The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the entity charged under Florida law with the responsibility of operating and controlling the public school system within the Miami-Dade County, Florida School District. As such, it has authority over personnel employed by the School Board. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was an employee of the School Board. The Respondent was hired in October 1985 as a secretary. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was subject to the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was assigned work duties at the Division of Student Services as a senior secretary. On or about August 26, 1997, the Respondent reported that a laptop computer with an approximate value of $1200.00 was missing from her work location. Thereafter, the Respondent formally reported that the laptop computer had been stolen from her work location. In June 2001, a repossession company took possession of the Respondent's car. As part of its procedure, the repossession company inventoried the contents of the Respondent's vehicle. A laptop computer was discovered in the car's trunk. Because it bore a School Board inventory control identification sticker, the repossession company returned the laptop to the School Board's police. The recovered laptop inventory control sticker corresponded to the computer that the Respondent had reported stolen. Recovered almost 4 years after it was reported missing, the laptop was deemed obsolete and of little value to the School Board. As such, it was sent to a warehouse so that it could be sold with other surplus property. In follow-up to the recovery of the laptop, the School Board police interviewed the Respondent in July 2001 regarding the computer. The Respondent admitted that she had taken the laptop from her office without permission and had falsely reported the item as stolen. The Respondent further admitted that she had left the laptop in the trunk of her personal automobile that had been repossessed. On August 28, 2001, a conference for the record was conducted with the Respondent to address the removal of the laptop computer from the worksite, the false report, and the Respondent's future employment status. During such conference, the Respondent maintained that she had only taken the laptop without permission by removing it from the worksite. She did not acknowledge having reported it as stolen. She admitted that she had "borrowed" the computer. Prior to the series of events with the laptop computer, the Respondent was arrested on a charge of third degree grand theft. The charges in that matter arose from the Respondent's fraudulent and illegal application for a loan. The Respondent used the name, address, and social security number for another person in order to procure a loan in the amount of $3769.00. Subsequently, the Respondent defaulted on the loan. A bench warrant for the grand theft charge was executed against the Respondent on or about July 22, 1997, and on July 23, 1997, the Respondent entered a plea of no contest to the charge. As a result, the Respondent was placed on probation which included restitution to the victim and community service. The Respondent was apprised of all School Board rules, policies and procedures pertinent to this matter and was directed to comply with all rules and regulations of the School Board. The Respondent did not have permission to remove the laptop computer from her work premises.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida enter a Final Order sustaining the termination of the Respondent's termination of employment effective February 13, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Merrett R. Stierheim, Interim Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1394 Honorable Charlie Crist Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Luis M. Garcia, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Kimberly A. Tarver 3456 Frow Avenue Miami, Florida 33133
The Issue The issue for determination at formal hearing was whether Rule 5J- 12.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Theron C. Phinney is the sole owner and operator of Mobile Auto Repair Shop, located in Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Florida. He is engaged in the repairing of motor vehicles and has been in the auto repair business for over 35 years. Mr. Phinney's auto repair business is mobile. All of his equipment and tools for repairing vehicles are located in his truck. Mr. Phinney repairs vehicles wherever they are located, i.e., he goes to where the vehicles are located. No repairs are performed at Mr. Phinney's residence. Mr. Phinney has no employees. Mr. Phinney has been issued an occupational license by Palm Beach County at a cost of $25.00. The license identifies his residence as the location for his business. Even though Mr. Phinney does not perform any vehicle repairs at his residence, the County required him to provide his residential address as the location of his business. The County renews his license yearly with the residential address. 1/ Repairs by mobile motor vehicle repair shops are performed wherever the vehicle needing repair is located. Equipment and tools used to perform the repairs are located in the vehicle owned by the mobile motor vehicle repair shop. The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) is charged with administering the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, Sections 559.901-559.9221, Florida Statutes. The Act requires motor vehicle repair shops to register with the Department and pay a fee and provides certain exemptions. Section 559.904, Florida Statutes. Section 559.904(9), Florida Statutes, provides: (9) No annual registration application or fee is required for an individual with no employees and no established place of business. Section 559.903(8), Florida Statutes, defines "place of business" and provides: (8) "Place of business" means a physical place where the business of motor vehicle repair is conducted. The Department's Rule 5J-12.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (2) "Established place of business" means that physical location noted on the occupational license issued to the motor vehicle repair shop pursuant to Chapter 205, Florida Statutes. If the county or municipality has adopted no local occupational license requirement pursuant to Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, the term means that physical location where motor vehicle repairs are performed, or records, equipment, or tools used for the conduct of the business of motor vehicle repair are housed or stored. The term includes any vehicle constituting a mobile repair shop. The Rule was adopted on January 18, 1995. Rule 5J-12.001(2) implements Section 559.904(9). The Rule also implements Section 559.903(5) and (7), Florida Statutes, which define "minor repair service" and "motor vehicle repair shop," respectively. There is no dispute that mobile motor vehicle repair shops are included in the definition of motor vehicle repair shops. The Department developed the challenged Rule over a period of several months. Numerous public meetings were conducted, particularly with the motor vehicle repair industry, throughout the State of Florida. From the public meetings conducted by the Department, it was evident, among other things, that there was no clear understanding of the meaning of the term "established place of business" in Section 559.904(9). Consequently, the Department was convinced that clarification of the term was needed. The Motor Vehicle Advisory Council (MVAC) reviewed and advised the Department on the challenged Rule and gave the Rule its (MVAC) approval. The MVAC is a statutorily created advisory council, composed of members from the motor vehicle repair industry. The challenged Rule includes all mobile motor vehicle repair shops within the class of businesses required to be registered with the Department pursuant to Chapter 559, Florida Statutes. The Department contends that this inclusion is necessary because, since the purpose of Chapter 559 is to regulate the auto repair business, the mobile motor vehicle repair shops are conducting the business sought to be regulated in that the mobile repair shops are licensed by county and municipal authorities and are performing significant repairs for compensation. There are approximately 560 mobile motor vehicle repair shops registered with the Department. Standing is not at issue in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant thereto, respondent, William Reinhart, was licensed to operate a commercial driving school called Easy Method Auto Driving School at 920 North Dixie Highway, Suite 144G, Pompano Beach, Florida. He is holder of commercial driving instructor certificate card number 6634 and commercial driving school license number 2460 issued by petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver Licenses (agency or Division). Reinhart has owned and operated his driving school since 1976. The school presently has four instructors, including Reinhart. Beginning in April, 1986 respondent undertook the driving instruction of Kathleen McKeever, a thirty-two year old female who resides in Boca Raton, Florida. Prior to their lessons, the two had never met. She selected respondent's firm by chance out of the telephone directory. McKeever took approximately five or six one-hour driving lessons from Reinhart between April and June, 1986. On the first two lessons, Reinhart placed his hand in McKeever's lap while she was driving. She thought this was unusual but believed it might have been necessary in the event Reinhart had to suddenly grab the wheel. 1/ She did not voice any objection to his actions at that time. On the third or fourth lesson, the two drove on I-95 in Fort Lauderdale. While heading north on that roadway Reinhart reached over and placed his hands on her breasts and "private areas." McKeever at once began "squirming" in her seat. Reinhart then asked her if she minded him flirting with her, and she responded "yes", but he did not stop. The actual length of time in which Reinhart fondled McKeever was not disclosed, but McKeever stated she feared having an accident on I-95 while this occurred. After the lesson was over, McKeever did not disclose the incident to her family or friends because she was embarrassed and afraid it would upset her mother, who was home recuperating from heart bypass surgery. Fearing possible distress to her mother if she suddenly quit her lessons, McKeever decided to return for another driving lesson in June, 1986. At the beginning of the lesson, Reinhart placed his hand in her lap but she pushed it away. Later on, Reinhart offered McKeever $100 if she would give him a "blow job." She told him she wasn't a prostitute. The lesson ended a few minutes later when McKeever stalled the car in a parking lot and it would not restart. She was forced to telephone her family to get a ride home. After the lesson, McKeever telephoned a local television station (WPLG) and asked if the station would send a reporter to investigate the incident. When the station declined, she reported the incident to the Division. The emergency suspension of respondent's two licenses followed on July 21, 1986. According to the chief of the Division's driver improvement bureau, Reinhart's conduct constituted a lack of good moral character as well as a threat to the safety of others since the incidents occurred while a student (McKeever) was driving the vehicle in traffic. He also stressed the fact that an instructor should have good moral character because of the trust which students place in their instructor. Respondent offered two witnesses on his behalf, one a current instructor and the other a former office manager of the driving school. The office manager related that McKeever had never voiced any complaints to her, and that it was not unusual for every instructor to receive complaints from students at one time or another. However, she acknowledged that no complaints had ever involved sexual harassment. The second witness, an instructor, characterized the job of an instructor as being difficult because of the nervous and erratic nature of students. Although he stated it was necessary to keep his left hand near the student for the purpose of grabbing the steering wheel, he acknowledged that this would not require an instructor to place his hand in the student's lap. Respondent denied McKeever's allegations stating she had concocted the story because McKeever was not progressing well in her training and needed an excuse for ending the lessons. Through cross-examination of his counsel, he also suggested that McKeever might have long-standing psychological problems which prompted her to fabricate the story. However, Reinhart's version of events and contentions concerning possible psychological problems on the part of McKeever are not deemed to be credible and are accordingly rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's instructor certificate card number 6634 be REVOKED for violating Rules 15A-2.09(2)(a) and 15A-2.11(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The charges concerning respondent's driving school license number 2460 should be DISMISSED and the license immediately reinstated. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1986.
The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Avenel Cesaire, holds commercial driving school instructor's certificate number 6027. Respondent, Avenel Cesaire d/b/a Cesaire's Driving School, holds commercial driving school license 2256. Respondent's chauffeur license number C260-000-53-363-459 is currently under suspension. Each license was issued by the Department. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a driving instructor and engaged in the business of instructing persons in the safe operation of motor vehicles so they might be licensed by the State of Florida. During October and November 1984, former driver license examiner Mary Louise Smith (Smith), at the insistence and request of Respondent, issued driver licenses to Respondent's students without them having passed the required written or oral examination. Ms. Smith and Respondent were intimate. Ms. Smith first met Respondent at her place of employment: the Department's driver license examination station at 3095 Northwest 79th Street, Miami, Florida (the station). The parties began dating in June 1984 and continued to date until late November 1984, when she was discharged from her employment. During the course of their relationship, Respondent gave Ms. Smith $50-100, as frequently as twice a week. Prior to his students reporting to the station for testing, Respondent provided Ms. Smith with the names, and identification, of those students who needed "assistance." Ms. Smith issued or caused to be issued, driver licenses to such students without examination or, if examined, without regard to their failure to pass the examination. By aiding or assisting persons in obtaining driver's licenses without having first demonstrated their knowledge of the skills mandated by Section 322.12, Florida Statutes, and Rule 15A-1.12, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent caused to be licensed persons not deemed competent to operate motor vehicles upon the roads of the State of Florida. Such acts constituted a clear and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order permanently revoking Respondent's commercial driving school license number 2256 and commercial driving instructor's certificate card number 6027. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 9th day of May, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne H. Printy, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eric William Hendon, Esquire 8011 Northwest 22nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33147 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Respondent knowingly sold rebuilt vehicles without disclosing in writing to the purchaser, customer, or transferee that the vehicles were previously titled as rebuilt vehicles.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles R. Kuhn, III, is and was at all times relevant to the allegations in the administrative complaint a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida. The Respondent did business in the name A-1 Auto and Truck Center and was located at 12180-1 Phillips Highway, Jacksonville. The Department is the state agency authorized by statutes to regulate licensed independent motor vehicle dealers and to maintain the titles of motor vehicles in the State of Florida. Pam A. Albritton testified about her experiences buying a vehicle from the Respondent. On August 22, 2003, as reflected by the date on the installment sales contract, Albritton purchased a 2000 Volkswagen (VW), VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, for $8,281.80. The Respondent did not at any time provide Albritton with a written statement that the vehicle she purchased, VIN 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, hereafter the Albritton vehicle or car, was a rebuilt vehicle and had been previously titled as a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Albritton that this vehicle was a rebuilt vehicle. Albritton did not see the certificate of title to the vehicle until after the sale of the vehicle. Albritton took the car to an authorized VW dealer in November of 2003 because it was not shifting gears properly. The dealer found that the vehicle had suffered extreme damage from an accident and needed extensive repairs to the engine control system and the airbag in order to make the car safe to drive. The dealer told Albritton what had been found and advised her not to drive the car until it had been repaired. Albritton confronted the Respondent about the problems with the vehicle, and the Respondent gave her a handwritten "warranty" dated November 20, 2003. Pursuant to this agreement, Albritton took the car to the Respondent to have the seatbelts fixed; however, the repairs did not actually make the belts safe because the seatbelt retractor mechanism would not lock. In December of 2003, the wheel bearings on Albritton's car broke, and she contacted the Respondent about getting the car fixed. She was informed that the Respondent was away for two weeks, and nothing could be done until he returned. Needing her car for transportation in her work, she paid $200 to have the wheel bearings repaired. Pursuant to a mediation agreement, Albritton agreed to settle her complaint against the Respondent on the basis that he would get her a comparable vehicle. The Respondent was supposed to contact Albritton within 30 days of the mediation but failed to do so. The records introduced at hearing show that Albritton's vehicle had been re-titled as a rebuilt vehicle. Such a title indicates that the vehicle in question had been written off as an insurance loss and the original title cancelled or destroyed. Thereafter, the vehicle was repaired, and the person making the repair obtained a new title, which when issued, showed that the vehicle was rebuilt. Aylwin S. Bridges testified regarding his purchase of a VW from the Respondent. On or about June 14, 2003, Aylwin S. Bridges, purchased a 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, from the Respondent for $11,555.00. Neither prior to nor at the time of the sale did the Respondent provide Bridges a written statement that the 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, was a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Bridges that the car he was purchasing was rebuilt. The records introduced at hearing show that the Bridges' car had been re-titled as rebuilt. Bridges did not see a certificate of title to the vehicle prior to the sale of the vehicle. The Bridges' vehicle had extensive mechanical problems. For example, the engine control module had been spliced into the car and several codes had been deleted from it; the seat belts would not work; and the horn would not work. When Bridges sought to trade the vehicle, he found that the most he was offered for the car was only $2,500 because it was rebuilt. The Respondent testified in his own behalf. He did not deny having failed to disclose to Albritton and Bridges in writing prior to selling them their cars that the vehicles had previously been titled as rebuilt vehicles. The Respondent introduced a general disclaimer, Respondent's Exhibit 7, which was provided to Albritton and Bridges. This disclaimer states that the purchaser is buying a used car and that used cars may have any one or more of the listed problems. The Respondent testified that he knew the cars were rebuilt, but felt he had complied with the legal requirements of disclosure by providing the buyers with the aforementioned disclaimer. The specifics of the disclaimer are discussed in the Conclusions of Law for purposes of continuity, but are findings of fact.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding that the Respondent violated Section 319.14, Florida Statutes, on two occasions; fine Respondent $1,000 for each violation; and suspend the Respondent's license for six months for each violation, said suspensions to run consecutively, and that payment of the fine be a condition precedent to re-issuance of a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Patrick Kuhn, III A-1 Auto and Truck Center 12180-1 Philips Highway Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite B439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399
