The Issue The issues for determination are whether, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Walter L. Moyer, violated Section 472.033(1)(g) and (h) F.S. and Rule 21 HH-2.01(3) by performing a land survey in a negligent or incompetent manner, without due care and without due regard for acceptable professional standards, and violated Section 472.033(1)(e), (g) and (h) F.S., and Rule 21HH- 2.01(3) and (5) FAC, by providing a false or deliberately inaccurate survey sketch to a client on two separate occasions.
Findings Of Fact Walter L. Moyer has been licensed by the State of Florida as a registered surveyor from approximately August 1977 until present, and holds license number LS 0002828. His address for license purposes is Palm Bay, Florida, in Brevard County. His practice as a surveyor has been primarily in construction-related surveys and lot surveys, with very few parcel surveys. THE CHILCOTT SURVEY (COUNT I) In June 1984, Charles and Robin Chilcott purchased property on Grant Road, in Brevard County, consisting of approximately 1.44 acres of undeveloped land. The Chilcotts acquired the parcel with the intent to construct a home and keep their horses. Shortly after purchase, the Chilcotts retained Moyer to prepare a boundary survey of the parcel. The cost of the survey was $315.00 including $7.50 extra cost for two concrete monuments, rather than iron rods, at the front corners, as requested by the Chilcotts. The survey was performed on July 27, 1984, and Moyer was paid. He furnished the Chilcotts several sketches of survey which he had signed and sealed. In 1985, the Chilcotts hired a contractor, Casey Jones, and commenced building their house. At the request of Casey Jones, Moyer prepared both the foundation and final surveys. These two surveys were added to the boundary survey on September 26, 1985, and November 23, 1985, respectively. At the time that the field work on the foundation and final survey was done, Moyer detected no problems with the monumentation he had initially set in the boundary survey. He did not see any evidence that the monuments had been disturbed. The final survey shows the house to be 17.35 feet inside the east lot line. The Chilcotts wanted at least that distance because the area is zoned agricultural and they did not want the neighbor's livestock close to the house. They also understood that the county required a minimum 10-foot set-back. In connection with the construction of their home, and in reliance upon Moyer's survey identifying their property's boundary, the Chilcotts installed a well and a fence and had approximately 800 feet of sod planted along the east boundary. The Chilcotts have since learned that those improvements are not on their property and that their house is, in fact, only 7.25 feet from the lot line. In May, 1986, David Rothery, a Florida licensed land surveyor, performed a boundary survey of the Donald Waterbury parcel adjacent to and just east of Chilcott's land on Grant Road. Rothery checked and double-checked his field measurements and still found a ten foot discrepancy in the placement of the monuments on the eastern corners of the Chilcott parcel. Those monuments were ten feet too far to the east and were, therefore, placed ten feet within the Waterbury boundaries. He did not observe any indication that the monuments had been moved, and when he placed his corners for the proper boundaries, he found no evidence that monuments had ever been there before. As required, the monuments placed by Moyer had his identification on them. Rothery put a dotted line on his survey with the notation, "Apparent survey error on adjoining property by Walter Moyer Land Surveying". Rothery also called Moyer and told him about the discrepancy. On the morning of May 10, 1986, Moyer went back out to the Chilcott property and discovered that his monuments were ten feet too far to the east. He was in the process of moving them when he was confronted by Charles Chilcott. He told Chilcott that an error was made, that he "dropped ten feet". There was some discussion about possible remedies such as paying for the well and fence to be moved or buying the ten feet from Waterbury. Chilcott did not let Moyer finish moving the monuments. That night, Chilcott, who had never met Moyer before, but had only communicated by phone or in writing, called Moyer's house and confirmed that it was the same person he had seen moving the monuments. That was the last time Chilcott spoke with Moyer. Chilcott called Moyer's house several times over the following months, but always reached Mrs. Moyer and his phone calls were not returned. Moyer did contact Waterbury about purchasing the ten foot strip. Waterbury was concerned about how this would affect his eventual ability to build on his lot and refused to sell. Waterbury is not pressing the Chilcotts about their encroachments; he simply expects to have the matter resolved sometime in the future. By a letter dated 8/18/86, the Chilcotts requested damages of $2,500.00 from Moyer, including an estimate of costs to move the well, fence and a power pole and to replace sod. On September 13, 1986, another letter from Chilcott to Moyer listed the same plus additional damages, for a total demand of $4,025.00. In a letter to Chilcott dated August 27, 1987, Moyer offered to pay the application fee to seek a variance from the setback requirement and offered to provide a final survey and half the cost of moving the well. The letter denied that the problem was Moyer's fault and said that Moyer believes that the markers were moved between the date the survey was completed and the date of the foundation. The Chilcotts rejected that offer. No evidence in this proceeding supports Moyer's contention that the Chilcotts or someone else moved the monuments he originally set in 1984. The evidence does establish a strong circumstantial basis for finding that the monuments were not moved, but were incorrectly placed by Moyer at the time that the boundary survey was completed. Setting the monuments properly is an essential component of conducting a boundary survey. Moreover, when a subsequent final survey is done, it is the duty of the surveyor to assure that the original monuments have not been disturbed during construction and site work by a contractor. Assuming that Moyer is correct in his contention that the monuments were moved after they were set by him, but before the foundation was placed, it was his duty to discover that fact. He did not, since his final survey shows that the house is 17.35 feet from the boundary, whereas the house is, in fact, approximately seven feet from the adjoining property. Except when witness monuments are used, as when a tree or other obstruction sits on a boundary corner, it is a violation of standard surveying practice to place a monument other than where it is shown on the survey drawing. In this instance, the drawing is accurate; as described in the Chilcott deed, the northeast corner of their property is 600 feet from the section corner. There was no need for witness monuments here; yet the east boundary monuments are ten feet off and are 590 feet from the section corner. There is no overlap in the legal descriptions of the Waterbury and Chilcott properties to account for the overlap in monuments discovered by David Rothery, the Waterbury surveyor. Surveying is a system of checking measurements. Both human and equipment errors in the profession are neither rare nor entirely common. Even the most up-to-date electronic equipment is subject to discrepancies. Checking and rechecking field measurements helps alleviate errors. The minimum technical standards developed by and for the profession are intended to reduce errors, although it is not clear that slavish adherence to those principles will absolutely prevent any possibility of error. When errors do occur, the standard of the profession is to work with the client to resolve the problem. In some cases, this may mean the purchase of the client's property or adjoining property if the party is willing to sell. Moyer's limited offers do not meet the established standards of the profession. THE BURGOON-BERGER SURVEYS COUNTS II AND III On August 21, 1986, Moyer signed and sealed a survey sketch of Lot 22, Block 2245, Port Malabar, Unit 44, in Brevard County Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey of Lot 22 showed the drawing of an improvement within the boundaries of the lot with a notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 25.86." Next to the date on the survey is the abbreviation, "FND". The survey was submitted to the Palm Bay Building Department on August 26, 1986, the day before the pre-slab inspection. A pre-slab inspection is done before the slab is poured; therefore, at the time the survey was signed and sealed, the concrete slab had not yet been poured. On October 20, 1986, Moyer prepared a sketch of survey of Lot 7, Block 1054, Port Malabar Unit 20, in Brevard County, Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey sketch indicated an improvement within the boundaries of the lot, with the notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 26.87". Next to the date on the survey is the notation "FND". The survey was submitted to the City of Palm Bay on October 28, 1986. The pre-slab inspection was done by the City on October 22, 1986. Again, the survey was signed and sealed before the slab was actually poured. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", is commonly understood to mean "foundation, finished floor elevation". "FND" is commonly understood to mean "foundation". Moyer, himself, has used both notations to signify those common usages. Foundation is generally accepted in the land surveying profession to mean something permanent and constructed, like a concrete slab, not bust the ground or wooden form boards used to guide the pouring of the slab. A survey which depicts an improvement with the note, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", when the floor has not been finished misrepresents the status of the construction of that project. Reviewing personnel at the Palm Bay Building Department rejected the surveys and alerted the City's Flood Plain Administrator. That individual, Maria Parkhurst, reported the incidents to the Department of Professional Regulation. Lots 22 and 7 are both in the flood plain and slab elevation is significant, as the City must assure that federal maximum elevation requirements are met. The City requires the submission of surveys containing slab elevation data. Banks also rely on foundation surveys submitted by contractors in order to determine the state of construction before the release of a foundation draw. That is, before the contractor is entitled to partial payment for his work, the bank needs to know if the work has been done. Both Moyer and his client, Bergoon-Berger, intended the notation in these cases to mean "finished form", not "finished floor". Burgoon-Berger had Moyer perform a survey after the wooden form boards were constructed, but before the concrete slab was poured, in order to assure that the house was placed properly on the lot. The survey was somehow submitted prematurely to the city, whereas because Moyer and his client intended that the poured slab be re-surveyed before the sketch was submitted. When the survey for Lot 7 was resubmitted to the City on October 31, 1986, the slab had been poured and, while the elevation remained the same, the size of the fireplace foundation was slightly smaller. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV" remained the same, with nothing on the face of the survey sketch to indicate that this later version was the finished floor, rather than the finished form. Moyer no longer uses these abbreviations. A survey is not valid until it is signed and sealed, but once it is signed and sealed, it signifies to the client and to the public at large that the information provided therein is true and accurate. The standard of professional land survey practice dictates that abbreviations which are not commonly accepted should be explained on the face of the drawing. The professional standards also dictate that even if a client asks for certain information on a survey, in anticipation that other third parties might rely on the survey the professional should either refuse to indicate improvements that do not exist yet or indicate unambiguously that the improvements are intended, but still under construction. Notwithstanding Bergoon-Berger's and Moyer's intentions with regard to the two surveys at issue, Moyer failed to meet professional standards when he signed and sealed those surveys and released them to his client.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final Order be issued finding Respondent guilty of Counts I, II and III of the Amended Administrative Complaint and placing him on probation for a period of two years, under such conditions as the Board may deem appropriate, including, but not limited to the participation in continuing professional education courses and the pursuit of a reasonable resolution to the Chilcott's boundary problems arising from the Respondent's negligence in performing their survey. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact. Petitioner (Count I) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 2. 3-4. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Incorporated in Part in Paragraph 1., as to the limitation of experience, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Adopted in part in Paragraph 3, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 9-10. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 4. 14-18. Adopted in Paragraph 3 and 4. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 11. 23-28. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 8, however the accurate date is May 10, 1986, and the evidence is inconclusive as to whether Moyer spoke to either of the Chilcotts before coming back. This fact is not material. 32-33. Adopted in Paragraph 8. 34. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 35-37. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 9. Adopted in part in Paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence and immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 6. 42-43. Rejected as cumulative. 44. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. 45-47. Rejected as cumulative. 48-49. Adopted in Paragraph 12. 50-51. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 13. Rejected as cumulative. 54-55. Adopted in Paragraph 14. (Counts II and III) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 15. Adopted in Paragraph 16. 4-6. Adopted in Paragraph 17. Adopted in Paragraph 20. Adopted in Paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Respondent Adopted in Paragraph 1. 2-5. Addressed in Background. Adopted in Paragraph 2. Adopted in Paragraph 3. 8-11. Rejected as immaterial. 12-13. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 7. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, except for the fact that the Chilcott house is 7 feet from the boundary. That fact is adopted in Paragraph 6. 19-20. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Adopted in Paragraphs 9, 10, and 14. Adopted in Paragraph 10. Rejected, except as adopted in Paragraph 10. 24-25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in part in Paragraph 14, otherwise rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 13. Rejected as immaterial. While the boundary depiction is accurate, the placement of the house is in error on the final and foundation surveys and, of course, the markers are erroneously set. 30-33. Addressed in Background. 34. Adopted in Paragraphs 15 and 17. 35-36. Adopted in part in Paragraph 22, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 37-38. Rejected as immaterial. 39. Adopted in Paragraphs 19 and 22. 40-44. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: DAVID R. TERRY, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JAMES P. BEADLE, ESQUIRE 5205 BABCOCK STREET N. E. PALM BAY, FLORIDA 32905 ALLEN R. SMITH, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 TOM GALLAGHER, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 WILLIAM O'NEIL, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the factual stipulations of the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Pahokee Farms, Inc., is a Florida corporation which, since 1960, has been a lessee of state- owned agricultural lands in the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA) in Palm Beach County. Its present lease expires December 31, 1985. Leases of state-owned lands within the EAA are presently governed by existing Rule 16Q-15.07(3), Florida Administrative Code This Rule provides that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board) may offer to lease lands in the EAA "by negotiation or competitive bidding." The actual practice and policy for extending leases in the EAA has, in fact, been one of negotiation rather than competitive bidding. Land has generally been released to existing leaseholders through a process of negotiation, providing the existing leaseholder paid its rent in a timely manner, properly cared for the land and was willing to pay an increased rental fee based on the current appraisal of the land. In June of 1982, Pahokee Farms, Inc., requested two five-year extensions of its agricultural lease in the EAA. The matter was deferred from the October 18, 1983, meeting of the Board of Trustees and rescheduled for the November 1, 1983, meeting. At the November 1, 1983, meeting of the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees, several members of the Board, as well as the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources, expressed an interest in reexamining the policy regarding agricultural leases in the EAA. For this reason, as well as the fact that several members of the Board were not present, the agenda item regarding the Pahokee Farms lease extension was deferred again to the November 17, 1983, meeting. At the November 17th meeting, the Board of Trustees directed the DNR staff, in consultation with the State Lands Management Committee, to formulate "policy recommendations" for the leasing of state-owned lands in the EAA for submission to the Board in February of 1984. The Board voted to establish its policy at that time and to then apply that policy to Pahokee Farm's request for extensions of its lease. As a result of the Board of Trustee's directions to develop policy recommendations, DNR, through the Division of State Lands, prepared a report to the Governor and Cabinet on policies for leasing state-owned lands in the EAA The report, dated March 20, 1984, set forth four options for leasing such lands, but ultimately recommended a competitive bid process through the request for proposals for leases. The report, after being deferred from the March 20, 1984, meeting, was agenda for the April 19, 1984, meeting of the Board of Trustees. The agenda item recommends "acceptance of the report and approval of recommendations." At the April 19, 1984, meeting of the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees, there was extensive discussion as to what the State's policy should be with respect to state-owned lands in the EAA. After directing the staff to develop a specific plan of action, with the Board's approval, to sell or exchange state-owned lands leased for agricultural purpose in order to acquire other valuable lands, the Board then turned to the leasing issue Governor Graham offered an amendment to the DNR report's recommended option of competitive bidding through the use of requests for proposals. The Governor's amendment to the DNR's recommendation was a two-step bidding process, calling for an initial qualification of bidders procedure and then the bid itself to be based upon both appraised value and a percentage of profits from the parcel leased. The qualified applicant offering the highest payment to the State was to be awarded the lease. Vacating lessees were to be compensated by the new lessee for ratoon or other crops based on an appraisal performed by an independent appraiser. The Governor's amendment also deleted the DNR's recommendation to provide a first right to renegotiate with existing lessees whose lease expires within four years. Prior to the Board's adoption of the Governor's amendment on April 19, 1984, a question was raised as to whether this "amendment" should he promulgated as a rule and subject to the Adinistrative Procedure Act. Governor Graham responded: "...Well, what we're doing, Mr. -- we're accepting a report. That's what we're doing at this point. We're not in a rulemaking posture." (DNR's Exhibit 9, page 209, lines 8-11). Attorney General Smith remarked that the staff would have to "do their developing toward inventing a rule here. That will have to come back through the process." (DNR's Exhibit 9, page 205, lines 16-18). Mr. Smith reiterates that "We routinely develop the policy direction and the staff goes out and makes that into a rule and comes back to us through that process, and I would contemplate that that would be done here." (DNR's Exhibit 9, page 206, lines 1-4). Governor Graham again expressed the opinion that what the Board was doing was, under its agenda item, "accepting the report which has been amended." (DNR's Exhibit 9, page 207, lines 5 and 6). Mr. Turlington stated: "...when we're voting this, we're just voting, you know, to kind of indicate to people how we're heading, and that we can handle things in a flexible, legal manner in the days ahead in order to take care of legal entanglements that some may care to inject at some future point, and I just want to be on record to make that clear..." (DNR's Exhibit 9, page 208, lines 6-12). The DNR staff thereafter drafted and the DNR Executive Director directed publication of what appears in the March 1, 1985, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly as "proposed rules" 16Q-15.01 and 16Q-15.07. The published material differs in some respects from the Governor's amendment approved by the Board. For example, where the approved amendment provides that the participation rent factor be based upon a "percentage of the profits," the DNR's published material requires that the participation rent factor be "2 percent of the gross income." The compensation to vacating lessees for ratoon or other residual crops under the Governor's amendment was to be based upon an appraisal by an independent appraiser. DNR's published material requires compensation based upon "the remaining portion of unamortized planting costs." The published material also provides for a discretionary exemption from the qualification procedure for parcels less than 100 acres or where the annual rental value is estimated to be less than $10,000. The Board's amendment contains no such exemption. The two DNR persons most involved with the preparation and drafting of the published "proposed rules" each felt that the Governor's amendment adopted by the Board of Trustees was a policy statement direction and that it was their duty to develop a rule based upon that direction. Each felt that they were charged with the responsibility of drafting a rule and bringing it back to the Governor and Cabinet for their concurrence, their approval and their adoption. Mr. MacFarland, Director of the Division of State Lands, referred to certain portions of the published material, at least where it is different than the Board's amendment, as a "staff recommendation." (Transcript, Vol. III, page 89, line 19; also see page 27, line 25). Mr. Merriam, the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of State Lands Management, refers to the published material as a "draft rule." (Transcript, Vol. I, page 172, line 20). The material published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 1, 1985, has never been presented to the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Board of Trustees. While the published notice did state that a hearing would be held by the Department of Natural Resources and the Board of Trustees on March 19, 1985, this meeting never occurred.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Andrew T. Edgemond, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed against Respondent's land surveyor's license.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Board of Professional Surveyors and Mappers, with the responsibility to license, regulate, and discipline land surveyors in the State of Florida. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number LS 0002347. Respondent was initially licensed as a land surveyor in 1971 and has practiced land surveying in Plant City, Florida for more than twenty years. On or about March 22, 1989, Respondent was contacted by a client who requested that Respondent prepare a survey specifying the location of certain mono form boards. Mono form boards are temporary structures and are not fixed improvements, although they may be used to indicate where fixed improvements will be located. The client indicated that the survey was needed immediately because the client was to have a slab of concrete poured before the next morning. Prior to conducting the survey, Respondent asked his client for a legal description of the property on which the form boards were located. The client provided Respondent with a copy of a building permit which contained a reference to a preliminary plat. Respondent then went to City Hall in Plant City, Florida where he obtained a preliminary plat which included the property on which the form boards were located. After leaving the City Hall, Respondent went to his office to determine where the property was located. In researching the files in his office, Respondent found a boundary survey which included a property line which was coincident with the property the client had asked him to survey. Having obtained the building permit, preliminary plat, and the boundary survey, Respondent went into the field to measure the location of the form boards. Upon returning to his office, Respondent prepared a survey which indicated the location of the mono form boards. The survey, dated March 22, 1989, was signed and sealed by Respondent. On the survey was the following: "SPECIFIC PURPOSE SURVEY" "FOR BUILDING PERMIT PURPOSES ONLY" The survey drawing contained a preliminary description as follows: PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTION Lot 22 of WALDIN LAKE UNIT 55 as per "Preliminary Plat" on file in City Engineers office, City of Plant City, Florida. Respondent made the decision to designate the survey a specific purpose survey after he reviewed Rule 21HH-6.002, Florida Administrative Code. After reviewing the various types of surveys outlined in the rule, Respondent concluded that a survey done solely to provide a client with the location of mono form boards that were already in place came within the definition of a specific or special purpose survey. A specific or special purpose survey is one that is performed for specified purposes and does not come within the definition of other types of surveys outlined in Rule 21HH-6.002, Florida Administrative Code. The specific purpose survey allows the surveyor to perform a survey that meets the client's particular need. However, a specific purpose survey may not be used to circumvent the law and must conform to the minimum technical standards. The Department's position is that a specific purpose survey was inappropriate in the instant case. Moreover, even if a specific purpose survey was appropriate, the Respondent's survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards. With regard to the type of survey performed by Respondent, the Department's expert witness, Lewis Kent, testified that Respondent's use of the specific purpose survey in this case was improper. Although this was his opinion, Mr. Kent candidly admitted that he was not sure what Respondent was requested to do by the client. Mr. Kent further testified that standard practice requires that boundary surveys be performed prior to new construction. Apparently, Mr. Kent believed that the situation in this case involved new construction. Based on that belief, he concluded that Respondent was obligated to perform a boundary survey. Notwithstanding this conclusion, no authority was cited for this proposition. In fact, evidence was presented that the Plant City Building Department did not require a boundary survey as a condition of issuing a building permit for commercial projects, such as the proposed project of Respondent's client. At one point, Mr. Kent stated that the Respondent was required to perform a boundary survey of the entire 1,539.523 acre tract, even though the tract had already been surveyed. During the course of his testimony, Mr. Kent retreated from this position and indicated that Respondent was not obligated to retrace the entire tract, but should have retraced enough of the tract to tie his survey to a legal corner. Notwithstanding the Department's position that the specific purpose survey was inappropriate in this case and that Respondent should have performed a boundary survey, its expert witness testified that a boundary survey was not the only way to locate the mono form boards. During his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Kent indicated that perhaps the type of survey that Respondent should have performed was a "construction layout survey" as that term is defined in Rule 22HH-6.002 (6)(c), Florida Administrative Code. In regard to the second allegation, the Department asserted that even if the survey was appropriately designated a specific purpose survey, the survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards. Specifically, the Department alleged that Respondent's specific purpose survey failed to include an adequate legal description and a legend which included abbreviations used in the drawing. According to the Department's expert witness, the legal description on Respondent's specific purpose survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards in that the description on the face of the survey referred only to a preliminary plat, which by its very nature is subject to change. However, at the time Respondent prepared the specific purpose survey, the subdivision had not yet been platted. The Department's position is that the minimum technical standards required that the survey include a phrase describing the legal metes and bounds, and show the location of the mono form boards in relation to a boundary line. According to the Department's expert, as presently drawn, another surveyor could not reproduce this survey without first obtaining a copy of the preliminary plat referred to on the survey. Richard Hinson, the expert witness for Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida since 1982. During that time, Mr. Hinson has performed several hundred boundary surveys in Plant City, Florida and over a hundred surveys for building permit purposes. The testimony of Mr. Hinson conflicted directly with the testimony of Mr. Kent. It was Mr. Hinson's testimony that in the instant case, a specific purpose survey is appropriate. Based on what Respondent's client requested, a measurement showing the location of the mono form boards, the survey was appropriately designated a specific purpose survey. The Department asserted that, at a minimum, Respondent was obligated to do a boundary survey of Lot 22. However, in this situation, a boundary survey of preliminary Lot 22 would have made no difference in the location of the mono form boards because Lot 22 did not exist when Respondent prepared the survey. With regard to the preliminary description on the survey, based on Mr. Hinson's opinion, the specific purpose survey prepared by Respondent meets the minimum technical standards. While the survey does not recite or go back to a corner for the description, the description given is that it relates to the preliminary plat. With respect to the use of a specific purpose survey, Mr. Hinson's opinion was that, in this case, it was appropriate for Respondent to perform a specific purpose survey to measure the location of form boards. This opinion was based on two factors, both of which were present in this case. First, prior to performing the survey, the surveyor must have reviewed the following: a boundary survey, a building permit with a legal description describing Lot 22 according to a preliminary plat, and a copy the preliminary plat showing Lot 22. Second, the surveyor must have determined that the preliminary plat was rendered out of the boundary survey. In this case, prior to performing the specific purpose survey, Respondent utilized a boundary survey of the tract, which included Lot 22 as shown on the preliminary plat, and determined that the preliminary plat was rendered from that survey. After assuring himself that the preliminary plat was rendered from the boundary survey which he reviewed, Respondent went to the site and proceeded to measure and draw the location of the mono form boards in his field notes. Respondent's survey shows Lot 22 and notes that this is a preliminary description based on a preliminary plat. The preliminary plat is referenced on the survey. The drawing, which depicts the location of the mono form boards, measures the distance from the boundary of Lot 22 to Old Sydney Road and to Sydney Road. The drawing also measures the distance of the mono form boards from the boundary lines of Lot 22. The accuracy of these measurements were undisputed by the Department. Based on Mr. Hinson's opinion, Respondent's decision to designate the survey in the instant case as a specific purpose survey was appropriate. Also, with respect to the preliminary description that appears on the face of the survey, the survey meets the minimum technical standards. The specific purpose survey prepared by Respondent fails to meet the minimum technical standard set forth in Rule 21HH-6.003(5), Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that the abbreviations used on the drawing be noted within a legend on the face of the drawing. In this case, the abbreviations used on the survey are not noted on a legend or anywhere else on the survey. No evidence was presented to indicate that the specific purpose survey performed by Respondent inaccurately depicted the location of the mono form boards. Neither was evidence presented which even claimed to indicate that the survey prepared by Respondent failed to comply with the client's request. Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida for twenty-four years, and there is no evidence that he has been subjected to disciplinary action on any prior occasion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Land Surveyors and Mappers, enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 472.033(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $250.00 RECOMMENDED that Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1159 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Statutes, (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4-5. Accepted. 6. Accepted and incorporated. 7-9. Accepted. 10. Rejected as statement of rule. 11. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 12. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 13. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 14. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 15. Rejected as argument. 16. Accepted and incorporated. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 20. Rejected as argument. 21-22. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Accepted except at time of survey the lots were preliminary. Rejected as argument. 26-27. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 28. Accepted except statement that Respondent was obligated to retrace part of the survey is rejected. 29-31. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Accepted. 34-35. Rejected as argument. 36. Accepted. 37-40. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 41. Accepted. 42-43. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. 46-48. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated. Unsupported by record evidence. 3-7. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 1-3 of page 2. Rejected as conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Miriam S. Wilkinson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mark W. Reagan, Esquire P.O. Box 321028 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32932 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent Charlene Touby was exclusively connected with International Land Brokers, Inc., as a real estate salesperson from May 23, 1975, to September 30, 1975; and again from November 17, 1975, to April 15, 1976. During the period of respondent's employment, Jeffrey Kramer, a real estate broker, was president and active firm member of International Land Brokers, Inc. One of the corporation's offices consisted of two rooms. The front room contained Mr. Kramer's desk, a secretary's desk, file cabinets, a duplicating machine, and a reception area. The back room was divided into six cubicles each with a telephone. The office complex had a regular telephone line and a WATS line. Attached to the walls of most of the cubicles most of the time were portions of a packet of papers that was mailed to certain prospects. Pages two through five of composite exhibit No. 1, together with the last page, were at one time posted on the walls of some of the cubicles. By the time respondent began her second period of employment with International Land Brokers, Inc., Walter J. Pankz had joined the firm as a broker. Between the hours of six and half past ten five nights a week and at various times on weekends, salespersons in the employ of International Land Brokers, Inc. manned the telephones in the cubicles. They called up property owners, introduced themselves as licensed real estate salespersons, and inquired whether the property owner was interested in selling his property. When a property owner indicated an interest in selling, the salesperson made a note of that fact. The following day, clerical employees mailed a packet of papers to the property owners whose interest in selling the salesperson had noted. Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 1 contains the papers mailed to one prospect. The contents of the materials which were mailed out changed three or four times over the year and a half that International Land Brokers, Inc., was in business. As a general rule, a week or so after the initial call to a property owner who proved interested in selling, a salesperson placed a second telephone call to answer any questions about the materials that had been mailed, and to encourage the property owner to list the property for sale with International Land Brokers, Inc. Property owners who listed their property paid International Land Brokers, Inc., a listing fee which was to be subtracted from the broker's commission, in the event of sale. When International Land Brokers, Inc., began operations, the listing fee was $200.00 or $250.00, but the listing fee was eventually raised to about $300.00. In the event the same salesperson both initially contacted the property owner and subsequently secured the listing, the salesperson was paid approximately 30 percent of the listing fee. If one salesperson initially contacted the property owner and another salesperson secured the listing, the one who made the initial telephone call was paid approximately $20.00 and the other salesperson was paid between $75.00 and $90.00 or thereabouts; when more than one salesperson was involved the sum of the amounts paid to the salespersons represented about 35 percent of the listing fee. In telephoning property owners, the salespersons worked from lists which International Land Brokers, Inc., had bought from unspecified individuals, or compiled from county tax records.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Louis B. Guttmann, III, Esquire, and Mr. Richard J.R. Parkinson, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. Charles A. Finkel, Esquire 801 East Hallandale Beach Boulevard Hallandale, Florida 33009
The Issue The matters in dispute in this cause concern the attempts by Petitioner to achieve licensure in the State of Florida as a registered land surveyor, pursuant to Chapter 472, Florida Statutes, and through Rule 21HH-3.01, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not met the necessary prerequisites in Section 472.013, Florida Statutes, to allow him to stand the licensing examination. Moreover, Respondent has not allowed Petitioner to gain licensure by endorsement as defined in Subsection 472.015 (3) , Florida Statutes. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to licensure by endorsement or in the alternative, to stand the examination, leading to his licensure by testing. WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS Petitioner testified in this cause and offered two exhibits which were received. Respondent presented a composite exhibit which is constituted of file materials related to the Petitioner's application for licensure and responses to the application request.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retiree from the United States Army, having served 22 years, commencing in 1955. During his service, he obtained military occupational specialties related to the field of surveying in the artillery branch. This experience included occupational training given to Petitioner and examinations of his skills following that training; practical surveying work, and instructional work by Petitioner performed for the benefit of other trainees. This work experience included surveying activities in Florida while in the military. Those surveying duties were military assignments. Material related to Petitioner's training and job performance is generally set forth in Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 are further statements related to the Petitioner's military occupational specialties. Petitioner has made application to be licensed as a land surveyor in Florida in keeping with the provisions of Chapter 472, Florida Statutes. Through this process, it is Petitioner's desire to be accepted for licensure through the endorsement process or be given the opportunity to sit for the examination. Respondent is unwilling to accent Petitioner as a candidate for licensure by endorsement. In this connection, he did not establish his successful completion of an examination identified in Subsection 472.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes, or that he holds a valid license from another jurisdiction within the meaning of Subsection 472.015(3)(b) , Florida Statutes. After reviewing Petitioner's application, Respondent through correspondence dated September 10, 1982, denied Petitioner's reguest for licensure by examination premised upon the fact that Petitioner's land surveying experience was not verified by a registered land surveyor who had employed or supervised Petitioner's work. In addition, the letter of denial of licensure indicated that the applicant's file was not complete in that it failed to account for work experience following Petitioner's retirement from the armed services in 1976. (In the course of the hearing, it was established that Petitioner has not practiced land surveying following his retirement.) Notwithstanding his considerable experience, Petitioner has failed to submit by application and/or in the course of the final hearing, documentation which would verify that Petitioner has gained his experience in the field of surveying as a sub- ordinate to a land surveyor as defined in Subsection 472.005(3), Florida Statutes. His documentation did not identify that Petitioner's supervisors or commanders were land surveyors as previously defined and Petitioner did not establish in the hearing that his superiors were land surveyors, as defined. As a consequence, Petitioner failed to provide references from land surveyors setting forth the quality and character of his duties and responsibilities while under the land surveyor's supervision. After receiving the letter of denial of the application, Petitioner made a timely request for a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. This matter was transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings and received by that Division on October 18, 1982. An initial hearing date was established for December 8, 1982, and was continued to allow for the negotiations between the parties. The case was subsequently reset for final hearing on March 16, 1983, the date the final hearing was conducted.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, at all times material to the Administrative Complaint in this proceeding, was a land surveyor licensed by the State of Florida, having been issued license number 1305. The Respondent is also a licensed professional engineer and a licensed architect. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged under Chapter 472, Florida Statutes, and appurtenant rules with the licensure and regulation of licensure status of land surveyors in Florida and the regulation and enforcement of their practice methods and standards. The Board of Land Surveyors published "Minimum Standards for Land Surveyors (Rule 21HH-6) effective September 1, 1951. The Respondent was unaware of the promulgation of those minimum standards. The Respondent had not attended meetings of the "Manasota" Chapter of the Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors at which those standards were discussed and a checklist for the standards was distributed. On August 24, 1982, the Respondent prepared a land survey of a part of Lot 306, Overbrook Gardens, in Sarasota County. The survey was submitted to the Sarasota County Building Department in connection with an application for a building permit pertaining to that real property, filed on August 26, 1982. The offenses charged are alleged violations of the minimum standards with respect to that survey. The Respondent's client had delivered to him a survey prepared by Lemonde Surveying, Inc., of Port Charlotte, Florida, which was prepared on February 28, 1980. That survey contained a metes and bounds land description. The client engaged the Respondent to survey the same parcel of land with that description and provide a survey drawing to be used in conjunction with an application for the subject building permit. The survey gas not certified by the Respondent in accordance with minimum standards. The Respondent admitted this and it was undisputed that the signature and seal of fixed on the survey complied with the legal requirements enforced before the adoption of the abovementoned minimum standards, of which the Respondent was unaware. The Respondent admitted to failure to refer to all sources of information upon which the survey was predicated. The Respondent used a legal description from a previous survey provided him by Darrell Newell, the contractor who was agent for the owner of the property. The survey the Respondent submitted to the building department only showed the name of the owner. The older survey submitted by the Respondent's client was his only source of information in this regard. The parties stipulated that the allegation regarding failure to show measured distances to the nearest intersection was incorrect and that indeed the Respondent had shown the distance to the nearest intersection. The Respondent failed to show the location of a telephone company underground terminal pedestal and an abandoned wire fence of unstated dimensions which is outside the surveyed property near the north and east boundaries. The fence does not encroach on the surveyed property at all. The telephone terminal pedestal is approximately one foot or less in height, located just inside the northerly boundary of the property, approximately midway between the two northerly corners. The telephone terminal was not visible at the time of the survey due to high grass, weeds, and undergrowth covering the property when the fieldwork was conducted by the Respondent's survey party chief. The triangular parcel of property involved was located with reference to an established, identifiable real property corner. All three corners were monumented prior to the survey by the Respondent, so that the location of boundaries near the abandoned, partial, non-encroaching fence could be established with reasonable certainty. On September 15, 1932, personnel of the county building department charged with the responsibility of issuing the building permit for the property requested advice with regard to the efficacy of Respondent's survey from Mr. Emerson, the County Surveyor, who testified for the Petitioner. Mr. Emerson spoke with the Respondent by phone and mailed him copies of the "minimum standards" and the "Surveyor's Checklist" of the Manasota Chapter of the Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, which relates to those minimum standards in the rule cited below. The Respondent then promptly and voluntarily prepared a new survey which fully complied with those minimum standards which he had at that point first become aware of, and the building permit was duly issued to the Respondent's client. The Respondent's client's interests were not shown to be prejudiced and the complaint to the Board of Land Surveyors did not emanate from the Respondent's client, but rather from Mr. Emerson of-the county building department, who did not bother to consult the Respondent or obtain his explanation prior to lodging the complaint with the Board. The survey originally submitted to the Sarasota Count Building Department would have been adequate support for the issuance of the building permit before adoption of the minimum standards. The survey was shown to be totally adequate in terms of its substance and reflection of technical surveying competence, as opposed to the particular format prescribed by the minimum standards. This is the first disciplinary action ever taken against the. Respondent as a land surveyor licensee, and the Respondent's practice of his profession has always been characterized by a high degree of technical competence and professional integrity.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, William J. Lindh, be accorded the penalty of a private, written reprimand for violation of Rule 21HH-6.03(1) and (6),,Florida Administrative Code, and Section 472.033(1)(g) , Florida Statutes (1951) , and that the Administrative Complaint, in all other respects, be dismissed. DONE ADD ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles J Cheves, Esquire Cheves & Rapkin 341 West Venice Avenue Venice, Florida 33595 Allen R. Smith, Jr., Executive Director Board of Land Surveyors Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, CASE NO.: 83-512 vs. LICENSE NO: 1308 WILLIAM J. LINDH, Respondent. /
The Issue Eleven separate petitions were filed pursuant to section 120.535, F.S. alleging various non-rule policies of the Board of Professional Land Surveyors and requesting that those alleged policies be adopted by rule. The threshold issue in these cases is whether such policies exist; if so, it must be determined whether they are rules, as defined in section 120.52(16), and whether rulemaking is feasible and practicable, as provided in section 120.535(1), F.S. CASES NUMBER 94-0609RX - 94-0616RX The eight petitions in these consolidated cases are challenges to specific provisions within Chapter 61G17-6, F.A.C. (formerly 21HH-6, F.A.C.), "Minimum Technical Standards", relating to the practice of land surveying, adopted by the Board of Professional Land Surveyors. The issue in these cases is whether those specific provisions are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, as alleged by Petitioner. CASE NUMBER 94-0925F In this case, Respondent seeks attorney's fees and costs from counsel for Petitioner pursuant to section 120.57(1)(b)5., F.S. The issue, therefore, is whether an award under that section is appropriate. OTHER ISSUES Respondent does not dispute the standing of Petitioner in the sections 120.535 and 120.56, F.S. cases. Petitioner, in his proposed order, argues that he, not Respondent, is entitled to fees and costs. Petitioner also argues that his subpoena were properly served by mail on various board members. Those two issues are thus addressed in this order.
Findings Of Fact Gary A. Burden (Burden) is a professional land surveyor registered in the state of Florida pursuant to Chapter 472, F.S. The parties have stipulated that he is substantially affected by the rules of the Board of Professional Land Surveyors (Board). On June 22, 1993, the Department of Professional Regulation (now, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, DBPR) issued an administrative complaint alleging that Burden failed to follow minimum technical standards for land surveying in a boundary survey he performed for Lot 33, Lafayette Forest, in Seminole County, Florida. The complaint alleged seven specific deficiencies and cited the Board rule which applies to each. (Petitioner's exhibit Number 9) The seven specific violations are identified in a consultant's report dated April 1, 1993, from Dianne Jones, PLS, to the Board. (Petitioner's Number 10) Burden requested a formal hearing on the complaint and the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and was assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6433. On February 14, 1994, Hearing Officer, Ella Jane P. Davis issued an order on all motions pending as of that date. The order includes these pertinent provisions describing discussions at a January 20, 1994, conference call between the hearing officer and counsel for the parties: The undersigned also advised the parties that the instant Section 120.57(1), F.S. proceeding was not the appropriate vehicle to raise what appeared to be challenges in existing rules named in Respondent's affirmative defenses and that challenges to existing rules can only be initiated pursuant to Section 120.56, F.S. Further, the parties were informed that challenges to existing rules could not and would not be resolved by the Recommended Order to be entered in the instant Section 120.57(1), F.S. license disciplining proceeding. After hearing oral argument, the undersigned further requested that the parties file their respective memoranda as to whether the instant case had any Section 120.535, F.S. ramifications. Shortly after the January 20th telephone conference, Gary Burden, through counsel, filed the nineteen petitions that are the subject of this proceeding. The eleven petitions filed pursuant to section 120.535, F.S. request that these alleged policies of the Board be promulgated as formal rules: The Board's refusal to allow land surveyor registrants to incorporate other recorded instruments into their drawings by reference; The Board's determination of what constitutes "substantial compliance" to the minimum technical standards; The Board's application of a "substantial compliance" standard to probationary registrants, but a "strict compliance" standard to accused registrants. The Board's assessment of a single penalty, no matter how major or minor the offense; The Board's refusal to utilize the simple citation rule found at rule 61G17-9.004, F.A.C. (providing for disciplinary citation and fine); The Board's refusal to allow its registrants to mitigate damage to the public. The Board's equating the determination of boundaries to real property to the words contained in recorded deeds and plats; The Board's equating the standards of practice for "corners" with the standards of practice for "monuments". The Board's need to define the meaning of the term, "fixed improvements"; The Board's requirement that lot and block numbers be shown on a survey drawing in a specific location; and The Board's requirement that registrants measure distances and directions to "reference points". Burden did not testify at hearing, nor did he appear in person at the hearing. His single witness, Benjamin Paul Blackburn, has been registered as a land surveyor since 1969. Blackburn has been before the Board once on allegations of minimum technical standard violations, and the charges were dismissed; he has attended two Board meetings in the last year, and attended once in 1981 when the Board was promulgating rules. He has been an active member of the state professional association and was president of the association in the past. Blackburn was an articulate and sincere witness; however, he has no competent knowledge of the policies of the Board. His information comes from talking with other surveyors and from attending training seminars sponsored by the association. He freely admits that he has no direct knowledge of many of the policies alleged by Burden; in some instances his understanding of the Board's policy is contrary to that alleged by Burden. For example, Blackburn believes the Board has allowed surveyors to mitigate damages; he also believes the Board allows incorporation by reference on surveys and maps. Counsel for Burden attempted to compel the appearance of Board members by mailing subpoena to them, certified mail, with witness checks enclosed. On the advice of counsel that the service was defective, the members did not appear. Documents sought by the subpoena duces tecum were voluntarily produced by the Board's Executive Director, an employee of the DBPR, Angel Gonzalez, to the extent that he was able to obtain the documents and records. Diane Jones has been registered as a land surveyor for seven years and worked as an intern in the field for fifteen years. She has been employed by DBPR in the past as a consultant in cases the agency brings to the Board. She was a consultant in the Burden case. Ms. Jones was unable to confirm that the alleged policies were, in fact, Board policies. Her understanding was similar to Blackburn's, generally. In her capacity as consultant to DBPR in discipline cases, she has no difficulty interpreting and applying the minimum technical standards or other rules of the Board, based on her knowledge of the rules and her professional experience. In addition to alleging unwritten policies by the Board, Burden challenges a series of existing Board rules which he claims are invalid exercises of legislative delegation. For each rule that is a subject of his petitions, he claims invalidity based on excess of rulemaking authority, enlargement or modification of the law, vagueness and capriciousness. More specifically, Burden claims the following: a) Rules 61G17-6.002(2) and 61G17-6.002(6)(g), F.A.C. (defining "corner" and "land or Boundary Survey", respectively) illegally attempt to grant the land surveyor the right to establish or re-establish "boundary lines"; b) Rule 61G17-6.003(4), F.A.C. illegally requires a basis of bearing to be shown; c) Rule 61G17-6.003(8)(a), F.A.C. is non-specific about the location of lot and block numbers on a survey drawing; Rule 61G17-6.003(15), F.A.C. illegally requires land surveyors to state certain unnecessary data for survey corners. Rule 61G17-6.003(18), F.A.C. illegally requires the land surveyor to place almost all abbreviations in a legend or not use such abbreviations; Rule 61G17-6.003(13), F.A.C. illegally requires the land surveyor to show unidentified "fixed improvements"; Rules 61G17-6.003(8)(c) and (d) illegally require a land surveyor to perform a comparative analysis to reference points other than those described at Rule 61G17-6.002(5), F.A.C.; and Rule 61G17-6.003(10), F.A.C. illegally requires the land surveyor to show adjoining elements and rights of way which are shown on instruments incorporated by reference into the survey drawing. 11. Rules 61G17-6.002(2) and 61G17-6.002(6)(g) provide: (2) Corner: shall mean a point on a land boundary that designates a change in direction, for example: points of curvature, points of tangency, points of compound curvature and so forth. . . . (6) Survey: shall mean the orderly process of determining data relating to the physical or chemical characteristics of the earth, and may be further defined according to the type of data obtained, the methods and instruments used, and the purpose(s) to be served. All surveys showing land boundary information must be in accordance with Rule 61G17-6.003. For purposes of this rule, types of surveys shall include the following definitions: . . . (g) Land or Boundary Survey: shall mean a survey, the primary purpose of which includes, but is not limited to, the determining of the perimeters of a parcel or tract of land by establishing or re-establishing corners, monuments, and boundary lines for the purposes of describing, locating of fixed improvements, or platting or dividing the parcel. According to Blackburn, the deed rather than the surveyor establishes the land boundaries. This argument or fact does not provide a basis to invalidate the rules as the rules do not require or allow a surveyor to create boundaries as an extent of legal possession. Rather, the purpose of the rules is clearly stated in (6)(g). The language of the rules is consistent with treatises and textbooks that are nationally recognized. The American Congress on Surveying and Mapping (ACSM) and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) jointly adopted this definition in 1978: Land surveying is the art and science of: (1) Re-establishing cadastral surveys and land boundaries based on documents of record and historical evidence; (2) planning, designing and establishing property boundaries; and (3) certifying surveys as required by statute or local ordinance such as subdivision plats, registered land surveys, judicial surveys, and space delineation. Land surveying can include associated services such as mapping and related data accumulation; construction layout surveys; precision measurements of length, angle, elevation, area and volume; horizontal and vertical control systems; and the analysis and utilization of survey data." (Respondent's exhibit Number 2) 12. Rule 61G17-6.003(4), F.A.C. provides: (4) A reference to all bearings shown must be clearly stated, i.e., whether to "True North"; "Grid North as established by the NOS"; "Assumed North based on a bearing for a well defined line, such as the center line of a road or right of way, etc."; "a Deed Call for a particular line"; or "the bearing of a particular line shown upon a plat." References to Magnetic North should be avoided except in the cases where a comparison is necessitated by a Deed Call. In all cases, the bearings used shall be referenced to some well-established line. Both parties' experts agree that the purpose of this rule is to relate the property surveyed to an established line so that subsequent surveyors could retrace or reconstruct what the surveyor did with regard to angles and the like. "Assumed north" is simply a direction assumed and does not relate to a compass direction. If only angles are shown, and no bearings, the rule does not apply. Bearings are a way of indicating angular relationships; an angle can be developed from the bearings. The rule legitimately fulfills its purpose of avoiding ambiguity. 13. Rule 61G17-6.003(8)(a), F.A.C. provides: Surveys of all or part of a lot(s) which is part of a recorded subdivision shall show the following upon the drawing: The lot(s) and block numbers or other designation, including those of adjoining lots. This is not a complicated rule. Showing the lot numbers helps interpret and orient the map. Even though the title of the survey or text on the survey may identify the lot number of the lot being surveyed, including the number on the face of the drawing makes the survey easier to read. 14. Rule 61G17-6.003(15), F.A.C. provides: (15) The surveyor shall make a determination of the correct position of the boundary of the real property and shall set monuments, as defined herein, unless monuments already exist at such corners. All monuments, found or placed, must be described on the survey drawing. When the property corner cannot be set, a witness monument shall be placed with data given to show its location upon the ground in relation to the boundary lines or corner. The corner descriptions shall state the size, material, and cap identification of the monument as well as whether the monument was found or set. The distance along boundaries between monuments shall not exceed fourteen hundred feet. When a parcel has a natural and/or an artificial feature such as a roadway, river, lake, beach, marsh, stream or other irregular boundary as one or more of its boundaries, then a monument meander or survey line shall be established either directly along or near the feature. Dimensions shall be shown between the meander or survey line and the boundary line sufficient to show the relationship between the two. Even though monuments may be accidentally or deliberately moved by contractors, property owners or neighbors, the monuments are still an important feature of a survey. A prudent surveyor would not rely on an existing monument without looking for signs of disturbance and verifying its placement. The efficiency of showing and describing a monument outweighs any danger of including it. 15. Rule 61G17-6.003(18), F.A.C. provides: ABBREVIATIONS: Abbreviations generally used by the public or in proper names that do not relate to matters of survey are excluded from the legend requirement. Acceptable abbreviations on the face of maps, plats, or survey drawings are: N = North S = South E = East W = West or any combination such as NE, SW, etc. . = Degrees ' = Minutes when used in bearing " = Seconds when used in a bearing ' = Feet when used in a distance " = Inches when used in a distance AC = Acres + = More or less (or Plus or Minus) Any other abbreviations relating to survey matters must be clearly shown within a legend or notes appearing on the face of the drawing. Blackburn contends that the legend requirement is time-consuming, expensive and unnecessary. A surveyor, however, is not required to use abbreviations. To the extent that they are used, they should be explained on the face of the document. A legend facilitates interpretation of the survey and eliminates questions or ambiguities. The rule establishes some clear exceptions to the legend requirement in subsection (b). According to Diane Jones, subsections (a) and of the rule are vague and confusing. In her opinion, every abbreviation that is not addressed in subsection (b) should be explained in a legend on the survey. She, therefore, would prefer to see everything explained on the face of the document, while Petitioner prefers to dispose of the legend altogether. Reasonable minds plainly differ; although the rule could be improved with rewording, as suggested by Ms. Jones, it is not invalid for the reasons advanced by Petitioner. 16. Rule 61G17-6.003(13), F.A.C. provides: (13) Location of fixed improvements pertinent to the survey shall be shown upon the drawing in reference to the boundaries, either directly or by offset lines. If fixed improvements are not located or do not exist, a note to this effect shall be shown upon the drawing. Pertinent improvements are improvements made for the enjoyment of the property being surveyed and shall include docks, boathouses, and similar improvements. According to Blackburn, inclusion of fixed improvements on the survey should depend on what the client has ordered. He also feels the rule results in surveys that are misleading to the public as the inclusion of any fixed improvements would imply that those are the only fixed improvements in the area. These concerns are mutually inconsistent. The rule is clear and unambiguous. It is also consistent with accepted principles of land survey practice. 17. Rules 61G217-6.003(8)(c) and (d), F.A.C. provide: (8) Surveys of all or part of a lot(s) which is part of a recorded subdivision shall show the following upon the drawing: . . . A comparison between the recorded directions and distances with field measured directions and distances to the nearest street centerline, right of way intersection or other identifiable reference points where the block lines are straight. A comparison between the recorded directions and distances or computed directions and distances based upon the recorded data with field measured directions and distances to an identifiable reference point where the block lines are curved. The requirements of these rules are clear to a practicing land surveyor. "Reference point" is described in rule 61G17-6.002(5), F.A.C. as ". . . any defined position that is or can be established in relation to another defined position." Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, there is no conflict between the requirements of (c) and (d), and the definition of "reference point". 18. Rule 61G17-6.003(10), F.A.C. provides: (10) All recorded public and private rights of way shown on applicable recorded plats adjoining or across the land being surveyed shall be located and shown upon the drawing. Easements shown on applicable record plats or open and notorious evidence of easements or rights of way on or across the land being surveyed shall be located and shown upon the drawing. If streets or street rights of way abutting the land surveyed are not physically open, a note to this effect shall be shown upon the drawing. If location of easements or rights of way of record, other than those on record plats, is required, this information must be furnished to the surveyor. This rule requires that specific information be included even when that information may already be found on material incorporated by reference, like a plat, for example. The rule serves the legitimate purpose of saving the user from time consuming research. The survey should stand alone as a complete document. In summary, the rules at issue are valid and reasonably clear and consistent with establishing principles guiding the practice of professional land surveying. According to Brown, Robillard, and Wilson, Evidence and Procedures for Boundary Location, 2nd Ed (Respondent's Ex. 2): A plat should tell a complete story; it should show sufficient information to allow any other surveyor to understand how the survey was made and why the survey was correct. It also should show complete information on encroachments to enable any attorney or others to evaluate properly the effect of continued possession. (p.350) . . . A plat should be complete in itself and should present sufficient evidence of monuments (record and locative) and measurements so that any other surveyor can clearly, without ambiguity, find the locative points and follow the reasonings of the surveyor. A plat does not show the client's land alone; it shows all ties necessary to prove the correctness of location. If it is necessary to measure from a mile away to correctly locate a property, that tie, as measured, is shown. (p. 360) There is no evidence in this proceeding that either party or attorney filed pleadings or papers for any improper purpose, such as delay harassment, increase in cost or otherwise. The petitions are numerous, but they relate to rules or alleged policies at issue in a separate disciplinary action, and, on their face, they raise legitimate issues. Respondent's defense was necessary and appropriate.
The Issue May this appeal be dismissed as moot due to the impossibility of the development order being granted?
Findings Of Fact This case involves Florida Rock's May 20, 1992, application for a development order to the Citrus County Department of Development Services (LDDS or Department) for a mining operation. Sometime after 1980, the real property at issue had been designated "extractive" on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM). Citrus County's 1986 Comprehensive Plan designated Florida Rock's real property as "extractive." In 1990, after the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs challenged the "extractive" designation in the County's 1989 plan amendments, the site continued to be designated "extractive." Citrus County simultaneously enacted its Citrus County Land Development Code (LDC or Code). At all such times, zoning and all maps also embraced the same "extractive" designation. Citrus County maintains two sets of land use maps. The Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP or Comprehensive Plan) has a FLUM (a generalized land use map) and the LDC has attached to it atlas maps on a smaller scale. The LDC maps are identical to the county tax assessor tax maps and show individual parcels/lots of record. Such parcels defined by the Comprehensive Plan and LDC text have a land use designation as associated with each. Mining operations are permitted on real property designated "extractive." Under the LDC, when an application is submitted, it must be reviewed for completeness and the applicant notified within three days of whether the application is deemed complete or incomplete. If the application is deemed incomplete, the applicant must be advised of how the application should be amended or supplemented in order to be deemed complete for technical review. The applicant then may amend or supplement the application. Once a determination of completeness has been made, a technical review must be completed by each member of the technical review team within ten days, and thereafter, a series of committee meetings and public hearings may follow. During this portion of the procedure, amendments to the application may be required before the development order is ultimately granted or denied. Citrus County's land use amendment process began on April 10, 1992, before Florida Rock's application was submitted to the LDDS. Florida Rock had actual notice on April 10, 1992, that a change in its property designation from "extractive" to "rural residential" was pending, but no moratorium on development orders was imposed. Thus, the "rush to the Commission" began.1 On May 20, 1992, Florida Rock's application for a development order to permit mining on its real property was submitted to the Citrus County LDDS. The Department made four sequential determinations of incompleteness. At no time did Florida Rock ever amend its application or submit any supplemental material. On December 22, 1992, Citrus County's Board of County Commissioners adopted Ordinance 92-A73, to change the designation of the subject real property on the Comprehensive Plan from "extractive" to "rural residential." The ordinance does not recite any retroactive effect. No moratorium on development orders was imposed. Mining operations are prohibited on real property designated as "rural residential." On December 28, 1992, the Department made the determination of incompleteness which gave rise to this instant proceeding. Florida Rock has not affirmatively plead and has not proven that the Department made any of its incompleteness determinations arbitrarily, capriciously, discriminatorily, in bad faith or solely for purposes of delaying the process of a technical review on the merits of the project. In the absence of any formal allegation and affirmative proof, no improper motive or improper purpose by the Department can be found.2 The December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness noted, in the following terms, the refusal of the applicant to supply certain assurances: The applicant is exempt from Section 4344 of the LDC only in regards to the bonafide [sic] agricultural or forestry purposes. Commercial forestry involves the harvesting or marketable timber not the wholesale clearing of all vegetation. Therefore, the impact on protected trees as defined by Section 4342.A and 4344.B needs to be addressed as it regards compliance with Section 4344 of the LDC. The application needs to reflect how this will be accomplished. Contrary to your statement, this item was previously referenced as Item 11 in my letter of May 29, 1992. While vegetative removal of unprotected trees as defined in Section 4343.A.6. of the LDC is acceptable, the issue of protected trees as defined in Section 4344.B of the LDC is still unaddressed in your application submittal. The submitted site plan indicates a setback of less than the 3000 feet from residentially committed areas as required by Section 4525.A.8.1 and 4531.E.1. of the LDC regarding expansion of existing mines. Interpretation of the LDC is addressed in Section 1410 of the LDC and so the attached interpretation is not applicable. Please revise your site plan to reflect this set back or resubmit your application after vesting pursuant to Section 3160 through 3163 of the LDC has been determined. Pursuant to Section 380.06(4)(b)F.S., Citrus County believes that Florida Rock Industries operations within Hernando/Citrus Counties may exceed DRI threshold. Therefore, please provide a letter from DCA resolving this matter. In regard to your position that DCA has not formally requested a binding letter, please note that the above referenced citation specifies the state land planning agency or local government with jurisdiction over the land on which a development is proposed may require a developer to obtain a binding letter. Based on information made available to this Department, we believe a determination is called for. In regards to the requested items 23 through 34 of my letter of May 29, 1992, please be advised that Section 4659.F. of the LDC requires proof of compliance with all applicable Citrus County regulations and policies. This includes the Comprehensive Plan (C.O. 89-04) and its amendments. The information requested is to assure that the proposed development will be in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. None of the reasons listed in the December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness specifically stated that Florida Rock could not qualify for a development order for mining because its real property had just become designated by the December 22, 1992, ordinance as "rural residential," instead of "extractive." Indeed, the December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness did not mention the ordinance change at all. However, its fourth paragraph concerns the requirement that an applicant establish its real property's consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. The County has taken the position that, without using the terms "extractive use" or "rural residential," paragraph four encompasses the change of ordinance as well as all matters pertaining to the Comprehensive Plan. Under the statutes in effect on December 22, 1992, Ordinance 92-A73 was not effective until filed with the Secretary of State. (See the face of the ordinance). The exact date of its filing was not stipulated, but it was agreed that filing occurred sometime in December 1992. Under Florida's growth management process, the newly adopted ordinance also was transmitted to the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs, which would then issue a report before the new ordinance became part of the Citrus County Comprehensive Plan.3 On January 3, 1993, Florida Rock challenged, pursuant to Section 163.3184(9), Florida Statutes, the new ordinance as it progressed through the Florida Department of Community Affairs' review process. On January 19, 1993, Citrus County's LDDS sent a letter to Florida Rock, further interpreting its December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness. That letter also made no specific mention of the ordinance amendment and did not amend the fourth paragraph of the incompleteness determination. It provided, in pertinent part: For the record, my letter of December 28, 1992, was not a "Denial" but rather a determination of incompleteness pursuant to Section 2222.B.1 of the Land Development Code. In response to your question of January 12, 1993, I was not persuaded by your argument in regards to access by way of Parcel 22100 lying in Section 36, Township 20 South, Range 19 East, but did recognize the driveway onto County Road 581. Florida Rock declined to amend its application or supply the information requested. On January 26, 1993, Florida Rock initiated the instant administrative appeal of the December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness. However, by agreement of Florida Rock and Citrus County, the appeal was abated until January 13, 1999 (see the Preliminary Statement), when it was transferred from a local hearing officer to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Florida Rock's challenge of the ordinance before the Florida Department of Community Affairs also did not progress in a timely manner. On February 6, 1998, Florida Rock's challenge to the new ordinance was dismissed. The effect thereof is that the Florida Department of Community Affairs has found, and entered a Final Order pronouncing, Citrus County Ordinance 92-A73 to be in compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, pertaining to Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act. That Final Order, as final agency action, was not appealed. By any interpretation, Citrus County's Comprehensive Plan, embracing the new ordinance's land use designation of Florida Rock's property as "rural residential" has been in effect since February 1998, as have been coordinated zoning, FLUM, and LDC atlas maps. Since December 22, 1992, the ordinance has designated Florida Rock's proposed site as "rural residential," which precludes the proposed mining operation. Since February 1998, the Comprehensive Plan, FLUM, and LDC atlas maps have all embraced, and currently all of them now embrace, the ordinance, and all of them prohibit mining or "extractive use" of the real property in issue.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Citrus County Department of Land Development Services enter a final order dismissing the appeal for mootness. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact have been determined: Background The parties Respondent, Marion County (County), is a local government subject to the comprehensive land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered and enforced by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments made thereto. Petitioner, William B. Hunt, owns property and resides within the County. Petitioner also submitted written comments to the County during the public hearing held on April 7, 1994, concerning the adoption of an amendment to the County's comprehensive plan. Therefore, he is an affected person within the meaning of the law and has standing to bring this action. The nature of the dispute In July 1991, the County initially transmitted its proposed comprehensive land use plan to the DCA. The DCA issued an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) report for the County's plan on October 18, 1991. The County issued a response to the DCA's ORC report and adopted its comprehensive plan in January 1992. In April 1992, the DCA issued a notice of intent to find the comprehensive plan not in compliance. In an attempt to bring the County's plan into compliance, the DCA and County entered into a settlement agreement in March 1993. Pursuant to the agreement, the County was supposed to adopt certain remedial amendments to its comprehensive plan. In August 1993, the County adopted remedial amendments to its comprehensive plan. In October 1993, the DCA issued a notice of intent to find the remedial amendments not in compliance. In another attempt to bring the County's plan into compliance, the DCA and County entered into another settlement agreement in February 1994, and into an addendum thereto in April 1994. Pursuant to this agreement, the County adopted the agreed-upon remedial amendments to its comprehensive plan by Ordinance No. 94-12 on April 7, 1994. On May 30, 1994, the DCA issued a cumulative notice of intent to find the County's comprehensive plan and remedial amendments in compliance. On June 18, 1994, petitioner filed a petition to intervene with the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking to challenge the newly amended plan. After being advised that the petition was filed in the wrong forum, and that he incorrectly sought to intervene rather than to initiate a new proceeding, on December 13, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for an administrative hearing with the DCA. In his lengthy petition, which contains allegations running some fifty-four pages in length, petitioner has challenged the County's plan, as amended, in numerous respects. In his proposed order, however, petitioner has summarized his complaints into the following categories: (a) "many" of the plan objectives are not "specific or measurable," (b) "many" policies in the plan are not "adequate," (c) "many" of the required objectives and policies are not found within a particular element, (d) "many" policies in the plan defer implementation to the land development regulations, or to other kinds of regulations, that are to be adopted after the plan is adopted, (e) "publications" adopted by reference in the plan "have not been adequately cited," (f) "the plan does not control growth," and it "designates an over- allocation of land that can be developed at non-rural densities and intensities," (g) the plan violates the concurrency provision on State Road 200, and (h) the plan fails to include an analysis of projected mass transit level of service and system needs. Is the Plan, as Amended, in Compliance? Generally In attempting to prove the allegations in his petition, petitioner offered only the testimony of a DCA land use planning manager and the County's acting planning director, both of whom concluded that the plan, as amended, was in compliance. Because both witnesses generally refuted all allegations raised in the petition, and they disagreed with the theories advanced by petitioner through his direct examination, the record in this case clearly supports a finding that the plan, as amended, is in compliance. Notwithstanding this state of the record, the undersigned will address in general terms the broad issues raised in the petition, namely, the adequacy of the plan's supporting data and analysis, the adequacy of the goals, objectives and policies, the plan's internal consistency, and the plan's consistency with the state comprehensive plan. In addition, the undersigned will address the more specific objections raised by petitioner in his proposed recommended order. Adequate data and analyses Petitioner has alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because ten elements were not supported by adequate data and analyses, as required by Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code. However, petitioner either abandoned these allegations or failed to prove them to the exclusion of fair debate. Goals, objectives and policies Petitioner further alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because a number of the goals, objectives and policies (GOPs) contained in the various elements were inadequate in that they did not meet some of the requirements for GOPs in Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code. However, petitioner either abandoned these allegations or failed to prove them to the exclusion of fair debate. Internal consistency of plan Petitioner next alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because the internal consistency requirements in Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, had not been met. Based on the findings of fact above, however, it is clear that the evidence failed to show to the exclusion of fair debate that the County's plan contained GOPs that were in conflict with each other, thereby rendering the plan internally inconsistent. Consistency with state comprehensive plan Petitioner has also alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because it is not compatible with, and does not further, a number of goals and policies of the State Comprehensive Plan, which are contained in Section 187.201, Florida Statutes. Petitioner failed to present any evidence showing that the County's plan, as amended, is not compatible with, and does not further, the State Comprehensive Plan. Other objections Petitioner has alleged in his proposed recommended order that some of the objectives and policies used by the County do not conform to the definition of those terms in Rule 9J-5.003, Florida Administrative Code. However, the evidence established that those definitions are not mandatory, they merely provide clarification for the local government, and the local government is free to use other definitions in its plan so long as they generally conform with the codified definition. Since the challenged objectives and policies generally conform with the above rule, and they provide the means for their achievement, they are found to be in compliance. Petitioner also alleges that some elements in the plan lack certain policies and objectives required by chapter 9J-5 and thus are deficient. The more persuasive evidence shows, however, that each of the challenged elements was adequate in terms of containing the necessary policies and objectives, and thus the requirements of chapter 9J-5 have been satisfied. Petitioner next alleges that many of the policies in the plan defer implementation to the land development regulations (LDRs) or other regulations that will not be adopted until after this plan becomes effective. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, however, some of the policies do not defer to the LDRs. In cases where they do, the LDRs must still be adopted in accordance with strict time limitations established by Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, and thus the necessary guidance in the plan is not lacking. Petitioner further contends that "publications" adopted by reference in the plan "have not been adequately cited." He specifically refers to policy 1.5 of the Traffic Circulation Element which adopts by reference, and without specific citation to a page number, a manual entitled Institute of Traffic Engineers Trip Generation. Through testimony of witness Manning, however, it was established that it is impractical and unnecessary for the local government to cite specific page numbers of the manual in the plan itself. Indeed, reference to the title of the manual is sufficient. Therefore, those provisions of the plan which incorporate by reference other publications without detailed citations are found to be in compliance. Petitioner has also complained that the plan does not control growth, and it over allocates land to non-rural purposes. In this regard, the County's future allocation of land use was made through the use of a multiplier, which is a planning technique for assessing future land use needs. This technique, and the accompanying calculations, were not shown to be unreasonable or to produce inappropriate results. It was further established that, in making its projections, the County exceeded the requirements of chapter 163. Indeed, in the words of a DCA planner, the County made one of the "most honest assessments of development of any plan in the state." Petitioner next asserts that policy 2.1 of the Traffic Circulation Element allows a 20 percent degradation to the existing level of service for two segments on State Road 200, and thus it "violates the concurrency provision of the act and Rule 9J-5." While the level of service for roads must be consistent with Department of Transportation standards to the maximum extent possible, if it cannot meet them, the local government may show justification for deviation from those standards. In this case, the County presented justification for deviating from those standards by 20 percent on State Road 200 as authorized by Rules 9J-5.0055(1)(d) and 9J-5.007(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, the questioned policy is deemed to be in compliance. Finally, petitioner alleges that the plan fails to include an analysis of projected mass transit level of service and system needs. Admittedly, such an analysis is not found in the plan. However, this is because the County does not operate a public mass transit system. In circumstances such as these, the County is required by chapter 163 to have a mass transit element in its plan, but it is not required to adopt an objective on this subject. Therefore, the absence of such an analysis does not render the plan not in compliance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that Marion County's comprehensive plan, as amended by Ordinance No. 94-12, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-7071GM Petitioner: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 2-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4a.-4c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 4d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 4e. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 4f. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 4g. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 7-9. Covered in conclusions of law. Respondents: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Hunt 3531 S. E. 30th Terrace Ocala, Florida 34471 Gordon B. Johnston, Esquire 601 S. E. 25th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34471-2690 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The general issue for determination in this case is whether Amendment 00-D1 to Sumter County’s comprehensive plan (the “Plan Amendment”) is "in compliance" with the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Sections 163.3161 through 163.3217, Florida Statutes. (All statutory references are to the 2000 codification of the Florida Statutes.) The initial Petition to Request Administrative Hearing (Petition) alleged numerous reasons why the Plan Amendment should be found not "in compliance." But from the time of the initial Petition--through the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, opening statement at final hearing, and Proposed Recommended Order (PRO)--Petitioners reduced the number of reasons why they contend that the Plan Amendment is not "in compliance" to the following: simultaneous conversion of Future Land Use (FLU) from Agricultural to PUD allegedly inconsistent with parts of the County's Plan's; alleged lack of demonstrated need for land use allocations contrary to Section 163.3177 and Florida Administrative Code Rules Chapter 9J-5 (all rule citations are to the Florida Administrative Code); conversion of FLU from Agricultural to PUD allegedly inconsistent with the Plan's Policy 4.6.1.1 (the so-called "90% rule"); and alleged failure to discourage urban sprawl contrary to Rule 9J-5.0006(6). These are the only compliance issues that still have to be addressed in this proceeding. In addition, Intervenor contends that Sumter Citizens Against Irresponsible Development (SCAID) does not have standing.
Findings Of Fact Intervenor, the Villages of Lake-Sumter, Inc., owns land in the northeast part of Sumter County on which Intervenor plans to construct a mixed-use development of regional impact (DRI) known as the Villages of Sumter. The proposed DRI will encompass approximately 4,679 acres and is anticipated to contain: 11,097 residential dwelling units; 1,250,000 square feet of commercial area; 250,000 square feet of office area; 157,000 square feet of institutional area; 120,000 square feet of hotel (300 rooms); 100,000 square feet convention center; 23,500 square feet of movie theater (8 screens); 512 acres of golf courses (126 holes); 8 marina slips; 602 acres of wildlife management and Kestrel foraging areas; 162 acres of lakes, 162 acres of roads, 31 acres of parks and buffers; and 227 acres of stormwater and open space. The proposed DRI will feature neighborhood and town centers and will extensively utilize clustering, open spaces, and buffering as part of its design. It is anticipated that the Villages of Sumter DRI will have an internal vehicle capture rate of over 60%--i.e., over 60% of vehicle trips starting in the DRI will not go outside the DRI. The DRI will provide water, sanitary sewer, stormwater management, aquifer recharge areas, and other governmental services as part of its development. Eighty percent of the residents in the Villages of Sumter DRI will have to be occupied by persons 55 of age or older, and no one under 19 will be permitted to reside within this DRI. When Intervenor filed its Application for Development Approval (ADA) for the Villages of Sumter DRI, Intervenor also requested the subject Plan Amendment to accommodate the DRI, including a change in the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) and FLUM from Agricultural use to UEA and PUD. The ADA itself served as a major part of the data and analysis supporting the Plan Amendment. (Another major part of the data and analysis was the Evaluation and Appraisal Report (EAR) prepared by the County in 1995.) The western part of the northern boundary of the Plan Amendment parcel (i.e., the Villages of Sumter DRI) will be the western part of the southern boundary of a related DRI developed by Intervenor known as the Tri-County Villages. From there, the Tri-County Villages DRI extends north to the southern border of Marion County and east to the western border of Lake County. (Towards the east, the northern boundary of the DRI drops just a little south of the southern border of Marion County.) Tri- County Villages is a large mixed-use DRI. It includes residential, commercial, recreational, and open space land uses. Prior to the Tri-County Villages DRI, Intervenor or its predecessor also developed other related mixed-use DRIs to the east in Lake County. SCAID was formed in 1993 or 1994 to oppose the Tri- County Villages DRI and 1994 comprehensive plan amendments adopted to accommodate the Tri-County Villages DRI. SCAID, T. Daniel Farnsworth, and James E. Boyd filed a petition initiating Sumter Citizens Against Irresponsible Development, T. D. Farnsworth, and James E. Boyd vs. Department of Community Affairs and Sumter County, DOAH Case No. 94-6974GM, to oppose DCA's determination that the County's 1994 amendments were "in compliance." SCAID, Farnsworth, and Weir are collaterally estopped to deny facts established in DOAH Case No. 94-6974GM (SCAID I). (Latham and Roop are not estopped.) See Conclusions of Law 63-64, infra. In any event, all Petitioners agreed to official recognition of the Final Order entered in DOAH Case No. 94-6974GM. Among the facts established by adoption of the Recommended Order by the Final Order in SCAID I was the history of the earlier DRIs, the Tri-County Villages DRI, and the comprehensive plan amendments required by the Tri-County Villages DRI: [¶4] [I]ntervenor [Villages] is the owner and developer of the Tri- County Villages development located in unincorporated Sumter County. Development which predated the existing Tri-County Villages development commenced in approximately 1968 with Orange Blossom Garden North (OBGN). OBGN was an approximately 1,000-acre project owned and operated by Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. as a mobile home retirement community located mostly in the Town of Lady Lake, Florida. That community lies in the northwestern corner of Lake County, which adjoins the northeastern corner of Sumter County. Because the development of OBGN commenced prior to July of 1973, it is vested for purposes of development of regional impact (DRI) review pursuant to Section 380.06(20), Florida Statutes. [¶5] In 1987, Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. submitted an Application for Development Approval (ADA) with the Town of Lady Lake which requested authorization to develop Orange Blossom Gardens South (OBGS). The OBGS development was an approximately 595-acre extension of the vested OBGN retirement community and was determined by the DCA and Town of Lady Lake to be a DRI. On January 18, 1988, the Town of Lady Lake approved the proposed OBGS development. [¶6] In 1989, Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. submitted to the Town of Lady Lake and the County an ADA requesting a substantial deviation from the OBGS DRI. The substantial deviation request sought authorization to develop Orange Blossom Gardens West (OBGW). OBGW was planned as an approximately 1,700-acre extension to the OBGS DRI. The Town of Lady Lake approved the substantial deviation request through the issuance of an Amended Development Order on May 7, 1990. The County approved the development within its jurisdiction on May 29, 1990. [¶7] In September 1993, intervenor, as successor to Orange Blossom Hills, Inc., submitted an ADA to the County which requested a substantial deviation from the OBGS and OBGW DRI's. By submitting this latest development, intervenor sought to add approximately 1,960 acres to the existing OBGS and OBGW DRI's and modify the development already approved by adding a total of 6,250 residential units and 910,000 square feet of commercial square footage. The overall development was renamed Tri-County Villages. The development order approving the substantial deviation for Tri-County Villages was adopted by the County on September 20, 1994. [¶8] On September 20, 1994, or prior to approval of the Tri-County Villages development substantial deviation, but in conjunction with it, the County adopted plan amendment 94D1 by Ordinance No. 94-6. On November 10, 1994, the DCA determined the amendment to be in compliance. That amendment amended the plan's Future Land Use Map (FLUM) to revise the land use designations on approximately 1,960 acres of land. Specifically, the plan amendment designated as Planned Unit Development (PUD) all areas of the approved OBGW DRI and the additional 1,960 acres referred to in Exhibit 1 of 94D1 as parcels 5 and 8. Prior to the amendment, parcels 5 and 8 had been designated predominantly as agricultural, with small pockets of rural residential. [¶9] The plan amendment also revised the FLUM by extending the urban expansion area to include all of parcels 5 and 8. Prior to the amendment, only a small section of parcel 8 was included in the urban expansion area. [¶10] The plan amendment further included several textual revisions to the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), including a revision to FLUE Policy 1.5.7 concerning the ratio of commercial square footage to residential units and the addition of FLUE Objective 1.14 and Policies 1.14.1 - 1.14.6, which essentially incorporated the concept of sector planning into the plan. [¶11] Finally, the plan amendment revised Policy 2.1.5 of the Sanitary Sewer Element which, subject to submission of appropriate data and analysis, and Department of Environmental Protection approval, reduced the established level of service for sanitary sewer throughout the Tri-County Villages development. SCAID I, 17 F.A.L.R. 4527, 4531-32 (Dept. Community Affairs Aug. 1995). (The Recommended Order may also be found on WESTLAW at 1995 WL 1052949.) At its inception, the Tri-County Villages DRI was projected to build-out in approximately 2015. When the Tri- County Villages DRI first began construction in late 1992, the developer pulled 24 building permits. In 1993, the County issued 406 residential building permits, 365 of which were pulled for the Tri-County Villages DRI. In 1997, the developer pulled 1,052 building permits for the Tri-County Villages DRI. To date, approximately 13,000 homes have been built in the Tri- County Villages DRI. Based upon present projections, the Tri- County Villages DRI is anticipated to be substantially built-out in 2003-04, 12 years ahead of its initially projected build-out date of 2015. Presently, there are numerous cultural and recreational activities, shopping options, medical and governmental services available to residents within the Tri-County Villages DRI. While still designated as a UEA and PUD on the County's FLUM, the Tri-County Villages DRI in fact is a self-contained urban area, especially in the context of Sumter County. Sumter County is mostly rural. According to the 1995 EAR, the County's permanent (non-seasonal) population was projected to be: 38,961 for 1998; 56,000 for 2005; and 64,200 for 2010. The unincorporated portion of the County contains 334,903 acres, approximately 99,436 acres of which are state- owned conservation lands, and approximately 202,000 acres of which are agricultural lands. There are five municipalities in the County--Wildwood, Bushnell (also the County seat), Center Hill, Coleman and Webster. None are as urbanized as the Tri- County Villages DRI. Simultaneous Conversion Objective 7.1.2 of the County's comprehensive plan provides in pertinent part: Upon adoption of this plan, Sumter County shall . . . provide for a compatible and coordinated land use pattern which establishes agriculture as the primary use outside of the urban expansion area boundary and insures retention of agricultural activities, preserves natural resources and discourages urban sprawl. In pertinent part, the County Plan's Policy 7.1.1.2(e) provides that the County's land development regulations governing PUDs should be based on and consistent with the following standards for densities and intensities: Within the Urban Expansion Area, a base density of up to 8 residential units per gross acre in residential areas and 6 units per gross acre in commercial areas are allowed. . . . . Outside of an Urban Expansion Area, a base density of up to 4 residential units per gross acre in residential, commercial and agricultural areas are allowed. Policy 7.1.5.1 allows PUDs "in the following land use districts and at the following densities/intensities of use": 8 dwellings per gross acre in "Residential Areas Inside UEA"; 6 dwellings per gross acre in "Commercial Areas Inside UEA"; and 4 dwellings per gross acre in "Res./Comm. Uses Outside UEA." Petitioners contend that the foregoing objective and policies somehow combine to preclude the simultaneous conversion of Agricultural FLU to UEA and PUD; they appear to contend that these policies necessitated an intermediate conversion to UEA. (Protection of agricultural lands was raised in a more general sense, but this precise issue was not raised prior to final hearing.) But Petitioners argument not only is not persuasive, it is not even easily understood. It is at least fairly debatable that the objective and policies do not combine to preclude simultaneous conversion of Agricultural FLU to UEA and PUD. Even without prior notice of this precise issue, one of the County's expert witnesses in land planning persuasively testified that the cited objective and policies do not combine to preclude simultaneous conversion of Agricultural FLU to UEA and PUD. Even Petitioners' expert land planner ultimately agreed that there is nothing in the Florida Statutes or Florida Administrative Code Rules Chapter 9J-5 to prevent conversion of agricultural uses to more urban uses. Demonstrated Need As reflected in previous Findings of Fact, the subject Plan Amendment is for a highly mixed-use PUD. Of the many mixed uses involved, Petitioners focus on the allocation of land for residential use in their challenge to the demonstration of need for the Plan Amendment. In this context, demonstrated need refers to the existence of adequate data and analysis to demonstrate the need for additional allocation of residential dwelling units on the FLUM. Petitioners assert that the methodology utilized by the County to project need is flawed. Determination of the need for a certain allocation of residential densities starts with a projection of population on the planning horizon (2020). In doing so, all available data and analysis must be considered. (Petitioners also assert that Policy 7.1.2.5(b)1. of the County's comprehensive plan requires such an analysis "utilizing professionally accepted methods," but that policy speaks to additional densities and allocations of land use for developments proposed in agricultural areas, while the Plan Amendment in this case converts the agricultural land to UEA and PUD.) For the purpose of analyzing whether there is a demonstrated need for this Plan Amendment, the County's planner, Roberta Rogers, relied upon need projections made in conjunction with the preparation of the County's EAR. The EAR, prepared in 1999, included a projection of the County's population for the 2020 planning horizon. The EAR projected that the permanent population of unincorporated Sumter County, by the year 2020, will be 79,475. (The total County permanent population is projected to be 94,205.) One of the purposes of an EAR is to provide data and analysis for comprehensive plan amendments. In preparing the population projections reflected in the EAR, Rogers began her analysis by referring to the projections for Sumter County formulated by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research ("BEBR"), as reported in 1996. The 1996 BEBR Report actually reflected projections made in 1995. BEBR publishes yearly reports that state both the estimated current and the projected future populations for each Florida county. The population projections reflected in BEBR Reports are based upon historical trends of 10-15 years' duration. Because the development in the Tri-County Villages DRI is a relatively recent phenomenon, Rogers believed that reliance upon the BEBR projections alone would have resulted in a significant under-projection of the County's future population. As a consequence, Rogers added an annual rate of growth of 1000 building permits per year through 2005 and 500 permits per year through the remaining portion of the planning period for the Tri-County Villages and the Villages of Sumter. Her approach was a conservative approach, since the actual number of building permits issued for the Tri-County Villages DRI in the past two years has significantly exceeded 1000 per year. Rogers conferred with BEBR, prior to completing her analysis, and was assured that her approach was appropriate. Such an adjustment for the Villages is particularly appropriate since the Villages cater to a very specific segment of the population, i.e., persons 55 and above. Over the twenty- year planning horizon relevant to the Plan Amendment, the population of persons in Florida aged 55 and above will increase dramatically as the "baby boomer" population ages. The demand for residential housing for these senior citizens will show a similar dramatic increase. Henry Iler, the Petitioners' land planning expert, took the contrary position, opining that no additional growth factor should be added to the 1996 BEBR projections. However, Dr. Henry Fishkind, an expert in demography who was involved in the original development of the BEBR population projection methodologies, directly contradicted Iler's opinion, concluding instead that Ms. Rogers' methodology was appropriate. As Dr. Fishkind stated that [Sumter] county has experienced a dramatic structural change to its population growth and development because of the Villages, and that has altered the characteristics of its population growth. In light of that, the use of past trends, which is what the bureau [BEBR] does, is simply extrapolate past trends, would not be appropriate, for it would not have taken into account that major structural change. Ms. Rogers identified the structural change, she measured its amount, and then she added on to the bureau's projections, which were extrapolations of the past trends. That's a very appropriate adjustment, and it's the kind of adjustment that econometricians and economists make on a regular basis. DCA's analysis concurred that the high absorption rates in the Tri-County Villages DRI had to be taken into account. To have ignored the explosion of growth in the Tri- County Villages DRI, particularly in view of the generally accepted expectation that the population to be served by the Tri-County Villages and by the Villages of Sumter will experience tremendous growth, would have resulted in an inaccurate population forecast. Even Iler had to concede that he was aware of building permit data being used to project population figures. It is simply not his preferred methodology to use such information. Thus, Rogers' projection of the County's total population for the year 2020 appropriately incorporated all available and relevant data and was formulated using an accepted methodology. While not part of their PRO, Petitioners previously attacked the County's population projections by questioning the continued success of the Villages to attract out-of-state retirees. Primarily through Weir's testimony, they attempted to raise the specter of a reduction of sales and Intervenor's subsequent financial ruin. But there was no credible evidence to support Petitioners' prophecy of doom. On the evidence presented in this case, it would be more rational from a planning standpoint to expect the Villages to continue to be a marketing and financial success. Having reasonably projected future population, it was then incumbent upon the County to determine how many dwelling units would be needed to accommodate anticipated housing needs. This determination was made by Gail Easley, an independent planner retained by the County to assist Rogers in preparation of the EAR. Easley performed this calculation for the County. Easley used 2.46 as the average number of persons per dwelling unit in the County, a figure taken from the BEBR reports (not from 1990 census information, as Iler incorrectly surmised.) There was no evidence that a number other than 2.46 was appropriate. It would not be appropriate for the number of dwelling units needed in the future to be calculated simply by the division of the anticipated population by the average household size. Rather, it is appropriate to apply a "market factor" (or multiplier) in order to ensure that there is a choice of types of housing and to accommodate lands that are not actually useable for residential construction. Even Petitioner's expert, Henry Iler, agreed that the use of a market factor was appropriate in order to ensure sufficient housing supply and to avoid an increase in housing prices. Easley furnished Rogers with the market factor for the EAR. The market factor chosen by Easley was 1.5, a factor she viewed as conservative and as appropriate for a jurisdiction that is beginning to urbanize. In more rural counties, a higher market factor, such as 2.0, should be used. While Iler implied that a lower marker factor would be more suitable, the record clearly established that the market factor used by Easley fell within the range of reasonable choices. (In SCAID I, the ALJ expressly found, in paragraph 31 of the Recommended Order, that the 1.87 market factor used by the County on that occasion was reasonable and actually low compared to factors used for other comprehensive plans that had been found to be "in compliance." As reflected by this Finding of Fact, facts and circumstances bearing on the choice of a market factor for Sumter County have not changed significantly to date. Cf. Conclusion of Law 64, infra.) Applying the 1.5 market factor to the projected population and average household size, the County determined that 62,274 dwelling units will have to be accommodated during the twenty-year planning horizon. (This includes 48,461 units in permanent housing, 9,113 in seasonal housing, and 4,700 in transient housing.) The County then allocated those dwelling units in various land use categories. Much of Petitioners' PRO on this point was devoted to criticizing parts of the evidence in support of the demonstration of need. They state the obvious that Easley did not perform a demonstration of needs analysis for the Plan Amendment in the EAR, but that was not the purpose of the EAR; nonetheless, the EAR contained valuable data and analysis for use in the demonstration of need analysis for the Plan Amendment. Petitioners also questioned DCA's reliance on the DRI ADA in conducting its demonstration of need analysis, based on the timing of the ADA and Plan Amendment submissions and decisions; but it is not clear what it was about the timing that supposedly detracted from DCA's demonstration of need analysis, and nothing about the timing made it inappropriate for DCA to rely on the data and analysis in the ADA. Petitioners criticized Rogers' reference to up-to-date building permit information that was not offered in evidence; but this information only further supported Rogers' demonstration of need analysis. Petitioners asserted that one of Intervenor's witnesses may have overstated residential sales in the Tri- County Villages DRI (1,750 sales a year versus evidence of 1,431 building permits for 1999); but the witness's statement was not used in any of the demonstration of need analyses. Finally, Petitioners attacked one of Intervenor's witnesses for an alleged "conflict of interest, a lack of professional integrity and an indication of bias"; but the basis for this allegation supposedly was evidence that the witness worked for the County while also working for Intervenor or its predecessor for a few years in the late 1980's, not enough to seriously undermine the credibility of the witness's testimony in this case (which in any event had little or nothing to do with the demonstration of need analyses.) It is at least fairly debatable that the County's demonstration of need was based on relevant and appropriate data, and professionally acceptable methodologies and analyses. Likewise, it at least fairly debatable that the County's projections regarding housing needs, the growth in the retirement population, and the absorption rates achieved in the existing Tri-County Villages DRI adequately support the allocation of 11,000 dwelling units permitted by the Plan Amendment. So-called "90% Rule" The County's Plan Policy 4.6.1.1 provides: The County shall maintain approximately 90% of its land area in land uses such as agricultural (including timberland, mining and vacant), conservation, and open (recreation, open space etc.) land uses for this planning period. (Emphasis added.) This policy is found in the Utilities Element of the County's comprehensive plan under a goal to protect and maintain the functions of the natural groundwater aquifer recharge areas in the County and under an objective to protect the quantity of aquifer recharge. Although couched as an approximation, the policy has been referred to as the "90% rule." Based on the evidence presented in this case, it is at least fairly debatable that the subject Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with Policy 4.6.1.1. The primary debate had to do with the proper treatment of certain "open space" provided in the Tri-County Villages DRI and the Villages of Sumter DRI-- 1,032 acres in the former and 2,135 acres in the latter. This "open space" consists of golf courses, preserves, wetlands, parks/buffers, and some stormwater/open spaces. Petitioners' expert refused to count any of this acreage for purposes of the so-called "90% rule" because, while the FLUE and FLUM have Agricultural, Conservation, and Recreation land use categories, there is no category designated "Open Space." (Meanwhile, there is an entire element of the plan entitled "Recreation and Open Space.") The witnesses for the County and DCA counted those 3,167 acres. They reasoned persuasively that the policy's express mention of "open space" (as opposed to a specific land use category designated "Open Space") supports their position. They also argued persuasively for the logic of including "open space," which serves the objective of the policy to "protect quantity aquifer recharge quantity," even if there is no specific land use category designated "Open Space." Counting the 3,167 acres of "open space" in the two DRIs, the percentage calculated under Policy 4.6.1.1 exceeds 90% for existing land uses. Omitting that land, as well as another 500 acres that should have been counted, Petitioners' expert calculated 88.96%. Petitioners' expert also calculated a lower percentage (85.34%) by using land uses he projected for the end of the planning period. However, Petitioners' expert conceded that it was not clear that Policy 4.6.1.1 should be interpreted in that manner. If so interpreted, it would be possible for all plan amendments reducing agricultural, conservation, and open FLUs to be prohibited even if existing land uses in those categories did not fall below "approximately 90%" for another 20 years. It is at least fairly debatable whether such a result is logical, or whether it is more logical to wait until existing land uses in those categories did not fall below "approximately 90%" before prohibiting further FLUE and FLUM amendments. Urban Sprawl Petitioners contend that the Plan Amendment fails to discourage urban sprawl. They attempted to prove seven urban sprawl indicators. But their evidence was far from sufficient to establish any beyond fair debate. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment promotes, allows or designates for development substantial areas of the jurisdiction to develop as low intensity, low density, or single-use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need. To the contrary, while gross residential density may be relatively low (2.4-2.6 units per gross acre), the Plan Amendment PUD provides for highly mixed-use development, not single-use development, and densities in residential areas within the PUD are significantly higher (up to 5.6 units per acre), especially for Sumter County. Petitioners also did not prove that the Plan Amendment promotes, allows or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development, or that the Plan Amendment promotes, allows or designates urban development in radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban developments. To the contrary, the evidence was that part of the northern boundary of the Plan Amendment parcel coincides with the western part of the southern boundary of the Tri-County Villages DRI, and the Villages of Sumter PUD will be an extension of the Tri-County Villages DRI, which already has all the characteristics of an existing urban area. The reason why the eastern part of the northern boundary of the Plan Amendment parcel does not coincide with the southern boundary of the Tri-County Villages DRI is the existence of land in between which is already in use and not available to become part of the Plan Amendment PUD. Development will not be in a radial or ribbon pattern like (usually) commercial development along main roadways; nor will development be isolated. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment fails to protect adjacent agricultural areas and activities, including silviculture, and including active agricultural and silvicultural activities as well as passive agricultural activities, and dormant, unique and prime farmlands and soils. Obviously, conversion of agricultural land eliminates such land from agricultural use. But the Plan Amendment protects adjacent agricultural land by phasing development starting from existing urban areas in the Tri-County Villages DRI by mixing in open and recreational uses throughout the Villages of Sumter PUD and by providing some additional buffer between the periphery of the PUD and adjacent agricultural lands. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment fails to maximize the use of existing public facilities and services. Indeed, Petitioners' land use planning expert admitted at the hearing that he "didn’t have the time or expertise, really, to try to evaluate this particular question." To the contrary, the evidence was that the Plan Amendment PUD will include water, sanitary sewer, stormwater management, aquifer recharge areas, and other governmental services as part of its development. In addition, impact to schools will be minimal or non-existent due to the character of the PUD as a retirement community. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment fails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. To the contrary, the evidence was that clustering, open spaces and buffering in the Villages of Sumter PUD will provide a clear enough separation between rural and urban uses. Petitioners did not prove that the Plan Amendment discourages or inhibits in-fill development or the redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and communities. Specifically, Petitioners argued that in-fill in the City of Wildwood will be discouraged. But the evidence was to the contrary. Not only would development of the kind envisioned in the Plan Amendment PUD be unlikely to occur in Wildwood, sufficient land is not available for such a development there. Actually, the Plan Amendment might encourage in-fill in Wildwood, where service providers for the Villages of Sumter might be expected to reside. SCAID SCAID was formed in 1993 or 1994 by a small group of Sumter County citizens for the purposes of preserving the "rural lifestyle" of Sumter County, preventing urban sprawl, and ensuring "that development will not be a burden to the taxpayers" of the County. SCAID has about 80 members, who are not required to pay dues. The majority of SCAID's members live in Sumter County, including all of the individual Petitioners in this case. SCAID is not incorporated but has by-laws drafted in 1995 or 1996. The by-laws provide for election of officers for one-year terms, but SCAID has not had an election of officers since 1994. Petitioner, T. Daniel Farnsworth, is and always has been SCAID's president. The evidence was that, when former SCAID member James Boyd resigned, Petitioner Linda Latham was appointed to replace him as secretary. SCAID has held just two meetings since its inception. Approximately 15-20 persons attended each meeting. Most communication with members is by regular and internet mail. Financial contributions are solicited from time to time for litigation efforts initiated by SCAID. Farnsworth, on behalf of SCAID, submitted comments on the Plan Amendment to the County between the transmittal hearing and the adoption hearing. Farnsworth and Weir also testified on behalf of Petitioners at final hearing. The other individual Petitioners did not.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, under Section 163.3184(9)(b), the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order that Sumter County's Amendment 00-D1 is "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Martha Harrell Chumbler, Esquire Nancy G. Linnan, Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. Post Office Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 Jane M. Gordon, Esquire Jonas & LaSorte Mellon United National Bank Tower Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard, Suite 1000 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-2204 Terry T. Neal, Esquire Post Office Box 490327 Leesburg, Florida 34749-0327 Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Council Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
