Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent was licensed as an Ordinary Life and General Lines Agent (Exhibit 1) and was the agent for Dixie Insurance Company at the Bartow office. As such, he had the authority to write policies binding the insurer. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was president and principal stockholder of Friendly Insurance Companies of Bartow, Winter Haven, Lake Wales and Haines City. The corporate records (Exhibit 3 for Polk County) show this to be the same as Friendly Auto Insurance of Lake Wales, Inc. Respondent was the agent for Dixie Insurance Company only at the Bartow office. Dixie Insurance Company qualifies agents, not offices, to sell their policies. Respondent had no authority to act as agent for Dixie Insurance at any of these offices other than the Bartow office as the insurance company has but one agent per office. To support the allegations in count 34 of the Administrative Complaint, Edward Bland testified, and Exhibits 21 through 23 were admitted. Bland applied for automobile insurance at Friendly Auto Insurance at the Winter Haven office, which he paid for by check in the amount of $728 (Exhibit 23) as full payment for the one year premium. Subsequent thereto, a Premium Finance Agreement was prepared on which Bland's signature was forged showing $546 of the premium to be financed. This finance agreement was signed by T. R. Shaw as agent. Upon learning that the finance agreement had been issued on his coverage, Bland contacted the Winter Haven office manager, and after a few weeks of "run around" contacted the Department of Insurance and "got his money back." Bland never saw Shaw or Respondent. Rafael Gomez, M.D. purchased automobile insurance on his three cars from Friendly Auto Insurance of Winter Haven in December 1985 for which he paid $3452.71 for the annual premium. Subsequently thereto, he received a call from the Barnett Bank, which had financed one of the cars, to tell him that the bank needed evidence of insurance on the financed auto. Dr. Gomez contacted Ruth Kent, the office manager at the Winter Haven office, who assured him she would supply the bank with the necessary documentation. When the bank contacted Dr. Gomez later to again demand proof of insurance, Gomez went to the Winter Haven office and demanded to see his file. He made copies of certain documents which he took to the bank. Dr. Gomez subsequently learned that a finance agreement had been entered into on his behalf, but without his knowledge or consent, and that the address shown on the agreement under his name was that of Ruth Kent. Although when accosted by Dr. Gomez with this information, Ms. Kent denied such an intentional act, this would have allowed her to hold the finance coupons and get all information supplied by the finance company to the borrower without Dr. Gomez learning that the policy for which he had paid in full was subsequently financed. After learning of the subterfuge, Dr. Gomez contacted the Department of Insurance. Ruth Judd was office manager at the Friendly Insurance Agency of Haines City for a period of time ending in 1987 when she was terminated by Respondent. Ms. Judd contends she was only the office manager, and Respondent was the boss of the office and hired all employees. During the time she worked in the office, Ms. Judd testified several different people served as the licensed agent for the office, but they spent little time in the office with Donald Leroy Flentke, towards the end of his tenure, coming in only for his weekly paychecks. No evidence was presented from which a determination could be made that for a specific period of time any of the four offices were not being supervised by a licensed agent. Ms. Judd testified she was aware of one policy for which the insured had paid the premium in full being submitted for a premium finance agreement with forged documents. She also was aware that monthly financing payments were made by the Haines City office on some three or four other premium finance agreements. Ms. Judd testified on March 2, 1988, that she was presently unemployed. Respondent called one witness that testified and produced documentary evidence (Exhibits 24 through 26) that on March 2, 1988, this witness purchased insurance from Ms. Judd at New Horizons and was required to buy an accidental death policy in order to obtain PIP coverage. Exhibit 7 shows that an automobile insurance policy was issued to Jackie Bryan, the policy was sold through Friendly Insurance of Winter Haven, Inc., that the premium was financed, the borrower owed an additional $142.66 on the finance agreement, and the policy expired 2-26-86. Respondent acknowledged that his signature appears on the premium finance application. Some 5000 policies are sold by Respondent's agencies per year, and Respondent has no independent recollection of that finance agreement. Dixie Insurance Company issued a policy to Johnny Davis which was also financed through Envoy, but this application was signed by Shaw. Although Dixie Insurance Company had their own premium finance organization and, if the premium is financed, preferred to do the financing, Respondent testified that occasionally, if a client did not want to finance their premium through Dixie, the agency would go through another premium finance company such as Envoy. Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12 show premium finance agreements were contracted for on behalf of Raymond Scott, Mark Turner, Kathy Smith and Cathy Phillips, but no auto insurance policies were issued by Dixie Insurance Company to these individuals. Only one of these finance agreements (Exhibit 12) purports to be prepared at the Bartow office, and two of the drafts (Exhibits 9 and 12) purport to be signed by Respondent. Respondent testified he neither signed those drafts nor authorized someone else to sign for him. The forgery on both Exhibits 9 and 12 appear to have been perpetrated by the same person. Cathy Phillips, a friend of Ruth Kent, testified without contradiction that the signature purporting to be hers on Exhibit 12 was forged, that she never entered into a premium finance agreement with Envoy Finance Corporation, and that she had never seen Exhibit 14 until presented to her by the Petitioner's attorney. Ms. Phillips did receive a past-due notice on one occasion and called Ruth Kent who told her not to worry about it, that everything was taken care of. Subsequently, Ms. Phillips' husband wrote a letter to Envoy Finance Corporation denying any knowledge of any insurance policy written by Friendly Insurance of Bartow. Considerable testimony was submitted regarding the activities of Chuck Evans who was, at one time, employed by Respondent at the Winter Haven agency as a non-licensed employee with authority to write checks on the Trust Account. While the statements made by Evans to Department of Insurance officials contributed to the initiation of the investigation of Respondent's agencies, none of this testimony was relevant to the charges here at issue.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in conduct proscribed by the Insurance Code as is particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed December 7, 1993.
Findings Of Fact During times material, Respondent, Nelson Speer Benzing, was licensed with Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, as a life insurance and as a life and health insurance agent. During times material, Respondent was an employee of U.S. Savings Trust Management (herein USSTM). During times material, Respondent was never appointed with Petitioner to represent Wisconsin National Life Insurance Company (herein Wisconsin). However, Respondent did attend a workshop sponsored by Wisconsin. At some time prior to March 5, 1992, Respondent met with George Cantonis, President of Mega Manufacturing, Inc. (herein Mega) in order to obtain Cantonis' permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. Cantonis granted Respondent permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. On March 5, 1992, Respondent made a sales presentation to Mega's employees. The purpose of said presentation was to enroll the employees of Mega in a "savings plan" offered by USSTM. The presentation lasted approximately 15- 30 minutes. Employees were told that the plan, as presented, incorporated an insurance savings plan which had a "liquid" component as well as a long term savings component. At no time during this sales presentation did Respondent explain to employees of Mega that he was a licensed life insurance agent. During the course of his presentation, Respondent described USSTM's product variously as an "insurance saving plan", as an "investment in insurance companies" and as a "retirement savings plan". At no time during the presentation did Respondent specifically state that he was selling life insurance. At the conclusion of the presentation, Respondent enrolled all interested employees in USSTM's plan. During the enrollment procedure, Respondent told the employees to complete portions of at least three documents which included a form entitled "Employee History", a Wisconsin's life insurance application, and an employee payroll deduction authorization. Cantonis enrolled through the above procedure and signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application. Subsequent to the group sales presentation, Respondent made a similar presentation to Tina Netherton, Mega's office manager, who was working in the office and answering the telephone. At the conclusion of the presentation to Netherton, she enrolled in the plan and also signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application pursuant to instructions from Respondent. Both Netherton and Cantonis believed that the "savings plan" consisted of both a short term "liquid cash element and a long term investment". Neither were aware that they had purchased life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis had, in their opinion, adequate life insurance at the time of Respondent's sales presentation, and would not have purchased additional life insurance if they had been told (by Respondent) that they were purchasing life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis executed beneficiary designations on their belief that such was needed so that disbursements, if any, could be made to their designee in the event of their death. Approximately three weeks after enrollment, Netherton and Cantonis received brochures from USSTM which acknowledged their enrollment and detailed the benefits of the "savings plan". The brochure advised that Netherton and Cantonis had enrolled in an insurance "savings plan" and failed to state that they had purchased life insurance. Cantonis and Netherton attempted to withdraw funds from the liquid portion of the plan and were unable to do so. Four to five months after their enrollment, Cantonis and Netherton received life insurance policies from Wisconsin. Pursuant to the insurance applications, Cantonis and Netherton were issued Wisconsin life insurance policy numbers L00566485 and L00566483, respectively. Cantonis and Netherton maintained their Wisconsin policies in order to realize some gain from their overall loss in dealing with Respondent and USSTM. At the time that Respondent made his presentation to Mega's employees and officials, he had never before made sales presentations in order to enroll employees in plans offered by USSTM. Respondent's general manager, Vincent Radcliff, was the agent of record of Wisconsin. The insurance application and policies issued to Cantonis and Netherton were signed by an agent other than Respondent. Respondent's supervisor, Vincent A. Radcliff, III, was disciplined by Petitioner and Respondent cooperated with the Petitioner in investigating the complaint allegations filed against his supervisor, Radcliff. Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner on November 15, 1989. Respondent has not been the subject of any prior disciplinary actions by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's life and health insurance licenses for a period of three (3) months. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner order that Respondent engage in continuing education respecting the manner and means of soliciting on behalf of insurance companies, and to the extent that he completes the required courses within an acceptable time frame, that the suspension be suspended pending the outcome of Respondent's satisfactory completion of such continuing education courses. 1/ RECOMMENDED this 1st day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1994.
The Issue Whether Highlands has standing to challenge the Department's Emergency Rule 4ER93-20, Florida Administrative Code, and if so, whether Sections 2(d) and 6(a) should be invalidated because they constitute invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Moratorium Statute During Special Session B of 1993 the Florida Legislature passed HB 89- B. The Governor signed the bill into law on June 8, 1993. Now codified as Section 1 of Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, the law, in pertinent part, provides as follows: Section 1. Moratorium on cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverages.-- * * * (3) MORATORIUM IMPOSED.--Effective May 19, 1993, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, until the expiration of this section pursuant to subsection (6), cancel or nonrenew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrenewals must be substantiated by underwriting rules filed with and accepted for use by the Depart- ment of Insurance, unless inconsistent with the provisions of this section. The Department of Insurance is hereby granted all necessary power to carry out the provisions of this section. Pursuant to the Moratorium Statute, on an emergency basis, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 20. The Challenged Sections The sections of Emergency Rule 20 Highlands seeks to have invalidated are 2(d) and 6(a): 4ER93-20 Procedures For Applying for Moratorium Exemption and Required Insurer Corrective Action on Previous Notices of Cancellation or Nonrenewal. * * * (2) General Provisions. * * * (d) House Bill 89-B, as enacted at the May 1993 Special Legaislative (sic) Session, revoked all prior approvals issued by the Department, of insurer plans for programs of onrenewals and cancellations, where the non- renewal or cancellation was not effective as of May 19, 1993, notwithstanding that the notice of nonrenewl or cancellation was issued before May 19, 1993. * * * (6) Required Action On Prior Notices of Cancellation. (a) Any insurer which, prior to May 19, 1993, shall have issued any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, whether approved by the Department or not, upon the basis of risk of hurricane claims, which cancellation or non- renewal was not yet effective as of May 19, 1993, shall revoke said notice and shall not cancel or nonrenew such policy, or if same has been cancelled or non-renewed subsequent to May 19, 1993, shall immediately reinstate coverage without lapse as if there had been no cancellation or nonrenewal. The insurer shall also, by no later than June 10, 1993, mail by first class mail to every policy holder and agent who was sent such notice or whose policy was so cancelled or non-renewed, written advice that the previous notice is withdrawn, and that the coverage will not be cancelled or nonrenewed, or that the coverage is rein- stated, as the case may be. In the event that the renewal premium has not been received because the insured was operating under the impression that the coverage was not renewable, or a premium is due because the insurer has already refunded the unearned premium, the insurer shall allow the insured a reasonable period after receipt of an invoice from the insurer, in which to forward the required premium, and the insurer shall provide coverage during that reasonable period. Insurance and the parties Insurance is defined in Florida as "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a specified amount or a determinable benefit upon determinable contingencies." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes. A highly regulated business activity, insurance is regulated primarily at the state level. The Department of Insurance, among other powers and duties, enforces the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code against insurers, including Highlands, defined by the Code as, "those persons engaged as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of providing insurance." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes. Highlands Insurance Company, domiciled in Texas, is a stock insurance company admitted to transact insurance in Florida as a foreign insurer. After many years of transacting insurance in Florida, Highlands was issued a "new permanent Certificate of Authority" from the Department by letter dated November 22, 1991. The certificate authorized Highlands to write "Homeowner Multi Peril" and "Commercial Multi Peril" lines of business as well as numerous other lines. Pursuant to its Certificate of Authority the standard homeowner's policy issued in Florida by Highlands allowed for cancellation by the homeowner at any time through notice to the company. It allowed for cancellation by Highlands under limited circumstances. And it allowed for non- renewal by written notice within a certain number of days before the policy's expiration date. Reinsurance From the early 1960s through June 30, 1993, Highlands wrote its Florida property and casualty insurance, through a reinsurance facility ("SU Reinsurance Facility") made available by Southern Underwriters, Inc. ("Southern"). Under the terms of the SU Reinsurance Facility, 93.5 percent of homeowners and commercial risks insured by Highlands are reinsured to a large group of reinsurers. Highlands retains only 6.5 percent of its homeowners and commercial lines risks. The SU Reinsurance Facility consists of two principal reinsurance agreements, which, in the aggregate, reinsure 93.5 percent of the liabilities of the homeowners and commercial lines insurance written in Florida by Highlands and its wholly owned subsidiary, Highlands Underwriters Insurance Company ("HUIC"). One agreement is the Quota Share agreement, the other is the Obligatory Surplus agreement. For each homeowners or commercial policy, the risks are ceded pro-rata under the two agreements, 25 percent to the Quota Share and 75 percent to the Obligatory Surplus. Highlands and HUIC retain 16 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively of the 25 percent of total risk attributable to the Quota Share agreement for a total of 5.375 percent of total risk. Highlands retains 1.5 percent of the 75 percent of total risk attributable to the Obligatory Surplus agreement or 1.125 percent of total risk. Highlands exposure to total risk, therefore, is 6.5 percent. The total risk for each policy attributable to Quota Share is 19.625 percent and to Obligatory Surplus 73.875 percent which equals, together, 93.5 percent of total risk. Hurricane Andrew and Claims against Highlands Hurricane Andrew struck Florida on August 24, 1992. The most costly civil disaster in the history of the United States, it caused over 16 billion dollars ($16,000,000,000) in insured losses, alone. As a result of the hurricane, Highlands incurred claims totalling approximately 337.3 million dollars ($337,300,000) under its homeowner and commercial lines policies. Highlands' 6.5 percent share of the losses on these claims was 21.9 million dollars ($21,900,000). The reinsurers' 93.5 percent share of the losses on the claims was 315.4 million dollars ($315,400,000). Highland's 1992 year-end policyholder surplus was 255.4 million dollars ($255,400,000). Thus, the claims incurred by Highlands as the result of Andrew exceeded its 1992 surplus by more than 80 million dollars ($80,000,000). Quota Share Reinsurance Cancellation By letter dated January 15, 1993, Highlands was formally notified that its reinsurers had terminated the Quota Share Facility for policies to be written or renewed on and after July 1, 1993. Highlands was unable to secure reinsurance to replace the terminated reinsurance. Highlands Response to Reinsurance Loss Based on the loss of the Quota Share reinsurance, Highlands notified the Department by letter dated January 22, 1993 (one week after the date of the letter by which Highlands received formal notice of the termination of the Quota Share reinsurance) that it would cease to write "Dwelling and Homeowner's insurance effective May 1, 1993 and after," Pet.'s Ex. 4., that is, that it would "discontinue" the writing of the "Multi Peril Homeowner's" line of insurance, one of the many lines authorized by the Certificate of Authority as shown on the certificate face. The January 22 "Discontinuance" letter was sent, in the words of Highlands' Vice-President for Reinsurance Jose Ferrer, because, "the magnitude of our involvement in Florida especially with Hurricane Andrew was such that we were losing our reinsurance protection, we had to take immediate action to protect our company." (Tr. 36) On January 22, 1993, discontinuance by an insurer from transacting any line of insurance in Florida was governed by Section 624.430, Florida Statutes and Emergency Rule 4ER92-11. Section 624.430, F.S., bears the catchline "Withdrawal of insurer or discontinuance of writing certain classes of insurance." With regard to the action taken by the January 22 letter, (notice of discontinuance of a line), the statute provides, in pertinent part: Any insurer desiring to ... discontinue the writing of any one or multiple kinds or lines of insurance in this state shall give 90 days' notice in writing to the department setting forth its reasons for such action. Rule 4ER92-11, (the "Withdrawal" Rule) entitled "Withdrawal of Insurers From the State," includes discontinuances of any line of property insurance as well as the complete cessation of writing any insurance business in an expansive definition of withdrawal: ... to cease substantially all writing of new or renewal business in this state, or to cease writing substantially all new or renewal business in any line of property insurance in this state; or in either of the two preceding instances, to cut back on new or renewal writings so substantially as to have the effects of a withdrawal. Section (2)(b), 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 7318 (Nov. 25, 1992). The Withdrawal Rule goes on to interpret Section 624.430 as "authorizing the Department to evaluate the sufficiency of the reasons" for withdrawal (or as in the case of Highlands for discontinuance of one or more lines) and to "impose reasonable terms and conditions regarding withdrawal [including discontinuance] as are necessary to prevent or reasonably ameliorate such adverse consequences." Id. Section 3(c). At no time after Highlands' Notice was received by the Department and before May 1, 1993 did the Department provide a written response, request a meeting, impose conditions upon discontinuance, or otherwise object to or deny Highlands' Notice. In addition to mailing a notice that it would cease to write Homeowner's and Dwelling lines effective May 1, 1993, Highlands began sending out non-renewal notices. Some were sent after May 19, 1993, the effective date of the Moratorium Statute. Highlands began sending non-renewal notices because of the loss of reinsurance and because of its position that the moratorium did not apply to Highlands. It did not matter to Highlands whether Andrew had occurred or not. If the reinsurance had been cancelled without a hurricane, Highlands would have taken exactly the same steps. On the other hand, if the reinsurance had remained in place in the wake of Andrew, Highlands would be writing the same lines and policies it did before Andrew. Mr. Ferrer believed the reinsurance was cancelled, not because of the risk of future hurricane loss, but "as the result of the massive loss from Hurricane Andrew." (Tr. 51) While the obvious inference to be drawn from his belief is that the reinsurer fears the risk of future hurricane loss, that is not the only inference that could be drawn. Massive losses could render a reinsurer incapable of providing any reinsurance to any party under any circumstances, regardless of the risk of future hurricane claims. Nonetheless, Mr. Ferrer testified that if there were no risk of future hurricane loss to homeowners, Highland would continue to write policies it is now refusing to renew: Q ... If there were no risk of hurricane loss, would you write the business? A Yes, if we can include wind on all policies. HEARING OFFICER MALONEY: Could you repeat that answer ... ? A The answer is, if there is no windstorm ability, hurricane ability, we will have no problem writing the policies. (Tr. 54) Thus, Highlands began sending 45-day notices of nonrenewals to its homeowners policy holders, on the basis of its position that it had withdrawn the line in Florida and because it had lost its reinsurance. But Highlands is also not renewing policies which expire during the moratorium because of risk of future hurricane loss. Insurance Crisis in the Aftermath of Andrew The immensity of Andrew's impact to insurers doing business in Florida created an extremely serious situation for the Florida property insurance market. The Legislature described the situation this way: Hurricane Andrew ... has reinforced the need of consumers to have reliable homeowner's insurance coverage; however, the enormous monetary impact to insurers of Hurricane Andrew claims has prompted insurers to propose substantial cancellation or non- renewal of their homeowner's policyholders. ... [T]he massive cancellations and non- renewals announced, proposed, or contemplated by certain insurers constitute a significant danger to the public health, safety and welfare, especially in the context of a new hurricane season, and destabilize the insurance market. (Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida, Section 1., Pet.'s Ex. 15). Between Hurricane Andrew and May 1993, the Department received notices from 38 insurers seeking to withdraw from homeowners insurance or reduce their exposure for homeowners insurance in the state. Twenty of these insurers filed notices of total withdrawal from the homeowners line. Eighteen sought to impose restrictions on new or renewal homeowners' business. Together the 38 insurers comprise approximately 40 percent of the Florida homeowners market. Of the 18 insurers seeking to impose restrictions, the greatest single source of impact on the Florida market came from the changes proposed by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate proposed to nonrenew 300,000 homeowners policies in certain coastal counties. The Department scheduled two days of public hearing on Allstate's notice of intent to restrict writings. The first was scheduled to take place in Clearwater on May 17. The second, held in Plantation on May 18, was attended by "[p]robably close to a thousand [people] -- in excess of 500 hundred anyway. There was a lot of people." (Testimony of Witness Kummer, Tr. 148). Complaints from citizens were received expressing that "it was inappropriate for Allstate to be able to cancel their policies and that something should be done to assist in that." Id. at 150. The Department's Response On May 19, 1993, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 4ER93-18, imposing a moratorium on the cancellation and nonrenewal of personal lines policies including homeowners, as follows: (3)90 Day Moratorium Imposed. As of the effective date of this rule, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, for a period of 90 days, cancel or non- renew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrewals (sic) must be substantiated by underwriting rules established and in effect on August 23, 1992. The State's Response to the Insurance Crisis a. The Governor's Proclamation and Call for a Special Session. On May 25, 1993, Governor Chiles issued a Proclamation. Addressed "To the Honorable Members of the Florida Senate and Florida House of Representatives," it contains the following pertinent "Whereas" clauses: WHEREAS, the damage resulting from Hurricane Andrew has prompted the insurance industry in Florida to propose substantial cancellation or nonrenewals of homeowner insurance policies, and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to provide a moratorium period to protect Florida's home- owners while a study is conducted to assess the effect of these extraordinary events on the insurance industry which occurred as a result of Hurricane Andrew, and WHEREAS, a study of the commercial viability and competitiveness of the property insurance and re-insurance industry in Florida would provide the Governor and the Legislature with the information needed to assess whether current regulatory statutes should be amended, and WHEREAS, certain additional statutory amend- ments are required to make necessary insurance coverage available to provide fundamental protection to the citizens of this state, and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to amend the pro- clamation of May 13, 1993, to add to the matters considered by the Florida Legislature convened in special session, the implementa- tion of a moratorium on personal lines property insurance cancellations or non- renewals, ... (Pet.'s Ex. 24). The Proclamation convenes the Legislature for the purpose of considering: (a) Legislation to implement and, if necessary extend for [a] period not to exceed 90 additional days, the emergency rule promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner, 4ER93-18. 1993 Special Session B Pursuant to the Governor's May 25, 1993 Proclamation and a May 13, 1993 Proclamation, the 1993 Florida Legislature was called into special session, Special Session B. Finding the public necessity for an orderly property insurance market to be overwhelming, the 1993 Legislature imposed, "for a limited time," a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies, beginning May 19, 1993. Id. The moratorium applies to personal lines residential property insurance. It does not apply to commercial coverages or passenger auto coverages, whether commercial or private. The Legislature allowed an exception from the moratorium for those insurers which "affirmatively demonstrate to the department that the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal is necessary for the insurer to avoid an unreasonable risk of insolvency." Section 1(4), Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida. If the department determines that the exception affects more than 1 percent of any class of business within the personal lines residential property market, then the department may set a schedule for nonrenewals, cancellation or withdrawal that avoids market disruption. Presumably, the moratorium will cover the 1993 hurricane season. The section of Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida, that imposes the moratorium is repealed on November 14, 1993. Promulgation of Emergency Rule 20 On June 4, 1993, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 20, effective the same date. According to the testimony of Hugo John Kummer, Deputy Insurance Commissioner, Emergency Rule 20 embodies three aims: first, to set a procedure for applying for a moratorium exemption allowed by the Moratorium Statute, [set forth in the rule outside Sections 2(d) and 6(a)]; second, to require a notice to update consumers who had received notices of cancellation or nonrenewal with the information that the earlier notices had been rendered temporarily ineffective under the moratorium, [Section 6(a)], and; third, to inform insurers who had entered consent orders with the Department governing the method with which the insurers were with- drawing from the State or restricting coverage, that the approvals by the Department found in the consent orders were overridden by the Moratorium Statute, [Section 2(d)]. (Tr. 136) On this last point, Mr. Kummer's testimony is consistent with the testimony of Douglas Shropshire, Director of the Department's Division of Insurer Regulation, one of two drafters of Emergency Rule 20 and the drafter of Section 2(d). Mr. Shropshire testified that the rule "simply reiterates the statute and provides the procedures for implementing [the Moratorium Statute]." Resp.'s Ex. 11, p. 25. With regard to Section 2(d), Mr. Shropshire testified as follows: Q Now, could you please direct your attention specifically to just the words, "Revoked all prior approvals issued by the Department," and explain how this implements the statute. A It simply repeats what the statute provides. It, basically, reiterates the statute. That moratorium statute, 89-B, essentially freezes all cancellation or nonrenewal action during the pendency of the 89-B moratorium. Q What would be the status of the moratorium, subsequent to November 14th, 1993, as you understand it? A Assuming that no other legislation is enacted that affects the subject at the special session, then prior approvals would be, again, effective, and companies could again being (sic) acting -- they could, basically, pick up where they had left off when the moratorium began. Q All right. What, if any, additional restrictions does the language place upon insurers above the requirements of the statute? A Absolutely, none. It is apparent, therefore, that if the Department's silence in response to Highlands' January 22, 1993 "Discontinuance" Letter constituted an "Approval," it was not the intent of the Department through the promulgation of Section 2(d) of Emergency Rule 20 to revoke that approval. The goal of the Department in promulgating the section was simply to inform parties to Consent Orders that any Department approval contained in the Consent Order had been revoked. Moreover, the Department's intent in using the term "revoke" was not "revoke" in the legal sense of rendered null and void and forever ineffective but more akin to "suspend" in a temporal sense. It was the Department's intent that any prior approval by the Department of a withdrawal or imposition of restrictions by an insurer was simply suspended by the Moratorium Statute temporarily, that is, for the life of moratorium - until November 14, 1993. Likewise, if the Department's silence following the January 22 Discontinuance Letter constituted an "approval," it would be the Department's intent that Section 2(d) would have no effect other than suspending the approval until the repeal of the Moratorium Statute on November 14, 1993. The import of the Department's intent in promulgating Emergency Rule 20 is dependent on whether the rule is ambiguous or plain on its face as concluded below in this order's Conclusions of Law.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible for licensure as a resident general lines agent.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Robert Manns, a representative for Butler County, Missouri, filed a consumer complaint with the Missouri Department of Insurance, which alleged that Petitioner financed a premium for an insurance policy when the premium had, in fact, been paid by the county. On June 9, 1999, Petitioner was assessed a fine of $10,000.00 by the Missouri Department of Insurance based on Petitioner's having practiced forgery and deception in an insurance transaction. Specifically, it was found that Petitioner signed the names of the city finance director and county commission clerk to premium finance documents and letters representing that the city and county had financed a premium when, in fact, the city and county had paid the insurance premium for the city and county accounts in full on an annual basis. At the time Petitioner forged the premium finance agreement, he was licensed as an insurance agent in the State of Missouri. The Missouri Department of Insurance did not revoke Petitioner's license as an insurance agent in the State of Missouri. On February 14, 2000, the Indiana Department of Insurance denied Petitioner’s application for licensure based upon the Missouri administrative action. On September 19, 2003, Petitioner applied for licensure as a resident general lines agent in the State of Florida. Based on its review of Petitioner's application and the administrative documents from the Missouri Department of Insurance described in paragraphs 2 above, the Department denied Petitioner’s application. In regard to the incident described in paragraph 2 above, Petitioner denied that he forged the insurance contract, but he admitted that he forged the premium finance agreement associated with the subject insurance contract. However, Petitioner testified that "no one lost money" as a result of his forging the premium finance agreement. Petitioner testified that he was not proud of the incident, that he was very sorry for doing it, and that his actions could not be justified. The Department considers the forgery of documents and deception related to insurance documents and transactions by an insurance agent to be serious matters. This is particularly true in light of the fiduciary role of an insurance agent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that final order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident general lines insurance agent in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny R. Howe 4367 Winding Oaks Circle Mulberry, Florida 33860 Michael T. Ruff, Esquire Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Peter Gregory Santisteban (Respondent) was licensed as a general lines agent by the State of Florida. At all times material hereto, Southern Associates Insurance Agency (Southern Associates) was a licensed general lines insurance agency by the State of Florida. Southern Associates was incorporated. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the owner, sole stockholder, president, and corporate director of Southern Associates. At all times material hereto, Respondent had sole responsibility for the financial affairs of Southern Associates and had sole signatory authority on Southern Associates’ checking account. AAPCO is a premium finance company. At all times material hereto, Respondent and AAPCO had an arrangement in which policies written by Respondent, which needed financing, would be financed by AAPCO. The arrangement between Respondent and AAPCO was executed as follows: Respondent maintained AAPCO drafts and had signatory authority on APPCO drafts. If a client needed financing, Respondent would receive a down payment from the client on the insurance premium. The down payment was approximately thirty-three percent of the premium. Respondent would receive a commission of approximately fifteen percent. His commission would be taken from the down payment. Respondent would execute an APPCO draft payable to the insurance company for the total premium less his commission. Respondent would forward the down payment less his commission (net) to AAPCO, the premium finance company. In or around 1990 or 1991, the execution of the arrangement changed in that, instead of writing a check to AAPCO for each insured’s net, Respondent would use transmittal forms which permitted Respondent to write one check for the net of multiple insureds. On or about March 25, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1503 from the account of Southern Associates payable to AAPCO in the amount of $1,215.14 for payment of multiple nets due to AAPCO. The check was deposited in the account of AAPCO but was returned for insufficient funds. On or about May 26, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1517 from the account of Southern Associates payable to AAPCO in the amount of $2,706.73 for payment of multiple nets due to AAPCO. The check was deposited in the account of AAPCO but was returned due to the account being closed. On or about July 13, 1994, AAPCO made demand for Respondent to pay the moneys due it. Respondent did not and has not paid AAPCO the moneys due. The total amount owed by Respondent to AAPCO is $3,921.87. Respondent attempted to reach an agreement with AAPCO wherein he would make monthly payments until the moneys due had been paid in full. AAPCO rejected Respondent’s offer and instead requested that Respondent make a lump sum payment of $2,000 and pay the remainder in monthly installments. Due to financial difficulty, Respondent was unable to agree to AAPCO’s payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order Suspending the license of Peter Gregory Santisteban, as a general lines agent, for nine months; and Conditioning the reinstatement of his license after the expiration of the suspension upon his payment of $3,921.87 to AAPCO. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bob Prentiss, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Miguel San Pedro, Esquire 825 Southeast Bayshore Drive Suite 1541 Miami, Florida 33131 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner General Counsel The Capitol, LL-26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was eligible for, and licensed as, an insurance agent in the State of Florida. The Respondent is currently eligible for, and licensed as, an insurance agent in the State of Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed agent for United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G). At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was an officer, director, and stockholder of D.E. Brewer and Company (Company), an incorporated general lines insurance agency primarily located in Jacksonville, Florida. On or about April 24, 1986, the Company entered into an agency agreement with USF&G whereby the Company was given authority to solicit and sell insurance on behalf of USF&C. This agency agreement was cancelled unilaterally by USF&G on November 24, 1986. At all times material to this proceeding, all funds received by the Company on behalf of USF&G represented premium funds paid by consumers for the purpose of obtaining insurance and were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity to be paid over to USF&G in the applicable regular course of business. Under the agency agreement with USF&G, accounts of premium funds received by the Company on behalf of USF&G were to be "rendered at the end of each month" and any "balance shown to be due to" USF&G was to "be paid to the designated reporting office not later than the twentieth day of the second succeeding month". On or about October 27, 1986, Southland Services of Jacksonville, Inc. (Southland) issued a check to the Company in the amount of $15,799.00 as a monthly installment for an auto policy and a general liability policy issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected by the Company on behalf of USF&G. On or about November 21, 1986, Southland issued a check to the Company in the amount of $13,785.00 as a monthly installment for auto policy and a general liability policy issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected by the Company on behalf of USF&G. On or about November 12, 1986, S. Gordon Blalock (Blalock) issued a check to the Company in the amount of $1,341.00 as a premium on an auto policy issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected on behalf of USF&G. On or about December 3, 1986, USF&G notified Blalock that USF&G had not received the premium and unless Blalock remitted the premium within 15 days his policy would be cancelled. This matter was cleared up by Blalock with USF&G and the policy was not cancelled. On or about November 5, 1986, Anita Grusenmeyer, on behalf of Grusenmeyer & Associates, Inc. (Grusenmeyer) issued a check to the Company in the amount of $2,810.00 as a premium payment for insurance policies issued by USF&G. These premium funds were collected by the Company on behalf of USF&G. On or about December 15, 1986, USF&G requested documentation from Grusenmeyer as to proof of premium payment to the Company on these insurance policies since the Company had not rendered the premium payment to USF&G. This documentation was furnished and there was no interruption of the coverage. On or about November 24, 1986, USF&G unilaterally terminated its agency agreement with the Company due to the Company's failure to remit premium funds collected on behalf of USF&G. Prior to, and at the time of the termination of the agency agreement by USF&G, Respondent was Vice President, a director and stockholder (11%) of the Company, but on or about November 24, 1986, the date of the termination of the agency agreement, Respondent became president of the Company. By letter dated December 12, 1986 and addressed to Respondent, USF&G, under paragraph 9 of the agency agreement, made a demand on the Company for the records pertaining to business dealings between the Company and USF&G. This demand was again made by letter on January 21, 1987. However, there was some concern on Respondent's part in turning these records over to USF&G and it was determined that USF&G could make copies of such records with someone from the Company being present. Due to conflicts in schedules of both parties this was never accomplished, and, in the interim, USF&G concluded that it had the capability to reproduce the records on its computer. No further demand for the records was made and the records were never turned over to USF&G by the Company. Also in its letter dated January 2, 1987, USF&G advised the Company that the premium funds received in November, 1986, were overdue as well as the August, 1986, and October, 1986, account. The August, 1986, and October, 1986, account would be for premium funds received in June, 1986, and August, 1986, respectively. The September, 1986, account had been paid on or about November 20, 1986, using premium funds received from Southland on November 21, 1986, in the amount of $13,785.00 to cover a check previously issued by Donald Brewer on an account that did not have sufficient funds to cover the check. The deposit of the Southland check into the account made the check written by Donald Brewer "good". In accordance with the agency agreement, the premium funds received from Southland ($15,799.00) in October, 1986, were due and payable on December 20, 1986, and the premium funds received from Southland ($13,785.00), Blalock ($1,341.00) and Grusenmeyer ($2,810.00) during November, 1986, were funds due and payable on January 20, 1987. However, these premium funds had been disposed of prior to Respondent becoming president of the Company on November 24, 1986, and the Company having insufficient funds that could be used to pay USF&G after Respondent became president, the funds were not remitted to USF&G in the regular course of business set forth in the agency agreement. All the premium funds received by the Company from Southland ($15,799.00 and $13,785.00), Blalock ($1,341.00) and Grusenmeyer ($2,810.00) in October and November of 1986 were deposited in the Southeast Bank, N.A., of Jacksonville, Florida, Account No. 001632637, an account on which Respondent had no check writing authority. All of the above-referenced funds were deposited in that account prior to Respondent becoming president on November 24, 1986. The Respondent was not the responsible agent for the three insurance accounts: Southland; Blalock; and Grusenmeyer, and none of the premium funds remitted to the company by these accounts were "received by" the Respondent. There is no evidence that these premium funds were "received by" any employee of the Company who was under the Respondent's direct supervision and control. There is no evidence that Respondent had access to, or responsibility for, the premium funds paid by Southland, Blalock and Grusenmeyer during October and November of 1986. Likewise, there is no evidence that the Respondent diverted or appropriated any of such premium funds to his own use or to the use of anyone other than to those entitled to receive them. Upon becoming president, Respondent opened a new bank account with the Florida National Bank, but there was no evidence that the account ever had sufficient funds, other than possibly premium funds belonging to other insurers which had been received on their behalf by the Company, to pay USF&G the premium funds due it from the Southland, Blalock and Grusenmeyer accounts. There was evidence that the Respondent had paid salaries to the employees out of the account, but no amount was established. Upon becoming president, Respondent began negotiating a settlement with USF&G on the amount of premium funds due USF&G. There was a dispute as to the amount but a settlement of approximately $52,000.00 was reached. Some of this amount has been paid, but there is a remaining balance. There was no evidence that Respondent, prior to becoming President of the Company, took any part in the policy decisions or administration of the Company, such as determining the manner in which the Company's receipts would be spent or to direct, control or supervise the activities of the employees or other insurance agents of the Company.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, John Lanahan, Brewer in Case No. 87-2692. Respectfully submitted and entered this 26th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-2692 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 2, except that there was no evidence presented as to the types of insurance licenses Respondent held. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3.-9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 through 9, respectively. 10. Adopted in finding of Fact 10 but clarified to show the date of the check to be November 12, 1986, rather than November 21, 1986. 11-14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11 through 14. 15-16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 17-18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. 20-22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19 and 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 except that there is competent evidence to show that the Grusenmeyer payment was received and deposited prior to Respondent assuming the Presidency. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23, but although there was a sincere dispute as to the amount there was no competent evidence that that amount was $200,000 or that the settlement figure of $52,000 was not a fair representation of the amount owed to USF&G by the Company. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 19, and 24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 9, and 19 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 and 19. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 18 and 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21 and 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 11-12. Rejected as being argument, not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Judith S. Beaubouef, Esquire Peter L. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 4099 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer ana Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent, James Edward Hickerson, violated the provisions of Chapters 624, 626 and 627, Florida Statutes, by commission or omission of acts as alleged specifically in the Administrative Complaint. The entry of this order was ; delayed by late filing of the transcript and post hearing briefs, the filing time of which was extended by order dated May 19, 1983. Petitioner submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of a proposed recommended order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact General Findings At all times relative to the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent, James Edward Hickerson, was President of the Hickerson Insurance Agency, Inc., located in Winter Haven, Florida, and held licenses as a surplus lines-property casualty and surety surplus lines, ordinary-combination life (including disability insurance) , general lines-property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous, and disability insurance agent issued by the Insurance Commissioner. The Respondent sold Hickerson Insurance Agency, Inc. , to James Hurst, Jr., as of March 1, 1982. Pursuant to their contract for sale, the Respondent remained liable for all business written prior to March 1, 1982, and the conduct of the business affairs of said agency prior to that date. Count I On January 29, 1982, Patricia Ann Haller applied for a bond as a notary at Hickerson Insurance Agency, Inc.(hereinafter, the Hickerson Agency). Haller paid the Hickerson Agency a total of $61 for a notary seal and as premium on said bond. When Haller did not receive the bond and seal, she called the Hickerson Agency and was advised by a secretary that her application had been lost. She received a letter presumably forwarding a new application but which did not contain an enclosed application. When Haller again called the Hickerson Agency, she was advised to come to the agency and sign a new application. Haller went to the agency and signed a second application in February 1982. When she did not receive the bond and seal, after March 1, 1982, she recontacted the agency and at that time spoke with James Hurst, Jr., the new owner. A search of the office records by James Hurst, Jr. and the office staff revealed no record of the Haller transaction with the Hickerson Agency. The company to which application was made for the bond had no record of receiving the application for Haller's bond. Haller advised James Hurst, Jr., that she no longer wanted the bond. Haller never received the bond or a refund of the money she paid to the Hickerson Agency. Under the contract for purchase of the Hickerson Agency, the Respondent received all premiums and was responsible for all money collected on transactions prior to March 1, 1982. The Respondent was responsible for providing Haller's bond and her premiums. Counts II, III, IV, V and VI The Hickerson Agency billed Southern Mortgage Company of Florida, Inc., in the amount of $86 on December 14, 1981, for the renewal of fire insurance in behalf of Pearly Mae Williams. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 12.) The Hickerson Agency billed United Companies Financial Corporation in the amount of $193 on or before February 17, 1982, for the renewal of homeowner's insurance in behalf of Annie N. Bonney. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 15.) The Hickerson Agency billed United Companies Life Insurance Company in the amount of $9 on February 8, 1982, for homeowner's insurance in behalf of Charles or Della M. Byrd. (See Petitioner'S Exhibit 18.) The Hickerson Agency received a check in the amount of $85 from United Companies, Inc., on December 23, 1981, for the payment of fire insurance for Pearly M. Williams. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 13.) United Companies Financial Corporation paid the Hickerson Agency $193 on January 25, 1982, for fire insurance in behalf of Annie M. Bonney. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 16.) United Companies Financial Corporation paid the Hickerson Agency $9 on February 17, 1982, for fire insurance in behalf of Charles Edward Byrd. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 19.) Under the contract agreement between the Hickerson Agency and Independent Fire Insurance Company, the premiums on insurance placed with Independent Fire Insurance Company were due the 15th of the month following the effective date of the insurance coverage. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 11.) The insurance for Pearly Mae Williams was renewed on January 31, 1982. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 9.) The premium was due and owing and to be paid by the Hickerson Agency on February 15, 1982. Independent Fire Insurance Company renewed the fire insurance for Annie N. Bonney on February 17, 1982. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 14.) The premium was due and owing and to be paid by the Hickerson Agency on March 15, 1982. Independent Fire Insurance Company renewed the insurance of Charles or Della M. Byrd on February 22, 1982. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 17.) The premium was due and owing and to be paid by the Hickerson Agency on March 15, 1982. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 17.) Independent Fire Insurance Company renewed the insurance of Curtis Smith on January 26, 1982, and, pursuant to the Hickerson Agency's agreement with said company, the premium for this insurance was to be paid by the Hickerson Agency on February 15, 1952. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 20.) Independent Fire Insurance Company renewed the insurance of Edna T. Tipper on December 14, 1951, and, pursuant to the Hickerson Agency's agreement with said company, the premium for this insurance was due from the Hickerson Agency on January 15, 1952. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 21.) Regarding the insurance of Curtis Smith, there is no evidence that the Hickerson Agency received payment from the insured or the insured's mortgagee. Concerning Edna T. Tipper, there is no evidence that the Hickerson Agency received payment for said insurance from the insured or the insured's mortgagee. A statement of account similar to Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 22, the statement for February 1952, was provided to the Hickerson Agency each month. As of February 25, 1952, premiums were owed for the insurance in effect on Pearly Mae Williams, Edna T. Tipper, Curtis Smith, Charles Byrd and Annie N. Bonney by the Hickerson Agency. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 22.) On July 14, 1952, Independent Fire Insurance Company advised the Respondent at his home address by certified mail that his account with the company was in arrears in the amount of $531.30 and made demand for payment no later than August 3, 1952. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 22.) On July 19, 1952, the Respondent tendered payment to Independent Fire Insurance Company with his check numbered 2343 in the amount of $531.30. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 24.) A letter from Independent Fire Insurance Company reflects that said company has been paid the premiums due on Williams, Tipper, Smith, Byrd and Bonney. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 25.) The Respondent received payments from Williams (Count II), Bonney (Count III) and Byrd (Count IV) with which he was to pay the premiums due on insurance for them. The Respondent did not pay the premiums for these insureds when due, although he had received the money with which to do so. Count VII Jackie Ricks Colson first insured her 1979 Toyota with the Hickerson Agency in March 1979. In March 1980, she renewed the insurance on her car and added her husband's 1978 Pontiac Transam to the policy. In March 1981, having received notice that her automobile insurance required renewal, Mrs. Colson paid $260 as a down payment to the Hickerson Agency and executed a finance agreement to finance the remainder of the premium with Capital Premium Plan. By financing the premium, Capital Premium Plan paid the Hickerson Agency the premium, and Mrs. Colson made payments as required under the financing agreement to Capital Premium Plan. Mrs. Colson made the payments as required from March 1981 through December 31, 1981, at which time she had paid off all but $3.60 of the borrowed amount, which Capital Premium Plan charged off. Although requested many times to provide a copy of the policy by Mr. and Mrs. Colson, the Hickerson Agency did not do so. As a result thereof, the bank financing Mr. Colson's Transam insured that car and charged Mr. Colson for the insurance. The Colsons have never received a policy of insurance on their cars from the Hickerson Agency. The records of the Hickerson Agency do not reflect that any insurance was in effect between March 17, 1981, and September 1981 on the Toyota and November 1981 on the Transam. The Colsons' Toyota was insured on September 28, 1981, for a period of one year with Dixie Insurance Company for a premium charge of $495. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 28.) Their Pontiac Transam was added to said policy by endorsement effective November 27, 1981. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 29.) On September 30, 1981, Mrs. Colson was involved in an auto accident in the Toyota, which suffered major damage. Mrs. Colson was unable to get her car from the garage until December 1981, because the insurance company would not pay for the repairs. Mr. Colson also had difficulty with delay in payment for insured damages when the top of the Transam was damaged. The Respondent accepted a premium from Mrs. Colson but did not provide automobile insurance as requested between March 17, 1981, and September 28, 1981, on the Toyota and November 27, 1981, on the Transam. The Respondent did not provide the Colsons with copies of their policies after repeated requests. Count VIII The records of Capital Premium Plan (Petitioner's Exhibit 33) reflect the Respondent owed Capital Premium Plan $1,306.01 as the result of cancelled policies which required the Respondent to return unearned premium amounts to Capital Premium Plan. A statement for these accounts was presented in June 1982. The record reflects that in late 1982 the Respondent paid $356.01 of the money originally owed. At the date of hearing, the Respondent owed Capital Premium Plan $950 in unearned premiums. The Respondent raised no valid defense to the claim by Capital Premium Plan. Count IX Pursuant to his agreement with Underwriters Insurance Company, the Respondent was required to pay said company premiums for policies sold issued by the company. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 34.) As of September 1981, the Respondent's accounts with Underwriters Insurance Company were not current. The company's representative called upon the Respondent and made demand for the money owed by the Respondent to the company. The Respondent gave the company's representative a check in full payment of the amount then due. This check was dishonored by the bank upon its presentation due to insufficient funds. As a result thereof, Underwriters Insurance Company cancelled its underwriting agreement with the Respondent. The Respondent owed Underwriters Insurance Company approximately $6,000 as of the date of the hearing. The Respondent asserted no reasonable defense to the company's claims. Count X On February 16, 1979, automobile and health insurance was purchased for Grecian Pool Service by Frank Weller, the company's president. Neither Grecian nor Weller received a copy of the insurance policies from the Hickerson Agency. One of Grecian's vehicles was involved in an accident. Michigan Mutual, the insurer of the other vehicle, attempted to collect $228 for damages it had paid but which were the responsibility of Grecian's insurer. Michigan Mutual contacted the Hickerson Agency many times in an effort to obtain payment from Grecian's insurer but was unsuccessful. Michigan Mutual contacted the Department of Insurance, and an agent of the Department contacted the Respondent, who stated that a check had been sent to Michigan Mutual. The Department's agent contacted Michigan Mutual, which denied receipt of the check. The Department's agent then asked the Respondent to provide the Department with a copy of the front and back of the cancelled check. In response, an employee of the Hickerson Agency advised the Department's agent that it had no information concerning the accident and requested the Department to provide more information in order that it could respond to the Department's request. The Respondent failed to provide a timely response to Michigan Mutual of claim information as requested. The Respondent failed to provide the Department with records and information upon request. The Respondent failed to provide the insured with a copy of the insurance policy. Count XI and XIII W. F. Jones and James Earl Jones, who are brothers, both tendered premiums to the Hickerson Agency for the purchase of insurance on tractor- trailer trucks which they respectively owned. The daughter of W. F. Jones paid the Hickerson Agency $2,678 in September 1981 for insurance on two trucks owned by W. F. Jones. This payment was made in four checks each for $669.50 to be negotiated one each week for four weeks commencing on September 2, 1981. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 52.) On September 4, 1981, Shelley, Middlebrooks and O'Leary (hereinafter, SMO), general agent for Carolina Casualty, issued a binder on insurance for W. F. Jones. The quoted down payment for this policy was $2,678, and the premium on the ten-day binder issued by SMO was $928. The Hickerson Agency remitted to SMO the amount of $557.95. This was $267.25 less than the required binder premium. SMO immediately notified the Hickerson Agency that additional money was due. When the money was not forthcoming, SMO sent the Hickerson Agency a 14-day notice of cancellation. This extended the coverage of the binder until October 6, 1981. The Hickerson Agency did not forward any additional amount, and the insurance was cancelled on October 6, 1981. The amount received from the Hickerson Agency was less than the earned premium for the coverage from September 4, 1981, until October 6, 1981. In November 1981, the Hickerson Agency sent SMO a check for $257.25, the amount left owing on the earned premium. In February 1982, after many requests by W. F. Jones and his wife for the insurance policy and inquiries from them to the Hickerson Agency about their monthly payments, Jones received notice from the company financing his trucks that the trucks were not insured by the Hickerson Agency as he had thought. W. F. Jones checked with the Hickerson Agency, which was unable to produce a policy of insurance or other evidence of insurance. W. F. Jones demanded his money back, and the Respondent wrote Jones a check for the money that Jones had paid. When Mrs. W. F. Jones took the Respondent's check for deposit, her bank advised her after checking with Respondent's bank that there were insufficient funds in Respondent's account to cover the check. Because W. F. Jones had left on a trip, Mrs. Jones took the check to the Hickerson Agency and requested insurance. On February 5, 1982, Huffman and Associates bound coverage on W. F. Jones's two trucks with Canal Insurance Company. Huffman and Associates received $2,345 with a balance of $6,097, which was financed through a premium finance company. The Canal Insurance Company policy number for W. F. Jones was AC29 67 99. No evidence was presented that the two trucks belonging to W. F. Jones were insured between October 6, 1981, and February 5, 1982, although the Hickerson Agency had received payment for the down payment in the amount of $2,678. James Earl Jones applied for insurance on his truck with the Hickerson Agency on or about July 29, 1981. Mrs. James Earl Jones wrote three checks to the Hickerson Agency on said date to be negotiated as indicated: July 29, 1981- -$500 for immediate negotiation; $474--hold until August 5, 1981; $474--hold until August 19, 1981. The balance of the premium was financed with Capital Premium Plan with a monthly payment of $305.45. Monthly payments were made by James Earl Jones to the Respondent or to Capital Premium Plan until April 5, 1982. At that time, Capital Premium Plan cancelled the insurance due to late payments by the insured. When notified of the cancellation of the insurance by Capital Premium Plan, Mrs. James Earl Jones contacted Canal Insurance Company in care of New South Underwriters, which was listed as the insurer by Capital Premium Plan. Mrs. Jones was advised by New South Underwriters that they had no record of insurance on the Jones's truck with Canal Insurance Company. Mrs. James Earl Jones called the Hickerson Agency and asked for the policy number on the truck. The Respondent called Mrs. Jones and gave the policy number for the insurance on the truck as AC29 67 99, the policy number of W. F. Jones. (See paragraph 38 above.) When Mrs. James Earl Jones rechecked, she found that the policy was that of W. F. Jones, whereupon she called James Earl Jones, who went directly to the Hickerson Agency and spoke with the Respondent. James Earl Jones demanded of the Respondent some proof of insurance. The Respondent gave him a copy of the first page of W. F. Jones's policy. When James Earl Jones pointed out the error and demanded proof of his insured status, the Respondent wrote him a check for $2,990.50, a refund of the down payment and payments which James Earl Jones had made to Capital Premium Plan through that date. The records of Canal Insurance Company do not reflect insurance issued to James Earl Jones between July 1981 and March 1982. James Earl Jones was insured by Canal Insurance Company in April 1982 through an agency in Tampa not related in any way to the transaction with the Respondent. The records of Capital Premium Plan reflect that money was borrowed for insurance to be placed with Canal Insurance Company through New South Underwriters. Capital Premium Plan made money available to the Respondent for the premiums as indicated. The Hickerson Agency did not have records or produce records indicating that James Earl Jones was insured by the Hickerson Agency between July 1981 and March 1982, when the Respondent refunded Jones's premiums. Count XII In September 1981, Hugh Shaw of Ridge Printing purchased workmen's compensation insurance from the Respondent and paid for said insurance with two checks, each for $426.50. Shaw was contacted in May 1982 by officials of the Department of Commerce and advised that he had no workmen's compensation insurance. Shaw referred the officials to the Respondent. Shaw never received a policy of insurance from the Respondent for insurance purchased in September 1981. A search of the records of Mr. Hurst's agency revealed no insurance placed by the agency for Shaw. No evidence was introduced by the Respondent that Shaw was insured against workmen's compensation loss. No evidence was received that any portion of the premiums paid by Shaw were returned to him. Count IV (In addition to this count, many of the other counts in this Administrative Complaint allege that records related to various insureds were not present at the Hickerson Agency, and that the Respondent failed to maintain records as required by law. The findings made relative to this count are applicable to similar allegations contained throughout the Administrative Complaint and constitute the findings of fact relative to those allegations.) The Respondent sold his insurance agency to James Hurst, Jr., effective March 1, 1982. Testimony was received that some of the records alleged to have been missing later were present prior to that date. Evidence was received that many records were not present at the agency after that date. No evidence was received that the Respondent was responsible for removal of the records. Pursuant to their contract, James Hurst, Jr., was responsible for the office after March 1, 1982, and the Respondent is not vicariously liable for missing records after that date. No evidence was presented as to any specific record at issue in these charges that was discovered to be missing prior to March 1, 1982. Count XV On October 2, 1981, Harold Scott purchased insurance on a camper from the Respondent. On that date, Scott gave the Respondent a check for $123 and signed a premium financing agreement for the balance of $287. Scott never received a copy of the insurance policy. No evidence was introduced by the Respondent that Scott was insured. In September 1982, the Respondent paid to Scott the down payment and other money that Scott. had paid on his insurance. Count XVI On April 7, 1981, Joseph Simmons purchased workmen's compensation coverage and a bond from the Respondent. Simmons paid $798 as a down payment and executed a premium financing agreement with Sesco Premium Plan. Simmons never received a copy of the policy or a payment book. Sesco Premium Plan never financed an insurance policy for Joseph Simmons of Winter Haven, Florida. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 64.) No evidence was introduced by the Respondent that Simmons was insured against workmen's compensation claims after April 7, 1981. The Respondent accepted a premium for insurance from Simmons and did not provide the requested coverage.
Recommendation While violations of Section 626.621, Florida Statutes, permit the Department discretion in disciplining a licensee, violations by the Respondent of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, as found above, mandate that the Department must discipline him. Considering the number and the severity of the violations, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer revoke each and every license held by the Respondent, James Edward Hickerson. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Department of Insurance Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Douglas H. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 1145 Lake Alfred, Florida 33850 Marvin B. Wood, Esquire 2600 Industrial Park Drive Lakeland, Florida 33801 Tom Pobjecky State Attorney's Office Post Office Box 1309 Bartow, Florida 33838 The Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent, William John Harnett, has been licensed or been qualified for licensure as an insurance agent in the State of Florida. Respondent currently holds licenses for service lines insurance, debit insurance, ordinary life and health insurance, and general lines insurance (which is property, casualty, or surety). The Department is charged with the administration of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. On December 15, 1975, the Department was appointed to serve as Receiver of Southern American Fire Insurance Company (Southern) . The purpose of this receivership was to seek the rehabilitation of the insurance company. On February 10, 1976, Southern was determined to be insolvent pursuant to Section 631.011(3), Florida Statutes and the Department, as Receiver, obtained an Order of Liquidation. The Department was charged with the responsibility of marshalling the company's assets in order to settle the outstanding claims against it. To this end, the Department filed civil suits against insurance agents and agencies which had allegedly failed to remit premium monies owed to Southern. One such suit was against Harnett, Inc., Respondent, and other individuals associated with Harnett, Inc. From April 9, 1947 until November 14, 1986, Harnett, Inc. was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida whose general business was insurance. Respondent served as the treasurer and a director for Harnett, Inc. Respondent was authorized to and did sign checks and correspondence on behalf of Harnett, Inc. The Department's civil suit against Harnett, Inc. (Case No. 76-23143) was filed in Dade County on July 26, 1976. This suit claimed Harnett, Inc. had failed to remit premium monies owed to Southern and that Respondent, as an officer and director of Harnett, Inc. having direct supervision or control over individuals acting on behalf of Harnett, Inc., was personally liable for the amounts owed. On March 6, 1981, a final judgment (Case No. 76-23143) was entered in favor of the Department as Receiver of Southern. This judgment found against Respondent and Harnett, Inc., jointly and severally, in the sum of $78,617.85. This judgment was affirmed on appeal. 1/ The Department has attempted to collect the funds awarded in this judgment. From October 26, 1962 until November 14, 1986, Franklin Insurance Agency of Miami, Inc. (Franklin) was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. At all times material to this cause, Respondent was president and a director of Franklin. On October 20, 1976, the Department as Receiver of Southern filed a civil suit against Respondent and Franklin. This suit (Case No. 76-32799) claimed monies were owed to Southern for premiums Franklin had failed td remit. Further, the suit alleged that Respondent, as Franklin's president and director, was personally liable for the refusal and continued refusal of Franklin to pay the premiums. A final judgment was entered for the Department as Receiver of Southern in the Franklin suit on December 9, 1980. This judgment (case No. 76- 32799) provided for recovery against Franklin and Respondent, jointly and severally, in the sum of $35,983.39. The Department has attempted to collect the funds awarded in this judgment. Gables Insurance Agency, Inc. (Gables), organized on November 28, 1967, continues as an active corporation in this state. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was the sole officer and director for Gables. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Inc. (Norfolk) entered into Agency Agreements with Gables and Harnett, Inc. on February 1, 1976. Subsequently, Norfolk sued Harnett, Inc. (Case No. 84-03815) and Gables (Case No. 84-03816) for premium monies it was claimed to be owed. These suits resulted in final judgments in favor of Norfolk. The suit against Harnett, Inc. (Case No. 84-02815) found the sum of $54,556.00 was owed to Norfolk. The suit against Gables (Case No. 84-03816) found the sum of $18,843.20 was owed to Norfolk. The four judgments identified herein (paragraphs 8, 11, 14 and 15) total $188,000.44 and remain unsatisfied. These judgments represent money damages owed for unpaid insurance premiums. An applicant for licensure with outstanding judgments incurred during the course of doing the business of insurance would not be approved by the Department without a showing of restitution or rehabilitation. The Department deems such an applicant to be untrustworthy, incompetent, and not fit to become qualified and licensed in Florida. Respondent offered no evidence of restitution or rehabilitation. Respondent maintained that no monies were owed by the respective debtor companies or Respondent individually.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order revoking the licenses held by Respondent, William John Harnett. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1988.
