Findings Of Fact Triton is a Florida corporation located in Brooksville Florida, which performs land development and construction work for Gulf Coast Diversified Corporation, owned by the same people who own Triton. Triton owns an asphalt "hatching" plant which mixes sand and aggregate with liquid asphalt which is then used as paving material. All asphalt so mixed was used by Triton and no outside sales were made. Gulf Coast Diversified Corporation contracted with Triton for site development of certain realty. The contract included the construction of roads and parking lots. The contract price was computed on a lineal foot basis for the roads and on a square yard basis for parking lots. Triton, using the asphalt mixed in its batching plant, completed the work contracted for. In addition, Triton contracted with Gulf Coast Diversified Corporation for sewer construction which included the construction of manholes fabricated from concrete batched by Triton. No concrete was ever sold to any other outsiders. The cost of the concrete was included in the overall contract price and was not separately itemized. Triton's books of account show concrete sales in the amount of $168,569.36 during the audit period. This figure reflects a $20.00 per yard "market" value of concrete which Triton picked up in its books for its own internal accounting purposes. The figure represents some 8,428 yards of concrete actually sold. For sales tax purposes, Triton valued the concrete at about $13.74 per yard, a figure established by DOR in a previous audit, and remitted 4 percent of the total value of $115,835.25 of the State of Florida. During the audit, DOR noted that 4 percent of the bookkeeping entry for concrete sales was $6,742.77, while only $4,633.41 was received as sales tax. Consequently DOR assessed Triton an additional $2,109.36 plus penalties and interest. The difference, however, reflects only differential per yard valuation of the concrete and not additional concrete yardage.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a registered roofing contractor in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, having been issued license no. RC 0039866. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the qualifying agent for Wayne Coatings Industries, Inc. On or about April 22, 1983, Wayne Coatings Industries, Inc., entered into a contract with Jack Jacobs on behalf of the Christopher House Condominium located in Pompano Beach, Florida, whereby Wayne Coatings Industries, Inc., agreed to reroof the entire building with a polyurethane roofing coating. The contract in the amount of $42,552 called for Wayne Coatings to clean and prepare all roof areas and parapet walls, install roof vents, apply urethane foam insulation over all roof areas up to the top of the parapet walls and then coat the entire roof area including the parapet walls and all projections. Upon completion of the work, Wayne Coatings issued to Christopher House a five-year warranty. Almost immediately after completion of the work, major leaks appeared in the urethane foam roofing system. Representatives of the Christopher House contacted Wayne Coatings almost daily, but Wayne Coatings responded rarely. On the few occasions when an employee of Wayne Coatings came to the condominium, that person would be present for a few moments and then leave. Nothing was done by Wayne Coatings to correct the leaks. A subsequent inspection revealed that the roof was not properly cleaned and prepared prior to application of the urethane foam roofing system, the parapet walls were left bare and the foam itself was applied in a grossly uneven fashion. Additionally, the subsequent coating of the foam was improperly done. The foam roofing system traps water both above and below it. Neither Wayne Coatings nor Respondent have honored the guarantee given to Christopher House Condominium.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating sections 489.129(1)(d) and (m), Florida Statutes, suspending Respondent's registered roofing contractor license for a period of one year, and assessing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $3,000 to be paid by a date certain. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 G. Vincent Soto, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Clarence L. Pitts 1712 Southwest 9th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315 William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Conclusions The record in this proceeding and the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer have been reviewed. Respondent, Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), has filed exceptions to the Recommended Order and Petitioner has filed a response thereto. FDOT's exceptions are considered and addressed below.1 The Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended Order are considered correct and are incorporated as part of this Final Order with the following exception. The Hearing Officer noted that FDOT's appeal of DOAH Case No. 87-0621R, is currently pending before the First District Court of Appeal. This is incorrect. The matter is pending before the Fifth District Court of Appeal. FDOT's exceptions to Findings of Fact numbered 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28, and 34 are rejected as an impermissible attempt to supplement the Hearing Officer's findings. Inverness Conval. Ctr. v. Dept. of H.R.S., 512 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Cohn v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 477 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). FDOT takes exception to the Findings of Fact number 24, claiming , in paragraph 1, that there is a lack of substantial record evidence that material from Merritt Island mine No. 70-1 tested less that the minimum carbonate requirement. However, closer examination of the exception reveals that the foundation of the claim lies in the Hearing Officer's omission of certain language contained in the Gammage memo of September 30, 1969. As noted above, the Department cannot supplement the Hearing Officer's finding. Consequently, paragraph one of the exception must be rejected. Similarly paragraph two, going to omitted facts must be rejected as well. The Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact number 25 is essentially a summary of Blackhawk's Exhibit 13 and is supported by competent substantial evidence. Consequently, FDOT's exceptions thereto are rejected. FDOT also takes exception to Finding of Fact number 29, Claiming first that there is competent substantial record evidence to support the finding that FDOT has never conducted a study to document the necessity of the 50 per cent carbonate requirement. Respondent is mistaken. The record reflects that FDOT personnel and their expert gave testimony indicating that such specific research had never been conducted. (TI 348, 434, 435, 480; TII 24, 71) FDOT's second and third complaints being predicated upon the omission of facts, must also be rejected. FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 30 is rejected because the record reflects that Dr. Eades testified that as used in this state, LBR is the indicator of the ultimate strength of the material. (TI 412, 434) FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 31 amounts to a challenge t the Hearing Officer's weight and credibility determinations regarding Dr. Bromwell's testimony, and consequently must be rejected. Heifetz v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). FDOT's first two paragraphs in its exception to Finding of Fact number 32 constitute challenges to the Hearing Officer's credibility determinations, the inferences she drew from the evidence, and her failure to rely upon or cite certain facts as opposed to others. As noted above, exceptions predicated on these types of grounds must be rejected. The third paragraph of this exception must also be rejected because record testimony clearly demonstrates that Bill Wisner testified that the Merritt Island mine was in existence for three to five months -- a very short period of time. (TI 52) FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 35 is rejected as being immaterial to the ultimate disposition of this matter. FDOT's exceptions to Findings of Fact numbers 36, 38, and 40, in the final analysis, represent challenges based upon the credibility and weight determinations of the Hearing Officer, and the inferences drawn from the record evidence. Since weight and credibility determinations cannot be disturbed, and since the inferences drawn, while not palatable, are nonetheless arguably reasonable, these exceptions must be rejected. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, supra.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding Respondent was a registered building contractor in the State of Florida having been issued license number RB 0009164. At no time material to this proceeding was Domingo Alonzo (a/k/a Domingo Alonzo) registered, certified or otherwise licensed by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. Respondent and Alonzo signed and submitted a proposal to Myron M. Gold and Roberta Fox for remodeling and additions to their residence located at 1550 Zuleta Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida in accordance with plans prepared by Frese - Camner Associates on file with the City of Coral Gables, Florida, File No. 2897 for a contract price of $65,940.00 with draw schedules attached. On December 6, 1982, Myron M. Gold and Roberta Fox (Homeowners) accepted the Proposal (Contract). On December 6, 1982, the Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo jointly $3,297.00 in accordance with the contract whereby they were to receive 5 percent of the contract amount as a down payment upon signing. The draw schedule provided for a 10 percent retainage from each draw which was to be paid to Respondent and Alonzo upon completion and the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. On December 21, 1982 the Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo jointly $2,025.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 3 for $1,350.00, Schedule II - Item 2 for $360.00 and Item 5 for $315.00. On December 17, 1982 the Homeowners and Respondent filed the affidavit required by ordinance with the City of Coral Gables for the purpose of having a building permit issued covering the work under the contract. 9. On January 19, 1983 Respondent using his building contractors license applied for building permit to cover the work anticipated under the contract and on the same day was issued building permit, No. 28214. Under the contract the Homeowners were to pay for the building permit and the bond required by the city. On January 26, 1983 the Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo jointly $3,000.00 which along with a payment on January 27, 1983 of $500.00 and January 31, 1983 of $544.60 represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 2 for $405.00, Item 5 for $1,260.00, Item 6 for $1,547.10 and Item 13 for $832.50. All payments from December 6, 1982 through January 31, 1983 under the contract by the Homeowners totaled $9,366.50 and were paid jointly to Respondent and Alonzo. On February 4, 1983 Respondent and Alonzo entered into an agreement, prepared by Myron Gold in the law office of Gold and Fox, whereby the Homeowners were to pay the balance of the funds remaining under the contract to Alonzo individually. After this date all payments were made to Alonzo. It was the Homeowners understanding after the February 3, 1983 agreement that Respondent would still be responsible for the supervision of the construction although they never saw Respondent again until October 1983. Edward Borysiewicz testified that he dealt with Respondent during March 1983 when he made the floor slab inspection on March 3, 1983 and the columns inspection on March 14, 1983. The record is clear that shortly after the agreement on February 3, 1983 Respondent no longer came to the construction site and supervised the work of Alonzo. On February 8, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $3,060.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 1 for $810.00, Item 5 for $1,417.50 and Item 13 for $832.50. On February 28, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $3,155.40 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 4 for $1,705.50 and $729.90 for extras apparently not covered by the contract but whether the balance of check No. 1161 (Pet. Ex. 13) of $720.00 was for payment under the contract or for extras is not shown in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15. On March 18, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $1,000 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 9 for $819.00. Again whether the balance of check No. 1206 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13) of $181.00 is for payment under the contract or for extras is not shown in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15. On March 21, 1983, the Homeowners paid Alonzo $6,400.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Items 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15. On March 21, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $2,166.90 but Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15 does not list check No. 1210 as being a payment under the contract or for extras. On March 31, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $4,230.00 which represents a draw under Schedule I - Item 7 for $2,520.00 and a payment for extras not covered under the contract in the amount of $1,710.00. On April 21, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $5,207.40 which represented a draw Schedule I - Items 1, 5, 6, 9 and 14. On June 24, 1983 the Homeowners paid Alonzo $5,788.00 which represented a draw on Schedule I - Item 12 for $667.00, Item 14 for $3,024.00 and payment for extras not under contract for $2,097.00. After March 14, 1983 Respondent was not seen on the job site and there was no longer any apparent supervision of Alonzo by Respondent. After Respondent left the job site there was no licensed building contractor involved in the construction. After Respondent left the construction site the Homeowners soon realized that Alonzo did not know how to proceed with the work and experienced problems with the pace and manner in which the work was being accomplished. On July, 1983, Alonzo stopped working altogether. Although the Homeowners were aware of the problems that Alonzo was having with the construction and that Respondent was not on the job, the record does not reflect that they ever attempted to contact Respondent after the meeting on February 3, 1983. On August 1, 1983 the Homeowners notified Respondent and Alonzo that the contract had been terminated. The Homeowners paid Respondent and Alonzo $42,174.20 total under the contract (pages 1-5, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15) and paid Alonzo $10,766.37 for extras (Pages 6- 10, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15). On August 31, 1983 the Homeowners paid Edward Bryant, plastering contractor the sum of $3,100.00 for plastering performed by Edward Bryant. This was for work under the contract that had not been completed or work necessary to correct problems that were already completed. Roberta Fox testified that there were no extras on plaster, however, page 7, line 11 and page 9, line 21 of Petitioner's Exhibit 15 indicates that there was extra plastering. On August 29, 1983 and September 29, 1983 the Homeowners paid Southwest Plumbing Services, Inc. the total amount of $4,875.00 for work contemplated under the contract that had not been completed or needed correction. Homeowners had paid Alonzo $3,591.00 for plumbing under the contract. Both Alonzo and Southwest Plumbing, Inc. were paid for extra plumbing not covered by the contract in the amount of $567.00 and $391.50, respectively by the Homeowners. From September 13, 1983 through June 13, 1984 the Homeowners paid Charles Brueg, Jim Brueg, Charles Buffington and Dan, Inc. the total amount of $4,192.91 for electrical work contemplated under the contract that was not completed or required correction after Alonzo left the construction site. Page 6 lines 6 and 11 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15 indicate that there were extras not covered by the contract. The total amount for electricity contemplated by the contract was $3,649.00. Alonzo was paid $2,627.10 under the contract and $1,710.00 for extras. The Homeowners were required to obtain the services of an air conditioning contractor to complete the work contemplated under the contract after Alonzo left the job site and as a result were required to pay Cameron, Inc., the air conditioning contract the amount of $5,181.60 between August 16, 1983 and January 24, 1984. The total amount contemplated under the contract was $3,600.00 of which $1,134.00 had been paid to Alonzo. Debris was dumped in the swimming pool requiring the Homeowners to pay $7,000 to refurbish the swimming pool. This amount included the repair contemplated under the contract and the extra work caused by Alonzo. The contract contemplated $2,300.00 for repairs of which none had been paid to Respondent or Alonzo. The Homeowners paid $1,150.00 to a painting contractor to finish the painting contemplated under the contract. Alonzo had been paid $1,125.00 for painting. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15) The contract provided $2,500.00 for all painting required under the contract. Respondent failed to notify the building department that he was no longer responsible for the construction. After the Homeowners terminated the contract due to Respondent's and Alonzo's nonperformance, the Homeowners had to expend a substantial amount of extra money to complete the construction. The evidence is insufficient to determine an exact or approximate amount. Roberta Fox's testimony was conflicting with regard to her understanding as to whether or not the Respondent would continue to supervise the construction after the meeting in the Homeowners' law office on February 3, 1983 when Respondent and Alonzo entered into this agreement. Myron Gold testified that it was his understanding that Respondent would continue to supervise Alonzo after the agreement. However, the Homeowners action in this regard subsequent to February 3, 1983, in making no effort to bring the matter to a "head" and requiring Respondent to supervise the work or terminate the contract and in continuing to deal with Alonzo although Homeowners were aware shortly after February 3, 1983 that Alonzo could not perform without Respondent's supervision and that they knew Respondent was not on the job, tends to show that they were aware or should have been aware that Respondent was no longer involved in the day to day supervision of the construction. Alonzo installed a fireplace pursuant to the contract that the building department determined to be a fire hazard and recommended against its use. The Homeowners applied for and were granted a "owner/builder" permit on September 1, 1983 and requested cancellation of the building permit issued to Respondent which was cancelled on September 6, 1983. They have not received a certificate of occupancy because the building department has not performed the following inspection: electrical final; plumbing final; air conditioning final; roofing final and public works final. The building department would have issued a "stop-work order" had it been aware that Respondent was not supervising the construction and would have required the Homeowners to obtain another licensed building contractor or proceed as a owner/builder. The plans prepared by Frese-Camner Associates that were made a part of the contract by reference were not introduced into evidence with the contract and thus the record is insufficient to determine what was required to meet the specifications of the plans and thereby determine if the specifications had been met. There was a permit issued for the septic tank and drain field which work was started in December, 1982. The construction of the house itself was started in January 1983. The first inspection (foundation) on the house was made by the building department of January 21, 1983.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is Recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(h)(k)(m), Florida Statutes (1981) and for such violations it is Recommended that the Board assess the Respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00 and suspend the Respondent's contracting license for a period of three (3) years, provided, however, that if Respondent submits to the Board competent and substantial evidence of restitution to Myron Gold and Roberta Fox within one (1) year from the date of the final order herein, then the suspension shall be stayed and Respondent placed on probation for the balance of the suspension. Respectfully submitted and entered this 6th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 84-2529 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. RULINGS ON PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12 except clarified as to the last date on construction site. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact24 but clarified to show correct amount paid under contract as indicated by Petitioner's Exhibit 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 but clarified to show that extra plastering not under contract was required. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30 but clarified. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32 but clarified to show that the record does not support a figure that approximate $32,000.00. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence even though the Homeowners' testimony supported this fact because the Homeowners' actions with regard to Respondent after February 3, 1983, was to the contrary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. RULINGS ON PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: No Findings of Fact was submitted by the Respondent. COPIES FURNISHED: James Linnan, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. Douglas Beason Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. George J. Soler, Pro Se 3315 S.W. 96th Avenue Miami, Florida 33165
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact About seven o clock on the morning of May 23, 1983, Michael S. Boyden telephoned the Pensacola offices of Shear Concrete Products, Inc. (Shear Concrete), and asked that 20 cubic yards of concrete be delivered to a construction site at 438 Creary Street. Under construction there was the house Mr. Boyden was building for himself and his family. (He has since finished it and moved in.) During the first conversation, somebody told him the concrete would arrive at half past ten. At eleven, with no concrete in sight, Mr. Boyden again telephoned; Danny Woods or Terry Knowles told him the concrete was on the way. In fact, it was at least five minutes before one before the first Shear Concrete truck was loaded, and this truck reached the site about two in the afternoon. Thirty-five or forty minutes later, the first truck had been emptied of concrete. The second Shear Concrete truck was loaded at quarter past one, but reached the construction site within minutes of the time the first arrived. Mr. Boyden, a concrete finisher and three other men he had hired were all present at the time the second truck arrived. At the finisher's direction, water was added to the concrete in the second truck; and its contents were also eventually emptied, wheelbarrow by wheelbarrow. By half past three, it was clear that a greater quantity of concrete would be needed; but it was evening before the finisher, Caesar Johnson, told Mr. Boyden that the concrete from the second truck was not setting up properly. Once cement, sand, water and gravel are mixed in a concrete mixer, a reaction begins that runs its course regardless of whether the mixture is poured in time. (The time this reaction takes depends on, among other things, how hot the day is.) If mixing is still going on when the concrete "gets hot," the elements of the mixture do not cohere and the batch is no longer useful as concrete. Adding water retards the reaction to the extent it acts as a cooling agent, but it does not reverse the process. By the time the mixture was poured into the Boydens' foundation, it was no longer suitable for its intended use. The other concrete had hardened by the next day, but concrete from the second truck, the one driven by Ronald Lane Thompson, was soft and friable. Mr. and Mrs. Boyden incurred expense in removing the miscongealed concrete. They ordered and received a replacement load on May 31, 1983, which was satisfactory. They have never paid for this load, even though Shear Concrete has billed them and given them a "notice to owner" in an effort to preserve its rights under the mechanics' lien law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been considered and adopted, in substance, for the most part. To the extent they have been rejected, they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, conclusive or subordinate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Cobo Company, Inc., is a mechanical contractor located in Miami, Florida, whose qualifying agent, Jose Cobo, is certified in that capacity pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. By letter of August 18, 1980, Respondent Department of General Services confirmed Petitioner's annual prequalification as a potential bidder for building construction contracts pursuant to Section 255.29, Florida Statutes, for the "type or class as defined in your license." (Testimony of Cobo, Exhibit 1) At an undisclosed date, Respondent published an advertisement for bids for Project No. DGS-7969-C, "Major Repairs-Chiller Replacement, Graham Building, Miami, Florida." The advertisement required all bidders to submit prequalification data of their eligibility to submit proposals if not previously qualified for the current fiscal year. The advertisement an invitation for bids stated that bids must be submitted in full in accordance with the requirements of the drawings, specifications, bidding conditions, contractual conditions, and that sealed bids would be opened on September 30, 1980. Section B-2 of the specifications required that the bidder present evidence that he was "authorized to perform the work required on these documents in accordance with the applicable provisions of Florida Statutes governing contractors." (Exhibit 4) Respondent's Instructions to Bidders further required that bidders submit evidence of ability to provide necessary performance and labor and material payment bonds, and that bids would be accompanied by a bid guarantee of not less than 5 percent of the amount of the bid. The instructions required bidders to submit a list of previous contracts involving similar work which had been satisfactorily completed, and to list those qualified subcontractors which the bidder intended to be employed on the contract. They further required a bidder to indicate bid prices on the proposal form for the entire work and for any alternates on which he bids. The instructions stated that if the base bid was within the amount of funds available to finance the contract and the owner (Respondent) wished to accept alternate additive bids, contract award would be made to that responsible bidder submitting the low combined bid, consisting of the base bid plus alternate additive bids. Section B-24 of the contract document reads in part as follows: B-24 CONTRACT AWARD The Contract will be awarded by the Executive Director, Department of General Services, as soon as possible, to the lowest qualified bidder provided in his bid is reasonable and it is in the best interest of the owner to accept it. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality on bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. The Agreement will only be entered into with reasonable contractors, found to be satisfactory by the Owner, qualified by experience and in a financial position to do the work specified. Section 01010 of the specifications provides in part as follows: SECTION 01010 - SUMMARY OF WORK 1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION The project in general consists of construction of the contract entitled Major Repairs-Chiller Replacement, Graham Building, Miami, Florida, State Project No. DGS-7969-C. A general Description of the project and its scope includes the following: Replacement of chiller for central air conditioning system. Install new cooling towers and pump. The contract drawings and specifications provided for the removal of a portion of an interior wall, and removal of an exterior wall window and masonry work below the window to provide access for removal of the existing chiller and its replacement with new equipment. In addition, the contract included electrical work incident to the installation of the chiller, removal of an existing hand rail for clear access to the equipment and later replacement, installation of pitch pans for pipes and other openings on the roof, and the erection and installation of structural steel cooling towers. The specifications call for painting, plaster work, replacement of flooring and ceiling, and installation of a window wall panel, as required in restoring the demolished area. They further called for a replacement demountable interior wall partition to provide future access to the air conditioning equipment, as an alternate portion of the project. Section 01021 of the specifications described the bid items as a Base bid, Additive Alternate No. 1 for using a higher efficiency chiller, and Additive Alternate No. 2 for installation of the demountable partition. However, the specifications had been altered prior to the issuance of the bid invitation to provide for the higher efficiency chiller as part of the Base bid, but Section 01021 had not been changed accordingly. Respondent's proposal form for use by bidders, however, had provisions for entry of only a Base bid and Alternate No. 1 for the installation of the demountable partition. (Testimony of Karagianis, Exhibits 4-6) Petitioner submitted its bid for the project on September 30, 1980. Its base bid was $225,440. It also bid on the alternate for installation of demountable partitions in the sum of $1,170, and added to the bid form an alternate for the use of a higher efficiency chiller in the amount of $1,150. Seven other bids were submitted on the proposal ranging from $239,300 by Sam L. Hamilton, Inc. to a high bid of $403,624. Hamilton's additive bid for the alternate partitions was in the amount of $1,950. Petitioner enclosed with its proposal the required contractor's qualification statement showing previous experience as a mechanical contractor, bid bond, and other required information. It listed L. Milton Construction, Inc. as a general construction subcontractor and Sparta Insulation as an insulation contractor. Although Petitioner intended that Lloyd N. Jones perform the electrical work on the project, he was not listed as a subcontractor because Petitioner did not know at that time whether he would be a subcontractor of Milton or of his own firm. Petitioner included the alternate bid for the higher efficiency chiller because it was required under Section 01021 of the specifications. Milton's bid to Petitioner for the construction work on the contract was in the sum of $7,000. (Testimony of Cobo, Exhibits 2-3) By letter of October 7, 1980, Respondent informed Petitioner that it intended to contract with Sam L. Hamilton, Inc. which had been determined the qualified low bidder meeting the requirements of the specifications. The letter advised the Petitioner that its bid was rejected because it was not a certified or registered general or building contractor as required by Section 489.105, Florida Statutes. Attached to the letter was a copy of a letter of William J. Roberts, attorney for the Florida Construction Industry Licensing board to Respondent, dated October 18, 1977, setting forth a legal opinion that a mechanical contractor could not be the prime contractor on a state contract in which the bulk of the work is mechanical in nature, but the remaining portion is to be subcontracted to a general contractor. Roberts testified at the hearing that he had drafted legislation which changed the definition of "contractor" previously found in subsection 478.102(1), and in his view, under such definition, a mechanical contractor would not be authorized to become a prime contractor if it were necessary for him to subcontract any non-mechanical work called for under the contract provisions which he was not qualified to perform. (Testimony of Roberts, Exhibit 7) Respondent's project director estimates that the chiller replacement project was approximately 90 to 93 percent mechanical in nature, and 7 to 10 percent requiring general construction and electrical work. It was his understanding of departmental policy that if any portion of a contract involved general construction work, only a general contractor would be eligible to receive the award and that, in this case, Petitioner could not therefore be accepted as a prime contractor. Respondent's chief of the Bureau of Construction has instructed Bureau personnel not to award contracts to mechanical contractors which involve non-mechanical work unless the contractor is certified in the non-mechanical area for which the work is required. Two contracts awarded by Respondent to mechanical contractors in 1980 which involved non-mechanical work were "incorrect" awards, in the view of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction. (Testimony of Karagianis, Scaringe, Composite Exhibit 8) General contractors and mechanical contractors are required to be licensed under Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. Any person who desires to be certified statewide in a particular contracting area must establish his competency and qualifications by a combination of education and experience, plus the successful completion of an appropriate examination. The general contractor's examination and mechanical contractor's examination have similar portions relating to applicable federal state laws and regulations in the contracting field. The remaining and major portion of the mechanical contractor's examination deals with subjects of that specialty such as air conditioning, refrigeration, heating, and the like. The general contractor's examination primarily covers matters relative to construction, such as site work, excavation, structural shell, masonry walls, piles, columns, and form work. (Testimony of Allen, Composite Exhibits 9-10) In the opinion of an expert in the field of architecture, there are no parts of the chiller replacement project which require the services of a general contractor. The demolition of the interior partition and the window wall properly may be accomplished by a mechanical contractor and installation of demountable partitions in lieu thereof can be obtained from specialty suppliers. Other aspects of the project, such as concrete pads, installation of cooling tower, pitch pans, and painting similarly are all considered to be incidental work to a project that is basically mechanical in nature. Certain large mechanical contractors customarily employ qualified individuals to perform specialty tasks such as painting and demolition work, but smaller contractors accomplish such portions of a job by subcontract. (Testimony of Coxen) A recent contract award was made by Dade County to a mechanical contractor for a project similar to the one here in controversy. In that case, the mechanical contractor had listed a general contractor as a subcontractor for the project. (Exhibit 11)
Recommendation That Petitioner Cobo Company, Inc. be awarded contract for Project No. DGS- 7969-C, as the qualified low bidder meeting the requirements of the specifications. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of January, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. Laface, Esquire Roberts, Miller, Baggett, LaFace and Wiser Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sprio Kypreos, Esquire Department of General Services Room 457 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire Williams, Salomon, Kanner, Damian, Weissler and Brooks 1000 DuPont Building Miami, Florida 33131 Henry P. Trawick, Jr., Esquire Trawick and Griffis, P.S. 2051 Main Street Post Office Box 4019 Sarasota, Florida 33578 Thomas R. Brown Executive Director Department of General Services 115 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's license as a professional engineer in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Board of Professional Engineers was the state agency responsible for the licensing of professional engineers in this state. Respondent, James B. Whittum, was licensed as a professional engineer by the Board under License No. PE 0027689, dated March 9, 1979. He is a consulting engineer dealing primarily in aluminum structures - mostly pool enclosures. Starting in 1990, Respondent did a number of designs, some thirty to fifty a year, for Paglino Aluminum, an aluminum contractor located in Tampa, which might also have had offices in Miami. The company is now out of business. Sometime in 1992 Respondent approved plans for Paglino for a residence for Mr. and Mrs. Marrero. These drawings were for an aluminum enclosure. He did not personally make the drawing which had been done by Mrs. Paglino. He did not know where the Marrero residence was but claims that at no time did he do or approve any drawings which he believed would be utilized for construction in Miami. In order to save clients money, Respondent had established a practice with Paglino and with a number of other clients by which he would train them in how to design and draw the pool cages. Respondent would provide the clients with a design booklet and instruction on how to use it. The client would bring drawings to the Respondent who would check them over to make sure that everything was done according to the design basis. A copy of the design guide was furnished to Paglino. Once Respondent received the drawings from the client, he would go through the whole design procedure himself to be sure that the drawings conformed to the code. In order to place his signature and seal on drawings, he had to have an identification of the site (either the name of the owner or the address of the site), the dimensions of the slab on which the structure is to be built, and the orientation of the structure with reference to the existing building to which it was to be attached. With regard to the specific plans in issue, Mr. Whittum did not know the structure was to be built in Dade County. The plans he saw bore the Marreros' name but not their address. He never spoke to the Marreros except for one call from Mrs. Marrerro, after the structure was built, complaining about it. Before signing the plans, Respondent checked in the Tampa phone book for listings for Marrero and found twenty-five or thirty listings for that name. He assumed the Marreros for which these plans were drafted were one of those families listed. It is not Respondent's practice to know the street address for every design he signs and seals. He inquired of several other engineers designing aluminum structures to see if they did the same as he proposed before signing and sealing these plans. He found that they have either the name of the owner or the street address, but not necessarily both. Included in those with whom Respondent spoke concerning this issue were engineers in Sarasota and Cape Coral. This testimony by Mr. Whittum as to the practice of other engineers is hearsay, however. Most counties in Florida, except Pinellas County, do not allow the use of standard plans as submittals for the purpose of permitting. However, an engineering firm has drawn a set of master drawings for the design of aluminum structures. These drawings were done for the Pinellas Chapter of the Aluminum Association of Florida, and each aluminum contractor in that county files them with the Pinellas Building Department. Thereafter, when plans are submitted, the Department official examines the plans with reference to the standard and decides whether or not to issue the permit. If the plans submitted by the contractor conform to the master design no engineer's signature or seal is required. This procedure has no bearing on any other county in Florida, however, and Respondent does not contend he believed at the time that the plans he signed would be used for construction in Pinellas County. It was not Respondent's practice to require a street address for the plans he signed and sealed for Paglino Aluminum. It was his understanding, however, that the instant structure was to be built in Hillsborough County because all the other jobs he had done for that company were, without exception, built in Hillsborough County. At no time did Paglino ever seek Respondent's permission to transfer these drawings to Dade County. By the same token, nobody asked him if the design he drew would be appropriate for Dade County. Had they done so, he would have told them the drawings were not suitable to meet the South Florida Building Code where the structural design standards are, in many ways, more stringent than in the Standard Building Code. As a result of this incident, Respondent has changed the procedure he follows. He now requires the drawings include a statement of who purchased the plans and who the proposed permitting authority is. This is not required by rule but is a precaution he takes. In his opinion, the drawings in issue were site specific. They showed the dimensions of the slab the structure was to be built on which determines the design for the size of the beams and their spacing. They also showed the orientation to the house where the structure would be connected. This was, he contends, all he needed to know to do the calculations for construction under the Standard Building Code. These calculations generally do not vary from county to county, with the exception of Dade and Broward County, where the South Florida Building Code is used. The plans Respondent signed and sealed did not indicate where the structure was to be built at the time he signed and sealed them. The plans called for a structure that could be put up anywhere in the state, except for Dade and Broward Counties. The fact remains, however, that at the time he signed and sealed these plans, Respondent did not know where the structure was to be built. His supposition that it would be built in Hillsborough County, while perhaps reasonable for a lay person, was not reasonable for a licensed professional engineer. According to James O. Power, a consulting structural engineer and expert in the practice of engineering, a structural engineer, in signing and sealing plans, accepts responsibility for the integrity of the design, certifies that the plans are good for their intended purpose, and asserts that the structure will be safe. A sealed plan may be necessary, depending on the building code and enforcement agency. The code leaves it up to the building official to require what he feels is necessary. Depending on the agency, permits may be issued on the basis of non-sealed plans. The seal carries with it the added imprimatur of the engineer's expertise. Properly sealed plans should: (1) identify the project; (2) identify the drafter; (3) identify the Code used; and (4) indicate limitations on responsibility the engineer has taken. Aluminum screen enclosures are generally similar and simple. Standard drawings can be developed for them. However, the standard plan, by itself, will not support a permit. To support the issuance of a permit, the plan must be site specific. This is a universal concept. For that purpose, additional drawings must be accomplished which consider and treat the specifics of that project. Frequently, plans are issued with a statement by the engineer limiting the degree of his or her responsibility, such as "only treating one issue" or "plans are standard and not site specific." No such limiting language was placed on the drawing in issue except, "This design is specific to this job. It is not valid if filed as a standard." In July, 1994, Mr. Power was contacted by the Department to evaluate the allegations against the Respondent in this case. In doing so, he reviewed the investigative report, portions of the transcript of the meeting of the Probable Cause Panel, the drawings in issue, and affidavits by Respondent and by the Dade County building official, but did not speak with any of them. Respondent's plans in issue bear the notation that the design is "job specific" and not valid if filed as a standard. This means that the plan should identify the job for which the plans were drawn and bear details pertinent to it. Here, the Respondent's plans refer to the "Marrero" job, and who the contractor was. In Power's opinion, this is not complete and it is not enough for the engineer to say he had the specifics in his mind. The plans must be complete and stand by themselves. Mr. Power admits he has not designed any pool enclosures. He also did not inquire whether Respondent had an office in Dade County or what the permit requirements of counties in the state are. However, in his opinion, it is universal that standard plans do not support the issuance of a permit. Respondent's design includes connection details, slab details and wind load requirements. However, the name of the owner, alone, is not site specific information. While the exact street location is not required, an identification of the area in which the project is to be built, at the very least by county, is. Respondent's expert, Mr. Sterling, is less critical of Mr. Whittum's performance. In his opinion, it is not common within the profession for signed and sealed drawings to have an address or a name or contractor's name on them. Having reviewed Respondent's drawings, Mr. Sterling does not see anything else he would need to know to properly design the structure. He does not agree with Mr. Power with respect to having the address on each and every drawing. To him, what is important in looking at the drawing from a structural point of view are the design criteria that were applied to that particular structure. To his knowledge there is no professional requirement, statute or regulation that would oblige one to provide additional information. He admits, however, that there may be different practices or rules being applied in Dade and Broward Counties with respect to structure of this type. By Final Order dated April 3, 1992, the Board disciplined Respondent's license for negligence in the practice of engineering by signing and sealing plans for an aluminum screened pool enclosure which the Hillsborough County Building Department found failed to meet acceptable engineering standards. The penalty imposed included an administrative fine of $500, a reprimand, and probation for one year under conditions designed to insure technical and professional enhancement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued finding Respondent guilty of negligence in the practice of engineering; imposing a fine of $1,000.00 and revoking his license, but that so much of the penalty as provides for revocation be suspended for a period of two years. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. Accepted and incorporated herein. 2 - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. - 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. Accepted, but primarily a restatement of testimony. 17. - 22. Accepted, but these are primarily restatements of witness testimony. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 4. Not Findings of Fact but statements of procedure followed. Unknown. - 9. Not Findings of Fact but comments of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 13. Accepted. 14. - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as surmise of witness, not knowledge. - 25. Accepted. - 28. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the issue. & 31. Not Findings of Fact but restatements of testimony. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. - 37. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the evidence. & 40. Not Findings of Fact but restatements of testimony. - 44. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of testimony. More a comment by one witness on the testimony of another witness. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Mary Ellen Clark, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles S. Stephens, Esquire 1177 Park Avenue, Suite 5 Orange Park, Florida 32073 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner operates a plant which manufactures wire and wire products located at the foot of Florida Street, Jacksonville, Florida adjacent to the St. Johns River. Petitioner's manufacturing operations include "pickling" (acid cleaning) of raw materials which generates a spent solution containing sulphuric acid and ferrous sulphate. Petitioner has requested a variance from Rule 17-3.05(2)(p) of the Florida Administrative Code which specifies a water quality standard of not exceeding .3 mg/1 of iron, which standard, as applied to the Petitioner in this instance, would require that Petitioner's effluent not contain in excess of .3 mg/1. Petitioner proposed-to construct a treatment system for its effluent which includes alkaline neutralization with continuous pH control, followed by the addition of an ionic polymer to enhance settling. Following polymer addition, settling and clarification will take place in a clarifier. The overflow from the clarifier will flow to a multimedia granular filter and thence to a pH adjustment station and thence to a continuous flow monitoring and sampling station and finally into the St. Johns River. The sludge that has settled to the bottom of the clarifier will be filtered by a cloth-media filter where it will be further de-watered such that the solids are discharged from the filter as a solid cake. The solid cake will be landfilled by an independent contractor. The above described treatment system represents at least the best practicable means known or available for the adequate control of iron in Petitioner's effluent. Petitioner is seeking a variance for a period of five years from the date Petitioner's treatment system becomes operational. Petitioner could suffer irreparable damage and harm if the variance were denied because no practicable technology is presently known or available which would reduce the iron in Petitioner's effluent to .3 mg/1. By using the treatment system proposed, Petitioner can reduce iron in its effluent to 1 mg/1 and can achieve that level of treatment within eleven months after commencement of construction of the treatment system. Since there is no other practicable means presently known or available for the removal of iron from Petitioner's effluent, Petitioner will be unable to reduce iron in its effluent to .3 mg/1 at any time during the presently foreseeable future. No discernible disadvantages will result to residents or the environment in the affected area by the granting of Petitioner's variance request. No evidence was presented at the hearing as to a weekly average of concentrations of iron which the Petitioner would be able to meet through its proposed system, and which would be appropriate and enforceable.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for variance to discharge effluent containing iron from its Jacksonville, Florida plant into the St. Johns River in excess of the State of Florida iron standard specified in Rule 17-3.05(2)(p) of the Rules of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, be granted subject to the following conditions: The effluent limitations which shall apply during the period of the variance are: Iron in Mid-State's effluent is to be composed of ferrous hydroxide, Fe(OH)2, with only a trace of ferric hydroxide, Fe(OH)3. The iron portion of the effluent is to be mostly in the particulate phase with a small amount of dissolved ferrous hydroxide. The following effluent concentrations of total iron shall not be exceeded: Monthly average: one (1) mg/1 total iron Daily maximum: three(3) mg/1 total iron The variance is granted for a period of five (5) years and eleven (11) months from the date that an approved construction permit is issued by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for the treatment facility. In the event of development of better practicable treatment technology during the period of the variance, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation will provide reasonable notice of the later developed technology and propose a reasonable schedule for implementation of said treatment technology, at which time Mid-States will, subject to its right to obtain review of proposals by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, be obligated to make appropriate improvements in its waste treatment facility, as may be required of the steel wire process industry in Florida. Mid States shall be required to establish a monitoring program for total iron in its effluent to be approved by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. Data obtained by such an approved monitoring program shall be submitted to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Subdistrict office on a routine basis. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of January, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gene Petersen, Esquire 1125 First National Bank Building Peoria, Illinois 61602 J. D. Boone Kuersteiner, Esquire 2562 Executive Center Circle East Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
