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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. JOSEPH J. GODOROV, 77-002090 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002090 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Joseph J. Godorov, was licensed in the State of Florida to practice osteopathic medicine, and held license No. 2319. In the course of his practice, Respondent treated a patient known to him as "Cindy Jeffords", who was, in reality, Gail Jackson, an undercover police officer from the City of St. Petersburg Police Department. In a period from April, 1977 through August, 1977, Officer Jackson made a total of nine visits to Respondent's office. These visits occurred on April 27, 1977; May 13, 1977; May 27, 1977; June 14, 1977; June 28, 1977; July 19, 1977; July 26, 1977; August 2, 1977; and August 26, 1977. On each such occasion, Respondent issued a prescription for thirty 300 milligram tablets of a substance known as "Methaqualone", or "Quaalude", a controlled substance by virtue of the provisions of Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. Officer Jackson's first office visit with Respondent occurred on April 27, 1977. At that time, she was required to complete a "registration slip" and sign a "consent for treatment" form. In addition, she was weighed, and Respondent took her pulse, heartbeat, blood pressure, and inquired concerning prior surgery and any allergies from which she suffered. Officer Jackson advised Respondent that she had moved to Florida from Georgia; that she was experiencing trouble sleeping; that while in Georgia she had been taking 10 Quaaludes per week, and had been treated in Stone Mountain, Georgia by a "Dr. Callahan". Each of these statements was untrue. Upon closer questioning by Respondent, Officer Jackson admitted that she wanted Respondent to write a prescription for Quaaludes for her so that she might use them to "get high". She made no specific medical complaint other than that she had experienced "trouble sleeping". Respondent then wrote a prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes for Officer Jackson. In fact, the physical examination performed on Officer Jackson by Respondent on this first visit, consisting of checking the patient's heartbeat and blood pressure, occurred after he had written the prescription. Officer Jackson later called Respondent's office and arranged a second appointment for May 13, 1977. Respondent again took the patient's heartbeat and blood pressure and wrote a second prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes. On this second visit, the patient made no physical or medical complaints, and Respondent performed no examination other than to listen to her heartbeat and take her blood pressure. Respondent specifically inquired of the patient whether she was using the medication to "get high", to which she replied in the affirmative. Upon leaving Respondent's office on the occasion of her second visit, Respondent's receptionist, without Officer Jackson's request to do so, arranged a subsequent appointment for her for May 27, 1977. Officer Jackson returned to Respondent's office on May 27, 1977, at which time Respondent again took her heartbeat and blood pressure. Officer Jackson made no medical or physical complaints, and Respondent made no inquiry in this regard. Respondent did, however, write a third prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes for the patient. Before Officer Jackson left Respondent's office on this occasion, Respondent advised her to stay happy and not to get too high." Officer Jackson next visited Respondent's office on June 14, 1977. Respondent checked her heartbeat and blood pressure and again wrote the patient an identical prescription for Quaaludes, despite the fact that the patient made no complaints of medical problems. Officer Jackson returned to Respondent's office on June 28, 1977. She advised Respondent that she was out of Quaaludes, and, upon being advised that Respondent was going on vacation, told Respondent that she would have to "stock up" since he was going to be out of his office for a couple of weeks. Officer Jackson also advised Respondent during this visit that she had been giving Quaaludes which Respondent had prescribed for her to a friend "to party on", and that she would be sending her friend in to see Respondent to get his own prescription. Respondent then wrote a fifth prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes for Officer Jackson, despite the absence of any physical complaints. Officer Jackson was again in Respondent's office on July 19, 1977, at which time she advised Respondent that she was out of Quaaludes, and he wrote a prescription for her identical to those written on her earlier visits. Respondent took Officer Jackson's blood pressure and heartbeat, and scheduled her for an appointment seven days later. Officer Jackson returned to Respondent's office on July 26, 1977. Respondent again wrote for her a prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes. On this visit, Respondent did not inquire whether the patient was out of the drug, or whether she needed additional medication. Again, Respondent took the patient's heartbeat and blood pressure. Officer Jackson's next visit to Respondent's office occurred on August 2, 1977. Respondent took the patient's blood pressure and heartbeat and, when advised that she was out of Quaaludes, wrote another prescription for thirty tablets. During this visit, a conversation took place between Officer Jackson and the Respondent concerning "partying on Quaaludes". The last visit made by Officer Jackson to Respondent's office occurred on August 26, 1977. During the course of this visit, a conversation took place between Officer Jackson and Respondent concerning the use of Quaaludes in heightening her sensitivity during sexual intercourse. Despite the fact that the patient did not request the prescription or make any complaint of illness, Respondent again wrote a prescription for her for thirty tablets of Quaaludes. On August 9, 16 and 23, 1977, a patient known to Respondent as "Jerry Coats" who was in reality George Chapman, an undercover detective with the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department, visited Respondent's office. During Officer Chapman's initial visit on August 9, 1977, Respondent obtained a cursory medical history, during the course of which Officer Chapman advised him that he was suffering from no medical problems but had been referred to Respondent by a friend in order to obtain a prescription for Quaaludes. Although Respondent checked Officer Chapman's blood pressure, weighed him, and administered an injection for "vitamin deficiency", he wrote a prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes for Officer Chapman before performing either of these procedures. At no time during this initial visit did Officer Chapman make any complaint to Respondent concerning physical ailments of any nature, although Respondent detected that Officer Chapman's pulse was elevated. As Officer Chapman was leaving Respondent's office, Respondent's receptionist scheduled an appointment for him for August 16, 1977, without any request from the patient for such an appointment. Officer Chapman returned to Respondent's office on August 16, 1977. When Officer Chapman advised Respondent that he hadn't found that the Quaaludes "were that good" Respondent advised him to take an extra one or one-half tablet, or to mix the drug with "a little alcohol" in order to get "sky high". Respondent took the patient's blood pressure, administered another injection, and wrote a second prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes. Officer Chapman returned to Respondent's office on August 23, 1977. Respondent inquired whether the patient had been to any "wild parties" and then issued a third prescription for thirty 300 milligram Quaaludes, prior to taking the patient's heartbeat and blood pressure. Again, the patient made no complaints of illness. Quaalude is a controlled substance which is classified as a "hypnotic", and is prescribed primarily as a sleeping medication. Under the circumstances present in this case, as reflected in the factual findings herein- above set forth, the issuance of the various prescriptions by Respondent to Officers Jackson and Chapman did not conform to the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing osteopathic medical practice in the St. Petersburg, Florida area. This conclusion is based specifically on Respondent's failure to take a detailed medical history of either of the patients; his issuance of the prescriptions notwithstanding the absence of any specific and consistently maintained physical complaints; and the affirmative representations by both patients to Respondent that their only purpose for seeking and using the prescribed medication was to "party" and "get high". Respondent has practiced osteopathic medicine since 1959 and enjoys a good reputation for moral character, truth and veracity, as well as good patient care. In fact, Respondent is held in high esteem by each of those patients called to testify in his behalf at the final hearing. Both Petitioner and Respondent have submitted Proposed Findings of Fact in this proceeding. To the extent that proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in, or are inconsistent with, factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57893.03893.05
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. LAWRENCE A. DECKER, 87-004428 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-004428 Latest Update: Jan. 24, 1989

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Lawrence A. Decker was licensed as an osteopathic physician in Florida. On November 18, 1980, D. K. was admitted to Sun Coast Osteopathic Hospital, with an admitting diagnosis of acute generalized anxiety disorder, under the care of Dr. Kaye, a psychiatrist. On her initial examination, she complained of severe menstrual cramping. She was referred to an internist and a gynecologist (Respondent). Exhibit 1). At her gynecology examination, D. K. gave a history of pain in the right lower quadrant of her abdomen shortly following a tubal ligation some six years earlier. She had visited three gynecologists in the intervening years and had been treated with medication (Estrace, Valium and Progesterone) by one of these gynecologists without significant improvement in her symptoms; one suggested she had a prolapse, a hysterectomy was indicated and Tranxene was prescribed; and a third physician stated she had a sore muscle on her right ovary, but no therapy was suggested. Respondent suggested a hysterectomy might relieve the menstrual cramps, but was unlikely to improve her anxiety disorder unless that was brought on by the dysmenorrhea. D. K. talked to her husband and then told Respondent she would like to have the hysterectomy during her current admission rather than be discharged and return at a later date. After concluding D. K. was capable of consenting to the surgery, the hysterectomy was scheduled for November 24, 1980. In Dr. Joyes' hospital notes (Exhibit 1), an entry dated November 21, 1980 states in part: "Anxiety re surgery. Feels her problems are due to physical causes." November 22, 1980 entry: "States relief decision made to have surgery (hysterectomy) scheduled for Monday." November 23, 1980 entry: "Patient expresses anxiety re A.m. surgery. Able to understand others and is supportive to their needs. Lacks emotional insight into her own." Nurses notes in Exhibit 1 (page 61) for November 22, 1980 reads: "Attended group session . . . Participated very well. Appears more relaxed and comfortable this evening." Nurses notes for November 23, 1980 read: "Good participation during group. Insight into other's problems good. Nothing specific to solving own anxieties offered except surgery." At no time did Dr. Joye conclude that D. K. was unable to fully and knowingly consent to the surgery that was performed by Respondent on November 24, 1980. Petitioner's witness, Dr. Eli Rose, opined that D. K. was unable to give informed consent to the surgery based upon her admitting diagnosis of acute anxiety reaction and Dr. Joye's comment in Exhibit 1 (finding 5 above) "that [she] lacks emotional insight into her own." He also opined that from the symptoms of D. K. as contained in the patient records there was insufficient medical justification for the hysterectomy performed. Dr. Rose was also perturbed that the operation was scheduled so quickly, disregarding (or not knowing) that D. K. had requested the surgery be performed during that hospitalization. Before becoming aware that a second surgeon assisted Respondent in performing this hysterectomy, Dr. Rose opined that the length of the operation, forty-five minutes, was too short a time for this procedure to be safely and adequately performed. After learning that another surgeon assisted Respondent, Dr. Rose backed away from this position. After this case was referred to Dr. Rose for consultation, he became aware that he was D. K.'s physician two years earlier who had treated D. K.'s symptoms with medication. In addition to his own testimony, Respondent presented two gynecologists, one board certified and the other board eligible. Dr. Broadnax reviewed the patient records of D. K. and the depositions of other witnesses. He opined that in the treatment of D. K., Respondent exercised the level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The parties stipulated if Dr. Rothman, a board certified gynecologist, was called he would testify that in the treatment of D. K., Respondent exercised the care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent osteopathic physician as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. With respect to the charge involving inadequate record keeping, no creditable evidence was presented to support this charge. Petitioner's only witness acknowledged that he was unaware there is a standard of care for the keeping of medical office records.

Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE vs ALAN SALTZMAN, D.O., 04-003495PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 28, 2004 Number: 04-003495PL Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2025
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE vs JOSEPH MILLER, D.O., 14-001077PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 12, 2014 Number: 14-001077PL Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2016

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Health has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found probable cause to suspect that the licensee has committed one or more disciplinable offenses. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 10658. Background On February 3, 2012, T.S., a 26-year-old single mother, presented to Respondent's medical office as a new obstetrical patient. At that time, T.S. was carrying her third child. For the next five months, T.S. and Respondent enjoyed what was, by all appearances, a productive and appropriate physician-patient relationship. However, as discussed below, Respondent would transgress the bounds of that relationship during an office visit on the evening of July 11, 2012. First, though, it is necessary to sketch the relevant background. On the morning of July 11, 2012, T.S.——who was then nine months pregnant——appeared at Respondent's office for a routine examination. During the visit, T.S. advised Respondent that she was experiencing substantial cramping and discomfort. In response to these complaints, Respondent performed a pelvic examination and a sonogram, both of which yielded normal results. Later that day, at approximately 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., T.S. telephoned Respondent's office and informed his staff of a new symptom: namely, that significant pain was making it difficult to lift her right arm. Although a member of the staff advised T.S. that she could be seen immediately, logistical constraints made it impossible for her to report to Respondent's office prior to the close of business. Over the course of the next several hours, T.S. communicated with Respondent by phone and text (his cell number was available to all patients) concerning the new symptom and her preference to be seen that evening. Ultimately, Respondent informed T.S., via a text message sent at approximately 6:15 p.m., that she could meet him at his office for an examination. The Misconduct T.S. arrived at the office at 6:30 p.m., whereupon Respondent unlocked the front door and invited T.S. inside. Upon entering the lobby area, which was only partially illuminated, T.S. saw no sign of Respondent's office staff. At that point, Respondent asked T.S. to sign a form that read as follows: I give consent to be seen at Dr. Miller's office, by Dr. Miller, without an assistant present, at my request, in order to have a medically urgent need addressed. The foregoing document, although signed by T.S., is of dubious propriety, as obstetrical treatment without a chaperone present is rarely, if ever, appropriate.3/ This issue is of no moment, however, for most of what occurred next——as established by the credible testimony of T.S. and Petitioner's expert witness——was not a legitimate medical examination but, rather, nonconsensual sexual contact perpetrated under the guise of an examination. Upon the execution of the "consent" document, Respondent directed T.S. to an examination room and informed her that the likely cause of her arm pain was either a clogged milk duct or the positioning of the fetus. Respondent then requested that T.S. disrobe her upper body, at which point he left the room for a few moments. Upon his return, Respondent asked T.S. to recline on the examination table, purportedly so he could examine her right breast to rule out the possibility of a clogged duct. T.S. complied and, for the next 30 to 45 seconds, Respondent squeezed her breast in a manner quite dissimilar to examinations she had undergone in the past. In particular, T.S. thought it peculiar that Respondent "cupped" her entire breast with his hand——as opposed to examining the breast from the outside in with the pads of his fingers.4/ Even more troublingly, Respondent asked T.S., while his hand was still in contact with her breast, whether "it felt good."5/ After removing his hand from T.S.'s breast, Respondent remarked to T.S. that her arm pain was not the result of a clogged milk duct. Respondent further stated that her symptoms would be assuaged upon the baby's delivery, an event which, according to him, could be facilitated by sexual activity. Before proceeding further, it is important to note that T.S.'s symptoms of arm pain arguably warranted, at most, a legitimate breast examination. In other words, there were no symptoms or aspects of T.S.'s history that justified a pelvic examination at that time,6/ particularly since Respondent had performed such a procedure (along with a sonogram) earlier in the day. Nevertheless, Respondent informed T.S. that he "needed" to measure the dilation of her cervix; then, in a disturbing and conspicuous departure from accepted obstetrical practice,7/ Respondent applied lubricant to one of his ungloved hands. Moments later, Respondent inserted two fingers into T.S.'s vagina and, for the next 30 seconds or so, positioned his penetrating hand in such a manner that his thumb was in continuous contact with T.S.'s clitoris——something that would never occur during a proper examination.8/ Tellingly, this was not the only physical contact incongruous with a legitimate pelvic examination, for at one point Respondent used his free hand to pull on one of T.S.'s nipples.9/ By now suspicious of Respondent's conduct, T.S. attempted to maneuver her body toward the head of the examination table. As she did so, Respondent began to remove his fingers from T.S.'s vagina while stating that she "needed to have sex" in order to induce labor. This could be accomplished, Respondent further suggested, by having sex with him, an invitation T.S. sensibly declined.10/ On the heels of this rejection, Respondent told T.S. that the only other means of inducing labor would be to "strip her membranes." Owing perhaps to an urgent desire to give birth——the reader should recall that she was nine months pregnant and in significant discomfort——T.S. acceded to Respondent's suggestion. Respondent then penetrated T.S.'s vagina with his (ungloved) hand for a second time and, prior to the removal of his fingers, repeatedly implored T.S. to engage in sexual intercourse with him.11/ When T.S. refused and tried to move to the other end of the table, Respondent grabbed her by the hips and pulled his midsection into her exposed vaginal area. By virtue of this aggression, T.S. could feel that Respondent's penis, albeit clothed, was erect.12/ Wishing to extricate herself from this situation, T.S. pushed Respondent away, at which point he attempted to "laugh off" his abhorrent behavior. T.S. dressed herself and, a short time later, drove to the home of an acquaintance to seek advice. Later that evening, T.S. made a report of the incident to the appropriate authorities,13/ which ultimately resulted in the filing of the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of violating section 459.015(1)(l), as charged in Count I of the Complaint. It is further determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of violating section 456.072(1)(v) and, in turn, section 459.015(1)(pp), as alleged in Count II of the complaint.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Osteopathic Medicine finding Respondent guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; revoking Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine; and imposing a fine of $10,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68456.063456.072456.073459.015
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. DAVID I. COLLIER, 77-001059 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001059 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is licensed by the Board to practice as an osteopathic physician in Florida. The Respondent has been licensed to practice as an osteopathic physician in the State of Pennsylvania. He was criminally charged in the State of Pennsylvania with various violations of 35 Penna. Stat. Section 780- 113(a)(14). After entering a plea of not guilty, he was tried and convicted of three counts of violating the statute. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced. The Respondent has exhausted all direct appellate remedies in Pennsylvania. He continues to pursue available collateral remedies. The Pennsylvania State Board of Osteopathic Examiners initiated disciplinary action against the Respondent. A hearing was conducted, and the Pennsylvania board concluded that the Respondent was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and was guilty of unethical conduct. The Board stated: It is clear that the Respondent blatantly disregarded the health and welfare of the citizens of Pennsylvania and the Board can impose a penalty for such disregard. How- ever, the Board has taken into consideration the fact that the Respondent no longer resides or practices osteopathic medicine in Pennsylvania, and therefore, he is presently not a danger to the health, safety and welfare of Pennsylvania. Apparently disregarding the testimony of the Respondent in the record that he did intend to continue practicing osteopathic medicine in Pennsylvania if his license was not revoked, the Board imposed no penalty against the Respondent. The Respondent thus continues to be licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Pennsylvania. The Respondent is presently engaged in the general practice of osteopathic medicine in Florida. He practices in a black area and is the only doctor who accepts Medicaid patients in the area. During 1976 he turned in his federal license to dispense controlled substances. He is thus not able to prescribe controlled substances in his practice, but he can prescribe other drugs. The Respondent has not been the subject of any other disciplinary proceedings during his many years as a practicing osteopathic physician.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. DAVID STURDIVANT, 87-001180 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001180 Latest Update: Feb. 08, 1988

Findings Of Fact Prior to and during part of 1983 Dr. Sturdivant practiced as an osteopathic physician. Dr. Sturdivant operated an office in Bradenton, Florida. Sometime during 1983 Dr. Sturdivant met and discussed employment with Dr. Daniel Clark. Dr. Clark operated the Total Health Care Clinic Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Center"), in Ormond Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Dr. Clark had been licensed as a physician in Florida. Dr. Clark's license to practice medicine in Florida was revoked, however, on April 21, 1983. As a result of his discussions with Dr. Clark, Dr. Sturdivant practiced medicine at the Center four days a week during most of 1983. One day a week Dr. Sturdivant continued to work out of his office in Bradenton. Sometime during 1984 Dr. Sturdivant left the Center. He did not return to the Center until 1985. During the early part of 1985 Dr. Sturdivant returned to the Center where he worked full time as the Center's Medical Director. Dr. Sturdivant worked at the Center from at least March 27, 1985 to at least June 22, 1985. During the period of time during 1985 that Dr. Sturdivant acted as the Medical Director of the Center, Dr. Clark's title was Administrator of the Center. During the period of time after April 21, 1983, that Dr. Sturdivant was employed at the Center Dr. Sturdivant knew or had reason to know that Dr. Clark's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida had been revoked. During the portion of 1985 that Dr. Sturdivant was employed as the Medical Director of the Center Dr. Sturdivant was aware that he was responsible for the medical care of patients seen at the Center. Ms. Judy Baxley was seen as a patient at the Center several times beginning in March, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director. Ms. Baxley was treated for asthma and a "yeast" infection. Ms. Baxley was seen by Dr. Clark on some of her visits. She received medical tests and treatments at the direction of Dr. Clark, as evidenced, at least in part, by progress notes signed by Dr. Clark. Ms. Shirley Van Gampler was seen as a patient at the Center on May 8, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center. Ms. Van Gampler was seen by Dr. Clark as a patient. Dr. Clark's treatment of Ms. Van Gampler included examination, testing and diagnosis, as evidenced, at least in part, by progress notes signed by Dr. Clark. Mr. Douglas Cutsail was seen as a patient at the Center in April, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director. Mr. Cutsail had a history of heart attacks and hypertension. He went to the Clinic in an effort to control his high blood pressure. Dr. Clark treated Mr. Cutsail as a patient, performing tests on Mr. Cutsail and directing chelation therapy treatments of Mr. Cutsail's medical problems. Dr. Clark signed the progress notes on Mr. Cutsail. Dr. Sturdivant also signed the progress notes but his signature was added at a later date after Dr. Clark had already treated Mr. Cutsail. Ms. Eileen Deasy was seen as a patient at the Center in April, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center. Dr. Clark treated Ms. Deasy as a patient, as evidenced by progress notes signed by Dr. Clark. Ms. Lonna Sloan was seen as a patient at the Center in April, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center. Ms. Sloan, who is now deceased, had breast cancer at the time she was seen by Dr. Clark. Ms. Sloan was treated as a patient by Dr. Clark. The treatment received by Ms. Sloan was substandard treatment. Dr. Sturdivant allowed Dr. Clark to exercise professional medical responsibilities during 1985 while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center and with knowledge that Dr. Clark was not licensed to carry out those responsibilities.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Dr. Sturdivant's license to practice in the State of Florida be suspended for a period of one (1) year. It is further, RECOMMENDED that the recommended suspension of Dr. Sturdivant's license for one (1) year be stayed and set aside and that he be placed on probation for a period of three (3) years in lieu thereof. During the period that Dr. Sturdivant is on probation, he should be required to work under the supervision of an osteopathic physician. He should not work in any supervisory capacity. During the period of his probation, Dr. Sturdivant and his supervisor should submit quarterly written reports of Dr. Sturdivant's employment activities. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Stipulated to by the parties. 2 3. 2 and 4. 5 and 6. 5 6. 6 7. 7 8. 8 9. 9 10. 10 11. 11 12. 12-13 13. This is a conclusion of law. Lonna Sloan's deposition is hearsay. It has been accepted only to the extent that it corroborates the testimony of Dr. Smith and Petitioner's exhibit 3, the progress notes on Ms. Sloan. Summary of testimony. Cumulative and hearsay. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. The evidence established that Dr. Sturdivant was aware that Dr. Clark's license to practice in Florida had been revoked. Whether Dr. Clark had a license to practice in Georgia is irrelevant. The evidence failed to prove this contention. The evidence did prove that some of the products sold by the Center were nutritional products available in health food stores. The evidence also proved that persons who received nutritional products were treated medically by Dr. Clark. The evidence failed to prove that these nutritional products were prescribed as only for nutritional purposes. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Branson, Esquire William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 David L. Sturdivant, D.O. 800 South Nova Road Suite H Ormond Beach, Florida 32074 Mr. Rod Presnell Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Osteopathic Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68459.015
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