The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Reimbursement Program established under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 for the petroleum terminal owned by Gulf Products Division of BP Oil Company at Port Everglades, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 provides for the expeditious cleanup of sites contaminated as the result of storage of petroleum or petroleum products. The Reimbursement Program, found in Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, provides for reimbursement of the allowable costs of site rehabilitation contaminated as a result of a discharge related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products from a storage tank, or its integral piping or dispensing system. The Reimbursement Program does not provide for reimbursement of cleanup costs for discharges related to the transportation or disposal of petroleum or petroleum products. The site at issue in this proceeding is a terminal facility used for the storage of petroleum and petroleum product located at 1500 Southeast 26th Street, Port Everglades, Florida. This facility is referred to as Gulf Facility No. 46888 and DER Facility No. 068732278 (Gulf Terminal). The subject terminal facility is one of fourteen petroleum storage terminals located at Port Everglades, Florida. Petroleum and petroleum products come to the terminal by ship and are pumped from the ship through permanent pipelines to the large aboveground storage tanks located at the facility. The petroleum and petroleum products are stored in these large tanks until it is time for the product to be distributed to the end user. The Gulf Terminal contains eighteen storage tanks whose total capacity is 650,000 barrels of petroleum or petroleum products. These tanks vary in size, with the smallest having a capacity of 10,000 barrels and the largest having a capacity of 80,000 barrels. One barrel equals 42 gallons. The primary activity of the terminals at Port Everglades is to store petroleum or petroleum products. None of the terminals at Port Everglades, including the Gulf Terminal, refines or produces petroleum or petroleum products. Operation of this facility began in 1946. Petitioner, as the successor to the Gulf Oil Corporation, owned and operated the facility until February 1, 1985, when it sold the facility to BP Oil, Inc. As the previous owner of the facility, Petitioner performed an environmental audit which revealed petroleum hydrocarbon contamination at the site. Petitioner is responsible for the cleanup and is entitled to reimbursement of the allowable costs of the cleanup if the site is eligible to participate in the reimbursement program. Any contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site was caused by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products, water contaminated with petroleum or petroleum product or sludges which consist predominately of petroleum or petroleum product constituents. Based on hydrogeological assessment information, Petitioner determined that response action, including ground water cleanup activities, was required at the site. Petitioner hired independent contractors to conduct the response action. In 1986, Petitioner designed a recovery system for petroleum and petroleum product and a ground water treatment system at the site. Through February, 1989, the recovery system had recovered over 12,000 gallons of petroleum or petroleum products, which constitutes the recovery of between 60%- 70% of the total amount in the ground. Through November 1989, Petitioner had expended in excess of $560,000 on its response action at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner advised Respondent of its response action at the site by letter dated January 6, 1988. Petitioner submitted documentation to Respondent concerning hydrogeological assessment at the site which included field and laboratory work and investigation performed for the site from 1984 to the present. Pursuant to the requirements of SUPER Act, Petitioner notified Respondent of its intention to seek reimbursement for money spent conducting response action in accordance with Chapter 17-70, Florida Administrative Code, with regard to petroleum and petroleum product contamination at the site. Petitioner's notice to Respondent was timely and was procedurally correct. On July 13, 1989, Respondent issued its Order of Determination of Ineligibility concerning Petitioner's request for reimbursement. As stated in this order the initial basis for Respondent's denial of eligibility was: The determination is based on the fact that the contamination was not related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products. Sources of contamination at this site include tanker trucks, an oil/water separator, a holding pond, and crude oil and tank-bottom sludge disposal pit. These items are not petroleum storage systems as defined in Section 376.301 F.S. therefore (sic), this site is not eligible for reimbursement under the SUPER Act. ... Respondent clarified its Order of Ineligibility by a Notice to Amend and Clarify dated November 14, 1989, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The notice of denial provides that the site is being denied due to the fact that the disclosed sources of contamination are not petroleum storage systems. One of the criteria for being a petroleum storage system is that it be used or intended to be used for storage of petroleum or petroleum product. It is the criteria that the Department contends is not met in this case; i.e., that the discharges were not intended for storage. Section 376.3071(4), Florida Statutes, specifically limits the use of the Environmental Protection Trust Fund to incidents of inland contamination related to storage of petroleum or petroleum product. * * * The Department recently became aware that prior to 1983, contaminated water was disposed of directly from tanks at the site with no pretreatment by an oil/water separator. As with the disposal of oil and sludge to a pit, the act of intentionally disposing of contaminants to the ground is not "related to storage" as required by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. * * * Wherefore, The State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation hereby requests that the Hearing Officer allow for the amendment of the notice of denial of eligibility to include the following basis for denial: Contamination at the site is related to the disposal of petroleum or petroleum product, or water contaminated with petroleum or petroleum products. Disposal activities including the intentional discharge and disposal of contaminated water and/or fuel from tanks, oil water separators and sump areas, the intentional discharge and disposal of contaminated water to a percolation pond, the intentional discharge and disposal of oil and sludge to a disposal pit, and the intentional discharge and disposal of fuel to the ground at the loading rack. Among the causes of contamination of the Gulf Terminal are accidental overfills of tanks and leaks from an integral pipeline. Absent any other source of contamination, the discharges that occurred at the Gulf Terminal due to these causes would be eligible for the reimbursement. Respondent has determined, however, that the following additional sources of contamination render the entire response action ineligible for reimbursement: Discharges of dissolved hydrocarbon molecules contained in water which accumulated in storage tanks; Discharges of petroleum or petroleum products at the loading rack at the terminal; and The discharge of crude oil and of crude oil tank bottoms. TANK OVERFILL During the operation of the Gulf Terminal, petroleum and petroleum products have been accidentally discharged onto the ground. In 1955, an unknown quantity of petroleum or petroleum products was accidentally discharged onto the ground in the areas of tanks 104 and 105 as a result of these tanks being over- filled. Following this massive spill, between 5,000 - 10,000 barrels of product was recovered, while an unknown quantity could not be recovered. PIPELINE LEAK Since 1955, approximately 15,000 additional barrels of petroleum or petroleum products were leaked from an underground pipeline that is integral to the storage system in an area between the loading rack and tank 101, extending toward the west to between tanks 110 and 102. This is the vicinity where the heaviest free floating petroleum contamination exists. DISCHARGE OF CONTAMINATED WATER Florida has adopted the standard code for the design of aboveground storage tanks prepared by the American Petroleum Institute (API-650). The tanks at the Gulf Terminal are in compliance with API-650. The accumulation of water in storage tanks is a problem associated with the storage of petroleum or petroleum products in the storage tanks at the Gulf Terminal and at the other terminals at Port Everglades. Water accumulates in the storage tanks from rainfall and from condensation. The records of the US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for Station 08063163 (Fort Lauderdale, Florida) accurately depict the rainfall levels at the terminal facility. The total annual rainfall levels are as follows: 1980, 69.67 inches; 1981, 57.9 inches; 1982, 82.92 inches; 1983 75.16 inches; 1984, 59.4 inches; 1985, 63.74 inches; 1986, 64.14 inches, 1987, 58.50 inches; 1988 40.66 inches. Because water is heavier than petroleum and petroleum products, the water accumulates at the bottom of the tanks. It is essential to the proper storage of the petroleum or petroleum products that the water be removed for at least three reasons. First, if the water is not removed, the tanks would eventually become filled with water instead of product. Second, the product contaminated by water, particularly fuel for motor vehicles and aircraft, would not meet specifications. Third, water in the tanks speeds the corrosion of the tank. In order to remove this water that accumulates at the bottom of the storage tanks, a water draw-off mechanism located at the bottom of the tank is a design feature of API-650. When water accumulates in the bottom of the tank, the water is drained out through the water draw-off mechanism. The storage tanks located at the Gulf Terminal are equipped with such a water draw-off mechanism. Throughout the existence of the facility, accumulated water in the tanks has been controlled by discharging the water through the water draw-off mechanism. From 1948 to 1980, water was drained out of the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism and on to the ground. Beginning in 1980, the water was taken from the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism and piped to a catch basin where an effort was made to recover petroleum product by skimming the water before the water was discharged into the ground. Since 1985, the water taken from the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism has been treated by an oil/water separator which effectively removes all petroleum product before the water is discharged. The purpose of the oil/water separator is to separate petroleum product from water so that the petroleum product can be returned to the storage tank and the water can be discharged. This process serves to prevent the discharge of petroleum product. Up to 1988, the discharges to the ground from the oil/water separator at the Gulf Terminal accumulated in a holding pond. In 1988, the holding pond was eliminated and the water discharges from the oil/water separator were routed to a holding tank prior to treatment by an air stripper and subsequent discharge into the canal adjacent to the property. At all times since 1983, the water drawn out of the tanks has been the subject of permits issued by Respondent which approve the use of the oil/water separator. While it is necessary for the operation of the storage tanks that water be drawn from the tanks, it is not necessary for the operation of the storage tanks for the contaminated water to be discharged onto the ground. The purpose of discharging the water was to dispose of it. There was no intent to recover the contaminated water after it was discharged. Any water coming out of a storage tank is contaminated with dissolved petroleum. It may have solids in it and floating residue or product on it. Between 1946 and 1980, when this water from the storage tanks was discharged to the ground, any contaminates in the water would be discharged along with it. Water has been drained from tanks numbered 101, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112 113, and 114 on a daily basis. The other tanks are drained after a rainfall. An average of one or two inches of water was drained off each time it rained. Following a rainfall, in excess of 30 barrels of water would be drained from the smaller tanks, while approximately 300 barrels of water would be drained from the larger tanks. The discharge of the water drawn from the storage tanks contributed to the contamination of the groundwater at the Gulf Terminal. This type contamination exists in almost all areas of the site. Petitioner was unable to distinguish the contamination to the groundwater caused by the discharge of contaminated water drawn from the storage tanks from contamination to the groundwater which resulted from other causes. Petitioner failed to establish that the contribution to this contamination to the groundwater by the discharge of the contaminated water drawn from the storage tanks was insignificant. THE LOADING RACK The loading rack at the Gulf Terminal is the apparatus by which the petroleum in the storage tanks is dispensed to tanker truck for distribution to consumers. The loading rack is a series of dispensers which operate much like at a service station except that it fuels tanker trucks rather than automobiles. The loading rack is connected by permanent integral piping to the storage tanks. The purpose of the loading rack is to load the transport trucks. Without the storage tanks at the terminal, there would be no need for a loading rack. Over the years, discharges have occurred in the loading rack, usually as the result of human error. Occasional overfills in the 10-15 gallon range have occurred while a truck was being filled. This type discharge is analogous to a spill which occurs at a service station when an automobile is being fueled and the fuel splashes back or overfills the automobile's fuel tank. The supervisor of Respondent's Reimbursement Section testified that this type discharge, absent other causes, would probably be eligible for reimbursement. This testimony conflicts with the official position taken by Respondent in this proceeding that the cleanup caused by the operation of the loading rack is ineligible for reimbursement. In other incidents, small amounts of product ranging from a teacup to less than a gallon, were occasionally discharged while a truck was being drained of one type of product so that the truck could transport another type of product. The loading rack is an integral part of the storage system because without a means of moving the product out of storage and into the distribution system, the storage tanks could not provide a meaningful function. The discharges which occurred at the loading rack during the course of both loading and unloading trucks are insignificant when compared with the other sources of contamination at the site. TANK BOTTOMS In 1956, a storage tank was emptied for the purpose of switching product from crude oil to diesel fuel. At the time the change in product was made, approximately 1000 barrels of sludge and crude oil were disposed of in a pit adjacent to tank 101. Also disposed of was the tank bottom, a hard tar residue which formed at the bottom of the tank. Oil occasionally oozes to the surface in the vicinity of the pit adjacent to tank 101, but the area around the sludge pit has not been found to be contaminated, and the tank bottom has remained a hardened mass. Each tank on the site also had a pit alongside the tank where a tank bottom was disposed. Although it was necessary to remove the sludge and the tank bottoms to be able to properly operate the storage tanks, it was not necessary for the operation of the storage tanks to dump the sludge and the tank bottoms onto the ground or into the pits. The purpose of discharging the crude oil sludge and the tank bottoms was to dispose of them. There was no intent to recover the crude oil sludge or the tank bottoms water after they were discharged. CONTAMINATION PHASES The contamination at the site exists in three phases, floating petroleum product contamination, dissolved petroleum groundwater contamination, and sludge contamination. The contamination in the form of floating petroleum was caused by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products following the tank overfills, the pipeline leaks, and spills at the loading rack. The dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by two primary sources. First, the dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by floating petroleum product coming into contact with groundwater. Upon such contact, molecules from the floating petroleum would dissolve into the water, causing contamination. Second, the dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by the discharge of the contaminated water that had been drawn off from the storage tanks. Petitioner was unable to distinguish the dissolved groundwater contamination that was caused by accidental discharges of product from the contamination caused by the discharge of the contaminated water. Petitioner was also unable to establish that the dissolved groundwater contamination caused by the contaminated water was insignificant. The sludge contamination was caused by the discharge of crude oil and crude oil tank bottoms. CLEANUP The sludge contamination is capable of being cleaned up separately from the free floating petroleum contamination and the groundwater contamination at the site. The sludge contamination is separate and distinct from the other contamination at the site both as to the location of the contamination and as to the methods that would be employed to clean up that type of contamination. Free floating petroleum contamination is recovered by drawing down the water level in a well by use of a pump so that a cone of depression is created. The cone of depression is a funnel shaped depression that causes the surface of the underground water table to bend down towards the well in all directions. The free floating petroleum which flows on top of the underground water surface is then recovered by use of a second pump. The free floating petroleum is then pumped into a holding tank where the recovery of free floating petroleum is completed. The recovery of free floating petroleum contamination is usually more expensive to accomplish than groundwater cleanup because more equipment is required. Groundwater cleanup usually takes a longer period of time to accomplish than does free floating product cleanup. The same or a similar well used to recover the free floating petroleum can also be used for the cleanup of contaminated groundwater. The contaminated groundwater is pumped from the well into an oil/water separator where the water and dissolved petroleum is separated, water is taken off the bottom, put through an air stripper, and is returned to the ground through an infiltration unit. Respondent has previously found sites eligible for the reimbursement program even though those sites experienced discharges which alone would render a site ineligible for the reimbursement program. The basis for finding these sites eligible was that the ineligible discharges had become indistinguishable from the eligible discharges and were insignificant by comparison. Petitioner has complied with all procedural requirements for seeking eligibility contained in Section 376.3701, Florida Statutes. Respondent has not been denied access to the Gulf Terminal. Respondent has made no determination that there has been gross negligence in the maintenance of the petroleum storage system locate at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not willfully concealed the existence of a serious discharge at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not falsified any inventory records maintained with respect to the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not caused any intentional damage to the Gulf Terminal. The Gulf Terminal is not owned by the federal government. Petitioner's challenge to Respondent's order of ineligibility was filed in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Recommended that Respondent enter a final order which determines that the subject site is eligible to participate in the reimbursement program for the cleanup of the free floating petroleum contamination, but that the subject site is ineligible to participate in the reimbursement program for the cleanup of the sludge contamination and for the cleanup of the groundwater contamination. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE 89-4521 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner in its Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 1-16, 18-25, 27-30, 33, 36-42, 44, 47-50, and 53-54 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 17, 31-32, 46, and 51-52 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being contrary to the findings made and to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings contained in paragraph 26 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in part and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings contained in paragraph 34 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as not being established by the greater weight of the evidence. The testimony cited by Petitioner in support of these proposed findings do not establish the proposed findings. The proposed findings conflict with the contents of the Report of Ground-Water Quality Assessment accepted into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 35 , 43, and 45 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected to the extent the proposed findings conflict with the findings made and the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact contained in Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order and in Respondent's Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-5, 7-19, 23, 25-31, 33-34, 39- 52, 55-68, and 70-72 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in material part. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6, 20-22, 24, 32, 35-38, and 69 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 53 and 54 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are rejected because the testimony referred to by Respondent in support of the proposed findings relates to amounts discharged following rainfalls, not amounts discharged daily. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-14 of Respondent's Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gray Early, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Robert W. Wells, Esquire Ignacio E. Sanchez, Esquire KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN 2400 Miami Center 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Notice of Violation (NOV) and Orders for Corrective Action (OCA) filed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) against Respondents, Thomas Kerper (Kerper) and All Salvaged Auto Parts, Inc. (ASAP) , in DEP OGC File No. 02-0447 should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact 1. The real property located at 3141 Sharpe Road, Apopka, Florida, is owned by the heirs of Donald Joynt, who owned it for the 30 years prior to his death in 2002. The property consists of approximately 40 acres in the shape of a right triangle with the west side bordered by Sharpe Road, the south side by a potting soil business, and the northeast side (the hypotenuse of the right triangle) bordered by a railroad track. Prior to his death, Joynt used the property primarily for the purpose of operating a junkyard and recycling business ultimately entitled Don's Auto Recycling. 2. At some time before 2000, Joynt became desirous of selling his property. He offered it to a neighbor named José Luis Benitez for $600,000. Benitez counter-offered for between $350,000 and $400,000 because he thought it would cost $200,000 to $250,000 to clean the property up. Joynt rejected the counter-offer, and asked Benitez to help him find a buyer who would pay more than Benitez. At some point, Joynt listed the property with a real estate broker for $600,000. 3. In 1999, Kerper was operating an automobile parts salvage business at a location near Joynt's property. Kerper needed a new location to move his business and inventory. A real estate broker showed him Joynt's property. The broker told Kerper that the seller's broker said the property was clean and had no environmental problems. The broker also told Kerper that Orange County had recently purchased an easement for $300,000 to run a drainage ditch through the property to a local lake, which was true. While this gave Kerper some level of assurance, the broker advised Kerper to have an environmental assessment done before going forward with the sale. 4. After being shown the property by the broker, Kerper spoke with Joynt directly. It was agreed that they could save the real estate commission and split the savings by waiting until the listing expired. Joynt personally assured Kerper that there were no environmental issues, as evidenced by Orange County's purchase of the easement for a drainage ditch. In late March of 2000, after expiration of the real estate commission, Kerper and Joynt entered into an informal agreement allegedly written on a scrap of paper, which was not placed in evidence. Kerper testified that the agreement was for him to buy the property for $500,000, with $100,000 down, and the balance payable over time at seven percent interest. He also testified that the required $100,000 down payment would be payable in installments, with $25,000 payable whenever Joynt cleaned 25 percent of the site to make it usable by Kerper for his business operations. 5. When it came time for Kerper to move onto Joynt's property, Kerper discovered that Joynt had not done any clean-up or removed any of his property from the site. Used cars, car parts, and tires that belonged to Joynt remained throughout the site. According to Kerper, it was agreed that Kerper would help Joynt clean off the western half of the property, which was split approximately in half by a stream, while Joynt worked on cleaning off the eastern half of the property.” 6. Starting from the gate at Sharpe Road, Kerper began removing junk from the western side to the eastern side of the site for Joynt to remove from the property. Pieces of equipment and used car parts that had been left there by Joynt were removed from this section of the property. When enough space was cleared off, Kerper began setting up his auto salvage operations on the western side. He used a bulldozer to level the driveways and spread powdered concrete where the ground was soft. He also used the bulldozer to level an area near the scale house, which was on the western side of the property, but continued to be used by Joynt for Don's Auto Recycling business. In doing this work, his workers encountered steel reinforcement bars, which Kerper had them cut with a torch. Some tires and battery casings also were visible in the ground. Kerper had several truckloads of fill dumped in the area and installed a concrete pad for storing and dismantling automobiles. 7. In September or October of 2000, Kerper was evicted from his prior business location, and he had to move to Joynt's property regardless of its condition. As he increased business operations on the cleared spaces, Kerper continued to clear more space on the western side of the property. Another concrete pad was installed farther to the north. Eventually, Kerper was operating ASAP on approximately ten acres on the western side of the 40-acre site. 8. As Kerper continued to move north, his heavy equipment began encountering assorted kinds of buried material. When a buried propane tank exploded, Kerper stopped working his heavy equipment in the area and confronted Joynt. Joynt denied any knowledge of buried tanks and stated they must have been placed there by someone else. Joynt told Kerper he would let Kerper move his operations to the east side of the property when Joynt finished cleaning it up, and then Joynt would finish clearing the western side for Kerper. Kerper agreed, and continued making payments on the required down payment. According to Kerper, he eventually paid $90,000 of the down payment. 9. By August of 2001, Kerper began to have serious misgivings about Joynt's promises and the condition of the site, and he decided to seek advice. Kerper hired David Beerbower, vice-president of Universal Engineering, to perform an assessment of the northern portion of his side of the site (in the vicinity where the exploding tanks were encountered). During his assessment on August 20, 2001, Beerbower observed various automotive parts including numerous crushed fuel tanks, antifreeze containers, and motor oil containers being excavated from the upper three feet of soil. It was determined by Beerbower, and stated in his written report to Kerper, dated September 21, 2001, that these parts appeared to have been buried there several years ago. This determination, which DEP does not dispute, was based on the high level of compaction of the soil found around these items that could be attributed to either the passing of a significant amount of time or a bulldozer passing over the items. Since the excavations Beerbower observed were in a separate location from where Kerper had already bulldozed, the soil compaction around these items could not be attributed to Kerper's bulldozing. It was stated in Beerbower's letter that the “amount of buried automotive debris qualifies this area essentially as an illicit landfill." ad 10. Mark Naughton from the Risk Management Division of the Orange County Environmental Protection Division (OCEPD), which runs the petroleum storage tank and cleanup program for Orange County under contract with DEP, was also present during the time Beerbower conducted his assessment. Naughton agreed with Beerbower's assessment that Kerper is not liable for the assessment or remediation of this area. Naughton also advised Kerper to move ASAP off Naughton's property and to seek legal advice from attorney Anna Long, who used to be the Manager of OCEPD. 11. Meanwhile, according to Kerper, Joynt changed his position and began to maintain that it was Kerper's responsibility to clean up the western side of the property. Given the newly-discovered environmental condition of the property, Kerper did not feel it was in his best interest to purchase the property "as is," and contacted Long to help him negotiate to extricate himself from his arrangement with Joynt. While negotiations proceeded, Kerper began to scale down ASAP's operations in anticipation of relocating. Kerper began fixing up more whole automobiles for resale, and had a car crusher used in connection with ASAP's business begin crushing more cars for removal from the site for recycling. 12. Eventually, Long had Beerbower conduct another assessment of portions of Joynt's property to try to establish responsibility for contamination as between Kerper and Joynt. On 10 February 13, 2001, Beerbower took a surface water sample froma "drain pipe under the north driveway," a soil sample "where the car crusher was," and another soil sample from "the sandblasting area." The evidence was not clear as to the exact location of these samples, particularly the soil samples, as described in Beerbower's written report to Long dated March 11, 2002. But it appears that the "car crusher" refers to the location of Respondents' car crusher operation in the northern part of the site, just across the northern driveway; it appears that the sandblasting area refers to a location used by Joynt on the eastern side of the property, but located just east of the trailers used by Kerper for his offices. These samples were analyzed and found not to contain volatile organic compounds (VOC) or total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons (TRPH) in excess of Florida's cleanup target levels. 13. Kerper continued to operate his junkyard until the beginning of March of 2002. On March 5, 2002, Long filed a citizen's complaint with OCEPD on Kerper's behalf. While acknowledging that Kerper was operating on the site at the same time as Joynt in recent years, the complaint alleged Kerper's discovery that Joynt had been burying waste batteries, tires, and gasoline tanks on the property and covering the burial sites with broken concrete pieces. The complaint alleged that Kerper had been moving his personal property off of the site since August of 2001, when he backed out of his "lease to purchase" agreement 11 with Joynt, and would be "completely off the property by 3/10/02." 414. It is not clear exactly when Kerper and ASAP were completely off the property. The testimony and evidence on the point is inconsistent. Kerper, after some confusion, placed the date at March 9, 2002. His wife said it was March 2, 2002. An attorney representing Kerper and ASAP in an eviction proceeding filed by Joynt and his wife, filed a notice "that as of the evening of March 15, 2002, [ASAP had] vacated the property." In any event, the evidence seemed clear that Kerper and ASAP did not go on Joynt's property on or after March 15, 2002. 15. On March 15, 2002, DEP representatives inspected Joynt's property in response to Long's complaint. Kerper remained outside the front gate of the property and did not participate in the inspection. This inspection covered the entire property including the section that had been occupied by Kerper and ASAP. 16. doynt told the DEP inspectors that Respondents were responsible for a 55-gallon drum found tipped over on its side on the western half of the site and leaking a substance that appeared to be used oil from a hole in the side of the drum. DEP's inspectors righted the drum, which still was partly full of its contents. There also were several other unlabeled 55-gallon drums and 5-gallon containers "of unknown fluids"; a burn pile containing burned oil filters, battery casings, and electrical 12 wiring; other broken battery casings; and an area of dark-stained soil which appeared to be soaked with used oil. Joynt accepted responsibility for other contamination on the site, but told DEP that Kerper and ASAP were responsible for these items. Kerper denied the allegations. 17. As to the leaking oil drum, Kerper first contended that DEP did not prove that the overturned drum contained used oil. But the evidence was clear that DEP's inspectors were ina position to determine that the liquid was oily. Respondents also contended that the drum would have been empty, not still partly full, if Kerper or ASAP had left it on its side at the site when they vacated the property several days earlier. Kerper alleged that Joynt could have put the hole in the drum and turned it over shortly before the arrival of DEP's inspectors. But, as stated, it was not clear when Kerper and ASAP vacated the site, and it was not clear from the evidence that Respondents were not responsible. 18. Similarly, the other unlabeled drums and containers were in a part of the site occupied and used by Respondents. Despite Kerper's denials, it is not clear from the evidence that they belonged to Joynt or that they were placed where DEP found them after Respondents vacated the site. Testimony that Respondents had containers properly labeled "used oil," "antifreeze," and "gasoline" inside one of the trailers on the site did not negate the existence of unlabeled drums and 13 containers on the site. However, there was no proof whatsoever as to what the closed drums and containers held. But some were open, and DEP's inspectors could see that these held an oily substance (possibly hydraulic fluid), mixed with other substances. 19. As to the dark-stained soil, none of it was tested, and Respondents contended that it was just naturally darker in color or possibly wet from water or some other liquid, DEP's witness conceded could explain the color variation. (Natural reasons such as different soil or rainwater probably do not explain the color variations in the site.) Joynt told DEP's inspectors that the discoloration seen by them on March 15, 2002, was froma hydraulic hose on a piece of heavy equipment that burst earlier. The evidence was not clear who Joynt was saying owned and operated the equipment. But Respondents also blamed Joynt's employees for repeatedly blowing hoses on aged heavy equipment all over the site. It is found that the dark-stained soil probably was the result of one or more releases of hydraulic fluid or motor oil. However, the testimony and evidence was not clear that all of the releases were Joynt's doing and that Respondents bear no responsibility at all for the releases observed on March 15, 2002, in the areas where Respondents were operating. 20. Respondents were able only to produce documentation of proper disposal of 232 gallons of oily water through IPC/Magnum, 14 dated February 13, 2002, and 29 batteries through Battery World, dated March 8 and 14, 2002. 21. The testimony of Kerper and others was that Respondents generally removed gasoline from automobiles and placed it ina marked container for reuse within a day or two by Respondents and their employees. The testimony was that used oil and antifreeze generally also were removed from automobiles and placed in marked containers until proper disposition. The testimony was that batteries were removed from automobiles and that most were given to one of the employees to sell for a dollar apiece. There was no documentation to support this testimony. 22. There was testimony that, when Respondents had cars crushed, E & H Car Crushing Co., Inc., managed the collection and proper disposition of gasoline, used oil, and batteries. But the documentation placed in evidence contained no description of the wastes removed, but only provided a weight calculation of the materials removed from Respondents’ facility. 23. There was testimony that Gabriel Lynch, who was properly licensed, removed freon from automobiles at Respondents’ facility every two to three days, or upon request. Respondents would trade the freon Lynch recovered and used in his business, Gabe's Auto Tech, for repair work on Respondents' vehicles. However, no documentation of these transactions was produced. (Lynch testified that he did not know it was required that he provide documentation to Respondents.) 15 24. Runoff from where Respondents were operating on Joynt's property entered the stream running north-south through the center of the property. Neither Joynt nor Respondents had a stormwater permit or an exemption from stormwater permitting. 25. Kerper argued that his duties were limited to managerial responsibilities for ASAP, and that he was not at any time responsible for ASAP's day-to-day operations and did not conduct any activities that may or could have resulted in hazardous waste or petroleum discharge violations so as to be liable as an "operator." But the evidence was clear that Kerper was involved in ASAP's day-to-day operations. 26. While the evidence did not totally absolve Respondents from the allegations in the NOV, several people testified on Respondents' behalf as to their practice of properly disposing of hazardous materials generated by his business. For example, Rafael Rivera, a former employee, testified that Kerper would get mad at him if any gas or oil was spilled and left on the ground or was not disposed of properly. Meanwhile, it appeared that environmental problems at Joynt's site existed for years before the arrival of Respondents. Mrs. Sandra Lovejoy, a neighboring property owner for the past 30 years, testified that she had experienced problems with her water quality, such as a foul smell or funny taste, for many years before Respondents moved onto Joynt's property. An inspection was conducted by OCEPD in September of 2000, in response to Lovejoy's complaint regarding 16 fuel odor and a drinking well which was no longer in service. In part, OCEPD's written report on the complaint found "[m]any spots of surficial petroleum contamination . . . from gasoline, motor oil and other petroleum products leaking or spilled from the junk vehicles" at Don's Auto Recycling and included a recommendation "referring this site to the FDEP task force that has been put together to inspect and deal with junk yard facilities," although "[n]o Petroleum Cleanup issues were found at [that] time." For reasons not explained by the evidence, it does not appear that Don's Recycling was referred to any task force, or that OCEPD followed up on the reported contamination. 27. Respondents contend that this entire proceeding against them was part of a vendetta against Kerper for going to the local television station to expose the condition of the site, the failure of OCEPD and DEP to follow up on the September 2000, report and recommendation, and Orange County's purchase of a north-south drainage easement through the western portion of the property in 2000. The evidence did not prove this contention. However, it is clear that Joynt was responsible for the condition of most of the 40-acre site, not Respondents, and that Joynt shared responsibility with Respondents for the conditions alleged in the NOV. 28. While this case has been pending, Joynt's heirs have cooperated with DEP in cleaning up the site, and DEP acknowledged in its PRO that several items in the OCA--specifically, those 17 relating to Counts II, III, and VII of the NOV--are moot and unnecessary in light of Respondents' eviction from the property and subsequent cleanup operations by Joynt's heirs. It also is suggested that the corrective actions requested in DEP's PRO to address Counts IV, V, and VI of the NOV--relating to failure to document proper disposal of wastes--are unnecessary. It seems clear that, to the extent such disposals occurred, any available documentation would have been placed in evidence during the final hearing. Ordering that they be produced within 30 days of the Final Order, as suggested in DEP's PRO, would be a futile act. 29. Count VIII of the NOV alleged costs "of not less than $500. In its PRO, DEP requested recovery of $1,367.31 of costs. Some of these costs--$867.31--were itemized in the PRO. The balance appears to relate to the $500 alleged in the NOV. There was no evidence introduced at the final hearing as to any of these alleged costs, and the costs itemized in the PRO seem to represent travel costs of counsel for DEP.
Conclusions David J. Tarbert, Esquire Jason Sherman, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Albert E. Ford II, Esquire Webb, Wells & Williams, P.A. 994 Lake Destiny Road Suite 102 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order providing: 1. Under Count I of the NOV, Respondents shall be jointly and severally liable, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for cleaning up the releases of used oil evidenced by the discolored soils photographed by DEP's inspectors on 24 March 15, 2002 (DEP Exhibit 20, photographs 5 and 7 on page 2 of the exhibit). As such, they shall be responsible, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for implementation of DEP's Initial Site Screening Plan to assess and remove all contaminated soils resulting from those releases. If the results of the Initial Site Screening indicate that further assessment and/or remediation of the contamination is required, Respondents shall also participate, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, in completing the required work, consistent with the "Corrective Actions for Contaminated Site Cases" (DEP Exhibit 16). 2. Counts II through VIII of the NOV are dismissed. 3. Respondents' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Vane ya J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2003. 25
The Issue Did the site in question fail to meet monitoring and retrofitting requirements within the schedules established under Chapter 17-61, Florida Administrative Code, and thereby not be eligible for the Early Detection Incentive Program?
Findings Of Fact The State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 was enacted as Chapter 86-159, Laws of Florida, and codified primarily in Section 376. 071, Florida Statutes. It provides for the expeditious cleanup of property contaminated as the result of storage of petroleum or petroleum product. As part of the SUPER Act, the legislature created the program which is of direct relevance in this litigation. The EDI Program, Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes,, provides for state cleanups of sites contaminated as a result of a discharge from a petroleum storage system. Petitioner now owns and operates a facility at Route 1, Box 167 Jay, Florida. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The facility contains two underground petroleum storage tanks which were installed on or before 1970. (T8, 9). Monitoring wells were installed for the tanks in December, 1988. (T7). Monitoring wells are pipes which are installed in the ground around a tank excavation to allow for detection of leaks from the tanks. (T8).
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the site owned by Petitioner be determined to be ineligible for the Early Detection Incentive Program, pursuant to Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-15SO (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Mr. Thomas L. MCNAUGHTON MCNAUGHTON's Store Route 1 Jay, FL 32565 Mr. Dale H. Twachtmann Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Program to encourage responsible persons with adequate financial ability to conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting cleanup. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (1993). Site owners and operators or their designees become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates after completing a program task. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. The costs of site rehabilitation must be actual and reasonable. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks, i.e. whether the cost represents work that is technically necessary for the program task and otherwise not in violation of reimbursement limitations prescribed by statute or rule. In order for costs to be reimbursable, an applicant must convert charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether a specific allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. In addition, DEP reviews each application to determine whether the overall cost and the methods used to perform the work are reasonable. DEP must also evaluate each application to determine whether a charge is an actual cost of a project. Contractors or subcontractors do not actually incur a fully reimbursable cost when they promise the site owner or its designee that they will perform work for an amount less than other professionals would charge, then allow the site owner or its designee to file a claim for reimbursement at or near the predominate rate. Such an agreement creates a back flow of funds to the site owner or its designee. This is true even though the charges are within the range of DEP's predominate rates. DEP never intended the rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement regardless of the cost that contractors and subcontractors actually incur. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices may apply the first-tier markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or "the person responsible for contamination site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second- tier markup and submit the reimbursement application to DEP. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. These terms are defined in Rules 17-773.200(1), 17-773.200(6), 17- 773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address or apply to activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement if an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. DEP must perform financial audits to ensure compliance with Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and to certify site rehabilitation costs. Rule 17- 773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. DEP's audit staff usually does not inquire as to the level of a PRFCSR's financing where the application contains no line-item financing charges. However, the audit staff makes appropriate inquiries depending on the facts and events surrounding an individual application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of the fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17-773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding petroleum contamination site cleanup flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE, discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors and shareholders of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as AFG's conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. ET filed the petition for administrative hearing on behalf of SEI in at least four cases: Case Numbers 96-405, 96-425, 96-433, 96-437. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into factoring contracts with: (a) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (b) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of Gator and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust documents. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created ET, WIFL, and SEI, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in petroleum contamination site cleanup programs. The officers and directors of AFG specifically created SEI to meet the needs of AFG's Florida investors. The purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. ET, WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. At least five of these letters written on SEI's behalf, refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a certified public accountant in each application; (c) funder's authorization form; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced them a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and the discounted amount of the invoices represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loans or advances provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The amount that Gator and Tower actually incurred is the discounted amount of their invoices. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement which set forth the terms under which EF or its assignee would finance Tower's site remediation work. At that time, the parties to the contract anticipated that EF would retain a general contractor to perform on-site remediation services with Tower acting as prime subcontractor. In the contract, Tower agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the general contractor at a percentage of the underlying invoices. Subsequent to the execution of April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement, Tower experienced financial difficulties resulting in its inability to pay subcontractors for work that they performed under non-EF contracts. These financial difficulties made it impossible for Tower to meet its payroll that was due in two weeks. Tower and its subcontractors under the non-EF contracts approached AFG and EF requesting financial assistance to resolve Tower's financial difficulties and to ensure that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. At that time, the program tasks under these non-EF contracts were complete or substantially complete. Given the preexisting contractual relationship between EF and Tower on other projects, AFG determined that it could use a similar financing arrangement to resolve Tower's financial problems. Such an arrangement also would protect AFG's investment in projects being conducted under the EF-Tower contracts. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects that were not covered by the original Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from the general contractor. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the general contractor. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. Late in 1993 or early in 1994, Gator began negotiating a contract with EF to provide general contracting services for on-site remediation work on unspecified Florida projects being financed by EF. Gator began serving as general contractor on some of these unspecified projects prior to the execution of a contract. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Agreement. In this contract, EF agreed to provide financing for projects on which Gator served as general contractor. Gator agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI) at a percentage of Gator's underlying invoices. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to the July 8, 1994 General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects which were not covered under the original General Contractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Gator to sell to EF Gator's right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI). In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount on each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. Gator and Tower negotiated the respective factoring contracts and addenda thereto at arms-length. Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, EF assigned to AEE the rights to payments due to Tower from Gator and to Gator from ET or SEI. ET and SEI were not named parties to these contracts. The factoring contracts and the corresponding addenda apply to the reimbursement applications at issue here. Pursuant to those agreements, the following interrelated transactions took place though not necessarily in this order. First, Tower provided EF with a Site Certification Affidavit for a certain project. Tower also sent Gator a complete reimbursement application for the project and an invoice for Tower's services and the services of its subcontractors and vendors. Next, EF designated either ET or SEI as the funder. The funder then sent Gator a funder's authorization form. This form acknowledged that EF was an affiliate of the funder. It is the only documented evidence of a contract between the funder and Gator. Gator's receipt of the form constituted authorization for Gator to perform work on the project subject to reimbursement for all reimbursable costs and paid subcontractor invoices. Within two days of receiving the funder's authorization for a project, Gator issued Tower a subcontract/purchase order. Gator notified EF and the funder of such issuance. Upon receipt of the subcontract/purchase order, Tower sold to AEE (at a discount) Tower's right to receive full payment from Gator. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Tower agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. Tower executed an agreement indemnifying the funder and guaranteeing the performance of all services and the delivery of all goods. Tower agreed to a reserve trust fund deposit as security for the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. Within four days of receiving the complete reimbursement application from Tower and within two days of receiving the funder's authorization, Gator and a certified public accountant (retained by EF) were supposed to review all supporting documentation on the project. The stated purpose of this review was to determine whether the invoices of Tower and its subcontractors were reimbursable under DEP guidelines. As to 30 of the instant applications, Tower completed the on-site work before Gator became involved. In those cases, Gator performed a minimal due diligence review, if any, of Tower's on-site work. This included comparing Tower's technical and administrative files with the applications prepared by Tower. Without Gator's minimal review and risk assessment on these 30 applications, EF would not have included them as projects covered by the addenda to the factoring contracts. As to 15 of the instant applications, Petitioners claim that Gator not only reviewed Tower's work product but also, issued subcontractor/purchase orders selected and scheduled subcontractors, and made on-site visits. However, there is no persuasive record evidence as to the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement in on-site work on any one of these 15 applications. When Gator and EF's certified public accountant completed their assessment, Gator prepared a deficiency letter and sent it to all parties. The report advised EF, the funder and Tower whether any of Tower's charges were in excess of the reimbursable amount. Tower could accept or reject any disallowance set forth in the deficiency letter. If there was no problem with a disallowance or within five days of Tower's acceptance of a disallowance, AEE advanced Tower an amount equal to 97 percent of Tower's invoice. Tower used these funds to pay subcontractors and vendors. The discounted amount of Tower's invoice represents the actual cost that Tower incurred. Tower signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. When Tower received the discounted cash advance from AEE, it had to contribute the reserve deposit (to cover any reimbursement shortfalls) to a reserve trust, domiciled in Bermuda, which was affiliated with EF. Tower was a beneficiary of the reserve trust to the extent of its contribution less any monies it owed AEE after the IPTF reimbursed the funder. Meanwhile, Gator sold to AEE (at a discount) Gator's right to receive full payment from the funder. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Gator agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Gator's invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. AEE advanced Gator an amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoice. The discounted amount of Gator's invoice represent the amount that Gator actually incurred. Gator used these funds to pay Tower the face amount of its invoice. Tower in turn repaid AEE in full. Gator signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of its invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. For the 45 applications at issue here, the addendum to the General Contractor Factoring Agreement did not require Gator to deposit any amount in the reserve trust which was domiciled in Bermuda and affiliated with EF. Next, Gator prepared an invoice for its services and the services of Tower and its subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and an application preparation fee. Gator's invoice could not include a charge for "management time." Then, Gator forwarded its invoice and Tower's invoice to the funder together with the complete reimbursement application. In the meantime, ET and SEI sold AEE their right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF at a discount equal to 87 percent of their total invoice amount. A bill of sale for each transaction is the only documented evidence of an agreement between the funders and AEE. ET and SEI agreed to repay AEE for the face amount of their invoices upon receipt of payment from IPTF. The funder prepared an invoice for the face amount of Gator's and Tower's invoices plus a 15 percent markup. Upon receipt of ET's or SEI's invoice, AEE advanced them the discounted amount as agreed. ET or SEI used the funds advanced by AEE to pay Gator the face amount of its invoice. Gator in turn repaid AEE in full. When ET or SEI receive a reimbursement payment from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The total cost for each project increased as the discount percentage and the face amount of each invoice passing up through the chain grew larger. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. It is clear that the turn around time on all of the above referenced transactions, including the time between the payment of the advances by AEE to Gator and Tower and their subsequent repayment of 100 percent of the face amount of an invoice to AEE, was very short--a matter of days or weeks. In Summary, the financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions but not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The Applications Petitioners filed the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme that Petitioners utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to receiving these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of financing scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when promulgating rules and developing written policies. DEP has established a list by which it determines whether an applicant is charging a "reasonable rate." DEP developed that list in accordance with Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement (PCR) Guideline Number 1. PCR 1 establishes a "predominant rate" for costs involved in the site rehabilitation process. The predominant rate may be exceeded by up to 30 percent for personnel charges, and by up to 50 percent for non-personnel charges. Within these ranges, DEP evaluates each application and determines whether the PRFCSR is entitled to reimbursement for "allowable cost" at "reasonable rates." The work performed by Tower was at or near DEP's "predominant" rate. In no instance were Tower's rates near the upper limits of the reasonable rate ceiling. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site rehabilitation which was broken down into appropriate units and rates. There is no evidence of "price fixing" between any entities engaged in site rehabilitation. There is no evidence that Tower intentionally inflated the costs of cleanup or of the scope of cleanup services to cover the cost of financing. There are no familial, beneficial or financial relationships, or any other form of affiliation between Tower and its subcontractors. A certified public accountant (CPA) attestation accompanied the applications indicating that Petitioners incurred (paid) all relevant costs. The applications did not include charges associated with the financing arrangements as line items. The CPA attestations referenced an addendum to the Certification Affidavit. The addendum indicated that "American Environmental Enterprises, Inc., an affiliate of the Environmental Trust, has provided financing to certain contractors and subcontractors by factoring invoices which are included within this application." The CPA provided the reference to the addendum in the CPA attestation as an "emphasis of the matter" statement rather then an "exception," or a modification of the CPA's attestation that Petitioners had incurred all costs in the application. The CPA firm performing the attestation services previously informed DEP of its intent with regard to "emphasis of the matter" reports. Nevertheless, the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discounted amount of that invoice clearly represents interest. This interest was not allowable as an actual and reasonable cost of site remediation because Gator and Tower agreed to accept a lesser amount for their services prior to submittal of the applications. Therefore, they did not actually incur the amount reflected in the face amount of their invoices. DEP's predominate rates and units are fully loaded. Interest rate charges on borrowed capital from unrelated third-party sources are a "cost of doing business." DEP's fully-loaded rates include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. The direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded rates include the cost of short-term "working" capital. However, DEP never intended the predominate rate schedule to entitle an applicant to reimbursement for costs that it did not actually incur. In the instant cases, funds that passed down through the chain from ET or SEI to Gator or from Gator to Tower flowed directly and immediately back to AEE who was affiliated with the funder. Any profit derived by the funder, ET or SEI, will flow directly to AEE and its investors. The amount that Petitioner's actually incurred before they submitted the applications was the amount that AEE advanced to Tower and/or its subcontractors for integral site work plus the actual cost of Gator's allowable services, if any, which were separate and distinct from Tower's work, plus any allowable markup(s). Factoring Policy At the time that Petitioners submitted the subject applications for reimbursement, there was no rule or written guideline governing financing transactions, including factoring, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement. DEP normally did not inquire about such financing so long as an applicant did not pass the costs of such financial transactions to DEP in the application as a line-item cost. There was no policy disallowing reimbursement for the face amount of the invoices when an applicant sold the right to payment, i.e. the receivable, at a discount to a disinterested third-party in an arms- length transaction. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP staff exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those documents, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In a November 1994 telephone conversation, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was: that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code.) A draft rule accompanied the request. The draft rule was developed in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that: nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services . . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. It did not single out any other type of financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate the draft rule because the problems with the program were too numerous to correct in a timely fashion by rulemaking. Instead, DEP focused on drafting proposed legislation. In the meantime, DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, ET and SEI responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filing the applications, ET or SEI paid Gator for the face amount of Gator's invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE an affiliate of ET, or SEI purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET or SEI, in turn, were obligated to pay AEE following their receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On April 21, 1995, DEP issued a memorandum to DEP application reviewers to guide them in the processing of reimbursement applications. The memorandum indicated that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. The memorandum directed reviewers to deduct costs in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice or application and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice or application. DEP did not direct the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum towards any individual company. DEP intended the policy to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third-party capital provider paid any program participants a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices." The April 21, 1995, policy did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and January 19, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications "as a result of factoring of the supporting invoices" and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62-773.350, F.A.C." The notices properly reflect a basis of denial of costs that is consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 draft rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. DEP has proven that its policy on factoring is consistent with its legislative mandate to deny reimbursement of costs which are not actual and reasonable. Affiliation Policy Not all out-of-chain affiliations between entities constitute a problem with regard to reimbursement. However, the instant cases presented DEP with unique facts as to the relationship between AEE, AFG, ET, WIFL and SEI which DEP's rules and written policies do cover. The mere existence of common corporate officers does not, in and of itself, cause AFG/AEE, ET, WIFL, and SEI to lose their integrity as separate legal entities, or make them "one and the same." Common officers of corporations are not an element of the term "financial relationship," nor does the concept of common corporate officers appear in the definitions of beneficial relationship, familial relationship, indirect interests, material interests, or sources of income. DEP's position at hearing that "affiliation" is a major key to it's position with regard to factoring does not appear in any of the documents in which DEP has either discussed or disseminated information regarding factoring. There are no requirements in DEP's application forms to disclose the nature of the relationships between an applicant and an applicant's source of financing. DEP makes no standard inquiry of funders to disclose the nature of any affiliation between the funder and the provider of capital. Nevertheless, the record supports DEP's position that it can deny reimbursement for costs when a PRFCSR has an "affiliation" with a factoring company outside of the chain of reimbursement under the facts of these cases. It is not contested that ET, WIFL, SEI and AFG and its sister company AEE are affiliated. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that this affiliation goes beyond a mere contractual agreement. AFG, AEE, WIFL (which owns ET and is a trust beneficiary), and SEI have common officers and directors. These officers and directors created ET and SEI primarily for the benefit of AFG and AEE as conduits for investment of funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site rehabilitation program. AFG has other investment vehicles, in addition to ET and SEI, which it can designate as a funder depending on the needs of its investors. AFG usually waits until the last instance to select the funder that it will use in any particular case. AFG often selects the funder on the same day that the funder issues its authorization to the general contractor. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE and the Petitioners did not negotiate the contractual agreements between them at arms-length. A bill of sale evidencing the sale of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement on each application is the only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG or AEE. Any profit derived by ET flows back to AEE through WIFL. ET and SEI are under the management and control of AEE and AFG's officers and directors. For all practical purposes ET and SEI are "one and the same" as AEE and AFG. The affiliation between AEE, AFG, WIFL, ET and SEI is especially troublesome here where AEE advanced the discounted amount of invoices to: (a) Tower so that it could pay its subcontractors in full; (b) Gator so that it could pay Tower in full; and (c) its affiliates, ET and SEI, so that they could pay Gator in full. Gator's and Tower's immediate repayment in the face amount of the invoices to AEE is a back flow of funds (interest) to an entity affiliated with Petitioners. All of these transactions took place before Petitioners filed the instant applications or within a few days thereafter. They create a paper trail indicating that the parties within the "chain" at each level incurred the face amount of the next lowest level. However, the only amount actually incurred at the time Petitioners submitted the applications was the discounted amount of the invoices. Interest or Carrying Charges "Incurred" means that "allowable costs have been paid." (Rule 17- 773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code) Under DEP's rules, the facial meaning of the term is that persons must receive due return for their invoiced goods and services, billed on a units and reasonable rates basis, for allowable costs of site rehabilitation. A finance charge usually does not effect DEP's determination of charges that were "incurred" unless that charge appears as a line-item cost which is not the case here. However, these consolidated cases presented DEP with a new scenario in which Gator and Tower immediately repaid the face amount of their invoices to AEE retaining only the discount amount of their invoices to pay the actual costs of the level below them before submitting the applications. Moreover, they included the carrying charges in the applications as having been "incurred." Case Number 95-403RU, Pick Kwick No. 143, DEP Facility No. 528515448 is a typical example showing how the entities in the chain paid interest charges and included them in the application. In that case, Gator provided Tower with a subcontract/purchase order on July 8, 1994. Tower provided Gator with an invoice in the amount of $17,556.43 on July 8, 1994. Tower's invoice represented services performed in connection with the initial remedial action task at the Pick Kwick No. 143 facility including $269.90 for application preparation. On or about July 8, 1994, Gator provided ET with an invoice in the amount of $20,149.41. This invoice included Gator's 15 percent markup in the amount of $2,592.98 and $269.90 for application preparation. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Gator's right to receive payment from ET. AEE advanced Gator $17,696.44 or 88 percent of Gator's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,452.97. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Tower's right to receive payment from Gator. AEE advanced Tower $17,029.74 or 97 percent of Tower's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $526.69. On August 10, 1994, AEE purchased ET's right to receive payment from IPTF. AEE advanced ET $20,831.41 or 87 percent of ET's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,981.93. On August 15, 1994, ET filed the reimbursement application in the amount of $23,813.34. This amount included ET's 15 percent markup on the face amount of Gator's invoice. Prior to filing the application, ET paid Gator, $20,149.41. Gator then paid Tower $17,556.43. Following receipt of payment from ET, Gator repaid AEE $20,149.41. Following receipt of payment from Gator, Tower repaid AEE $17,556.43. Gator and Tower made these repayments within a matter of weeks of the time that AEE advanced funds to them. Calculating simple interest, the annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Gator was approximately 144 percent. The annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Tower was approximately 36 percent. These were the interest rates, as predetermined by the discount percentage in the addenda to the factoring contracts (Gator at 88 percent and Tower at 97 percent), in approximately 30 of the 45 applications. In the other 15 applications, the Gator sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 87 to 89 percent of the face amount of the invoice. In those cases, Tower sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 95 and 72 percent of the face amount of the invoice. There is no evidence that Petitioners made adjustments to the costs in the applications where Gator and Tower sold their right to payments for a discount percentage at an amount other than as stated in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Analysis of the transactions involved in each of the subject applications clearly shows that the financing scheme utilized here was not equivalent to a "plain vanilla" loan from a disinterested third-party capital provider such as a bank. DEP properly deducted costs from Petitioners' applications that represented interest which Gator and Tower agreed to repay to Petitioners' affiliate, AEE, before Petitioners submitted the applications. The only costs that Gator and Tower actually incurred was the net amount that they received after factoring their invoices. That amount includes the difference between the face amount Gator's and Tower's invoices and the amount that AEE advanced to them. Gator and Tower did not actually incur allowable costs in the amount of the interest paid to AEE when they : (a) agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount; (b) accepted the full amount of their invoices from the next highest level; and (c) passed the full amount of their respective invoices back to AEE. DEP did not envision this type of elaborate factoring plan when it created its simple definition of "incurred" as meaning allowable costs have been paid. It is important for participants in the program to know the "rules of the game." Applicants have to make technical and financial decisions regarding site cleanup. They have to pay all contractors and subcontractors prior to submitting an application. In this case Petitioners' attempts to win DEP's pre-approval of their various factoring proposals were unsuccessful because DEP did not have enough information about the transactions and the relationships of the entities involved. After DEP received additional information from Petitioners, it became abundantly clear that the rules were insufficient to cover the financing scheme presented here. As early as November 4, 1993, Petitioners acknowledged that "the provisions of Rule 170773, F.A.C. do not specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." Petitioners revealed their final plan in July of 1994 just before they began filing the applications. At that time, Petitioners knew DEP's concerns. They also knew DEP could not make a decision on an application until they filed the application with DEP. Inconsistent Application of Statutes, Rules and Written Guidelines DEP has authorized financial transactions by which other applicants, after incurring (paying) all costs and filing their applications, sold or pledged their right to future payment to an entity outside the usual reimbursement chain. In those cases, DEP did not deduct interest associated with such transactions. DEP's approval of such transactions came before Petitioners filed their applications in this matter. There is no evidence that those transactions involved the factoring of invoices and an agreement to repay interest before the PRFCSR submitted the applications. Likewise, there is no evidence of an affiliation and less than arms-length negotiation between the funder and the financing company in those cases. The record contains no evidence of an inconsistent application of DEP's statutes, rules or written policies before or after Petitioners filed the instant applications. Reservoir Capital On March 14, 1994, DEP met with Reservoir Capital Corporation (Reservoir) to discuss a change of address notice directing reimbursement orders and checks for Clean America Financial, Inc. (Clean America) applications to a Baltimore, Maryland address. During that meeting Reservoir's counsel informed DEP that Reservoir "paid a percentage, not the full cost, for each application." DEP representative, Paul DiGuisseppe, informed Charles Williams of that conversation by memorandum dated March 15, 1994. Mr. DiGuisseppe later spoke with a representative of Clean America (the funder) and advised him to provide a list of facilities pledged to Reservoir for which notices and payments were to be sent to the Baltimore, Maryland address. On March 30, 1994, Clean America wrote to Charles Williams and Doug Jones, providing a list of sites pledged to Reservoir and directing DEP to send payments to the Baltimore, Maryland address. Among the sites pledged to Reservoir were Curry Station, DEP Facility No. 309103537 and Scardo Automotive, DEP Facility No. 428511319. On June 17, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Scardo Automotive at the Baltimore, Maryland address. On July 1, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Curry Station at the Baltimore, Maryland address. These orders did not contain a denial of costs or deductions of interest based upon the disclosed fact that Reservoir had purchased the applications for an amount less than their face value. However, there is no evidence that either of the applicants sold the right to receive reimbursement before submitting the application. Additionally, there is no evidence that Reservoir was affiliated with Clean America. On April 11, 1996, DEP revisited the Reservoir Capital factoring mechanism. In that instance, DEP reviewed a situation in which Reservoir Capital directly paid a subcontractor's invoice in an application that All American Funding (All American) filed. Reservoir had purchased the receivable of All American, and applied part of the purchase price to directly pay a subcontractor. There is no evidence of any "affiliation" between Reservoir and any other entity in the reimbursement chain. Prior to the meeting with Reservoir, DEP intended to deny those costs since it appeared that Reservoir actually paid them rather than the applicant, All American. As a result of that meeting, DEP requested additional information from Reservoir. At the time of hearing in these cases, DEP had not made a decision in that case pending receipt of the requested information. Governor's Bank On March 9, 1994, Governors Bank wrote to Charles Williams requesting that DEP directly remit to Governors Bank any reimbursement due on an application filed by Clean America due to the fact that Clean America "secured its borrowings from the bank with any rights to payment which CAFC has in connection with certain reimbursement applications." On March 30, 1994, Clean America sent a letter to Charles Williams and Doug Jones requesting that the DEP honor the March 9, 1994 letter directing payment to Governor's Bank. On November 4, 1994, Clean America advised DEP that DEP was to remit additional final reimbursements to Governors Bank. The letter advised DEP that "based upon a loan relationship Governor's Bank established with Clean America . . ." reimbursement payments had been assigned to Governors Bank and therefore "all payments and proceeds must be remitted to Governor's Bank." There is no record evidence that Clean America entered into a loan agreement with Governors Bank prior to submittal of the application or that the applications included claims for interest paid to the bank. There is no evidence of any affiliation between Clean America and the bank. The financing mechanism that Petitioners used for these 45 applications is not similar to a "plain vanilla" bank loan where a lender advances funds after an applicant files an application and directs DEP to forward reimbursement payments to a bank lock box. Barriston Environmental Investors L.P. On March 11, 1993, Barriston Environmental Investors, L.P. (Barriston) wrote to John Ruddell, Director of the DEP's Division of Waste Management and described a mechanism of financing by which Barriston (the funder) would obtain funds, at least partially through bank debt, for the payment of subcontractors' site rehabilitation invoices. In the Barriston proposal, the subcontractor would remit an "investment banking fee" of 5 percent of the value of the invoices back to the funder upon payment of 100 percent of the invoices. Barriston's letter acknowledged that this fee would not be reimbursable under the program. In addition, the Barriston funder would receive a commitment fee from the site owner which the Barriston funder would not include in the reimbursement claim. A reference in the letter to the payment of interest on funds advanced on the site owner's behalf does not specify the time frame in which interest would be paid, i.e. before or after the filing of an application. The letter sought DEP's approval and assurance that the payment of 100 percent of the invoices would entitle Barriston to full reimbursement including both markups. Barriston's letter requested an informal response because it realized that DEP had no authority to take official agency action without the submission of an application. On April 9, 1993, DEP responded to the Barriston letter. In its response, DEP stated that the arrangements appeared to be consistent with current statutes and rules and would be eligible for the full reimbursement allowed by DEP's rules. However, there is no record evidence of any official agency action on an application submitted in accordance with Barriston's proposal. Interest Indemnification Interest indemnification encompasses a situation in which a contractor pays interest directly back to a funder during the period of time after submittal of an application but before reimbursement by the IPTF. In June 1995, a DEP employee contacted Petitioners' certified public accountant (CPA) inquiring about the practice and seeking copies of his other clients' interest indemnification contracts. After that conversation, the CPA discussed the matter with another DEP employee to confirm his understanding that financing issues were outside of the scope of DEP's review so long as an applicant did not include such charges in the application. Since the June 1995 discussions, DEP has reimbursed applications which were financed through interest indemnification without adjustments for the payment of interest. However, the interest indemnification payments applied to applications after the applicants filed them with DEP to replace long-term interest that IPTF is no longer paying. The applicants were not seeking reimbursement of those payments as incurred costs. Petitioners have not established their entitlement to reimbursement for the factored amounts of their invoices. DEP presented competent evidence to support its "factoring" and "affiliation" policies as applied here. In addition, the evidence indicates that DEP has not inconsistently applied such policies to other similarly situated reimbursement applicants. Petitioners have failed to prove that DEP's denial of costs based upon factoring is not reasonably related to the purpose of reimbursement review and otherwise unsupported by competent evidence. The April 21, 1995 policy statement is a rule as defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. DEP was not aware of the need for such a rule when it made the last substantive amendments to Rule 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, in 1993. Nevertheless, DEP demonstrated that the non-rule policy is a reasonable interpretation of Sections 376.3071(12)(b) and 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. DEP provided an evidentiary basis to support its factoring policy in these consolidated cases. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and their factored amount did not represent allowable costs which were actual and reasonable. DEP deducted the amount of the relevant discount percentage (on a prorated basis) from each invoice submitted by Tower and its subcontractors. There is a discrepancy between the amount that DEP deducted from each invoice (itemized) and the total deduction based on a lump sum in 33 of the 45 cases which DEP did not explain during the hearing. Therefore, before DEP enters a Final Order, it should review the supporting documents to determine the correct deduction in each application. "Value Added" Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders generally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the participant at the next lowest level. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, prior to the submission of the instant applications, DEP was not aware of a case where a general contractor claimed a markup for work that was complete before the general contractor became involved in the project. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct site remediation activities performed by Tower or its subcontractors. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, there is no persuasive evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. According to the memorandum, DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that: if the 'GC' [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the 'GC' came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the 'GC' markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed. Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services in order for the contractor to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The Comptroller's Report describes a two-tier arrangement involving a "prime contractor engaged to manage the cleanup project" and a "funding entity." The report acknowledges that the prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The example in the Comptroller's report did not state what DEP's policy would be if a subcontractor had completed all of the actual work before the contractor became involved. Even without this consideration, the report was critical of DEP's allowance of markups on either level. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force (PETF) issued its final report on financing contractors on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups. In this discussion, the PETF recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued its report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. Because the rules and written guidelines do not reflect the "value added" policy, a participant in the program would not be aware of it even if the participant requested program information. Gator technically paid 100 percent of the face value of Tower's invoices. Without Gator's involvement, AFG and AEE would not have financed these applications. However, DEP presented persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its position that Gator was not entitled to a markup because Gator's services added no value to site remediation projects. In the instant cases, Gator performed some type of a minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work that was performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Gator limited the deficiency letters to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. However, there is no evidence that Tower's deficiency letters resulted in adjustments to costs in the applications as filed by Petitioners. The deficiency letters served only to adjust the discount percentage set forth in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice were often prepared on the same day. Gator technically paid Tower's invoices with funds that AEE advanced. Tower used these funds to repay AEE. When Gator received payment from ET or SEI, it passed the funds back to AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or immediately thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator indemnified AEE and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. The "value added" agency statement has the effect of a rule which DEP did not contemplate when it promulgated its rules and written policies. Nevertheless, DEP's decision concerning the value added policy is within the scope of its delegated legislative authority. DEP has proven that reimbursement for Gator's services was not allowable as actual and reasonable costs of site remediation. Therefore, it is not entitled to a first-tier markup. Computer Costs Prior to January 1, 1995, DEP determined the reimbursability of computer costs based upon a "units and rates basis" as provided by Rules 17- 773.100(5), and 17-733.700(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code. DEP evaluated computer costs "as a certain number of hours [at] a reasonable rate." Pursuant to the units and rates rule provisions, there was no rational basis for DEP to deny the computer costs contained in applications filed prior to January 1, 1995. On January 1, 1995, DEP established a policy by which it would disallow in full any computer costs greater than $750. Under that policy, DEP would reimburse in full an applicant's computer costs with supporting invoices of $749 dollars, but disallow in full computer costs with supporting invoices of $751. DEP's reimbursement orders involving more than $750 in computer costs after January 1, 1995 routinely stated that "there was insufficient justification to demonstrate that this computer time was integral to the task or necessary." DEP applied the computer policy to all applications filed and pending review at the time it developed the policy, regardless of when an applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the January 1, 1995 computer policy to the application in Case No. 95-4606 which ET filed on July 18, 1994. In that case DEP denied $1,456.25 in computer costs allowing no reimbursement for computer time. On April 27, 1995, DEP implemented a new policy by which it evaluated computer costs based upon a calculation of allowable personnel hours per task as opposed to a units and rates basis. Under that policy DEP would evaluate the total allowable personnel hours in a task and limit computer costs to 10 percent of those hours up to a maximum of $750. Under the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP reduced the reimbursement for computer costs to $500 if the reimbursable amount exceeded $750 after DEP made the 10 percent calculation. DEP implemented the April 27, 1995 policy through the use of a calculation work sheet which it provided to its application reviewers. DEP applied the April 27, 1995 computer policy and work sheet to all applications pending review at the time DEP developed the policy, regardless of when the applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the April 27, 1995, policy in all of the subject cases subsequent to Case No. 95-4606, with the following exceptions: Case Nos. 96- 0432RU, 96-1006 and 96-1009, which had no denial of computer costs; and Case No. 96-1352, in which DEP applied the 10 percent limitation, but reimbursed 896.75 dollars of the computer costs. After implementation of the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP made no effort to adjust the denial of all computer costs in Case No. 95-4606 under the January 1, 1995 policy. The only other category in which DEP evaluates reimbursement on a percentage of hours basis, rather than a units and rates basis, is total management costs. DEP's written guidelines and Rule 17-773.350(16), Florida Administrative Code, limit management costs to a percentage of total allowable personnel hours. There are no rules or written guidelines that would limit computer costs based upon criteria other than a units and rates evaluation, or that would support DEP's policies as reflected in the January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policy memoranda. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to this issue from the time Petitioners filed the subject applications, to the time DEP established the January 1, 1995 and the April 27, 1995 computer policies. DEP did not issue any PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of DEP's new policies with regard to computer costs. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policies. The only basis for the policy was DEP's representation that it developed the policies as a "reasonableness issue" in order to reduce the amount of computer costs that were appearing in reimbursement applications. DEP did not demonstrate that it based the new policies on any calculation of the amount of computer time necessary to perform a remediation task. Once the total computer costs reached $750 dollars, DEP gave no consideration to the scope or complexity of the task. Given the difference in the amounts involved in performing site remediation services (e.g. an application totaling 7,249.75 dollars in Case No. 96-0411RU versus an application totaling 149,080.02 dollars in Case No. 96-0425RU) and the differences in program tasks (see Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code), a policy establishing a flat numerical limit on computer costs that an applicant may claim in an application is not reasonable. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to prove the basis for its retroactive application of the policies to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the policies. DEP did not attempt to explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the records generated. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of computer costs in each of these applications is not supported by the statutes, rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the applications were filed. Each application contains information supporting the computer costs. The application Certification Affidavits and CPA attestations demonstrate that Petitioners incurred the computer costs which DEP should reimburse. The reimbursement for computer costs should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. As a final note, of the computer costs denied in 16 of the 45 reimbursement notices, the sum of the allowances and deductions does not equal the overall claim. The differences ranged from a few dollars to over four hundred dollars. DEP provided no evidence to explain the discrepancy in the amount calculated by DEP in its notices. Miscellaneous Costs Prior to September 27, 1995, DEP reimbursed miscellaneous line-item costs when the applicant furnished support for them in the application. The miscellaneous costs policy as of May 17, 1995 even dispensed with the requirement of supporting invoices when these costs totaled less than 300 dollars. DEP's reviewers are employees of a firm that provides DEP with application review services as an independent contractor. On September 27, 1995, after a meeting with DEP staff, the application reviewers implemented a policy to deny costs for "overhead." Under the new policy, certain items were overhead, including but not limited to: gloves, mason jars, sampling disposables, phone calls, excessive faxes, excessive copying, small hand tools, shipping documents, etc. The application reviewers had to exercise their own discretion as to which items were "overhead" until they received a guideline from DEP. The reviewers decided to approve overhead expenses of less than $50 and deny items for more than $50. The policy continued in existence at least through November 9, 1995. DEP applied the miscellaneous/overhead policy to all of the subject applications, regardless of the date of cleanup work or application submittal. The application reviewers applied the miscellaneous/overhead "policy" without the knowledge of DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, Charles Williams. When Mr. Williams found out about the policy, he "counselled them that they need to reverse that position." The correct policy would allow reimbursement of "miscellaneous/overhead" costs that the reviewers denied in 33 of the 45 applications. DEP made no effort to correct the denial of these costs based upon its erroneously applied policy. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its application of the miscellaneous/overhead policy in applications submitted prior to the development of the policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of miscellaneous/overhead costs in 33 applications in which DEP denied such costs is not supported by the applicable states, rules and written guidelines. Each application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The applications' Certification Affidavits and CPA Attestations demonstrate that Petitioner's incurred the miscellaneous costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse those miscellaneous costs. The reimbursement should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Airfare From June 17, 1993, to sometime prior to January 31, 1996, DEP's policy with regard to the reimbursement of airfare was to pay airfare integral to site rehabilitation when such costs were relatively inexpensive. By no later than January 31, 1996, DEP developed and applied a policy to deny all airfare costs regardless of whether the applicant provided justification. On March 13, 1996, DEP decided that once again it would reimburse airfare with sufficient justification such as a comparison with car travel. DEP considers the changes in reimbursability of airfare as "just procedures to follow," and applicable without regard to the timing of work performed. DEP denied airfare charges in Case No. 96-1353 as overhead charges. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to airfare from June 17, 1993, when airfare was reimbursable, to the policy implemented on January 31, 1996, in which airfare was not reimbursable, to March 13, 1996, when airfare was reimbursable once again. DEP issued no PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of the changes in policy with regard to airfare. DEP has not provided any evidence to support the basis for the fluctuations in its airfare policy. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to provide the basis for its application of the airfare policy to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the changes in policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of airfare costs in the application for Case No. 96-1353 is not supported by the applicable rules and written guidelines. The application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The application's Certification Affidavit and CPA Attestation demonstrate that Petitioner ET incurred the airfare costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse airfare costs in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting invoice the prorated amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Inconsistent Agency Practice The application of DEP's factoring policy did not treat Petitioners in a manner different from other funders. Heretofore, DEP was not aware of a case where program participants factored their invoices before filing an application and claimed the face amount of those invoices for reimbursement. The affiliation between Petitioners and AFG and/or AEE was also unique. DEP issued a memorandum requiring funders to provide "clarification regarding essential cost documentation" on July 26, 1995. The purpose of this memorandum was to remind application reviewers of the need for a funder to submit an invoice documenting and supporting its line-item claim for the second- tier 15 percent markup. DEP did not intend for this memorandum to limit DEP's ability to inquire about relationships and transactions taking place outside the usual chain of reimbursement when an application on its face refers to a factoring scheme involving an "affiliation" between the factoring company and the funder. DEP does not deduct finance charges when an applicant incurs (pays) all invoices, submits the application, then sells the receivable or agrees to pay long-term interest pending receipt of payment from the IPTF. In the instant cases, Petitioners agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount before they submitted the applications then included the cost of borrowing capital in the application. DEP does not routinely ask questions of other applicants regarding their financing. Nevertheless, under the facts of these cases, DEP would have been remiss in its duty if it had not made such inquiries. DEP's actions in the instant cases are not inconsistent with its actions taken in other cases with other similarly situated entities because there is no evidence that other such cases exist. Bias On August 31, 1994, Bruce French provided Charles Williams with a memorandum in which Mr. French discussed factoring. In his memorandum, Mr. French concluded that DEP could only reimburse the "discount" amount that the factoring company actually incurred/paid the funders. On September 1, 1994, Mr. French had a discussion with someone named "Toni" at McGuinnes Laboratories regarding the laboratories' use of AFG services for financing invoices to Tower. On September 2, 1994, Mr. French related in a memorandum to Charles Williams, his understanding that the laboratory had different price lists for different customers, generally depending on volume of analysis performed and individual payment agreements. Mr. French surmised that the laboratory's price for services "is inflated to deal with AFG's discount price to be paid by AFG." Mr. French concluded that, under those circumstances, AFG's financing arrangements may "represent collusion on behalf of all parties to the application to defraud DEP for the benefit of AFG. That is, prices are 'fixed' prior to performing of services." On September 2, 1994, Mr. Williams responded to Mr. French's memo by indicating that the scenario presented by Mr. French "sounds interesting" and that DEP would "absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." On September 12, 1994, Mr. French provided information on factoring to Bill Sittig of DEP's Office of the Inspector General and to Mr. Williams. Mr. French included a drawing entitled "The Tangled Web They Weave or the Hidden Discount Line Items and other Fluff, August 31, 1994 Interpretation of Bruce French's Discussion." At the hearing, neither Mr. Sittig nor Mr. Williams remembered seeing the drawing. There is no competent evidence as to the identity of the person creating the drawing. There is no persuasive competent evidence that Mr. French was biased against Petitioners or any other entity utilizing factoring as a mechanism of financing. Moreover, DEP had no direct and demonstrable bias against Petitioners. Timeliness of Agency Action Prior to filing the instant applications, representatives of the funders and AFG presented various financing schemes to DEP for pre-approval. In each proposal, the person speaking for AFG also spoke on behalf of the funders. At all times relevant here, Paul DeCoster was secretary and counsel for AFG. He was also secretary of SEI and a corporate director and shareholder of WIFL. In September of 1993, Mr. DeCoster wrote a letter to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. AFG's plans were in a formative stage at this time. Mr. DeCoster wrote DEP a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. This letter states that: the amount of financing required to meet [certain contractor clients'] working capital needs is so large that FEC [a funder] must find large institutional investors to accommodate them. For service of finding such investors, FEC proposes to charge a fee to the contractor client, which would be in addition to the 15 [percent] 'markup' taken by the investor providing the financing. The October 4, 1993 letter disclosed that contractor clients would deposit funds in a trust account as security for the performance of their work. The trust would invest its funds "in accounts receivable purchased from AFG, the parent of FEC, and any income earned by the trust on those investments would inure to the benefit of AFG." The plan that Mr. DeCoster proposed was markedly different from the scheme utilized here. The most noticeable differences are that the subject applications did not involve a finder's fee, FEC as a funder, or the purchase of AFG's accounts receivable by a reserve trust. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. When Mr. Robins made his presentation, DEP did not know the specific relationships between the entities involved or Mr. Robins' position as an officer, director, and or shareholder of these entities. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. According to the letter, ET would incur the costs but AFG would hold the right to receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. The letter clearly reveals DEP's concern that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which should be deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two allowable markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs of risky projects. The letter states that: since the Department's reimbursement rules do not specifically address the issue of site cleanups that are funded through private sources of capital . . . it is important that we know if there are any obvious or glaring problems with this plan that would cause reimbursement to be withheld otherwise restricted. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the cleanup or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Petitioners filed the first of their applications with DEP on July 18, 1994, five days after the date of the July 13, 1994 letter. In late November, 1994, after all but 4 of the 45 applications were filed, DEP placed a telephone call to Petitioners' counsel advising him of the position DEP intended to take with regard to his client's financing arrangements. DEP did not provide any written confirmation of that call, or issue any document describing its policy, until April 21, 1995. In each of the above described letters and/or meetings, AFG's attempt to ascertain DEP's position regarding the various proposed financing mechanisms was unsuccessful. However, AFG was aware that DEP could not take a position that represented official agency action until an applicant actually filed an application. At no time did DEP make any affirmative statement which misled Petitioners regarding the acceptability of AFG's proposals. There is no persuasive evidence to support a finding that the agency did not timely respond to the claims for reimbursement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that DEP enter a Final Order in each of these consolidated cases: (a) disallowing reimbursement of the first- tier markup; (b) disallowing reimbursement of any factored invoice in an amount equal to the amount of the discount on that invoice; and (c) allowing reimbursement of costs associated with airfare, computers, and miscellaneous/overhead expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esquire Christopher R. Haughee, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt and Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Betsy F. Hewitt, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed as an Installer A-Installation, Service and Repair of LP Gas Appliances and Equipment in the state of Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was an Independent Contractor working for Peoples Gas Systems, Inc. (Peoples Gas) pursuant to an Agreement For Contracted Work dated April 16, 1990, executed by the Respondent and Peoples Gas on May 9, 1990. Under this agreement the work to be performed by the Respondent, among other things, was to turn on gas for customers of Peoples Gas using procedures found in Peoples Gas Safe Job Procedure Manual. On January 31, 1991 in accordance with the above referenced agreement, and pursuant to a written work order from Peoples Gas, Respondent proceeded to the residence of Steven J. and Debra J. Fernaays, Jr. located at 4336 20th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida for the purpose of conducting a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LP Gas) service which consisted of turning the gas on at the residence. The gas had been turned off by Peoples Gas in August 1990 at the request of the previous owners. Upon arriving at the Fernaays' residence at 2:15 p.m. the Respondent: (a) determined what gas appliances were in the home; (b) determined that all gas valves to the stove burners and oven were closed and that the stove had no pilot lights (stove had electronic ignition); (c) determined that the gas valve to the water heater was closed; (d) determined that the main valve on the outside tank was closed (at this point it was discovered that there was no test-tee located in back of the regulator for use in performing the manometer test); (e) loosened the nut on the first coupling to the rear of the regulator to remove the bonnet (a bonnet is a plug-like device used to prevent gas from escaping a tank after a "turn-off"). There was no bonnet in place so the nut was retightened on the coupling; (f) turned on the gas by opening the main valve and heard the system "lock-up", but did not hear the regulator "singing" (which indicates that the system is filled with gas and there are no noticeable gas leaks in the system); (g) attempted to light the burners on the stove but could not because there was no gas getting to the stove, so the stove burners were turned off and the main valve at the tank was turned off; (h) followed the gas line from the tank checking each coupling until the bonnet was located and removed, retightened all couplings that had been loosened; (i) turned the gas back on at the tank, heard the system "lock-up" but did not hear the regulator singing. Checked all couplings around the tank, those on the lines going to the house and inside the house up to the water heater for leaks with soapy water but no leaks were found; (j) lit the pilot light and main burner on water heater and found the flame height and color to be normal which indicated proper gas pressure at water heater; (k) checked the balance of fittings inside the house that were visible for leaks with soapy water but found no leaks; (l) lit all stove burners and oven and found flame height and color to be normal which indicated proper gas pressure at the stove; (m) advised Debra Fernaays, who was present in the house during the "turn-on", that the control knob on the oven valve was missing and that she should not use oven until it was replaced. Also, brought Debra Fernaays' attention to the odor of the gas that had escaped while purging the lines of air so she could recognize the odor of the gas in the event of a leak and; (n) went outside to write ticket. After clearing nose of gas odor came back in the house to make a "sniff-test" but did not detect any odor of gas. The Respondent then left the Fernaays' residence at approximately 3:00 p.m. Within a few minutes (4-5) of leaving the Fernaays' residence, Respondent contacted Peoples Gas to advise the service department that he had not performed the water manometer test on the gas system at the Fernaays residence because there was no test tee. Respondent was placed on hold and because the telephone was not covered and there was a hard rain, he hung-up. Respondent then proceeded to find another telephone out of the rain which took approximately 20-30 minutes. This time Respondent was put through to Robert Louth, Service Manager Supervisor thereupon Respondent explained what he had done to check the gas system at the Fernaays but had not performed the water manometer test because of the missing test-tee, and asked for instructions. Louth advised Respondent that the matter would be taken care of the next morning. The telephone conversation between Louth and Respondent occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 31, 1991 and at approximately 6:30 p.m. that same day the Fernaays' residence was destroyed by an explosion as a result of gas leaking from the system and being ignited. The Fernaays were in the home at the time of the explosion and both suffered burns to their bodies as a result of the explosion. The Respondent always carried two manometers in his service truck and had those manometers with him when he arrived at the Fernaays' residence on January 31, 1991 but because the type work Respondent had contracted for with Peoples Gas did not require him to carry extra fittings, such as a test tee, he did not have a test tee with him on that day. This was the first instance that Respondent could remember where he did not perform a manometer test in connection with numerous turn-ons for Peoples Gas. The procedures used by the Respondent in turning on the gas at the Fernaays's residence on January 31, 1991 was in accordance with the Peoples Gas Safe Job Procedural Manual. The method used by the Respondent to check for gas leaks in the Fernaays' gas system is not as accurate as the manometer test for testing a gas system for gas leaks, particularly where small or minor leaks are concerned. However, the Respondent's method is an acceptable and appropriate method that is acceptable within the industry just as the test described in Appendix D, b.(2), Suggested Method For Checking Leakage, of NFPA No. 54, 1988 edition adopted by Rule 4B-1.001, Florida Administrative Code, and incorporated by reference in Rule 4B-1.023, Florida Administrative Code, which is also not as accurate as the manometer test described in Appendix D, b.(1), NFPA No. 54, 1988 edition where there may be small or minor leaks but it is a suggested method under the rule for checking gas leakage. During the evening of January 31, 1991 after the explosion and again during the day of February 1, 1991, Martin Brett employed by the Department as an LP Gas Inspector, several employees from Peoples Gas (Department has filed an Administrative Complaint against Peoples Gas in this matter) and Bill Buckley, owner S.E.A., Inc. were involved in rummaging through the debris at the site of the Fernaays' residence and extracting the different parts of Fernaays' gas system, particularly the piping, which was ultimately delivered to the S.E.A. warehouse by either S.E.A. or Peoples Gas. After delivery of the pipe to the S.E.A. warehouse, S.E.A. attempted to reconstruct the configuration of the pipe lines as they existed before the explosion. Under this reconstructed configuration there was a gas pipe line of approximately 1/2 inch in diameter that terminated in either the closet or in the ceiling of the area around the closet that was not capped. It was the Department's contention, based on the reconstructed configuration, that this pipe was uncapped at the time of turn-on by Respondent and that it was the gas leaking from this uncapped line that eventually ignited and destroyed the Fernaays' home. There was insufficient evidence to show that Brett or anyone from the Department exercised any control over the removal, transporting, storing or reconstruction of the configuration of the pipe. Neither Bill Buckley as an individual or as the owner of S.E.A. nor the employees of Peoples Gas were working for the Department in regard to removing, transporting, storing or reconstructing the pipe. None of the employees of Peoples Gas, Bill Buckley or Martin Brett testified at the hearing in regard to the removal, transporting, storing or reconstructing the pipe. The only witness called by the Department to testify was Edgar Lee Martin, Jr., employed by the Department as an LP Gas Inspector/Supervisor, who did not become involved in the investigation until February 5, 1991, which was after the removal, transporting, storing and reconstruction of the pipe had been completed. Martin relied solely on what he heard from Brett and Buckley in reaching the conclusion that there was an uncapped gas line pipe in the Fernaays' gas system on January 31, 1991 at the time of the turn-on, and it was gas leaking from the uncapped pipe that ignited and destroyed the Fernaays' home. Roger Owens, the Respondent's expert witness in the area of analysis of explosions caused by gas, opined that assuming there was a "lock-up" of the system and no singing of the regulator after the "lock-up" at the time Respondent turned on the gas at the Fernaays on January 31, 1991 and that the flames were of proper height when the stove burners and water heater were lit, there could not have been such a significant leak (open pipe 1/2 inch diameter) at the time of the turn-on by Respondents as alleged by the Department. There was insufficient evidence to show that the configuration of the gas lines as reconstructed by S.E.A., Inc. was of the same configuration as existed in the Fernaays' gas system on January 31, 1991 at the time Respondent turned on the gas at the Fernaays' residence. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to show that there were any fittings within the gas line configuration as existed in the Fernaays gas system on January 31, 1991 that Respondent failed to check for leaks. There was insufficient evidence to show that there was an open fitting in the Fernaays' gas system at the time Respondent turned on the gas on January 31, 1991 as indicated by the reconstructed configuration of the gas lines by S.E.A., and as alleged by the Department. The uncontroverted testimony of Respondent that when he turned the gas on for the second and last time he heard the system "lock-up", and although close enough to hear the regulator "sing", did not hear the regulator sing is credible. This testimony along with the testimony of Roger Owens supports the position that there was no leaks in the system at the time Respondent turned the gas on at the Fernaays' residence on January 31, 1991, and specifically no open fitting of approximately 1/2 inch in diameter in the system as alleged by the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint against the Respondent, Norman J. Smith. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following contributes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120- 59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Other than that the Respondent did not perform a manometer test which is adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 8, proposed finding of fact 3 is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6 except for that portion concerning an "uncapped pipe" which is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence is the record. Not stated as a finding of fact but what the expert witness testified to, however, see Findings of Fact 4, 10 and 17. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Respondent's proposed finding of fact are set out in unnumbered paragraphs which shall be referred in this Appendix as numbers 1 through 19. Covered in the Preliminary Statement, otherwise unnecessary as it goes to the credibility of the witness rather than being a finding of fact. - 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. 7. - 8. More of an argument than a finding of fact, otherwise subordinate, or unnecessary, or not material or relevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 7 and 8. - 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. 16. - 17. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Not stated as a finding of fact by what Martin testified to, otherwise unnecessary or subordinate or not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Zala L. Forizs, Esquire Blasingam, Forizs & Smiljanich, P.A. P.O. Box 1259 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether CJC Properties, Ltd. (CJC), is eligible for state restoration funding assistance under the Petroleum Contamination Participation Program or the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Insurance Program for one or more discharges of gasoline at DEP Facility No. 378943938 (“the facility”).
Findings Of Fact The Facility CJC is a Florida Limited Partnership. It is the current owner of property located at 5691 U.S. Highway 27 North, in Tallahassee. Prior to CJC’s acquisition of the property, the property was owned by Carolyn J. Chapman, John W. Chapman, Jane Chapman Latina, and Carolyn Chapman Landrum (“the Chapmans”). The property was leased to various entities and operated as a gas station. The tanks and dispensers remained in service until November, 1995. The last operator of the facility was Lake Jackson 76, Inc. There were five underground petroleum storage tanks at the facility. Before 1991, one of the tanks at the facility was used for regular, leaded, gasoline. When leaded gasoline was phased out, the tank was used for unleaded gasoline. Site Assessments and Sampling Data On November 30, 1995, the Chapmans employed Petroleum Contractors, Inc., to remove the five storage tanks. During the tank removal, Environmental and Geotechnical Specialists, Inc. (“EGS”) performed an assessment to determine whether the facility was contaminated with petroleum or petroleum products. The Underground Storage Tank Removal Report prepared by EGS noted that all five tanks appeared to be intact. Soils in the tank pit wall and bottom were not discolored. No significant contamination was observed directly below the tanks. Soil from the tank pit was stockpiled on the site. EGS observed no significant signs of contamination of this soil. The soil stockpile was also screened with a Flame Ionization Detector Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA). No organic vapors were detected. An OVA detects any organic vapor, but is used as a screening tool to find petroleum vapors. Department rules require that an OVA reading be performed both unfiltered and filtered. The filtered reading screens out everything but methane and is “subtracted” from the unfiltered reading to determine the presence of petroleum vapors. Twenty-four soil samples were taken from various depths at nine locations in the tank pit. These samples were tested using an OVA. Nine of the soil samples, taken from four locations, had corrected OVA readings indicative of petroleum contamination. EGS concluded that “soil contamination detected in the tank pit is likely the result of a leak in the piping” between the dispensers and the tanks. Soil samples were also taken from three borings in the vicinity of the dispenser island and OVA-tested. In boring D-2, organic vapors were detected from the surface to a depth of approximately seven feet. The OVA readings from D-2 declined with depth. EGS reported that “some contamination was detected beneath a dispenser; however, it does not ‘appear’ to significantly extend below six (6) feet.” EGS did not report both filtered and unfiltered OVA readings for the soil samples taken from the dispenser area, as it had done for soil samples taken from the tank pit and the stockpile. For the dispenser area soil samples, EGS reported a single OVA reading for each sample, without indicating whether the reading was “corrected” after filtering. For this reason, the Department contends that these data are unreliable. CJC points out that EGS stated in the text of its report that the soil samples were filtered. CJC also argues that, because the filtered OVA readings for soil samples taken from the tank pit area were not different from their unfiltered readings, the OVA readings for the soil samples from the dispenser area would not have changed after filtering. The preponderance of the evidence is that the contamination in the dispenser area was petroleum. Based on EGS’ findings during the tank removal in November 1995, Petroleum Contractors, Inc., filed a Discharge Reporting Form on December 1, 1995, stating that there had been a discharge of unleaded gasoline at the facility. In January 1996, the Chapmans applied to participate in FPLRIP based on the discharge reported on December 1, 1995. By order dated January 26, 1996, the Department determined that the reported discharge was eligible for state-funded remediation assistance under FPLRIP. In 1997, another consultant, Levine Fricke Recon (LFR) conducted a site assessment at the facility and submitted its Interim Site Assessment Report to the Department. As part of its own soil sampling at the site, LFR collected a “direct push” soil boring in the dispenser island area, near the place where EGS had reported organic vapors. The boring data showed no petroleum vapors until the interval 16-to-20 feet below ground surface. LFR also collected and analyzed groundwater samples from the site. It reported that a sample taken from beneath the former diesel dispenser contained lead. Because lead occurs naturally in soils, its presence in a water sample does not confirm that a discharge of leaded gasoline occurred. In 1998, LFR conducted a second assessment of the facility site. It installed and sampled four shallow monitoring wells, designated MW-1S through MW-4S, and three deep monitoring wells, designated MW-2D through MW-4D. Groundwater samples from MW-3S and MW-3D were analyzed for lead, ethylene dibromide (EDB), and 1,2-Dichloroethane. All three substances are usually detected in a groundwater sample contaminated with leaded gasoline. On August 28, 1998, LFR submitted its Interim Site Assessment II to the Department, which shows lead and EDB were found in a sample taken from MW-3S, but not 1,2-Dichloroethane. LFR did not conclude or express a suspicion in either of its two assessment reports that leaded gasoline had been discharged at the facility. The deadline for submitting a Discharge Reporting Form or written report of contamination was December 31, 1998. A site assessment report received by the Department before January 1, 1999, which contained evidence of a petroleum discharge, was accepted by the Department as a “report of contamination.” The petroleum discharge information received by the Department before January 1, 1999, consisted of the Underground Storage Tank Removal Report, the FPLRIP claim, the Interim Site Assessment Report, and the Interim Site Assessment Report II. Post Deadline Site Assessment Data After the statutory deadline, LFR submitted its Interim Site Assessment III. This report includes January 1999 groundwater sampling data from four monitoring wells which show the presence of low levels of EDB. When EDB is found in a groundwater sample, it is a common practice to re-sample the well from which the sample was taken. Of the wells that showed the presence of EDB, only MW- 10D was re-sampled, after January 1, 1999. There was no EDB present in the groundwater when MS-10D was re-sampled. In June 2000, as part of the remediation of the contamination at the facility, an area of contaminated soil was removed to a depth of 14 feet. The area of soil removed included the former dispenser area. In January 2003, the Department notified CJC that the $300,000 FPLRIP funding cap would soon be reached. In March 2003, CJC signed a Funding Cap Transition Agreement, acknowledging that “At no time will the DEP be obligated to pay for cleanup of this discharge any amount that exceeds the funding cap.” CJC further acknowledged that it “is responsible for completing the remediation of the discharge in accordance with Chapter 62-770, F.A.C.” In 2005, CJC re-sampled one of the monitoring wells for lead and EDB. Neither substance was present. The site is not currently being actively remediated. Periodic groundwater sampling indicates that concentrations of contaminants are dropping. No further active remediation has been proposed. The cost to complete remediation is a matter of speculation. The record evidence is insufficient to make a finding about future remediation costs. Eligibility Determinations On September 2, 2003, CJC submitted a PCPP Affidavit to the Department, seeking state funding under PCPP. On October 30, 2003, the Department denied CJC eligibility for PCPP funding on the basis that the contamination was covered under FPLRIP and, therefore, was excluded from funding under PCPP. The Department has never granted PCPP eligibility for the cleanup of a discharge previously being funded under FPLRIP. Apparently, in 2005, CJC hired Glenn R. MacGraw, an expert in the assessment of petroleum-contaminated sites, to review the EGS and LFR assessments. In a letter to CJC’s attorney dated August 19, 2005, MacGraw expressed the opinion that “at least 2 discharges have occurred on this site, one in the former tank area, and one in the former dispenser area.” MacGraw’s opinion that there had been a discharge of leaded gasoline was based on the detection of EDB and lead in the groundwater. He also thought the presence of methyl tetra-butyl ether (MTBE) in groundwater samples taken from the tank pit area showed a tank leak of unleaded gasoline. CJC requested FPLRIP funding for the other alleged discharges at the facility. On March 23, 2006, the Department issued a letter formally stating its disagreement that there were other reported discharges and denying eligibility for FPLRIP funding. On March 30, 2006, the Department issued an Amended Order of Ineligibility under PCPP. The amended order added a second ground for denial, that the reported discharge was not shown to have occurred before January 1, 1995. Whether There Was A Second Discharge Eligible for Funding CJC argues that the presence of lead and EDB in the groundwater sample taken from MW-3S shows that there was a discharge of leaded gasoline at the facility. However, LFR reported that the well screen for MW-3S had probably been damaged during installation, because a significant amount of filter sand was observed in the purge water. The Department contends, therefore, that the source of the lead detected in the groundwater sample from MW-3S could have been (naturally) in the soil that entered the well. The Department also discounts the detection of EDB in the groundwater sample because EDB is an ingredient of some pesticides and can show up in groundwater when pesticide has been applied to the overlying land. Furthermore, EDB was not detected in the groundwater sample taken from MW-3D, a deeper well located near MW-3S. MacGraw does not think the EDB came from a pesticide application, because the EDB contamination at the site occurs in an elongated “plume,” in the former dispenser area, whereas one would expect to see EDB distributed evenly over the site if the source was a pesticide application. MacGraw mapped the plume of EDB by using data obtained after the discharge reporting deadline. Michael J. Bland, a Department employee and expert in geology and petroleum site assessment, believes the data from the facility are insufficient to confirm the presence of EDB or its distribution. LFR reported in its Interim Site Assessment that no significant soil contamination was found near the dispenser island. Groundwater samples from MW-3D, a deep monitoring well near MW-S3, showed no EDB, lead, or 1,2-dichlorothane. Bland opined that, if the detection of EDB in the shallow well was reliable, EDB would have been detected in the deep well, too, because EDB is a “sinker.” EDB is persistent in groundwater, so when it is not detected when a well is re-sampled, reasonable doubt arises about the detection in the first sample. Of all the wells sampled in 1999 that showed EDB, only MW-10D was re-sampled in 2003. When the well was re-sampled, there was no EDB. CJC contends that EDB was not found in the re-sampling of MW-10D because of the soil removal in 2000, but the Department contends that the soil removal would not have affected the presence of EDB in MW-10D, because the well is significantly down-gradient of the area of soil removal. It was undisputed that the presence of 1,2- dichoroethane in MW-S3 was not reliably determined. There is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the contamination reported in the dispenser area is the source of contamination which persists at the facility. The reported contamination only affected the top six feet of soil. The soil removal to a depth of 14 feet in that area in 2000 should have fully remediated the reported contamination. The data upon which CJC relies in claiming eligibility under FPLRIP or PCPP for a second discharge are, at best, incomplete and ambiguous. CJC failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a discharge of leaded gasoline occurred. CJC also failed to prove that the reported contamination in the dispenser is associated with a discharge that still exists to be remediated with state assistance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order determining that CJC is ineligible to participate in the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program for the discharge reported to the Department on December 1, 1995, and that CJC has not demonstrated eligibility to participate in the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program or the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Program for any other discharges. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Friends of Lloyd, Inc. is a Florida non-profit corporation formed for the purpose of protecting Jefferson County from harmful development. The Council of Neighborhood Associations of Tallahassee/Leon County (CONA) is a non- profit Florida corporation whose members are the neighborhood associations in Leon county; members of those associations reside in 42 Leon County neighborhoods dispersed throughout Leon County. CONA's purposes and goals include protection of the quality of life and environment in Leon County. The Thomasville Road Association's members are principally residents of Leon County. The Association was formed to promote responsible growth management in northern Leon County. None of the Petitioners are owners or "developers" of a Development of Regional Impact within the terms or scope of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Rather, Petitioners are members of non-profit organizations interested in the environment and growth management of Leon County. The Department of Community Affairs (the "Department") is the state land planning agency with the power and duty to administer and enforce Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Sections 380.031(18), and 380.032(1), Florida Statutes (1987). Texaco is a business entity that proposes to develop a "tank farm" near the community of Lloyd in Jefferson County, Florida. The Texaco tank farm is a "petroleum storage facility" as that term is used in Rule 28-24.021, F.A.C. Colonial is a business entity that proposes to develop a petroleum pipeline that will connect to the Texaco tank farm. The pipeline is designed to carry and contain petroleum products For purposes of standing, the parties have stipulated that certain environmental hazards can reasonably be expected to occur as a result of the existence of the pipeline/tank farm. No competent evidence was submitted regarding those hazards. As a result of the stipulation, Petitioners have each established injury-in-fact so that they are "adversely affected" by the challenged rule to an extent sufficient to confer upon them standing to maintain this action under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On September 7, 1989, one of the Petitioners sent Respondent a letter suggesting that the proposed tank farm development to be built in Jefferson County should be required to undergo review as a DRI. Enclosed with the letter was a proposed circuit court complaint pursuant to Section 403.412(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioner expressed its intention of filing this circuit court action, but first provided Respondent a copy of the proposed complaint in accordance with the provisions of Section 403.412, Florida Statutes. In two letters dated September 8 and 25, 1989, Petitioner supplied additional information to Respondent concerning the tank farm project and contended that in making its determination as to whether the development must undergo DRI review, Respondent should consider the storage capacity of both the tank farm and the pipeline. On October 9, 1989, Respondent answered Petitioner's first letter, and stated that the proposed project was not required to undergo DRI review because the total storage capacity of the tanks was only seventy-eight percent (78%) of the threshold set out in Chapter 28-24, F.A.C. On October 13, 1989, Respondent answered Petitioner's second and third letters, stating that with respect to the pipeline, it has been long standing departmental policy to interpret "storage facilities" as meaning only the tanks, not the pipeline, when determining whether petroleum storage facilities meet the DRI thresholds set out in Chapter 28-24. The proposed tank farm would have nine tanks with a total capacity of 155,964 barrels, which is, as Respondent determined in its letters, approximately seventy-eight percent (78%) of the applicable DRI threshold for "petroleum storage facilities" set forth in Chapter 28-24, F.A.C. The proposed pipeline's capacity over its approximate forty-five mile length from Bainbridge, Georgia to the tank farm is approximately 34,000 barrels. The proposed pipeline's volume flow capacity from the Florida/Georgia state line to the site of the prosed tank farm is approximately 13,500 barrels over approximately 18 miles. If the pipeline's volume capacity from Bainbridge, Georgia is added to the tank farm's volume capacity, the resulting project would be approximately ninety-five percent (95%) of the applicable DRI threshold in Chapter 28-24. If the pipeline's volume capacity from the state line is added to the tank farm's volume capacity, the resulting project would be approximately eighty-five percent (85%) of the threshold. In either instance, the project would exceed the eighty percent (80%) threshold that may require it to undergo DRI review although the project would be Presumed not to be a DRI under the Statute. The Department does not require developments outside Chapter 28-24's enumeration to undergo DRI review. The Department has never treated petroleum Pipelines as "petroleum storage facilities," or as otherwise subject to DRI review. On Several occasions, the Department has applied the petroleum storage facility guideline and standard to petroleum tank farms without determining whether a pipeline was attached to the tank farm. On one prior occasion, the Department has explicitly stated that Petroleum Pipelines are not subject to DRI review. The Petitioners contend that Department's Position that pipelines are not "petroleum storage facilities" is an invalid policy because it has not been adopted as a rule. There is no dispute the Department's Position on this issue has not been promulgated as a rule. If a facility were represented to be a Petroleum pipeline, but was actually designed as and operating as a petroleum storage facility, the Department would apply the Petroleum storage facility DRI guideline and standard to that facility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns and operates a gasoline station located at 4625 U.S. 27 North, Davenport, Florida. The site was constructed in late 1986 and opened in early 1987. The underground tanks storing the gasoline are connected by pipes running underground to the pumps from which the gasoline is dispensed. A small portion of the underground supply pipe is accessible from the surface through a manhole. The excavated area exposing the pipe and what appears to be a valve are separated from the surrounding soil by a large, cylindrical corrugated pipe laid perpendicular to and above the underground supply pump. The leak in question was caused when the lower edge of the corrugated pipe cut into the underground supply pipe for the premium gasoline. The cut was caused by the cumulative effect of vehicular traffic driving over the manhole cover, placing pressure on the corrugated pipe, and eventually forcing the edge of the corrugated pipe to rupture the underground supply pipe with which it was in contact. Petitioner owns and operates a large number of gasoline stations. This incident is the first time that a corrugated pipe has cut into an underground supply pipe. The use of the corrugated pipe is not at issue in the present case. Pursuant to company policy, station employees complete a daily recap each day and forward the recap document to Petitioner. Part of the recap document is devoted to "gas inventory." The daily recap, which covers the preceding 24 hours, requires that an employee determine the amount of gasoline in each underground storage tank, adjust the figure for amounts sold and delivered, and then compare the figure to the amount determined to have been in the tank 24 hours earlier. This reconciliation is normally completed by mid- to late-morning each day. A station employee "sticks" each tank to determine how much gasoline it contains. The procedure requires that the employee insert a pole into the bottom of an underground tank. By observing the length of the pole dampened by gasoline, the employee can calculate approximately the amount of gasoline in the tank. Although stick reading results in an approximation, the results are fairly accurate, leaving at most, in the case of this 12,000-gallon tank, a margin of error of 50 gallons. "Sticking" normally takes place daily between 6:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. On the morning of March 6, 1988, which was a Sunday, the employee sticking the tank calculated that the premium tank held 5419 gallons. There had been no deliveries during the preceding 24 hours. During the same period, the station had sold 914 gallons of premium gasoline. However, the last sticking 24 hours earlier had disclosed 7989 gallons. A total of 1656 gallons were thus unaccounted for. The recap document requires that the station notify Respondent's "Dist. Mgr. immediately if shortage of 500 gallons or more appears." The employee failed to do so. On the morning of March 7, 1988, the employee sticking the premium tank calculated that it held 2147 gallons. During the preceding 24 hours, there had been no deliveries and 826 gallons of premium gasoline had been sold. Consequently, 2446 gallons were missing, for a total of 4102 gallons over the past two stickings. As soon as the reconciliation was completed, the employee contacted Respondent's management, which ordered that the pump be shut down during the afternoon of March 7, 1988. Comparing the sales of premium gasoline for the 24- hour period ending March 8 with those ending March 7, which are comparable because the sale of regular gasoline on those two days is almost identical, the station sold about 39% of a normal day's sales of premium gasoline. Reflecting the shutdown of the premium pumps on March 7, the employee sticking the tank on the morning of March 8, 1988, found 593 gallons. During the preceding 24 hours, there had been no deliveries and sales of 321 gallons of premium had been sold, leaving 1233 gallons unaccounted for. The total over the three stickings was 5335 gallons lost. The station had previously not experienced losses even approaching this magnitude. The daily recap for the 24-hour period ending on March 5, 1988, showed no significant loss. Although fluctuations in volume may occur shortly after deliveries due to temperature differentials, such fluctuations could not reasonably have accounted for these vast discrepancies. Theft, measurement errors, and recording errors may also account for variations in readings, but not of the magnitude and repetition involved in this case. Between the time of the reconciliation on the morning of March 6 and the system shutdown on the afternoon of March 7, the system continued operating and, thus, leaking for 28-30 hours. Given that 2446 gallons were lost during the 24-hour period ending on March 7 and 1233 gallons lost during about 9 hours on March 8, at least 100 gallons per hour were escaping from the pipe during these last 28-30 hours, for a total of between 2800 and 3000 gallons. For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the actions and omissions of the station employees following the reconciliation of inventory figures on March 6 constituted gross negligence in the maintenance of a petroleum storage system. These actions and omissions were in the scope of employment. During the relevant period of time, none of Respondent's employees performed monthly checks of the monitoring wells to determine the presence of leaks. This failure was due to ignorance and was not wilful. This failure in no way contributed to the leak or to any delay in discovering the leak. During the relevant period of time, the monitoring wells had not been properly grouted to prevent introduction of surficial contamination. However, this failure was unknown to Petitioner, which had hired a contractor to construct the wells and reasonably had relied on the contractor to grout properly the monitoring wells. The improper grouting in no way contributed to the leak or to any delay in discovering the leak. During the relevant period of time, Petitioner was not performing weekly or five-day averages of inventory records concerning gasoline. The failure to perform these reconciliations in no way contributed to the leak or to any delay in discovering the leak. Following the discovery of the leak, Petitioner notified Respondent on March 8. Petitioner requested approval to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program by filing a Notification Application dated March 29, 1988. On July 14, 1988, Respondent completed the Pollutant Storage Tank System Inspection Report Form and Early Detection Incentive Program Compliance Verification Checklist. These documents indicate that Respondent was not monitoring monthly its monitoring wells, failed to grout properly its monitoring wells, was not performing the weekly or five-day averages of inventory (although it was taking daily inventory and reconciling opening and closing inventories), and did not immediately investigate the 1600-gallon shortage disclosed on the morning of March 6, 1988. By letter dated September 30, 1988, Respondent notified Petitioner that its site was ineligible for state-administered cleanup under the Early Detection Incentive Program. The letter cited as reasons the wilful failure to perform monthly checks of the monitoring well, the failure to immediately investigate discrepancies in inventory records while the system continued to operate after initial discovery of the 1600-gallon loss, and the improper construction of the monitoring well with respect to the improper grouting. The letter concludes that these items constitute gross negligence in the maintenance of a petroleum storage system, which precludes participation in the program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order denying the application of Petitioner to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-1561 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-4: adopted. 5-6: adopted in substance. 7-16: adopted. 17: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18-20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: to the extent that this proposed finding suggests that Petitioner was performing the five-day or weekly averaging, rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. However, in view of the findings and conclusions contained in the Recommended Order, rejected as unnecessary. 22-26: adopted. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent 1-4: rejected as conclusions of law. 5-6: adopted. 7-16: rejected as subordinate. 17: rejected as an inference unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18-26: adopted. 27: rejected as irrelevant. 28-29 and 31: rejected as legal argument. 30: adopted. 32: adopted. 33: adopted except that the system was shut down at some point into the day of the second sticking showing a significant shortage. 34-38: adopted or adopted in substance. 39: rejected as speculation. 40: rejected as irrelevant. 41-42: adopted. 43: rejected as irrelevant. 44-45: rejected as subordinate. 46: adopted. 47-49: rejected as subordinate. 50: adopted. 51-53: rejected as vague with respect to reference to "Racetrac." 54: adopted. 55: rejected as cumulative. 56-57: rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Steven M. Mills Decker & Hallman Suite 1200 Marquis II Tower 285 Peachtree Center Avenue Atlanta, GA 30303 Michael P. Donaldson Assistant General Counsel Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is eligible for restoration funding (but not insurance coverage) under the Florida Pollution Liability Insurance and Restoration Program (FPLIRP) for cleanup of discharges from underground petroleum storage tanks (USTs) underlying Petitioners' real property.
Findings Of Fact Scott C. Miller, Richard D. Miller, Sr., and Richard D. Miller, Jr. as partners in "the Miller Partnership" (hereafter, Petitioners) acquired fee simple title to the site of a former gasoline station (active petroleum retail outlet) from Gulf Oil Corporation by a warranty deed dated January 30, 1984. None of Petitioners' principals have ever been in the business of storing or selling petroleum products. At the time of purchase, the site contained five 3,000 gallon underground petroleum storage tanks (USTs) and two 550 gallon USTs. These tanks had been in use by Petitioners' predecessor in interest Gulf/Chevron, until January 30, 1984, the date Petitioners bought the real property, and Petitioners knew of the presence of the tanks at the time of purchase. Pursuant to the deed, Petitioners also acquired title to the tanks. The deed contained a restrictive covenant specifically prohibiting Petitioners from using the storage tanks for a period of three years, but did not restrict Petitioners from removing the storage tanks. At the time Petitioners took possession, none of them intended to put the storage tanks back in service, and no Petitioner has ever used the tanks for any purpose. On May 21, 1984, the Department of Environmental Regulation's (DER's) Stationary Tanks Rules, Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. came into effect. None of the Petitioners' principals had actual knowledge of the substance or effective date of Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. until early 1989, shortly before they ordered the seven USTs removed from the subject property. At some time prior to March 8, 1989, Petitioners entered into negotiations with their tenant, Jack Bush, a used car dealer, to sell the subject property to Mr. Bush. During negotiations, Mr. Bush informed Petitioners that something would have to be done with the USTs on the property and made their removal by Petitioners a condition of sale. The Petitioners engaged Charles D. Chambers as an authorized agent of Petro Environmental Services, Inc. (Petro) to remove the storage tanks. Scott C. Miller understood that he had employed Mr. Chambers to do whatever was necessary to comply with DER regulations, but Petitioners' decision to remove the storage tanks was not based on any contact with DER or representations by any of its employees. Physical removal of the tanks was accomplished March 1, 1989. During the course of tank removal, Mr. Chambers discovered petroleum- contaminated soil on the site, which had not contained fuel for years preceding Petitioners' purchase, and Mr. Chambers notified DER on March 10, 1989 with a "Discharge Notification Form, 17-1.218(3)" (P-11). It is unlikely that the contaminated soil would have been discovered but for the removal of the USTs, but there is no evidence that removal of the tanks resulted in contamination of the soil or that they had leaked during any period of ownership by the Petitioners. The removal of the tanks was immediate and clearly within 90 days of discovery of the contamination, but not within 90 days of Petitioners' knowledge of existence of the tanks. See, 17-61.050(3)(c)1 F.A.C. Upon receipt of the "Discharge Notification Form," Tim Dohaney, an Environmental Specialist II with DER's Pollutant Storage Tank Program based in the DER Jacksonville District Office sent Scott Miller o/b/o Petitioners a Request notice (P-2) dated March 16, 1989 which requested, among other things, that Petitioners submit a registration form to indicate that the storage tanks had been removed. This notice specifically provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Upon reviewing the registration files for this facility it was determined that the facility has never been registered. Therefore, it is requested that you complete the enclosed tank registration form and tank installation form to show the removal of the tank systems. The completed forms should be returned to this office within ten (10) calendar days upon receipt of this notice. This request also listed several procedures necessary to bring the site into compliance. On June 26, 1989, Mr. Dohaney notified Petitioners of an inspection to be conducted on July 18, 1989. The letter - Notice of Inspection (P-3) requested, among other things, that an updated registration placard be available on the site. The specific language provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The Department is in receipt of a Discharge Notification Form completed on March 10, 1989 for the referenced facility. As required by Chapter 17-61, on the day of inspection, you should have available at the facility: 5) The updated registration placard. This letter also specified several other items that must be available during inspection to show that the site had been in compliance. On July 18, 1989, Dohaney, Scott Miller, and an attorney for Petitioners' predecessor in interest, Gulf/Chevron, met on the site. During the inspection, Dohaney informed the others that restoration coverage for the site might exist under FPLIRP, and Miller and the Gulf/Chevron attorney expressed interest in obtaining same. The conversation concerning FPLIRP was initiated by the attorney. At the time of the inspection, however, the USTs had still not been registered, although they had been physically removed from the site approximately three and a half months earlier by a method DER's tank expert and spokesman, Mr. Svec, acknowledged was permitted by DER's rules (TR-90-91). After the inspection, Mr. Dohaney completed and served on Petitioners a July 18, 1989 "Inspection Report Form" (P-4) which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The tanks remained on-site, improperly abandoned until 3-89 when they were removed. Violations - as shown on page 1 & 23 1) tanks are not/were not registered; 3,4) updated registration form not submitted upon tank removal; 49, 50, 51) cleanup has not begun - owner will be applying for restoration coverage under HB430. Thereon, under the heading, "13. Tanks properly abandoned? 17- 61.050(3)(c)," Mr. Dohaney had checked the column for "yes," but added, "Tanks had been on- site, improperly abandoned since approx. 1984," and checked the "yes" column for "removed." The inspection form also noted or reiterated improper abandonment, contamination discovered at time of 3-89 abandonment, lack of registration, and that groundwater had been contaminated. By way of a July 19, 1989 letter (P-5), Mr. Dohaney again requested that the tanks be registered and directed Petitioners and the attorney for Gulf/Chevron to contact DER's Tallahassee Bureau of Waste Planning concerning the possibility of restoration coverage, using the following language: Mr. Robert W. Wells, Jr., Attorney for Chevron USA and you expressed an interest in applying for restoration coverage and subsequent State Cleanup for your site under the guidelines of House Bill 430. Therefore, it is requested that you contact the tank regulation section of the Bureau of Waste Planning (BWPR) in Tallahassee at (904) 488- 3935 for information regarding the program and an affidavit that must be completed by you and returned to the Department. The registration/notification form that was given you during the inspection should be completed and returned to this office within ten (10) calendar days upon receipt of this Notice (Emphasis supplied). On August 1, 1989, Mr. Chambers subsequently submitted to DER an executed updated "Storage Tank Notification Form 17-61.090(3)" (P-11). Receipt of this form was acknowledged by Mr. Dohaney as an "updated registration form" for removal of the USTs in a letter dated August 10, 1989 (P-6). In this letter, Mr. Dohaney further notified Petitioners via their attorney as follows: As of this date, this office has no further requests regarding this location. However, as discussed, the district office is awaiting a determination by DER-Tallahassee on this site's eligibility status regarding the restoration program of the FPLIRP program. If the site is denied eligibility, an assessment and cleanup will be required by the responsible party. All DER witnesses at formal hearing acknowledged that they regarded the August 1, 1989 "Storage Tank Notification Form 17-61.090(3)" (P-11) as Petitioners' "registration," albeit late registration in their eyes. Mr. Scott Miller properly interpreted his July 18, 1989 conversation with Mr. Dohaney and all of the foregoing notifications to mean that DER found Petitioners' tanks to have been "properly abandoned." However, despite all of the foregoing written notifications, Mr. Scott Miller also interpreted his July 18, 1989 conversation with Mr. Dohaney and Mr. Dohaney's August 10, 1989 letter (P-6) as DER's assurance that Petitioners' site would qualify for restoration funding, and in that state of mind, he directed Petitioners' attorney to submit an application to DER for FPLIRP restoration benefits. Petitioners' decision to apply for coverage, however, was also based upon conversations with the Gulf/Chevron's attorney, with Mr. Chambers, and with Petitioners' own attorney. Petitioners' application for restoration funding was dated August 11, 1989 (P-8). DER subsequently denied eligibility for the site on the basis that the tanks were not in compliance with Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. in that they had been improperly abandoned in accordance with Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. and had not been registered in accordance with Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. Thereafter, by a "Warning Notice" (P-1) from Mr. Dohaney on November 27, 1989, DER attempted to fine Petitioners for noncompliance with Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. and for leakage, but this "Warning Notice" was withdrawn pending outcome of the instant proceedings (P-9). In interpreting its own rules and mission, DER does not view the act of tank removal by itself as constituting compliance with Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. Its standing operating procedure, according to Mr. Svec, a DER expert and agency spokesman, is to regard Chapter 17-61 F.A.C. as applicable to sites such as Petitioners' site even after physical removal of USTs (TR 93). In assessing eligibility, DER reviews tank compliance "history," including whether the tanks were properly abandoned in accordance with the time frames established within the Chapter. For eligibility, agency personnel interpret the statute and rules to require that a tank must be in continuous compliance with the rules and to further require that an updated registration be submitted within 10 days of tank removal. The agency also views a failure in registration to be such a major violation of the registration requirement imposed by statute and rules that it cannot be waived by the agency pursuant to the latitude granted it by Section 376.3072(3)(b) F.S.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order approving Petitioners' application for Florida Pollution Liability Insurance and Restoration Program restoration coverage. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-5251 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-4, 5-9, 10-11, 15-16, 20-26, 28-40, 45-47, 50. Irrelevant: 12-13. Immaterial: 14 (except that effective date is accepted), 17. 18 is rejected because it is stated as a conclusion of law; however, the age of the petroleum discharge is discussed in the Recommended Order. 27 is rejected because it is stated as a conclusion of law and as legal argument. Rejected as legal argument and not dispositive of the issue of rule interpretation in de novo proceedings. However, for all the reasons enunciated in the Recommended Order, proper abandonment has been found and concluded both in fact and in law: 41-44, 51-52. Subordinate and unnecessary: 48-49. There is no 19. Respondent's PFOF: Accepted: 1-9, 11, 13-25, 27-35, 36-41, 43, 50, 57. Rejected because stated as legal argument or as a conclusion of law: , 10,12, 26, 49, 51-56, 58-64. In most instances they are also direct quotations of agency witnesses' testimony and cumulative. Although the agency's interpretation of statutes and rules are to be accorded much weight, they are not required to be found as facts where, as they are here, cumulative or unnecessary. Rejected as subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found: 42, 44-48. COPIES FURNISHED: Sidney F. Ansbacher, Esquire Turner, Ford & Buckingham, P.A. 1904 Gulf Life Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Gary Early Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is eligible for reimbursement for allowable costs pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, related to the cleanup of certain contamination at the Petitioner's ground transportation facility.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Facts stipulated to by the parties The subject facility is a bus, limousine and van storage, dispatch, and service area for a ground transportation company serving Miami International Airport which contains a parking lot, fuel storage tanks, an administration building, and a maintenance shop. The Department of Environmental Regulation is the agency charged with responsibility for administering the provisions of Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. Red Top Sedan, Inc., through its agents, notified the Department of possible ground and ground water contamination on or about September 10, 1986. The Department received said notification and on September 19, 1986, advised Red Top that the notice was adequate and requested further information. Following various correspondence and requests for information, the Department determined that it had sufficient information and, on February 1, 1988, issued its Notice of Intent regarding the eligibility of the subject sites for participation in the program. One area, adjacent to and surrounding the diesel fuel pumps, was found to be eligible. Another area, east and west of the maintenance shop (Exhibit "2" to the Notice) was found to be ineligible. Red Top filed a Petition for Administrative Determination which was received by the Department on February 23, 1988. The Petition was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and a Hearing Officer assigned. Facts Established at Hearing General Information About The Facility The subject facility also contains a parking area for approximately 95 buses, 40 to 45 vans, two dozen mini-buses, and 15 or 16 limousines and Lincoln towncars. There is also employee parking on the site. To the east of the Red Top office building there is a fuel island used for fueling Red Top's vehicles. The tanks associated with that fuel island have discharged diesel fuel. That petroleum contamination site is entirely separate from the one involved in this proceeding and has been found to be eligible for reimbursement. When the subject facility was constructed, Red Top employed an engineering company. It also employed a company named Service Station Aid. Service Station Aid is in the business of servicing tanks and other equipment used in connection with the handling of oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, and other similar products. Among other things, Service Station Aid installed underground waste oil tanks and tanks to hold automatic transmission fluid and new motor oil in the area of the maintenance facility. A drainage system servicing the asphalt parking areas and driveways surrounding the various buildings was also installed on the subject site. That system contained various grease traps which conformed to accepted practice at the time of their construction. Facts Regarding The East Side of the Maintenance Building Two underground waste oil tanks are on the east side of the maintenance building. The two waste oil tanks have been in operation since 1976, when the facility was built. Each of these two tanks has a capacity of 560 gallons. Employees of Red Top regularly pour used motor oil into the two waste oil tanks on the east side of the maintenance facility. The used oil is periodically removed by an EPA approved company. That company removes the waste oil to a fuel recycling facility in the Port Everglades area where it is made into recycled fuel. It is possible, even probable, that used oil has been spilled from time to time both while being poured into the waste oil tanks and while being removed from the waste oil tanks. However, there is no persuasive competent substantial evidence that any such spillage was a significant contribution to the contamination at the site. .1/ It is possible that one or both of the waste oil tanks has leaked. However, there is no persuasive competent substantial evidence that any such leakage was a significant contribution to the contamination at the site. In this regard it is noted that Red Top has not tested either of the waste oil tanks to determine whether they are leaking. Approximately 70 feet to the east of the maintenance building there are three storm drains. The storm drains are attached by way of a catch basin to soakage pits. Soakage pits are specifically designed to allow materials entering the soakage pit to be discharged directly to the earth. Storm drains are designed to catch stormwater runoff rather than large amounts of pollutants. The area to the east of the maintenance facility is paved with asphalt. That paved area is sloped so that any discharge of pollutants in that area of the site will flow to the storm drains. On numerous occasions waste oil has been observed in the storm drains. Instances of direct discharges of waste oil onto the ground or into the storm drains have been observed. Oil stains around the storm drains and observations by Dade County inspectors indicate that such direct discharges have been regular, if not frequent. Other sources of contamination at the Red Top facility include leaking drums of oil, oil leaking from stored or discarded equipment, oil discharged to the ground, disposal of contaminated waters from the maintenance building, and engine washing water discharged on the site. In the ground to the east of the maintenance building there is a large plume of dissolved oil and grease. This plume includes a plume of free product in the vicinity of the southernmost of the two waste oil tanks. Extending beyond the identified plume there are additional areas contaminated by constituents of waste oil. The primary cause of the contamination on the east side of the maintenance building is the direct discharge of contaminants. Discharge from the two waste oil tanks constitutes, at most, only a very minor cause of the overall contamination. .2/ Facts Regarding the West Side of the Maintenance Building On the west side of the maintenance building there are two underground tanks that are used to hold new motor oil and new transmission fluid. Motor oil and transmission fluid are lubricants used to lubricate engines and transmissions. They are not fuels. Pollutants which were discharged onto the floor of the maintenance building during maintenance work have been washed directly into the storm drains on the northwest side of the maintenance facility. There are two small areas of contamination on the west side of the maintenance facility. One such area is around a storm drain at the northwest side of the maintenance facility. The other is around the two tanks that contain new motor oil and transmission fluid. The contamination in the area of the storm drain includes lead, cadmium, and chromium. Motor oil and transmission fluid do not contain lead, nor do they contain levels of cadmium or chromium in amounts sufficient to be detected in groundwater. There is also an area of free product near the storm drain. There is no storage tank adjacent to the storm drain on the northwest side of the maintenance facility that could account for the lead, cadmium, and chromium contamination or that could account for the area of free product. The contamination at the storm drain on the west side of the maintenance facility resulted from direct discharges of contaminants to the storm drain and catch basin and was not a result of a discharge from a storage tank. The contamination in the area of the two tanks used for new motor oil and transmission fluid also contains lead, cadmium, and chromium. The metals contamination at this area is a result of discharge to the storm drain, and is not the result of discharge of new motor oil or transmission fluid from the two tanks. The groundwater in the area around these two tanks is also contaminated by dissolved oil and grease. The dissolved oil and grease plume is consistent in terms of substance and concentration with the dissolved waste oil to the east of the building. Within that plume of dissolved oil and grease there is also a small plume of free product. There is no waste oil tank on the west side of the maintenance facility that could account for waste oil contamination at that location. The dissolved oil and grease plume on the west side of the maintenance facility is most likely the result of waste oil discharge to the catch basin. The tanks containing new motor oil and transmission fluid may have contributed to the small free product plume in that area as a result of overfilling, but any such contribution was only a minor part of the overall contamination. In reviewing an application for eligibility for reimbursement, the Department looks at the relative importance of eligible and ineligible portions of a contaminated site. In cases where a potentially eligible source is minor in comparison to an overall otherwise ineligible contamination site, the Department's policy is to treat the entire site as ineligible. This policy is based on the fact that as a practical matter it is not possible to clean up one part of a contaminated site without affecting any adjacent contaminated areas. For the same reason, if the majority of a contaminated site is eligible, but it contains minor ineligible sources, the Department's policy is to treat the entire site as eligible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a final order in this case concluding that the contamination area at issue in this proceeding is not eligible for reimbursement under Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of June 1989. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June 1989.
