.00; and on February 5, 1997, Macshmeyer Concrete Company of Florida, Inc. (Macshmeyer Concrete) for $5,814.00. The Aksoys paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. The Aksoys paid the lien holders to remove the liens, as follows: on or about February 18, 1997, $2,570.00 to Buckeye Plumbing; on or about April 7, 1997, $1,400.00 to Hodges Drywall, with the remaining unpaid amount ($2,100.00) being a loss for the company; on or about August 6, 1997, $7,760.10 to GW Stucco, which included additional monies for attorney's fees; on or about March 12, 1997, $1,866.00 to Gallina Electric; on or about April 7, 1997, $2,975.00 to Sasso Air; $1,500.00 to KD Installation (date of payment unknown); on or about March 12, 1997, $2,616.00 to Macshmeyer Concrete. The Aksoys also paid for work for which another KMH subcontractor, Spacerace Enterprises, Inc., claimed that KMH had failed to pay. On or about February 18, 1997, the Aksoys obtained the services of another contractor, Villafranca Design, to complete the construction of their home. The Aksoys paid Villafranca Design $145,250.00. In or around May 1997, Villafranca Design completed the construction of the Aksoys' house, which was essentially the same as the house which was to be constructed by KMH. KMH never provided the Aksoys with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. The Aksoys never had any direct dealings with Respondent personally. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3828PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $606.48. Case No. 01-3833PL On or about December 11, 1995, KMH contracted with Milo and Jerolene Glass for construction of a house on a lot owned by the Glasses. The contract price for the construction of the house was $395,795.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, the Glasses made the following payments to KMH: on or about November 13, 1995, $1,000.00; and on or about December 11, 1995, $39,079.00. The payments totaled $40,079.00. On or about May 21, 1996, KMH applied for a building permit from Palm Beach County to construct the home for the Glasses. Respondent's name as the qualifying agent for KMH and license number appeared on the application. Sometime thereafter in 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number B96019588. From approximately November 1996 to January 1997, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract, but thereafter, did not perform any further work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of the Glasses' home. At the time KMH stopped working on the Glasses' home, a substantial amount of work remained to be completed. Furthermore, much of KMH's work had to be repaired or corrected. KMH never explained to the Glasses why it did not complete her home. KMH's trustee in the bankruptcy never offered to complete the work. The Glasses never fired KMH, never denied KMH access to the property to perform work, and never refused to pay KMH monies due under the contract. The Glasses considered KMH to have abandoned the job. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Glasses' property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air for $925.00; on January 23, 1997, Electrical Express for $750.00; and on January 28, 1997, R J G Masonry, Inc. (RJG Masonry) for $8,353.99. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. The evidence is unclear as to whether the Glasses paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. The Glasses paid to remove the liens. The Glasses paid the following: $925.00 to Sasso Air for which they received a final waiver of lien dated July 8, 1999; on or about February 14, 1997, $750.00 to Electrical Express for which they received a release of lien dated June 2, 1997; and on or about January 24, 1997, $8,353.99 to RJG Masonary. The Glasses did not obtain the services of another contractor to complete the construction of their home. Contractors whom they approached were very reluctant or unwilling to take over the project. Finally, the Glasses, who had prior experience as owners of other construction projects, became their own contractors and completed their home. They also received the assistance of a contracting firm, but the Glasses handled all the disbursements of funds to the suppliers for labor and materials. By September 2000, the Glasses had substantially completed their home and were living in it. At the time of the hearing, they had sold the house and moved to another location in Florida. The Glasses estimate that they expended $1,239,487.78 in the construction of their home. They maintain that this cost does not include approximately $80,000.00 that the Glasses claim that their original lender paid to KMH without their authorization. The amount paid by the Glasses exceeds the contract price because (1) KMH underbid the job; (2) the Glasses spent substantial sums to repair or correct KMH's work, which the Glasses estimate conservatively to be more than $200,000.00; and (3) the Glasses spent substantial sums on upgrades of contract allowance items. The Glasses received approximately $1,000.00 from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided the Glasses with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. After the bankruptcy, Mrs. Glass contacted Respondent and requested the construction plans for the home. Respondent indicated that he did not have the plans. Mrs. Glass contacted Respondent again and he indicated that he may be able to locate the plans. Subsequently, Respondent contacted the Glasses and indicated that he had located the plans. The Glasses went to Respondent's place of business to retrieve the plans. After providing the plans, Respondent requested the Glasses to hire him to complete their home. The Glasses declined Respondent's offer because they considered Respondent's cost estimate to be too high and because of Respondent's association with KMH. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3833PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $628.33. Case No. 01-3834PL On or about December 8, 1995, KMH contracted with Suzanne Beck for construction of a house on a lot that Beck would acquire at a later date (in 1996), not as a part of the contract. The contract price for the construction of the house was $133,500.00. Respondent's license number did not appear in the contract. In accordance with the contract, Beck made the following payments to KMH: on or about December 8, 1995, $5,000.00; on or about July 31, 1996, $8,350.00 and 5,643.09; on or about August 7, 1996, $5,030.88; on or about September 4, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about September 18, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about October 1, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about October 11, 1996, $12,051.05; on or about November 7, 1996, $12,051.05; and on or about November 26, 1996, $12,051.05 and $12,051.05. The payments totaled $108,381.32. KMH applied for a building permit from the Town of Jupiter to construct the home for Beck. Respondent's name and license number appeared on the application as the contractor. On February 12, 1996, the building permit was approved and issued, bearing building permit number 96-29588. From approximately August to December 1996, KMH performed work pursuant to the contract and thereafter, did not perform any more work on the home. KMH failed to complete the construction of the Beck's home. KMH never explained to Beck why it did not complete her home. Around the end of December 1996 or in January 1997, Beck notified KMH that she was taking over the project. Progress by KMH had been slow and Beck discovered that KMH had closed the doors of its business for a second time and was not paying its subcontractors. Beck considered KMH to have abandoned the job. She obtained an owner's building permit and completed the project, making payments directly to the suppliers of labor and materials. On February 7, 1997, Beck obtained a certificate of occupancy from the Town of Jupiter. KMH's subcontractors/material suppliers recorded liens on the Beck's property. The subcontractors/material suppliers and recorded liens were as follows: on January 6, 1997, American Aluminum and Insulation FireProofing Company, Inc. (American Alum.) for $385.00; on January 6, 1997, Buckeye Plumbing for $2,625.00; on January 14, 1997, Hodges Drywall for $8,280.00; on January 14, 1997, Rizzo Tile & Marble, Inc. (R Tile & Marble) for $1,870.70; on January 15, 1997, James M. Webster d/b/a Rain Flow of South Florida (Rain Flow) for $75.00; on January 17, 1997, K. D. Installation, Inc. (KD Installation) for $520.40; on January 17, 1997, Q. C. Cabinet Systems, Inc. (QC Cabinets) for $3,207.00; on January 17, 1997, Paul Temple Painting (PT Painting) for $2,534.75; on January 17, 1997, Sasso Air for $3,360.00; on January 28, 1997, James Velix Bobcat Service (Bobcat Service) for $1,450.00; on February 4, 1997, Tideway for $279.00; on February 7, 1997, Florida Builder Appliances, Inc. (Builder Appliances) for $2,936.20; on February 7, 1997, Mc D Sprinklers, Inc. (McD Sprinklers)for $1,275.00; on February 11, 1997, Builder Direct Carpet Sales (Direct Carpet) for $1,959.26; and on February 12, 1997, Pollard Electric, Inc. (Pollard Electric) for $3,640.00. Beck paid KMH for all the work or materials pertaining to the liens. KMH failed to remove any of the liens. Beck paid to remove the liens as follows: on or about June 18, 1997, $2,625.00 to Buckeye Plumbing; on or about March 9, 1999, $10,125.00 to PT Painting, Hodges Drywall, R Tile & Marble, and Direct Carpet; and on or about October 19, 1999, $3,360.00 to Sasso Air. Hodges Drywall released its lien for $4,000.00 and the remaining amount of its lien was not paid, which represents a loss to the company. Builder Appliances, Rain Flow, McD Sprinklers, QC Cabinets, and Tideway did not receive payment from any source and the entire amounts of their liens were complete losses. After Beck took over construction of her home from KMH, she spent $19,203.00 to complete the home. Beck did not receive any money from KMH's bankruptcy. KMH never provided Beck with notification of the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. During the transaction between KMH and Beck, she met with Respondent at the job-site on one occasion to discuss some aspects of the project with which she was dissatisfied. Beck had expressed her dissatisfaction in a letter to KMH's owner. As of November 15, 2001, Petitioner's costs of investigation and prosecution for Case No. 01-3834PL, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, totaled $534.57.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order: Dismissing the following counts: Count I of Case Nos. 01-3828PL, 01-3831PL, and 01-3833PL. Count IV of Case No. 01-3832PL. Finding that Glenn L. Mustapick committed all other violations in the counts of Case Nos. 01-3827PL, 01-3828PL, 01-3829PL, 01-3830PL, 01-3831PL, 01-3832PL, 01-3233PL, and 01-3834PL. Imposing a $25,000.00 administrative fine. Requiring Respondent to pay restitution not exceeding $25,000.00. Assessing $4,245.34 in costs for investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board. Revoking the certified residential license, CR C040917, of Glenn L. Mustapick. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Respondent HRS published ITB 590:2306 for existing rental space in the central area of Brooksville, Florida. The bid solicitation specified a bid opening time and date of 2:00 p.m. July 17, 1991. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted sealed bids. They were the only two bidders. Neither they nor anyone else timely filed any protest of the bid specifications, and therefore the specifications are not subject to attack in this proceeding. Petitioner received a notice of intent to award the bid for lease 590:2306 to Intervenor by letter from Respondent dated August 27, 1991 and timely filed its notice of intent to protest and formal bid protest. Petitioner accordingly has standing to bring this proceeding. Intervenor is the intended awardee and as such has standing to intervene. Petitioner submitted the property located at 7348 Broad Street, Brooksville, Florida, and showed in his bid submittal form that his proposed property contained 22,500 net square feet, with future expansion of 2,100 square feet available. When Petitioner submitted his bid, it included a floor plan, site plan, and a PUR 7068 form. A PUR 7068 form is a "Public Entity Crime Certification Statement," a sworn statement under Section 287.133(a) F.S. The ITB included two separate requirements for bidders to establish that they have control over the property that they submit to HRS. HRS' purposes in requiring bidders to demonstrate control are to prevent bids based on total speculation, to establish a reasonable expectation that the bidder can meet his obligations if awarded the bid, and to establish a reasonable expectation that the property can be occupied on time. Item 1 on page 3 provides as follows: Control of property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (submit copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documen- tation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas through the base lease term and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas. d.) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required the state. e.) Submit form PUR. 7068 Sworn Statement of Public Entity Crimes (Attachment H). Page 12 provides, in part, as follows: In order for a bid proposal to be accepted the items 1 through 6 must be included in the bid proposal. Items 7 through 11 must be included, if applicable. [Items 11 and 13 state:] 11. Documentation showing bidder as controller of property. 13. Public Enemy [sic] Crime Certification Statement A pre-bid conference attended by Petitioner made clear that evidence of control and the PUR 7068 form were two different items. Petitioner testified that he attached the PUR 7068 form as his sole basis for evidencing control of the building and parking spaces he submitted for lease, and acknowledged that, in fact, the form did not provide any information with regard to his control of the buildings or parking spaces offered for lease. Petitioner's assertion that his name on some of his site plans, etc. constitutes evidence of control is not persuasive. Such assertion is not in line with the ITB requirements or even common sense. Petitioner Proctor owned the buildings he offered HRS in his bid submittal. Petitioner offered multiple buildings separated by parking areas and driveways. The property offered by Petitioner was to have built an awning- covered walkway between buildings but the walkway would have to be placed through the driveway area of the property. The expansion area for Petitioner's property designated in its bid submittal was composed of approximately 10 gated warehouse units which would be converted to office space. Petitioner had leased a portion of the same premises to HRS for 15 years, and HRS was still leasing that portion at the time of the bid opening. At the time of the bid opening, another portion of the property Petitioner proposed to be leased to HRS was also already rented to other tenants, including a lease to the Florida Department of Labor which was not scheduled to expire until December 31, 1991, one day prior to HRS' proposed first day of occupancy under the ITB. The space leased to the Department of Labor would require some renovation for HRS' use, at least to connect it on the interior with the rest of the building. The remainder of the second, adjacent, building to be rented under Petitioner's bid would require more extensive renovation to create office spaces to meet HRS' needs. In addition to the Department of Labor, Petitioner was also renting space in the second building to a beauty salon, a book store, an office supply store, a clothing store, and a barber at the time of bid submittal and opening and at the time of the formal hearing. These latter tenants were on month-to-month leases. In order to ensure that there would be time for necessary renovations before January 1, 1992 and further to ensure that the property would be available for occupancy on January 1, 1992, the ITB required in the following unequivocal language that all bidders file tenant acknowledgments of the bid/proposed lease with their bid submittal: Existing Tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the bid submittal. [Emphasis added] Petitioner submitted no tenant acknowledgments from any of his tenants with his bid to HRS. Even though Petitioner failed to submit evidence of control in the form of a deed and further failed to submit the required acknowledgments from tenants occupying the premises on the bid date, HRS did not immediately disqualify Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive. Instead, HRS evaluated Petitioner's bid simultaneously with Intervenor TCC's bid. HRS relied on old leases in its files and actual knowledge that monthly rent was paid to Petitioner for its own currently leased space, and HRS ignored the absence of tenant acknowledgments with Petitioner's bid. HRS followed this course of action despite the requirement of the ITB on page 7, item 1 under EVALUATION OF BIDS which unequivocally provides: Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal forms, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, signatures and notarization, etc. Non responsive [sic] bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. The portion of the ITB designated, Documents Required To Be Submitted With Bid Submittal For Existing Buildings on page 12, item 4. required bidders to submit "Scale Floor Plans showing present configurations with dimensions." Page 3 of 22, Item 9.(b) further required that, as a part of the bid submittal, bidders were to provide "A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0") floor plan showing present configuration with measurements." Contrary to the ITB requirement, Petitioner submitted a floor plan scaled at 1/20" = 1', which also failed to reflect the present configurations with all measurements. Petitioner's scaled floor plan submitted with his bid was prepared prior to the present addition to one building and contained a hand- drawn configuration without accurate measurements for the northwest corner of one building. The term of the lease as shown on the ITB and Bid Submittal Form was 9 and one-half years with an option to renew for 2-5 year renewal periods. At the time of the bid opening on July 17, 1991, the bid submitted by Petitioner failed to have any proposed rental rates shown for "Renewal Options: Option II years 1 through 5." HRS permitted Petitioner to correct or supplement its bid after the bid opening (same date and place) to cover this material omission. Page 6, item 4 of the ITB provided for the property owner or other bidding entity to sign the bid submission. The pertinent part states: 4. Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s) corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE WITNESSED BY TWO PERSONS. [Emphasis appears in ITB] Petitioner Proctor signed his bid submittal in proper person. TCC's bid submittal was signed by Sharon K. Lane, "Executive Director," of TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc., Intervenor herein. At all times material, TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc. has been a Florida corporation. At the time of the bid opening, Ms. Lane was TCC's sole shareholder and "all officers." At the time of formal hearing, Ms. Lane remained the sole shareholder, but others had assumed some of the corporate offices. Her status at the time of the bid submittal was sufficient for her to bid on behalf of the TCC corporation and to execute the PUR 7068 form on that corporation's behalf. Intervenor TCC submitted the required PUR 7068 form, but TCC submitted as sole evidence of control an undated, unrecorded "Contract for Sale and Purchase" by and between Hernando Plaza Ltd. as Seller and Intervenor TCC as Buyer, for the property which Intervenor was offering for lease to HRS. The best date assignable to this document is April 29, 1991. It was executed on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves as general partners of the limited partnership. TCC's obligation to proceed to closing under the foregoing contract was contingent upon TCC's securing an anchor tenant. However, the contract requires TCC to take steps to secure an anchor tenant. By its terms, TCC may purchase the property with or without an anchor tenant, but the contract requires TCC, in seeking an anchor tenant, to set time limits for the lease arrangement with the proposed anchor tenant which do not necessarily accord with the timing of HRS' bid process. HRS accepted TCC's contract to purchase from Hernando Plaza Ltd., as evidence of TCC's control of the premises offered by TCC for lease, believing it to constitute an option to purchase and the necessary evidence of control as required by the ITB. (See, Finding of Fact 6, supra.) At the time of the bid opening, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with a legal entity other than the record title owner of the property, which record title owner was and is the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation (Brown Foundation). See, infra. Up to that date, at least, Hernando Plaza Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as the owner of the property. The ITB did not require that an abstract of title be submitted with the bid, and HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contains provisions for future disclosure from successful bidders. (See, ITB item 5 under Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids.) Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS attempts to protect itself by requiring successful bidders to put up an irrevocable letter of credit for one-half of one percent of the proposed lease rental obligation over the basic lease term as a penalty in the event a successful bidder cannot perform. (See, ITB page 4, item 10.) Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s certificate from the Florida Secretary of State expired December 31, 1981. That fact was advertised and the certificate cancelled July 16, 1982. At that time, Edward M. Strawgate was listed as a general partner and Harold Brown was listed as a limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd. Hernando Plaza Ltd. had been administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. Subsequent to the time that Intervenor submitted its bid proposal, but prior to formal hearing, Hernando Plaza Ltd. was reinstated by the Florida Secretary of State. Once reinstated, the limited partnership's ability to act related back and validated its prior actions. At all times material, the record title of the property offered by Intervenor TCC for lease to HRS was owned by "Harold Brown, Lillian Brown and Muriel Kahr as Trustees of the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation." This title is derived from a recorded June 30, 1967 warranty deed from Hernando Plaza Ltd., which deed was admitted in evidence at formal hearing. The warranty deed was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. Neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid to HRS on behalf of the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. There is also in evidence a recorded December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease between the Brown Foundation and City National Bank. That Amendment to Lease also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal to evidence control of the premises TCC was offering to lease to HRS. That Amendment to Lease also recites that Hernando Plaza Ltd. leased back the subject property from the Brown Foundation by a lease dated June 30, 1967. The June 30, 1967 lease was not recorded, was not part of TCC's bid submittal, and is not in evidence. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to recite that Hernando Plaza Ltd. has assigned its lessee interest under the June 30, 1967 lease to City National Bank by a March 14, 1978 assignment. There is also in evidence a recorded March 14, 1978 "Assignment of Lessee's Interest in Lease from Hernando Plaza Ltd. to City National Bank." This assignment was not part of TCC's bid submittal. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to further recite that the Brown Foundation has "agreed to give and grant to [Hernando Plaza Ltd.] an option to purchase the property." The remainder of the December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease details the terms or conditions of the option to purchase granted by the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza. For instance, in order to exercise that option to purchase the subject property from the Brown Foundation, Hernando Plaza Ltd., among other requirements, would have to demonstrate that all the terms of the unrecorded June 30, 1967 lease are "in good standing." One may reasonably infer that "in good standing" would at a bare minimum mean that the rents under the lease are paid current at the time the option is exercised, but what the other terms of the lease might be are subject to pure conjecture. TCC's bid submittal did not include documentation that the June 30, 1967 lease was "in good standing." There is also in evidence a recorded June 7, 1989 Trustee's Deed (quitclaim deed of the trustee's interest) from City National Bank's successor bank/trustee to Hernando Plaza Ltd. The Trustee's Deed also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. On the date of bid submittal/opening neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. or City National Bank's successor. At formal hearing, TCC submitted an October 24, 1991 written hearsay statement by Harold Brown as Trustee of the Brown Foundation to the effect that Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s December 18, 1985 option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation was "in full force and effect" and that the June 30, 1967 lease back from the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza Ltd. was "in full force and effect and that the lessee is in good standing thereunder." Assuming these items may be considered in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.58 (1) F.S. as supplementing or explaining direct evidence, they still do not clarify in any way what all the terms of the unrecorded 1967 lease are or that those terms will remain in good standing on the date in the future that Hernando Plaza Ltd. elects to exercise its option, if it elects to exercise its option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation so that Hernando Plaza Ltd. may, in turn, convey the property to TCC, pursuant to Hernando Plaza Ltd. and TCC's April 29, 1991 contract for sale and purchase. Oddly enough, there is further explanatory hearsay that on October 24, 1991, Harold Brown was a trustee of the Brown Foundation and that he also was the sole limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd., although TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza for sale and purchase previously indicated Harold Brown was one of two general partners. Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation must be exercised by Hernando Plaza Ltd. before Hernando Plaza Ltd. can honor its contract to purchase/sell to TCC. Since there is no record evidence that the June 30, 1967 lease from the Brown Foundation as lessor to Hernando Plaza Ltd. as lessee will be in good standing on whatever future date Hernando Plaza Ltd. attempts to exercise its option with the Brown Foundation, one may only speculate both as to when and if TCC will be able to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza Ltd. TCC has only an option to become owner of the subject property at some unspecified date conditioned upon Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s first successfully exercising its option from the Brown Foundation and further conditioned upon all the terms of TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. Apparently, TCC's only recourse to enforce its contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. is a Circuit Court action for specific performance. TCC also submitted a site plan and floor plan with its bid submittal. The ITB required that offices on outside walls must provide windows. TCC's plans did not reflect windows in two sides of the building, but given HRS' retaining the right to partially design and locate its own halls and offices during the building's renovation, TCC's failure to show windows in the two outside walls is not, in and of itself, a material, disqualifying deviation from the ITB so as to unilaterally render TCC's bid nonresponsive. HRS staff member Donald J. Cerlanek prepared a bid synopsis of each bid. This involved completing a form from the HRS leasing manual which illustrates the characteristics of each of the bids. The bid requirements included evaluation criteria and a maximum amount of points which could be awarded for each criteria item. Five HRS bid evaluation committee members executed no conflict of interest forms. These were: Thomas C. Little Jr., David Thomley, Sylvia Smoot, Harvey Whitesides, and Mary Hawks. All committee members were given copies of the bid synopsis form to use in evaluating the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Some of the committee members did not obtain or review the actual bid submissions of each of the bidders, but all of them had access to the bid submissions and read the bid synopsis forms for both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bid submittals. The bid evaluation committee members, except for Mary Hawks, made site visits to the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Ms. Hawks essentially acted only as a facilitator or conduit for the evaluations of the other four evaluators as set out infra. The four site evaluators took notes regarding each location. The four site evaluators each assigned numerical weights to each item of evaluation criteria except for the rent and renewal rent portions of the evaluation criteria. Although on their site visits some committee members visiting TCC's site may have seen a color version of an artist's rendering of what TCC's project could look like after renovation was complete, a black and white version of the same artist's rendering was attached to TCC's bid submittal to which all committee members had access, and it is found that this situation in and of itself presented no false or misleading information nor constituted any prejudice to a fair bid process/evaluation. Likewise, although some evaluators discussed expansion prospects with TCC's and/or Proctor's on-site representatives, the evidence is credible and persuasive that each evaluator who visited the sites assessed the projects' respective expansion prospects substantially upon what they saw on each site and had experienced in Proctor's existing facility. The points awarded and reasons for the recommendations of each evaluator who visited the sites were reasonably based on specific needs of HRS. These specific needs of HRS were reasonably articulated by the two evaluators who made on-site inspections and who also testified at formal hearing and were reasonably set out in writing in the written notes of the two other evaluators who did not testify. Thomas C. Little, Jr., testified that he found the Intervenor's property superior as a result of the security problems at Petitioner's locations, the closer proximity of the courthouse, hospital, and health department to Intervenor's property and the superiority of a single building offered by Intervenor versus multiple buildings offered by Petitioner. Additionally, he found the esthetics of Petitioner's buildings lacking and expansion offered by Petitioner limited and was concerned that HRS would outgrow the space due to the fact that their service area is one of the most rapidly growing in Florida. His contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Sylvia Smoot, also a member of the evaluation committee, testified that she found Intervenor's facility superior based on its proximity to the courthouse, hospitals, and other key locations, and its flexibility of design and concentration of space in one building. She further found Petitioner's location lacking as a result of the three separate buildings, its limited expansion room, and the necessity for redirecting clients between buildings, and the difficulty for elderly and handicapped clients accessing Petitioner's building. Her contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Evaluators Whitesides and Thomley made substantially similar contemporaneous notes justifying their scoring of the two bidders. Three of the four site evaluators met as a group following the site visits and discussed the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. All four of the site evaluators made recommendations to accept the property for lease proposed by Intervenor, but they did not all confer and jointly develop a single recommendation to the facilities manager. The points assigned by each of the four site evaluators for the properties proposed by Petitioner and Intervenor were as follows: Evaluation Committee TCC Number Member's Names Proctor's Points 3's Points Thomley 75 98 Little 78 93 Whitesides 74 95 Smoot 80 91 307 377 The rent portion of the evaluation criteria was ascertained by applying present value methodology as set forth in the HRS leasing manual to the annual rents offered by the bidders. The discount factor was 8.32 percent. The present value of Proctor's bid was $1,934,038 and the present value of TCC's bid was $2,028,316. The leasing manual is considered advisory only. It advises present values be made, a determination of the difference in amounts be calculated and a comparison of the difference be made to determine a percentage. Thereafter, the percentage is applied to the maximum amount of points allocated for rent in the evaluation criteria. The lowest present value receives the maximum number of points allocated, and, thus, Proctor was awarded 35 points. TCC received 33 points, based upon the fact that its present value of rent was close to the present value submitted by Proctor. No penalty is imposed to a bidder whose rental amounts is higher than the lowest bidder. No benefit is conferred upon the lowest cost bidder over the next lowest bidder. Mary Hawks, Manager for Administrative Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, received each of the individual evaluation recommendations from Thomley, Little, Whitesides and Smoot. As a result of travel restrictions placed on the HRS, the four site evaluators and Ms. Hawks, who was also a fifth committee member, did not meet as a group following the site visits although three of the four site evaluators did meet collectively following the site visits. (See Finding of Fact 43-44, supra.) The committee members could have met by telephone conference call but Mary Hawks found it unnecessary to do so because there was such a clear evaluation in favor of Intervenor based on the total composite evaluation scores of 377 for Intervenor and only 307 for Petitioner, out of a total of 400 points. She assigned no points herself but approved their recommendations and forwarded a single recommendation in favor of TCC for ultimate approval by HRS management. Mary Hawks had spoken to the evaluation committee members subsequent to the evaluation and no member had expressed any reservation regarding his/her evaluation or a need to meet to discuss anything additional regarding the bid evaluation. The HRS Intent to Award to TCC subsequently issued. The evaluation process and formula for rent evaluation are not among the more commonly used methods but were reasonable and rational and fairly applied to the bids in this case. No conflict of interest in the evaluation committee members was demonstrated by Petitioner in these proceedings.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that: The bid of TCC Number 3 Ltd. is nonresponsive; The bid of Derick Proctor is nonresponsive; Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2306 to either bidder. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5963BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Proctor's 74 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted, except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the recommended order (RO). Unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material has not been utilized: 1-3, sentence 1 of PFOF 4, 5-6, 9, 11-12, sentence 1 of PFOF 13, sentence 1 of PFOF 16, 17-26, sentence 1 of PFOF 29, 30-33, 35-36, sentences 1 and 4 of PFOF 38, 39-41, 44-54, 56-57, 60-61, 63. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute a proposed conclusion of law (PCOL) or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 4, sentence 2 of PFOF 16, 34, 43. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 10, sentence 2 of PFOF 13, 14- 15, sentence 2 of PFOF 29, sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 38, 55, 58. PFOF 7-8 are accepted as modified because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found and other parts are mere recitations of unreconciled portions of the record and legal argument. The following PFOF are accepted in part but not utilized because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, and other parts are rejected as immaterial to the dispositive issues herein, although correctly quoted from the record: 68-73. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or not dispositive: 27-28, 37, 42, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74. The following PFOF are covered in preliminary material: 64, 66. HRS 21 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-4, 6-8, 11-12, 16-19. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 5, 9-10, 14-15, 21. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 20. PFOF 13 is accepted as modified to correctly reflect the credible record evidence as a whole. TCC Number 3 75 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-31, 34-38, 42- 45, 47-48, 56, 58-60, 64-69, 71-75. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 32. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 33, 40-41, 53-55, 57, 61-63, 70. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or as not dispositive: 39, 46, 49, 51-52. PFOF 50 is not a sentence, but the subject matter is covered in the RO as understood. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Infantino & Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire Sam Power, Clerk Bette B. Lehmberg, Esquire Department of Health and Suite 800 Rehabilitative Services One 4th Street North 1323 Winewood Boulevard St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by inducing a seller to enter in a contract for sale of real estate, based on a $50,000.00 earnest money deposit that was never made.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred Marberry, Jr. is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0369879 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Bernon Earl Thomas is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433736 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Fred Marberry was President of Marberry and Mack Development, Inc., and maintained an office in Altamonte Springs, Florida. James Mack was the Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer of the company. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Bernon Thomas was a real estate salesman with General Realty Management Corporation. His office was in Kissimmee, Florida. In 1985, the two Respondents had worked together on the potential sale and development of a multi-family project in Kissimmee. Thomas was aware of the availability of some commercial property in Kissimmee known as Cross Creek that he felt would be a good deal and shared that information with Marberry. Thomas got his information on Cross Creek from Larry Heninger, who was working with the owner, R. S. Futch, in putting together a development package to present to potential buyers and developers. Heninger had expended considerable effort in working with an engineer and permit agencies and had made contacts with a number of businesses interested in locating on the property. The engineering reports, correspondence and figures supplied to Marberry by Thomas indicated that the parcel comprised 14.75 usable acres. There were letters from the City saying that sewage capacity, utilities and similar public services would be based on this amount. Marberry told Thomas that the development package looked good and to continue working on it. Some time in mid-July 1985, Larry Heninger informed Thomas that some third parties were also interested in the Cross Creek property and that if Marberry and Mack, Inc., wanted to present an offer, they would need to do so immediately as Mr. Futch was leaving on a vacation for several weeks. Thomas called Marberry to relay this information. The details of the conversation are in dispute, but it is uncontroverted that Thomas was made a Vice-president of Marberry and Mack, Inc., for the sole purpose of executing a sales contract immediately. Arrangements were made for Thomas to draw up the contract/offer and have it taken to the Orlando airport where R. S. Futch was either leaving or was en route on his vacation. Marberry and Thomas disagree on what was discussed with regard to an escrow deposit. Thomas contends that Marberry authorized him to provide for a $50,000.00 escrow deposit to be held by Fred Marberry, licensed real estate broker upon acceptance of contract. Marberry denies this and claims that he never maintained an escrow account, that escrow funds were always handled by his (Marberry's) attorney. Marberry claims that the day after signing, when he actually saw the contract, he said something to Thomas about his failure to delete the escrow language on the contract form. Thomas denies this. Both Marberry and Thomas agree that all parties should have known that the deposit could not be escrowed upon acceptance, since Marberry was not there for the signing. The contract was prepared and signed by Thomas in Thomas' Kissimmee office and was taken to the Orlando airport. The contract, prepared on the standard Florida Bar and Association of Realtors approved form, provided a purchase price of $1,600,000.00, the $50,000.00 escrow deposit, and closing on August 25, 1985. The contract provided that closing could be extended by the buyer for 30 days with an additional $50,000.00 deposit. The contract contained the following special clauses: Contingent upon financing. Above described property of [sic] being viable to building Comm. Prop. with all necessary zoning and available utilities. [Pet. Ex. #5] At the airport, R. S. Futch accepted the offer by Marberry and Mack, made a few changes on the contract, initialled them and signed the contract; the changes were also initialled by Bernon Thomas. Later Thomas called Marberry and told him about the changes. The morning after the contract was signed, Marberry and Thomas visited Heninger's engineer to review the project. They reviewed the engineering plans and learned that the property was in a floodplain. Drainage was a problem and parking was a problem and it appeared that only 4.3 acres was actually buildable. On leaving the engineer's office Marberry told Thomas that there was no way the project could work; they could never get financing for a $1.6 million parcel of 14.75 acres, with only 4.3 buildable acres. Marberry felt the contingencies in the contract could not be met and the contract was off. Thomas still believed in the project, and since he had already put so much time and effort in it, he wanted to keep working on pulling it together. Marberry did not dissuade him, but said only to keep him informed on what was going on. Thomas told Heninger that Marberry didn't want the contract. Heninger said he wanted the contract to stay intact and encouraged Thomas to keep working on it. He also tried to get Thomas to do the deal himself, but Thomas told him he did not have the funds. Thomas claims that Heninger told him not to worry about the $50,000.00; Heninger denies this. Nothing was communicated in writing regarding the contract being terminated. The $50,000.00 deposit was never made. The deadline for closing passed, and sometime in September 1985, Larry Heninger arranged a meeting between R. S. Futch and Fred Marberry in a motel in Orlando. The purpose of the meeting was to either extend the contract entered in July (according to R. S. Futch), or to negotiate a new contract for the property (according to Fred Marberry). During the meeting Futch was told that no $50,000.00 deposit had been made on the original contract. The meeting apparently terminated and shortly later Futch filed suit for the $50,000.00. The testimony of the principal witnesses in this case: Marberry, Thomas, Futch and Heninger, establish a picture of lack of communication, misunderstanding, bungling, and unprofessionalism. It is impossible to determine from the rambling and disjointed stories of these witnesses, that either Fred Marberry or Bernon Thomas, individually or together, engaged in "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust..."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against both Fred Marberry and Bernon Thomas, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert D. Gatton, Esquire Maitland Center 1051 Winderley Place Maitland, Florida 32751 Bernon Earl Thomas 4226 Match Point Drive Augusta, Georgia 30909 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The ultimate issue to be determined in this proceeding is which of the bids submitted to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in response to its Request for Proposal for office space and facilities in Arcadia, Florida, is the lowest and best response to the invitation. The Petitioner contends that the Intervenor's bid was not responsive to the Request for Proposal, and that even if the Intervenor's bid were considered responsive, that Petitioner's bid was the lowest and best response. The Intervenor contends that its bid was responsive and that it was the lowest and best response. The Department contends that it properly evaluated the responses and that the bid should be awarded to the Intervenor.
Findings Of Fact In order to provide services as required by various federal and state statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services needs to maintain office space in or near to the city of Arcadia, Florida. The Department is presently leasing office space from C. W. Whidden, the Intervenor in this proceeding. The lease expires on November 30, 1982. The Department's space needs have expanded since the time that it entered into the lease for the existing facility. In order to meet the need for increased space and to continue with its present activities, the Department issued an "Invitation to Propose" inviting interested persons to submit bids for the required office space. Three persons responded to the invitation: Chuck Bundschu, Inc.; Martin M. McAllister, the Petitioner in this proceeding; and the Intervenor. The bid acquisition has been designated by the Department as Lease No. 590:1526. The Department formed a bid evaluation committee composed of five employees of the Department's District VIII office. The facility being acquired would be located within and serve people within the Department's District VIII. Members of the bid evaluation committee individually reviewed the three bids, and met together to form a consensus. On May 14, 1982, the committee generated a memorandum in which the three bids were given points in 12 separate evaluation areas. The Petitioner's bid was given 87 points, the Intervenor's bid was given 83 points, and the bid submitted by Chuck Bundschu, Inc., was given 75 points. The committee recommended that the lease be awarded to the Petitioner. The Department's District VIII Administrative Services Director, Frances Clendenin, was among the members of the committee. She was not satisfied with the committee's evaluation, and she communicated about it with Cindi Shaffer, the Department's Facilities Services Coordinator in Tallahassee. Shaffer agreed that the committee's evaluation had not been sufficiently objective, or at least that the evaluation did not adequately reveal that objective criteria were applied. She recommended to Clendenin that tangible factors be applied. She suggested that the most tangible factor was cost to the Department; and if cost was not a factor, that the committee should set out a detailed narrative statement in support of its conclusions that one bidder or another should receive more or less points in any given area of the evaluation. Clendenin interpreted these suggestions as meaning that all bidders should be awarded the same points in any area unless a specific cost to the Department could be identified so as to justify less points being given to any bidder. The committee conducted a second evaluation and concluded, based upon criteria directed by Clendenin, that the Intervenor's bid should be given 98 points, that Petitioner's bid should receive 90 points, and that the Bundschu bid should receive 81 points. Accordingly, the committee recommended that the lease be awarded to the Intervenor. This recommendation was accepted by the Department. Petitioner filed a timely bid protest, and this proceeding ensued. Chuck Bundschu, Inc., neither protested the bid award nor appeared in this proceeding. The Petitioner has contended that the bid submitted by Intervenor is not responsive to the specifications set out in the Invitation to Propose. The Invitation sets out the following evaluation criteria: The successful bid will be the one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Provision of the adequate square footage in a single building. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations provided the facilities are immediately adjacent to or within 100 yards of each other. Intervenor has proposed to provide the required aggregate square footage in three buildings. Two of the buildings are presently occupied by the Department under the lease which will soon expire. They are separated only by a five- or six-foot-wide concrete walkway which is covered. To get from one building to the other, one must merely open one door, cross the sidewalk, and open another door. While these are more than one building, they effectively serve as a single location in the same sense that two floors in a single building serve as a single location. The third building in Intervenor's proposal is located across a parking lot from the other two buildings, within 100 yards of them. Intervenor proposes to meet the aggregate square footage required by the Department through three buildings. The three buildings constitute two locations, however, which are within 100 yards of each other. The proposal thus meets the bid evaluation criteria and is not unresponsive to the Invitation to Propose. The evaluation criteria set out in the Invitation to Propose delineates 12 separate areas to be evaluated and designates a weighted point value to be assigned each area. The highest number of points that could be given was 100. The first area for evaluation is "rental rate including projected operating expenses." Twenty-five points are assigned to this area. The Intervenor's bid offered the lowest rental rate. Over the 10-year period of the proposed leases, Intervenor's bid is between $84,000 and $85,000 lower than Petitioner's bid. In its first report, the evaluation committee gave Intervenor 25 points and the Petitioner 21 points. In its second evaluation, Intervenor was given 25 points and Petitioner 17 points. The second evaluation more objectively sets out the difference in rental rate between the proposals and constitutes an accurate appraisal of the difference between the rental rates proposed by Intervenor and Petitioner. Petitioner sought to establish at the hearing that the Department would incur additional operating expenses under Intervenor's proposal which would not be incurred under Petitioner's proposal. Petitioner offered the testimony of an employee of the electrical utility that serves the area to the effect that electrical utility charges would be greater for Intervenor's facility than for Petitioner's. The evidence is not, however, credible. The witness estimated Intervenor's utility charges by tracing the past history of charges for the two buildings presently occupied by the Department and assuming that the third building would incur utility expenses at the same rate per square foot. The Petitioner has proposed to construct a new building. The witness estimated utility charges that would be incurred at Petitioner's facility by utilizing accepted formulas. The comparison is not appropriate in an evidentiary sense because of the different techniques used to estimate charges for the two facilities. Furthermore, the witness's assumption that utility charges in the Intervenor's third building would be consistent with those in the other two is not valid because the third building would not be utilized on a daily basis. Finally, the theoretical computations for Intervenor's building cannot be credited because such services as heating and required equipment were not included in the estimate. Petitioner sought to establish that the Department would incur increased operating expenses under Intervenor's proposal because an additional employee would be required for Intervenor's facility. This contention is not supported by the evidence. The Department's activities are presently being undertaken in the Intervenor's two buildings that are separated only by a sidewalk, and no additional employees are required because of the configuration. Petitioner sought to establish that the Department would incur higher janitorial charges under Intervenor's proposal than under Petitioner's. A janitorial service made an estimate of the amounts that it would charge for the Petitioner's proposed building and for the Intervenor's existing three buildings. The estimate assumed that the third building would be utilized on a daily basis by the Department. The evidence establishes, however, that the building would be used on less than a daily basis and only for a portion of those days on which it is used. The janitorial service estimates are therefore based upon an unsupported assumption. The second area to be evaluated is "conformance of space offered to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid." Twenty-five points are assigned to this area. In its initial report, the evaluation committee gave the Intervenor 20 points in this area, and the Petitioner 25 points. In its second evaluation, both bidders were given 25 points. The first evaluation reflects a concern with the fact that Intervenor's proposal was to provide the required square footage in three buildings, while Petitioner proposed to construct a new facility and to offer the square footage in a single building. The second evaluation reflected the committee's inability to assign a specific dollar amount to the inconvenience that would be caused by utilizing three buildings instead of one. Clearly, there are inconveniences that would result from use of three buildings rather than a single building. The operation would be less compact and therefore less efficient. Petitioner's proposal met the specific requirements in the Invitation to Bid with precision as might be expected from a facility which is designed specifically with the Invitation in mind. As also might be expected, Intervenor's facility, which was not developed with this specific Invitation in mind, does not conform as specifically with the requirements of the Invitation. The initial evaluation giving the Intervenor 20 points and the Petitioner 25 points for this area appropriately reflects differences in the bids offered by Intervenor and Petitioner and accurately assesses the difference through the point system. The fourth area to be evaluated is "provision of the aggregate square footage in a single building." Ten points are assigned to this area in the Invitation. In its initial report, the committee gave five points to the Intervenor and 10 points to Petitioner. In its second report, Intervenor was given eight points and Petitioner 10 points. The second evaluation reflects a more objective appraisal of the disadvantages of the three-building complex offered by Intervenor as compared to the one-building complex offered by Petitioner. The first evaluation represented too harsh a view of the inconveniences that would result from the three-building proposal. Some members of the evaluation committee felt that an additional employee would be required, which is not the case. Furthermore, the third building proposed by Intervenor, which is located across a parking lot, would be utilized only for storage of old files and as a conference room. It would not be used on a daily basis, and this minimizes the inconvenience that would result from its being located across the parking lot. It is appropriate that the Intervenor be given eight points and the Petitioner 10 points for this area of the evaluation. The fifth area to be evaluated is "susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization." In its initial report, the committee gave Intervenor three points and the Petitioner five points. In its second report, both Intervenor and Petitioner were given five points. The first evaluation too harshly downgrades the effect of three buildings, and the second evaluation gives too little weight to it. It is appropriate that Intervenor be given four points and Petitioner five points for this area of the evaluation. The twelfth area of the evaluation is "moving costs." Two points are assigned to this area in the Invitation. In both of its reports, the evaluation committee gave Intervenor two points and Petitioner no points for this area. Given the fact that no moving costs would be incurred under Intervenor's proposal, and costs would be incurred under Petitioner's, this appears to be an appropriate evaluation. The third and sixth through eleventh areas to be evaluated under the Invitation for Bid are "proximity to clients," "environmental factors," parking," "street-level space," "transportation," "dining facilities," and "proximity to other Department activities." The evaluation committee's reports varied in insignificant respects, but the evidence demonstrates that, objectively, the Intervenor's and Petitioner's proposals are equal in each of these areas. A total of 33 points is assigned to these areas under the Invitation. Both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bids meet the requirements in these areas set out in the Invitation, and both should be given 33 points. In its initial report, the evaluation committee gave Intervenor 83 points and Petitioner 87 points. In its second report, the committee gave Intervenor 98 points and Petitioner 90 points. The first report did not reflect an appropriate scoring because too much penalty was assigned to Intervenor's three-building configuration. The second evaluation did not adequately downgrade Intervenor's bid because of the three-building configuration. When the points set out in the above findings are added, Intervenor's bid is given 92 points and Petitioner's bid 90 points. This numerical assignment accurately reflects the differences between the bids and the advantages that would accrue to the Department for accepting one bid or the other. The reduced price of Intervenor's proposal and increased efficiency of Petitioner's render the proposals very nearly equal in value to the Department. By a very narrow margin, the Intervenor's proposal is the lowest and best bid in response to the Invitation to Propose for Lease No. 590:1526.
The Issue Whether Respondent's determination that the bid submitted by Petitioner was non-responsive, was arbitrary, capricious, or beyond Respondent's scope of discretion as a state agency.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the formal hearing, the following relevant facts are made: A. Background The Department issued a Request For Proposal and Bid Submittal Form (BID) for a full service lease, Lease Number 700:0556, seeking to rent office space in an existing facility located in Polk County, Florida. Responses to the BID were to be filed with the Department by 10:00 a.m. on June 12, 1990. Six proposals were timely submitted in response to the BID, including McCarty's and Fearn's proposal. The Department evaluated the six proposals and made site visits to the properties proposed to be leased. The McCarty proposal received the highest evaluation score of 95.4 points, while the Fearn proposal received the second highest evaluation score of 92.6 points. Because the McCarty proposal had been found responsive to the BID and received the highest evaluation score, the Department awarded the lease contract for Lease No. 700:0556 to McCarty. Fearn filed a timely protest challenging the award to McCarty. The Fearn protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing. However, after the protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings but before McCarty could intervene or a hearing could be held, the Department reviewed the McCarty proposal and found it to be non- responsive. The Department determined that the McCarty proposal was non-responsive because the McCarty proposal was for more space than authorized by the BID and that not all owners of the property proposed to be leased signed the BID. After determining that the McCarty proposal was non-responsive, the Department rejected the McCarty proposal and awarded the lease contract for Lease No. 700:0556 to Fearn. Upon Fearn withdrawing its protest, the Division of Administrative Hearings closed its file by relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department and the Department entered a Final Order dismissing the Fearn protest. By letter dated July 31, 1990, the Department advised McCarty of its decision to reject his proposal as non- responsive and award the bid to Fearn. By this same letter, the Department advised McCarty of his right to file a protest and his right to a formal administrative hearing. B. Lease Space Requirement Prior to issuing the BID the Department submitted to the Department of General Services (DGS) a Request For Prior Approval of Space Need (BPM Form 4405) wherein the Department justified, through a Letter of Agency Staffing, the need for 3,108 square feet of office space to be located in an existing facility in Auburndale, Polk County, Florida. However, the Department requested approval of only 3,017 net square feet. DGS approved the request for 3,017 net square feet of space and the Department issued the BID referred to in Finding of Fact l. The BID requested bidders to submit proposals to lease 3,017 square feet (plus or minus 3%) measured in accordance with Standard Method of Space Measurement and advised the bidder that the space offered must be within the plus or minus three percent required. The maximum square footage requested by the BID was 3,108 square feet (3017 + 3%). The McCarty proposal was for 3,150 square feet or 42 square feet over the maximum requested. The Department was aware of, and considered, the square feet of rental space proposed by each response to the BID in the initial evaluation since it rejected two proposals for exceeding this requirement by 145 and 392 square feet, respectively. The Department apparently considered the excess 42 square feet of space in the McCarty proposal in its initial evaluation but through an oversight failed to reject the McCarty proposal as it had in the other two proposals. Upon the Fearn protest being filed the Department's legal office reviewed the McCarty proposal and determined that the excess 42 square feet of space was a deviation that should not have been waived. At this point, the McCarty proposal was found to be non-responsive. The price per square foot of the McCarty proposal in all years, one through five, was less than the Fearn proposal. The total price of the lease in the McCarty proposal, including the excess 42 square feet, in all years, one through five, was less than the Fearn proposal. There was no evidence that the cost of the McCarty proposal would exceed the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. C. Signature of Owner(s) and Transfer of Ownership Requirements. At the time McCarty signed and submitted the BID he was co-owner of the property bid with Adrian Gabaldon. Gabaldon was aware that McCarty was offering the property in question for lease to the Department having witnessed McCarty's signature on the BID and having been involved with the Department personnel concerning the BID. Section D. 4. A, General Provision, page 8 of the BID provides in pertinent part: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner,(s), corporate officer(s), or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal McCarty's signature was the only signature, as owner, appearing on the McCarty proposal. Below McCarty's signature the word "owner" was handwritten. Gabaldon signed the McCarty proposal as a witness to McCarty's signature and not as an owner. There is insufficient evidence to establish that at the time McCarty submitted his proposal the property bid was owned by a partnership consisting of McCarty and Gabaldon. There is no printed or typewritten partnership name in the vicinity of McCarty's signature in his proposal or anywhere else in his proposal. Sometime between the date McCarty submitted his BID and the date of the hearing, Gabaldon transferred his interest in the property bid to McCarty. D. General By signing the BID, McCarty agreed to comply with all terms and conditions of the BID and certified his understanding of those terms and conditions. In accordance with Section D.10., General Provisions, page 9 of the BID, all question concerning the specifications were to be directed to C. Donald Waldron. And, although McCarty or Gabaldon may have discussed the space requirement and other matters with certain employees of the Department, they knew, or should have known, that these questions should have been directed to Waldron. Otherwise, the answer could not be relied upon. Neither McCarty or Gabaldon ever contacted Waldron concerning the terms, conditions or specifications of the BID and, more specifically, concerning the space requirement or who was required to sign the BID. Submitted with the Fearn proposal was a letter from Entrepreneur of Tampa as owner of the property bid in the Fearn proposal appointing David Fearn, CCIM and The Fearn Partnership, Inc. as its agent to submit a proposal on behalf of Entrepreneur of Tampa.
Recommendation Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, William R. Cave, held a formal hearing in the above- captioned case on October 16, 1990 in Tampa, Florida.
The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Respondent's decision to rescind a previous notice of award of a bid to Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc., on the basis that the original bid was nonresponsive, was appropriate. If rescission of that bid award was proper, a secondary issue is whether Respondent was also justified in rejecting the competing bid submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc.
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an Invitation To Bid in order to obtain a leasehold of 15,397 square feet of office space to house operations of its child support enforcement office in Lakeland, Florida, for a term of seven years with an option to renew the lease for two additional three year periods. The Invitation To Bid (ITB) states Respondent's reservation of the right to reject, if in the best interest of the State of Florida, any and all bids. Further, the invitation states a number of conditions that submitting bidders must meet in order for their bids to be deemed responsive. Among the stated conditions is the requirement that bids be submitted on the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB in compliance with conditions specified on that form. Further, bidders are directed to complete the bid submittal form providing acknowledgements requested by the form. Another stated condition of the ITB is the requirement that a bidder be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas offered for lease; or, if a lessee seeking to sublease, submit with the bid proposal documentation of authority to sublease the facility and parking areas. A further ITB condition requires each bid to be signed by the owner, corporate officers or legal representative of the bidding entity. Corporate, trade or partnership titles of the bidding entity are to be stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature. Bid submissions signed by an agent are required to be accompanied by written evidence from the owner of record documenting the agent's authority. All bid submittal signatures are to be notarized. Page 4 of the standardized bid submittal form enclosed in the ITB requires, in paragraph 11, that any bid offering premises for consideration (including parking areas), which are presently occupied or which will covered by other active leases on the anticipated lease effective date, must be accompanied by documentation executed by those tenants indicating their acknowledgement of the bid and their ability to vacate the premises by the proposed lease effective date. Submitting bidders are required to indicate whether this requirement is applicable to their bid. Page 4 of the standard bid submittal form contains a number of other conditions which require agreement by the submitting bidder. Proof of the bidder's agreement to those conditions is to be documented by the bidder's initials on each page of the bid submittal package and the bidder's notarized signature on page 16, the submittal form's concluding page. Among the conditions on Page 4 of the form is the agreement of the successful bidder to provide leased space to Respondent for exclusive use on a 24 hour basis, seven days per week during the term of any lease resulting from the bid. This condition further explicitly states that the space to be leased will be fully occupied during normal working hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. during the week and may be fully or partially occupied at other times as necessary in Respondent's discretion. Respondent's bid request specified that bidders must offer a minimum of 65 parking spaces in conjunction with premises proposed for lease. Of those spaces, two spaces were required to meet requirements of accessibility for handicapped parking. Of the remaining spaces, 52 spaces were required to accommodate full size automobiles. All parking was required to be provided as part of the lease cost to Respondent and under the "control of the bidder, off street, suitably paved and lined." On May 16, 1989, five bids were opened, including those submitted on behalf of Petitioner DSJ Realty Company Inc. (DSJ), and Petitioner First Master Lessors, Inc. (MASTER). Out of the five bids opened, only the bids of MASTER and DSJ were determined to be responsive. After evaluation of the bids by Respondent's personnel, the bid was awarded to MASTER on July 6, 1989. On July 11, 1989, and in response to the award to MASTER, a notice of intent to protest the award was filed by counsel for Dale S. Jones, as trustee; DSJ; and Elizabethan Development, Inc. (ELIZABETHAN). By letter dated July 12, 1989, Alan Taylor filed a protest of the lease award to MASTER. That letter simply stated its efficacy as a protest with the words "[w]e hereby protest the award of lease # 590:2087 to First Master Lessors, Inc." No particular factual or legal basis for the protest was stated. Taylor is associated with ELIZABETHAN and his letter is typed on stationary of that business entity. Taylor, designated the bidder on page one of the DSJ bid submittal, was authorized to act solely on behalf of DSJ in the submission of its bid by its president, Dale S. Jones, Jr. Documentation of that authority is contained in a May 8, 1989 memorandum attached to the bid package. There is no documentation in the bid submittal package of DSJ that Taylor was empowered to act on behalf of ELIZABETHAN, or that ELIZABETHAN was authorized to act on behalf of any entity in regard to the bid submittal. While not set forth in the bid package, testimony at the final hearing establishes that Jones is the sole owner of DSJ. Subsequent to the filing of the DSJ protest, Respondent determined to reject the bids of MASTER and DSJ as nonresponsive. By letter dated August 28, 1989, Respondent informed both counsel for DSJ and MASTER of this decision. As set forth in the August 28, 1989 letter, Respondent's decision to reject the bid of DSJ was based upon the failure of DSJ's bid submittal to reflect that its agent, Alan Taylor, or the proposed lessee designated in that bid submittal, DSJ Realty Company, had control of the property offered for lease to Respondent. The August 28, 1989 letter also stated Respondent's rejection of MASTER's bid due to a lack of control of the property sought to be leased, specifically control over parking spaces to be provided in conjunction with the premises to be leased. MASTER's bid submittal stated that the bid requirements in paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form requiring documentation of acknowledgements by any existing tenants of the premises (including parking areas) offered for lease, and ability of those existing tenants to vacate the premises, was not applicable. In response to the bid requirement for 65 parking spaces, MASTER's bid proposed 17 "exclusive" spaces on site and 48 "nonexclusive" spaces off site. An attachment to the bid response was a copy of a letter dated June 10, 1983, from the First Christian Church to a predecessor of MASTER, First Bank of Lakeland. The church, located across the street from the site proposed to be leased to Respondent by MASTER, granted "permission to the First Bank of Lakeland to use our parking lot for the convenience of their employees." Subsequent to the opening of bids and receipt of DSJ's bid protest, MASTER provided Respondent with another letter from the church reciting permission for MASTER to use 48 spaces within the church parking lot for the parking of Respondent's employees and clients, provided that the church reserved the right to use those spaces at any time upon the giving of one week's written notice to MASTER. The church also reserved the right to cancel the agreement at any time upon the giving of 60 days written notice. The letter was dated May 15, 1989. Also, as established at the final hearing, yet another letter was sent to MASTER's authorized agent from the church. That letter documents the rejection by the church of any "formalization" of a reciprocal parking arrangement with regard to the premises proposed to be leased by MASTER. However, the letter, dated July 20, 1989, restated the church's consent to the use of the parking lot by tenants of the premises proposed for lease by MASTER in accordance with its previous letter of May 15, 1989. Another letter attached to the bid submittal of MASTER, is also dated May 15, 1989. Directed to Respondent's facilities services manager, this letter is signed by an individual named Geneva Pettus as "[a]gent for First Master Lessors, Inc." The letter signed by Pettus references the 1983 letter from the church and states in pertinent part: We further guarantee your parking requirements during the term of the lease and will accommodate such spaces either within our own building or other locations if changes in the above parking facilities should occur. The MASTER bid submittal contains no documentation of authority of Geneva Pettus to act as agent for MASTER. Further, as established by the proof at final hearing, the vast majority of on site spaces controlled by MASTER are leased to present tenants or their employees. Remaining unencumbered parking spaces are inadequate to meet Respondent's bid requirements. The "guarantee" by Pettus, absent her lack of authorization to act for MASTER, is further invalidated by failure of MASTER to provide acknowledgements, as required by paragraph 11 of the bid submittal form, from the existing lessees of those parking spaces controlled by MASTER which would have to be vacated in order to comply with bid requirements. The proof establishes that MASTER did not have control of a portion of the property submitted for lease consideration by Respondent, specifically the proposed parking areas. Such lack of control is nonresponsive to Respondent's bid requirements. Notably, the May 15, 1989 date of Pettus' letter coincides with the May 15, 1989 letter to MASTER from the church. Respondent's facilities service manager, involved in evaluation of the bid submittals, was understandably concerned that this letter's existence was not disclosed to Respondent's personnel prior to August 17, 1989. The position of the church as reflected in the letter caused Respondent's personnel to reevaluate the issue of whether MASTER's bid demonstrated the requisite control over the property submitted for bid consideration and concluded that such control was absent. The DSJ bid submittal contains the notarized signature of Dale S. Jones, Jr., in the space on page 16 reserved for the signature of the bidder. His signature is followed by the title "PARTNER." That term is not further described, nor is a partnership or connection of that partnership with Jones identified in the bid package. At the final hearing, Jones confirmed his signature. However, the proof fails to establish that the required initials on each page of the DSJ bid package are those of Jones. Jones was unacquainted with the bid package submitted on his behalf, having merely looked through the package before affixing his signature. Further, the bid submittal form, on page 16, has a blank space for insertion of the name of the bidder submitting the bid package. The bid package submitted on behalf of DSJ contains no name in this portion of the submittal form. Page 16 of the bid submittal form also requires that the bidder indicate the name of the entity in whose name the subsequent lease is to be written, if that entity is one other than the bidder. The bid, signed by Jones and submitted by Taylor on behalf of DSJ, contains the statement that any future lease resulting from the bid should be titled in the name of "DSJ REALTY COMPANY as managing and Leasing Agent for Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Also attached to the DSJ bid submittal package is a copy of an instrument entitled "DEED TO TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST AGREEMENT." By terms of that instrument, the fee simple title to the property and appurtenances of the site of the building proposed to be leased by DSJ, was purportedly conveyed to Dale S. Jones, Jr., as "Trustee under Land Trust Agreement dated June 15, 1987". By terms of the deed, Jones is granted specific authority to convey, lease or otherwise exercise those rights to property which are commensurate with ownership. The grantor of the deed, dated July 7, 1987, is Florida Southern College. The bid package of DSJ contains no documentation that either Jones or DSJ is authorized to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." Further, the bid package of DSJ offers no explanation as to the identity of this entity. As established by Jones' testimony at hearing, the entities "Dale S. Jones, Trustee" and DSJ Realty, Inc., are not interrelated businesses. The DSJ bid submittal further contains no documentation of authority for ELIZABETHAN or Taylor to act as an agent on behalf of "Crystal Lake 301 and 302 Joint Venture." It is found that the bid submittal of DSJ is nonresponsive to the requirements of Respondent's ITB. In response to Respondent's letter rejecting the bids of Petitioners, counsel for both parties filed petitions dated September 8, 1989, protesting the decision and requesting administrative proceedings. The petition filed on behalf of DSJ, ELIZABETHAN, and Dale S. Jones, as Trustee, was entitled "PETITION FOR FORMAL HEARING AND FORMAL BID PROTEST" and alleges the submitting bidder to be ELIZABETHAN. The document, in support of the July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award to MASTER, sets forth specific grounds for that protest. Further, it is alleged in the petition that DSJ was appointed to act as the agent of Dale S. Jones, as trustee, in appointing ELIZABETHAN as his agent. It is found that these allegations, with regard to the identity of the submitting bidder, are not supported by any competent substantial proof; that Dale S. Jones, as trustee was not a submitting bidder; and that ELIZABETHAN was not a submitting bidder. Each petition filed in opposition to Respondent's August 28, 1989 rejection letter, was accompanied by a $5,000 cashier's check payable to Respondent. MASTER subsequently substituted this check with a surety bond. DSJ's July 12, 1989 protest of the bid award was not accompanied by any bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the bids of MASTER and DSJ to be unresponsive; finding the cancellation of the award to MASTER to be justified; dismissing ELIZABETHAN and Dale S. Jones, as trustee, as petitioners in this proceeding; and rejecting all bids. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner Master's Proposed Findings. Petitioner MASTER's proposed findings consisted of 21 pages encompassing unnumbered paragraphs dealing with an intertwined mixture of legal conclusions, argument and proposed factual findings. Therefore, MASTER's submission cannot be treated by the Hearing Officer in this appendix on an individualized basis for each proposed finding. However, MASTER's submission has been reviewed and addressed, where possible, by the findings of fact set forth in this recommended order. Otherwise, all disputed issues of material fact have been addressed by the evidence adduced at the hearing held in this cause. Petitioner DSJ's Proposed Findings. Addressed in substance, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 7.-1I. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unsupported by the evidence. Addressed in substance. Adopted by reference. Adopted in substance. 16.-21. Not relevant inasmuch as Jones, in an individual capacity or the legal capacity of trustee or partner, was not a bidder. 22.-23. Adopted in substance. Rejected, legal conclusion, relevancy. Addressed in substance. 26 Rejected, not supported by the evidence. Taylor was authorized to act on behalf of DSJ Realty, Inc., by the corporate president. 27.-28. Rejected, not supported by the evidence; no evidence that Jones was a bidder. 29.-32. Rejected as unnecessary in view of result. 33.-42. Adopted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-12. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 4000 West Buffalo Avenue 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, FL 33614 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, Esq. General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Bruce Marger, Esq. 1700 66th Street, North Suite 501 St. Petersburg, FL 33710 David H. Simmons, Esq. 120 South Orange Avenue P.O. Box 67 Orlando, FL 32602 =================================================================
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a real estate broker/salesperson in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Division of Real Estate was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of real estate salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the real estate profession. Respondent’s pertinent license as a broker- salesperson was issued on April 5, 1993, and remained valid at least through June 19, 1998. She is still licensed as a broker- salesperson with Geiger Real Estate/Century 21, in Apollo Beach, Florida. Respondent has been licensed as a salesperson for fifteen years and as a broker for between ten and twelve years. Since her initial licensing, she has repeatedly been cited as a million-dollar producer. Respondent first met Mr. Gilliam, the owner of the property in issue sometime in 1995. She recalls him at that time as an already older man who was hard to talk with and who often forgot portions of conversations she had with him. At the beginning of their relationship, however, he signed a sales listing agreement with Respondent for the sale of several acres of property he owned which had on it both a house and a mobile home. The property did not sell readily. Mr. Gilliam admits to extending the listing agreement several times through the use of a Listing Status Report form. On the several occasions this form was used; sometimes Mr. Gilliam would sign it himself, but, according to Respondent, on other occasions she would call him by telephone and get his verbal authority to sign it for him. It was important to file a report of this nature so that the property listing would not be dropped from the multiple listing service operated by the local real estate association. Respondent asserts that Mr. Gilliam never objected to this procedure, but he claims he always came into the office and signed the form himself. In late 1996, the listing expired, and when she submitted an extension form to the multiple listing service, it was rejected. Therefore, on November 25, 1996, to get the property back into the multiple listing system, she signed Mr. Gilliam’s name to a new listing agreement, not merely a status report extension, which extended the listing until May 31, 1997. She contends he was out of the state at the time, but acknowledges she did not try to contact Gilliam by phone or mail before signing the listing agreement, nor did she ever think to obtain a power of attorney from him to facilitate matters since he was out of state so much. Mr. Gilliam, on the other hand, contends he had agreed to an extension until December 31, 1996, but no longer. In October 1997, the then current listing was due to expire. Respondent claims she called Mr. Gilliam and asked for permission to extend the listing and he agreed, but noted this would be the last time. Respondent suggested he lower his asking price for the property, and he agreed. She, therefore, advertised the property at the reduced price. The property was ultimately sold through this advertisement, but through another agent in her office because, at the request of Mr. Gilliam and his sister, the listing was taken away from Respondent. Respondent claims she was never told why this was done. Mr. Gilliam did not sign the listing contract dated November 26, 1995, nor did he specifically give Respondent authority to do so. Based on the prior practice of his authorizing extensions which were later ratified by the owner, Respondent may reasonably have believed she had the authority to sign the new listing agreement. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s signing Mr. Gilliam’s name to the listing agreement dated November 25, 1996, in any way resulted in any loss to the property owner or anyone else.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Real Estate enter a final order in this case placing Respondent’s license as a broker-salesperson on probation for a period of one year, under such terms and conditions of continuing education and supervision as the Florida Real Estate Commission shall deem appropriate; and imposing a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 David P. Rankin, Esquire Law Offices of David P. Rankin, P.A. 3837 Northdale Boulevard PMB 332 Tampa, Florida 33624 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Herbert S. Fecker, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
