The Issue Whether or not Sohio, a subsidiary of BP Oil Company, Inc., is liable for the payment of certain local option gas taxes to the Department of Revenue under the facts of this case.
Findings Of Fact This cause was initiated by the Petition for Formal Hearing filed with the Department of Revenue on or about February 2, 1989. This petition was in response to the Department's assessment of February 29, 1988. During the period from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1987, Petitioner Sohio made sales of gasoline to various customers including 290,698 gallons of gasoline to Enos Ying (Ying), and 634,555 gallons of gasoline to Basil Roberts (Roberts). Petitioner's sales to Ying and to Roberts occurred at their respective places of business in Broward County, Florida, which imposed a six cent per gallon local option gas tax, pursuant to Chapter 336, F.S. during 1986 and 1987. At all times material, Petitioner was licensed in the State of Florida as a "refiner". Petitioner collected motor fuel tax under Chapter 206, F.S., but did not collect or remit local option gasoline tax under Chapter 336, F.S., with regard to its sale of gasoline to Ying and to Roberts. Petitioner did not obtain resale certificates or affidavits from Ying or Roberts covering its sales to them. On November 1, 1985, the Department of Revenue published an "Important Notice to all Retail Gasoline Dealers" which stated that: Effective January 1, 1986, Sections 336.021 and 336.025, Florida Statutes, requires (sic) the Retail Gasoline Dealer to collect and remit the local option gas tax and the voted gas tax on the sale of motor or special fuel at the retail level within a county which imposes one of the above taxes. On January 17, 1986, the Department of Revenue issued an "Important Notice to Motor Fuel Wholesalers, Importers or Distributors Concerning 1986 Licenses" and a list of retail service stations licensed for 1986 as of January 10, 1986, which notice stated: Those accounts that are unlicensed in 1986 will be receiving notification concerning their account and should secure their licenses immediately in order to prevent further complications, On the reverse side of the aforesaid notice, it was stated, Those accounts that are licensed in 1986 are responsible for remitting the local option gas taxes under Chapter 336, Florida Statutes. If you sell to an unlicensed retail dealer, the wholesaler, importer or refiner is responsible for collecting and remitting the local option taxes due under Chapter 336, Florida Statutes. Evidence should be obtained from the retail dealers as to his (sic) current status with the Department prior to selling to the account on a tax-free (Chapter 336, F.S.) basis. No rules or regulations of the Respondent Department under Chapter 336, F.S. or which make specific reference to Chapter 336, F.S. were promulgated by the Department during the period in question. On February 29, 1988, the Respondent issued a notice of delinquent local option gas tax, penalty and interest due and assessed against Petitioner in the amount of $1,302,545.13 (tax of $956,420.65, penalty of $229,806.11 and interest of $116,318.37) regarding sales made by the Petitioner to its customers including Ying and Roberts. A schedule describing the items forming the basis of the assessment was enclosed therewith, which schedule described the transaction subject to the assessment as being sales made to unlicensed retail dealers. The Respondent has never pursued collection of the tax, penalty and interest at issue from either Ying or Roberts. Petitioner did not know or have reason to know whether or not Ying or Roberts had paid the tax in question. On March 17, 1988, Petitioner filed a protest with the office of the General Counsel of the Florida Department of Revenue objecting to the entire assessment on the grounds Petitioner was not liable for the local option tax in regard to the subject transactions and in the alternative, that the retail dealers involved were either listed by the Department of Revenue as being licensed or had filed returns and previously paid their tax. By letter dated April 5, 1988, Petitioner was informed by Christine F. McCann, Special Programs Analyst, Bureau of Enforcement of the Florida Department Revenue, that the above referenced assessment had been revised downward to reflect the liability of $253,260.11 (tax of $182,813.42, penalty of $45,370.91, and interest of $25,075.78) on the grounds that the Petitioner had identified certain dealers as being licensed by the Department, who were part of a transaction for which the Respondent sought to tax Petitioner. As a result of an informal conference held on May 27, 1988, a Notice of Reconsideration was issued on December 7, 1988 which further reduced the assessment against Petitioner to a total of $80,463.39 (tax of $57,769.38, interest of $8,251.61 and penalty of $14,442.40) on the grounds that the Petitioner either identified additional dealers as being licensed by the Department or demonstrated that the retail dealers though not licensed by the Department, had paid the tax in question in regard to the subject transactions. The assessment as revised by the Department's Notice of Reconsideration continues to be in error in that it yet includes certain retail dealers although not licensed and other than Ying and Roberts, who have already paid the tax in question and therefore the assessment should be revised downward further. After the above-referenced adjustment, there remains and is now in controversy in this case the following amounts: SALES TO YING SALES TO ROBERTS Tax $17,436.48 Tax $38,073.30 Penalty 4,359.13 Penalty 9,518.37 Interest to Interest to 4/20/89 4,073.15 4/20/89 9,679.30 TOTAL $25,868.76 $57,270.97 GRAND TOTAL $83,139.73 as of 4/20/89. Should the Respondent prevail in this matter, interest will continue to accrue until the tax is paid. During the course of the informal protest procedures before the Department of Revenue, Petitioner established that all the sales which were the subject of the original notice, except those to Ying and to Roberts, were either to licensed gasoline retailers or to unlicensed gasoline retailers who had collected and remitted the local option tax due. Upon the testimony of Charles (Chuck) M. Reed Jr., Retail Marketer, who has been a dealer lease and supply agent for Ying and for Roberts from Gulf BP, parent corporation of Petitioner Sohio, it is found that Sohio's customary sales both to Ying and to Roberts were made exclusively by filling underground gasoline tanks at the respective establishments of Ying and of Roberts on delivery by the truckload of no less than 7,100 gallons and no more than 8,402 gallons at a time. Also upon the basis of his testimony and the photographs he took which were admitted in evidence, it is found that Ying and Roberts made retail sales to the general motoring public. More specifically, signs posting product affiliation and prices [see Section 206.01 (7) F.S.] which were observed by Mr. Reed identified each of these establishments as retail outlets. The sales agreements between Petitioner and Ying and between Petitioner and Roberts are also clearly in support of this finding. It is also proper to infer from Mr. Reed's testimony that he watched a majority of the gasoline gallons sold to Roberts and to Ying pumped into their respective underground tanks and then observed them pumping gasoline out of those tanks into motorists' cars via the traditional hose arrangements found in commercial gasoline stations, that it was the same Sohio gasoline which was pumped and sold by Ying and Roberts at retail. It was not necessary for Mr. Reed to physically observe the gasoline coursing through the hoses or account specifically day by day from delivery in bulk by Sohio to dispensation one car gasoline tank at a time by Ying and by Roberts in light of the exclusivity clauses of their contracts with Sohio. Therefore, Sohio established that the gasoline it sold to Ying and to Roberts was resold by Ying and by Roberts to the general motoring public. Ying and Roberts therefore fall in the category of being gasoline retailers unlicensed by the Department of Revenue, of whom it is undetermined whether they submitted their county local option gas tax due and from whom Petitioner Sohio, licensed as a refiner, did not obtain resale certificates or affidavits covering Sohio's sales to them. Petitioner did not establish that Ying and Roberts had collected and remitted the local option gasoline tax in controversy. There is no statute or rule which precludes Petitioner selling to an unlicensed dealer. Respondent Department of Revenue requested that Petitioner Sohio provide information which would indicate whether Ying and Roberts had collected and remitted the local option gasoline tax. Since all of the revisions and reductions of the original assessment against Petitioner as set out above were done by the Respondent based on information supplied by the Petitioner, the Respondent anticipated that Petitioner also would be able to provide information on Ying and Roberts. Respondent could have searched its records to find out if Ying and Roberts had paid their tax, and then gone directly to Ying and Roberts to find out why they did not pay the tax, if that were the case. However, due to the agency's search system which is geared to retailer license numbers, Department of Revenue employees asserted that such a search is probably impossible and certainly is impractical. All retail gasoline dealers are required to be licensed in order to sell gasoline. Accordingly, income tax forms are mailed by the agency only to those retail dealers who have obtained a license, despite the assertion in the agency's Notice described in Finding of Fact 8 that unlicensed retailers who had paid their tax without such a number/license were traceable. The problem appears to be that Petitioner sold to persons (unlicensed retailers Ying and Roberts) who had no vehicles (respective retail license numbers) by which to submit the local option gas tax. Instead of pursuing Ying and Roberts for payment of the county local option gas tax, the agency chose to come back against Petitioner for either the certificates or affidavits specifically required with regard to collection and remittance of the state motor fuel tax under Section 206.425 F.S., or for other proof of Roberts' and Ying's compliance concerning the county local option gas tax. According to Mr. Zych, Administrator of the Disposition Section of the Office of the General Counsel and superior to Ms. McCann, the agency would have accepted properly executed retail certificates if Petitioner had gotten them. Without such proof forthcoming from Petitioner, the agency held Petitioner liable for the local option gas tax imposed by the statute upon the retailer. So far as Ms. McCann, Respondent's Special Program Analyst, was concerned, this election to proceed against Sohio was completely in the discretion of her superior. There is no rule that requires Petitioner to get an exemption certificate or affidavit before they sell to a retail dealer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order rescinding its Notice of Assessment against Petitioner with regard to its sales to Ying and Roberts and letting Petitioner go hence without ay. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0638 The following constitutes specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the parties respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner' s PFOF: All of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted, but those not adopted have not been adopted because they are unnecessary, subordinate to the facts as found or mere legal argument. Respondent ` s PFOF: 1.-6. Accepted. 7. Accepted as modified to conform to the record and the natural inferences of the evidence of record. 8.-11. Accepted but not necessarily adopted as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 12. Accepted. 13.-15. Accepted but not necessarily adopted as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the competent substantial evidence and the natural logical inferences there from. Accepted but not adopted because not dispositive of any material issue of fact in dispute in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Taylor, Esquire Excise Tax Analyst Ira L Smith, Esquire Director, Ad Volorem Tax Division BP America, Inc. 200 Public Square 38-3600-L Cleveland, Ohio 44114-2375 Lealand McCharen Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 William D. Townsend General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Katie D. Tucker Executive Director 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Petitioner owes tax in the amount of $4,554.80 plus a penalty and interest on the sale of special fuel between December 1, 1976, and December 31, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Miami Tiresoles, Inc., sells both new and retreaded tires for cars and trucks. The company also sells gasoline and diesel fuel. It is licensed by the Department as a dealer in special fuels. As far as this case is concerned special fuel is number 2 diesel oil. Unless an exemption is met each gallon of special fuel sold by MTS is taxed by the Department at a rate of eight cents per gallon. The Department has given BITS a revised notice of proposed assessment of tax for the sale of special fuel in the amount of $4,551.88 plus a penalty of $455.48 and interest in the amount of $735.11 (through April 21, 1980). The tax figure on the assessment appears to reflect a typographical error. The Department's records (Exhibit A) indicate that for the period in question, 2/ MTS sold 56,936 gallons of special fuel subject to tax according to the Department's interpretation of the law. If a tax at a rate of eight cents per gallon is due, then the amount due should be $4,554.88 and not $4,551.88. The correct tax figure is reflected on the Department's work sheets but was probably misread when the figure was transferred to the revised Notice of Assessment issued on April 21, 1980. The foregoing assessment is based on MTS' invoices which reflect sales of special fuel to customers in amounts of more than 110 gallons at one time. Those sales were made to MTS customers who have filed with MTS a document called "Purchaser's Exemption Certificate". A typical example of such a certificate states: PURCHASER'S EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE The undersigned hereby certifies that the motor duel (sic) and/or special fuel pur- chased on 1-19-79 is for the following purpose as checked in the space provided. (X) Purchased for home, industrial, com- mercial, agricultural or marine purposes for consumption other than for the propul- sion of a motor vehicle. ( ) Purchased at bulk plant or terminal in volumes of not more than 110 gallons for delivery into a receptacle not connected to the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle for consumption other than for the propulsion of a motor vehicle. Purchaser is aware that if this exemption if (sic) falsely claimed, or if this certificate is not rescinded at the time he fails to quality (sic) for the exemption, he shall be liable for the taxes imposed under Chapter 206, F.S. Furthermore, by issuing this certificate, the purchaser also certifies that he does not have any motor vehicles which use special fuel for propulsion. This certificate is to continue in force until revoked by written notice to MIAMI TIRESOLES, INC. Purchaser Trade Name A ACME SANDBLASTING, INC. Street Address 9521 W. Oakmont Dr. ,Hialeah,Fla. 33015 BY /s/ The industrial customers of MTS (those who have filed an exemption certificate) are engaged in the construction business. They use the diesel fuel to operate bulldozers, front-end loaders, back hoes, sandblasters and similar equipment. None of the fuel is used for the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of Florida. All the fuel in question is sold on the premises of MTS. At the time of sale it is placed either in the fuel tank of a particular piece of equipment such as a back hoe, or it is placed in a fuel storage tank mounted on the back of a truck. The storage tanks are not connected so they can provide fuel for the propulsion of the truck. They are used to transport fuel to the purchaser's particular job site. The storage tanks have a capacity of between 100 to 300 gallons. MTS does not have delivery trucks of its own and has no facilities for taking fuel to its customers' job sites. A single invoice of MTS which indicates a sale of 110 gallons of special fuel to an individual customer is frequently the result of a sale where multiple fuel tanks are filled at one time. For Instance, the customer may have a back hoe sitting on the rear of a flat-bed truck. He will fill the fuel tank in his back hoe and then perhaps fill an additional 55 gallon drum or two which would be on the truck. This would occur all in one transaction. The reason why the Department seeks to tax special fuel sold by MTS to its industrial customers in an amount exceeding 110 gallons is because the fuel was placed in the customers' own fuel tanks on the premises of MTS and not on the premises of the customer or at the customer's job site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming its assessment for a special fuel tax against the Petitioner in the amount of $4,554.88 plus penalty and interest computed pursuant to Section 206.44, Florida Statutes (1979). DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March 1981.
The Issue Whether Petitioners are liable for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department)?
Findings Of Fact Salma is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 2231 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida, 33990. Gausia is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 11571 Gladiolus Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, 33908. Petitioners are in the business of operating gas stations with convenience stores. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. Petitioners were selected for audit because their reported gross sales were less than the total cost of items purchased (inventory) for the audit period. The Department issued Salma and Gausia each a Notice of Intent to Conduct a Limited Scope Audit or Self-Audit, dated April 26, 2013, for sales and use tax, for the period February 1, 2010, through January 31, 2013 (collectively referred to as the Notices). The Notices requested that Petitioners provide the Department: (a) a list of all their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) their total purchases of alcohol and tobacco, by vendor, for the period July 2010 to June 2011; (c) copies of their federal tax returns for the examination period; (d) purchase receipts for all purchases for the last complete calendar month; and (e) daily register (Z tapes) for the last complete calendar month. The Notices gave Petitioners 60 days to gather the requested documents before the audit was to commence. The Notices also requested that Petitioners complete an attached Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet. In response to the Notices, Petitioners requested a 30- day extension of time until July 18, 2013, to provide the requested documents and to designate a Power of Attorney. Petitioners did not provide the Department any books and records for inspection, nor did they complete and return the questionnaire and self analysis worksheets. As a result, the Department's auditor determined the sales tax due based upon the best information available. To calculate an estimated assessment of sales tax, the Department used the purchase data of Petitioners' wholesalers and distributors of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011; the 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and in-store sales percentages of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products; and historical audit data. After reviewing the purchase data for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, and for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012, the Department's auditor determined that the data was missing a few vendors. As a result, the Department's auditor estimated the amount of Petitioners' cigarette purchases, based on historical audit data that shows that cigarette sales are generally 4.31 times more than beer sales. The Department's auditor and audit supervisor testified that the estimated gross sales seemed reasonable and consistent with the national averages and the purchase data for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012. The Department estimated gross sales (i.e., the retail sale value of the goods sold) by marking up the taxable sales and exempt sales reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners. For example, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Salma purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $148,826.15, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $189,009.21. For July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Gausia purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $132,138.65, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $167,816.09. The Department's markup on the alcoholic beverage and tobacco products is reasonable because the Department's auditor testified that he used a combination of 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and the competitive pricing and information from audits of other convenience stores. The Department determined that the exemption ratio reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners was extremely high for their industry. The Department used an exemption ratio of 15 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry, to calculate Petitioners' estimated taxable sales. A review of Petitioners' sales and use tax returns revealed that they did not apply the tax bracket system to their taxable sales transactions, as required under sections 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes. Instead, Petitioners remitted sales tax on their taxable sales based on their gross receipts at a flat tax rate. The Department's auditor testified that this method of reporting tax is inappropriate and does not accurately reflect the sales activity of the business. The Department calculated the average effective tax rate of 6.0856 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry. To calculate the estimated tax due, the Department multiplied the effective tax rate by the estimated taxable sales and gave Petitioners credit for any tax remitted with their tax returns. The Department issued Salma a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149872. The Department issued Gausia a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149749. The Department assessed Petitioners sales tax on their sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes gave Petitioners 30 days to request a conference with the auditor or audit supervisor, to dispute the proposed changes. Petitioners did not make such a request. The Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) to Salma on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $159,282.26; for penalty in the sum of $39,820.57; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $27,772.36. The Department issued a NOPA to Gausia on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $213,754.46; for penalty in the sum of $53,438.62; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $36,921.79. Additional interest accrues at $30.55 per day until the tax is paid. The NOPAs became final assessments on May 5, 2014. After filing a request for an administrative hearing, Petitioners completed the Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet and produced the following documents to the Department: (a) a list of all of their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) a list of vendors for alcohol and tobacco, for the examination period of July 2010 to June 2011; (c) a summary of their taxable sales, for the period February 2010 through December 2012; (d) copies of their federal tax returns, for the tax years 2010 through 2013; (e) copies of its purchase receipts for the months of July 2013; and (f) copies of their daily register (Z-tapes) for the month of July 2013. The Department's auditor testified that aside from being untimely, the records and information provided by Petitioners during these proceedings were not reliable because Petitioners did not provide any source documents that would allow the Department to reconcile the reported figures and confirm the supplied information. In addition, the purchase receipts and Z- tapes were not relevant because they were from outside of the audit period. The Z-tapes are also unreliable because the manager of the convenience store testified at the final hearing that employees purposely and routinely entered taxable sales into the cash registers as tax exempt sales. Petitioners argue that the Department did not use the best information available when estimating the taxes due. Petitioners claim that because their businesses are combination gas station/convenience stores, the national data for standalone convenience stores is inapplicable. However, notably absent from Petitioners' testimony or evidence was any alternative data upon which the Department could have relied for more accurate estimates.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioners' requests for relief and assessing, in full, the Department's assessments of sales tax, penalty, and interest against both Salma and Gausia. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are, first, whether, as Petitioner alleges, Intervenor's failure to attach copies of "occupational licenses" to its proposal was a deviation from the requirements of the Request for Proposal; second, whether any such deviation was material; and third, whether Respondent's preliminary decision to award Intervenor the contract at issue was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact On September 18, 2009, Respondent Department of Transportation ("Department") issued Request for Proposal No. RFP-DOT-09/10-4007FS (the "RFP"). Through the RFP, which is entitled, "Treasure Coast Road Ranger Service Patrol," the Department solicited written proposals from qualified providers who would be willing and able to perform towing and emergency roadside services on Interstate 95 in Martin County, St. Lucie County, and Indian River County. The Department intended to award a three-year contract to the "responsive and responsible Proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department." The Department anticipated that the contract would have a term beginning on December 1, 2009, and ending on November 31, 2012. The annual contract price was not to exceed $1.59 million. Proposals were due on October 13, 2009. Four firms timely submitted proposals in response to the RFP, including Petitioner Sunshine Towing @ Broward, Inc. ("Sunshine") and Intervenor Anchor Towing and Marine of Broward, Inc. ("Anchor"). An evaluation ensued, pursuant to a process described in the RFP, during which the Department rejected two of the four proposals for failing to meet minimum requirements relating to technical aspects of the project. As a result, Sunshine and Anchor emerged as the only competitors eligible for the award. Sunshine offered to perform the contractual services for an annual price of $1,531,548. This sum was less than the price that Anchor proposed by $46,980 per year. Despite Sunshine's lower cost, Anchor nevertheless edged Sunshine in the final score, receiving 92.86 points (out of 100) from the Department's evaluators, to Sunshine's 87.75. On November 30, 2009, the Department duly notified the public of its intent to award the contract to Anchor. Sunshine promptly initiated the instant protest, whereby Sunshine seeks to have Anchor's proposal disqualified as nonresponsive, in hopes that the Department will then award the contract to Sunshine as the highest-ranked (indeed the sole) responsive proposer. Sunshine alleges that Anchor's proposal failed to conform strictly to the specifications of the RFP, principally because Anchor did not attach copies of its "occupational licenses" to the proposal. Anchor insists that its proposal was responsive but argues, alternatively, that if its proposal deviated from the specifications, the deviation was merely a minor irregularity which the Department could waive. Anchor further contends that Sunshine's proposal contains material deviations for which it should be deemed nonresponsive. The Department takes the position that Anchor's failure to attach "occupational licenses" was a minor irregularity that could be (and was) waived.1 The RFP includes a "Special Conditions" section wherein the specifications at the heart of this dispute are located. Of particular interest is Special Condition No. 8, which specifies the qualifications a provider must have to be considered qualified to perform the services called for under the contract to be awarded. Special Condition No. 8 provides as follows: QUALIFICATIONS General The Department will determine whether the Proposer is qualified to perform the services being contracted based upon their proposal demonstrating satisfactory experience and capability in the work area. The Proposer shall identify necessary experienced personnel and facilities to support the activities associated with this proposal. Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals who will be directly involved in the project should have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise excepted by the Department's Project Manager. Where State of Florida registration or certification is deemed appropriate, a copy of the registration or certificate should be included in the proposal package. Authorized To Do Business in the State of Florida In accordance with sections 607.1501, 608.501, and 620.169, Florida Statutes, foreign corporations, foreign limited liability companies, and foreign limited partnerships must be authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Such authorization should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contact. For authorization, [contact the Florida Department of State].[2] Licensed to Conduct Business in the State of Florida If the business being provided requires that individuals be licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, such licenses should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contract. For licensing, [contact the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation]. References and experience must entail a minimum of three (3) years of experience in the towing industry in Florida. NOTE: Copies of occupational licenses must also be attached to the back of Form 'F'. (Boldface in original.) Special Condition No. 19, which defines the term "responsive proposal," provides as follows: RESPONSIVENESS OF PROPOSALS Responsiveness of Proposals Proposals will not be considered if not received by the Department on or before the date and time specified as the due date for submission. All proposals must be typed or printed in ink. A responsive proposal is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in this Request for Proposal in accordance with all the requirements of this Request for Proposal and receiving fifty (50) points or more on the Technical Proposal.[3] Proposals found to be non-responsive shall not be considered. Proposals may be rejected if found to be irregular or not in conformance with the requirements and instructions herein contained. A proposal may be found to be irregular or non-responsive by reasons that include, but are not limited to, failure to utilize or complete prescribed forms, conditional proposals, incomplete proposals, indefinite or ambiguous proposals, and improper and/or undated signatures. (Emphasis and boldface in original.) In the "General Instructions to Respondents" section of the RFP there appears the following reservation of rights: 16. Minor Irregularities/Right to Reject. The Buyer reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, and to waive any minor irregularity, technicality, or omission if the Buyer determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests. The Buyer may reject any response not submitted in the manner specified by the solicitation documents. Anchor did not attach copies of any "occupational licenses" to the back of Form 'F' in its proposal. Anchor contends that it did not need to attach such licenses because none exists. This position is based on two undisputed facts: (1) The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") does not regulate the business of providing towing and emergency roadside assistance; therefore, neither Anchor nor Sunshine held (or could hold) a state-issued license to operate, and neither company fell under DBPR's regulatory jurisdiction. (2) The instrument formerly known as an "occupational license," which local governments had issued for decades, not for regulatory purposes but as a means of raising revenue, is presently called (at least formally) a "business tax receipt," after the Florida Legislature, in 2006, amended Chapter 205 of the Florida Statutes, changing the name of that law from the "Local Occupational License Tax Act" to the "Local Business Tax Act." See 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 152. Sunshine asserts that the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are synonymous and interchangeable, and that the RFP required each offeror to attach copies of its occupational licenses/business tax receipts to the proposal. Sunshine insists that Anchor's failure to do so constituted a material deviation from the specifications because, without such documentation, the Department could not be sure whether an offeror was authorized to do business in any given locality. Sunshine presses this argument a step further based on some additional undisputed facts. As it happened, at the time the proposals were opened, Anchor held a local business tax receipt from the City of Pembroke Pines, which is the municipality in which Anchor maintains its principal place of business. Anchor had not, however, paid local business taxes to Broward County when they became due, respectively, on July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2009. Anchor corrected this problem on December 14, 2009, which was about two weeks after the Department had posted notice of its intent to award Anchor the contract, paying Broward County a grand total of $248.45 in back taxes, collection costs, and late penalties. As of this writing, all of Anchor's local business tax obligations are paid in full. Sunshine contends, however, that during the period of time that Anchor's Broward County business taxes were delinquent, Anchor was not authorized to do business in Broward County and hence was not a "responsible" proposer eligible for award of the contract. In support of this proposition, Sunshine relies upon Section 20-15 of the Broward County, Florida, Code of Ordinances ("Broward Code"), which states: Pursuant to the authority granted by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, no person shall engage in or manage any business, profession or occupation, as the same are contemplated by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, unless such person first obtains a business tax receipt as required by this article, unless other exempt from this requirement . . . . On this latter point regarding Anchor's authority to operate in Broward County, Sunshine appears to be correct, at least in a narrow legal sense. It is abundantly clear, however, and the undersigned finds, that, as a matter of fact, Anchor was never in any danger of being shut down by the county. Indeed, even under the strict letter of the local law, Anchor was entitled to continue operating in Broward County unless and until the county took steps to compel the payment of the delinquent taxes. Broward Code Section 20-22, which deals with the enforcement of the business tax provisions, provides: Whenever any person who is subject to the payment of a business tax or privilege tax provided by this article shall fail to pay the same when due, the tax collector, within three (3) years from the due date of the tax, may issue a warrant directed to the Broward County Sheriff, commanding him/her to levy upon and sell any real or personal property of such person liable for said tax for the amount thereof and the cost of executing the warrant and to return such warrant to the tax collector and to pay him/her the money collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60) days from the date of the warrant. . . . The tax collector may file a copy of the warrant with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Broward County[, which shall be recorded in the public records and thereby] become a lien for seven (7) years from the due date of the tax. . . . Any person subject to, and who fails to pay, a business tax or privilege tax required by this article, shall, on petition of the tax collector, be enjoined by the Circuit Court from engaging in the business for which he/she has failed to pay said business tax, until such time as he/she shall pay the same with costs of such action. There is no evidence suggesting that the county ever sought to enjoin, or that a court ever issued an injunction prohibiting, Anchor from engaging in business, nor does it appear, based on the evidence, that a tax warrant ever was issued, filed, or executed to force Anchor to pay its back taxes. Given the relatively small amount of tax due, the likelihood of such enforcement actions being taken must reasonably be reckoned as slim to none. While paying taxes when due is certainly the obligation of a good corporate citizen, it would not be reasonable, based on the facts established in this case, to infer that Anchor is a scofflaw for failing to timely pay a local tax amounting to about $80 per year. Anchor, in short, was a responsible proposer. Sunshine's other argument has more going for it. The RFP clearly and unambiguously mandated that "occupational licenses" be attached to a proposal. If, as Sunshine maintains, the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are clearly synonymous, then Anchor's proposal was noncompliant. For reasons that will be explained below, however, the undersigned has concluded, as a matter of law, that the term "occupational license" does not unambiguously denote a "business tax receipt"——at least not in the context of Special Condition No. 8. The specification, in other words, is ambiguous. No one protested the specification or otherwise sought clarification of the Department's intent. The evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that the Department understood and intended the term "occupational license" to mean the instrument now known as a "business tax receipt." The Department simply used the outdated name, as many others probably still do, owing to that facet of human nature captured by the expression, "old habits die hard." The Department's interpretation of the ambiguous specification is not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be disturbed in this proceeding. Based on the Department's interpretation of Special Condition No. 8, the undersigned finds that Anchor's failure to attach copies of its occupational licenses was a deviation from the requirements of the RFP. That is not the end of the matter, however, for a deviation is not necessarily disqualifying unless it is found to be material. The letting authority may, in the exercise of discretion, choose to waive a minor irregularity if doing so will not compromise the integrity and fairness of the competition. There is no persuasive direct evidence in the record that the Department made a conscious decision to waive the irregularity in Anchor's proposal. Documents in the Department's procurement file show, however, that the Department knew that Anchor's proposal lacked copies of occupational licenses, and in any event this was a patent defect, inasmuch as nothing was attached to the back of Anchor's Form 'F'. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Department elected to waive the irregularity, and the undersigned so finds. Necessarily implicit in the Department's action (waiving the deficiency) is an agency determination that that the irregularity was a minor one. The question of whether or not Anchor's noncompliance with Special Condition No. 8 was material is fairly debatable. Ultimately, however, the undersigned is unable to find, for reasons more fully developed below, that the Department's determination in this regard was clearly erroneous. Because the Department's determination was not clearly erroneous, the undersigned accepts that Anchor's failure to submit occupational licenses was a minor irregularity, which the Department could waive. The Department's decision to waive the minor irregularity is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless it was arbitrary or capricious. The undersigned cannot say that waiving the deficiency in question was illogical, despotic, thoughtless, or otherwise an abuse of discretion; to the contrary, once it has been concluded that the irregularity is minor and immaterial, as the Department not incorrectly did here, waiver seems the reasonable and logical course of action. The upshot is that the proposed award to Anchor should be allowed to stand. The foregoing determination renders moot the disputed issues of fact arising from Anchor's allegation that Sunshine's proposal was nonresponsive. It is unnecessary, therefore, for the undersigned to make additional findings on that subject.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order consistent with its preliminary decision to award Anchor the contract at issue. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010.
Findings Of Fact In a letter dated April 13, 1990, the Department informed the Petitioner, Cherokee Rental And Construction Co., Inc., that it was denying the Petitioner's request for refund of the $95.00 fuel tax and civil penalty assessment it had previously paid to the Department. In a letter received by the Department on February 13, 1990, the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the Department's decision. The address included on the Petitioner's letter was the address used by the Department to notify the Petitioner of its decision to deny its request for a refund. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on June 1, 1990, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address listed in its letter requesting a formal hearing. Neither party responded to the Notice. On July 12, 1990, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address listed in his letter requesting a formal hearing. The Petitioner did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Department was present at the hearing. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that he would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Petitioner to appear, the hearing was commenced. At the commencement of the formal hearing the Department was informed that it could proceed with the formal hearing or, since Petitioner had the burden of proof in this case, move for dismissal of the case. The Department elected to make an ore tenus motion for dismissal. The Department was informed that a Recommended Order would be issued recommending dismissal of this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's request for hearing in this case for failure to appear at the final hearing. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Read Cherokee Rental & Construction Co., Inc. Post Office Box 850606 Mobile, Alabama 36685 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's use of the 1998 percentages to distribute the local option gas tax revenues for fiscal year ending 2001 is contrary to applicable law.
Findings Of Fact By Interlocal Agreement Between Indian River County, Florida and City of Sebastian, Florida, dated June 25, 1996 (Interlocal Agreement), Petitioner and Respondent agreed upon a distribution schedule for the county and five municipalities within the county of the local option gas tax (Gas Tax). The schedule was based on a formula weighing equally each local government's lane miles of road, transportation expenditures over the past five years, and population (Formula). The Interlocal Agreement, which expires in 2026, provides that the "[F]ormula shall be reviewed every two years starting September 1, 1998." Indian River County Code (Code) Section 209.04 also addresses the distribution of the Gas Tax. Section 209.04(a) describes the Formula and adds: "The method of distribution of the [Gas Tax] revenues shall be reviewed and a public hearing held at least every two (2) years by the parties to the agreement." However, Code Section 209.04(b) provides in part: Each year, during the term of the imposition of this tax, the division and distribution of tax proceeds under this article shall be evaluated and recalculated based upon the . . . [F]ormula: [Formula omitted]. By August 15 of each year, the county shall provide the Florida State Department of Revenue a certified copy of the distribution proportions established by interlocal agreement under this section. The revised distribution of tax proceeds shall become effective on September 1 of each year. Historically, the local governments of Indian River County may have used reporting deadlines for Gas Tax data that did not conform with the deadlines imposed by the Department of Revenue, but the local governments have since changed their reporting deadlines and eliminated any inconsistencies. However, such inconsistencies do not relieve the parties of their responsibilities under the Interlocal Agreement and Code in distributing the Gas Tax revenues. Intervenor describes the situation well in its proposed recommended order. Historically, the local governments of Indian River County did not worry about the distribution formula due to their equal, and generally low, growth rates, but disparate growth rates between Petitioner and Intervenor have eroded this easy custom. Disdaining any attempt to wring from the Code an interpretation that suits its needs, Intervenor instead contends only that it relied on the current distribution formula in preparing its current budget. Intervenor claims that it would not be good budget practice and, thus, would be contrary to the public interest, to require it to revise its budget in the middle of the year due to reduced Gas Tax revenues. As Intervenor implicitly concedes, the Code requires an annual recalculation of the distribution percentage, applying current data to the Formula and then distributing the Gas Tax revenues accordingly. Apparently, the effect of this recalculation for fiscal year ending 2001 would be to increase Petitioner's share by about $40,000, evidently largely at the expense of Intervenor. Although Intervenor's budget will be disturbed by the immediate implementation of this recalculation, the Code does not permit a contrary interpretation, and Intervenor was aware prior to adopting the current budget that Petitioner was insisting that the parties conform to the law in dividing the Gas Tax revenues. And it nearly goes without saying that the Formula is an equitable allocation of these revenues based on the respective needs of the local governments of Indian River County.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order sustaining Petitioner's appeal of the distribution of the Gas Tax revenues for fiscal year ending 2001, requiring Respondent to recalculate each local government's distribution percentage in accordance with the Interlocal Agreement and Code, and providing for an equitable adjustment to Gas Tax revenues that the Department of Revenue is currently distributing to the local governments of Indian River County. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna Arduin, Secretary Administration Commission Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol--Suite 1601 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Rich Stringer City Attorney City of Sebastian 1225 Main Street Sebastian, Florida 32958 William G. Collins II Deputy County Attorney Indian River County 1840 25th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Charles P. Vitunac Assistant City Attorney City of Vero Beach 1053 20th Place Vero Beach, Florida 32960
The Issue Whether this cause should be dismissed for Petitioner's failure to comply with Section 120.80(14)(b)3., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is contesting an assessment of taxes, pursuant to an audit conducted by Respondent Department of Revenue. The total amount of the assessment was $32,312.24. Following the audit, in a letter to the Department's auditor dated April 17, 2006, Petitioner's counsel stated that taxes "in the amount of $5,744.80 is something [Petitioner] would be obligated to pay under the laws of the State of Florida, and as such, they are willing to do so. They would be willing to pay interest due on this money."1/ This statement constitutes a clear admission that Petitioner owes the stated amount of the tax, $5,744.80, plus interest that accrues daily. Petitioner's Memorandum makes the un-sworn statement that: At the time the parties met to discuss the assessment with the representative of the Department of Revenue, Martha Watkins, they offered to pay $5,744.80 of the taxes but were informed it was part of the $32,312.24, and they could either pay it all or contest it. At all times material hereto the petitioners have stood ready to pay the $5,744.80. On April 17, 2006, we wrote a letter to Martha Watkins making this offer for the second time. On August 17, 2006, we again wrote to the Department of Revenue attaching our letter of April 17, 2006, again making this offer. At no time was a response received to either letter. The August 17, 2006, letter alluded to in Petitioner's Memorandum is not of record and neither a copy of that letter, nor an affidavit of its contents, has been submitted by either party. At no time has Petitioner asserted that any amount of tax money was unequivocally tendered to Respondent. No affidavit to that effect has been filed in this case. The Second Affidavit of Martha Watkins, submitted with the Department of Revenue's timely Memorandum states, in pertinent part: I conducted the audit of C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., from which arose the challenged assessment and this controversy. During the course of the audit, and subsequent communication with C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., regarding the audit and assessment of taxes and interest, C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., made at least one settlement offer, that was unacceptable, and was rejected by the Department as such. At no time did C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., unequivocally tender to me, or unequivocally offer to tender to me, the uncontested tax and applicable interest, and at no time did I refuse to accept any payment of taxes. On September 21, 2006, a Request for Administrative Hearing was filed with the Department of Revenue. On September 28, 2006, the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue entered an Order Dismissing the Petition with Leave to Amend. That Order reads, in pertinent part: On September 21, 2006, the Florida Department of Revenue received a "Request for Administrative Hearing" from Petitioner, C & C Mechanical Contractors. While the document clearly is a request for hearing, the petition does not state what the Petitioner is disputing. A record search shows that at least one Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued by the Department on June 15, 2006 to this Petitioner. It is impossible to determine from the petition whether this proposed assessment is being challenged. However, because this request was sent within the applicable time frame to dispute the Notice of Proposed Assessment, the Department will treat it as such. As required by law, the notice stated that a formal protest for an administrative hearing had to be received in the Office of the General Counsel within sixty days after the assessment became final and had to be in compliance with chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The petition fails to meet the requirements contained in chapter 120, Florida Statutes and Uniform Rule 28- 106.201, Florida Administrative Code, the appropriate rule for use in filing a petition requesting a hearing involving disputed issues of material fact. A copy of the appropriate rule is provided with this order. Specifically, the petition does not contain: (1) a statement of when and how the Petitioner received notice of the agency decision; (2) all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; (3) a concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts the Petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action; (4) a statement of the specific rules or statutes the Petitioner contends require reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action, and (5) a statement of the relief sought by the Petitioner, stating precisely the action the petitioner wishes the agency to take with respect to the agency's proposed action. Because of these deficiencies, Petitioner's documentation must be dismissed. IT IS ORDERED: The petition for hearing filed by Petitioner is DISMISSED. Such dismissal is without prejudice to Petitioner to amend the petition to provide the information listed above. . . . On October 11, 2006, the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed with the Department of Revenue. That Amended Petition stated, in pertinent part: 1. The Petitioner received a certified letter dated June 15, 2006, stating taxes were due and owing in the amount of $32,312.24. This amount included $5,774.80 in fabrication cost taxes which the Petitioner does not object too [sic]. The balance of the $32,312.24 was for taxes on items sold to non-taxable entities. The Petitioner would object to these taxes and gives as grounds the following: Items sold to non-taxable entities are not subject to the Florida Tax Code. The department made a determination the items sold to the non-taxable entities were taxable stating the contractor, in this case the Petitioner, was the end user. Florida Tax Code states in part ". . . a determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast." The department "shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property." The Department of Revenue has adopted a rule which is in violation of the incident [sic] of legislature and contrary to Florida Statute 212.08.2/ (Emphasis supplied). The Amended Petition constitutes a clear admission that the $5,744.80 portion of the taxes due under the audit were both uncontested and owed, as of October 11, 2006. The first Affidavit of Martha Watkins, filed November 28, 2006, in support of the pending Motion to Dismiss, states, in pertinent part: I am a [sic] sui juris and otherwise competent to testify in this matter. I am employed by the Florida Department of Revenue in the position of Tax Auditor III. I am familiar with the accounts, accounting methods, and maintenance of records at the Florida Department of Revenue for sales tax, interest, and penalties. I am authorized by the Department of Revenue to make affidavit regarding the payment status of sales taxes, interest and penalties relative to registered Florida dealers. I have reviewed, and have personal knowledge of the accounts of the Florida Department of Revenue regarding tax payment of C&C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., a Florida corporation that has in the past been issued a Certificate of Registration by the Department of Revenue. According to the records of the Department of Revenue, as of November 27, 2006, C&C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., has not paid any sums to the Department of Revenue against the assessed outstanding balance of sales tax, interest or penalties, since prior to April 16, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Revenue enter a final order dismissing the Amended Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2007.
The Issue The issues in these cases are (1) whether four tax warrants issued by Petitioner against Respondent, Frances Bowers, a/k/a Francis Bowers, d/b/a Shannon Oil Company and Shannon Service Stations, were properly issued; (2) whether two Notices of Freeze and two Notices of Intent to Levy on Respondent were properly issued; (3) whether the allegations of an Administrative Complaint entered March 1, 1995 by Petitioner against Respondent are correct; and (4) whether an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by Petitioner on or about March 3, 1995 was warranted.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Frances Bowers, a/k/a Francis Bowers, held a Special Fuel Dealers License #10-011382, a Motor Fuel Jobbers License #09-001450 and Retail Dealer License #’s 77- 000320 and 40-001175. The motor fuel and special fuel licenses were held at Highway 90 East, Caryville, Florida 32427. The retail dealer licenses were held at 1007 North Waukesh Street, Bonifay, Florida 32425 and Highway 279 South, Caryville, Florida 32427. Ms. Bowers operated under the business names of Shannon Oil Company or Shannon Service Station. Ms. Bowers has been engaged in the sale of fuel at various retail locations since 1986. She has engaged in the sale of special fuels (diesel) since May 10, 1985. She has operated as a motor fuel jobber (gasoline) since January 18, 1989. From April 1994 through December 1994, Ms. Bowers purchased special fuel from Murphy Oil Co. From May 1994 through July 1994, Ms. Bowers purchased special fuel from Beards Oil Co. For the period July 1993 through December 1994 Ms. Bowers delivered unsigned, no-remit tax returns to Petitioner, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”). Those returns were delivered by Ms. Bowers to Kathy Jones, a Department Revenue Specialist, at the Department’s Marianna offices. Returns for some months were not remitted. Ms. Bowers subsequently returned to the Department’s Marianna offices and signed the no-remit returns she had filed in the presence of Ms. Jones. The no-remit returns filed by Ms. Bowers indicate that she owed taxes pursuant to Chapters 206, 212, Part II and 336, Florida Statutes. No part of the tax Ms. Bowers indicated was owed was remitted by Ms. Bowers to the Department. For months for which no return was filed, the Department estimated the amount of tax owed. The Department issued Notices of Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Ms. Bowers in January 1995. These Notices informed Ms. Bowers of the Department’s intent to cause tax warrants for the outstanding taxes owed by Ms. Bowers to be filed with the Clerk of Court. Based upon the no-remit returns, the Department filed four tax warrants. The warrants were for total taxes of $218,801,56. Additionally, penalties, filing fees and interest was included in the tax warrants. The total amount for the four warrants, without the filing fees, was $187,167.18 attributable to Shannon Service Stations and $183,548.97 attributable to Shannon Oil Company. Included in the no-remit returns filed by Ms. Bowers were Special and Alternative Fuel Tax Returns. These returns indicated that Ms. Bowers had purchased “tax-paid” special fuel, meaning that she had paid the tax at the time she purchased the fuel. The tax was allegedly paid to Murphy Oil Co. or Beard’s Oil Co. Based upon the Special Fuel Tax Returns of Murphy Oil Co. and Beard’s Oil Co. no tax was paid by Ms. Bowers on purchases of special fuel purchased by Ms. Bowers. Copies of these returns were accepted into evidence without objection from Ms. Bowers. Ms. Bowers has admitted during her deposition testimony that she owes the outstanding taxes at issue in this proceeding. See Department’s exhibit 14. On or about February 28, 1995, the Department issued two Notices of Freeze and two Notices of Intent to Levy on Frances Bowers, a/k/a Francis Bowers, d/b/a Shannon Oil Company and Shannon Service Stations. Pursuant to the Notices, the Department notified Ms. Bowers that it intended to levy against her assets, consisting of deposits at the Bank of Bonifay, for outstanding taxes. The Department indicated that it was taking this action for nonpayment of taxes, penalty and interest in the sum of $183,548.97 attributable to Shannon Oil Company and in the sum of $187,267.18 attributable to Shannon Service Stations. On or about March 20, 1995, Ms. Bowers filed a Request for Administrative Hearing with the Department. Ms. Bowers contested the proposed levy and alleged that she had not failed to pay any taxes owed. On or about March 1, 1995, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint against Ms. Bowers. Pursuant to the Administrative Complaint, the Department informed Ms. Bowers that Special Fuel Dealers License #10-011382, Motor Fuel Jobbers License #09-001450 and Retail Dealer License #’s 77-000320 and 40-001175 were being revoked. This action was premised upon allegations that Ms. Bowers “failed to file or pay fuel taxes collected for the period of July, 1993 through December, 1994”. The Department also issued an Emergency Order of Suspension on or about March 3, 1995. Pursuant to this Order, the Department suspended the licenses held by Ms. Bowers which the Department sought to revoke in the Administrative Complaint. On or about March 22, 1995, Ms. Bowers sent a Petition for Administrative hearing to the Department in response tot he Administrative Complaint. Ms. Bowers disputed in the Petition whether she had failed to remit outstanding taxes or that she owed such taxes as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. All of the exhibits and the facts of this matter were stipulated to by Ms. Bowers. Ms. Bowers also stipulated to the revocation of her licenses, the emergency suspension order issued by the Department, the issuance of the tax warrants and the Notices of Freeze and Notices of Intent to Levy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered upholding the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department’s Administrative Complaint, the four tax warrants issued by the Department against Respondent and the Notices of Intent to Freeze and Notices of Intent to Levy. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of February 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Albert J. Wollermann John N. Upchurch Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Owen N. Powell, Esquire Post Office Box 789 Bonifay, Florida 32425
The Issue The issue for determination is whether DOAH has jurisdiction to entertain an agency's motion for attorney's fees brought pursuant to section 185.05(5), Florida Statutes, where the motion was filed with DOAH approximately two and one-half years after the agency's entry of a final order in the administrative proceeding for which the agency seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs.
The Issue Petitioner's liability for proposed assessment of fuel tax and penalty pursuant to Chapter 206, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Barkett Oil Company, Miami, Florida, is a distributor of motor fuel and a dealer in special fuel licensed by Respondent. During the period 1971 through 1974, it held three licenses for motor fuel and three for special fuel. It owned over 100 fuel service stations during that period. At the time petitioner obtained its licenses, it provided Respondent with a list of its stations' fuel storage tank capacities. However, over the years and prior to 1971, the fuel capacity of 12 stations was increased by the addition of tanks in the total amount of some 57,000 gallons, but Petitioner did not advise Respondent of such changed capacity. (Testimony of Barkett, Respondent's Exhibit 3). In May 1974, D. L. Hunt, Respondent's auditor, conducted an audit of Petitioner's business for the period April 1971 through March 1974. Petitioner made most of its existing records available to the auditor, including purchase and sale invoices, and monthly tax reports which had been timely filed with Respondent during the audit period. Petitioner used Respondent's standard forms for the monthly tax returns which reflected an inventory of fuel at the beginning of the month plus gallons acquired during the month, less nontaxable sales. These computations resulted in net gallonage subject to fuel tax on which the tax was remitted, less a collection fee. Petitioner's standard business practice had been to conduct its monthly inventory in the morning of the last day of the monthly period. However, by this method, sales and deliveries which were made during the remaining portion of the day, and fuel contained in its trucks were reflected in the next month's report. Once the inventory was made, Petitioner recorded the "stick" measurements of fuel on hand at the various stations in its computer and discarded the individual station inventory records. State tax returns were then prepared using the figures derived from the computer "print-out." (Testimony of Hunt, Barkett, Petitioner's Exhibit 1,3). During the course of his audit, Mr. Hunt ascertained that the recorded purchases and sales as reflected on the monthly tax returns were correct. However, he noted that fuel on hand at the end of each month apparently exceeded Petitioner's storage capacity. He therefore asked for inventory records in the form of tank readings, but was informed that they had been destroyed and he was not informed that the readings from the "stick" measurements had been processed by computer and that this stored information was available. Hunt therefore made audit findings that the amount of gallonage on hand at the end of each month over and above Petitioner's storage capacity was taxable, even though there was no showing that the fuel had actually been sold. He also predicated penalties against Petitioner for late payment of tax because sales made during the latter half of the last day of the reporting month were carried over to next month's report. Additionally, he found that certain untaxed sales should have been taxed. In February 1975, a proposed assessment of tax and penalties was issued in the total amount of $375,543.27. A number of informal conferences were held by the parties which resulted in certain adjustments to the proposed assessment, primarily consisting of tax exempt sales. As a result of these conferences, the asserted tax was reduced to $245,652.96, with penalties of $39,405.04, for a total amount of $285,058.00. Thereafter, further reductions were made in the assessment, as reflected in a letter from Respondent's counsel to Petitioner's counsel, dated July 22, 1977. This letter stated that the remaining assessment consisted of tax due in the amount of $27,216.05, with penalties of $63,269.22, for total amount due of $90,485.27. The letter explained that the differences in the penalties consisted of instances where the tax had not been timely paid on fuel which had been sold. For instance, as to license No. 391, the letter showed that although only $2,378.46 in additional tax was due, penalties over the audit period amount to $38,769.19. (Testimony of Hunt, Barkett, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Respondent's Exhibits 1-2, 5, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). During the course of informal negotiations, Petitioner's counsel, by letter of April 17, 1978, to Respondent's counsel, provided a corrected list of the capacity of twelve of its stations. Respondent's auditor Hunt had checked four of these stations, but was unable to determine the existence of additional tanks at those locations. He also declined to accept the computer printout sheets as a basis for determining inventory because the actual tank reading reports were not available. At the hearing, Petitioner's president, Harry Barkett, established that additional tanks had existed at the four locations during the audit period. (Testimony of Hunt, Barkett, Petitioner's Exhibit 4-8, Respondent's Exhibit 3, 4). A certified public accountant retained by Petitioner testified that he had audited Petitioner's books and had personally reconciled inventory amounts for the fiscal year 1972-73. He further testified that Petitioner's accounting procedures were proper and that even if inventory had been overstated, it had no effect on sales, and that any unreported sales during one monthly period would be overstated in the following month, which would balance out any prior underpayments. He had never found any discrepancy in Petitioner's fuel reports and found no accounting reason for retaining "stick" readings after the information had been placed in the computer. (Testimony of Pfeiffer).
Recommendation That Respondent proceed to collect the amount of $5,707.50 from Petitioner for unpaid fuel tax under Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, but that the remainder of the proposed assessment be withdrawn. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Maxie Broome, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Milton J. Wallace, Esquire 2138 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137
