The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Robbie Reynolds, is eligible for family medical insurance coverage for medical expenses incurred by the Petitioner's son?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Petitioner, Robbie W. Reynolds, was an employee of Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Division is responsible for managing the State's employee health insurance system. Participation in the State of Florida Health Insurance Plan. The State of Florida makes health insurance available to its employees (hereinafter referred to as the "State Health Plan"). Employees may choose health insurance through the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan or through various health maintenance organizations (hereinafter referred to as "HMOs"). The Division has promulgated Chapter 60P, Florida Administrative Code, regulating the State Health Plan. Employees pay part of the premiums for their health insurance and the State contributes a part of the cost of premiums. The amount of premiums paid by an employee and the State depends on the type of coverage selected. Employees may elect coverage only for themselves ("individual" coverage), or coverage for themselves and certain qualified dependents ("family" coverage). Female employees who elect individual coverage are eligible for the payment of maternity or pregnancy benefits. Included in these benefits are certain benefits for the newborn child referred to as "well-baby care." In order for medical expenses attributable solely to a newborn baby that is ill at or after birth to be covered by the State Health Plan, an employee must elect family coverage for the employee and the child. The family coverage must be effective as of the date the medical expenses are incurred for the child. Open Enrollment Periods. Once an employee selects the type of health insurance he or she desires, that employee generally may change the election only during certain designated periods of time, referred to as "open enrollment periods." During an open enrollment period, an employee may change from HMO coverage to the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan, or vice versa, may change from individual coverage to family coverage, or vice versa, and may add or delete dependents to the employee's family coverage. Changes to an employees' State Health Plan coverage made during an open enrollment period are effective for the calendar year immediately following the open enrollment period. Other Changes in Health Insurance Coverage. An exception to the requirement of the State Health Plan that changes in coverage only be made during an open enrollment period is provided for certain specified events, referred to as "qualifying events." The acquisition of an "eligible dependent" during a year may constitute a qualifying event. For example, if an employee marries, the employee may elect family coverage for himself or herself and the employee's spouse. A change from individual coverage to family coverage may also be made if an employee or an employee's spouse gives birth to a child. The change to family coverage as a result of marriage or the birth of a child must be made within thirty-one days after the eligible dependent is acquired. An employee may also elect family coverage as a result of the employee or the employee's spouse becoming pregnant. If the employee or employee's spouse elects family coverage in time for the family coverage to be effective at the time of the child's birth, the child may then be added as a dependent to the family coverage by notifying the Division of the child's birth within thirty-one days after the child is born. In order to change to family coverage when an employee or employee's spouse becomes pregnant, the employee, must apply for the change to family coverage in time for the employee to make a month's premium payment on the first day of at least the month during which the child is born or an earlier month. For example, if an employee elects to change from individual coverage to family coverage for a yet to be born child in July effective for September, the first full month's premium is paid on September 1, and the child is born on September 2, the employee has family coverage for all of September and the child will be covered if the Division is notified of the child's birth within thirty-one days after the date of birth. In order for an employee to make a change in coverage as the result of a qualifying event, the employee must file a Change of Information form with the employee's personnel office. The personnel office forwards the form to the Division. Ms. Reynolds' Health Insurance. Ms. Reynolds, as an employee of the State of Florida, was eligible for state health insurance. She elected to participate in the HMO that was available in the Gainesville area where she is employed. AvMed is the name of the HMO for the Gainesville area and Ms. Reynolds' insurer. Although married, Ms. Reynolds initially elected individual coverage. Ms. Reynolds did not elect family coverage for her husband because he received health insurance benefits from his employer. During 1992, Ms. Reynolds became pregnant. The baby's projected due date was April 15, 1993. The Open Enrollment Period for 1993. The open enrollment period for the next calendar year (1993) after Ms. Reynolds became pregnant took place in October of 1992. During the October 1992 open enrollment period the Department of Corrections, through its personnel office, conducted meetings with employees to discuss health care benefits and coverage available to its employees. Two benefits consultants, trained by the Division, conducted the meetings, providing information to, and answering questions from, employees concerning the open enrollment period. Ms. Reynolds, who was approximately three months pregnant at the time of the benefit consultation meetings, attended one of the sessions. Ms. Reynolds attended the session for the purpose of determining what steps she should take to insure that her yet-to-be-born infant was covered by health insurance. Ms. Reynolds spoke for some time with Gail Page and Jordaina Chambers, benefits consultants of the Department of Corrections. Ms. Reynolds informed the benefits consultants that she was pregnant and that she wanted to insure that her yet-to-be-born infant was covered by her health insurance. Ms. Reynolds was incorrectly told that she could not elect family coverage for just her and her yet-to-be-born infant. This incorrect advice, however, did not have any effect on the effective date Ms. Reynolds ultimately decided to begin her family coverage. Ms. Reynolds also informed the benefits consultants that the baby was due April 15, 1993. The benefits consultants informed Ms. Reynolds that her pregnancy constituted a qualifying event and that she could, therefore, switch to family coverage in order to cover her baby. She was also informed that she would have to notify the Division of her child's birth with thirty-one days after birth to add the child to the policy. After being told that she would have to switch her coverage from individual coverage to family coverage, adding her husband as a dependent, Ms. Reynolds asked the benefits consultants when she should switch to family coverage. Consistent with the policies of the Division, and the training the benefits consultants had received from the Division, the benefits consultants advised Ms. Reynolds that she should elect family coverage effective two or three months prior to her due date. The Division makes this recommendation so that employees can save the increased premiums for family coverage a reasonable period of time before the child is born. In light of the fact that Ms. Reynolds' conversation with the benefits consultants took place during the 1992 open enrollment period and the fact that January 1, 1993 was three and one-half months prior to Ms. Reynolds' due date, Ms. Reynolds was advised by the benefits consultants that it would be reasonable to switch from individual coverage to family coverage through the open enrollment period. Based upon this advice, Ms. Reynolds' family coverage would be effective January 1, 1993. The benefits consultants did not advise Ms. Reynolds of any possible consequences of not electing to switch from individual coverage to family coverage with an effective date prior to January 1, 1993. The benefits consultants also did not tell Ms. Reynolds that she could not choose to switch from her individual coverage to family coverage with an effective date prior to January 1, 1993. On or about October 15, 1992, Ms. Reynolds executed and filed with the Division an Annual Benefit Election Form. Respondent's exhibit 1. Pursuant to this form Ms. Reynolds elected to change her health insurance coverage from individual to family effective January 1, 1993. Ms. Reynolds elected to add her husband as a covered dependent. Based upon the election made by Ms. Reynolds, her family coverage became effective on January 1, 1993. If her child was born before that date, any expenses attributable solely to medical services received by the child would not covered by Ms. Reynolds' medical coverage. If the child was born on or after that date and Ms. Reynolds notified the Division of the child's birth within thirty-one days after the child's birth, any expenses attributable solely to medical services received by the child would be covered by Ms. Reynolds' medical coverage. The evidence failed to prove that the advice given by the benefits consultants in October 1992 was not reasonable based upon the information available to them and to Ms. Reynolds. The evidence also failed to prove that either the benefits consultants or Ms. Reynolds unreasonably failed to realize that the child would be born more than three and one-half months premature. Ms. Reynolds, while reasonably relying on the advice of the benefits consultants, knew or should have known that the ultimate decision as to when to begin family coverage was hers to make. Ms. Reynolds also should have been somewhat wary of the advice she was given, in light of the fact that Ms. Reynolds admitted that she was told by the benefits consultants that they "did not know that much about what she was asking." Despite this warning, Ms. Reynolds testified during the final hearing that she followed their advice because she felt there was "no reason to believe they would be wrong." The Premature Birth of the Reynolds' Child. On December 29, 1992, Ms. Reynolds underwent surgery, due to unforeseen medical complications, to deliver her child. The child died on January 1, 1993. In order to add the child as a dependent to her medical insurance when the child was born, Ms. Reynolds had to have family coverage in effect as of December 1, 1992 or earlier. Unfortunately for Ms. Reynolds, on December 29, 1992 when her child was born, Ms. Reynolds only had individual coverage. The rules governing medical benefits of state employees do not allow employees with individual coverage to add dependents. Therefore, even though Ms. Reynolds attempted to get the Division, through the personnel office of the Department of Corrections, to add her child by notifying the personnel office of the birth of the child immediately after December 29, 1993, the child could not be added to her individual coverage. The child received medical services and incurred medical expenses between December 29, 1992 and January 1, 1993. Those expenses were not covered by the well-baby care provided by Ms. Reynolds' individual coverage. Because Ms. Reynolds did not have family coverage at the time the child was born and the child could not be added to her individual coverage, the medical expenses incurred for the child were not covered by Ms. Reynolds' health insurance. Although the child should be added as a dependent to Ms. Reynolds family coverage which took effect as of January 1, 1993, the evidence failed to prove that any medical expenses incurred for the care of the child on January 1, 1993, were not attributable to a preexisting condition. Therefore, expenses incurred for the care of the child on January 1, 1993, are not eligible for reimbursement. Should the Division be Estopped from Denying Coverage? The Division relies on benefits consultants to assist the Division in administering the State Health Plan. Benefits consultants are trained by the Division, they are state employees and they hold themselves out as representing the State in general and the Division in particular. The Division's rules provide for the active involvement of the various personnel offices in administering the State Health Plan. See, Rule 60P- 2.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Annual Benefit Election Forms issued by the Division during the open enrollment specifically provide that the forms are to be turned in to employees' personnel offices. The Division allows personnel offices of the various state agencies to hold themselves out to employees as agents of the Division. In this case, Ms. Reynolds was given advice by benefits consultants, on behalf of the Division and consistent with Division policy, which played a role in Ms. Reynolds making a decision which resulted in medical expenses incurred upon the premature birth of her child not being covered by her medical insurance. While Ms. Reynolds was given some incorrect advice, she was not given incorrect advice concerning the effective date of her family coverage. The advice given to Ms. Reynolds concerning when to start her family coverage was reasonable at the time given and, as she admitted during the hearing, there was no reason in October of 1992 to doubt the wisdom of the advice she received. Ultimately, it was Ms. Reynolds decision. While she may not have understood that advice, she made the decision to make choices and act on the advice even after being warned that the benefits consultants were not knowledgeable about what she was asking.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing Robbie W. Reynolds' petition in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3731 The Division has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Ms. Reynolds did not file a proposed recommended order. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 2-3 and 19. Accepted in 4-5, 9 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 6 and 9. Accepted in 11-17. Accepted in 7-8. Accepted in 1 and 18-19. Accepted in 23-26. Accepted in 20, 28 and 30-32. But See 27-20. See 29-30. But see 27. Accepted in 34 and 38. See 40. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 40-41 COPIES FURNISHED: Robbie W. Reynolds 2635 South West 35th Place, #1304 Gainesville, Florida 32608 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. Chief of Bureau of Benefits and Legal Services Division of State Employees' Insurance Department of Management Services 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-4876 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offenses alleged in the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Harold Sydney Rose (Rose) was, at all times material hereto, licensed in the State of Florida as a life and health insurance agent and health insurance agent. During all such times, Rose did business as the Harold Rose Insurance Agency, an unincorporated business, in Dade County, Florida. Here, petitioner has filed an amended administrative complaint against Rose which charges him with certain misconduct which was alleged to have arisen while he was an agent for Union Bankers Insurance Company (Union Bankers) and United American Insurance Company (United American). Count I of the complaint concerns allegations that Rose failed to remit premiums and applications solicited on behalf of Union Bankers, and misappropriated and converted such monies to his own use and benefit or unlawfully withheld such monies from the insurer and insured. Counts II-V of the complaint allege similar conduct which purportedly occurred during the course of his agency relationship with United American. The Union Bankers transaction Pertinent to Count I, Rose's agent's contract with Union Bankers, dated September 27, 1984, provided: 5. SOLICITATION The agent is hereby authorized to solicit and procure applications for individual life insurance, accident and health annuity policies and to promptly deliver such applications to this Company. The Company shall have the right at all times to reject any application submit- ted for insurance without specifying any reason for rejection. * * * 11. COLLECTION OF MONEY The Agent is not authorized to receive any money due or to become due to the Company ex- cept the initial first-year premiums on appli- cations obtained by/or through him in exchange for the Conditional Receipts furnished by the Company. Any and all monies or securities re- ceived by the Agent for and on behalf of the Company shall be securely held by the Agent in a fiduciary capacity and shall not be used by the Agent for any personal or other purposes whatsoever, but shall be immediately paid over to the Company. While the literal terms of his agreement with Union Bankers would imply that Rose was required to hold all premiums in trust and immediately remit them to the company, his agreement with the company actually permitted him to retain his commission from the first-year premium and remit the balance (referred to as the "net") to the company, along with the application, within ten days of receipt. If the company declined to issue the policy, then Rose's account was debited for the amount he had retained. During early 1992, as a consequence of complaints from applicants, Union Bankers became concerned that Rose was not timely submitting applications and premiums due the company on policies he solicited. As a consequence, by letter of April 3, 1992, Union Bankers terminated Rose's agency agreement, effective April 18, 1992. Subsequently, following repeated demands by Union Bankers that Rose submit to it all applications and premiums he had received on behalf of the company, the Rose Agency submitted new business reports, together with applications and partial premium payments to the company. This information was received about the end of June or early July 1992, and reflected significant delays in forwarding applications and premiums to Union Bankers. Regarding such delays, the competent proof demonstrated the following: On March 16, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Dennis Rehman, as well as an application from his wife Gail, for health insurance, and received two checks from them, one for $1,073 and the other for $409, representing the first year premium. These checks were deposited to the account of the Harold Rose Agency at Florida International Bank on March 18, 1992. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until June 1992, and then only upon complaint of the applicants and demand by Union Bankers. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check from the Harold Rose Agency to Union Bankers for $787.00, the correct net premium, and the policies were issued in July 1992. On March 23, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Clarence Medlin for home health care insurance, and received a check in the sum of $953.00, representing the first year premium. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 25, 1992, and then only upon complaint of the applicant and demand by Union Bankers. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check from the Harold Rose Agency to Union Bankers for $142.95, which was significantly less than the net commission of $333.55 that was due. Nevertheless, Union Bankers underwrote the application. On April 1, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Sally Goldhirsch for home health care insurance, and received from her the sum of $1,033.00, representing the first year premium. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 25, 1992, and then only following demand by Union Bankers. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check from the Harold Rose Agency to Union Bankers for $206.60, which was significantly less than the net commission of $361.55 that was due. The ultimate disposition of the Goldhirsch application does not appear of record. On April 7, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Morris Olkes for home health care insurance, and received a check in the sum of $1,986, representing the first year premium. The check was deposited to the account of the Harold Rose Agency at Florida International Bank on April 13, 1992. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 25, 1992, and then only upon complaint of the applicant and demand by Union Bankers. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check from the Harold Rose Agency to Union Bankers for $397.20, which was significantly less than the net commission of $695.10 that was due. Nevertheless, Union Bankers underwrote the application and delivered a policy to Mr. Olkes. Upon review of the policy Mr. Olkes declined to accept it, and Union Bankers refunded his $1,986 premium. On April 3, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Cora Burghard for a home health care insurance policy, and received from her the sum of $1,033, representing the first year premium. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 25, 1992. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check drawn on the Harold Rose Agency account for $206.00, which was significantly less than the net commission of $361.55 that was due. The ultimate disposition of the Burghard application does not appear of record. On May 1, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Daisy Schumann for a home health care insurance policy, and received from her the sum of $557.00, representing the first year premium. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 29, 1992. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check drawn on the Harold Rose Agency account for $111.40, which was significantly less than the net commission of $194.95 that was due. The ultimate disposition of the Schumann application does not appear of record. On April 15, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Grace DuMond for a home health care policy, and received from her the sum of $1,075.00, representing the first year premium. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 29, 1992. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check drawn on the Harold Rose Agency Account for $215.00, which was significantly less than the net commission of $376.25 that was due. The ultimate disposition of the DuMond application does not appear of record. On April 24, 1992, Rose solicited an application on behalf of Union Bankers from Bernard Bernard for a home health care policy and received from him the sum of $1,588.00, representing the first year premium. Notwithstanding, Rose did not forward the application to Union Bankers until on or about June 29, 1992. When submitted, the application was accompanied by a check drawn on the Harold Rose Agency account for $317.60, which was significantly less than the net commission of $555.80 that was due. The ultimate disposition of the Bernard application does not appear of record. Finally, in August 1992, Union Bankers received an inquiry on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Anthony Feanny regarding the status of applications they had made for Union Bankers health insurance through the Harold Rose Agency. In this regard, the proof demonstrates that the Feannys were solicited by Allen James, an agent with the Harold Rose Agency, who secured applications for health insurance from them on three occasions, and received checks for the first year premium. The first check was for $2,021.00, dated February 20, 1991, and deposited to the Harold Rose Agency account on February 20, 1991; the second check was for $3,521.00, dated February 28, 1991, and deposited to the Harold Rose Agency account on March 8, 1991; and the third check was for $1,929.67, dated September 23, 1991, and deposited to the Harold Rose Agency account on October 3, 1991. According to Mr. James, the Feannys agreed for the agency to delay sending their applications to Union Bankers until a claim pending with another insurance company had been resolved. Whether that claim was ever resolved does not appear of record; however, the record does demonstrate that none of the three applications or any premiums were ever submitted to Union Bankers, and that, considering the balances maintained in the Harold Rose Agency account discussed infra, those premium funds were not maintained in trust. In August 1992, Union Bankers refunded the Feannys the premiums they had entrusted to the Harold Rose Agency. The premium refunds and premium credits made by Union Bankers to various applicants or insureds were, along with other transactions, reflected on Rose's account current statement with the company. As of August 31, 1991, Rose's statement reflected a debit balance of $21,534.48, and as of January 31, 1994, through the company's application of renewal commissions due Rose to the debit, a debit balance of $11,491.98. Absent additional debits, Rose's account with Union Bankers will be current within 15 to 18 months by applying his renewal commission to the outstanding debt. United American and the Rosenbaum, Jaffer, Lichtman and Rutkin transactions (Counts II-V) Counts II-V of the amended administrative complaint allege that Rose failed to remit premiums and applications solicited on behalf of United American from Fannie Rosenbaum (Count II), Adah S. Jaffer (Count III), Arnold Lichtman (Count IV) and Judith and Norman Rutkin (Count V), and misappropriated and converted such monies to his own use and benefit or unlawfully withheld such monies from the insurer and insured. Pertinent to these counts, the proof demonstrated that on November 19, 1991, United American and Rose, as agent, entered into a vested commission contract. That contract provided: APPOINTMENT AND RELATIONSHIP The Agent shall be a General Agent of the Com- pany and is authorized to solicit in person or through Sub-agents, applications for Insurance. Such applications are subject to Company ap- proval. The Agent may collect only the initial premium payments due on such applications. The relationship between the Agency, or any Sub-agent, and the Company shall be that of an independent contractor only, and not a rela- tionship of employer and employee. Any initial premiums collected by the Agency, or any Sub- agent, shall be held in trust by the Agent, on behalf of the Company, and the Agent shall have a duty to promptly remit the premiums to the Company, less applicable commissions due the Agent. The general transactions of busi- ness including eligibility requirements of ap- plicant will be governed by Company rules which may be changed, altered, or amended from time to time by the Company. COMMISSION COMPENSATION The Agent shall receive as full compensation for any expenses, as well as all services pro- vided by the Agent, the commissions on pre- miums paid on policies issued on applications secured by the Agent or any Sub-agents, as specified and set forth in the Schedule(s) of Commissions shown below. The Agent shall im- mediately remit to the Company all premiums collected by the Agent, or any Sub-agents, less the Agent's initial commission thereon. The Company may discontinue any plan or policy and/or change commissions on existing or new policies, but such change shall not affect any commissions due Agent on policies issued prior to the effective date of the change. The Com- pany shall determine the commission on any policy which is determined to be a replacement or conversion of any existing policy. * * * SCHEDULE OF COMMISSIONS - FLORIDA HEALTH PLANS: First Year Commissions Medicare Supplements - 34 percent, except no commissions will be paid on any portion of the premium for Part B deductible coverage. Other Health Plans - 54 percent, plus re- gistration fee (less $1 on monthly and quar- terly modes). Renewal Years Commissions Medicare Supplements - 17 percent, except renewal years commission will not include any portion of rate increases and no commissions will be paid on any portion of the premium for Part B deductible coverage. Other Health Plans - 12 percent Here, like Rose's agreement with Union Bankers, his agreement with United American permitted him to retain his commission from the first-year premium and remit the net to the company, along with the application. If the company declined to issue the policy, then Rose's account was debited for the amount he had retained. As to Count II, the proof demonstrates that on May 28, 1992, Rose received from Fannie Rosenbaum of Miami Beach, Florida, a check made payable to United American in the sum of $1,637.00 as payment of the initial premium on a United American health insurance policy Rose had solicited. This check was deposited to the account of the Harold Rose Agency at Florida International Bank on May 29, 1992, but no application or premium was remitted to United American. Following inquiry regarding the status of her application and proof of payment of the premium to Rose, and consistent with Ms. Rosenbaum's request of June 22, 1992, United American credited her account with the sum of $1,617.00 to renew a preexisting policy and refunded $20.00 to her. Subsequently, Ms. Rosenbaum requested the return of the balance of the premium ($1,617.00) and it was refunded to her by United American. By letter of July 10, 1992, United American demanded of Rose the premium he had been paid on its behalf by Ms. Rosenbaum, as well as an explanation for its non remittance. On September 22, 1992, United American received from the Rose Agency a partially completed application on Ms. Rosenbaum, but has yet to receive any part of the premium or any explanation for Rose's failure to timely remit the application and premium. As to Count III, the amended administrative complaint alleges that on or about June 9, 1992, Rose solicited and sold to Adah S. Jaffer a United American Health insurance policy, and received from Adah S. Jaffer a check made payable to United American in the sum of $3,475.00 as payment of the initial premium on the policy. The complaint further alleges that Rose failed to remit any premium or submit the application to United American, but misappropriated and converted the funds to his own use. At hearing, the deposition testimony of Adah S. Jaffer, marked as petitioner's exhibit 3, was not received into evidence. Notwithstanding, the testimony of Rose demonstrates that he took an application for insurance from the Jaffers, although its nature does not appear of record, and other competent proof demonstrates that a check dated June 9, 1992, drawn by Harold G. Jaffer and payable to United American in the sum of $3,425 was deposited to the account of the Harold Rose Agency at Florida International Bank on June 10, 1992. Moreover, the proof demonstrates that in September 1992, United American received an inquiry from the Jaffers regarding the status of their application and, upon review, discovered that no application or premium had been received by the company. Upon inquiry, the Rose Agent sent United American an incomplete application on the Jaffers, which was received September 22, 1992, but no premium. Subsequently, United American refunded the Jaffers $3,425, but Rose, despite demand, has failed to remit any part of the Jaffer premium to United American. As to Count IV, the proof demonstrates that on July 10, 1992, Rose received from Arnold Lichtman of Miami Beach, Florida, a check made payable to United American in the sum of $1,352 as payment for the first year premium on a United American Medicare Supplemental Insurance policy Rose had solicited. This check was deposited to the account of the Harold Rose Agency on July 15, 1992, but no application or premium was remitted to United American. Following inquiry by Mr. Lichtman on September 11, 1992, regarding the status of his application, United American discovered that no application or premium had been received by the company. Upon inquiry, the Rose Agency forwarded a partially completed application for Mr. Lichtman to United American on September 22, 1992, but no premium. In the interim, United American refunded Mr. Lichtman $1,352. Notice of the refund and request for reimbursement was mailed to Rose, but he has failed to remit any part of the premium to United American. As to Count V, the proof demonstrates that on July 23, 1992, Rose received from Judith Rutkin of Miami, Florida, a check made payable to United American in the sum of $1,352 as payment for the first year premium on a United American ProCare Plan F Medicare Supplemental insurance policy Rose had solicited. This check was deposited to the account of the Harold Rose Agency at Florida International Bankers on July 27, 1992, but no application or premium was submitted to United American. Mr. Rutkin, who became increasingly concerned about nondelivery of his wife's policy, and lack of communication from Rose, called United American on September 29, 1992, only to learn that no application or premium had been submitted to them. At United American's request, Mr. Rutkin wrote them a letter on October 9, 1992, explaining the circumstances and enclosing a copy of his wife's cancelled check. On October 15, 1992, United American reimbursed Mrs. Rutkin for her premium deposit. Notice of the refund and a request for reimbursement was mailed to Rose, but he has failed to remit any portion of the premium to United American. United American terminated Rose's agency agreement September 2, 1992, for his failure to remit premiums, and demanded reimbursement of the policy premiums. To date, Rose has failed to reimburse United American for the premium refunds it made. Unlike his account with Union Bankers, Rose's account with United American has no outstanding policies upon which Rose could receive renewal commissions and against which United American could apply the debt due it from Rose. The Harold Rose Agency bank account The Harold Rose Agency bank account at Florida International Bank is described as a business checking account, and Harold S. Rose is designated as the owner and sole signatory. As of June 31, 1992, the account had a negative balance (overdrawn) of $798.53, as of July 31, 1992, a positive balance of $1,092.11, as of August 31, 1992, a negative balance of $1,165.55, and as of the date of hearing a positive balance of $2.62. Rose's response According to Rose, he has delegated all office duties at his agency to two secretaries, and they are responsible for processing all applications, handling all finances (bank deposits, check writing, and review of bank statements), responding to inquiries from insurance companies, or anything else that has to do with office operations. Moreover, although he is the sole signatory on the agency bank account, Rose has authorized his secretaries to sign his name and, according to Rose, they sign all the checks on that account. Essentially, Rose suggests he has absolutely nothing to do with any office duties, but restricts his activities to selling and servicing his agents, and that when he takes an application and premium from a client he merely turns it in for processing with his secretaries like any other agent working for him. Rose further averred that he never intentionally withheld applications from the companies and never took any part of a premium that was not his. Notwithstanding, Rose offered no cogent or credible explanation for why the subject applications and premiums were not submitted to Union Bankers and United American in the regular course of business, why client inquiries repeatedly went unanswered, why repeated demands from the insurance companies were necessary to get the applications, why the net premiums due the companies were not held in his account, in trust, until disbursed according to law, or why the premiums have not been paid to the companies on demand or at any time to date. Under the circumstances, Rose's explanation and attempt to distance himself from responsibility for the operations of his agency are rejected as improbable and lacking credibility, and he is found to have intentionally deferred submitting applications and premiums to Union Bankers and United American, and to have diverted premiums entrusted to his agency for other than their intended purposes. 1/ But for the instant case, no complaint has been filed regarding Rose since his licensure as an insurance agent in the State of Florida in 1950, and no prior disciplinary action has been initiated by the Department of Insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which revokes respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of April 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, WANDA DIRKS, was licensed in the State of Florida as a health insurance agent and was authorized to solicit health insurance policies on behalf of National States Insurance (National States) and on behalf of American Integrity Insurance Company (American Integrity). John Rickard was born March 18, 1905, and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, lived in Fort Pierce, Florida. On February 25, 1988, Respondent sold to Mr. Rickard a Medicare supplement policy and a nursing home insurance policy, both issued through National States. On March 28, 1988, Respondent sold to Mr. Rickard a cancer insurance policy and a medical expense insurance policy, both issued through National States. In December 1988, Mr. Rickard suffered a stroke which left him partially paralyzed and which resulted in his having a colostomy. Following his hospitalization he was placed in a rehabilitation center. In February 1989, Mr. Rickard was transferred from the rehabilitation center to the Fort Pierce Care Center, which is a nursing home. Mr. Rickard was a continuous resident of that nursing home (except for a brief hospitalization which is not pertinent to the disposition of the issues herein) from the date of his admission to his death on December 22, 1989. Friends took Mr. Rickard on day trips away from the nursing home on occasion. From February 1989 until his death, Mr. Rickard was confined to a wheelchair and required assistance with his activities of daily living. Mr. Rickard had poor vision, but he could occasionally read with the assistance of a large magnifying glass. Prior to his admission to the nursing home, Mr. Rickard resided in his mobile home located at 164 Port St. Lucie Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Dee James was a friend and former coworker of Mr. Rickard who assisted him with the payment of his bills. Ms. James was the primary beneficiary of Mr. Rickard's estate. In April 1989, Ms. James' grandson and his girlfriend were living in Mr. Rickard's mobile home. On April 18, 1989, National States cancelled all of its policies of insurance that Respondent had sold to Mr. Rickard. The letter of cancellation provided, in pertinent part, as follows: During the course of routine investigation into your claims, it has come to our attention that the health history portions of the applications for your coverage are inaccurate and incomplete. Specifically, health history was not shown on the application. Had we been aware of your medical conditions we would not have issued this coverage. Consequently, we have no alternative but to rescind your coverage as of its effective date and to make full premium refund. Accordingly, we are enclosing our check in the amount of $4,005.80. Between April 18, 1989, and April 24, 1989, Respondent was contacted by Ms. James and advised of the cancellation of Mr. Rickard's policies of insurance by National States. Ms. James, at the request of Mr. Rickard, asked Respondent for her assistance and set up a meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard. On April 24, 1989, Respondent met with Mr. Rickard and prepared an application for a Medicare supplement policy of insurance to be issued by American Integrity. The application for the American Integrity policy contained the following caveat: "IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IS 'YES', THE APPLICANT IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR COVERAGE". All of the questions that followed pertained to the medical history of the applicant and were answered in the negative. Respondent answered the questions on the application form based on information given to her by Mr. Rickard. The following were among those questions: Are you presently confined to a hospital or nursing home, or have you been hospitalized 4 times or more in the past 2 years? Are you presently bedridden or wheelchair confined? The location of this meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard is in dispute. Petitioner contends that the meeting occurred at the nursing home. This contention is based on evidence that Mr. Rickard was a continuous resident of the nursing home from the date of his admission except for the brief hospitalization. If Petitioner's contention is accepted, it follows that Respondent knew that Mr. Rickard was in the nursing home when she filled out the application. Respondent contends that the meeting occurred at Mr. Rickard's residence at 164 Port St. Lucie Boulevard, Fort Pierce and that she had no knowledge that Mr. Rickard was a nursing home patient when she filled out the application. Her contention is supported by evidence that friends took Mr. Rickard from the nursing home on occasion and by Respondent's testimony. The dispute is resolved by finding that Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard on April 24, 1989, occurred at the nursing home. Respondent's version of the meeting is accepted, and it is concluded that the meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard occurred at the mobile home Mr. Rickard owned at 164 Port St. Lucie Boulevard, Fort Pierce. It is further concluded that the evidence failed to establish that Respondent had actual knowledge that Mr. Rickard was residing in the nursing home when she filled out the American Integrity application. Ms. James set up the meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard, but neither she nor anyone other than Mr. Rickard was present when Respondent arrived at Mr. Rickard's mobile home on April 24, 1989. Respondent reviewed the American Integrity policy with Mr. Rickard and filled out the application that was submitted. Both Respondent and Mr. Rickard signed the application and he paid for the premium in the amount of $1,045.00 with a check that had been given to him by Ms. James. On April 24, 1989, Mr. Rickard was unable to ambulate and was confined to a wheelchair. He was unable to come to the door when Respondent knocked and he remained in a wheelchair during the meeting. It should have been apparent to Respondent when she completed the application for the American Integrity policy that Mr. Rickard was confined to a wheelchair. She knew or should have known that the application contained a false representation as to Mr. Rickard's physical condition and that he was not eligible to purchase this policy. The following appears on the application form above the Respondent's signature: I hereby certify that I have (1) accurately recorded the information supplied by the applicant; and (2) given an Outline of Coverage for the policy applied for and a Medicare Supplement Buyer's Guide to the applicant. Respondent testified that she read the questions on the application to Mr. Rickard, that he answered the questions, and that she wrote his answer on the application. She further testified that he reviewed the completed application with the use of his magnifying glass. The American Integrity policy would not have been issued had Respondent answered question 10 of the application in the affirmative. The American Integrity policy was subsequently issued. It was rescinded on November 11, 1989, after Ms. James notified American Integrity that Mr. Rickard resided in a nursing home, and Mr. Rickard received a full refund of the premium he had paid. Mr. Rickard and Ms. James filed no complaint with the Petitioner regarding Respondent. Neither blamed Respondent for the cancellation of the National States policies and both appreciated her efforts to be of assistance. The investigation into Respondent's actions was triggered by a complaint that Mr. Rickard, with the assistance of Ms. James, filed against National States. There was no evidence that Respondent's licensure had been subject to discipline prior to this proceeding. Respondent has a favorable reputation for service to her community and to her clients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, and which suspends her licensure and her eligibility for licensure for a period of three months. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-8 and 10-12 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The remaining proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence and as being contrary to the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3, 5-6, 9, and 18 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4, 7, 14, 26-27, 29, 33-34, 36- 37, 39, 41-42, 45-52, 58-61 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8, 10, 13, 15, and 17 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being either subordinate to the findings made or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 11-12, 16, 19-22, 24-25, 28. 35, and 53 are rejected as being either unnecessary to the conclusions reached or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 23 are rejected as being argument and as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 43 and 44 are rejected as being argument and as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 30 and 40 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 31 and 32 are rejected as incomplete recitations of testimony. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 57 are rejected as being argument based on unsubstantiated facts. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Wanda Sue Dirks 25 North Causeway Drive Ft. Pierce, Florida 34946 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an employee of the State of Florida, and was at all times pertinent, a member of the State Group Health Insurance Program administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. In March of 1984, Petitioner was hospitalized due to severe indigestion and abdominal pain. Petitioner was discharged from the hospital and informed by his physician that if his condition worsened, surgery would be necessary. Petitioner's condition worsened and on May 28, 1984, his physician, R. Klein Bowen, M.D., admitted him to the hospital with a pre-operative diagnosis of chronic acalculus cholecystitis which is chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. On May 29, 1984, said physician operated upon petitioner and his operative report listed the following under the title "Operation": Cholescystectomy. Attempted operative cholangiogram. Incidental appendectomy. The description of the operative procedure stated in the operative report (Respondent's Exhibit 1) establishes that the appendectomy which was performed was accomplished through the same incision which was made for performing the cholescystectomy (gallbladder removal). The operative report stated that the appendix was not acutely inflamed. Subsequent to the operative procedures the Petitioner filed a claim with the State Group Health Insurance Plan administrator, seeking payment for the following charges: May 28, 1984, $90.00 for consultation and case history preparation prior to surgery; May 29, 1984, $1,350.00 Cholescystectomy; May 29, 1984, $375.00 Appendectomy. All of said services were performed by R. Klein Bowen, M.D. The State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan paid the charge for the cholescystectomy and denied the claims for consultation and case history preparation prior to the surgery and for the appendectomy. The State Self- Insurance Plan justified its denial of Petitioner's claim for the above benefits based upon limitations it alleged were contained in the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self-Insurance Plan Benefit Document (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Section VIII entitled "Limitations" in paragraph I. specifies that payment may be made for in-patient medical care physician visits in addition to payment for surgery only when the condition which required medical care is not related to the surgery and does not constitute a part of the pre-operative or post-operative care. Additionally, Section VIII, F. specifies that no additional payment shall be made for a surgical procedure which is an incidental procedure performed through the same incision. Petitioner did not dispute the provisions which Respondent alleged were limitations justifying denial of payment, although he asserted that the provisions contained within the Group Health Self-Insurance Plan Benefit Document were not cost effective and would result in additional expenses and lost time from work and were worthy of reconsideration. However, Petitioner did not present any competent evidence to support his claim or refute the limitations relied upon by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying the Petition. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald B. Richardson 2909-198 South Semoran Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32822 Richard L. Kopel, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, which is the subject of Case Number 01-2295, reflect statements of agency policy which should have been adopted as rules pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties United is a foreign insurer, domiciled in the State of Wisconsin holding a certificate of authority from the Department to transact the business of insurance in this state. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Medical Securities Group, Inc. The Department, through its agency head, the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, has regulatory jurisdiction over United in connection with certain matters set forth in the Complaint. The regulatory scheme for out-of-state health insurance companies Health insurance companies operating pursuant to in-state regulatory schemes are subject to oversight regulation of the corporate entity including financial solvency and market conduct. Rates are required to be filed and approved prior to being used in the state. The review process involves a review of the rates to determine if they are reasonable in relation to the benefits provided. In regard to this, the Department has rules which it has adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, which it uses to determine the standards and formulae for making that determination. Certain out-of-state health insurers, such as United, are not subject to such stringent regulation. No review of premium rates is conducted by the Department in the case of these insurers, but it would be incorrect to state that they are not subject to regulation by the Department at all. Approximately 40 percent of the health insurance market in Florida is written through out-of-state group arrangements that do not provide policyholders consumer protections afforded to policyholders holding in-state policies regulated by the Department. United is required by Florida law to provide certain types of coverage. United must also ensure that certificates of coverage provided to residents of Florida contain the following language: The benefits of the policy providing your coverage are governed primarily by the law of a state other than Florida. Indent Background At all times pertinent, American Medical Security, Inc. (AMS), was a Florida-licensed administrator authorized to market and administer United's out-of-state group health insurance plans in Florida. AMS, like United, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Medical Securities Group, Inc. In May 1993, United, through AMS, filed for approval with the Department pursuant to Section 627.5515(2), Florida Statutes (1993), as an out-of-state group health insurer who would provide policies to be offered through an Alabama entity called the Prescription For Good Health Trust, which was formed primarily for the purpose of providing group insurance. The Department approved this filing. On March 2, 1995, the Department participated by conference call in a Regulatory Task Force of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The mission of the task force was to attempt to address a number of problems facing the insurance market. One of the problems discussed was rate protection for consumers when faced with "tier rating" or "tier blocking." The two terms are synonymous and mean, as to group health insurance, reclassifying insureds subsequent to having been initially placed in a class. This practice will be discussed in more detail below. In 1996, United made a filing for the Prescription For Good Health Trust which proposed tier rating. Sometime during 1996, after the Department objected to the filing, United withdrew it. The Department had never seen such a filing previously. United is the only health insurer to assert before the Department that reclassification by movement between classes would be permissible under the Florida Insurance Code. Section 627.6515(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a group health insurance policy issued or delivered outside this state under which a resident of Florida is provided coverage, shall comply with the provisions of Part VII, of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, in the same manner as health policies issued within the state. Part VII of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, provides for a comprehensive regulatory scheme for group health insurance. Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes, however, sets forth a number of exemptions. Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes, provides an exemption for an insurer like United, which provides health insurance through an association formed for a purpose other than that of offering insurance, which provides the language referred to in paragraph 5, supra, on the face of the certificate, and which offers the bundle of coverages provided in Subsection (c). This exemption applied to the Prescription For Good Health Trust. The Department concedes that it has no authority to set premium rates for out-of-state insurers like United. In November 1996, United through AMS, filed with the Department, pursuant to Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes, a request for approval of an out-of-state group health insurance policy termed the "MedOne Choice" plan. This plan was to be offered through an Ohio association called the Taxpayers' Network, Inc. (TNI). The association was formed primarily for purposes other than providing insurance. In January, 1997, the filing was accepted by the Department as meeting the requirements of Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes. Chapter 96-223, Laws of Florida, created Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, effective May 25, 1996. When created, the section only addressed the renewability of individual coverage. Chapter 97-179, Laws of Florida, substantially amended Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, effective May 30, 1997. Subsequent to the amendment, the section addressed certificates of coverage offered to individuals in the state as part of a group policy. This statute, along with Sections 627.6571 and 627.6487, Florida Statutes, implemented the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The basic theory of the HIPAA legislation is that an insurance company cannot simply cancel a health insurance policy without providing other options. On or about September 25, 1998, United, through AMS, notified all Prescription For Good Health Trust certificate holders that the policy forms through which their coverage had been provided were being discontinued, effective as of each certificate holder's 1999 renewal date. Upon discontinuance of the Prescription For Good Health Trust Plans, the only United health insurance plans available in Florida were the MedOne Choice plans offered through TNI. Membership in TNI was available to anyone upon submitting an application form and paying the membership fee. Membership in TNI was a prerequisite to continuance of a persons' health insurance coverage under United's MedOne Choice plan. United guaranteed each certificate holder, upon joining TNI, that upon request, they would be issued coverage under the Classic Benefit Plan (one of the TNI MedOne Choice plans) without regard to their health status. However, there was no guarantee that premiums would not rise. Certificate holders were also advised that if they desired coverage under a MedOne Choice plan other than the guaranteed issue Classic Benefit plan, they could apply for any of the other TNI plans. Only if the applicant met the underwriting guidelines for the plan for which they applied, would they be issued coverage under another MedOne Choice plan. Between October 1998 and early January 1999, United responded to questions and concerns raised by the Department about the decision to discontinue the Prescription For Good Health Trust plan, and whether the plan of discontinuance was in compliance with Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes. Specifically, discussions were had concerning the movement of insureds from the class in which they were originally assigned to another class at the time of renewal. United entered an agreement with the Department on January 14, 1999, whereby United would offer to certificate holders an additional guaranteed issue TNI plan and would cap the rate for the guaranteed issue plans at no more than twice the premium then currently being paid for the discontinued Prescription For Good Health Trust plan. In accordance with this agreement, United notified certificate holders of the additional guaranteed issue option available to them. Later in 1999, United discontinued the trust plan in accordance with their agreement with the Department. During the process of discontinuance, no certificate holder requested conversion coverage under Section 627.6675, Florida Statutes. Section 627.6675, Florida Statutes, provides that an insured may assert his or her right to a "converted policy," which provides for certain health insurance continuation rights. The Department determined that United's rate for the conversion policy, pursuant to the agreement, was within 200 percent of the standard risk rate and that the notice of the conversion privilege was contained in the certificate of coverage issued to Florida residents. Thus, the Department concluded that United was in compliance with the agreement of January 14, 1999. On May 19, 1999, a Department letter informed a consumer that the discontinuance of her coverage by United did not mean she was being discriminated against because the policy had been terminated for all members. The letter further recited that the Department did not have the ability to regulate United because it was not domiciled in Florida and her insurance was being provided to a group, referring to TNI, that was not registered in Florida. On July 27, 1999, a Department letter informed a consumer that United had an obligation to offer a replacement policy but that United had the right to underwrite the policy and charge additional premium. This statement also referred to TNI. Section 627.6425(1), Florida Statutes, provides that "except as otherwise provided in this section, an insurer that provides individual health insurance coverage to an individual shall renew or continue in force such coverage at the option of the individual." For the purpose of the aforementioned Section, the term "individual health insurance" means health insurance coverage, as described in Section 627.6561(5)(a)2, Florida Statutes, offered to an individual in the state, "including certificates of coverage offered to individuals in the state as part of a group policy issued to an association outside this state. " As noted earlier, Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, is one of the statutes enacted in Florida which implemented HIPAA. HIPAA provides for continuation of health insurance of an insureds health policy but does not limit the premiums which an insurer can charge for coverage. Although Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, does not have the words "guaranteed renewable" contained within the statute, the gist of the statute is that if a person has a health policy, the person has the right to continued coverage. The Department contends that the statute also means that there can be no reclassification or movement between classes at the time of renewal. On March 30, 2000, the Department notified United that it believed the discontinuance of Prescription For Good Health Trust plan, in accordance with the January 1999 agreement, may have violated Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes. A Department publication dated January 4, 2001, entitled, "The Florida Health Insurance Market, Issues and Possible Market Reform Measures," noted that there are "an increasing number of carriers attempting to establish HIPAA eligible individuals as a separate rating class with premium charges ranging from 300 to 500 percent of standard rates. While the Department has found such a rating practice to be in violation of the Florida Insurance Code, many carriers have continued to protest this interpretation. Carriers contend the surcharge practice is both actuarially sound and interpreted as a HIPAA permissible practice by other states." In the 2001 legislative session, the Department sought additional regulatory authority concerning out-of-state group insurers, such as United, along with numerous other changes to the Florida Insurance Code which are unrelated to the issues addressed in this Order. The Florida Legislature failed to approve the requested legislation. Tier rating When a group health policy is underwritten, the members of the group may be divided into classes. The classes are based on risk, which is a function of the probability of claims and the cost of claims. Classes may be denominated, for example, as preferred, manual, and substandard. Very healthy persons are put in the preferred class and pay lower premiums relative to other classes. Average persons are put in the manual class because the likelihood and cost of claims may be average. Persons who for actuarial reasons are determined to have an above-average likelihood of claims and whose claims are apt to be costly, are placed in the substandard class. It, perhaps, goes without saying that the individuals in the substandard class must pay higher premiums for the same coverage as others in the group. If the group health policy is guaranteed renewable, certificate holders may continue their coverage. However, premiums within a class can be increased. It is general industry practice to increase the premiums by class when the time for renewal occurs, if the loss experience is such that there is a requirement to increase premiums. As earlier noted, the Department asserts that only by raising premiums for an entire class may premiums be raised. The Department insists that this requirement is part of the definition of "guaranteed renewable." It became United's practice to move insureds between classes. Therefore, for instance, if a person in the group who had been a member of the preferred class experienced the need for costly medical services, then that person might be moved to the manual or substandard class. This would inevitably result in that person paying an increased premium. On the other hand, a person in the substandard class, who was subsequently determined to be a good risk, might be moved to the preferred or manual class and experience reduced premiums as a result. When a substandard class becomes populated with persons who cause the payment of costly claims, premiums increase within that class. Premiums may increase to the point where persons egress the plan, which leaves the class with fewer and sicker members. Eventually, under such a plan, there will be no members, because the premiums will inflate to the point that the benefits, in relation to the amount of the premium, will render the plan uneconomical. This sequence of events is often referred to as the health insurance "death spiral." One of the asserted evils which the Department seeks to combat in the Complaint is the "death spiral." HIPAA eligibles In 1996, when HIPAA became law and Florida enacted laws to implement it, a practice sometimes referred to as "rating up" occurred among some carriers in the industry. As noted earlier, HIPAA and the state statutes implementing it, guarantee that an individual, who through no fault of his own, loses his or her group health insurance coverage has the opportunity to obtain substitute health insurance. A person in this category is referred to as HIPAA eligible. Companies providing insurance under these laws are cognizant of the fact that persons in good health generally decline to purchase this type of insurance but that persons who are in bad health, and who will, therefore, likely have costly claims, will purchase it if they can afford it. This results in a desire on the part of insurers, to charge higher premiums for HIPAA eligible persons than they might charge persons in a comparable, non-HIPAA plan. It is a permissible underwriting practice to take into consideration age, health, and a myriad of other actuarial considerations when developing premium rates for HIPAA eligibles. If an insurer factors in the knowledge that unhealthy persons are more likely than healthy persons to obtain a policy based on HIPAA and charge higher premiums as a result, then "rating up" occurs. The Department contends in its Complaint that "rating up" is discriminatory and, therefore, forbidden by the Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act (UITPA), Section 626.951, et seq., Florida Statutes. United allegedly arrives at rates for HIPAA eligibles solely based on the fact that the individuals are HIPAA eligible which if true, would be "rating up." Immediately prior to April 30, 1998, the Department received a memorandum from the federal Health Care Financing Administration addressing three general problems with insurance practices regarding HIPAA eligibles. One of the three problems addressed in the memorandum was the practice of "rating up." In response, the Department issued Informational Memorandum 98-103M on April 30, 1998, addressing the three problems. The Department announced that it had concerns similar to that of the Health Care Financing Administration, and would address them in administrative rules implementing HIPAA and Chapter 97-179, Laws of Florida. However, no rules addressing these concerns have been adopted. Insurance carriers disagree with the Department as to whether "rating up" is unfairly discriminatory and therefore a violation of the UITPA. The Department is addressing these differences on a case-by-case basis in the course of market conduct examinations. The evidence adduced at the hearing did not elucidate exactly what "addressing these differences on a case-by-case basis in the course of market conduct examinations" means. Count Three in the Complaint represents the first time an administrative action has been brought against an insurer addressing this practice. The definition of guaranteed renewable Chapter 4-149, Florida Administrative Code, is entitled "Filing of Forms and Rates for Life and Health Insurance." Rule 4-149.006(4)(o)3, Florida Administrative Code, provides for a definition of "guaranteed renewable." However, Chapter 4-149, Florida Administrative Code, does not address out-of-state group health insurers, such as United, because the Department has no authority to require the filing of forms and rates in the case of out-of-state health insurers like United. A life and health insurance treatise written by Black and Skipper states that the definitions of the categories of renewable health insurance policies are not uniform among the states. It is the Department's position that Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, applies to out-of-state trusts, such as United's Prescription For Good Health Trust, even though the word "trust" is not used in the statute. It is apparent that if there is no limit on the amount of premium a health insurer can charge at the time of renewal, a guarantee of renewal can be meaningless. This fact is ameliorated by rate-setting in the case of highly regulated health insurers such as domestic insurers. In the context of this case, it is not the renewability of a policy that is the gist of the problem. Rather, it is whether rates can be increased on persons through the movement of insureds from one class to another. The allegations of the Complaint In order to determine which statements are alleged to be unadopted rules, it is necessary to refer to Counts Two through Seven of the Complaint. These counts will be summarized, in seriatim. Count Two alleges that persons who continued their participation in TNI were unlawfully and unfairly discriminated against because some members were reclassified based on their health status present at that time (1999), rather than being retained in the class in which they resided when the policy was initially issued. The Petition alleges, inter alia, that this practice violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, which is a section in the UITPA. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Three alleges that all of those individuals formerly covered through the Prescription For Good Health Trust who were at the time of their discontinuance HIPAA eligible, were, arbitrarily and without regard to health status, assigned a premium rate of either three or five times the base rate for TNI as a whole. Count Three alleges that this assignment unfairly discriminated against the HIPAA eligible individuals who were of the same actuarially supportable class and essentially the same hazard. Count Three further alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Four alleges that the enactment of Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, in 1996, as amended in 1997, statutorily determined that the Prescription For Good Health Trust plan was "guaranteed renewable" as that term is used and understood in the insurance industry. It further alleged that the term "guaranteed renewable” means that once an insurer classifies an individual as a member of an actuarially supportable class for rate and premium applicable to the specified coverage, that individual may not thereafter be charged a premium which is different from any other member of the same class and cannot be moved to another class. The complaint states that United unlawfully moved insureds from one class to another. Count Four additionally alleged that when United discontinued the Prescription For Good Health Trust, the prerequisite for individuals to obtain renewed health insurance coverage was reclassification of some of those individuals to different actuarially supportable classes based on their health status then pertinent to those individuals. It was further alleged that higher premiums were charged to approximately 70 percent of those who renewed or continued, and that premium increases of 200 percent to 300 percent were experienced. Count Four asserted that Section 627.6425(3), Florida Statutes, prohibits such reclassification. Count Four also alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, because such reclassification was discriminatory. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Five alleges that on the one year anniversary of renewal with TNI, United unlawfully reclassified additional individuals which resulted in a premium increases of up to 60 percent. Count Five alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, because this action was discriminatory. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Six alleges that within the tier blocks described in Count Two, United unlawfully established numerous sub- classifications based on health related factors pertinent to each individual within that class. It is alleged in the Complaint that these sub-classifications resulted in individuals within the same class being charged a different premium than are other members of the class. Count Six alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, because this action was discriminatory. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Seven alleges that United used a point debit system where an arithmetic number of points are assigned to a corresponding health hazard. The higher the cumulative debit score, the higher the premium. United will decline to insure at all if the cumulative debit score gets sufficiently high. Count Seven alleges that the assignment of points with no criteria for decision-making results in arbitrary and discriminatory point scores. Count Seven alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. In summary, the three statements alleged to be rules are: Practicing tier rating is discriminatory and violates the UITPA. Placing HIPAA-eligible individuals in a premium classification solely on the basis of their HIPAA eligible status is discriminatory and violates the UITPA. The term "guaranteed renewable" prohibits the classification of individuals in a health insurance group at a time other than at the inception of coverage.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was an Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent, and a Disability Agent licensed by the State of Florida. During this period, Respondent was licensed to sell life and health insurance policies for National States Insurance Company, American Guaranty Life Insurance Company, and Old Southern Life Insurance Company. Respondent was employed as an agent by Diversified Health Services, an insurance agency whose office is located in St. Petersburg, Florida. At no time material hereto was Respondent employed by any agency of the State of Florida. As indicated above, there remain viable in the Administrative Complaint ten counts charging Respondent with various violations of provisions of the Florida Insurance Code. For purposes of clarity, the findings of fact with regard to each of those remaining counts will be set forth separately. COUNT I On February 12, 1983, Respondent visited Lucille Shock at her home in Bradenton, Florida. Mrs. Shock had earlier purchased a Medicare supplement policy from National States Insurance Company through another agent, but had decided to cancel that policy. Respondent visited Mrs. Shock's home in response to her notice of cancellation in hopes of persuading her to reinstate coverage. In paragraph three of Count I of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent is charged with having told Mrs. Shock that he was ". . . authorized by the Florida Department of Insurance to investigate the Diversified Health Agency" when, in fact, he was not employed by any state agency. While it is true that Respondent was not at the time of his visit to Mrs. Shock employed by any state agency, the record in this cause is insufficient to establish the foregoing allegation of the Administrative Complaint. Respondent denies having made any c representation to Mrs. Shock that he was employed by the State of Florida. Further, Mrs. Shock's testimony in this regard is inconsistent and conflicting. In a February 21, 1983, letter to a representative of the Florida Department of Insurance, Mrs. Shock stated that at the time of his visit to her home the Respondent represented that he ". . . was an investigator for the Diversified Health Agency. . . . At final hearing, Mrs. Shock testified that Respondent told her that he was an investigator for the "insurance department," but also, on cross-examination, testified that Respondent told her that he was an investigator for Diversified Health. Despite these inconsistencies, it is clear from the record in this proceeding that before the end of Respondent's visit with Mrs. Shock on February 12, 1983, she knew that Respondent was an insurance agent for National States Insurance Company. Because of the inconsistencies in Mrs. Shock's testimony, it is specifically concluded that her testimony concerning Respondent's representation about his employment is unreliable. Other than Mrs. Shock's testimony, there is no other record basis to establish that Respondent represented himself to be an employee of the Department of Insurance as alleged in Count I. Respondent is also charged in paragraph five of Count I of the Administrative Complaint with having "falsely represented the financial condition of several insurance companies licensed to do business in Florida as part of your sales presentation to induce Mrs. Shock to buy insurance policies from you." The record in this cause establishes that Respondent and Mrs. Shock discussed several insurance companies, including Vulcan Insurance Company, Tara Life Insurance Company, and Bankers Life during their visit on February 12, 1983. Respondent reviewed with Mrs. Shock data contained in certain A. M. Best Company reports concerning these insurance companies.Respondent advised Mrs. Shock that Vulcan Insurance Company was "a rather shaky company" and that Tara Life Insurance Company had been experiencing "financial problems." There is, however, nothing of record in this proceeding to establish either that these companies are licensed in Florida or that the representations made by Respondent to Mrs. Shock concerning these insurance companies were false. Accordingly, the allegations contained in paragraph five of Count I have not been established. COUNT II On or about February 10, 1983, Respondent visited Koy B. Cook at his home in Port Orange, Florida. The purpose of Respondent's visit to Mr. Cook was to dissuade Mr. Cook from cancelling a policy with National States Insurance Company whichir. Cook had previously bought from another agent. After buying the National States policy initially, Mr. Cook had attempted to cancel a preexisting policy with Bankers Life Insurance Company, but had been advised by that company that the policy could not be cancelled. Mr. Cook determined that he could not afford duplicated coverage, so he contacted National States Insurance Company and advised them of his desire to cancel his National States policy. Be was advised, in writing, by National States, that his policy had been cancelled and that his premium had been returned to the insurance agency which had sold him the policy for refund. Sometime prior to January 12, 1983, Respondent contacted Mr. Cook by telephone, identified himself by name, and arranged an appointment to visit with Mr. Cook in his home. Mr. Cook understood from the conversation with Respondent that the purpose of their appointment was to return Mr. Cook's refund check from his cancelled National States policy. Immediately prior to Respondent's arrival at Mr. Cook's home, Mr. Cook had been asleep. When Respondent arrived at Mr. Cook's door, Mr. Cook was still in a "daze," having just awakened. This fact is of significance, because at various times in his testimony Mr. Cook testified that Respondent identified himself as . . . an adjuster with Bill Gunter out of Tallahassee, or . . . an adjuster for the insurance company out of Tallahassee." Mr. Cook also testified that Respondent showed him some identification which bore a photograph of Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter. This photograph was apparently attached to a document, the contents of which were unknown to Mr. Cook. Respondent denies having represented that he was an employee of the Department of Insurance. During the course of their conversation, Mr. Cook advised Respondent that he preferred the coverage offered under the National States policy to that of the Bankers Life policy, but simply could not afford duplicate coverage. Respondent and Mr. Cook discussed the amount of unearned premium outstanding on the Bankers Life policy as compared to the cost of reinstating the National States policy. Mr. Cook had originally paid $630 for the issuance of the National States policy. Respondent returned to Mr. Cook a check in that amount during the course of their visit. Further, by offering to reinstate the National States policy for a $526 annual premium, Respondent demonstrated to Mr. Cook that he would save approximately the amount that remained in unearned premiums on the Bankers Life policy. Mr. Cook agreed to this proposal, Respondent completed an application form, and Mr. Cook gave Respondent a check for approximately $526 to reinstate the National States policy, with the understand- ing that the National States and Bankers Life policies would overlap for some period of time. Upon leaving Mr. Cook's house, Respondent gave Mr. Cook one of his business cards, which identi- fied Respondent as an agent of National States Insurance Company. In Count II of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent is charged with having told Mr. Cook that he was an "insurance adjuster working out of Tallahassee" and that he "worked for the Florida Department of Insurance. Respondent is further charged with having told Mr. Cook that he "had a refund check for a cancelled Bankers Life policy when in fact the] had no such check." The testimony of Mr. Cook and Respondent on the issues alleged in Count II are diametrically oooosed. Viewing the transaction between Mr. Cook and Respondent in its totality, it is concluded that Respondent's version of the transaction is the more credible. Mr. Cook's testimony concerning Respondent's representations about his employment status contained several contradictions and inconsistencies. In addition, it is clear that Mr. Cook expected to receive a refund check from National States Insurance Comoany, that Mr. Palesky contacted him by telephone prior to his February 10 visit to advise him that he had his refund check, and that Respondent conducted himself during the entire transaction in a manner which clearly identified him as an insurance salesman. Finally, Respondent furnished Mr. Cook with a business card during the course of their meeting which clearly showed Respondent to be an agent of National States Insurance Company. It is also clear that Mr. Cook was aware during this entire transaction that his Bankers Life policy had not been cancelled, and that as a result of his transaction with Respondent he would be carrying policies with National States and Bankers Life which afforded duclicate coverage, and that he was advised of this fact by Respondent. These facts are clearly inconsistent with Mr. Cook's testimony that Respondent advised him that he had a refund for a cancelled Bankers Life policy in his possession. COUNT IV On or about March 2, 1982, Respondent visited Marjorie Brubaker in her home in Bradenton, Florida. The purpose of Respondent's visit to Mrs. Brubaker was to dissuade her from cancelling an insurance policy with National States Insurance Company which she had previously purchased through another agent and had subsequently cancelled. Mrs. Brubaker testified that, upon arrival at her home, Respondent represented to her that he was an "investigator for the state" or a "state investigator," looking into her cancellation of her policy with National States Insurance Company. Respondent denies having made that representation. The record is clear, however, that shortly after entering Mrs. Brubaker's home, Respondent showed Mrs. Brubaker materials which clearly identified him as an agent of National States Insurance Company, and that Mrs. Brubaker clearly understood within minutes after his entering her home that he was, in fact, a salesman for National States Insurance Company. Under these circumstances, it is specifically found that Respondent's testimony concerning his employment status is more credible. If, as is clear from the record, Respondent intended to sell insurance to Mrs. Brubaker, there is little logic to his having represented himself as a state employee at the door to her home, and within minutes clearly divulging to her that that was indeed not the case. Petitioner also alleges in the Administrative Complaint that Respondent displayed a photograph of Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter to Mrs. Brubaker to establish his position as an investigator for the state. Mrs. Brubaker, however, was unable to identify the person in the photograph displayed to her by Respondent, other than to assert that the person in the photograph was not the Respondent, but instead a clean-shaven person with light hair and fair, reddish complexion. Those facts, standing alone, are insufficient to establish that the person in the photograph was, in fact, Mr. Gunter. Respondent is alleged in paragraph twenty of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint of having ". . . . falsely represented the status of Medicare coverage in this state in order to induce Mrs. Brubaker to purchase' new insurance policies from you." The only evidence in the record on this issue is Mrs. Brubaker's testimony that Respondent told her that Blue Cross-Blue Shield would soon cease to be the Medicare carrier in Florida, and that there existed a substantial possibility that National States Insurance Company would be designated as the new Medicare carrier in Florida. The record in this cause is absolutely devoid of any evidence that that representation, even if it had been made, was false. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish facts to support the allegations that Respondent has falsely represented the status of Medicare coverage in Florida. Finally, paragraph twenty-one of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent falsely told Mrs. Brubaker that her present insurer, Orange State Life Insurance Company, was cancelling its Medicare Supplement policies. . . . It is undisputed that Mrs. Brubaker, at the time she was visited by Respondent, had insurance coverage through Orange State Life Insurance Company. Mrs. Brubaker, it is clear from the record, was under the impression that her policy with Orange State Life Insurance Company was a Medicare supplement policy. Respondent testified that her policy was not a Medicare supplement policy, and, in fact, bore a statement across the top of the policy to the effect that the policy was not a Medicare supplement policy. Petitioner offered no evidence to rebut Respondent's testimony in this regard, and neither party sought to introduce the policy into evidence. The only evidence offered by Petitioner to support the allegation that Respondent's representation that Orange State Life Insurance Company was cancelling its Medicare supplement policv was the fact that Mrs. Brubaker had continued to pay premiums on her policy after the representation was made by Respondent without receiving notice of any cancellation. However, any inference that might be drawn from continued payment of premiums fails if, in fact, the policy held by Mrs. Brubaker was not a Medicare supplement policy. Neither party having offered competent evidence to establish that Mrs. Brubaker's Orange State Life Insurance Company policy was in fact a Medicare supplement policy, the allegations contained in paragraph twenty-one of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint are deemed to be without factual support. COUNT VI In Count VI f the Administrative Complaint, it is alleged that Respondent visited the home of Leila Mueller on October 18, 1979. It is further alleged that at that time Respondent told Mrs. Mueller that he was ". . . from Medicare and that [Respondent] had called at one of [Mrs. Mueller's] neighbor's homes to explain the changes in Medicare coverage." It is further alleged that Respondent ". . . misrepresented [his] actual employment in order to induce Mrs. Mueller to buy insurance policies. The record in this cause establishes that on or about October 18, 1979, Mrs. Mueller was visited in her home by two insurance salesmen whom she believed to be in some way affiliated with Medicare. Mrs. Mueller did not recall the names of either of the two men, was not asked to physically identify the Respondent, and could not recall which of the two men led her to believe that they were affiliated with "Medicare." Mrs. Mueller inquired about whether there existed any written material that she could review to decide whether to purchase insurance coverage. One of the men furnished her a brochure which had the name "Palesky" on it. There is no evidence of record in this proceeding to establish that Respondent was ever in the home of Mrs. Mueller or that he in any fashion ever represented to her or to anyone else that he was a representative of Medicare. The only testi- mony in this record that in any way connects Respondent with Mrs. Mueller was her testimony that she was given a brochure, which was not introduced into evidence, containing Respondent's name. This fact, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the factual allegations contained in Count VI of the Adminis- trative Complaint. COUNT XI On or about March 21, 1982, Respondent visited William F. and Winifred M. Bell in their home in Sarasota, Florida. The purpose of Respondent's visit to the Bells was to sell them a Medicare supplement policy. The Bells had previously purchased a policy from Union Fidelity Insurance Company. During the course of Respondent's visit with the Bells, Respondent advised them that Union Fidelity was "not a good company" and that the policy they had with Union Fidelity was "not a good policy." In addition, Respondent advised the Bells that if anything happened to Mr. Bell that Mrs. Bell would not be insured within two months after Mr. Bell's death. Paragraph fifty-five of Count XI of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent told the Bells ". . . that their present insurance coverage was no good" and that if Mr. Bell died, Mrs. Bell would not be insured when in fact [Respondent] knew that both of those statements were false." The record in this cause contains no evidence that the representations set forth above made by Respondent to the Bells were false. The Bells' insurance policy was not received into evidence because Petitioner failed to respond fully to Respondent's Request for Production of Documents, and had further failed to fully exchange exhibits with Respondent, including a copy of the Bells' policy, as required by the Pre-hearing Order entered by the Hearing Officer approximately two months prior to the date set for final hearing in this cause. Accordingly, there are no facts to substantiate the allegations contained in Count XI of the Administrative Complaint. COUNT XII On or about February 4, 1983, Respondent visited Louise S. Donovan at her home in Daytona Beach, Florida. Respondent visited Mrs. Donovan in response to her cancellation of a previous policy purchased from National States Insurance Company from another agent on or about November 17, 1982. Soon thereafter, she cancelled that policy but on December 22, 1982, reinstated the policy after having available coverages explained to her by the other agent. Sometime thereafter she again can- called the National States policy. By letter dated January 17, 1983, from the home office of National States Insurance Company, Mrs. Donovan was advised that her refund-check had been returned to her agency for refund to her. On February 4, 1983, Respondent visited Mrs. Donovan in her home. Under direct examination, Mrs. Donovan testified as follows concerning that visit: Q So, you showed [the January 27, 1983] letter to Mr. Palesky; and, how did he respond to the letter? A He said sort of -- it's a little vague now after all these months -- that, oh, well, they didn't pay any attention to those things, or some- thing like that, and that the company would not refund any money on the policy. Q Be made the statement to you that the company was not going to refund? A The company would not -- now, I believe his interpretation of that, but it wasn t clear to me, was that there was a certain clause in that policy that I was not satisfied with and that he would not reissue the same policy under the same conditions. Well, I'm a lay person. I don't know all these fine points. And, I under- stood that he meant that the company would not refund any money to me at all... During the course of their discussions, Mrs. Donovan advised Respondent that she had cancel led the policy because she did not have nursing home coverage. Respondent explained to her that, under those circumstances she would have to either add nursing home coverage to the policy she had cancelled, which he was not sure that he could do for her because the so-called "RS 100 feature" was in the process of being discontinued, or she could take out a separate nursing home policy. Resnondent advised her that in order to keep the RS 100 feature she would have to reinstate the policy which she had cancelled, and take out a separate nursing home policy at a later date. This is the option which Respondent recommended to Mrs. Donovan, and the option that she ultimately chose. Accordingly, Mrs. Donovan opted to fill out an application reinstating the cancelled policy. She had originally paid $659 for the policy she took out on December 22, 982, but premium rates had increased since that time. The application filled out by Mrs. Donovan on February 4, 1983, reflects the premium rate increased to $691. Mrs. Donovan testified that she did not recall endorsing a refund check in the amount of $659 from National States Insurance Company and allowing Respondent to submit the endorsed check to National States along with the application dated February 4, 1983. Respondent testified that she did, in fact, endorse that check, which he forwarded to National States Insurance Company with the February 4, 1983, application. According to Respondent's testimony, which is uncontradicted, he submitted the $659 check to National States, notwithstanding the fact that the premium rate had increased to $691, with the understanding that the company had the option of either reinstating the policy for $659 or insisting upon the increased premium rate. Thereafter, Mrs. Donovan again decided to cancel the coverage she received as a result of the February 4, 1983, application submitted through Respondent. Mrs. Donovan signed a sworn statement on March 30, 1983, which provided, in part, as follows: Mr. Palesky has shown me the com- plaint filed against him by the Department of Insurance. I totally disagree with the accusa- tions in the complaint. My only problem with Mr. Pale sky was a misunderstanding concerning the fact that the RS 100 rider could not be refunded and reissued (as it was being discontinued) [sic] I thought he meant the entire policy could not be refunded. . . . Count XII of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent ". . . refused to return [premium] money to Mrs. Donovan. . ., and that ". . . as a result of your refusal Mrs. Donovan felt pressured into applying for a new policy at a higher premium." Further, Count XII alleges that ". . . the new policy was written for a higher premium, that [Resoondent] signed a receipt acknowledging receipt of the higher premium, and that Mrs. Donovan gave [Respondent] no money during [the] visit [of] February 4, 1983." The evidence in this cause does not establish that Respondent refused to return premium money to Mrs. Donovan, nor does the evidence establish that Mrs. Donovan was pressured into applying for a new policy at a higher premium. Finally, the evidence in this cause establishes that Respondent attempted to have National States Insurance Company reinstate Mrs. Donovan's coverage at the premium originally paid in December of 1982, notwithstanding a premium increase that had occurred in the interim, a procedure which has not been shown by the record in this cause to be in any way improper. COUNT XV On or about January 24, 1983, Kenneth E. Fritz bought a National States Insurance Company policy from an agent other than Respondent. On or about February 12, 1983, Mr. Fritz cancelled that policy and asked for a full refund. Mr. Fritz subsequently received a letter dated March 11, 1983, from National States Insurance Company acknowledging his request for cancellation, and advising him that a full refund of his premium was being sent to the agency office which had sold the policy to him, with instructions to deliver the refund to him. On or about March 24, 1983, Respondent visited Mr. Fritz in his home in Largo, Florida, with Mr. Fritz' refund check. In paragraph eighty-eight of Count XV of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent is charged with having ". told Mr. Fritz that [Respondent was] an `investigator with Florida' and that [Respondent] pointed to an emblem on [Respondent's] jacket which gave [Mr. Fritz] the idea [Respondent was] employed by the State of Florida' when in fact [Respondent was] not and are not employed by the Florida Deoartment of Insurance in any capacity." It is further alleged that Resoondent made this representation to influence Mr. Fritz to buy insurance policies, and that Mr. Fritz did not realize that Respondent was not a government employee until reading a newspaper article on or about April 2, 1983, concerning the emergency suspension of Respondent's licensed. Respondent denies ever having represented to Mr. Fritz that he was an employee of the State of Florida. Indeed, Mr. Fritz testified on this issue only that: Mr. Palesky came here, and he had a thing on his coat, and he says[sic] you bought some policies from the -- and he mentioned the name of the company in St. Louis, and he says[sic] I'm here to check on that, and he rattles this thing and give [sic] me the impression that he was the--was from the State of Florida checking this. . . . As mentioned above, Respondent is charged with representing to Mr. Fritz that Respondent was an "investigator with Florida." Nothing contained in the record in this cause establishes that Respondent ever made such a representation to Mr. Fritz. Indeed, Mr. Fritz clearly testified that he could not remember exactly what Respondent said to him to give him the "impression" that he was an employee of the State of Florida. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that the allegation of the Administrative Complaint that Mr. Fritz did not know that Respondent was not a state employee until reading of Respondent's emergency suspension in a newspaper article on or about April 2, 1983, is false. What is clear is that Respondent made a sales presentation to Mr. Fritz which resulted not only in Mr. Fritz' reinstating the policy he had earlier purchased from another agent and cancelled, but in fact buying another policy from Respondent at the same time. It is also clear that Respondent gave Mr. Fritz a business card during the course of their conversation which clearly identified Respondent as a salesman for National States Insurance Company. In short, this record does not establish that Respondent ever represented himself as an employee of the State of Florida during the course of his sales presentation to Mr. Fritz, nor did Mr. Fritz reinstate his cancelled policy and purchase a second policy based upon any such representation. COUNT XVII On April 15, 1981, Esther Huddleson purchased two Medicare supplement policies issued by National States Insurance Company from agent Michael Frye. On April 16, 1901, she requested a refund on the National States policies. On June 1, 1981, she was visited in her home by Respondent. Count XVII alleges that Respondent falsely advised Mrs. Huddleson that he was an "insurance investigator" and an "investigator for the State." It is also alleged that Respondent was not an "investigator" for National States Insurance Company and that his status with the company had always been that of a sales representative. Further, it is alleged that Respondent ". . . falsely told Mrs. Huddleson her statutory `free look' had expired and so persuaded her to sign a conservation notice." It is clear from the record in this proceeding that Respondent never advised Mrs. Huddleson that he was an "investigator for the State" or in any other manner employed by the State of Florida or the Department of Insurance. A sworn statement signed by Mrs. Huddleson upon which she was closely interrogated by counsel and the Bearing Officer during the course of this proceeding clearly reflects that Respondent identified himself either as "an investigator from National States Insurance Company" or "States Insurance Company." Fur ther, there is no evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that this representation by Respondent was in any way false. Finally, the only testimony in the record in this cause concerning Mrs. Huddleson's statutory "free look" period occurred on the direct examination of Mrs. Buddleson as follows: Q Did [Respondent] lead you to believe that your 30-day period had passed? A yes. At least, that was in my mind. Mrs. Buddleson's testimony in this regard is, at best, equivocal, and does not persuasively establish that Respondent did, in fact, advise her that her "free look" period had expired as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. There is, accordingly, insufficient evidence of record in this proceeding to establish the allegations against Respondent contained in Count XVII of the Administrative Complaint. The Bearing Officer feels constrained, further, to note with concern the failure of Petitioner's counsel to deal with both Mrs. Huddleson's sworn statement and direct testimony concerning the fact that Respondent never represented himself to her to be an employee of the State of Florida. In fact, to say that Petitioner's counsel failed to deal with those issues is most charitable. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the proposed findings submitted by Petitioner's counsel on this particular issue have absolutely no factual basis in this record, despite citations to a portion of the transcript purportedly supporting the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. COUNT XXI In December of 1982 Mary Ellen Stapleton purchased a Medicare supplement policy from an agent, other than Respon- dent, representing National States Insurance Company. After reviewing the policy and deciding that she did not want to retain it, Mrs. Stapleton returned the policy on or about February 8, 1983, to National States Insurance Company, and requested a refund of her premium. Through a series of correspondence with National States Insurance Company, Mrs. Stapleton's cancellation request was acknowledged, and she was advised that her premium refund had been returned to the office of the agency selling the policy, with instructions to make immediate delivery to her. On or about March 8, 1983, Respondent telephoned Mrs. Stapleton at her home and advised her that he was an investigator for National States Insurance Company and that he was investigating a Mr. Buffer, who had sold Mrs. Stapleton her National States policy. Count XXI, in pertinent part, alleges: That on or about March 8, 1983, you, JOSEPH MICHAEL PALESKY, telephoned Mrs. Stapleton at her home in Lakeland, Florida, and told her you were "an investigator for National States and [that you were] investi- gating Mr. Buffer" when in fact you were not and are not an investigator for National States Insurance Company but were and are only a salesman. That at no time did you tell Mrs. Stapleton that you represented Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida. That you, JOSEPH MICHAEL PALESKY, created the false impression of your employ- ment status in order to induce Mrs. Stapleton to keep the [cancelled] policy. . Respondent did not tell Mrs. Stapleton that he represented Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida. It is undisputed that Respondent was, on March 8, 1983, a salesman for National States Insurance Company. Petitioner has not established by any evidence whatsoever that Respondent was not an investigator for National States Insurance Company with authority to investigate Mr. Buffer. Neither has it been shown in this record that Respondent was under any obligation to identify the insurance agency by whom he was employed after having first clearly identified himself as being affiliated with National States Insurance Company. It is, therefore, specifically concluded that there are no facts of record to establish the violations alleged in Count XXI of the Administrative Complaint. COUNT XXII On September 24, 1980, Respondent visited John Capers Smith and Lillian H. Smith in their home in Bradenton, Florida. Respondent went to the Smiths' home in response to the Smiths having sent a card to National States Insurance Company requesting information concerning Medicare supplement policies. Upon his arrival at the Smiths' home, Respondent was advised by Mrs. Smith initially that she did not wish to speak with him further on that day because her husband had recently undergone surgery and was still recuperating. However, uoon Respondent's insistence, he was admitted to the Smiths' home at approximately 1:00 p.m. Respondent remained in the Smiths' home until approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 24, 1980. When he first arrived in the Smiths' home, Respondent told the Smiths that he worked for the State of Florida and that Bill Gunter was his boss. In the course of discussing National States Insurance Company policies, Respondent advised the Smiths that this type of policy was something that Mr. Gunter was attempting to do to assist elderly Floridians. During the course of his conversation with the Smiths, Respondent displayed a photograph of Mr. Gunter to the Smiths as proof of his affiliation with the State of Florida, and offered to call Mr. Gunter on the telephone to verify his credentials. After a long period of discussion, the Smiths purchased an insurance policy from Respondent, and gave him a check for $694. The Smiths' purchase of the policy was due in large part to Respondent's representation that he was an employee of the State of Florida, and that Mr. Gunter approved of the policy. Respondent denies having made any representation to the Smiths concerning his employment by the State of Florida, but, under the circumstances here present, it is specifically concluded that the Smiths' versions of the transaction occurring on September 24, 1980, are more credible.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner became employed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Weights, on November 5, 1982. Upon being accepted for employment Petitioner completed and submitted to proper authorities the forms necessary to be covered by the State's group health insurance program and authorized the appropriate deductions from his salary to cover the premiums. On several occasions, he and his wife inquired through the Department of Transportation regarding their failure to receive an insurance card. Each time they were told the insurance card would be forthcoming and only administrative delays in processing the application were causing the delay. During this time no deductions were being taken from Petitioner's pay. In June, 1983 Petitioner incurred two doctor bills for his wife and son (Exhibit 1) in the total amount of $50, of which he paid $10 with the remainder forwarded to Blue Cross and Blue Shield who administers the state's health insurance plan. Blue Cross and Blue Shield had no record of Petitioner's insurance and the claim was denied. Petitioner paid the additional $40 charges. Although evidence was not submitted to show why Petitioner's application was not properly processed or what finally got this application back on track, the proper steps were finally taken and Petitioner was credited with having been covered with health insurance in accordance with his application from December 1982 and billed for premiums due from that date. This resulted in the assessment by the state of $436.14 for back premiums. Since he was not on the Blue Cross register in June 1983, Petitioner contests the assessment as a condition to remaining a participating member in the state health insurance program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Administration, enter a final order denying coverage for the orthodontia recommended for Sandra Walsh. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was entitled to enrollment for his son in the State of Florida Group Health Self Insurance Plan for the January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2008, plan year and, if so, whether he is entitled to reimbursement of $543 for student health insurance coverage that was added to his son's college tuition bill.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bashere Bchara, has been employed by the Florida Department of Transportation for the past 9 years including the period October 2007 through December 2008. He is and was, on all relevant dates, entitled to state employees’ benefits, including participation for himself, his spouse, and eligible dependents in the State Group Health Insurance Program. On October 16, 2007, during the open enrollment period, the Petitioner accessed his state employee benefits from his computer to change his dental coverage, as he was required to do because of a change in State providers. Mr. Bchara believes that an error in the People First computer program, that is used to manage state human resources data, caused his son, Dani Bchara, to be removed from health insurance coverage as his dependent. He also said it was his first time using the computerized People First program to elect or change benefits. There is no dispute that Dani Bchara, who had been covered during the previous plan year, continued to be an eligible dependent. Mr. Bchara's witness, Michael Smith, testified that he too had problems trying to use People First to change dental plans. He found the People First computer screens confusing and disorganized. Dani Bchara was, at the time, a 22-year-old college student. As a part of his tuition and fees, Florida State University charged his account $543 for health insurance. In May 2008, after a claim for reimbursement for health expenses for Dani Bchara was rejected, Mr. Bchara, contacted plan insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield; plan contract administrator, People First; and then Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance (Respondent or DSGI). DSGI has the responsibility for administering the insurance program. See § 110.123, Fla. Stat. (2008). After reviewing his complaint, Sandi Wade, a benefits administrator for DSGI, notified Mr. Bchara that his son was not covered by the state health plan. She also determined that he could not add his son, at that time, due to the absence any qualifying status change, as required by federal and state law. There is no allegation nor evidence of a qualifying status change that would allow the addition of Mr. Bchara's son to his coverage. Ms. Wade was not aware of any other reports of possible computer glitches of the type Mr. Bchara believes he experienced during the open enrollment period in October 2007. James West, a manager for People First testified that, during the enrollment period in October 2007, computer screens for health insurance and dental insurance were entirely different. Each was displayed only after the appropriate tab was chosen. In addition, Mr. West noted that a "summary last step" had to be chosen and the final summary screen allowed employees to view changes from all prior screens before selecting the option to "complete enrollment." Mr. West examined logs of computer transactions on October 16, 2007. The logs showed that Mr. Bchara, using his People First identification number changed his health insurance by deleting coverage for his son. Mr. West reviewed correspondence logs that indicated that Mr. Bchara was sent a notice dated October 27, 2007, confirming the changes he had made to his benefits. The notice was sent from the Jacksonville service center of Convergys, the contract operator of the People First system, to an address that Mr. Bchara confirmed was correct. Mr. Bchara testified that he did not receive the letter. Mr. West testified that the letter was not returned, as confirmed by an electronic tracking system for mail. Scott Thompson, Director of Application Development for Convergys, testified that his records also show every time Mr. Bchara logged into the People First system using his identification number and password. The logs also show that his health plan was changed when he accessed the system on October 16, 2007. Based on the evidence in the computer records and logs that Mr. Bchara, albeit unintentionally, deleted coverage for his son in the group health insurance program, there is insufficient evidence of computer or human error attributable to Respondent. In the absence of sufficient evidence of any errors by DSIG or its agents, or any evidence of a qualifying status change in Mr. Bchara's employment or his family, DSIG correctly rejected the request for retroactive enrollment of his son in the state group health insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner, Bashere Bchara, retroactive health insurance coverage for an additional dependent under the state plan for the 2008 plan year. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Matthews, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Bashere Bchara 10178 Southwest 53rd Court Cooper City, Florida 33328 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
