The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") properly disallowed Petitioners' expense for liability insurance and accrued contingent liability costs contained in AHCA's audit of Petitioners' Medicaid cost reports.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners operate licensed nursing homes that participate in the Florida Medicaid program as institutional providers. The 14 Palm Gardens facilities are limited liability companies operating as subsidiaries of New Rochelle Administrators, LLC, which also provides the facilities with management services under a management contract. AHCA is the single state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. One of AHCA's duties is to audit Medicaid cost reports submitted by providers participating in the Medicaid program. During the audit period, Petitioners provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to Institutional Medicaid Provider Agreements that they entered into with AHCA. The Provider Agreements contained the following relevant provision: (3) Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA. Section 409.908, Florida Statutes (2002)1, provided in relevant part: Reimbursement of Medicaid providers.-- Subject to specific appropriations, the agency shall reimburse Medicaid providers, in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in the rules of the agency and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference therein. These methodologies may include fee schedules, reimbursement methods based on cost reporting, negotiated fees, competitive bidding pursuant to s. 287.057, and other mechanisms the agency considers efficient and effective for purchasing services or goods on behalf of recipients. . . . * * * (2)(a)1. Reimbursement to nursing homes licensed under part II of chapter 400 . . . must be made prospectively. . . . * * * (b) Subject to any limitations or directions provided for in the General Appropriations Act, the agency shall establish and implement a Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Medicaid) for nursing home care in order to provide care and services in conformance with the applicable state and federal laws, rules, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to ensure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable geographic access to such care. . . . AHCA has adopted the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the "Plan") by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. The Plan incorporates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") Publication 15-1, also called the Provider Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual" or "PRM"), which provides "guidelines and policies to implement Medicare regulations which set forth principles for determining the reasonable cost of provider services furnished under the Health Insurance for the Aged Act of l965, as amended." CMS Pub. 15-1, Foreword, p. I. The audit period in these cases spans two versions of the Plan: version XXIII, effective July 1, 2002, and version XXIV, effective January 1, 2003. It is unnecessary to distinguish between the two versions of the Plan because their language is identical as to the provisions relevant to these cases. Section I of the Plan, "Cost Finding and Cost Reporting," provides as follows, in relevant part: The cost report shall be prepared by a Certified Public Accountant in accordance with chapter 409.908, Florida Statutes, on the form prescribed in section I.A. [AHCA form 5100-000, Rev. 7-1-90], and on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) as incorporated by reference in Rule 61H1-20.007, F.A.C., the methods of reimbursement in accordance with Medicare (Title XVIII) Principles of Reimbursement, the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB. 15-1)(1993) incorporated herein by reference except as modified by the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan and State of Florida Administrative Rules. . . . Section III of the Plan, "Allowable Costs," provides as follows, in relevant part: Implicit in any definition of allowable costs is that those costs shall not exceed what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer pays for a given service or item. If costs are determined by AHCA, utilizing the Title XVIII Principles of Reimbursement, CMS-PUB. 15-1 (1993) and this plan, to exceed the level that a prudent buyer would incur, then the excess costs shall not be reimbursable under the plan. The Plan is a cost based prospective reimbursement plan. The Plan uses historical data from cost reports to establish provider reimbursement rates. The "prospective" feature is an upward adjustment to historical costs to establish reimbursement rates for subsequent rate semesters.2 The Plan establishes limits on reimbursement of costs, including reimbursement ceilings and targets. AHCA establishes reimbursement ceilings for nursing homes based on the size and location of the facilities. The ceilings are determined prospectively, on a semiannual basis. "Targets" limit the inflationary increase in reimbursement rates from one semester to the next and limit a provider's allowable costs for reimbursement purposes. If a provider's costs exceed the target, then those costs are not factored into the reimbursement rate and must be absorbed by the provider. A nursing home is required to file cost reports. The costs identified in the cost reports are converted into per diem rates in four components: the operating component; the direct care component; the indirect care component; and the property component. GL/PL insurance costs fall under the operating component. Once the per diem rate is established for each component, the nursing home's reimbursement rate is set at the lowest of four limitations: the facility's costs; the facility's target; the statewide cost ceiling based on the size of the facility and its region; or the statewide target, also based on the size and location of the facility. The facility's target is based on the initial cost report submitted by that facility. The initial per diem established pursuant to the initial cost report becomes the "base rate." Once the base rate is established, AHCA sets the target by inflating the base rate forward to subsequent six- month rate semesters according to a pre-established inflation factor. Reimbursement for cost increases experienced in subsequent rate semesters is limited by the target drawn from the base rate. Thus, the facility's reimbursement for costs in future rate semesters is affected by the target limits established in the initial period cost report. Expenses that are disallowed during the establishment of the base rate cannot be reclaimed in later reimbursement periods. Petitioners entered the Medicaid program on June 29, 2002. They filed cost reports for the nine- month period from their entry into the program through February 28, 2003. These reports included all costs claimed by Petitioners under the accrual basis of accounting in rendering services to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. In preparing their cost reports, Petitioners used the standard Medicaid Cost Report "Chart of Accounts and Description," which contains the account numbers to be used for each ledger entry, and explains the meaning of each account number. Under the general category of "Administration" are set forth several subcategories of account numbers, including "Insurance Expense." Insurance Expense is broken into five account numbers, including number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party," which is described as "[c]osts of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or a non-profit service corporation."3 Petitioners' cost report stated the following expenses under account number 730810: Facility Amount Palm Garden of Clearwater $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Gainesville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Jacksonville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Largo $171,188.00 Palm Garden of North Miami $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Ocala $217,712.00 Palm Garden of Orlando $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Pinellas $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Port St. Lucie $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Sun City $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Tampa $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Vero Beach $217,712.00 Palm Garden of West Palm Beach $231,151.00 Palm Garden of Winter Haven $145,042.00 AHCA requires that the cost reports of first-year providers undergo an audit. AHCA's contract auditing firm, Smiley & Smiley, conducted an examination4 of the cost reports of the 14 Palm Gardens nursing homes to determine whether the included costs were allowable. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") has promulgated a series of "attestation standards" to provide guidance and establish a framework for the attestation services provided by the accounting profession in various contexts. Attestation Standards 101 and 601 set out the standard an accountant relies upon in examining for governmental compliance. Smiley & Smiley examined the Palm Gardens cost reports pursuant to these standards. During the course of the audit, Smiley & Smiley made numerous requests for documentation and other information pursuant to the Medicaid provider agreement and the Plan. Petitioners provided the auditors with their general ledger, invoices, audited financial statements, bank statements, and other documentation in support of their cost reports. The examinations were finalized during the period between September 28, 2006, and October 4, 2006. The audit report issued by AHCA contained more than 2,000 individual adjustments to Petitioners' costs, which the parties to these consolidated proceedings have negotiated and narrowed to two adjustments per Palm Gardens facility.5 As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the first adjustment at issue is AHCA's disallowance of Palm Gardens' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of GL/PL insurance, where Palm Gardens could not document that it had purchased GL/PL insurance. The second adjustment at issue is ACHA's disallowance of a portion of the premium paid by Palm Gardens for the Mature Care Policies. The total amount of the adjustment at issue for each facility is set forth in the Preliminary Statement above. Of that total for each facility, $18,849.00 constituted the disallowance for the Mature Care Policies. The remainder constituted the disallowance for the accrual of GL/PL related contingent liabilities. Janette Smiley, senior partner at Smiley & Smiley and expert in Medicaid auditing, testified that Petitioners provided no documentation other than the Mature Care Policies to support the GL/PL entry in the cost reports. Ms. Smiley testified that, during much of the examination process, she understood Petitioners to be self-insured. Ms. Smiley's understanding was based in part on statements contained in Petitioners' audited financial statements. In the audited financial statement covering the period from June 28, 2002, through December 31, 2002, Note six explains Petitioners' operating leases and states as follows, in relevant part: The lease agreement requires that the Company maintain general and professional liability in specified minimum amounts. As an alternative to maintaining these levels of insurance, the lease agreement allows the Company to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount. The Company chose to self-insure, and has recorded litigation reserves of approximately $1,735,000 that are included in other accrued expenses (see Note 9). As of December 31, 2002, these reserves have not been funded by the Company. . . . The referenced Note nine, titled "Commitments and Contingencies," provides as follows in relevant part: Due to the current legal environment, providers of long-term care services are experiencing significant increases in liability insurance premiums or cancellations of liability insurance coverage. Most, if not all, insurance carriers in Florida have ceased offering liability coverage altogether. The Company's Florida facilities have minimal levels of insurance coverage and are essentially self-insured. The Company has established reserves (see Note 6) that estimate its exposure to uninsured claims. Management is not currently aware of any claims that could exceed these reserves. However, the ultimate outcome of these uninsured claims cannot be determined with certainty, and could therefore have a material adverse impact on the financial position of the Company. The relevant notes in Petitioner's audited financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2003, are identical to those quoted above, except that the recorded litigation reserves were increased to $4 million. The notes provide that, as of December 31, 2003, these reserves had not been funded by Petitioners. Ms. Smiley observed that the quoted notes, while referencing "self-insurance" and the recording of litigation reserves, stated that the litigation reserves had not been funded. By e-mail dated April 21, 2005, Ms. Smiley corresponded with Stanley Swindling, the shareholder in the accounting firm Moore Stephens Lovelace, P.A., who had primary responsibility for preparing Petitioners' cost reports. Ms. Smiley noted that Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the company "chose to self-insure" and "recorded litigation reserves," then wrote (verbatim): By definition from PRM CMS Pub 15-1 Sections 2162.5 and 2162.7 the Company does in fact have self-insurance as there is no shifting of risk. You will have to support your positioning a letter addressing the regs for self-insurance. As clearly the financial statement auditors believe this is self- insurance and have disclosed such to the financial statement users. If you cannot support the funding as required by the regs, the provider will have to support expense as "pay as you go" in accordance with [2162.6] for PL/GL. * * * Please review 2161 and 2162 and provide support based on the required compliance. If support is not complete within the regulations, amounts for IBNR [incurred but not reported] will be disallowed and we will need to have the claims paid reports from the TPA [third party administrator] (assuming there is a TPA handling the claims processing), in order to allow any expense. Section 2160 of the Manual establishes the basic insurance requirement: A. General.-- A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider's financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self-insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. . . . . . . If a provider is unable to obtain malpractice coverage, it must select one of the self-insurance alternatives in §2162 to protect itself against such risks. If one of these alternatives is not selected and the provider incurs losses, the cost of such losses and related expenses are not allowable. Section 2161.A of the Manual sets forth the general rule as to the reimbursement of insurance costs. It provides that the reasonable costs of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or nonprofit service corporation are allowable to the extent they are "consistent with sound management practice." Reimbursement for insurance premiums is limited to the "amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Section 2162 of the Manual provides as follows, in relevant part: PROVIDER COSTS FOR MALPRACTICE AND COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY PROTECTION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE General.-- Where provider costs incurred for protection against malpractice and comprehensive general liability . . . do not meet the requirements of §2161.A, costs incurred for that protection under other arrangements will be allowable under the conditions stated below. . . . * * * The following illustrates alternatives to full insurance coverage from commercial sources which providers, acting individually or as part of a group or a pool, can adopt to obtain malpractice, and comprehensive general liability, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and employee health care insurance protection: Insurance purchased from a commercial insurance company which provides coverage after a deductible or coinsurance provision has been met; Insurance purchased from a limited purpose insurance company (captive); Total self-insurance; or A combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. . . . part: Section 2162.3 of the Manual provides: Self-Insurance.-- You may believe that it is more prudent to maintain a total self- insurance program (i.e., the assumption by you of the risk of loss) independently or as part of a group or pool rather than to obtain protection through purchased insurance coverage. If such a program meets the conditions specified in §2162.7, payments into such funds are allowable costs. Section 2162.7 of the Manual provides, in relevant Conditions Applicable to Self-Insurance.-- Definition of Self-Insurance.-- Self- insurance is a means whereby a provider(s), whether proprietary or nonproprietary, undertakes the risk to protect itself against anticipated liabilities by providing funds in an amount equivalent to liquidate those liabilities. . . . * * * Self-Insurance Fund.-- The provider or pool establishes a fund with a recognized independent fiduciary such as a bank, a trust company, or a private benefit administrator. In the case of a State or local governmental provider or pool, the State in which the provider or pool is located may act as a fiduciary. The provider or pool and fiduciary must enter into a written agreement which includes all of the following elements: General Legal Responsibility.-- The fiduciary agreement must include the appropriate legal responsibilities and obligations required by State laws. Control of Fund.-- The fiduciary must have legal title to the fund and be responsible for proper administration and control. The fiduciary cannot be related to the provider either through ownership or control as defined in Chapter 10, except where a State acts as a fiduciary for a State or local governmental provider or pool. Thus, the home office of a chain organization or a religious order of which the provider is an affiliate cannot be the fiduciary. In addition, investments which may be made by the fiduciary from the fund are limited to those approved under State law governing the use of such fund; notwithstanding this, loans by the fiduciary from the fund to the provider or persons related to the provider are not permitted. Where the State acts as fiduciary for itself or local governments, the fund cannot make loans to the State or local governments. . . . The quoted Manual provisions clarify that Ms. Smiley's message to Mr. Swindling was that Petitioners had yet to submit documentation to bring their "self-insurance" expenses within the reimbursable ambit of Sections 2161 and 2162 of the Manual. There was no indication that Petitioners had established a fund in an amount sufficient to liquidate its anticipated liabilities, or that any such funds had been placed under the control of a fiduciary. Petitioners had simply booked the reserved expenses without setting aside any cash to cover the expenses. AHCA provided extensive testimony regarding the correspondence that continued among Ms. Smiley, Mr. Swindling, and AHCA employees regarding this "self-insurance" issue. It is not necessary to set forth detailed findings as to these matters, because Petitioners ultimately conceded to Ms. Smiley that, aside from the Mutual Care policies, they did not purchase commercial insurance as described in Section 2161.A, nor did they avail themselves of the alternatives to commercial insurance described in Section 2162.A. Petitioners did not purchase commercial insurance with a deductible, did not self- insure, did not purchase insurance from a limited purpose or "captive" insurance company, or employ a combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. Ms. Smiley eventually concluded that Petitioners had no coverage for general and professional liability losses in excess of the $25,000 value of the Mutual Care Policies. Under the cited provisions of the Manual, Petitioners' unfunded self- insurance expense was not considered allowable under the principles of reimbursement. Petitioners were uninsured, which led Ms. Smiley to further conclude that Section 2162.13 of the Manual would apply: Absence of Coverage.-- Where a provider, other than a governmental (Federal, State, or local) provider, has no insurance protection against malpractice or comprehensive general liability in conjunction with malpractice, either in the form of a limited purpose or commercial insurance policy or a self-insurance fund as described in §2162.7, any losses and related expenses incurred are not allowable. In response to this disallowance pursuant to the strict terms of the Manual, Petitioners contend that AHCA should not have limited its examination of the claimed costs to the availability of documentation that would support those costs as allowable under the Manual. Under the unique circumstances presented by their situation, Petitioners assert that AHCA should have examined the state of the nursing home industry in Florida, particularly the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, and further examined whether Petitioners had the ability to meet the insurance requirements set forth in the Manual. Petitioners assert that, in light of such an examination, AHCA should have concluded that generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") may properly be invoked to render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Keith Parnell is an expert in insurance for the long- term care industry. He is a licensed insurance broker working for Hamilton Insurance Agency, which provides insurance and risk management services to about 40 percent of the Florida nursing home market. Mr. Parnell testified that during the audit period, it was impossible for nursing homes to obtain insurance in Florida. In his opinion, Petitioners could not have purchased commercial insurance during the audit period. To support this testimony, Petitioners offered a study conducted by the Florida Department of Insurance ("DOI") in 2000 that attempted to determine the status of the Florida long-term care liability insurance market for nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and continuing care retirement communities. Of the 79 companies that responded to DOI's data call, 23 reported that they had provided GL/PL coverage during the previous three years but were no longer writing policies, and only 17 reported that they were currently writing GL/PL policies. Six of the 17 reported writing no policies in 2000, and five of the 17 reported writing only one policy. The responding insurers reported writing a total of 43 policies for the year 2000, though there were approximately 677 skilled nursing facilities in Florida. On March 1, 2004, the Florida Legislature's Joint Select Committee on Nursing Homes issued a report on its study of "issues regarding the continuing liability insurance and lawsuit crisis facing Florida's long-term care facilities and to assess the impact of the reforms contained in CS/CS/CS/SB 1202 (2001)."6 The study employed data compiled from 1999 through 2003. Among the Joint Select Committee's findings was the following: In order to find out about current availability of long-term care liability insurance in Florida, the Committee solicited information from [the Office of Insurance Regulation, or] OIR within the Department of Financial Services, which is responsible for regulating insurance in Florida. At the Committee's request, OIR re-evaluated the liability insurance market and reported that there has been no appreciable change in the availability of private liability insurance over the past year. Twenty-one admitted insurance entities that once offered, or now offer, professional liability coverage for nursing homes were surveyed by OIR. Six of those entities currently offer coverage. Nine surplus lines carriers have provided 54 professional liability policies in the past year. Representatives of insurance carriers that stopped providing coverage in Florida told OIR that they are waiting until there are more reliable indicators of risk nationwide to re-enter the market. Among the Joint Select Committee's conclusions was the following: In the testimony the Committee received, there was general agreement that the quality of care in Florida nursing homes is improving, in large part due to the minimum staffing standards the Legislature adopted in SB 1202 during the 2001 Session. There was not, however, general agreement about whether or not lawsuits are abating due to the tort system changes contained in SB 1202. There was general agreement that the long-term care liability insurance market has not yet improved. After hearing the testimony, there is general agreement among the members of the Joint Select Committee that: * * * General and professional liability insurance, with actual transfer-of-risk, is virtually unavailable in Florida. "Bare- bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory insurance requirement are available; however, the cost often exceeds the face value of the coverage offered in the policy. This situation is a crisis which threatens the continued existence of long-term care facilities in Florida. To further support Mr. Parnell's testimony, Petitioners offered actuarial analyses of general and professional liability in long-term care performed by AON Risk Consultants, Inc. (AON) on behalf of the American Health Care Association. The AON studies analyzed nationwide trends in GL/PL for long-term care, and also examined state-specific issues for eight states identified as leading the trends in claim activity, including Florida. They provided an historical perspective of GL/PL claims in Florida during the audit period. The 2002 AON study for Florida was based on participation by entities representing 52 percent of all Florida nursing home beds. The study provided a "Loss Cost per Occupied Bed" showing GL/PL liability claims losses on a per bed basis. The 2002 study placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $10,800 per bed for the year 2001. The 2003 AON study, based on participation by entities representing 54 percent of Florida nursing home beds, placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $11,810 per bed for the year 2002. The studies showed that the cost per bed of GL/PL losses is materially higher in Florida than the rest of the United States. The nationwide loss per bed was $2,360 for the year 2001 and $2,880 for the year 2002. The GL/PL loss costs for Texas were the second-highest in the country, yet were far lower than the per bed loss for Florida ($5,460 for the year 2001 and $6,310 for the year 2002). Finally, Petitioners point to the Mature Care Policies as evidence of the crisis in GL/PL insurance availability. The aforementioned SB 1202 instituted a requirement that nursing homes maintain liability insurance coverage as a condition of licensure. See Section 22, Chapter 2001-45, Laws of Florida, codified at Subsection 400.141(20), Florida Statutes. To satisfy this requirement, Petitioners entered the commercial insurance market and purchased insurance policies for each of the 14 Palm Gardens facilities from a carrier named Mature Care Insurance Company. The policies carried a $25,000 policy limit, with a policy premium of $34,000. These were the kind of "bare bones" policies referenced by the Joint Select Committee's 2004 report. The fact that the policies cost more than they could ever pay out led Mr. Swindling, Petitioners' health care accounting and Medicaid reimbursement expert, to opine that a prudent nursing home operator in Florida at that time would not have purchased insurance, but for the statutory requirement.7 The Mature Care Policies were "bare bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory liability insurance coverage requirement. The policies cost Petitioners more than $37,000 in premium payments, taxes, and fees, in exchange for policy limits of $25,000. In its examination, AHCA disallowed the difference between the cost of the policy and the policy limits, then prorated the allowable costs because the audit period was nine months long and the premium paid for the Mature Care Policies was for 12 months. AHCA based its disallowance on Section 2161.A of the Manual, particularly the language which states: "Insurance premiums reimbursement is limited to the amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Petitioners responded that they did not enter the market and voluntarily pay a premium in excess of the policy limits. They were statutorily required to purchase this minimal amount of insurance; they were required to purchase a 12-month policy; they paid the market price8; and they should not be penalized for complying with the statute. Petitioners contend they should be reimbursed the full amount of the premiums for the Mature Care Policies, as their cost of statutory compliance. Returning to the issue of the contingent liabilities, Petitioners contend that, in light of the state of the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, AHCA should have gone beyond the strictures of the Manual to conclude that GAAP principles render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Under GAAP, a contingent loss is a loss that is probable and can be reasonably estimated. An estimated loss from a loss contingency may be accrued by a charge to income. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FAS No. 5"), Accounting for Contingencies, provides several examples of loss contingencies, including "pending or threatened litigation" and "actual or possible claims and assessments." Petitioners assert that the contingent losses reported in their cost reports were actual costs incurred by Petitioners. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, provides: The ultimate costs of malpractice claims, which include costs associated with litigating or settling claims, are accrued when the incidents that give rise to the claims occur. Estimated losses from asserted and unasserted claims are accrued either individually or on a group basis, based on the best estimates of the ultimate costs of the claims and the relationship of past reported incidents to eventual claims payments. All relevant information, including industry experience, the entity's own historical experience, the entity's existing asserted claims, and reported incidents, is used in estimating the expected amount of claims. The accrual includes an estimate of the losses that will result from unreported incidents, which are probable of having occurred before the end of the reporting period. Section 8.10 of AICPA Guide provides: Accrued unpaid claims and expenses that are expected to be paid during the normal operating cycle (generally within one year of the date of the financial statements) are classified as current liabilities. All other accrued unpaid claims and expenses are classified as non-current liabilities. As noted above, Petitioners' audited financial statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003, showed that the accrual was incurred and recorded by Petitioners during the audit period. Mr. Swindling prepared Petitioners' cost reports, based on information provided by Petitioners, including trial balances reflecting their costs, statistics on patient days, cost data related to square footage, and revenue information. Mr. Swindling advised Petitioners to include the accrued losses. He believed that the loss contingency was probable and could be reasonably estimated. The losses were probable because it was "a given in the state of Florida at that time period that nursing homes are going to get sued." Mr. Swindling testified that the accrual reflected a per bed loss amount of $1,750, which he believed to be a reasonable estimate of the contingent liabilities faced by Petitioners during the audit period. This amount was much less than the per bed loss indicated by the AON studies for Florida. Mr. Swindling used the criteria set forth in Section 8.05 of the AICPA Guide to establish the estimate. He determined that the lesser amount was adequate based on his discussions with Petitioners' management, who indicated that they had a substantial risk management program. Management also disclosed to Mr. Swindling that Petitioners' leases required $1,750 per bed in liability coverage. See Finding of Fact 22, supra. Mr. Swindling believed that the estimated loss per bed was reasonable based on the AON studies and his knowledge and experience of the state of the industry in Florida during the audit period, as further reflected in the DOI and Joint Committee on Nursing Homes materials discussed above. Mr. Swindling's opinion was that the provisions of the Manual relating to GL/PL insurance costs do not apply under these circumstances. The costs at issue in this proceeding are not general and professional liability insurance costs subject to CMS Pub. 15-1; rather, they are loss contingencies related to general and professional liability, including defense costs, litigation costs, and settlement costs. Mr. Swindling placed the loss contingency under number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party" because, in the finite chart of accounts provided by Medicaid, that was the most appropriate place to record the cost.9 Despite the initial confusion it caused the agency's auditors, the placement of the loss contingency under number 730810 was not intended to deceive the auditors. Mr. Swindling opined that, under these circumstances, Sections 2160 through 2162 are in conflict with other provisions in the Manual relating to the "prudent buyer" concept, and further conflict with the Plan to the extent that the cited regulations "relate to a retrospective system as opposed to prospective target rate-based system." Mr. Swindling agreed that the application of Sections 2160 through 2162 to the situation presented by Petitioners would result in the disallowance of the loss contingencies. Mr. Swindling observed, however, that Sections 2160 through 2162 are Medicare regulations. Mr. Swindling testified that Medicare reimbursements are made on a retrospective basis.10 Were this situation to occur in Medicare -- in which the provider did not obtain commercial insurance, self-insurance, or establish a captive insurer -- the provider would be deemed to be operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. Though its costs might be disallowed in the current period, the provider would receive reimbursements in subsequent periods when it could prove actual payment for its losses. Mr. Swindling found a conflict in attempting to apply these Medicare rules to the prospective payment system employed by Florida Medicaid, at least under the circumstances presented by Petitioners' case. Under the prospective system, once the contingent loss is disallowed for the base period, there is no way for Petitioners ever to recover that loss in a subsequent period, even when the contingency is liquidated. During his cross-examination, Mr. Swindling explained his position as follows: . . . Medicare allows for that payment in a subsequent period. Medicaid rules would not allow that payment in the subsequent period; therefore you have conflict in the rules. When you have conflict in the rules, you revert to generally accepted accounting principles. Generally accepted accounting principles are what we did. Q. Where did you find that if there's a conflict in the rules, which I disagree with, but if there is a conflict in the rules, that you follow GAAP? Where did you get that from? I mean, we've talked about it and it's clear on the record that if there is no provision that GAAP applies, but where did you get that if there's a conflict? Just point it out, that would be the easiest way to do it. A. The hierarchy, if you will, requires providers to file costs on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If there's no rules, in absence of rules -- and I forget what the other terms were, we read it into the record before, against public policy, those kind of things -- or in my professional opinion, if there is a conflict within the rules where the provider can't follow two separate rules at the same time, they're in conflict, then [GAAP] rules what should be recorded and what should be reimbursed. * * * Q. [T]he company accrued a liability of $2 million for the cost reporting period of 2002-2003, is that correct? A. Yes. * * * Q. Do you have any documentation supporting claims paid, actually paid, in 2002-2003 beyond the mature care policy for which that $2 million reserve was set up? A. No. Q. So what did Medicaid pay for? A. Medicaid paid the cost of contingent liabilities that were incurred by the providers and were estimated at $1,750 per bed. Generally accepted accounting principles will adjust that going forward every cost reporting period. If that liability in total goes up or down, the differential under [GAAP] goes through the income statement, and expenses either go up or they go down. It's self-correcting, which is similar to what Medicare is doing, only they're doing it on a cash basis. Mr. Swindling explained the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. The highest governing law is the Federal statutory law, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Subsection. 1396-1396v. Below the statute come the federal regulations for implementing Title XIX, 42 C.F.R. parts 400-426. Then follow in order Florida statutory law, the relevant Florida Administrative Code provisions, the Plan, the Manual, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, GAAP. Mr. Swindling testified that in reality, a cost report is not prepared from the top of the hierarchy down; rather, GAAP is the starting point for the preparation of any cost report. The statutes, rules, the Plan and the Manual are then consulted to exclude specific cost items otherwise allowable under GAAP. In the absence of an applicable rule, or in a situation in which there is a conflict between rules in the hierarchy such that the provider is unable to comply with both rules, the provider should fall back on GAAP principles as to recording of costs and reimbursement. John A. Owens, currently a consultant in health care finance specializing in Medicaid, worked for AHCA for several years up to 2002, in positions including administrator of the audit services section and bureau chief of the Office of Medicaid Program Analysis. Mr. Owens is a CPA and expert in health care accounting and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that AHCA's disallowance of the accrued costs for GL/PL liability was improper. Mr. Owens noted that Section 2160 of the Manual requires providers to purchase commercial insurance. If commercial insurance is unavailable, then the Manual gives the provider two choices: self-insure, or establish a captive program. Mr. Owens testified that insurers were fleeing the state during the period in question, and providers were operating without insurance coverage. Based on the state of the market, Petitioners' only options would have been to self-insure or establish a captive. As to self-insurance, Petitioners' problem was that they had taken over the leases on their facilities from a bankrupt predecessor, Integrated Health Services ("IHS"). Petitioners were not in privity with their predecessor. Petitioners had no access to the facilities' loss histories, without which they could not perform an actuarial study or engage a fiduciary to set up a self-insurance plan.11 Similarly, setting up a captive would require finding an administrator and understanding the risk exposure. Mr. Owens testified that a provider would not be allowed to set up a captive without determining actuarial soundness, which was not possible at the time Petitioners took over the 14 IHS facilities. Thus, Petitioners were simply unable to meet the standards established by the Manual. The options provided by the Manual did not contemplate the unique market situation existing in Florida during the audit period, and certainly did not contemplate that situation compounded by the problems faced by a new provider taking over 14 nursing homes from a bankrupt predecessor. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that, under these circumstances, where the requirements of the Manual could not be met, Petitioners were entitled to seek relief under GAAP, FAS No. 5 in particular. In situations where a loss is probable and can be measured, then an accounting entry may be performed to accrue and report that cost. Mr. Owens concluded that Petitioners' accrual was an allowable cost for Medicaid purposes, and explained his rationale as follows: My opinion is, in essence, that since they could not meet -- technically, they just could not meet those requirements laid out by [the Manual], they had to look somewhere to determine some rational basis for developing a cost to put into the cost report, because if they had chosen to do nothing and just moved forward, those rates would be set and there would be nothing in their base year which then establishes their target moving forward. So by at least looking at a rational methodology to accrue the cost, they were able to build something into their base year and have it worked into their target system as they move forward. Steve Diaczyk, an audit evaluation and review analyst for AHCA, testified for the agency as an expert in accounting, auditing, and Medicaid policy. Mr. Diaczyk was the AHCA auditor who reviewed the work of Smiley & Smiley for compliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, and to verify the accuracy of the independent CPA's determinations. Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Mr. Swindling's description of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Mr. Diaczyk affirmed that Petitioners employed GAAP rather than Medicaid regulations in preparing their cost reports. Mr. Diaczyk testified regarding the Notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements, set forth at Findings of Fact 22-24, supra, which left AHCA's auditors with the understanding that Petitioners were self-insuring. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that Section 2162.7 of the Manual requires a self- insurer to contract with an independent fiduciary to maintain a self-insurance fund, and that the fund must contain monies sufficient to cover anticipated losses. The fiduciary takes title to the funds, the amount of which is determined actuarially. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, in reimbursing a provider for self-insurance, Medicaid wants to make sure that the provider has actually put money into the fund, and has not just set up a fund on its books and called it "self-insurance" for reimbursement purposes. AHCA's position is that it would be a windfall for a provider to obtain reimbursement for an accrued liability when it has not actually set the money aside and funded the risk. Medicaid wants the risk transferred off of the provider's books and on to the self-insurance fund. Mr. Diaczyk testified as to the differing objectives of Medicaid and GAAP. Medicaid is concerned with reimbursing costs, and is therefore especially sensitive regarding the overstatement of costs. Medicaid wants to reimburse a provider for only those costs that have actually been paid. GAAP, on the other hand, is about report presentation for a business entity and is concerned chiefly with avoiding the understatement of expenses and overstatement of revenue. Under GAAP, an entity may accrue a cost and not pay it for years. In the case of a contingent liability, the entity may book the cost and never actually pay it. Mr. Diaczyk described the self-insurance and liquidation provisions of 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100, "Special treatment of certain accrued costs." The federal rule essentially allows accrued costs to be claimed for reimbursement, but only if they are "liquidated timely." Subsection (c)(2)(viii) of the rule provides that accrued liability related to contributions to a self-insurance program must be liquidated within 75 days after the close of the cost reporting period. To obtain reimbursement, Petitioners would have had to liquidate their accrued liability for GL/PL insurance within 75 days of the end of the audit period. Mr. Diaczyk also noted that, even if the 75-day requirement were not applicable, the general requirement of Section 2305.2 of the Manual would apply. Section 2305.2 requires that all short-term liabilities must be liquidated within one year after the end of the cost reporting period in which the liability is incurred, with some exceptions not applicable in this case. Petitioners' accrued liability for general and professional liability insurance was not funded or liquidated for more than one year after the cost reporting period. It was a contingent liability that might never be paid. Therefore, Mr. Diaczyk stated, reimbursement was not in keeping with Medicaid's goal to reimburse providers for actual paid costs, not for potential costs that may never be paid. Petitioners responded that their accrued liabilities constituted non-current liabilities, items that under normal circumstances will not be liquidated within one year. Mr. Parnell testified that there is great variation in how long it takes for a general and professional liability claim against a nursing home to mature to the point of payment to the claimant. He testified that a "short" timeline would be from two to four years, and that some claims may take from eight to eleven years to mature. From these facts, Petitioners urge that 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100 and Section 2305.2 of the Manual are inapplicable to their situation. As to Section 2305.2 in particular, Petitioners point to Section 2305.A, the general liquidation of liabilities provision to which Section 2305.2 provides the exceptions discussed above. The last sentence of Section 2305.A provides that, where the liability is not liquidated within one year, or does not qualify under the exceptions set forth in Sections 2305.1 and 2305.2, then "the cost incurred for the related goods and services is not allowable in the cost reporting period when the liability is incurred, but is allowable in the cost reporting period when the liquidation of the liability occurs." (Emphasis added.) Petitioners argue that the underscored language supports the Medicare/Medicaid distinction urged by Mr. Swindling. In its usual Medicare retroactive reimbursement context, Section 2305.2 would operate merely to postpone reimbursement until the cost period in which the liability is liquidated. Applied to this Medicaid prospective reimbursement situation, Section 2305.2 would unfairly deny Petitioners any reimbursement at all by excluding the liability from the base rate. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, where the Medicaid rules address a category of costs, the allowable costs in a provider's cost report are limited to those defined as allowable by the applicable rules. He stated that if there is a policy in the Manual that addresses an item of cost, the provider must use the Manual provision; the provider cannot use GAAP to determine that cost item. In this case, Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Ms. Smiley as to the applicable rules and the disallowance of Petitioners' contingent liability costs. According to Mr. Diaczyk, GAAP may be used only if no provisions farther up the chain of the "hierarchy" are applicable. In this case, the Medicaid rules specifically addressed the categories of cost in question, meaning that GAAP did not apply. Under cross-examination, Mr. Diaczyk testified that the accrual made by Petitioners in their cost reports would be considered actual costs under GAAP, "[a]ssuming that they had an actuarial study done to come up with the $1.7 million that they accrued." Mr. Diaczyk acknowledged that AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, does not limit the provider to an actuarial study in estimating losses from asserted and unasserted claims. See Finding of Fact 49, supra, for text of Section 8.05. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that the problem in this case was that Petitioners gave AHCA no documentation to support their estimate of the accrual, despite the auditor's request that Petitioners provide documentation to support their costs. Mr. Diaczyk's testimony raised a parallel issue to Mr. Swindling's concern that Medicaid's prospective targeting system permanently excludes any item of cost not included in the base rate. Mr. Swindling solved the apparent contradiction in employing Medicare rules in the Medicaid scenario by applying GAAP principles. Responding to the criticism that GAAP could provide a windfall to Petitioners by reimbursing them for accrued costs that might never actually result in payment, Mr. Swindling responded that GAAP principles would adjust the cost for contingent liabilities going forward, "truing up" the financial statements in subsequent reporting periods. This truing up process would have the added advantage of obviating the agency's requirement for firm documentation of the initial accrual. Mr. Swindling's "truing up" scenario under GAAP would undoubtedly correct Petitioners' financial statements. However, Mr. Swindling did not explain how the truing up of the financial statements would translate into a correction of Petitioners' reimbursement rate.12 If costs excluded from the base rate cannot be added to future rate adjustments, then costs incorrectly included in the base rate would also presumably remain in the facility's rate going forward.13 Thus, Mr. Swindling's point regarding the self-correcting nature of the GAAP reporting procedures did not really respond to AHCA's concerns about Petitioners' receiving a windfall in their base rate by including the accrual for contingent liabilities. On April 19, 2005, Petitioners entered into a captive insurance program. Petitioners' captive is a claims-made GL/PL policy with limits of $1 million per occurrence and $3 million in the aggregate. Under the terms of the policy, "claims-made" refers to a claim made by Petitioners to the insurance company, not a claim made by a nursing home resident alleging damages. The effective date of the policy is from April 21, 2005, through April 21, 2006, with a retroactive feature that covers any claims for incidents back to June 29, 2002, a date that corresponds to Petitioners' first day of operation and participation in the Medicaid program. The Petitioners' paid $3,376,906 for this policy on April 22, 2005. Mr. Parnell testified that April 2005 was the earliest time that the 14 Palm Gardens facilities could have established this form of insurance program. In summary, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the contingent liabilities established that Petitioners took over the 14 Palm Gardens facilities after the bankruptcy of the previous owner. Petitioners were faced with the virtual certainty of substantial GL/PL expenses in operating the facilities, and also faced with a Florida nursing home environment market in which commercial professional liability insurance was virtually unavailable. Lacking loss history information from their bankrupt predecessor, Petitioners were unable to self-insure or establish a captive program until 2005. Petitioners understood that if they did not include their GL/PL expenses in their initial cost report, those expenses would be excluded from the base rate and could never be recovered. Petitioners' leases for the facilities required them to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount of $1,750. Based on the AON studies and the general state of the industry at the time, Petitioners' accountant concluded that, under GAAP principles, $1,750 per bed was a reasonable, conservative estimate of Petitioners' GL/PL loss contingency exposure for the audit period.14 Based on all the evidence, it is found that Petitioners' cost estimate was reasonable and should be accepted by the agency. Petitioners included their GL/PL loss contingency expenses in their initial Medicaid cost report, placing those expenses under a heading indicating the purchase of insurance from a third party. The notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the facilities were "essentially self- insured." These factors led AHCA to request documentation of Petitioners' self-insurance. Petitioners conceded that they were not self-insured and carried no liability insurance aside from the Mature Care policies. The parties had little dispute as to the facts summarized above. The parties also agreed as to the applicability of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Their disagreement rests solely on the manner in which the principles of the hierarchy should be applied to the unique situation presented by Petitioners in these cases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order that allows Petitioners' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of general and professional liability ("GL/PL") insurance, and that disallows the Mature Care policy premium amounts in excess of the policy limits, prorated for a nine- month period. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Charles Anderson, currently is eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, general lines property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous agent, and health insurance agent. The Respondent moved to Florida from Michigan in September, 1983. In January, 1984, the Respondent and a partner bought Guaranteed Underwriters, Incorporated, a corporate general lines insurance agency doing business as Security Insurance Agency (Security) in New Port Richey, Florida. The Respondent's background was primarily in the life and health insurance business; his partner's background was primarily in property and casualty insurance. They planned to divide responsibilities for Security's operations along the lines of their respective areas of expertise. However, the partnership dissolved, leaving to the Respondent responsibility for all of the operations of the agency. After the dissolution of the partnership, the Respondent delegated to unlicensed employees most of the day-to-day responsibilities for the property and casualty and workmen's compensation side of the agency's business. The Respondent was personally involved primarily in the day-to-day operations of the health and life insurance side of the business, as well as in selected large commercial accounts. The conduct of Security's business, as described above, went smoothly (there were no charges of any license violations) until two disruptive factors entered into the picture. One was financial in nature; the other was personal. In 1986, Security bought an existing insurance agency (Sunland Insurance Agency) in Holiday, merged it into Security, and attempted to operate it as part of Security's overall business. In 1987, Security bought another, large agency (Village Insurance Agency) and also merged it into Security and attempted to operate it as part of Security's overall business. At this point, the Respondent essentially was attempting to operate three insurance agencies, something he never attempted before. With the purchase of Sunland and Village, in addition to Security, the Respondent incurred significant debt which had to be met for his business to just break even. By approximately 1988, the Respondent owed approximately $150,000 still outstanding on the purchase of Security, $100,000 borrowed to finance the purchase of Village, $43,000 to three different relatives and $3,500 to the NCNB bank on loans made in connection with the business. Payments on these debts, together with payroll, rent and other business expense left Security with a monthly operating budget of almost $12,000. At this expense level, the business was losing money. In calendar year 1989, the business lost between approximately $12,600 and (counting unpaid bills outstanding at the end of the year) $17,900. At the end of 1988, severe personal problems added to the Respondent's financial woes. In December, 1988, the Respondent's wife had to be hospitalized in Tampa for eight weeks for treatment for symptoms of mental illness. During this time, in addition to trying to supervise the operations of Security, the Respondent was required to travel back and forth to Tampa (about an hour drive by car, each way) to visit his wife and also make arrangements for the care of his eighteen month old son (either by himself or by a baby-sitter). As if the Respondent's personal problems were not enough, when his wife was discharged from the hospital (with a diagnosis of a chemical imbalance), she informed him that she wanted a divorce. She took up a separate residence in Tampa where she lived pending the dissolution of the marriage. As a result of the his personal problems, the Respondent delegated more and more responsibility to his unlicensed employees. He would go to the office only for an hour or two a day. Sometimes he was not able to get into the office at all. Judy Nelson (Count V). Judy Nelson, who is self-employed doing business as Pedals 'N' Presents, used Security for her insurance needs since 1986. In January, 1989, she applied through Security for renewal of a special multi-peril (SMP) insurance policy with American Professional Insurance for another year beginning January 21, 1989. On January 10, 1989, she gave Security her check for $485 as partial payment for the coverage. The $485 was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. Security never processed Nelson's application or secured the coverage. On or about March 10, 1989, Nelson received notice from American Professional that no application for renewal of coverage or premium had been received and that coverage was being cancelled. Nelson immediately contacted Security regarding the notification, and one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees acknowledged an error on Security's part but assured Nelson that Security would correct the situation and have Nelson's coverage reinstated. Security never got the policy reinstated, and the policy was cancelled on March 21, 1989. On or about April 8, 1989, Nelson's business was burglarized, and Nelson made a claim on her MPS policy. At this point, in handling the claim, the Respondent realized that the policy had been cancelled and that Nelson had no coverage. But, instead of telling her the facts, the Respondent paid the claim himself. Nelson thought the claim was paid under the terms of her SMP policy and still thought she had coverage. Later, Nelson had a question about a signature on her policy and telephoned the Professional American to get her question answered. Professional American told her that she had no coverage. At about the same time, Nelson was contacted by a Department investigator, who asked her not to contact the Respondent yet as he would make arrangements for a refund for her. On or about December 6, 1989, after the Department investigator cleared it, Nelson telephoned the Respondent and asked for a refund. This time, the Respondent acknowledged that Nelson had no coverage and agreed to a refund. The Respondent paid Nelson the refund at the end of December, 1989, or the beginning of January, 1990. Nelson still does business with Security. She has in force workmen's compensation insurance through Security. Fred J. Miller (Count VI). On or about February 24, 1989, Fred J. Miller came into the Security offices to get commercial automobile insurance for the vehicles he uses in his recycling business. He dealt with one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees. Several application and other papers for coverage with Progressive American Insurance Companies were prepared and were signed by Miller. Miller also made a partial payment for the coverage in cash in the amount of $296, for which the employee gave Miller a receipt. As he left the office, the Security employee assured him that he had coverage. A few days later, on or about February 28, 1989, Security contacted Miller and told him an additional $606 was needed to obtain the coverage for which he had applied. Miller returned to Security and gave the employee he was dealing with an additional $606 cash, for which he was given another receipt. It was not proven, and is not clear, whether the cash received from Miller was placed in the Security operating account. Security never submitted Miller's application for insurance. Contrary to Miller's understanding, Miller had no insurance on his vehicles. As of April 6, 1989, Miller had neither a policy (or copy of one) nor an insurance identification card. On or about April 6, 1989, Miller bought a new vehicle and had to contact Security to get an insurance policy number in order to have the vehicle registered in his name. The Security employee speaking to Miller discovered that Miller's undated application still was in the "pending matters" file and told Miller he could not get the policy number at that time. Miller said he had to have the policy number immediately. At that point, the employee brought the problem to the Respondent's attention. The Respondent had the employee tell Miller they would call right back. Security then dated Miller's application April 6, 1989, telephoned Progressive American to secure coverage effective April 6, 1989, and called Miller back with the policy number he needed. Security then processed Miller's application to secure the coverage for a year, through April 6, 1990. Miller has renewed the Progress American coverage through Security and still has his vehicles insured under the policy. Donald E. Wilkins (Count IV). Donald E. Wilkins, President of Apple Paradise Landscaping, Inc., used Security for his general liability and automobile insurance needs. He has no complaint about, and no issue is raised in this proceeding, as to Security's handling of those coverages. (The evidence is that the coverages Wilkins applied for were placed in the normal course of business.) On or about March 9, 1989, Wilkins decided he wanted a workmen's compensation insurance certificate. He went to Security's office, and one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees completed an application for the insurance and for premium financing. Wilkins gave her a $250 check "just for the certificate." The check was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. On March 9, 1989, Wilkins also specifically requested that Security furnish to Hawkins Construction of Tarpon Springs, Florida, a certificate of insurance. In response to the request, Security furnished to Hawkins Construction a certificate that Apple Paradise with the "S. Atlantic Council on Workers Compensation." A policy number appears on the certificate, and the certificate states that coverage was effective March 13, 1989, to expire on March 13, 1990. There is no evidence that the Respondent personally was involved in providing this certificate of insurance. The evidence did not prove whether Wilkins ever got any workmen's compensation insurance. The Department proved that Security never processed the premium financing application, and Wilkins testified that he never got a payment book or other request for payment from any premium financing company. But the representative of the National Council on Compensation Insurance gave no testimony on Wilkins or Apple Paradise. Wilkins himself did not appear to have any complaint against the Respondent or Security. Theoharis Tsioukanaras (Count III). Theoharis (Harry) Tsioukanaras owned and operated Harry's Painting and Enterprises, Inc. He had been doing business with the Respondent to meet his business and personal insurance needs since the Respondent first bought Security (and did business with the prior owner for a year before that). He had his business and personal automobile insurance, as well as his workmen's compensation insurance through Security. In the normal course of their business relationship, either Harry would telephone Security when he had insurance needs or Security would telephone Harry when it was time to renew insurance. Harry would then drop by the office to complete the necessary paperwork and pay the premium. When Harry did not have the necessary premium money when it was time to buy or renew insurance, the Respondent regularly loaned Harry premium money and Harry would pay the Respondent back later. Harry usually dealt with the Respondent's unlicensed employees, not with the Respondent directly. On or sometime after July 7, 1989, Harry telephoned Security for proof of insurance on a 1987 Subaru so that he could avoid having to pay for lender insurance on the vehicle at a bank where he was seeking to obtain financing. One of the Respondent's unlicensed employees gave Harry a purported insurance identification card for "Progressive American," listing a purported insurance policy number and purported policy effective dates of July 7, 1989, to January 7, 1990. The lending institution did not accept the card. In fact, no Progressive American policy had issued on the vehicle. At some point, Harry came by the Security office and told the Respondent that he (Harry) was due a $640 refund for automobile insurance renewal premium money on a policy that never issued. By the Respondent's own admission, he checked with his records and his unlicensed employees and confirmed that Harry was owed the money. On September 28, 1989, he gave Harry a check for $640. 1/ Despite the circumstances that resulted in the false Progressive American insurance identification card, in Harry's need to buy Allstate insurance on a vehicle he thought was insured through Security, and in Harry's need for a $640 refund from Security, Harry continues to do his insurance business with the Respondent and Security and also refers friends to the Respondent for insurance needs. John Stuiso (Count I). On or about June 7, 1989, John Stuiso, a self-employed building contractor, applied for both general liability and workmen's compensation insurance through Security. (Stuiso had been insured through Security for the preceding four years with no apparent problems.) Stuiso paid Security $3,250 as partial payment of the premiums on the policies and also applied for premium financing through Security. At least $3,000 was paid by check; the evidence is not clear how the other $250 was paid. The $3,000 check was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. It is not clear what happened to the other $250. It was understood between Stuiso and Security that Security would have the applications processed and would inform Stuiso if there was any problem with coverage. Not having heard anything to the contrary, Stuiso believed he had the general liability and workmen's compensation insurance for which he had applied. In fact, Security never processed either application for insurance or either application for premium financing. In late July or early August, 1989, Stuiso requested that Security furnish a certificate of insurance for him to provide to a customer, APCO Building Systems of Oldsmar, Florida. On August 4, 1989, Security issued to APCO a certificate that Stuiso had both general liability insurance with American Professional Insurance Company and workmen's compensation insurance with "South Atlantic Council on Work Comp." Purported policy numbers also appeared on the certificate. When Stuiso never received a payment book for his premium financing, he became concerned about his coverage and was about to approach the Department for assistance when he received a telephone call from a Department investigator who had been investigating the Respondent (unbeknownst to the Respondent.) The investigator told Stuiso that he had no coverage. Stuiso then approached the Respondent and asked for a refund. The Respondent checked his records and asked his unlicensed employees about Stuiso's claim that he had paid for and applied for insurance that never issued. He learned for the first time the facts about Stuiso and immediately wrote Stuiso two refund checks, one for $3,000 and one for $250. Due to the financial problems the Respondent was having, his $3,00 check was returned for insufficient funds. The Respondent tried to borrow the money to cover the $3,000 check from a friend who declined on advice of counsel. Stuiso then went to the police and had the Respondent charged with writing a worthless check. The Respondent was advised of this and turned himself in to the police. He was given a week to make good on the check. The Respondent was able to borrow the money from another friend and paid Stuiso in full. However, his encounter with the police brought home to him the depths to which he had sunk. He decided to commit suicide by monoxide poisoning but changed his mind before it was too late. He telephoned his wife in Tampa to report what he had just done, and she initiated steps to have him committed involuntarily for treatment for mental illness under Florida's Baker Act. He spent four days in the Community Hospital in New Port Richey, Florida, where he was diagnosed as having "adjustment reaction." He was released to the custody of his wife and spent the next week to ten days with her in Tampa. After the Respondent recovered, he decided to do whatever was necessary to save his business and pay off his debts. He laid off office staff and, to take up the slack, himself assumed the responsibilities he had been delegating to his unlicensed employees. He also decided, in light of the Harry's and Stuiso matters, to himself investigate to see if there were any other Security customers who did not have insurance coverage for which they had paid. He found Wanda Mae Riley (Custom Plumbing of Pasco, Inc.). Wanda Mae Riley (Count II). In about August, 1988, the Respondent himself called on Wanda Mae Riley of Custom Plumbing of Pasco County to advise her that the company's general liability and automobile insurance policies for its fleet of four trucks were up for annual renewal on August 24, 1988. The Respondent filled out applications for renewal of the policies and for premium financing and accepted Riley's check in the amount of $3,244 as down payment for the renewal policies. The $3,244 was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. The Respondent telephoned American Professional Insurance Company to bind the coverage. He or his office also issued proof of insurance identification cards for Custom Plumbing. But, for reasons he cannot explain (having no recollection), he never processed the applications and the binders expired when the applications were not processed and policies were not issued in the normal course of business. Having had a lapse of memory as to the matter and as to Security's responsibilities to Custom Plumbing, the Respondent did not know and never told Riley or Custom Plumbing that the insurance policies were not renewed and that Custom Plumbing did not have the coverage it thought it did. Later in 1988, Security also arranged for workmen's compensation insurance for Custom Plumbing. The evidence did not prove that there were problems in the way Security obtained this coverage for Custom Plumbing. In approximately April, 1989, Custom Plumbing requested that Security furnish a certificate of insurance for him to provide to the Barnett Bank of Hernando County. On April 21, 1989, Security issued to the bank a certificate that Custom Plumbing had automobile insurance with American Professional Insurance Company. The expired binder number (which perhaps was the same as the policy number of the prior year's policy) appeared on the certificate as the purported policy number. There is no evidence that the Respondent personally was involved in providing this certificate of insurance. When, in approximately late October or early November of 1989, the Respondent discovered that Security had not obtained the coverages for which Custom Plumbing had made down payments in August, 1988, he telephoned Riley to inform her 2/ and tell her that he would refund the down payments Custom Plumbing had made in August, 1988. When the refund was not made promptly, Riley went to a lawyer to have a promissory note drawn for the Respondent's signature. The promissory note reflected the $3,244 the Respondent owed to Custom Plumbing, payable $500 a month. On or about December 9, 1989, the Respondent signed the note, which was paid in full in accordance with the terms of the note. (As previously found in Finding 14, by this time the Respondent also had heard from Nelson.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Robert Charles Anderson, guilty of the charges contained in Counts I, II, III, V and VI of the Administrative Complaint, as set forth in the Conclusions of Law, above; and (2) suspending the Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure for six months. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ralph Edward Carter, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health insurance agent and general lines agent - property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed as a property and casualty insurance agent for Bankers Insurance Company (BIC) and Underwriters Guarantee Insurance Company (UGIC). In March 1987 respondent purchased an insurance franchise and began operating an insurance firm under the corporate name of Mr. Auto of South St. Petersburg, Inc. Records on file with the Department of State reflect that effective June 25, 1988 the name of the corporation was changed to Reliable Insurance of South St. Petersburg, Inc. Since February 1989 the business has been located at 3135 18th Avenue, South, No. C- 3, St. Petersburg, Florida. The corporation was primarily engaged in doing business as a general lines insurance agency. Respondent has been licensed as an agent since 1968, and during his tenure as an agent, has worked in sales with several large insurance companies. In January 1988 Betty Andrews purchased from respondent liability and property damage coverage on her two automobiles, a 979 Ford station wagon and a 1980 Chrysler. The insurance was written through UGIC and was effective for the year beginning January 8, 1988. Shortly after May 16, 1988 Andrews received a notice from UGIC reflecting that she owed an additional $38.90 on her policy. For some undisclosed reason, Andrews did not pay the additional premium owed. On July 6, 1988 Andrews visited respondent's office for the purpose of adding comprehensive and collision coverage on her two automobiles. After respondent quoted a rate, she agreed to purchase the additional coverage, filled out an application, and gave respondent two checks totaling $166. These monies were deposited into respondent's business account. The balance was to be paid in three monthly payments of approximately $55 each month through a finance company. Respondent gave Andrews a document entitled "Receipt and Binder Certificate" reflecting she had comprehensive and collision coverage with "Bankers" effective from July 6, 1988 to January 6, 1989. "Bankers" was in fact Bankers Insurance Company. When Andrews did not receive a policy from BIC, she attempted to contact respondent on several occasions to ascertain its whereabouts. Andrews could not recall when or how many times she telephoned respondent's office but indicated she was never able to reach him. This was probably because respondent operated a one-man office with no clerical help and was frequently absent from his office. In late August 1988 Andrews received a notice from UGIC advising that UGIC intended to cancel her policy effective September 7, 1988 because she failed to pay the $38.90 premium still due. At about this same time Andrews' husband sold the station wagon and purchased a truck. Accordingly, Andrews needed to transfer her insurance to the new vehicle. She went to respondent's office in early September 1988 and asked him why she had never received the new policy. She also asked him to find out why her existing policy was being cancel led and requested him to transfer coverage from the station wagon to the new truck. In Andrews' presence, respondent made a telephone call to UGIC and learned that Andrews' husband had failed to disclose on the insurance application that he had received a traffic ticket. This in turn caused a $38.90 increase in the annual premium, and because that amount had not been paid, the policy was being cancelled. Respondent attempted to persuade UGIC to reinstate the policy but was unsuccessful. Dissatisfied, Andrews told respondent she intended to file a complaint with the Department of Insurance. Respondent then wrote her a check for $166 which represented a full refund of her monies. There is no evidence to establish that respondent intended to defraud Andrews or to evade the requirements of the insurance code. Despite the fact that Andrews did not receive a policy, she was covered until September 1988 by her original policy and respondent's errors and omissions policy. Through testimony by an underwriting manager for BIC, David R. Wardlow, it was established that respondent had entered into a correspondent agreement with an agent of BIC. Wardlow's review of BIC's records reflected that BIC had never received Andrews' application and premium nor was a policy written on her behalf. However, there was no evidence to establish how promptly respondent was required to remit a new application and premium to BIC or whether respondent violated BIC policy by retaining the application and monies for some sixty days until he learned that the existing policy had been cancel led. Respondent readily conceded that he never forwarded the application and premium monies to BIC. He explained his actions by pointing out that after Andrews left his office he decided to secure the coverage from UGIC rather than BIC in order to have the entire coverage with one company at a cheaper rate. When he later learned that UGIC intended to cancel Andrews' policy for nonpayment of premium, he thought he might be able to persuade UGIC to reinstate the policy but was unsuccessful. He offered no excuse except inadvertence as to why he had not promptly followed up on Andrews' application. Petitioner also presented the testimony of Johnnie Ruth Bell who purchased automobile insurance from respondent in October 1988. Although Bell's testimony was often vague and confusing, the following facts were established. On or about October 1, 1988 Bell went to respondent's office to purchase full insurance coverage on her 1987 Toyota Corolla. After discussing various options with respondent, Bell agreed to purchase a policy issued through Redmond-Adams, a Sarasota underwriter for UGIC. Bell gave respondent a check in the amount of $227 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance through a finance company at a rate of $78 per month for eight months. These monies were deposited into respondent's bank account. Respondent issued a "Receipt and Binder Certificate" reflecting coverage with "Underwriter - Redmond Adams". Because Bell had financed the car with a local bank, it was necessary for respondent to furnish the bank with evidence of insurance. Through inadvertence, but not intentionally or willfully, respondent misplaced the application and never forwarded the application and premium to the insurance company nor did he notify the bank of Bell's insurance coverage. However, Bell was covered during this period of time by respondent's errors and omissions policy. After Bell did not receive a copy of her policy from Redmond-Adams, but received a number of telephone calls and notices from her bank, she met with respondent around December 2, 1988. Respondent accepted an additional $156 in cash from Bell and issued her a new binder effective that date which was identical to the first binder except for the date. It is unknown why the additional money was collected. He then tore up the first binder. When Bell had still not received her policy by April 1989, she filed a complaint with petitioner. After respondent learned that Bell had filed a complaint, he contacted her in May 1989 and refunded all of her monies. There was no evidence to establish how promptly respondent was required to submit applications and premiums to UGIC or how that company construed the term "in the regular course of business" in the context of agents remitting applications and premiums. Respondent blamed his problems on the fact that he is the sole employee of his office and, according to his estimate, services some 500 active clients per year and more than 1,500 accounts. He desires to continue in the insurance profession and points to the fact that, of the many insurance transactions handled by him over the last twenty-two years, the Andrews and Bell transactions are the only two that have spawned any significant problems. Moreover, he has never been disciplined by petitioner during his tenure as an agent. Respondent asks that any penalty be limited to a period of probation during which time he can have the opportunity to improve his management and bookkeeping skills. There was no evidence to establish whether respondent's conduct demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the insurance profession. As to respondent's knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by his licenses, he conceded he lacks training in bookkeeping and management skills, both needed for a general lines agent, but denied that he lacks the necessary skills in the sales part of the business. This was not contradicted. Finally, respondent has taken curative steps to insure that applications are not misplaced and the customer receives the requested insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating sections 626.611(8) and 626.734 and that his general lines license be suspended for thirty days. All other charges should be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 13 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 5-7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 8-11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a finding has been partially adopted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. Respondent: A Partially adopted in findings of fact 5 and 6. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. Rejected since respondent did not move his office until February 1989. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. I. Partially adopted in findings of fact 3 and 8. Partially adopted in findings of' fact 7 and 8. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact l. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. Note - Where a finding has been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, cumulative, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner Plaza Level, The Capital Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Richard J. DaFonte, Esquire O. Box 41750 St. Petersburg, FL 33743-1750 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue This case involves a dispute as to whether the Petitioner underpaid the premiums due on his health insurance coverage and, if so, what action should be taken by the Department of Administration as a result of any premium underpayments. By notice dated March 18, 1988, the Department of Administration notified the Petitioner that the Department records "show a total underpayment of $1,117.81 for the coverage periods 9/86 through 9/87." At the formal hearing, over the objection of the Petitioner, the Department was permitted to offer evidence regarding the Petitioner's premium history (both the amounts due and the amounts actually paid) for the entire period of the Petitioner's employment with the State of Florida, a period which runs from May 1978 until October 1988. At the formal hearing the Department of Administration presented the testimony of one witness and offered several exhibits, all of which were received. The Petitioner did not present any evidence, but did present oral argument on his own behalf. The parties were allowed 10 days from November 3, 1988, within which to file their post-hearing submissions with the Hearing Officer. The Department of Administration timely filed Proposed Findings Of Fact. Those findings are specifically addressed in the appendix to this recommended order. The Petitioner did not file any post-hearing submission.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the formal hearing, I make the following findings of fact. From May 1, 1978, until August 1, 1978, the Petitioner requested and received family coverage under the State Group Health Self-insurance Plan. From November 1, 1978, until November 1, 1985, the Petitioner requested and received individual coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan. From November 1, 1985, until the date of the hearing, the Petitioner requested and received family coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan. From May 1, 198, until July 1, 1984, the Petitioner was a part-time employee of the State of Florida, working .25 of a full-time equivalent position. Accordingly, his premiums for health insurance coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan during this period should have been paid on the basis of employment in a .25 full-time equivalent position. From July 1, 1984, until at least the date of the hearing, the Petitioner has been a part-time employee of the State of Florida, working .20 of a full-time equivalent position. Accordingly, his premiums for health insurance coverage under the State Group Self-Insurance Plan during this period should have been paid on the basis of employment in a .20 full-time equivalent position. During the period beginning May 1, 1988, and continuing through October of 1988, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals S1,116.36. 1/ During the period beginning March 1, 1986, and continuing through October of 1988, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals $861.74. During the thirteen-month period beginning with September 1986 and ending with (but including) September 1987, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals $258.36.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order to the following effect: Finding the Petitioner to be in debt to the State of Florida in the amount of $258.36 by reason of underpayment of premiums during the period of September 1986 through September 1987. Providing that the Petitioner's health insurance coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan will be cancelled unless within thirty (30) days following the entry of the final order the Petitioner either pays the full amount of $258.36 or enters into an installment payment program consistent with Rule 22K-1.049(1)(a)2., Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1988.
Findings Of Fact In October 1981, Respondent Edward Willison Carroll, III, purchased the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency from Richard Paul Jackson. On or about February 5, 1982, Bobby L. Hancock and Janice Fels Hancock went to the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency to purchase liability coverage and comprehensive coverage on one of their vehicles. An employee of Respondent, Judy Conrad, completed one application for liability and another for comprehensive insurance, listing the drivers as Bobby Hancock, Janice Hancock, and Michael Fels, who was Mrs. Hancock's 16-year-old son. About two weeks later the Hancocks were notified that Michael Fels' driver license number was needed and that there was an error regarding Mr. Hancock's birth date which needed to be corrected. Very shortly after being notified, Mr. Hancock and Michael Fels returned to the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency to provide the requested information. The underwriting information referred to in paragraph 4, supra, was not supplied to Protective Casualty Insurance Company, which provided the liability insurance on the Hancocks' vehicle through the negligence of the Respondent or his agents. Protective Casualty mailed several requests for the missing underwriting information to the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency and finally, on April 1, 1982, mailed to Friendly Auto a notice of cancellation effective May 16, 1982. Neither Respondent nor any of his employees at the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency notified the Hancocks of the cancellation of the liability coverage by Protective Casualty. In July 1982, the Hancocks separated. Janice Hancock retained the vehicle which the Hancocks had insured through Respondent's agency, and she and her son continued to drive it. On or about July 1, 1982, Respondent instructed his employee, Laurie Starr, to complete a second application for liability insurance for the Hancocks. Accordingly, Ms. Starr completed an application and signed Respondent's name to it. Bobby Hancock's signature was placed upon the application to Allied by someone other than Bobby Hancock and without his knowledge or consent. Said application differed from the original application of Bobby and Janice Hancock by omitting coverage on Michael Fels, Mrs. Hancock's son. These were willful acts. In October 1982, Janice Hancock received a partial refund from Perry, her insurance financing company. This check reflects a different policy number than the insurance policy issued by Protective Casualty Insurance Company, the policy which was cancelled. It was only after the Hancocks received the refund checks that they became aware that their liability insurance had been cancelled and that the Allied policy had been obtained for their benefit by Respondent's agency.
